Iraqi Perspectives Project
Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents
Volume 1 (Redacted)

Kevin M. Woods, Project Leader
with James Lacey

• This volume is a redacted version of Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume I (IDA Paper P-4151).

• The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classifications.
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This report is a redacted version of the original *Iraqi Perspectives Report—Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 1*, dated January 2007.

This redacted version was prepared by the original authors following a classification review by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pursuant to a request by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

All redactions from the original are in accordance with the 15 September 2007 DIA Memorandum, Subject: Classification Review of Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) Report Saddam and Terrorism. As stated in said memorandum, the DIA "made every effort to balance national security concerns, requirements of law, and the needs of an informed democracy and focused the redactions to the necessary minimum." Moreover, all redactions have been made pursuant to Executive Orders 12958 (as amended) and 12333, and US Code provisions 5 USC 552, 5 USC 552a, and 10 USC 424.

The classification markings within are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.
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Foreword

The Iraqi Perspectives Project. In September 2003 the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), asked the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to help develop the operational and strategic lessons from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) from the perspectives of former senior Iraqi decision-makers. By creating a historical narrative of the events surrounding OIF, interviewing captured prisoners, and reviewing translations of enemy documents and media archives, IDA researchers were able to report on the inner workings—and sometimes delusional behavior en masse—of the Saddam Hussein regime.

For this paper, the JAWP Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) research team screened more than 600,000 original captured documents\(^1\) and several thousand hours of audio and video footage archived in a US Department of Defense (DOD) database called Harmony. As of August 2006, only 15 percent of the captured documents have English translations. Nevertheless, a user can search all of the documents by their cataloging descriptions, i.e., by topic, key concepts, and date, all of which are in English.

IPP Phase I. The results of IPP research have been captured and published in official US government-supported products that range from government reports to books and articles published in open literature. Phase I task deliverables to USJFCOM included a 350-page classified report, with unclassified versions of the report published later by the US Government Printing Office and the Naval Institute Press.\(^2\)

IPP Phase II. The IPP research team is currently working on a series of papers in support of USJFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned. The effort examines a range of operational and strategic issues pre-dating OIF from the perspective of the Iraqi regime.
In addition to this survey of documents relating to the regime’s ties to terrorism, the following topics will be the subject of future IDA–JAWP papers:

- The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).
- OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990–91).
- Regime reactions to the post-war uprisings in 1991 (Kurds in the north, Shi’as in the south).
- Regime adaptation to US targeting and weapons capabilities.

The papers in this series will supplement ongoing efforts to develop and implement the lessons of OIF from US and Coalition perspectives.

Karl Lowe
Director
Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
Institute for Defense Analyses

Kevin M. Woods
Project Leader, Iraqi Perspectives Project
Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
Institute for Defense Analyses
Preface

IDA Paper P-4151 was prepared under the Iraqi Perspectives subtask of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) task order for the Director, Joint Center for Operational Analyses and Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). It helps address the subtask objective of “cueing beneficial paths of exploration for other parts of the national security community” by using interviews, oral histories, and captured Iraqi documents and media to place in temporal context the conversations and materials of senior Iraqi leaders (political and military).

IDA Paper P-4151 comprises five volumes published as part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II series. Volume 1 examines the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global context. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in Volume 1. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.

*****

JAWP was established at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to serve as a catalyst for stimulating innovation and breakthrough change. It is co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, USJFCOM. JAWP includes military personnel on joint assignments from each Service and civilian specialists from IDA. JAWP is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and includes an office in Norfolk, Virginia, to facilitate coordination with USJFCOM.

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of IDA or the sponsors of JAWP. Our intent is to stimulate ideas, discussion, and, ultimately, the discovery and innovation that must fuel successful transformation.
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...when they say anything about Iraq—[like] Iraq supports terrorism—then they have to say that Iraq has documents on this issue and [we] don’t …

— Saddam Hussein, 1993

It has never [been] proven that Iraq participated in a terrorist operation.

— Tariq Aziz, 1996

**Executive Summary**

The Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) review of captured Iraqi documents uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States. At times these organizations worked together, trading access for capability. In the period after the 1991 Gulf War, the regime of Saddam Hussein supported a complex and increasingly disparate mix of pan-Arab revolutionary causes and emerging pan-Islamic radical movements. The relationship between Iraq and forces of pan-Arab socialism was well known and was in fact one of the defining qualities of the Ba’ath movement.

But the relationships between Iraq and the groups advocating radical pan-Islamic doctrines are much more complex. This study found no “smoking gun” (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam’s Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam’s interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relationships with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks. A review of available Iraqi documents indicated the following:

- The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The predominant tar-
gets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.

- On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence services directly targeted the regime’s perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.

- Saddam’s regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq’s long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.

- State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing of terrorists. Examples include the regime’s development, construction, certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999 and 2000.

From the beginning of his rise to power, one of Saddam’s major objectives was to shift the regional balance of power favorably towards Iraq. After the 1991 Gulf War, pursuing this objective motivated Saddam and his regime to increase their cooperation with—and attempts to manipulate—Islamic fundamentalists and related terrorist organizations. Documents indicate that the regime’s use of terrorism was standard practice, although not always successful. From 1991 through 2003, the Saddam regime regarded inspiring, sponsoring, directing, and executing acts of terrorism as an element of state power.

**Methodology**

This paper summarizes a detailed review of a unique source—the captured documents and media files from the Harmony database, which have been translated and analyzed. While Harmony holds most of the documents captured
in Iraq, it is not an exhaustive list. Other documents were not available for this phase of the IPP study, e.g., those under the control of other US government agencies or others still being processed.

In complying with one of the original purposes for the IPP study, four volumes of primary source materials accompany Volume 1 (this paper). Volumes 2 through 5 contain the “raw” Harmony files cited in Volume 1, allowing further review and study by other researchers. As new materials become available from captured documents and media and secondary (non-Iraqi) sources, alternative explanations may result from reviewing this material.

The Harmony database cannot address all questions relating to Iraq and terrorism: many potentially relevant documents were either inadvertently destroyed by Coalition forces during major combat actions or else were hidden or destroyed by members of the former regime. It should not be surprising, therefore, that some topics or events are lightly addressed or not covered at all. Despite these and other reasons, the number of relevant documents available to, and reviewed for, this project remains impressive.

This paper examined the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global contexts. It is not a study of terrorism in general or of any specific terrorist group. Our research approaches this question from a unique source—the regime’s own archives.

About Harmony Database

Each Harmony document folder has its own unique document number. It may contain more than one item, e.g., a collection of memoranda on a single topic or a series of related documents, but individual items within the folder do not have their own unique numbers. The reader will often see the same document number for citations with different titles or subjects. A Harmony media file (e.g., audio or video) does have its own number; rarely will there be additional material, e.g., a transcript with the video. Volumes 2 through 5, the primary sources materials, have a generic metadata reference sheet as part of their front matter. We have highlighted certain elements in the generic example to help explain certain high-level information about the structure and contents found in a Harmony document folder and a media file.
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Iraqi Perspectives Project.

Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents.

Volume 1
Figure 1. Iraq

Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section.
I. Terror as an Instrument of State Power

A. Infrastructure for State Terrorism

Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq. In 1999, the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe.

A Fedayeen Saddam planner outlines the general plan for terrorist operations in the Kurdish areas, Iran, and London, to "His Excellency, Mr. Supervisor" (the title for the head of the Fedayeen Saddam, a position occupied by Uday Hussein, Saddam's oldest son). This memorandum (Extract 1) specifically states that these "trainees" are designated for martyrdom [suicide or suicidal] operations. The memorandum concludes with a request for Uday to review the plan and make any changes he deems necessary. While this document suggests that the targets for this operation were most likely Iraqi exiles, it remains unclear to this day if any parts of this specific plan were ever executed. However, the intent and desire to develop the capability are openly stated.

Extract 1

[May 1999]
My respects and regards, sir:
Referr[ing] to your Excellency's orders on the days of 20-25 May 1999, to start planning from now on to perform special operations (assassinations/bombings) in the centers of the traitors' symbols in the fields of London/Iran/self-ruled areas, and for coordination with the Intelligence service to secure deliveries, accommodations, and target guidance.

[Continued]
I would also like to go over here the orders that were issued by you during the first and second meetings with your Excellency, which lay the groundwork for the success of these operations.

Codename of the special operations is **BLESSED JULY**

The duties will be divided into two branches, which are:

A – Bombings

B – Assassinations

  - The execution order for Jordan is canceled.
  - Reminding members who are captured in the European area to use death capsules on themselves.

Execution Steps:

  - Select 50 Fedayeen martyrs according to the required specifications.
  - Admit them to the Intelligence School to prepare them for their duties.
  - After passing their tests they will be selected for their targets as follows:
    - The top ten will work in the European field – London.
    - The second ten will work in the Iranian field.
    - The third ten will work in the self-ruled [Kurdish] area.

After passing the final test the Fedayeen will be sent as undercover passengers, each one according to his work site.

An example of the kind of mission implied in the **BLESSED JULY** capability is documented in a series of memoranda from April 2000. The intended target was the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmad Chalabi. Using a forged passport, the Fedayeen volunteer was to travel through northern Iraq, making his way to London “for the purpose of executing a sanctimonious [sic] national duty which is eliminating the hostile agent Ahmad Chalabi.” The operation failed, in part, because the Iraqi agent failed to obtain a visa to enter the United Kingdom.
Two other documents present evidence of logistical preparation for terrorist operations in other nations, including those in the West. It is not clear from these documents if these weapons were being staged for a specific purpose or stockpiled for future contingencies. **Extract 2** is a response from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to a letter from Saddam asking for a list of weapons available in Iraqi embassies overseas.

**Extract 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject: Weapons Information:</th>
<th>[July 2002]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We would like to inform you of the following:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Missile launcher and missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens [Greece]</td>
<td>Explosive charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna [Austria]</td>
<td>Explosive charges, rifles with silencers, hand grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Explosive materials of TNT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Plastic explosive charges and booby-trapped suitcases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Plastic explosive charges and booby-trapped suitcases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague [Czech]</td>
<td>Missile launcher and missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Missilelauncher, missile, and pistols with silencers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a [Yemen]</td>
<td>Missile launcher, missile, plastic explosives and explosive charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baku [Azerbaijan]</td>
<td>American missile launcher, plastic explosives and booby-trapped suitcases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut [Lebanon]</td>
<td>American missile launcher, plastic explosives and booby-trapped suitcases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf nations</td>
<td>Explosive material outside the embassies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Between the year 2000 and 2002 ... explosive materials were transported to the embassies outside Iraq for special work, upon the approval of the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The responsibility for these materials is in the hands of heads of stations. Some of these materials were transported in the political mail carriers [Diplomatic Pouch]. Some of these materials were transported by car in booby-trapped briefcases.
Extract 3 shows the regime worrying about some of the incriminating materials stored in various Iraqi embassies that might be raided, particularly those in former and/or soon-to-be coalition countries. Responding to an order from “the Presidency,” the Iraqi embassy in London asks for directions on how to dispose of some of this material.

