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Executive Summary

This report includes all the articles written from April 2015 through June 2015 by members of IDA’s Africa team for publication in *Africa Watch*, the Institute’s e-newsletter. *Africa Watch* is distributed to a diverse audience of Africa specialists in government, the U.S. military, and American and international universities, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations. The articles span a wide range of countries and issues. They reflect the comprehensive approach of IDA’s Africa team. The common thread running through the content is a focus on trends and developments that could affect political, economic, or social stability on the continent.
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NIgerian Elections: Ushering in a New Era of Politics?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

After a 6-week delay due to the government’s inability to provide adequate election security throughout the country, Nigerians went to the polls on March 28, 2015, to cast their ballots in presidential and legislative elections. Three days later, on March 31, opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari emerged victorious, unseating incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan. The 2015 election marked the first time since the country’s return to multiparty elections in 1999 that an incumbent president was defeated at the ballot box. Two prominent yet conflicting narratives have characterized the elections. Several international bodies, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the United Nations, have praised Nigeria for its peaceful election, but others have described the election as chaotic and violent. Which interpretation is more accurate?

The Past as Comparison

Past Nigerian elections have been deeply flawed, with fraud and violence occurring frequently and to an alarming degree. The 2007 elections were described by some as a “sham” in which the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) committed widespread fraud to secure a commanding victory. The 2011 elections, considered by some to be the country’s best managed, resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 in combined pre- and post-election violence. While it is too soon to definitively adjudicate the conduct of the just-concluded 2015 elections, it is possible to examine the conduct of the pre-electoral period and Election Day itself.

Violence Surrounding the Election

Much like previous elections, significant violence took place before, and on the day of, the 2015 elections. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria, over the course of 50 days between December 2014 and January 2015, at least 56 people were killed in incidents related to the elections. This pattern continued through Election Day. Although there is yet no comprehensive estimate of the total number of fatalities that occurred in pre-election violence, if attacks in February and March continued at roughly the earlier pace, it is likely that the total number of fatalities was in the hundreds. The Cleen Foundation released a report shortly before the election alleging that hate speech was pervasive and providing examples of violence and intimidation that had taken place in many of the country’s 36 states.

During the actual vote, extended by a day in some areas due to technical difficulties, violence was perpetrated both by Boko Haram and by political party agents. Boko Haram attacks caused fatalities of at least 25 in the North East zone of the country. According to the chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, at least 50 fatalities in total could be attributed to the elections. Fatalities were recorded in nine states, injuries in an additional five states, and theft of election materials in at least six states.

In Anambra State, All Progressives Congress (APC) politicians called for the election to be canceled, accusing the ruling party of hijacking ballots and manipulating the collation process. A polling center in Akwa, also in Anambra State, was bombed early in the day, but voters returned later to cast their ballots. In Enugu State, a polling station was bombed, but fortunately no one was injured. In Bauchi State, a curfew was also imposed, leading to peaceful protests outside the offices
of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). A man was reportedly shot to death during protests outside INEC offices on March 29. Election materials were stolen on the day of the election. Journalists were attacked in Cross River State, and four election officers were feared kidnapped. In Delta State, voting was suspended in Udu because the police said they could not guarantee voter security. A youth leader from the APC was beaten to death and his body set on fire in Edo State. A member of the deputy governor of Ekiti State’s security team shot and wounded a protester.

Rivers State was the site of significant election violence the week before the election, with reports of arson, injury, and several deaths. The governor announced a dusk-to-dawn curfew ahead of the announcement of election results on March 31. Massive protests took place in Rivers State as the APC alleged that elections had been rigged. Protesters demanded a rerun. Several deaths were reported on the day of elections, and INEC offices were set on fire the day after the election.

Violence, however, did not affect all states equally, suggesting a pattern to, and motivation behind, its use. The South East and South South zones—PDP strongholds—were much more affected than states in the North West and North Central zones, where it is believed that the APC had significantly more support. For example, Kaduna State in the North West zone, where much of the 2011 violence occurred, was calm on Election Day, although PDP offices were set on fire on the eve of the election.

**Conclusion**

Many were concerned before Nigeria’s elections that violence could match or perhaps exceed levels of previous elections. Given the violent atmosphere in the months leading up to the election, this fear was not unfounded. The 2011 post-election violence erupted when the loser of that election, the current president-elect Buhari, refused to accept the outcome. This year, defying the expectations of many, President Jonathan conceded defeat while the electoral commission was still in the process of collating the results. Many hope this move will forestall serious post-election violence.

While the 2015 elections may be momentous and the overall outcome may be a cause for celebration, this election looks similar to most other Nigerian elections in terms of the violence that took place before the election. The outcome, while historic, should not overshadow the work that still needs to be done to curb election violence in Nigeria over the long term. Perhaps this election will prove the needed catalyst to effectively end the win-at-all-costs mentality associated with past elections.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
**ZIMBABWE: COURT CASES HIGHLIGHT SPLITS IN RULING PARTY**

By Alexander Noyes

On March 3, 2015, Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo, two former high-ranking officials in President Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), filed court cases against Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The suits claim that Mutasa and Gumbo’s recent expulsions from the party—for supporting former Vice President Joice Mujuru (who was fired from her government and party posts in December 2014 for allegedly plotting to overthrow Mugabe)—were illegal according to the party’s constitution. The court cases highlight the deep splits remaining within Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU-PF party.

**Succession Battle Fuels Party Divisions**

As outlined in previous editions of Africa Watch, ZANU-PF’s succession battle came to a head in the run-up to the party’s congress held from December 2 to 7, 2014. Over the past several years, two main candidates had emerged as front-runners in the race to replace Mugabe: Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former Justice and Defense Minister. Given her support in the party structures at the grassroots level, Mujuru was seen as the front-runner until recently. During a fierce bout of party infighting between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions in April 2014, Mugabe reasserted himself and scolded both Mujuru and Mnangagwa, declaring that it is “terrible even to have your name mentioned as leader of a faction. It is shameful...But why should it [succession] be discussed when it’s not due? Is it due? I’m still there.”

In the lead-up to the party congress, Mugabe’s wife also entered the fray as a political player in her own right in the succession struggle, viciously attacking Mujuru in public, allegedly for coveting the presidency and conspiring to overthrow Mugabe. Mujuru denied the allegations. At the congress, Mugabe was expected to resolve the issue of his successor by finally naming a replacement or stepping aside. Neither happened. Two days after the congress, on December 9, 2014, Mujuru, along with 17 ZANU-PF ministers and deputy ministers who were accused of supporting her, were fired from their government and party positions. A handful of officials from this group were later expelled from the party, including Mutasa and Gumbo. Although Mugabe neither announced a successor nor stepped aside at the congress, his naming of Mnangagwa as Mujuru’s replacement (both as the party’s number two and vice president of Zimbabwe) ostensibly put Mnangagwa in the driver’s seat on the issue of succession. In the process; however, Mugabe’s actions also deepened splits in the party.

**Mutasa and Gumbo Court Cases**

In the wake of the party congress, some elements within the Mujuru faction are publicly standing up to Mugabe in an unprecedented and confrontational fashion, as illustrated by Mutasa and Gumbo’s court cases. Mutasa, a former minister of state security in the president’s office, was most recently ZANU-PF’s secretary for administration, while Gumbo, formerly the minister of economic development, was most recently the party’s secretary for information. Both were long-standing ZANU-PF stalwarts. In their suits, they claim that their expulsions from the party were illegal according to the ZANU-PF constitution, and they are challenging the “unlawfulness and unconstitutionality of certain appointments and decisions that were made and of certain constitutional amendments that were made during the party’s congress.” In his filing,
Mutasa maintains, “the manner in which allegations were made against myself and Vice-President Mujuru, allegations that included malicious and defamatory contentions, clearly infringed our right to human dignity.”

After the court cases were filed, Gumbo spoke on splits within the party: “It is clear that there are now two Zanu (PF)s, which means the party has effectively split. There is the illegal Zanu (PF) that was established at congress in 2014 and is led by Mr. Mugabe. Then there is the popular and legitimate Zanu (PF) that people wanted Mai (Joice) Mujuru to lead after congress.” Other former ZANU-PF loyalists have also spoken out publicly against Mugabe and the party. Jabulani Sibanda, former chairman of the influential War Veterans Association, who was expelled from the party in November 2014 for allegedly slandering the president, claimed last week that ZANU-PF is highly corrupt and to blame for the country’s economic crisis. He told a local newspaper: “Before we accuse [opposition leader Morgan] Tsvangirai or any foreigner of hurting our country let us look at ourselves. We have failed as a government and we are now even failing as a party, and as a result the revolution is being liquidated in the process.”

Conclusion

Zimbabwe’s ruling party continues to feel the fallout from decisions made during and after the 2014 party congress. While Mugabe again demonstrated his firm grip on the party and succeeded in keeping everyone guessing about his eventual replacement, his hard-line actions around the congress also deepened fissures in the party. Mugabe is unlikely to lose in court to Mutasa and Gumbo because the judiciary in Zimbabwe is seen as partisan, favoring ZANU-PF. That said, Mutasa and Gumbo’s lawsuits, by keeping the party’s factionalism in the headlines and airing the party’s dirty laundry, could prove to be a thorn in Mugabe’s side down the road.