**Extract 3**

[July 2002]

We hope for your opinion regarding how to destroy weapons in our embassy in London, which include seven Kalashnikov guns, nineteen other guns with ammunition belonging to them, and silencers.  

Apparently, the embassy in London was not happy with the response it received from Baghdad and reiterated the problems it faced (Extract 4).

**Extract 4**

[July 2002]

We would like to show the following:

We can’t use the chemical methods, dissolving by acids to destroy the quantities mentioned, because it is impossible to ensure the chemical materials will work. Also, purchasing the chemicals or people seeing the rising vapor may raise suspicions.

We need a period of time not less than three weeks of continuous work to achieve the destruction mission.  

The documents themselves do not specify the purpose of this weapons cache, only its existence. Given the level of concern in the correspondence, it is reasonable to suspect they were in excess of weapons required for embassy security.

In addition to supplying arms to Iraq’s overseas missions, the IIS managed a research and production capability for high-technology bombs, components, and silencers. In a series of memoranda dated 4 September 1999, various elements of the IIS report on coordinating the production, testing, and delivery of
a sophisticated car bomb using military-grade explosives. Brief summaries of four documents in particular capture the almost routine process surrounding the manufacture of car bombs:

1. A request from IIS Section 27 to IIS Directorate 6 for 40 kilograms of RDX, primer-cord, advanced detonators and other materials.  

2. An approval memorandum from IIS Directorate 4 to Section 27 to load a vehicle with 50 to 75 kilograms of explosive material and provide to the At Ta'mim Intelligence Branch [M52] for a “special duty.”

3. A follow-up memorandum from the senior engineer for IIS Section 27 to his director confirming that his Top Secret–Confidential–and–Urgent job number 2/1999/20 has been completed. The memorandum included such details as the final explosive charge weight (56 kilograms), and the fact that the device had a 30-minute electronic timer and came equipped with a hidden safety switch. The explosives were disguised as washing detergent packets and the detonator was hidden in a pack of cigarettes. Finally, the engineer notes that the “above-mentioned bombs” were delivered to the “beneficiary representative” [an IIS agent] according to the “special forms” with a “full explanation about the detonating method, storing, and transportation.”

4. To complete the car bomb task, the IIS staff officer includes a collection of “special forms” as part of the mission documentation. For example:

   a. The Duty Assignment Confirmation Form where the engineer and the IIS agent account for the exchange,

   b. The Inspection Certificate Form that verifies the car bomb meets chemical, electrical, and mechanical standards and is “ready to execute the duty.”

   c. A Duty Delivery Form that certifies the training of the operator and provides the bomb warranty as good for “only one month from date of delivery” as well as a recommendation that they use a Duracell battery instead of an everyday version “for the importance of the duty.”
A similar example is found in the documentation of a June 2001 operation carried out by the IIS against the Iranian-supported Iraqi dissident group, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution (al-Da’wah Party). The target of this operation was not identified by name, but the target location was identified as a lecture hall in Qum, Iran.

The challenges for the IIS bomb builders were the “checkpoints and enemy explosives detection personnel” that protected this target. To accomplish this task, the bomb-makers in the IIS carefully rigged a “Persian-made fur vest” with plastic explosives. Following established IIS procedures, they conducted realistic field-testing, developed a briefing on proper transportation and safe handling of their bomb, wrote a bomb manual, and finally trained the “performer of the task.” According to the documents, the mission was successful and “inflicted the enemy with heavy casualties.” This operation was judged by IIS M-16 Directorate to be so successful that a step-by-step procedure for assembling more vests was prepared.

The 2002 annual report for the IIS’s M16 Section (the IIS department responsible for, among other things, explosives) describes in detail projects to develop better liquid explosives, produce “pliable explosives” to be camouflaged in the pages of books and diplomatic bags, and discover a way to make improvised explosives from civilian “materials in the current market.” In one such example from the annual report, a tally sheet (Extract 5) lists production and related activities (explosives research and testing) in 2000 and 2001.

Extract 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosive devices of different types</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Programmed electronic timers</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Booby-trapping cars for various missions</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Preparing and developing silencers for various weapons</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Continued]
The development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) progressed from booby-trapped cars and disguised explosive packages to actual roadside bombs designed to be used in civilian areas. An IIS memorandum dated 5 August 2001 describes in detail the manufacture and testing of a powerful type of IED that could be exploded by remote control and "vectored like rays so it will largely [destroy] the objective."21 These devices were tested in a "residential area," with an emphasis on wireless detonation from 100 to 200 meters, and camouflage to match the area.22

B. State Sponsorship of Suicide Operations

Documentary evidence shows that suicide operations became an increasingly popular weapon in Saddam’s arsenal in the decade before OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (2003). Correspondence (Extract 6) within the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) provides evidence that organizations within the regime were already considering the use of suicide terrorism in the fall of 2001.

Extract 6.

[ca. 17–19 September 2001]

Presidency of the Republic
The General Military Intelligence Directorate

[Continued]
We refer to the top secret letter of the Military Intelligence Command of 6 and the top secret letter of the Military Branch Command of Baghdad of Sept 2001. The section command discussed a meeting held on 2 Sept 2001 28 August 2001, which stated that the Division Commands should launch a campaign among their members, supporters, and backers of the Party encouraging them to volunteer in suicide operations, and have them write volunteer statements, preferably in their blood.23

The remainder of the letter lists forty-three volunteers this particular effort enlisted. Based on the number of documents from local Ba’ath organizations, local Ba’ath Party leaders competed among themselves to provide suicide bombers to Saddam. An al-Sumud Division Ba’ath Party memorandum (Extract 7) is one such example, listing nine suicide volunteers. The data, such as ages and education levels of the volunteers, indicates a kind of bureaucratic routine that placed suicide operations, or at least public “statements of intent” to commit suicide operations, on the list of routine state activities.

Extract 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name Withheld</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Party Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>BA, law</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Name Withheld]</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>BS, physics</td>
<td>Trainee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Name Withheld]</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Name Withheld]</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>Trainee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Name Withheld]</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Admin diploma</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidence in the captured archives shows that motivated Iraqis and other Arab citizens could participate in other programs to volunteer their bodies as weapon delivery means. One example, the so-called “Martyrdom Project,” allowed members of the Fedayeen Saddam to ask for special status. One hopeful candidate stated in his letter to Saddam his desire to “liberate Quds [Jerusalem] from the Jews... and prove to the full [sic] world that we are with our brothers... Moreover with your holy hand we will liberate our Quds...”

In this intensely paranoid bureaucracy, a policy existed for almost every activity, including suicide operations. The Fedayeen Saddam Security Director had to remind Uday Hussein of the official government policy on the occasion of two Arab citizens volunteering for suicide operations (Extract 8).

Extract 8.

The National Command’s office of the General Secretariat made clear in its Top Secret letter #1244 of 8/1/2002 that such cases will be dealt with in the future in light of the contents of the letter of the Presidency of the Republic’s Secretary Top Secret and Immediate letter #474 of 1/29/1998. Paragraph 3 states that “Through the process of training, it is possible to select those suitable for suicide operations and those who truly wish to volunteer for suicide operations, given that their training will take place during the summer vacation of schools and universities.”
These documents indicate that as early as January 1998, the scheduling of suicide volunteers was routine enough to warrant not only a national-level policy letter but a formal schedule—during summer vacation—built around maximizing availability of Arab citizens in Iraq on Saddam-funded scholarships.

The bureaucratic process to handle suicide operations was still functioning as Coalition tanks rolled towards Baghdad. The following letter is from an Iraqi Army major volunteering to be part of a suicide operation soon after the start of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (Extract 9). It begins with the major’s volunteer statement and receives endorsements up the chain of command, the original request passing through the bureaucracy. It does not reach final approval authority until 30 March 2003, just a week before the fall of Baghdad; so far, no record has been found that reveals if the major ever got to “obtain his reward.”

Extract 9.

[22 March 2003]
The Respectful Section Director
Subject: Al-Jihad

1. My honorable sir, God almighty says prepare what you could from your powers and braveness that would terrorize your enemies and those of God and God the great said the truth.

2. There are several routes that the enemy entered from [in order to] humiliate Islam and Muslims and humiliate Iraqis and their leader. [T]hey won’t be able to do that, God willing.

3. Among the force options there are the suicidal operations that terrorize the enemy more than the force of cannons. Our program is honored to be under your command, I suggest that I would be delegated for this duty against the enemy positions and as fast as possible, for its possibility to achieve victory and enter fear in the hearts of the assaulting infidels.

4. I do not just say that, but I hope that your honor would delegate me to this holy duty and maybe I could obtain one of two rewards (either victory or martyrdom) this is a chance, for he who didn’t die by the sword would die through other methods, reasons varied and death is the same.

Signature
Major Imad
An example of a successful suicide operation is documented in a letter that Fedayeen Saddam headquarters forwarded to Uday Hussein. A woman called Nazah asks for his help in processing her husband’s pension documents. She claims the request is justified because her husband died when “he carried out a suicide mission on 19 July 2000, and exploded himself at the Ibn Sina Hotel [exact location unknown—most likely in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq] during the presence of US and UK citizens and officials from Iraqi opposition parties." According to the widow, the General Command of the Fedayeen Saddam assigned this mission to her husband. She goes on to list some of his other activities that would justify a pension for his family:

- Booby-trapped a car in front of the Kurdish Communist Party Headquarters.
- Detonated a car [bomb] during the convoy of Danielle Mitterrand [wife of French President Francois Mitterrand] in Halsabahaj City, which killed forty enemies.
- Poisoned opposition party members on IIS orders.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification.

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II. State Relationships with Terrorist Groups

A. Managing Relationships

Iraq was a long-standing supporter of international terrorism. The existence of a memorandum (Extract 10) from the IIS to Saddam, written a decade before OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, provides detailed evidence of that support. Several of the organizations listed in this memorandum were designated as international terrorist organizations by the US Department of State.\textsuperscript{31}

Extract 10.

We list herein the organizations that our agency [IIS] cooperates with and have relations with various elements in many parts of the Arab world and who also have the expertise to carry out assignments indicated in the above directive [the cited directive has not been discovered yet].

Fatah – Revolutionary Council (Abu-Nidal’s Organization)

Established in 1973 after a split with the Fatah organization. [L]ed by Sabri al-Bana who used to be head of the Fatah office in Baghdad. The organization’s political beliefs are based on violence and assassinations. We have been in contact with the organization since 1973 and have provided financial and logistical support, such as vehicles. They have members in many Arab countries, but we did not assign them any operations in the war [1991] despite their willingness to assist.

Palestine Liberation Front

Established in 1983 by Abu al-Abbas. Currently has an office in Baghdad. They were assigned and carried out commando operations for us against American interests in the [1991] war.
Force 17

Security agency specializing in operations inside the occupied territories (Palestine). We have good relations with them and they maintain an office in Baghdad. They were not assigned to conduct any commando operations during the war; nevertheless, they were assigned to collect intelligence information and they provided valuable information.

Renewal and Jihad Organization

Secret Islamic Palestinian Organization established after the war. It believes in armed jihad against the Americans and Western interests. They also believe our leader [Saddam Hussein], may God protect him, is the true leader in the war against the infidels. The organization’s leaders live in Jordan when they visited Iraq two months ago they demonstrated a willingness to carry out operations against American interests at any time.

The Palestinian Abd al-Bari al-Duwaik (aka Abu Dawoud)

Was a representative of the Popular Front organization—abroad operations. He currently lives in Cyprus, and he was assigned to carry out a number of commando operations during the [1991] war which he did. Our relationship with him is outstanding and we can benefit by him carrying out operations for us.

Islamic Jihad Organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad]

In a meeting in the Sudan we agreed to renew our relations with the Islamic Jihad Organization in Egypt. Our information on the group is as follows:

- It was established in 1979.
- Its goal is to apply the Islamic shari’a law and establish Islamic rule.
- It is considered one of the most brutal Egyptian organizations. It carried out numerous successful operations, including the assassination of Sadat.
- We have previously met with the organization’s representative and we agreed on a plan to carry out commando operations against the Egyptian regime.
Islamic Ulama Group – Islamic Scholars Group

It was established in 1948 and is very influential in large areas of Pakistan, especially in the northern districts. They rely on financial support from Iraq and Libya. The party is led by Ahmad Nu’mani. He has strong relations with our agency since 1981 and is ready to carry out any assignment we task him with.

The Afghani Islamic Party

It was founded in 1974 when its leader [Gulbuddin Hekmatyar] escaped from Afghanistan to Pakistan. It is considered one of the extreme political religious movements against the West, and one of the strongest Sunni parties in Afghanistan. The organization relies on financial support from Iraq and we have had good relations with Hikmatyar since 1989.

Jam’iyat Ulama Pakistan – Pakistan Scholars Group

Established in 1970, its goals are religious and political reform. It is well known in Pakistan and well into India. The organization maintains offices in England and Holland.

Our agency has had relations with them since 1987. They were not tasked with commando operations during the war, but were tasked to undertake protest demonstrations against American aggression in several countries. They did undertake activities for this purpose.

B. Nurturing Organizational Relationships

Captured Iraqi archives reveal that Saddam was training Arab fighters (non-Iraqi) in Iraqi training camps more than a decade prior to OPERATION DESERT STORM (1991). A Saddam memorandum directed the IIS to submit a list of foreign nationals who were trained in Iraq and carried out operations during the 1991 war against the United States. In response, the IIS sent a list of one-hundred names of foreign national fighters, categorized by country (Extract 11, next page).
Extract 11.

[Foreign national fighters by country]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have no way of knowing if this is the complete list or how many others had been previously trained but not activated during Operation Desert Storm. One other memorandum (Extract 12) bears consideration. Drafted in Saddam’s office, it refers to an agreement with Islamic terrorists to conduct operations against the Egyptian regime during the first Gulf War (1991) and for continued financial support for the terrorists after hostilities ended.

Extract 12.

Office of the President of the Republic – Secretary
Subject: Carrying out a directive
There has been agreement since December 24, 1990, with the representative of the Islamic Group organization in Egypt on a plan to move against the Egyptian regime by carrying out commando operations provided that we guarantee them financing and training and provide them with the requirements in accordance with the honorable order of the President [Saddam Hussein] which calls for carrying out commando operations against hostile alliance governments. Afterwards, the operations will cease immediately after the ceasefire.

With respect to the proposal of our special security agency [IIS] regarding calling a representative of the Islamic Group in Egypt to Iraq in our top-secret personal letter dated 11 March 1993. This letter was in response to the President directing that only financial support is available for now. Intelligence operatives and contacts should be maintained in any movement in the Arab homeland, as indicated by the President in a top-secret letter, dated 25 March 1992. [Emphasis added]
The last sentence (in italics referring to the agreement with Islamist terrorists) deserves special attention: it refers to a top-secret order for Saddam’s intelligence services to maintain contact with any movement in Arab countries. While it is not surprising that Saddam, one of the last of the Middle East’s revolutionary nationalists, would endeavor to support revolutionary groups, it is important to recognize that many of these nationalist groups changed in the late 1990s. Saddam viewed these groups through the eyes of a pan-Arab revolutionary, while the leaders of the growing Islamist movements viewed them as potential affiliates for their Jihad. *In other words, two movements, one pan-Arab and the other pan-Islamic, were seeking and developing supporters from the same demographic pool.*

Captured documents reveal that later IIS activities went beyond just maintaining contact. For example, at the time this memorandum was written, the Iraqi GMID was training Sudanese fighters inside Iraq. The details appear in a separate GMID report (21 November 2001) about the reorganization or reconstruction of a training camp in the Sudan. This memorandum states that Iraq would send one administrative officer to establish and overseer the camp and that the following equipment would be provided initially:

- 15,000 Kalashnikov 7.62-mm rifles
- 15,000 [SKS] rifles
- 5,000 Browning pistols
- 5,000 Markarov pistols
- 1 high quality photocopier

The memorandum ends with the names of fifty-two fighters waiting for training in the camp.

A much longer document from 1993 illuminates how the outwardly secular Saddam regime found common cause with terrorist groups who drew their inspiration from radical Islam. One could argue that keeping some of these extremist groups active outside of Iraq was a pragmatic defensive measure against them. Nevertheless, the Iraqi document reports on contact with a large number of terrorist groups in the region, including those that maintained an office or liaison in Iraq. The document goes into great depth about Iraq’s links to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and includes a
memorandum, dated 8 February 1993, asking that movement to refrain from mov­ing against the Egyptian government at that time.

In same folder is a copy of an order from the Presidential Secretary to the IIS, directing a task for the Afghan Islamic Party. The task is not specified, but the relationship with an organization the IIS identifies as an “extreme political religious movement” is explicitly described. Other documents in this folder include the following:

- A memorandum from the IIS to the Presidential Secretary discussing cooperation with Islamic Organizations in Egypt (Jamaal Islamiya) in planning for an insurgency against the Egyptian government.
- A memorandum asking that the IIS Directorate be kept informed on all non-Iraqis training in Saddam Fedayeen camps.
- A list of 100 non-Iraqi Fedayeen in Iraq that details when they had finished their commando courses and the operations in which they had already participated.
- A memorandum discussing a letter sent by Tariq Aziz [Deputy Prime Minister] to Egyptian Islamic Groups, encouraging their cooperation in “acts of insurgency against the Egyptian Government.”

Two other memoranda in this folder are from Saddam through his Presidential Secretary to a member of the Revolutionary Council and to the IIS Director, respectively.

- In the first, from January 1993, and coinciding with the start of the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia, the Presidential Secretary informed the council member of Saddam’s decision to “form a group to start hunting Americans present on Arab soil; especially Somalia.”
- In the second memorandum, Saddam orders the IIS Director to revise a plan the IIS director had previously forwarded to include setting up operations inside Somalia. The overlap between bin Laden’s and Saddam’s interests in Somalia provides a tactical example of the parallel between Iraq and radical Islam: at the same time Saddam was or-
dering action in Somalia aimed at the American presence, Osama bin Laden was doing the same thing.45

Evidence of Saddam's continuing interest and support for global terrorist activities is found in a 2002 annual report of the IIS M8 Directorate of Liberation Movements. The first two-thirds of the report list all of the subjects of the 2002 intelligence reporting, ranging from commentary on various Western newspaper articles to information on the contacts with and support for various regional groups.46

But it is the last third of the report that is much more interesting. The IIS hosted thirteen conferences in 2002 for a number of Palestinian and other organizations, including delegations from the Islamic Jihad Movement and the Director General for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of al-Ahwaz.47 The same document also lists messages that various terrorist groups sent to Saddam (37 messages), Saddam's Deputy (22), and Tariq Aziz (6). The titles of the message range from simple best wishes on Saddam's birthday to the following:

- Information on the number of Palestinian martyrs killed vs. Zionists killed.
- Requests for military equipment and for help for the families of suicide bombers.
- Information on (1) the financial status of various terrorist organizations, (2) the volunteers for suicide operations, and (3) rumors of a plan to assassinate Saddam Hussein.48

The M8 annual report also notes that among the 699 passports, renewals, and other official documentation that the IIS issued, many were issued to known members of terrorist organizations. Moreover, it states that the IIS took four million dinars from its own budget to finance Palestinian terrorist groups and a further ten million to support Iraqi-sponsored terrorist activities in Iran.49

The IIS also provides a list of activities that it considered "exemplary events," for example:

- Re-equipping and training Palestinian fighters in al-Quds training camps [in Iraq].
• Establishing and activating a course to train Arab Liberation Front fighters on martyrdom operations.

• Establishing fighter schools\textsuperscript{50} for Arab volunteers and later Iraqi volunteers.

• Re-establishing and re-equipping the military base of the Arab Liberation Front.

• Training groups from the occupied territories [Palestine] on light weapons and tanks in secret thirty-day courses.\textsuperscript{51}

The final page of the M8 annual report lists IIS failures during the year\textsuperscript{52} and enumerates several handicaps the IIS faced in trying to do its work: (1) not enough sedans were available to give one to each key officer; (2) foreign intelligence officers were not given permission to leave the country to study their areas of responsibility; and (3) the lack of an Internet connection within IIS caused them to miss many news events. They suggest allocating the office an Internet connection so that they do not have to rely on others to tell them the news. The IIS did claim the establishment of a single e-mail account as one of the year’s significant accomplishments.\textsuperscript{53}

C. Outreach Program

A document written in late September 2001 shows the Saddam regime trying to make common cause with Islamic radicals (Extract 13). An Iraqi intelligence agent in Kuwait reports to the Director of the IIS on Iraqi efforts in stirring up religious movements against the Kuwait royal family.