Mugabe appears to be taking the cases seriously. He responded to news of the court cases by questioning the competence of any judge who would agree to preside over “that kind of nonsense” and asserted, “We would want to see which magistrate would sit to hear that case. Then we will question their educational qualifications.” Unless ZANU-PF is able to bring Mujuru back into the fold (which seems unlikely but is not impossible as Mujuru herself has not yet been expelled as a member of the party), the splits within ZANU-PF, combined with the dire state of the economy, could significantly weaken the ruling party in the lead-up to elections in 2018.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
ANOTHER KENYAN TRAGEDY—A PATTERN TOO FAMILIAR

By George F. Ward

The murder of 148 Kenyan university students at Garissa University College by al-Shabaab terrorists on April 2, 2015, has been the subject of wide media coverage and expert analysis. The Garissa attack has been characterized as evidence of al-Shabaab’s resilience in the face of military defeats inside Somalia. The attack is also seen as representing al-Shabaab’s evolution from “a popular resistance movement into a full-blown, international terrorist organization.” Both these theses seem valid, but other conclusions to be drawn from Garissa are potentially even more important. The first is that al-Shabaab is becoming ever more deeply rooted in Kenya itself. The second is that the Kenyan government’s response to the attack is following patterns that in the past have only exacerbated the problem.

Garissa—New Evidence of al-Shabaab’s Evolution

The facts of the tragic terrorist attack on Garissa University College have been widely reported. Four al-Shabaab gunmen, one of whom was the son of a Kenyan official and a 2013 law graduate of the University of Nairobi, brushed by token security, gained entrance to Garissa University College, and began to murder students. Those killed were mostly Christian, but Muslims were also among the victims. Security forces present in Garissa, both army and police, were not able to stop the slaughter. The incident came to an end 12 hours after it began, when a special police unit arrived from Nairobi, having been delayed by the unavailability of transport aircraft. The four terrorists were killed.

The Garissa attack was unfortunately not unique, but only the latest and most deadly example of al-Shabaab’s evolution. As the terrorist organization has been progressively weakened by the efforts of the Somali government and international forces inside Somalia, it has increasingly focused its attacks on Kenya. According to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, who have maintained a database of al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, after the fall of the Somali port of Kismayo to Kenyan troops in late September 2012, over 550 people have died in Kenya at the hands of al-Shabaab. Since the October 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, there have been several other high-profile incidents of violence, some of which have targeted Kenya’s Christian majority. In November 2014, al-Shabaab attacked a bus in Kenya and killed those who could not recite the Muslim profession of faith. In December 2014, 36 quarry workers, mostly Christian, were murdered in Mandera County. Earlier in 2015, al-Shabaab attackers launched a raid on Wajir, around 100 kilometers from the Somali border, and killed four persons by locking them in a shop that they then set on fire.

Al-Shabaab—A Kenyan Brand

As reported in the October 10, 2014, issue of Africa Watch, al-Shabaab’s leadership in Kenya is largely in the hands of Kenyans. The organization in Kenya emerged from al-Hijra, a covert group of Muslim extremists, which in turn had its roots in Nairobi’s Muslim Youth Center, formed in 2008. Although most adherents of al-Shabaab in Kenya are probably of Somali ethnicity, Matt Bryden, director of a Nairobi-based think tank, asserts that al-Shabaab has actively recruited “hundreds, if not more than a thousand … non-ethnic Somali Kenyans.” Some of those recruited are converted Christians. The group’s members communicate routinely in Swahili, the lingua franca of Kenya, rather than in Somali.

The reaction of the Kenyan government and security forces to past instances of al-Shabaab violence in Kenya has included crackdowns on Kenyans of Somali ethnicity and on Somali refugees living in Kenya, threats to close the large refugee camps that shelter refugees from Somalia, and extrajudicial killings of radical Muslim leaders. This harsh counterterrorism strategy has been a major factor in the success of al-Shabaab’s recruitment inside Kenya. In a study...
based on interviews with al-Shabaab adherents, Anneli Botha, a South African researcher, discovered, “The single most important factor that drove respondents to join al-Shabaab, according to 65 percent of respondents, was government’s counterterrorism strategy.”

The Kenyan Government Reaction—Plus ça change

Writing in Foreign Affairs one year ago, Paul Hidalgo predicted, “Kenya is on its way to becoming the world’s next hotbed of extremism as a result of al-Shabaab’s active and growing presence there. And so far, the Kenyan government has been its own worst enemy in attempting to reverse this trend.” The writer doubtless had in mind the kind of counterterrorism strategy described above.

Unfortunately, the tragedy at Garissa displayed striking similarities to previous incidents, indicating that little has changed. Once again, the reaction by Kenyan security forces was slow. Once again, there was a lack of coordination between police and army on the ground. And once again, the Kenyan government’s reaction in the immediate aftermath was to target ethnic Somalis. Kenya’s deputy president told the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to shut down the Dadaab refugee camp, which has a population of around 350,000, within three months or else Kenya would shut it down itself. A similar ultimatum had been issued after the Westgate Mall attack, and nothing came of it. The refugee agency responded that a forced repatriation of refugees would violate international law. The only other concrete step by the Kenyan government that has been reported was a decision to close 13 money transfer firms to prevent their use by terrorists. This step triggered an immediate protest by international nongovernmental organizations over the loss of the principal means of transferring both international humanitarian aid to Somalia and remittances by ethnic Somalis living in Kenya to their families in Somalia.

Conclusion

When the Kenyan government sent its armed forces into Somalia in October 2011, one of its goals was to establish a buffer zone in southern Somalia that would help prevent the type of terrorist attacks that are now occurring. A buffer zone of sorts has been created, but violence inside Kenya has only increased. Criticism of President Uruhu Kenyatta, who is beset by problems on several fronts, is increasing day by day. There is probably no short-term solution to the problem of al-Shabaab terrorism in Kenya, but it is clear that a new strategy needs to be put in place.

What elements might that strategy include? First, President Kenyatta needs to take steps to address the concerns of Kenya’s Muslims, the vast majority of whom are not extremists. Arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial violence should cease. Second, he needs to gain better control of Kenya’s border with Somalia, which is currently porous. That is a task with which the Kenya Defense Force, more effective and less corrupt than the Kenyan police, could help. Third, he needs to review the mission and effectiveness of the Kenyan military presence in Somalia. Allegations by United Nations investigators of complicity of members of the Kenya Defense Force in the illegal trade in Somali charcoal, which finances al-Shabaab, persist. If these allegations are true, then the blood of Kenyans murdered by al-Shabaab is on the hands of other Kenyans who have put illegal profits ahead of country.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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the most powerful man in Burundi until a dispute with Nkurunziza landed him in jail in 2007. He was charged with plotting against the state and sentenced to 13 years in prison. Although it is unlikely that Radjabu himself will run for president, he will have some influence over the party’s nomination process.

In mid-March, several members of the ruling party, some high-ranking, delivered a letter to Nkurunziza asking him not to present his candidacy for president. In response, party leadership suspended dozens of its members, including the president's spokesman, three members of parliament, and a provincial governor. Although the exact size of the faction is unknown, it is clear that there is a growing divide within the party. In a move seen as countering the mounting pressure against the president and his party, on April 11, more than 10,000 CNDD-FDD party supporters marched in the capital city, Bujumbura, to show unity. Many were chanting Nkurunziza’s name and wearing shirts with his likeness.

Conclusions

International and domestic actors alike have appealed to Nkurunziza to abandon his attempt to seek a third term as president. Tanzania, which helped to broker the peace in the early 2000s, has warned that violence could break out if Nkurunziza is allowed to run for a third term. Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, whose second term as president is set to expire later in 2015, called upon all parties to adhere to the Arusha peace agreement. The head of the Catholic Church in Burundi, which is very influential, has said that he does not believe the president should run again.

Despite these pleas, it seems as though Nkurunziza is intent on pursuing a third term as president. By doing so, he has put his party—and perhaps his entire country—at risk. In Burkina Faso, long-time president Blaise Compaoré was ousted in a coup d’état in October 2014, after similarly insisting that term limits be repealed so that he be allowed to run for elections for a fifth time. As the party and country continue to take sides in the matter, the stability of Burundi is very much in question.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
XENOPHOBIA: SOUTH AFRICA’S SUCCESSOR TO APARTHEID

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

In mid-April, a spate of xenophobic attacks broke out in South Africa. Foreign nationals, most believed to have emigrated illegally from neighboring countries, were attacked in large cities including Durban and Johannesburg. After at least seven fatalities, South African security forces were deployed to quell the violence. What is driving the violence?

South Africa’s History of Xenophobia

Xenophobia, or fear of foreigners, is not a new phenomenon in South Africa. Under apartheid, a race-based oligarchy in which the white elites controlled virtually all economic resources and made most social and political decisions, the South African government strictly regulated the movement of people, especially Africans from other countries, through its borders. Cheap labor needs aside, the politics of apartheid made assimilation into such a racialized society very difficult.

After the end of apartheid, the new South African government continued to maintain a highly restrictive immigration policy. Immigrants were viewed as an economic and social threat to ordinary South Africans. In 2002, the government reformulated its migration policy. Part of the goal of the new policy was to address xenophobic attitudes, but little of substance emerged.

Violence targeted against immigrants, however, is a more recent development. The most notable—and fatal—attacks occurred in May 2008. South African mobs specifically attacked immigrants from Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other African countries. Many of their homes and businesses were destroyed. Over the course of a week, more than 20 foreign nationals were killed and thousands chased from their homes. By the time the violence subsided, more than 60 in total were killed.

Why Xenophobia?

South Africa is often viewed as substantially different from its continental counterparts due to its unique history and more favorable economic development. It currently boasts one of the higher per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa, and its total gross domestic product is only slightly less than that of Nigeria, which overtook South Africa in 2014.

The country’s relative stability and prosperity make it a common destination for other Africans. Refugees seeking peace or economic opportunities have poured across the country’s multiple borders. Estimates of how many foreign nationals are illegally residing in South Africa range from 4 percent to 11 percent of the total population of 52 million.