Extract 13.

[ca. late September 2001]

The religious movements in Kuwait have a considerable effect on Kuwaiti society especially in light of these movements, animosity toward the policies of the al Sabbah family [Kuwait’s ruling family] and their support for American policies.

[Continued]
It is our desire to create situations of confrontation with these organizations [presumably against American or Kuwaiti interests], with an aim to penetrate these movements and revive our intelligence network in this field in the Kuwaiti arena.

The memorandum names each of the groups in Kuwait that the Iraqis were trying to work with or penetrate:

- The National Islamic Unity, representing the Shi’ites of Kuwait.
- The Islamic Constitutional Movement, representing the Islamic Brotherhood.
- The Popular Islamic Community, representing the Salafis.
- The Islamic Jihad Organization of Kuwait.

Saddam viewed international terrorist organizations in terms of what they could do to further his “historic” mission. During the course of the 1990s, bin Laden came to see Islamic terrorist groups as part of a jihad that would one day topple all apostate governments, unite all Muslims, and finally restore the caliphate. Saddam had his own slightly less grand vision, namely, a Ba’athist pan-Arab socialist super-state with Iraq at its center. Whether attempting to overthrow the Egyptian government or the Kuwait royal family, the vision was always about the centrality of Saddam and his pan-Arab vision—and never about the glory of Islam or some modern-day caliphate.

The following conversation took place between Saddam and some senior Ba’ath leaders as they were deciding whether to retreat from Kuwait City in 1991 (Extract 14, next page). Though he knew the Coalition had attacked, Saddam was not yet aware that his forces were being destroyed.
Male voice 1: It will be a very difficult sight to watch when our army and troops are withdrawing...

Male voice 2: We will withdraw them at night.

Saddam: It is better to withdraw the troops ourselves than to have the enemy do it for you. They will withdraw from the city on the fourth day.

Male voice 3: Why should they wait until the last day? They should remove themselves unseen at night... Sir, could we assassinate the Prince of Kuwait upon his entrance to Kuwait?

All present: (laughter)

Male voice 3: I understand that it is a daring task; however, it is for a good cause. The Palestinians have not done anything courageous regarding our situation. How could they call themselves Palestinians? They have not performed anything.

Saddam: If they could just help Iraqi intelligence that would be great.

Male voice 1: No, they did help us, and their intelligence organizations helped ours carry out many operations in Kuwait and even Lebanon. We have received documents from Palestinian intelligence operations with details of many operations they have carried out in your honor.55

Throughout the decade after Operation Desert Storm, Saddam’s support to Palestinian terrorist groups remained extensive. His funding of the families of suicide bombers attacking Israel is well documented in the open media, but Saddam’s support did not stop there. For example, in a 2002 document, the Chief of Staff of Saddam’s al Quds Army orders each brigade to build a replica of an Israeli settlement in its headquarters area so that fighters can train in a realistic environment.56

In addition to establishing and maintaining ties to existing Islamist organizations, Saddam’s intelligence services were always watchful for emerging movements. In December 1998, the IIS developed a new resource in the
form of a small, radical Kurdish-based Islamic movement. In a series of memora-
danda, the IIS reported being impressed with the new terrorist organization’s
“readiness to target foreign organizations... Iranian border posts, and Kurdish par-
ties...” \(^{57}\)

However, based on the size of the movement (only sixty-two
members at the time), the IIS decided it was better to establish individual contacts
within the organization and to provide them “financial and moral support.” The
document goes on to note that “if their will [becomes] linked to their capabilities,”
then the IIS will establish an organizational relationship. \(^{58}\)

Another folder illustrating Saddam’s interest in the activities of world-
wide terrorist groups contains notes from an Iraqi agent in the Philippines, Ahmad
Mahmud Ghalib. Ghalib’s job was to report any information he could uncover on
various Philippines-based terror groups and on American, Saudi, and Israeli ac-
tivities in the country.

\[\text{Ghalib mentions that the Libyans were trying to}
\text{influence the Abu Sayyaf Group to release their American hostages}^{59}\text{ as part of}
\text{Libya’s efforts to “clean up its image after the Lockerbie incident.”}^{60}\]

One possible reason Saddam
took an interest in monitoring such far-flung terrorist groups was to locate any
organization whose services he might use in the future. For instance, a report from
the IIS office in Baghdad states that it met with representatives of the National Sri
Lankan Socialist Student Union during the run-up (late 1990) to the first Gulf
War. According to the report, these student-terrorists volunteered to

\[\ldots\text{carry out a suicide bombing targeting any American interest here}
\text{in Thailand or elsewhere... any other place the Iraqi leadership or-
der[s] them to carry out such [an] attack.}^{61}\]
The IIS headquarters responded that the students should be thanked and kept close in case a demand for their use arose.

D. “Quid Pro Quo”

An extensive intelligence report from the IIS on the current state of Palestinian security places the business of state sponsorship in clear terms. The senior Iraqi intelligence representative in Gaza relates a conversation (Extract 15) he recently had with the Hamas leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, whom he describes as a dependable individual with whom he has a strong, lifelong relationship.

Extract 15.

Following our talk about the Intifadah, the Palestinian cause and the stance of the Iraqi Leadership... his [Rantisi's] remarks firmly upheld and acknowledged Iraq's leadership and the freedom fighter Saddam Hussein, may God protect and guard him. He subscribes to the idea for the need to continue the Intifadah and especially the military solution and martyrdom operations.

I said, “The Iraqi Leadership trusts you fully, more than anyone else in your organization. Ask what you wish and I will inform them [the Iraqi leadership] of it. They are willing to meet your demands.”

He said, “Martyrdom operations will prostrate the Zionists and liberate Palestine, in addition to the operations currently in place. A great deal of financial support is necessary in order to reach the desired objective.”

I said “The leadership in Iraq will not be parsimonious about providing any amount for the liberation of Palestine, from the sea to the river…”

He said, “We thank you... I will explain this stance to brother Sheik Ahmad Yassin.”

In return for financial support, Palestinian terror groups, particularly Hamas, were willing to do Saddam's bidding. After the September 11th attacks on the United States, a Palestinian representative informed the Iraqis that Hamas had thirty-five armed terror cells around the world, mingled with refugee populations. These cells were in “France, Swe-
den, Denmark, and other places.” The Palestinian boasted that these cells could shake America and force the United States to back out if it ever invaded Iraq.  

Other documents reveal the depth of the Hamas commitment to Saddam, through demonstrations and suicide attacks. A memorandum (Extract 16) informs the Director of the IIS of this assurance.

Extract 16.

[26 March 2003]

We have lately been visited by representatives of the Hamas movement in Baghdad who inform us of the following points:

The leadership of the movement in Damascus called us a number of times to make sure we renew our commitment to you against the foolish American attack.

A request to open our border check points to let the volunteer fighters participate in the war.

An offer from Hamas leader, Dr. al-Rantisi to carry out demonstrations and suicide attacks to support Iraq.

Another document provides some insight into the changing nature of regional loyalties: it states that these Hamas terror groups, so freely offered by Palestinian representatives to support Saddam, are partially financed by the Iranians (Extract 17). Terrorism in the 1990s was becoming an increasingly competitive seller’s market.

Extract 17.

[1 August 1998]

An agent [NAME WITHHELD] supplied us with information about a pact between Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and the Iranian leadership. The most significant information was Iran’s support for the Hamas movement and the appropriating of 15 million dollars a month, as well as supplying Hamas with commando teams to carry out operations abroad, and forming a new organization named Hezbollah-Palestine to divert suspicion away from Hamas in case it carries out sensitive operations. Likewise, there was a pact to train elements to carry out special operations and assassinations.
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III. Iraq and Terrorism: Three Cases

A. The Abu al-Abbas Case

Iraq and Iran were not the only states that wanted to use Palestinian terrorist organizations for their own purposes. For Saddam, these groups were often the means toward a common end and a tool to influence or manipulate an ally. One such example was a Palestinian Liberation Front leader, Abu al-Abbas who lived in Iraq under Saddam’s protection. He originally fled to Iraq to avoid an Italian warrant imposing five life terms for his part in the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* and the murder of an American citizen. Abu al-Abbas was captured later by US forces as they entered Baghdad in April 2003.

In 1988, the Director of IIS sent a letter (Extract 18) to the Arab Liberation Movements Office in the Revolutionary Command Council about a recent conversation with Abu al-Abbas and his problems with funding and contacts with the Libyan opposition.

Extract 18.

[January 1988]

Abu al-Abbas pointed out that he had received a sum of 2.5 million [US] dollars, which was spent on the camps and was given to him by Libya. He also spent additional sums on [the camps].

He adds that he was never approached by the Libyans regarding the elimination of any Libyan opposition or any other matter except what he reported to your lordship after his visit to Tripoli in response to a Libyan request.
Under his signature, the IIS Director adds a note regarding Abu al-Abbas’s veracity (Extract 19).

Extract 19.

I was informed that, according to estimates, Abu al-Abbas received a larger sum than the one he confessed. Of course he denies that but he is still suspect in that department.

The rest of the documents in this folder detail Iraqi procedures for accepting Abu al-Abbas and his wife as residents and providing them with Iraqi diplomatic passports so the couple could move freely within the Middle East.

While in Iraq, Abbas often traveled to Gaza and reported back to Saddam on the conditions of the Palestinians and the various terrorist organizations there. In one note, he asks for Saddam’s help in developing methods for the Palestinians to infiltrate Israeli military and security operations in order to “analyze the weak points in the enemy structure so as to select potential targets and our future hits.”

Through his dealings with the Palestinian terrorist groups, Abu al-Abbas provided Saddam with considerable support when needed. One memorandum (Extract 20) details some of these activities, including examples of Abu al-Abbas’s “good intentions” toward Iraq.

Extract 20.

Subject: Abu al-Abbas


[Continued]
2. On July 22, 1998, the meeting with Abu al-Abbas took place and he discussed in detail the Palestinian conditions in the occupied territories. He stayed in Gaza for two and a half months and met with most of the prominent Palestinian personalities and in particular Abu Mazen, Faisal al-Husaini, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, and most of the leaders of the Palestinian political parties. In addition, Abu al-Abbas met with leaders of the Arab political parties of the pre-1948 Palestine and with various Palestinian security organizations.