Those seeking opportunity, however, are often surprised to find that South Africa’s prosperity is not inclusive. The country is considered by many to be one of the least equal societies in the world, with almost 50 percent of the population living in extreme poverty. Official unemployment hovers between 25 and 35 percent, numbers similar to those at the end of the apartheid era.

Xenophobic attacks are almost always committed by poor black South Africans against other poor Africans. Those organizing and supporting the violence assert that foreign nationals commit more crimes than ordinary South Africans and that foreign nationals take jobs away from South Africans, contributing to the country’s endemic poverty.
Many political elites have either been complicit in reinforcing these stereotypes or, in a few isolated instances, have publicly encouraged them. The most recent attacks were preceded by inflammatory statements by Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini that referred to foreigners as “lice” and requested “foreign nationals to pack their belongings and be sent back.”

**Governments Respond**

The official response from the South African government has been criticized as being *slow* and inadequate. President Zuma, in an open letter published on April 28, thanked neighboring countries for their assistance during apartheid and asked that the international community not interpret the actions of a few as the beliefs of the many. But he also noted that there were *some valid concerns* raised by those organizing the violence. He indicated that it might be time for South Africa to again re-evaluate its immigration policy.

Relations with several other African countries have been strained by the violence. Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania have all *repatriated* citizens who have fled the violence. Rumors that the Nigerian envoy to South Africa has been recalled have been *dismissed by the government* of Nigeria as inaccurate, but Nigeria’s High Commissioner in South Africa will be returning to Nigeria for “*consultations*” on the situation.

**Conclusion**

Economic, social, and political inequality was a grim reality in apartheid South Africa and continues to pose a problem for the current government, even after 20 years of democracy. Foreign nationals are being used as convenient scapegoats for South Africa’s many ills, but they are not the problem. Until poverty, unemployment, and inequality are adequately addressed, the threat of civil violence in South Africa will be constant. The country should look inward for solutions rather than directing blame outward.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
DOES PEACEKEEPING FUEL MUTINY IN AFRICA?

By Alexander Noyes

On April 20, 2015, over 20 former Nigerian soldiers who “were part of the 850 members of the 15th Battalion of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission sent to Liberia between September 2007 and April 2008” asked President-elect Muhammadu Buhari to reinstate them. After their peacekeeping deployment, the soldiers were sentenced to life in prison and forcibly retired in 2009 for mutinying over nonpayment of their peacekeeping entitlements. Their sentences were later reduced to seven years. But the soldiers still want what is owed to them: “I want them to compensate us. We are looking up to Gen. Buhari to look into our case. He has been a soldier and he would appreciate the enormity of the injustice done to us.” Recent research documents a number of other peacekeeping-related mutinies in West Africa. Do international peacekeeping deployments fuel mutiny in Africa?

Unintended Consequences: “Peacekeeping Abroad, Troublemaking at Home”

In contrast to past academic research that emphasized the salutary impact of international peacekeeping on domestic civil-military relations, recent studies suggest a link between international peacekeeping deployments and destabilizing military behavior at home. An article by Maggie Dwyer published this year in African Affairs argues that out of 24 overall cases of mutiny in West Africa from 1991 to 2012, “at least ten mutinies in West Africa since 1991 have been related to grievances by soldiers who participated in peacekeeping missions.” A mutiny is distinct from a coup, as mutinies do not aim to overthrow heads of state. Instead, a mutiny is a collective revolt over “communal complaints” by soldiers against their leadership, often carried out by enlisted troops. Mutinies can lead to military coups, however, as seen in Mali in 2012, when Captain Amadou Sanogo’s mutiny over lack of equipment quickly morphed into a successful coup.

Dwyer cites peacekeeping-related mutinies once soldiers returned home in nine countries in Africa since the early 1990s: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria. Based on interviews with mutineers, Dwyer finds that international peacekeeping deployments often led to material grievances among peacekeepers, as well as a sense of injustice. She maintains, “While peacekeepers are meant to contribute to the resolution of foreign conflicts, a pattern of mutinies in the wake of these missions indicates that at times their participation can lead to new grievances and exacerbate existing tensions within the contributing country’s military.”

Grievances include problems and lack of transparency with pay and lengths of deployment. Also, peacekeeping experiences can foster resentment toward senior officers and politicians, some of whom are regarded as corrupt. A soldier from Sierra Leone noted that peacekeepers “are not happy, they are grumbling. [US$]1,225 [is sent] to [the] country [supplying the peacekeepers] but we only get 400. We do not know what the government is using the money for.” Exposure to soldiers from other countries also allows peacekeepers to compare their situations to others in the region, adding substance to grievances. In addition to disparities in pay, “differences between countries regarding uniforms, food, equipment, leadership styles . . . have also served as a basis for grievances among peacekeepers.”

Findings Beyond Africa

Separate research presented by Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan Caverley at the Sixth Oceanic Conference on International Studies at the University of Melbourne in 2014 also finds an association between peacekeeping and military instability. Although they propose a different process through which this occurs, their work lends some support to Dwyer’s findings. Savage and Caverley’s statistical study encompasses the period from 1990 to 2009, looking at the relationship
between peacekeeping deployments worldwide and “destabilizing events carried out by the military,” a category that includes coups as well as mutinies. They largely depart from Dwyer’s grievance-based explanation, arguing that peacekeeper training increases the “human capital” of soldiers: “By increasing the human capital, training provides soldiers with increased capacity to carry out political actions [once returned home], and reduces the risk that they may be punished due to their increased value to the regime and their international connections.”

In addition, the authors posit that by working together in foreign environments, peacekeepers will have the opportunity to network and build cohesion as a group, which may “help overcome collective action problems” and aid in launching a mutiny or coup back home. After controlling for other factors, Savage and Caverley run a regression and find a “statistically significant, and substantially important, association between peacekeeper commitments and destabilizing events carried out by the military.”

**Conclusion**

More research needs to be done to further flesh out, refine, and rigorously test the proposed theories and mechanisms outlined above. That said, these recent studies offer new and perhaps counterintuitive evidence of the potential unintended consequences of international peacekeeping in Africa. If these findings are substantiated by further analysis, two policy implications follow from the above discussion.

First, transparency is needed from troop-contributing governments regarding peacekeeping costs and peacekeeper salaries. As Dwyer points out, while the UN publicly publishes what it pays troop-contributing governments, troop-contributing governments often are not transparent about how these salaries are used to cover costs and to pay peacekeepers, leading to perceptions of corruption that can result in mutinies, as noted in the case of Sierra Leone. Second, in addition to improving operational capabilities, training for peacekeepers should place a greater emphasis on instilling norms of civilian control of the military and professionalism in peacekeepers. These steps might help minimize the potentially harmful unintended consequences of peacekeeping.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
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Alliance (APGA), one of the few opposition parties not to merge with the APC, controls Anambra state. Also, for the first time since 1999, the ruling party will control Lagos state, long a bastion of opposition party support.

The PDP did retain control of several key states in the South-East and South-South, including oil-producing states such as Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers. Because revenues from these states form the backbone of the total government budget, relations between the federal government and the governments of these states will be key to successful governance.

Last, note that the APC is a coalition of members from several opposition parties (Action Congress of Nigeria, All Nigeria People’s Party) and disaffected members of the PDP who defected before the 2015 elections. Governors from eight states (Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kwara, and Sokoto) are former members of the PDP. Because party switching is nothing new in Nigeria, and given the autonomy and power of governors, it is not clear how committed these APC members will remain to the party. Buhari seems well aware of the tendency of politicians in Nigeria to flock to the party in power and has publicly stated that he would not be appointing any post-election PDP defectors to his cabinet.

Conclusion

As momentous as the Nigerian general elections were, they were only the more visible of the two important elections held in the country in 2015. President-elect Buhari’s success at effectively governing and implementing the broad changes in the economic and security sectors that he campaigned on will depend in large part on how closely his regime is able to work with Nigeria’s new state governors.
MEETING AFRICA’S ELECTRICITY NEEDS—WHAT WILL THE FUTURE LOOK LIKE?

By George F. Ward

In sub-Saharan Africa today, only around 30 percent of the population has access to electricity. This fact negatively affects many aspects of daily life, from industry to education to community health, and it is a powerful impediment to development. African governments and the private sector have begun to address this problem in a serious fashion. Through their own efforts and with international assistance, such as from the U.S. “Power Africa” program, Africans are making progress on electrification. At the same time, the continent’s population is increasing rapidly. Can electrification outpace population growth? Will today’s power outages, brownouts, and load shifting become things of the past, or are they harbingers of worse to come? Are traditional energy sources the solution, or can renewables play a significant role?

Resource Rich—Power Poor

In a special report produced in 2014, the International Energy Agency presented a comprehensive picture of the current energy situation in Africa and the outlook for the future. The facts cited here are drawn from that report. Energy usage per capita in Africa is one-third of the world average. More than 40 percent of the total demand is accounted for by two countries, Nigeria and South Africa, which represent only 25 percent of the population. Grid-based electric generation capacity has recently been increasing relatively rapidly, from 68 gigawatts in 2000 to 90 gigawatts in 2012 (a 32 percent increase), but sub-Saharan Africa’s population has increased even faster, from 666 million in 2000 to 905 million in 2012 (36 percent). According to the IEA report, coal-fired generation capacity was 45 percent of the total, followed by hydropower (22 percent), oil-fired (17 percent), and gas-fired (14 percent). Renewable sources, excluding hydropower, provided less than 1 percent. Diesel- and gasoline-fueled generators also provide electricity, but at high monetary and environmental costs.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s energy paradox is that it is energy rich while being power poor. As the IEA reports, “energy resources in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole are more than sufficient to meet regional needs, both now and into the foreseeable future. This holds true across the range of energy resources . . . .” For example, recoverable reserves of oil will last for around 100 years at the current level of production, and new discoveries are being made. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for nearly 30 percent of global oil and gas discoveries in the period 2009 through 2013. In terms of renewable energy, the IEA sees substantial potential in hydropower, geothermal, solar, and wind.

Africa’s Future Energy Challenge

The challenge for Africa is to expand access to electricity at a rate faster than population growth. To accomplish this, African countries will need to radically expand their energy and power infrastructures, engage effectively with their domestic private sectors, and attract international support. Both the IEA report referenced above and a February 2015 study by McKinsey & Company estimate that sub-Saharan Africa can meet this challenge, but both project that efforts will fall short of complete success.
While the studies differ in detail, they come to similar conclusions. McKinsey’s analysis foresees slightly greater population growth by 2040 than does the IEA—a doubling of population versus an increase on the order of 90 percent—and McKinsey projects a quadrupling of demand for electricity, to 1,600 terawatt hours, while the IEA foresees somewhat more than a tripling, to 1,300 terawatt hours. The McKinsey report includes an important observation, which is that countries with electrification rates of less than 80 percent of the population consistently suffer from reduced GDP per capita. It projects that by 2040 sub-Saharan Africa will reach an electrification rate of more than 70 percent, still less than the 80 percent standard. Finally, both studies reach similar conclusions on the number of people in sub-Saharan Africa who will remain without electricity in 2040—530 million in the case of the IEA and between 370 and 550 million in the case of the McKinsey study.

**The Components of Potential Progress**

For the 25-year push toward greater electrification, Africa has the advantage of being positioned to draw upon multiple sources of energy, several of which represent significant, new potential:

- **Proven natural gas reserves** that have increased 80 percent since 2000. Mozambique and Tanzania have emerged recently as potential producers of significant natural gas.

- **New oil discoveries** in East Africa. Despite the slump in oil prices, exploration activity in countries such as Kenya and Uganda is continuing. The Lake Albertine Rift basin in Uganda may contain deposits estimated at 3.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent.

- **Large-scale hydropower** in countries such as Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Previous editions of *Africa Watch* have discussed the potential of the Grand Ethiopian Millennium dam and the Gibe III dam, also in Ethiopia. The potential of the projected Grand Inga dam in the DRC would dwarf the Ethiopian projects and could deliver twice the power of the world’s largest power station, the Three Gorges dam in China. Given the situation in the DRC, development on that scale is unlikely. It is within the bounds of possibility, however, to project that the government in Kinshasa will be successful in putting together the $12 billion in financing to build the Inga 3 dam, which would deliver 4.8 gigawatts.

- **Geothermal power in East Africa.** It can be expanded to play an even more important role today. Kenya currently produces inexpensive base-load power from geothermal energy in the Rift Valley, and Ethiopia, Tanzania, and other East African countries are undertaking explorations.

- **Solar and wind.** These have real potential. According to Bloomberg, sub-Saharan African countries were set to add more wind and solar power in 2014 than in the past 14 years, amounting to 1.8 gigawatts of capacity. South Africa is in the lead on wind and solar, planning to bring 6.9 gigawatts of capacity online by 2020. In programming its renewable energy investments, South Africa has used a market-based system called the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REIPPPP). Three rounds of bidding have been completed in the REIPPPP, and $14 billion has been committed for projects that will provide 3.9 gigawatts of capacity. Over the three rounds, the price for solar photovoltaic power has dropped 68 percent, and the price of wind power has dropped 42 percent. Despite these auspicious developments, solar and wind power will play only a minor role in eliminating Africa’s energy deficit until around 2030.

**Investment Is the Key**

The cost of constructing the fuel infrastructure, power plants, and electrical distribution networks needed in sub-Saharan Africa will be large. McKinsey cites the need for $490 billion in capital spending by 2040 for power generation. The $20 billion in investments that the U.S. Power Africa initiative has so far leveraged is a start, but only that. Continued commitment by the United States and other external donors will be necessary. It will fall to the countries of Africa themselves, however, to prioritize spending on power generation and to create the needed incentives for the private sector to do its work. Ethiopia is financing its hydropower largely on its own using a government-driven model. South Africa is making progress with a market-driven approach. Can other countries find effective models for financing their energy futures? Time will tell, but time is short.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA.
May 14, 2015

ANGOLA: UPTICK IN PROTESTS

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

On May 8, 2015, three youth activists were detained at the start of a demonstration in the Rangel district in the capital of Angola, Luanda. Organized by the Grupo Mura, a collective of individuals fighting for social equality in Angola, protesters were demanding increased access to water, electricity, and sanitation. Similar scenes have played out across Angola as police routinely arrest protesters minutes after their arrival at protest locations and often hold them for days. Angolan youth activists have not been deterred. In fact, protest activity has increased in the country, which rarely experienced protests before 2011. Even with the government’s attempt to crack down on any opposing views, civil society has recently become bolder in voicing grievances.

A Snapshot of Angola

Angola is considered by some to be Africa’s foremost emerging market. From 2002 to 2013, Angola’s GDP grew between 5 and 15 percent annually. Since the end of its civil war in 2002, Angola has focused on reconstruction and has made great strides in the development of its economy, which is largely propelled by oil. The country is second in Africa only to Nigeria as an oil producer. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that Angola earned $24 billion in net oil export revenue in 2014. The country is also rich in other natural resources, including gold, bauxite, uranium, phosphates, copper, timber, and natural gas, and it is the world’s fourth largest producer of diamonds.

At the head of these developments is one of Africa’s longest serving presidents, José Eduardo dos Santos, who came into power in 1979. In 2010, dos Santos strengthened his grip on power with a new constitution that ended the need for a direct presidential ballot. The head of the party that wins in parliamentary elections now automatically becomes president. The post of prime minister was abolished, and the president was empowered to appoint a vice president. The constitution also granted the president the authority to appoint the judges of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and the Court of Audits. The new constitution also imposes a limit of two 5-year presidential terms, but this does not apply retroactively, meaning that 72 year-old dos Santos could remain in office until 2022.

An Emboldened Population

In the lead-up to Angola’s 2012 presidential election, Dos Santos faced increasing opposition as youth activists stepped up anti-government protests. The small-scale youth movement, named the Angolan Revolutionary Movement (MRA), includes rappers, intellectuals, and journalists who call for social reforms and the resignation of President dos Santos. While the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) prevailed in the polls, the activists have not backed down, continuing to demonstrate and call for social reforms. In a recent interview, youth activist David Mendes told DW Africa that protests will not stop until there is proper access to sanitation, education, and health care and the unemployment situation is addressed. He also addressed income inequality: “wealth is not being shared equally, there is a group that dominates, food and fuel prices have increased and we object to it all.”

In interviews the author conducted in late 2014, activists asserted that they were in the process of rethinking strategies and had considered building coalitions with other groups. This appears to slowly be taking shape—the MRA recently assisted with organizing demonstrations to highlight the disappearance of António Alves Kamulingue and Isaías Cassule, who were organizing protests by war veterans and members of the former presidential guard to claim unpaid pensions. In early April 2015, youth activists also planned to travel to Cabinda, in the northern part of the country, to...
participate in a protest for the release of two local activists who were detained for planning a demonstration. Activists had been unable to organize the protest due to the heavy government crackdown in oil-rich Cabinda.

Since 2011, there has also been an increase in smaller, low-level protests throughout the country, including civil service workers demanding better pay and working conditions. Most recently, residents of the Cacuaco neighborhood of Luanda held a protest after a power cut. Trucks were reportedly sent to restore power immediately. One activist noted the significance: “This is a sign that things are changing.” Paula Roque, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group on Southern Africa, echoes this view, noting that the recent conviction of police officers and state security agents for the murder of the two missing activists shows that civil society, the opposition, and youth groups can have an impact when they make enough noise.

Conclusion

There has been an increase in the number of protests in Angola in recent years. According to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), there were 89 protests between 2011 and 2014—more than the total number that occurred from the end of the civil war, in 2002, to 2010. Given Angola’s culture of fear and intimidation, these protests suggest that various sectors among the population may no longer be afraid of the regime in the way they once were. Angola’s population has become increasingly emboldened with youth and civil sector workers and war veterans regularly taking to the streets to voice their grievances. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the largest opposition party, is also more vocal, recently asserting that the one-party model does not serve Angolans and that there is a need to enhance democracy.

President dos Santos also faces economic challenges. Oil accounts for the majority of government revenue. In response to plummeting oil prices, Angola’s cabinet cut social spending and ended fuel subsidies and infrastructure projects in the 2015 budget. These cuts will affect the mostly urban and youth population that already suffers from lack of access to water and overcrowding. As a result, the drop in oil prices, if it persists, has the potential to exacerbate current grievances and lead to broader citizen activism and possibly civil unrest.

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
May 14, 2015

TOGO PRESIDENT REELECTED IN PEACEFUL BUT DISPUTED ELECTION

By Alexander Noyes

On May 4, 2015, President Faure Gnassingbé of the Union for the Republic (UNIR) party was sworn in for a third term after winning reelection with 58.77 percent of the vote in elections held on April 25. Jean-Pierre Fabre, the candidate of a coalition of five opposition parties named the Combat for Political Change (CAP 2015), came in second place, garnering 35.19 percent of the vote. The poll was widely deemed free and fair by international and regional actors, including the African Union and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS). Reminiscent of the 2010 presidential elections, which he also lost, Fabre denounced the election results as fraudulent and on April 29 called for protests: “I call on the people to mobilize by all legal means to counter this new coup.”