3. Abu al-Abbas stated that he is willing to fully work, in any area, which will serve Iraq’s objectives towards the Zionist enemy. We believe that Abu al-Abbas has the capabilities to conduct several assignments that are of interest to the Service towards the Zionist regime. After reviewing and discussing many suggestions and ideas, Abu al-Abbas has proved, throughout all of the previous period, his good intentions towards Iraq especially during the Gulf War when his organization conducted several military operations as follows:
   - Burning of the Japanese Embassy in Manila-Philippines.
   - Burning the American Airlines office in the Philippines.
   - Placing an explosive device near an American base in Izmir.
   - Placing an explosive device on the pipe lines that carry oil to an American base in southern Spain.
   - Placing gliding airplanes (including their pilots) under the command of the IIS and an agreement was reached with the Iraqi Special Work Team to use these planes.
   - Provided a team of his organization to carry out some of the operations in the Saudi territories; this team is now under the command of the Iraqi Special Work Team.

4. Abu al-Abbas has provided personal [identifications] and summaries of the political lives of the members of the current Israeli Knesset in accordance with the attached forms.

5. Abu al-Abbas has requested a meeting with your Excellency to greet you and update you with the Palestinian situation. Please review and direct us as you see fit

Signed
Akram ‘Umar Salih
Office Director
Given what has emerged over the past two years about the general nature of Saddam's bureaucracy, the possibility is good that either the IIS or Abu al-Abbas himself embellished, overstated, or even falsely reported some exploits.\textsuperscript{72} The writer of the above memorandum either was unaware or else ignored the fact that while Abbas may have done his best to help Saddam, some of his operations were spectacular failures, as detailed in an Iraqi intelligence file from May 1994. The document (seventy-one-pages) details why many of the bombs manufactured by the IIS Directorate malfunctioned during a variety of operations in the early 1990.

- A bomb exploded prematurely and caused the death of a collaborator in Iran.
- A bomb planted inside an Iranian fuel reservoir was discovered before it exploded.
- A bomb intended to destroy the American ambassador's residence in Jakarta, Indonesia failed.
- Bombs designed to destroy the American Airlines office and Japanese embassy in the Philippines exploded prematurely and damaged only the front of the office, while killing one and wounding another of the terrorists transporting the explosives.

The report states that ninety-five of the one-hundred bombs were successfully shipped to countries all over the world—and that the five bombs that didn't make it were carried by Fedayeen who were arrested at Cairo's airport.

Finally, the report laments that many poisoning attempts had failed and lists a number of quality assurance measures to ensure better results in the future.\textsuperscript{73}

B. Attacks on Humanitarian Organizations

A 16 May 1993 letter\textsuperscript{74} to the Iraqi Minister of Defense (MOD) details some of the IIS activities aimed at the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Kurdish areas of Iraqi. The letter indi-
cates that terrorist operations in the Kurdish areas were carried out with the direct knowledge of the highest levels of the Iraqi government (Extract 21).

Extract 21.

[16 May 1993]

TOP SECRET & PRIVATE

... Since the beginning of the current year until now there have been four workers from non-governmental organizations killed, (two Kurds, one Belgian, one Australian), a hospital bombed, and dynamite exploded in trailers bringing aid to the Kurds. The deteriorating conditions forced the Doctors Without Borders organization to leave the area at the end of April.

This news is a clear expression as to what foreigners are exposed to in the self-ruled area. The operations referred to in the news above were executed by our Directorate in fulfillment of your excellent direction through some of the cooperatives and the National Defense battalions as follows:

a. The operation that killed the Australian was executed by a group cooperating with our Directorate, on the Jam Jamal – Bazin road on 7 January 1993, and it was revealed in our letter Secret and Private dated 20 January 1993.

b. The operation that killed the Belgian was executed by a group cooperating with our Directorate on the Sulaymaniya – Dukan road on 22 March 1993. We revealed it in our study (top secret and private) of 27 March 1993.

c. The operation that killed the two Kurds working with foreign non-governmental organizations (that claim humanity) was executed by one National Defense Brigade counselor and we revealed it in our letter [marked] Secret and Private, dated 10 May 1993.

d. The operations putting detonating [sic] dynamite on trailers carrying relief materials operations of this kind were executed by the National Defense Brigade counselor.

In fulfillment of your excellent instructions, effective June 1992 and up to this month, two hundred and twelve operations were executed in the Northern Area. Forty-five of these operations were against foreigners and these were revealed to your excellent sight in special letters [these letters have not been discovered as of yet].

We called the Counselors; those distinguished in executing the operations, and informed them to raise their activity to benefit from the gap that will occur during the withdrawal of the United Nations members...
A later page in the letter identifies a victim of terrorists, a murdered Belgian who was the head of Handicap International and who had been traveling in the area to determine what help could be provided to the Prosthesis Hospital in Chamchamal [northeastern Iraq]. The killers and their families were forced to flee after their identities were revealed. The letter asks Saddam to allow them to reside in Altun Kubri [vicinity of Erbil in northeastern Iraq] and to furnish them with seven rifles to protect themselves from pursuing “terrorists” [i.e., Kurdish groups].

Notwithstanding the carefully documented planning and preparation of the regime’s terror operations, the actual execution of these operations was sometimes distinguished by betrayal and ineptitude. In 1995, for instance, an IIS agent was assigned a secret mission to kill two Swedish journalists by blowing up their car with two sticks of dynamite. Before the agent carried out the mission, he informed his brother, an officer in the Kurdish security forces, of the details of the attack—which his brother promptly passed them on to his superiors. According to a captured document, Kurdish security in the area decided to let the IIS agent blow up the car but told him he could use only one stick of dynamite—the Swedish journalists would be wounded and not killed. 76

Both journalists apparently survived the blast. However, when the IIS brought its agent in for interrogation, the agent immediately broke down and confessed everything. An IIS tribunal closed the matter by sending the agent to Abu Ghraib prison for life. A note at the end of the file indicates that both brothers were friends of the Swedish journalists whom they had met on a trip to Sweden. The betrayal and incompetence displayed by the Iraqi agent should not obscure the fact that Saddam’s intelligence service was deliberately targeting Western journalists for assassination. 77

Other documents show Saddam’s terror organizations could be deadly. They were willing to target not only Western interests but also to directly attack Americans. Uday Hussein reports to his father the results of one such terrorist strike that specifically targeted American aid workers with the UN (Extract 22, next page).
1. What was the target?
Attacking the new Land Cruiser vehicle with the UN symbol, the vehicle originally owned by the [unclear] organization. There were four American citizens including one female in the vehicle.

2. Execution
On 19th of February at 1915 hours, using an explosive charge.

3. Participants in the execution of the operation
An advisor and three other citizens. The results of the mission were the destruction of the above mentioned vehicle, the death of the head of the organization and the serious injury of the other three, including the woman. The operation was supported by the command of the At Ta’nim branch of the Party…

This and other attacks were not isolated incidents but part of a state-directed program of significant scale. According to correspondence between the MOD and the GMID, seventy-nine regime-directed attacks were successful against “saboteurs,” Kurdish factions, UN operations, and various international NGOs in the northern Iraq during a six-month period in 1993. The attackers used a variety of bombs, RPG-7s (rocket-propelled grenades), small arms, and hand grenades in locations as diverse as a tourist club, hotels, political party headquarters, police stations, water-pumping stations, and private homes. A routine example is found in a Fedayeen staff officer responding (Extract 23, next page) to Uday Hussein’s authorization of a series of bomb attacks against foreigners staying at hotels in the northern region.
Another incident concerns the job application of a Kurdish "collaborator" applying for employment with the IIS. In addition to assisting in the targeting of "foreign organizations in the northeast province of Sulaymaniyyah" (a Kurdish area), this individual also helped in bombing the British aid group "Response, Relief, Resettlement, Rehabilitation" (known as "4Rs") in late 1999.

When attacking Western interests, the competitive terror cartel came into play, particularly in the late 1990s. Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda—as long as that organization’s near-term goals supported Saddam’s long-term vision. A directive (Extract 24) from the Director for International Intelligence in the IIS to an Iraqi operative in Bahrain orders him to investigate a particular terrorist group there, The Army of Muhammad.

Extract 23.

[8 December 2001]
Your Excellency [Uday Hussein] ordered striking the dens and concentrating on the foreigners who work in the Northern Zone to frustrate their planning and their disgraced action. Two targets that are over populated with foreigners were specified; one of them will be done on Christmas night, and the other one will be done several days after the first.

Extract 24.

[July 2001]
We have learned of a group calling themselves The Army of Muhammad...has threatened Kuwaiti authorities and plans to attack American and Western interests...We need detailed information about this group, their activities, their objectives, and their most distinguished leaders. We need to know [to] whom they belong to and with whom they are connected. Give this subject your utmost attention.
The agent reports (Extract 25) that The Army of Muhammad is working with Osama bin Laden.

Extract 25.

[9 July 2001]
Information available to us is that the group is under the wings of bin Laden. They receive their directions from Yemen. Their objectives are the same as bin Laden...

A later note lists the group’s objectives, among them:

- Jihad in the name of God.
- Striking the embassies and other Jewish and American interests anywhere in the world.
- Attacking the American and British military bases in the Arab land.
- Striking American embassies and interests unless the Americans pull out their forces from the Arab lands and discontinue their support for Israel.
- Disrupting oil exports [to] the Americans from Arab countries and threatening tankers carrying oil to them.

A later memorandum from the same collection to the Director of the IIS reports that the Army of Muhammad is endeavoring to receive assistance [from Iraq] to implement its objectives, and that the local IIS station has been told to deal with them in accordance with priorities previously established. The IIS agent goes on to inform the Director that “this organization is an offshoot of bin Laden, but that their objectives are similar but with different names that can be a way of camouflaging the organization.”

C. Destabilizing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

Saddam’s plans and activities included preparations to destabilize his perceived enemies or US allies in the region. As seen in the following
folder of extracts and documents, a key objective of the Saddam regime was operations directed against Saudi Arabia. **Extract 26** is a cover letter for attachments, ten copies of the lists of volunteers for martyr work in Saudi Arabia.

**Extract 26.**

In the name of God the most Merciful, the most Compassionate
Arab Socialist Ba’th Party
Fallujah Branch Command
Fallujah Section Command
No/2730
Date: 2001
To: Fallujah Branch Command
Re: Lists
Greetings:
Enclosed find ten copies of the lists of volunteers for martyr work in Saudi Arabia.
Stay the revolutionary cause
Signature
Comrade ‘Abd Hamid Jasim
Fallujah Section Command Secretary

Another document details an earlier operation in Saudi Arabia (**Extract 27**) commanded by “Unit 999.” An IIS special operations organization, Unit 999’s primary missions were long-range reconnaissance and direct action operations outside of Iraq. It conducted some of the regime’s most dangerous and clandestine activities. (In the run-up to **OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**, Unit 999 was involved in training foreign volunteers in “commando” operations.)