Past Disputed Elections

Because Togo’s elections have been some of the most violent in sub-Saharan Africa, Fabre’s assertions of fraud and calls for protests have spurred fears of a new cycle of post-election violence in Togo. Gnassingbé was put into office with backing from the military in 2005 but stepped down due to regional and international pressure. He subsequently won a disputed election in 2005 that left up to 500 people dead in post-election clashes. After the violence, Gnassingbé was forced into a power-sharing agreement with the opposition, which was mediated by the European Union and ECOWAS. The inclusive government launched several electoral, judicial, and security reforms, and in 2007 the country held peaceful legislative elections. After Gnassingbé won the 2010 presidential elections with 61 percent of the vote, the opposition disputed the results and staged demonstrations, again calling fraud.

Fight over Term Limits and 2015 Election

As highlighted in the December 4, 2014, edition of Africa Watch, before the 2015 election, widespread protests over Gnassingbé’s running for a third term were held across urban areas in Togo, leading to several clashes with security forces. Although a 2014 survey conducted by Afrobarometer found that 85 percent of Togolese supported term limits, according to constitutional amendments made by Gnassingbé’s father in 2002, the president can legally serve in perpetuity.

In the run-up to the 2015 election, the opposition fought to change this and introduce term limits. Debate on a constitutional amendment bill tabled by the opposition began in parliament on January 5, 2015, but talks broke down soon after. The opposition “needs to be more realistic,” Christophe Tchao, UNIR’s parliamentary head, told Reuters. A similar effort was attempted and stymied in June 2014, when hardline elements in UNIR refused to pass a constitutional reform bill limiting the president to two 5-year terms.

With no compromise reached on the issue of term limits, the 2015 elections took place in a tense political environment. A dispute between UNIR and the opposition over the voter roll resulted in the elections, originally scheduled for April 15, being postponed by 10 days. Up to 500 international election observers were deployed to 4,000 polling stations on the April 25 vote. On voting day, the election was conducted peacefully, albeit with low turnout of just over 50 percent.

When provisional vote tallies were released, Fabre immediately contested the results, claiming that the tally from the election commission did not align with CAP 2015’s own recorded results. Patrick Lawson-Banku, his campaign manager,
went further, asserting, “This is an electoral coup planned long ago.” He also said: “CAP 2015 and its candidate Jean-Pierre Fabre categorically reject the fraudulent results . . .”

**Conclusion**

International and regional endorsement of the vote as free and fair, combined with a parallel vote tabulation that also closely matched the official results, suggests that Fabre’s assertions of widespread fraud are likely just a political ploy to remain relevant. Despite Fabre’s calls for protest, it appears, at the moment at least, that the divided opposition will not launch a coordinated and widespread effort to fight the election results. Gnassingbé’s genuinely large vote margin and international and regional pressure on the opposition to remain peaceful and accept the results should help prevent the type of electoral violence seen in previous electoral cycles in Togo.

That said, as the recent example of Burundi illustrates, the public sentiment in favor of term limits in Togo is unlikely to go away anytime soon and may prove to be a thorn in Gnassingbé’s side down the road, especially if he remains recalcitrant. There are some signs that Gnassingbé and moderate factions of his party may be open to the idea of term limits as long as they do not apply retroactively. Now that Gnassingbé has secured another term, for the sake of democratization and to perhaps save him the same fate as Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, international and regional actors would be wise to push him in this more moderate direction.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
ETHNICITY, SECURITY, AND CONFLICT IN BURUNDI

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

As civil unrest continues in Burundi over President Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial third term candidacy, the role of the country’s security forces is receiving increased attention. The Arusha agreement, which effectively ended the country’s 12-year civil war in August 2000, mandated significant security sector reform. Until very recently, many had considered the security reforms undertaken in Burundi to be relatively successful. How does the current political impasse affect this assessment?

Security in Burundi Prior to Arusha

Security in Burundi has been a source of conflict since the post-colonial restoration of independence in 1962. Although members of the Tutsi ethnic group are a minority in Burundi (approximately 15 percent of the population), they have historically dominated the army. There are numerous examples of Tutsi repression of the Hutu majority. In 1972, following a violent rebellion against the Tutsi government by members of the Hutu majority, the government responded by killing between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutu civilians over the course of a few months. In the early 1990s, Burundi’s first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected in the country’s first multiparty elections. Security sector reform was one of his key campaign promises. Feeling threatened, members of the military assassinated Ndadaye in October 1993, triggering civil war.

Ethnicity and Power-sharing within Security Forces

The Arusha accords established the framework for a post-civil war government. Ethnic inclusion and power-sharing were bedrocks of the agreement. To these ends, the agreement formalized an ethnically based government and required that no ethnic group comprise more than 50 percent of the military. Since the war ended, security sector reform has been an ongoing process in Burundi. Major donors include the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada. Specific attention has been paid to the governance of the military — specifically, improving the transparency and accountability functions of military institutions and security actors. Burundi has enjoyed significant success in overcoming its ethnic divisions to create a new, inclusive, and professional military organization. According to research published in 2015, Burundi is now one of the world’s top troop contributors to peacekeeping missions.

Current Conflict

The conduct of the police has been called into question due to their partiality for Nkurunziza and frequent firing on protesters. The military, with the major exception of an attempted coup on May 13, 2015, has been praised for its impartiality, especially in comparison to the police.

The coup leader, Godefroid Niyombare, was a former rebel alongside Nkurunziza and was once considered very close to the president. He was the country’s first Hutu chief of staff of the army. Niyombare also served as Director of National Intelligence until he leaked a memo warning against a third-term bid in February 2015. He was fired as a consequence.

The conflict in Burundi has, thus far, broken along political lines, not ethnic ones. The key issue has been the legality of Nkurunziza’s third presidential term. Despite explicit language in the Arusha accords, which states that “no
one may serve more than two presidential terms,” President Nkurunziza insists that he is eligible to run for a third term as president. Opposition to Nkurunziza’s third term has come from co-ethnics from within his party and from outside his party. Agathon Rwasa, a former Hutu militia leader and Nkurunziza’s main opponent in the election, has also been vocal about his concerns about Nkurunziza’s bid and the elections themselves. Rwasa has requested the East African Community deploy a standby force during elections, if polls are to proceed.

Conclusion

Since mid-April, the opposition has been staging daily protests over Nkurunziza’s decision. Despite these protests, an attempted coup, members of the electoral commission fleeing the country, aid cuts, and international pressure, Nkurunziza still appears to have dug in his heels. On June 1, the government of Burundi said that it was considering the East African Community’s call for a six-week election postponement, but there are no indications that Nkurunziza intends to abandon his bid for a third term. Local and parliamentary elections, previously scheduled for June 5, have been postponed indefinitely but presidential elections are still tentatively scheduled for June 26.

As the current situation continues to unfold, the power-sharing agreement within the military appears to be holding. The current conflict has yet to take on a strong ethnic component. This fact might be reflective of the transformative effects of power-sharing. But it also serves to underscore the pernicious nature of political conflict, especially countries transitioning away from autocracy. Many countries in transition have retained overly powerful executive branches and weak counterbalancing government institutions. (As a testament to the weakness of other institutions in relation to the executive, members of the high court and the electoral commission have fled the country rather than openly dispute Nkurunziza’s third term.)

To be clear, the current situation in Burundi is a conflict over political power. It is not an ethnic-based conflict — not yet, at any rate. Ethnic power-sharing within the military has, on its own, not eliminated conflict dynamics in Burundi but rather has channeled them into a different arena.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
AFRICA’S THIRD WAVE OF PROTESTS

By Alexander Noyes

On June 2, 2015, the opposition in Burundi called for a fresh round of demonstrations against President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term in office. Burundi has seen widespread protests over the past month, with more than 20 killed and 90,000 fleeing the country. Burundi is not the only African country to see large-scale protests lately; recent demonstrations have also taken place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Togo, Burkina Faso, and Angola, among others. Are such demonstrations merely isolated events, or are they part of broader upward trend of popular protests in Africa?

“Third Wave” of Protests

Compared to the flurry of academic and press attention paid to the “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, recent African protest movements remain considerably under-reported and under-researched. Analysts have often asked why an “African Spring” never took hold on the heels of the Arab Spring. Recent research, however, suggests that the current demonstrations in Burundi are indeed part of a broad “third wave” of protests in Africa that began toward the end of the previous decade. In a book released in March 2015 titled Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, political scientists Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly situate current protests in a long history of popular protest in Africa. Including North Africa as well as sub-Saharan Africa, they argue that Africa’s first wave of protests began in the decolonization period, the second wave in the late 1980s and early 1990s over democratization, and a third wave taking shape over the past decade motivated by both local problems and broad governance issues.

Contrary to conventional wisdom on the frequency and breadth of African protests, Branch and Mampilly assert: “Starting in the late 2000s, what we identify as the third wave of African protest has posed dramatic challenges to the established order in over forty countries across the continent.” They include all popular protests with “significant political society participation” in their count. They argue that, from 2005 to 2014, “popular protest has been sweeping the continent, erupting in dozens of countries from Egypt to South Africa, Ethiopia to Senegal, Sudan to Angola.” They identify two major patterns of protests in Africa during this period: one, “localized protests,” which are smaller in scale and focused on a particular issue or constituency, such as service-delivery protests, and two, broader-based “general uprisings,” which are focused on changing the political status quo and can grow into revolutions, as seen in Burkina Faso in October 2014. Branch and Mampilly maintain that general uprisings often gain traction around elections, when diverse interests have an opportunity to coalesce and target the current regime.

Support in Findings Beyond Africa

The study by Branch and Mampilly gains support from separate research conducted by political scientist Dawn M. Brancati. In her forthcoming book titled Democracy Protests: Origins, Features, and Significance, which looks at democracy protests on a global scale during the period of 1989 to 2011, Brancati echoes the finding by Branch and Mampilly of a pronounced rise in protests in Africa over roughly the last decade. Brancati defines democracy protests as “mass public demonstrations in which participants demand countries install or uphold democratic elections.” She finds: “in Africa, there was a spat [sic] of protests in the early 1990s and an even more pronounced rise in protest activity at the end of the first decade of this millennium.” Her most interesting finding for Africa specialists may be that from 1989 to 2011, Africa as a region accounted for the single most protests worldwide, accounting for more than 40 percent. She notes: “Democracy protests occurred most commonly in Africa and Asia where 40 percent and 37 percent of democracy protests that arose in this period took place respectively. Only 13 percent occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean and 11 percent occurred in Europe.”
Conclusion

Further research remains to be done on recent protests in Africa, particularly on the various causes, consequences, and outcomes of this “third wave” of protests. While large in scope, the study by Branch and Mampilly carries out only four in-depth case studies (Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan), leaving dozens of other cases as promising avenues for future research. That said, the studies discussed above provide evidence that Africa’s recent protests can no longer be sidelined or dismissed as isolated events. While the extent of a “diffusion” effect is yet unclear, reports that activists with experience from previous protest movements in Burkina Faso and Senegal were deported from the DRC after participating in term-limit protests suggest that such links should be analyzed carefully.

What role should international actors play? Recent research by political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan may offer useful guidance. Using global data from 1900 to 2006, they assert that “campaigns of nonviolent resistance against authoritarian regimes were twice as likely to succeed as violent movements” and that “the larger and more diverse the campaign, the more likely it was to succeed.” They also maintain that “nonviolent resistance also increased the chances that the overthrow of a dictatorship would lead to peace and democratic rule.” Given the potentially salutary impact of non-violent protests on peace and democracy, international actors might focus on developing creative ways to help African protestors organize cohesively, build broad-based coalitions, and remain non-violent.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
KABILA’S ATTEMPT AT A THIRD TERM

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

The political climate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is tense before the presidential election scheduled for late next year, when President Joseph Kabila’s mandate is set to expire. Kabila, who has been in office for 14 years, has given no indication of whether he will run for a third term. Although a government spokesperson has said that Kabila intends to respect the constitution, opponents suggest that the government will use technical delays to justify postponing the presidential election.

Protests and Crackdown

Kabila has been in office since 2001, when he became president at the age of 29 after his father, former president Laurent Désiré Kabila, was assassinated. The younger Kabila played a key role in negotiating peace agreements with rebel forces and the Sun City agreement that ended the war. Kabila then won disputed elections in 2006 and 2011, but he is constitutionally barred from standing for a third term.

In January 2015, citizens in DRC hit the streets en masse in opposition to legislative changes that called for a census before the 2016 election. Many saw this census requirement as an attempt by Kabila to stay in office beyond his two-term limit—some critics estimated that it could take up to three years to organize a national census because of the ongoing conflicts in the northeast and the lack of paved roads throughout the country. The anti-government protests were violent, with hundreds of arrests and more than 40 deaths. There were also reports that Kabila responded by cutting off the Internet and blocking mobile text messaging in an attempt to halt the unrest. Following the nationwide protests, the Senate amended the controversial bill and removed the clause mandating a national census before the 2016 presidential election. “We have listened to the street. That is why the vote today is a historic vote,” Senate President Leon Kenga Wa Dondo said after the amendment was passed.

In March 2015, activists from Senegal’s Y’en a Marre (We’re Fed Up) movement and Burkina Faso’s Le Balai Citoyen (Citizen’s Broom), along with several journalists and Congolese activists and a U.S. diplomat, were detained after a press conference just outside of Kinshasa. The local NGO Filimbi had invited the activists to the DRC for a series of workshops and events. All in attendance were arrested. While the U.S. diplomat was released, the activists were accused of entering DRC to destabilize the country, declared personae non gratae and subsequently expelled.

The next month, a mass grave was discovered in Maluku, an area about 80 kilometers from Kinshasa. Human rights groups are concerned that it may contain the bodies of missing protestors. A judicial enquiry into the mass grave was opened at the request of the United Nations Joint Office for Human Rights (BCNUDH) in the country. On June 8, the families of 34 missing protestors filed a public complaint with Congo’s national prosecutor requesting the exhumation of the mass grave.

Découpage and Dialogue

On March 2, Kabila set a 120-day deadline for the implementation of découpage, “a constitutional change introduced in 2006 intended to divide Congo’s 11 provinces into 26.... The delay is not surprising given that découpage is one of the most complex processes that the government has had to grapple with since the official end of the war.” The government has neither budgeted for the process nor designed an implementation plan. In pursuing découpage now, Kabila may be able to extend his term by claiming he needs additional time and money to complete the rezoning of the DRC’s political map.
In early June, Kabila called for a dialogue with the political opposition, prominent church officials, traditional leaders, and other members of civil society. Some opposition leaders are skeptical and fear that the talks could be yet another Kabila tactic to delay the presidential vote. There are splits emerging within the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the oldest opposition party. Long-time opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, 82, has been in Belgium receiving medical treatment. UDPS members and most other opposition parties have refused to participate in the talks, but Tshisekedi’s son, Felix Tshisekedi, has agreed to meet with Kabila. His participation in Kabila’s dialogue has divided the UDPS party. Furthermore, there are concerns that Felix could be offered a high post, opening the way for power sharing, which could help Kabila soften public opposition if he tries to stay in office. Felix Tshisekedi rejects suggestions that he wants to join Kabila’s government.

Conclusion

In recent years, citizen uprisings have been a key factor in acting as a counterbalance to governments that lack a strong, organized opposition. The most recent Afrobarometer surveys, conducted between 2011 and 2013, show that it is now the norm for citizens across Africa to support term limits. The survey found that in 34 countries, about three-quarters of citizens favored limiting presidential mandates to two terms. Afrobarometer surveys also revealed that most Africans reject authoritarianism, military rule, and one-party rule. The surveys’ findings on term limits appear to hold in the DRC, where citizens are watching Kabila’s actions closely and are willing to engage in mass protest to keep him from securing a third term or extending his term in office.

It is unclear whether Kabila’s attempts to stay in office will be successful. Regardless of when the elections are held, the regime is likely to secure another mandate, with Kabila or another presidential candidate, if the divisions within the opposition persist. The opposition, therefore, would be well advised to engage in coalition building in addition to monitoring the ruling party’s efforts to keep Kabila in office.

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
OPPOSITION BOYCOTTS BY-ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

On June 10, 2015, Zimbabwe held by-elections in 16 constituencies to replace MPs who were expelled from parliament in March for breaking away from Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) and joining a new opposition party, the United Movement for Democratic Change (UMDC). Although Tsvangirai called for the expulsions, both MDC-T and UMDC boycotted the by-elections. These opposition parties claimed that a lack of electoral reforms left an unfair playing field that favored President Robert Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). MDC-T called the polls “shambolic and flawed.”

Major Splits in Both ZANU-PF and Opposition

As reported in earlier editions of Africa Watch, both ZANU-PF and the opposition in Zimbabwe are currently dealing with major splits in their ranks. ZANU-PF has been riven by a fierce succession struggle over who will eventually replace Mugabe. The long-running battle between factions aligned to former Vice President Joice Mujuru and current Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa (who was formerly the justice and defense minister) intensified in the run-up to and after the party’s congress in December 2014. Immediately after the congress, Mugabe installed Mnangagwa as Mujuru’s replacement. Since then, ZANU-PF has expelled hundreds of officials linked to the Mujuru faction. Concurrently, senior officials have publicly criticized the ruling party in an unprecedented fashion. On April 7, 2015, Mujuru’s faction announced the formation of a new party, stating that the party would also be called ZANU-PF, but the PF would stand for “People First.”

On the other side of the political spectrum, the opposition has also been mired in a leadership struggle dating back to its overwhelming defeat in the July 2013 elections. In January 2014, Tendai Biti, the former MDC-T secretary general and finance minister, broke ranks with Tsvangirai over his continued leadership of the party, forming the MDC Renewal Team. The MDC Renewal Team later joined Welshman Ncube’s smaller MDC faction, branding the new party as the UMDC, which was officially launched in March 2015. The UMDC, however, has struggled to get off the ground. It has been stricken by infighting, with co-president of the party, Sekai Holland, resigning her post shortly after the party’s official launch and senior official Elton Mangona breaking away and forming his own party on June 3. UMDC’s decision to boycott the by-elections has also caused turmoil, leading other officials to resign from their posts.

Pre-election Violence

Although MDC-T and UMDC boycotted the polls, ZANU-PF did not enjoy a smooth campaign period, because a record number of former ZANU-PF officials—believed to be aligned to Mujuru—formed a coalition and ran as independents. The ruling party suspected that the coalition of independent candidates had ties to MDC-T. In the run-up to the poll, ZANU-PF cracked down on the independents. There were reports of pre-election violence in Hurungwe West and other constituencies. Hurungwe West independent candidate Temba Mliswa, who was the former chairman of ZANU-PF in Mashonaland West before his expulsion from the party, was arrested, and his supporters were assaulted by ZANU-PF youths during the campaign. Mliswa asserted: “The six village heads were accused of supporting me and subsequently beaten. The assault was perpetrated in full view of the nine ZRP [Zimbabwe Republic Police] officers in a Land Rover and members of the President’s Office present.” Despite the violence aimed at him, he remained outspoken, saying, “I am not afraid….there is so much desperation [in ZANU-PF], I see it.”
Conclusion

While full results of the by-elections are not yet available, preliminary returns suggest that independent candidates failed to make inroads against ZANU-PF. Although both ZANU-PF and the opposition are suffering from factionalism, the opposition’s boycott appears likely to further cement the ruling party’s parliamentary majority in Zimbabwe. As a result, the boycott is unlikely to help push electoral reforms forward, at least in the near term. A 2010 study by the Brookings Institution finds that election boycotts worldwide rarely work; instead, “electoral boycotts generally have disastrous consequences for the boycotting party, rarely result in desired international attention or sanction, and many times further entrench the ruling leader or party.” Research by political scientist Steffan Linberg on election boycotts in Africa reached a similar conclusion: “boycotting strategies tend to derail rather than promote democratization.”