**Extract 27.**

Defense plan pertaining to NAME WITHHELD
1. Areas of Interest: Saudi Arabia/Hafir Al-Batin

[Continued]
2. Entrance Date: Night of December 25/26
3. Duration: (Blank)
4. Way of Crossing Border: Infiltrating at night
5. Unit Enforcing Plan: Unit 999.

The next page of the same folder details the recruitment and training of the agent (Extract 28).

Extract 28.

Pressure Types:
   a) Volunteered personally for this work
   b) Signed a personal commitment statement
   c) His father and the rest of his family are in Iraq.

Training Received:
   a) Physical exercise
   b) Using all kinds of weapons
   c) Explosives (use of all kinds and ways)
   d) Planting car bombs

The agent’s personal commitment statement, which included pledging the lives of himself and his family, is in the document too (Extract 29).

Extract 29.

I, the undersigned commando, [NAME WITHHELD], attest to protect the confidentiality of the mission I have to accomplish in Saudi Arabia and further attest by taking my responsibilities assigned to me in light of the assigned mission explained to me. In case I am not loyal to all what was mentioned above, my family and myself will face consequences. God is a witness on what I say.
His mission, observing and eliminating important members of the Kuwait royal family (when possible), is briefly described in Extract 30.

Extract 30.

Purpose of Operation
Settling in (Hafir Al-Batin) [Saudi Arabia] to establish a safe house for other individuals sent into the area.
Collect information on enemy military forces from other nations present in the region.
Monitor the movements of the important members of the Kuwait Royal Family (Sabbah family) and eliminate them when possible and when in they are in the area.

Aspects of this agent’s training program are instructive (Extract 31).

Extract 31.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING REPORT
2. Name of Person Trained: [NAME WITHHELD]
3. Training Duration: Nine days
4. Training Completed:
   a. Introduction to explosives and other elements pertaining to terrorism.
   b. Conduct terrorist training period for quick missions by using dough and plastic explosives.
   c. Practical training on use of explosives and conduct of terrorist training missions by using electronic timing devices.
   d. Ways to destroy buildings, oil refineries, pipes and planting car explosives.
5. Training Place: Unit 999

[Continued]
COMMANDER’S OPINION

He is an excellent officer, loyal to the Revolutionary Command and their officers. He is ready to sacrifice his life for our nation and also the Arab nation’s sake. He is good for special missions the commander or the unit assigns for him.

After the agent was sent on his mission, Unit 999 sent the following message (Extract 32) to IIS Headquarters, reporting on the status of other Iraqi assassins in Saudi Arabia.

Extract 32.

Commando Commissioner Police, [NAME WITHHELD] has been sent to settle. We are preparing to send other groups from Unit 999. 1st Lieut. Special Forces, [NAME WITHHELD], to stay in Riyadh City for the following purposes:

1. Monitor Kuwaiti Ruling Family and take the chance of eliminating some of them.
2. Collect information on vital American and Saudi targets.

We prepared commando, [NAME WITHHELD], to be in Abu Dhabi [capital of the United Arab Emirates] for the following missions:

1. Collect vital information on the Emirates and other enemy nations in the area.
2. To monitor the ruler and his son and to collect information on them

Previously we sent a Palestinian, [NAME WITHHELD], to Riyadh so he can eliminate the Kuwait ruling family. He is still there.

Other pages of the document folder list agents-in-place to conduct operations inside Saudi Arabia and against the Kuwait royal family (Extract 33, next page). Note: The exact nature of the mission referred to is not specified.
[NAME WITHHELD] and Commando [NAME WITHHELD], both in Unit 999 are available to accomplish the following mission.

1. Saudi Oil Company (ARAMCO)
2. Military Headquarters for Sabbah Clan (Kuwait Ruling Family)
3. Foreign military headquarters in Khaled Military City.  

Ten more pages in this document folder give further details on operatives sent into the countries around Iraq to attack American installations, the ruling families in the Middle East, and oil installations. Most of this material details the cover identities they would use while traveling and how Unit 999 could guarantee their future loyalty once they were out of the unit’s direct control.

Further evidence of Saddam’s strong and continuing interest in destabilizing Saudi Arabia and his use of terrorist groups was found in a captured IIS instruction manual, Lessons in Secret Organization and Jihad Work – How to Organize to Overthrow the Saudi Royal Family. Compiled in December 2001 for IIS agents and supporters in Saudi Arabia, the instruction manual contains handwritten notes and changes reportedly made by Saddam himself. It is full of advice for the budding revolutionary, e.g., how to organize a subversive movement, conduct operations, use codes, test the loyalty of members, and a host of other important items necessary for the task.
IV. The Business of Terror

A. Venture Capitalists for Terrorists

Saddam Hussein was demonstrably willing to use terrorism to achieve his goals. Using this tactical method was a strategic choice of Saddam's, often requiring direct and indirect cooperation with movements, organizations, and individuals possessing, in some cases, diametrically opposed long-term goals.

An example of indirect cooperation is the movement led by Osama bin Laden. During the 1990s, both Saddam and bin Laden wanted the West, particularly the United States, out of Muslim lands (or in the view of Saddam, the "Arab nation"). Both wanted to create a single powerful state that would take its place as a global superpower.

But the similarities ended there: bin Laden wanted—and still wants—to restore the Islamic caliphate while Saddam, despite his later Islamic rhetoric, dreamed more narrowly of being the secular ruler of a united Arab nation. These competing visions made any significant long-term compromise between them highly unlikely. After all, to the fundamentalist leadership of al Qaeda, Saddam represented the worst kind of "apostate" regime—a secular police state well practiced in suppressing internal challenges. In pursuit of their own separate but surprisingly "parallel" visions, Saddam and bin Laden often found a common enemy in the United States.

The Saddam regime was very concerned about the internal threat posed by various Islamist movements. Crackdowns, arrests, and monitoring of Islamic radical movements were common in Iraq. However, Saddam's security organizations and bin Laden's terrorist network operated with similar aims, at least for the short term. Considerable operational overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the regional groups involved in terrorism. Saddam provided training and motivation to revolutionary pan-Arab nationalists in the region. Osama bin Laden provided training and motivation for violent revolutionary Islamists in the region. They were recruiting within the same
demographic, spouting much the same rhetoric, and promoting a common historical narrative that promised a return to a glorious past. That these movements (pan-Arab and pan-Islamic) had many similarities and strategic parallels does not mean they saw themselves in that light. Nevertheless, these similarities created more than just the appearance of cooperation. Common interests, even without common cause, increased the aggregate terror threat.

B. The Terror “Business” Model of Saddam Hussein

Saddam’s interest in, and support for, non-Iraqi non-state actors was spread across a wide variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. For years, Saddam maintained training camps for foreign “fighters” drawn from these diverse groups. In some cases, particularly for Palestinians, Saddam was also a strong financial supporter. Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda (such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led at one time by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri) or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives.  

Saddam was a pragmatist when it came to personal and state relationships. He and many members of his regime understood that whatever the benefits of a relationship, there was always a potential for internal and external costs for associating too closely with some of these groups. Saddam’s reaction to this concern often swung like a pendulum, from arresting members of Wahabi sects to “extending lines of relations” to a new radical Kurdish Islamic group.  

In one case, Iraq’s ambassador in Switzerland, who was also Saddam’s half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, recommended that the Director of the IIS meet directly with an Egyptian who had strong connections to “Islamic parties and anti-Western Islamic organizations,” and who was offering his assistance in brokering an alliance. But the director of the IIS department responsible for Arab issues did not concur with the ambassador’s recommendation and cautioned in an internal memorandum that a meeting at such a level would “not serve the current Iraqi situation...and will make us lose our main target.” He went on to note that working with the religious parties was dangerous at this time because they were
“associated with the religious terror, which Hezbollah and Iran are practic­ing…and it is provoking the West…”

Some aspects of the indirect cooperation between Saddam’s regional terror enterprise and al Qaeda’s more global one are somewhat analogous to the Cali and Medellin drug cartels. Both drug cartels (actually loose collections of families and criminal gangs) were serious national security concerns to the United States. Both cartels competed for a share of the illegal drug market. However, nei­ther cartel was reluctant to cooperate with the other when it came to the pursuit of a common objective—expanding and facilitating their illicit trade. The well­
publicized and violent rise of the Medellin cartel temporarily obscured and over­shadowed the rise of, and threat posed by, the Cali cartel. Recognizing Iraq as a second, or parallel, “terror cartel” that was simultaneously threatened by and somewhat aligned with its rival helps to explain the evidence emerging from the detritus of Saddam’s regime. Based on captured recordings and documents, this paper illus­trates in part how Saddam Hussein ran his “cartel.”

Saddam’s “business model” also included using terrorist events to his advantage even when he had no direct connection to them. One example is an audio file of a meeting between Saddam and his senior advisors recorded sometime in 1994. The subject was the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center in New York; Iraq now had a suspect in custody, Abdul Rahman Yasin. Saddam discusses the possibility that the attack was part of the “dirty games that the American intelligence would play if it had a bigger purpose.” The participants in this meeting discuss other possible explanations, including direct or indirect involvement of either Israel or various factions in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. These alternative theories resonate with Saddam; he doubts that Abdul Rahman Yasin, convicted of being the ringleader, is capable of such an operation.

Saddam’s suspicions were also heightened because he did not trust the information coming out of the Iraqi interrogations of Abdul Rahman Yasin. According to Saddam, he was “too organized in what he is saying and [he] is playing games, playing games and influencing the scenario.” Saddam ordered that the interrogations continue since “if it comes out that the entity that car­ried this operation out are the Zionists without the involvement of any American officials, then it would be a big bonus for the Arabs…” Regardless of what hap­
pens, the suspect must be kept alive. Saddam actually warns against allowing Yasin to commit suicide or be killed in jail. According to Saddam,

...the most important thing is not to let the Arabic public opinion [believe] we are cooperating with the US against the opposition. I mean that is why our announcement [that Yasin is being held] should include doubts...[about] who carried out this operation. Because it is possible that in the end we will discover—even if it is a very weak possibility—that a fanatic group who carried it organized the operation.... In that case, we will be accused by the Arab public opinion that we assisted the Americans because of our weakness and fear, against the Arabs and Moslems or something of that nature...  