A likely win for ZANU-PF will allow Mugabe to claim a short-term victory and some momentum moving forward to the 2018 elections. That said, deep splits in ZANU-PF, Mugabe’s old age, and Mnangagwa’s perceived lack of broad popular support suggest that things could change significantly for ZANU-PF by the 2018 polls. Without Mugabe in the picture, opposition candidates may have a real shot at competing. From the opposition’s perspective, if any positive is to be taken from the by-elections, it is that MDC-T and UMDC were able to remain aligned on the issue of boycotts, which may prove to be a helpful building block in forging a more cohesive opposition alliance in the run-up to the 2018 elections.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE—A PROBLEM OF “THICK BORDERS”

By George F. Ward

Africa’s share of world trade is small, and Africa trades surprisingly little with itself. The World Economic Forum’s *Africa Competitiveness Report 2015* estimates that the continent’s share of global trade is around 2 percent. Of that, only around one-tenth of Africa’s global trade total is intra-African commerce. This share compares unfavorably with intra-regional trade in other world regions—21 percent in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 48 percent in the countries covered by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 65 percent within the European Union (EU). According to experts, including the World Bank, a major factor restricting intra-African trade is the problem of “thick borders,” meaning the complex of tariff and, even more important, non-tariff restrictions that slow down traffic across African frontiers. Recently, three of Africa’s regional economic groupings have announced progress toward a new free-trade area. It is worth examining whether the agreements announced could succeed in effectively addressing the practical problems that impede intra-African trade.

**How Thick Are Those Borders?**

Most shipments of goods cross African borders by road, and the delays can be staggering. One survey found that drivers spent an average of 68 hours to get clearance at most of the customs stations on the Kenya-Tanzania border. Up to 1,600 documents might be required for each truck that Shoprite, a large South African supermarket company, sends across a border, even one within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Companies such as Woolworths pay full tariffs at SADC borders because the process of providing rules-of-origin documentation to obtain customs preferences is too costly. A World Bank study concentrated on Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) demonstrated that for agricultural products, the effect on prices of crossing the Burundi-DRC border was equivalent to pushing markets in each country 1,824 kilometers, or 41 hours, further apart. The equivalent figures for the DRC-Rwanda border were 1,549 kilometers, or 35 hours. The costs imposed by border delays create opportunities for corruption. Surveys have showed that the majority of truckers traveling across borders in the East African Community (EAC) have paid bribes.

**Counting the Cost**

Trade barriers have two components—tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs). According to the *World Economic Forum*, 60 to 90 percent of trade costs relate to NTMs. One study showed that if all countries raised their performance on just two NTMs—border administration and transport and communications infrastructure—halfway to the level of global best practice, worldwide GDP would increase 4.7 percent and exports would rise 14.7 percent. It can be surmised that the effects in Africa would be at least that great.

Although NTMs play the largest role in restricting intra-African trade, high tariffs are also a problem. Tariff receipts provide a sizable share of government revenue in many African countries, and those tariffs seem to have a disproportionate effect on goods destined for African markets. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has estimated that African firms face markedly higher tariff rates when exporting to African markets than in exporting the same goods to markets outside the continent. This situation is largely due to preferential trade agreements between African countries and western nations.
What Is Being Done

The African Union recognizes eight regional economic communities (RECs). The RECs are considered to be the building blocks of a future Africa-wide economic community. All the RECs have put in place measures aimed at facilitating intra-African trade. These measures have been implemented in varying degrees by member states. Only a few programs have succeeded in facilitating trade by reducing NTMs. The Walvis Bay Corridors system that links Namibia to other SADC countries is one example of a success.

In 2005, three RECs—the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EAC, and SADC—launched a tripartite effort to establish a free-trade area based on three pillars: market integration, infrastructure development, and industrial development. One early accomplishment of the tripartite effort was the creation in 2008 of a new tool to handle trade complaints, the Tripartite NTB (Non-Tariff Barrier) Monitoring Mechanism, or NTBMM. This is a web-based “post box” through which the private sector can report trade complaints in Eastern and Southern Africa. In its first five years of operation, the NTBMM registered 436 complaints and reportedly resolved 326 of them.

Most recently, at a summit meeting on June 10, 2015, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, the three RECs officially launched the COMESA–EAC–SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area, which covers about half the continent and over half of its GDP. The agreement signed at the meeting commits all member states to accord each other most-favored-nation trade treatment, mandates elimination of all non-tariff barriers to trade, and pledges cooperation in several areas aimed at facilitating trade. Just a few days after the tripartite agreement was signed, heads of state at an African Union summit set 2017 as the target year for the extension of the Tripartite Free Trade Area to the entire continent.

Will There Be Real Change?

As one expert has said, the tripartite pact is really more of an integration plan than a free trade agreement. The agreement will come into force when 14 parliaments have ratified it. Although that seems likely, many of the details needed to effect change still have to be worked out. These details will be contained in 14 annexes, each of which will address a specific area of the deal. The annex on NTBs has reportedly been agreed to. Beyond that, the parties are giving themselves one year to complete the annexes on tariffs, remedies, and rules of origin. Trade in services, intellectual property, competition policy, and other issues will be handled in a second phase, scheduled for completion in 2017. Clearly, a good deal of work lies ahead, but the tripartite agreement does provide hope of thinning down the thick trading borders that currently limit economic growth and prosperity in Africa.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
AGRICULTURE, ASSUMPTIONS, AND DATA IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

It is frequently asserted that women make up the majority of agricultural workers in Africa—anywhere from 60 to 80 percent of the workforce. Much international assistance programming is either implicitly or explicitly based on this belief. New analysis from the World Bank, supported by other research, calls these figures into question, and suggests a range closer to 40 to 50 percent. What are the implications of this lower range for programming and development in Africa?

Africa’s Agricultural Sector

Almost 60 percent of the world’s arable land is found in Africa, and yet food scarcity remains a persistent problem for the continent. Part of the reason lies with some of the political and economic choices countries made when they obtained independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Many countries in Africa during the immediate post-colonial period attempted to rapidly industrialize—often using heavy taxes and price distortions on agricultural products to subsidize such attempts. Countries also sought to keep food prices particularly low to prevent urban populations from protesting, rioting, or worse. These approaches broadly resulted in reduced incentives for agricultural production and yielded poorly performing economies. Beginning in the 1970s, Africa became a net food importer. By 2007, the food deficit was approximately $22 billion. The past decade, however, has seen renewed interest in agriculture-based development policy on the continent, and agriculture has been recognized as an engine for growth.

Women’s Role in Agriculture in Africa

As early as the 1970s, it was asserted (and eventually accepted as fact) that women were disproportionately responsible for the bulk of agricultural activities in Africa. Several development policies have used this assumption as a springboard for women-centered agricultural programming.

Recent research indicates that this assumption may have a shaky empirical basis. The World Bank study, released in June 2015, takes a closer look at agricultural production in six countries in Africa: Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. Together, these countries comprise almost 40 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa. The authors find that on average, women contribute 40 percent of the labor force for food produced in those six countries, but there is significant variability in the range of women’s contribution to the labor force for agricultural production—from 24 percent in Niger to 56 percent in Uganda.

In an article published in 2011, Cheryl Doss, a development economist at Yale University, makes a similar argument. She points out that the often-touted statistic of women comprising 60 to 80 percent of the agricultural workforce is wide of the mark. Doss finds great variation across regions in terms of women’s participation, but concludes that the true average range is much closer to 50 percent of the agricultural workforce. According to Doss, women may be more heavily involved in food preparation, but they are not disproportionately responsible for food production in Africa.

Bad Data Lead to Bad Policy

This finding has two significant implications. More inclusive agricultural programming might prove a more effective way of increasing overall food production in some countries than women-only initiatives. This is not to say that women-focused programs are ineffective. They are likely very effective at empowering women, giving voice to their concerns, incorporating them into the development dialogue, and improving micro-levels of crop production, all of which are desirable outcomes. But to generate broad-based, country-level improvements, it is necessary to take into account the
most accurate understanding possible of the nature of food production. In some countries, men might be responsible for the majority of food production; in others, women. Good policy should understand and reflect these differences.

Second, it is unfortunate that a fundamental assumption such as this (that women play a disproportionate role in agricultural production in Africa) went untested and unexamined for so long. This failure highlights the dearth of quality data in Africa. Bad assumptions and data can lead to bad policy. More efforts to improve the quality and collection of data indicators in Africa are needed.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
AFRICAN SOLUTIONS FOR AFRICAN PROBLEMS—STILL SEARCHING

By George F. Ward

The African Union (AU) held its 25th summit in South Africa from June 7 to 15, 2015. Media coverage of the meeting was dominated by the drama surrounding the participation of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. That controversy aside, the summit produced some interesting results. One such was a resolution that pledged to have “united and functioning single military” in the form of the African Standby Force (ASF) by the end of this year. This ambitious goal is not likely to be fulfilled in a fashion consonant with the original concept for the ASF. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at the status of the AU’s effort to create an African response force and to examine what progress might be achievable in the near term.

Creating an African Standby Force—A Long, Slow Road

The framework for the ASF took shape in 2003, soon after the creation of the African Union. Along with other institutions, the ASF formed part of an African Peace and Security Architecture, the overall aim of which was to furnish African countries with the means to provide for their collective security. The original concept of the ASF included five regional brigades, each with 5,000 personnel. In addition to soldiers, the units would include police and civilian experts. The brigades would be formed under the guidance of the regional economic communities (RECs) responsible for north, west, central, east, and southern Africa. A portion of each brigade was to be prepared to serve as part of a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) that would be able to intervene with force in emergency situations as authorized by the AU and the United Nations Security Council.