Saddam and his advisors then proceeded to lay out a strategic communication strategy on how and when to make dramatic statements about Yasin’s arrest. Additionally, they decided that to be effective, they must let out a little information every day. Saddam’s approach was that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing suspect, if handled correctly, “will benefit us greatly; it will benefit us in our issue in the matter of the stance that the US has taken against us.”
V. Conclusion

One question remains regarding Iraq’s terrorism capability: *Is there anything in the captured archives to indicate that Saddam had the will to use his terrorist capabilities directly against United States?* Judging from examples of Saddam’s statements *(Extract 34)* before the 1991 Gulf War with the United States, the answer is yes.

**Extract 34.**

[19 April 1990]

“If America interferes we will strike. You know us, we are not the talkative type who holds the microphone and says things only, we do what we say. Maybe we cannot reach Washington but we can send someone with an explosive belt to reach Washington.”

“We can send people to Washington... a person with explosive belt around him could throw himself on Bush’s car. 107

In the years between the two Gulf Wars, UN sanctions reduced Saddam’s ability to shape regional and world events, steadily draining his military, economic, and military powers. The rise of Islamist fundamentalism in the region gave Saddam the opportunity to make terrorism, one of the few tools remaining in Saddam’s “coercion” toolbox, not only cost effective but a formal instrument of state power. Saddam nurtured this capability with an infrastructure supporting (1) his own particular brand of state terrorism against internal and external threats, (2) the state sponsorship of suicide operations, and (3) organizational relationships and “outreach programs” for terrorist groups. Evidence that was uncovered and analyzed attests to the existence of a terrorist capability and a willingness to use it until the day Saddam was forced to flee Baghdad by Coalition forces.
However, the evidence is less clear in terms of Saddam's declared will at the time of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. Even with access to significant parts of the regime’s most secretive archive, the answer to the question of Saddam’s will in the final months in power remains elusive. Potentially, more significant documents and media files are awaiting analysis or are even yet to be discovered.

As noted in the foreword of this paper, access to the captured archives of this regime provides researchers with the ability to document a part of the context in which this regime operated. While this context is far from complete, it provides at least one glimpse into the complex nexus between state and non-state terror.
Notes

Approximately 100,000 have some level (full, partial, or a summary) of translation. Some captured documents are hundreds of pages in length.

The commercial (i.e., non-government) version was published under the title *The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2006.

Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0007419 – Saddam meeting with his ministers and discussing the 1993 WTC terrorist bombing (circa 1993)

Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0006443 – Saddam meeting with command members to discuss the biological case in relation to the Iran-Iraq War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, date undetermined but probably ca. 1996.

Only the SIPRNET version of the Harmony database was used (up to and including files received on 22 August 2006). See the four-volume set of primary source materials to IDA Paper P-4151 (this paper).

For readability and security requirements, the authors have redacted the names of low-level personnel identified in some of the Iraqi documents cited in this paper.

Harmony document folder ISGZ-2004-018948 – Memorandum to Uday Hussein from a Fedayeen Saddam staff planner on the continuing planning for the operation known as “BLESSED JULY,” May 1999.

Additional material to indicate if this program went beyond planning stages is fragmentary at best. Occasional references in IIS memoranda such as the 23 November 1999 direction from the IIS Director to the M4 Directorate to “establish relations with the Islamic Center in London...” indicates a willingness to expand beyond Iraq’s traditional foreign surveillance targets. (Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-000331 – Memorandum from the IIS Director to the M4 Directorate to “establish relations with the Islamic Center in London...,” 23 November 1999.)

Harmony document folder ISGZ-2004-018948 – Memorandum to Uday Hussein from a Fedayeen Saddam staff planner on the continuing planning for the operation known as “BLESSED JULY,” May 1999.

(Continued on the next page)

Harmony document folder CMPC-2004-002746 – Collection of memoranda from July 2002 between the IIS/M4 and IIS/M16 regarding destruction of embassy weapons caches. A summary of a related document folder (ISGP-2003-00010399, 3 October 2000) includes inventories of weapons within the Iraqi embassies in Geneva, Brussels, Sweden, Athens, Austria, and Madrid. The summary also states that more than 200 kilograms of TNT were stored in the Iraqi embassy in Athens, Greece. The explosives ended up buried in the Iraqi embassy garden in Germany after the Iraqi consulate in Bayern (Bavaria) was closed.

Harmony document folder CMPC-2004-002746 – Memorandum between the IIS/M4 and IIS/M16 regarding destruction of embassy weapons caches, July 2002.

Harmony document folder CMPC-2004-002746 – Memorandum regarding destruction of embassy weapons caches, July 2002

RDX is a military grade explosive; also known as hexogen, T4, and by its chemical name cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine.

The At Ta’mim branch of the IIS was a regional office located in the At Ta’mim governorate (province); it was often used as the planning and staging ground for IIS and Fedayeen Saddam operations in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

Harmony document folder CMPC-2004-003446 – IIS work order to charge a car with the explosive RDX, 4 September 1999. Another IIS Harmony document folder, CMPC-2003-017029, contains a memorandum about preparing and executing a mission to blow up a Turkish school in northern Iraq, January 2000. Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-017029 (memorandum about preparing and executing a mission to blow up a Turkish school in northern Iraq, January 2000) includes another document that describes in detail the same bureaucratic process for the delivery of five bombs disguised as briefcases and books, for eventual use by the Fedayeen Saddam in a planned attack.


Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-005626 – The Iraqi Intelligence Service explosives projects, 7 December 2000. This document also discusses the

(Continued on the next page)
manufacture, testing and training of explosives and related equipment for IIS and Fedayeen Saddam customers.


Harmony document folder ISGQ-2005-00037352 – Contains various memoranda from the GMID between 17 and 29 September 2001 on the subject of “suicide operations.” Nothing in this folder indicates what prompted this apparent interest in suicide operations.

Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-011229 – 22 September 2001 memorandum from the Ba’ath party al-Sumud Division to the 17 Tammuz Section Command, subject: volunteering for suicide bombing operations. (The names in column 1 were redacted for this IDA paper.)

References to “Arab citizens” in the Iraqi bureaucratic lexicon usually referred to non-Iraqi Arabs.


Harmony document folder ISGQ-2003-00004467 – 5 March 2001 correspondence between an office in the Secretariat of the Fedayeen Saddam (the “Public Relations Commission”) and the Iraqi National Olympic Committee, concerning a request from a Fedayeen Saddam widow. Saddam’s son, Uday Hussein, ran the Olympic Committee and several other organizations as private

(Continued on the next page)
mafias. He often used them to recruit, cover, and support his other hobby, the Fedayeen Saddam. For years prior to the 2003 invasion, Saddam made extensive use of his terror cadres within Iraq, primarily in the Kurdish (northern Iraq) and Shia (southern Iraq) areas.

Various media sources reported an unsuccessful bomb attack on a convoy carrying Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of French President Francois Mitterrand, while she was visiting UN operations in Kurdistan in July 1992. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Mrs. Mitterrand Is Spared in Iraq," *New York Times*, July 7, 1992, page A3.

Many of the early members of al Qaeda were Egyptian extremist veterans of al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), including the organization's “number two” man, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Palestine Liberation Front, Renewal and Jihad (Hamas), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) are all listed as designated foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department. (www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm)

Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Partial translation of a folder of memorandum and reports between Saddam's personal secretary and the Director of the IIS, between January and March 1993. *(Note: An update with a complete translation has been provided; see Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Iraqi Intelligence Service memos regarding affiliations with terrorist groups, 18 January 1993, in *Iraqi Perspectives Project. Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 3* .)

Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Partial translation of a folder of memorandum and reports between Saddam's personal secretary and the Director of the IIS, between January and March 1993. *(Note: An update with a complete translation has been provided; see Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Iraqi Intelligence Service memos regarding affiliations with terrorist groups, 18 January 1993, in *Iraqi Perspectives Project. Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 3* .)


*(Continued on the next page)*
Iraq’s use of Arab volunteers to defend the “Arab nation” was well documented during its war with Iran in the 1980s (a number of Egyptians and Jordanians fought for Iraq). Saddam’s isolation from most Arab allies during the 1991 Gulf War forced him to rely on small, ideologically motivated groups of volunteers within his former allies. This would become an increasingly common tactic for Saddam during Iraq’s long isolation of the 1990s.

The IPP study documents the continuation of this program through the 1990s and into early 2003. During the buildup of the Saddam Fedayeen, “Arab fighters” were integrated into camps that were graduating thousands by 1997.

This document appears to refer to the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG). EIG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Rahman, is in prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The group’s most recent terrorist attack was the 1997 massacre of fifty-eight tourists in Luxor, Egypt. Since 1998, several of EIG’s leaders have renounced its violent past.

Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189. This document is actually a partial translation of a large folder of memoranda and reports between Saddam’s personal secretary and the Director of the IIS between January and March 1993. As noted later in this paper (page 18), the Presidential Secretary corrected the drafting of this document with his statement about the Egyptian operations: “We did not direct acting against the Egyptian regime.” The secretary added that the “focus should be on Somalia” and “His Excellency approved assigning the said task to the Afghan Islamic Party.” The cause of the discrepancy between the IIS’s recollection of the 1990 operations and the President’s Office is not clear. the IIS wrote this memorandum at a time when Iraq was working to repair its relationships with its fellow Arab governments. It seems less likely that the operational arm of Iraqi policy (in this case, IIS) in this area would get the history wrong and more likely that there was an attempt by the President’s Office to shape future policy by cleaning up the past. (Note: An update with a complete translation has been provided; see Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Iraqi Intelligence Service memos regarding affiliations with terrorist groups, 18 January 1993, in Iraqi Perspectives Project. Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 3.)


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According to the 4 November 1998 U.S. Justice Department indictment of Osama bin Laden, bin Laden ordered the establishment of training camps in Somalia to “cause violence to the United States.” In a March 1997 CNN interview,

(Continued on the next page)
Osama bin Laden stated that “they [Arab Mujahideen] participated with their brothers in Somalia against the American occupation troops and killed large numbers of them.” Saddam Hussein noted that after the U.S. military failure in Somalia “the example of the Somalis will make others believe they can win if they resist.” Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0006960, Saddam discusses Western politics and America’s involvement in Somalia.

The area in the southwest region of Iran known as al-Ahwaz (Arabistan) has a large ethnic Arab population. The control or possession of this territory, which is rich in oil, has been one of the long-standing historical disputes between Iran and Iraq. Saddam had a long history of supporting this group in its efforts against the Iranian government.

Iraqi fighter schools were a combination of militia, indoctrination, and commando training.

Not one of any significance was noted.

Iraqi fighter schools were a combination of militia, indoctrination, and commando training.

(Continued on the next page)

Libya was long thought by Western intelligence agencies to be a supporter of the Abu Sayyaf group whose founder learned his trade in Afghanistan and was later educated in Libya. Throughout the 1990s, Libya was the conduit for ransom money paid by European governments for the release of kidnap victims held by the Abu Sayyaf Group. See Larry Niksch, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine–U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*, (CRS Report for Congress (RL31265), Washington DC, 25 January 2002).


Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-10107642 – Iraqi dictation (transcript) of a conversation between an IIS representative and Abu al-Abbas (leader of the Palestine Liberation Front); the conversation took place on 10 November 2001.


Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly Jew and a wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen, was shot by the terrorists, then thrown overboard from the *Achille Lauro*.

Abbu al-Abbas died of natural causes while in the custody of the United States on 9 March 2004.

*(Continued on the next page)*


Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-00015083. This document (seventy-one pages) is a detailed after-action review and correspondence on the performance of the al-Ghafiqi project (M16/2), 10 May 1994.

Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-301499 – Letter from the Director, GMID, to a member of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning operations against foreigners, 16 May 1993.

Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-301499 – Letter from the Director, GMID, to a member of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning operations against foreigners, 16 May 1993.

Harmony document folder IISP-2003-00042526 – Summary translation of a 114-page report, dated October 1995, concerning IIS operations in the northern area of Iraq. Given the uneven nature of reporting from northern Iraq during the Saddam era, it is difficult to confirm that events described in official regime correspondence actually occurred as described.

(Continued on the next page)

Harmony document folder ISGQ-2003-00004439 – Collection of Fedayeen Saddam reports concerning operations in the northern Iraq [dated between May and September 2001].

Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-00301651 – Correspondence between MOD [Ministry of Defense] and GMID regarding operations against saboteurs and UN representatives in the northern area, 10 November 1993. Sixteen of the seventy-nine attacks were against explicitly named Western entities. One example of a targeted NGO from this memorandum was the French aid organization *Medecins sans Frontieres* (*Doctors Without Borders*).

Harmony document folder ISGQ-2003-00004790 – Memorandum to the Honorable Fedayeen Saddam Supervisor, 8 December 2001. A British NGO, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), was a specified target of at least one of the planned attacks.


Harmony document folder IISP-2003-0029003 – Memorandum from the Director, IIS, to a military command containing a volunteer for a special mission, January 1991.

Harmony document folder IISP-2003-0029003 – Memorandum from the Director, IIS, to a military command containing a volunteer for a special mission, January 1991.

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification.


A simplistic description of Saddam Hussein’s long-term goals would include a pan-Arabic super-state trending toward earthly socialist “super-power” status. Bin Laden’s Salafi-Jihadist view of a “restored” caliphate is broader in scope (Islamic, not just Arab focused) and aims toward fulfilling a religious destiny.

The nature of al Qaeda and its associated movements makes establishing firm organizational connections difficult. Many terrorism experts have noted al Qaeda’s increasing use of “sympathetic affiliates” to carry out its radical Salafi vision. Terror organizations associated with al Qaeda in this “affiliate” status include the following:

- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
- Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (Kashmir)
- Jaish-e-Muhammad (Kashmir)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
- Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
- Jemaah Islamiya (Southeast Asia)

(Continued on the next page)
• Jama’at al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Iraq)
• Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Algeria)


For the relationship building with radical Islamic groups in Kurdistan, see Harmony document folder ISGQ-2005-00118681 – Memorandum to M40 Director, subject: Hamas organization, 15 December 1998. The “Hamas” reference in this document is to an extreme radical dissident offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan—not the Palestinian Hamas movement. For an example of Iraqi concern over growth of al-Wahabiyyah movement in Iraq, see Harmony document folder ISGQ-2003-00004790 – Memorandum to Iraqi National Security Council, discussing Iraqi concerns over growth of the al-Wahabiyyah movement in Iraq, 24 June 2001. On the reply to this memorandum, Uday Hussein, Saddam’s oldest son, requests a decision as to whether he should “torture these elements [the Wahabis] or turn them over to National Security.”

Harmony document folder ISGZ-2004-027795 – Iraqi intelligence reports about an Egyptian citizen, 11 September 1997. The reference to “main target” was the eventual lifting of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations after the 1991 war.

For an example see Anatomy of a Colombian Drug Trafficking Operation in the United States, US House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, report, Washington, DC, 16 October 1997. In testimony a former member of the Medellin drug cartel described the organization as a “…federation. It is organized by autonomous groups. They unify their efforts and resources for common targets.” As for entering into a cooperative relationship with competing or rival cartels, the witness noted that “…as a group, they could enter into transactions with Cali or with any other entity, depending on the capability that they might have…” (pp. 10 and 33).


Abdul Rahman Yasin is still wanted for his alleged participation in the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center, New York City, on February 26, 1993, which resulted in six deaths, the wounding of numerous individuals, and the significant destruction of property and commerce. He remains on the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorist List.”


(Continued on the next page)


Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0006248 – Video and transcript of Saddam Hussein and Yassir Arafat discussing international affairs, 19 April 1990. It should be noted that this was four months prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent military confrontation with the United States. The “Bush” referred to here is George H. W. Bush, father of the current president of the United States.

Several possible explanations exist for this lack of data. An obvious one is that it simply has not been found or else it was destroyed during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Another explanation was offered during IPP interviews with senior members of the Iraqi regime. Several senior Iraqis noted that after OPERATION DESERT FOX (December 1998), Saddam became much more concerned for his personal security. Saddam isolated himself from all but the most senior staff. One of the effects of his increased fear of electronic monitoring and tracking was a reduction in the number of senior meetings recorded.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current U.S. classification.

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Appendices
Appendix A. References

Note: In many instances, the Harmony document folders comprise more than one item, e.g., a collection of memoranda, related documents, or a mix of reports and memos. Each Harmony document folder has its own unique document number; the individual items within the folder do not. Consequently, the reader may see the same number with different titles and/or media types. Each Harmony media file has its own unique number; rarely will there be additional material, e.g., a transcript with the video.

Books, Periodicals, Reports, Websites ................................................. A-1
Harmony Media Files .......................................................................... A-2
  Video ................................................................................................. A-2
  Audio ................................................................................................. A-2
Harmony Document Folders ................................................................. A-3

Books, Periodicals, Reports, Websites


A-1

**US Government Publications**


**Harmony Media Files**

**Video**


**Audio**


Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0006443 – Saddam meeting with command members to discuss the biological case in relation to the Iran–Iraq War and the Arab–Israeli conflict, [date undetermined but probably ca. 1996].


Harmony media file ISGQ-2003-M0006960 – Saddam discusses Western politics and America’s involvement in Somalia, [n. d.].
Harmony Document Folders


Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – (1) Partial translation of a folder of memorandum and reports between Saddam’s personal secretary and the Director of the IIS, between January and March 1993. (2) Report on meeting with Arab factions, from Saddam’s personal secretary to the Director, Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), 18 January 1993. (3) IIS to Saddam, list of foreign national fighters, categorized by country, 18 March 1993. (Note: An update with a complete translation has been provided; see Harmony document folder ISGP-2003-00300189 – Iraqi Intelligence Service memos regarding affiliations with terrorist groups, 18 January 1993 in Iraqi Perspectives Project. Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 3.)


Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-000331 – Memorandum from the IIS Director to the M4 Directorate to “establish relations with the Islamic Center in London…,” 23 November 1999.


Harmony document folder CMPC-2003-017029 IIS – Memorandum about preparing and executing a mission to blow up a Turkish school in northern Iraq, January 2000.


Harmony document folder CMPC-2004-003446 – IIS work order to charge a car with the explosive RDX, 4 September 1999.


Harmony document folder ISGQ-2003-00004439 – Collection of Fedayeen Saddam reports concerning operations in the northern Iraq, [dated between May and September 2001].


Harmony document folder ISGQ-2004-00102338 – Correspondence within Iraqi Presidency–Arab Liberation Movements Office and Palestinian Liberation Front regarding presenting passports to secretary-general of the Palestinian Liberation Front and support them with money, 31 March 1998.

Memorandum from Director of the IIS to the Revolutionary Command Council (Arab Liberation Movements Office), January 1988.


Harmony document folder ISGZ-2004-018948 – Memorandum to Uday Hussein from a Fedayeen Saddam staff planner on the continuing planning for the operation known as “BLESSED JULY,” May 1999.


Harmony document folder ISGZ-2004-032673 – Summary translation of GMID reports and memos on the reopening and activating of the Sudanese fighters training camp in Iraq [dated between November 2001 and November 2002].
Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-00301651 – Correspondence between MOD [Ministry of Defense] and GMID regarding operations against saboteurs and UN representatives in the northern area, 10 November 1993.

Harmony document folder IZSP-2003-301499 – Documents from the Director, GMID, to the Minister of Defense, [dated March–June 1993], including letter from the Director, GMID, to a member of the Revolutionary Command Council concerning operations against foreigners, 16 May 1993.

ISGQ-2004-00102336 – Information on the Secretary of the Palestinian Liberation Front, Abu al-Abbas, and his relation with the Iraqis, 28 September 1996.


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Appendix B. Acronyms and Abbreviations

4Rs Response, Relief, Resettlement, Rehabilitation (British aid group)

ARAMCO Arabian American Oil Company (now Saudi Aramco)

BA bachelor of arts
BS bachelor of science

CNN Cable News Network
CRS Congressional Research Service (US)

DOD Department of Defense

EIG Egyptian Islamic Group

GMID General Military Intelligence Directorate (Iraqi)
GPO Government Printing Office (US)
IDA  Institute for Defense Analyses
IED  improvised explosive device
IIS  Iraqi Intelligence Service
IPP  Iraqi Perspectives Project
JAWP  Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
MAG  Mines Advisory Group (British non-governmental organization)
MOD  Ministry of Defense
NGO  non-governmental organization
OIF  OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
PLF  Palestinian Liberation Front
PLFP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
RPG  Rocket-propelled grenade
TNT  trinitrotoluene
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
US  United States
USA  United States of America
USJFCOM  United States Joint Forces Command
Iraqi Perspectives Project. Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents. Volume 1 (Redacted)

Kevin M. Woods, project leader
with James Lacey

Joint Advanced Warfighting Program – Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22311-1882

Director, Joint Center for Operational Analyses and Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command, 116 Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

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Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist–operatives monitored closely. Because Saddam’s security organizations and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a “de facto” link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.

Al Qaeda, business models, Gulf Wars, Iraq, Saddam Hussein, terrorism.

Brigadier General James Barclay, USA, Director, JCOA-LL, USJFCOM

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