For a number of reasons, the ASF has not developed according to the ambitious original plan. There have been organizational difficulties, shortages of funding, and, in some cases, political differences and lack of will. Phase 1, which involved setting up organizational structures and command arrangements, was to have been completed by 2005, but was delayed until 2008. Phase 2, in which the ASF would become operational, was to have been completed by 2010, but has not yet been realized. In the western and southern regions, where there were both capable RECs—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—and hegemonic states—Nigeria and South Africa—progress on forming the regional brigade structures was relatively rapid. In East Africa, where several countries are members of more than one REC and where both Ethiopia and Kenya have hegemonic aspirations, progress was slower, but the East African Standby Force (ESF) was seen as ready to deploy by late 2014. The laggards have been the central and northern regions. In the former, there has been little progress, and in the latter, none.

A New Concept Emerges

In part because of these delays, African countries have continued to lack effective collective security mechanisms, whether through the AU or the RECs. As a result, they have been obliged to rely on Western intervention in crises such as the Islamist insurrection in Mali and the internecine violence in the Central African Republic. In the latter case, the failure of a REC military force to support a South African contingent during an attack by Séléka rebels in March 2013 was one factor that led to the loss of 13 South African soldiers.

African frustration and embarrassment with this state of affairs peaked in May 2013, when the AU celebrated the 50th anniversary of the pan-African union (the AU and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity). At the
meeting, South African President Jacob Zuma, under domestic criticism for the tragic loss of South African soldiers in Bangui, tabled a new idea—the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). Despite its unwieldy title, the ACIRC was designed to be a flexible and speedy instrument that would make up for the failure to field an RDC. Zuma lobbied intensively for his project with the support of the Nkozasana Dlamini Zuma, the chairperson of the AU Commission, former South African foreign minister, and his former wife. The ACIRC was included in the results of the summit meeting as a transitional capability.

The ACIRC was designed to circumvent the complicated mechanisms of the ASF. It is intended to have 5,000 troops, of which 1,500 might be deployed at any one time. Rather than being formed through the RECs, the ACIRC would be composed of contributions pledged directly by AU member states and would report directly to the AU. Its freedom of action would also be less circumscribed by the requirement for United Nations approval than that of the ASF. In short, it was supposed to be easier to organize, more agile, and more effective than the nonexistent RDC.

Unfortunately, the ACIRC has had its own problems. In November 2013, President Zuma organized a summit meeting to make progress on the ACIRC and to collect pledges of forces. Only three other heads of government attended. Six additional countries were represented at a lower level. The meeting ended with pledges of limited forces by Chad, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda and a decision to leave further organizational details to the chiefs of national defense staffs.

Various reasons have been advanced for the failure of the ACIRC to move forward. Some see the project as taking away whatever momentum might still be behind the ASF concept. Others are opposed or lukewarm because they view the ACIRC as an attempt by South Africa to throw its weight around. Ethiopia and Nigeria are two military heavyweights that both initially seemed to support the concept, but later moved away from it. Ethiopia has been traditionally wary of committing its military forces to joint endeavors, and Nigeria may be too focused on the fight against Boko Haram to consider external responsibilities.

Is There a Way Forward?

South Africa seems likely to remain the key actor in the continuing effort to create capabilities that will permit African solutions to African problems. Recent developments suggest that the government in Pretoria wants to continue the ACIRC initiative without abandoning the ASF—its rapid deployment capability being an eventual goal. The chief of staff of the South African army announced that the ACIRC contribution by South Africa, consisting of 1,800 personnel built around one infantry battalion, will be operationally ready by the end of June 2015. Days later, the AU announced that South Africa would be the venue from October 19 to November 7, 2015, for a large multinational military exercise, Amani Africa II, involving regional standby forces from SADC, ECOWAS, and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This exercise is billed as part of the way forward for the ASF.

If the South African ACIRC contingent ends up also forming that country’s contribution to Amani Africa II, that exercise will be an opportunity to test whether or not the ACIRC and ASF concepts can be made mutually compatible. In the event the exercise proceeds smoothly, we should not be surprised to see the AU declare the ASF to be operationally ready, with the ACIRC force as a stand-in for a REC-based rapid deployment capability that will remain a project for the distant future. Although this arrangement would not be problem free, it would provide the AU with both a limited emergency reaction force and at least the semblance of an outcome of the long effort to create an ASF.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
AFRICAN DEMOCRACY EMERGES FROM BELOW

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

Across sub-Saharan Africa, threats to repeal or otherwise circumvent term limits for heads of government have led to broader debates about democratic backsliding and challenges to democracy. Recent citizen activism illustrates the powerful role that actors from “below” play as opposition leaders, social activists, and ordinary citizens have responded to such threats with demands for responsive and accountable government.

Term Limits under Threat

In recent years, a number of African presidents have attempted to modify or reinterpret their countries’ constitutions to extend their terms in office. In Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza’s determination to run for a third term in 2015 has led to protests, a failed coup d’état, and the opposition of regional leaders and the African Union. In Burkina Faso in 2014, then-president Blaise Compaoré’s attempt to push legislation through the National Assembly to repeal presidential term limits resulted in a popular uprising and ultimately led to his resignation. In Senegal in 2011–12, then-president Abdoulaye Wade’s attempted constitutional changes and a bid for a third term led to a protest movement that dragged the country into a period of unrest marked by riots, repeated arrests, hundreds of injuries, and a number of deaths. Leaders of the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda, all of whom are term limited, appear to be heading in a similar direction.

Democracy Grows from Below

While leaders’ attempts to manipulate constitutions to stay in power could be interpreted as democratic backsliding, it may also be that popular protests and sustained opposition from civil society are indications that democratic practices and ideals are becoming entrenched and that African populations are attempting to hold leaders accountable. Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2011 and 2013 show that it is now the norm for citizens across Africa to support term limits. The survey found that in 34 countries, about three-quarters of citizens favored limiting presidential mandates to two terms. Afrobarometer surveys also revealed that most Africans reject authoritarianism, military rule, and one-party rule.

As noted in the June 11, 2015, issue of Africa Watch, the political climate in the DRC has been tense since January 2015, when ruling president Joseph Kabila attempted to pass an electoral-reform bill that many argue would have extended his term in office. Citizens in DRC hit the streets en masse, facing violent crackdowns. In response to the protests, the Senate amended the controversial bill. Kabila, who has been in office for 14 years, has given no indication of whether he intends to run for a third term. Activist groups have vowed to continue to protest if Kabila attempts a power grab.

Pro-democracy activists influence each other, learn from each other, and work together by coalition building. This became clear in March 2015, when activists from Senegal’s Y’en a Marre and Burkina Faso’s Le Balai Citoyen were invited to the DRC for a series of workshops geared toward engaging youth in politics. The visiting activists were arrested and declared personae non gratae in the DRC. Pro-democracy activists across sub-Saharan Africa are also becoming emboldened as they see successes in places they never thought imaginable. In an interview with the author, one activist from Burkina Faso noted, “No one ever thought Compaoré would be forced out. If it can happen in Burkina, it can happen anywhere.” A Y’en a Marre activist interviewed by the author asserted, “We will go wherever we are invited in Africa; they might try to intimidate us but they can’t and they won’t stop us.” The activist also said that members of the group had been invited to Burundi just before the attempted coup d’état.
Social movement theory argues that protest movements are often more successful when they emerge within longstanding grassroots movements rather than when they emerge spontaneously in response to triggering events. Spontaneous collective action, however, can invigorate a movement or help develop new coalitions. In Senegal, *Y’en a Marre* activists had been organizing for several months before Wade’s attempted power grab, and in Burkina Faso, *Le Balai Citoyen* activists began organizing in 2013, a year before the proposed constitutional changes.

Research also suggests that forging alliances and building coalitions are essential strategies in grassroots social action. The *Y’en a Marre* protest movement had been collaborating with other civil society groups and had developed an effective media campaign that included direct messaging to the broader population and not just its primary youth constituents. In Burkina Faso, *Balai Citoyen* activists had started coordinating protests with other citizen groups and the opposition. Both groups were also successful in their efforts to link the threat to democracy to the deteriorating social conditions (high unemployment rates, power outages, high costs of fuel and food) in each country.

It is unclear whether the current citizen action in the DRC or Burundi will prevent the ruling regimes from hanging onto power. Citizens in the DRC appear to have built a loose coalition of organizations. The government, however, has not hesitated to use a variety of means to prevent citizens from mobilizing. These measures have included interruption of Internet access, imprisonment, and violent crackdowns. In Burundi, Nkurunziza has maintained his grip on power and is determined to move forward with elections and his third-term bid, despite anti-government mobilization among the population, increasing insecurity, condemnation from the region and international community, and the threat of sanctions.

**Conclusion**

Several African leaders have attempted to change their country’s constitutions to extend their terms in office, thereby obstructing democratic progress. African populations have responded by mobilizing en masse to voice their opposition and to defend their constitutions—in some cases facing violent crackdowns by the police or military. As the events in Senegal, Burkina Faso, DRC, and Burundi highlight, popular protests illustrate not only people’s willingness to go to extreme lengths to protect their constitutions but also their support for term limits and other democratic institutions. While the actions of some African leaders appear to be setbacks for democracy, the responses by civil society illustrate that the democratization process across Africa continues even as term limits come under threat.

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
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   George F. Ward, Stephanie M. Burchard, Alexander H. Noyes, Janette Yarwood

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