

ZIMBABWE: FORMER VP MUJURU JOINS FRAY

By Alexander Noyes

On September 8, 2015, former Vice President Joice Mujuru—who was sacked from her position by President Robert Mugabe in December 2014—[released](#) a political manifesto. The [document](#), “Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development (BUILD),” reads as a strong rebuke to Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. It calls for rapprochement with Western countries and revision of some of Zimbabwe’s most controversial policies, including land reform. The BUILD manifesto announces Mujuru’s return to the political stage with a splash. But does she stand a chance at unseating 91-year-old Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980? [more...](#)



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President, Joice Mujuru. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

SECURING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Providing security is an essential feature of election management, especially in newly democratizing countries and post-conflict environments. In those situations—where trust in institutions and political actors is lacking and electoral processes are relatively new and unfamiliar—the need for impartial and professional security is great. The police and the military are frequently expected to provide security during elections, but problems have been associated with the involvement of each, especially in Africa. There appears to be a need for more and better training of security forces before elections are held. [more...](#)



Police provide security during local municipality elections in Cape Town, South Africa, May 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

ZIMBABWE: FORMER VP MUJURU JOINS FRAY

By Alexander Noyes

On September 8, 2015, former Vice President Joice Mujuru—who was sacked from her position by President Robert Mugabe in December 2014—[released](#) a political manifesto. The [document](#), “Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development (BUILD),” reads as a strong rebuke to Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. It calls for rapprochement with Western countries and revision of some of Zimbabwe’s most controversial policies, including land reform. The BUILD manifesto announces Mujuru’s return to the political stage with a splash. But does she stand a chance at unseating 91-year-old Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980?

Background

As [highlighted](#) previously by *Africa Watch*, ZANU-PF has faced increasing factionalism over the past several years. A long-running struggle between two political camps, one headed by current Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the other by Mujuru, came to a head at the party’s congress held in December 2014. Shortly afterward, Mugabe [sacked](#) Mujuru and dozens of her closest supporters. Mugabe then installed Mnangagwa as vice president and purged [hundreds](#) other party officials seen as aligned with Mujuru. While Mujuru retreated to her farm and kept a low profile after the congress, several senior officials in her camp openly [criticized](#) Mugabe and ZANU-PF, a rarity in Zimbabwe. In April, several former senior ZANU-PF officials and allies of Mujuru’s, led by Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo, [announced](#) a new opposition party called “People First,” which Mujuru was expected to eventually lead. In June, Mujuru broke her silence and apologized for her past complicity in Zimbabwe’s [failures](#): “We collectively failed in our basic mandate to the nation. For my role in the failure I am truly sorry and I apologize to my fellow Zimbabweans.”

BUILD Manifesto

After her apology, Mujuru again largely remained out of the public eye until the release of her two-page manifesto last week. Contrasting sharply with ZANU-PF’s platform, the document called for a market-driven economy, respect for the rule of law and property rights, a free press, and a revision of the controversial land-reform program and [indigenization](#) policy (which requires foreign- and white-owned businesses to sell a 51-percent stake to black nationals). The manifesto also [eschewed violence](#), called for reengagement with the international community, and addressed the contentious topic of reforming the country’s security sector, which plays an influential role in keeping ZANU-PF in power: “We say no to violence... We shall ensure that our foreign policy will be guided by rapprochement across the board... The security establishment shall be apolitical, well-resourced and we shall promote meritocracy and professionalism in the sector.”

Opposition Coalition?

Following release of the BUILD document, [local papers](#) have reported on a potential alliance between Mujuru and various opposition groups. Zimbabwe’s [opposition](#) parties have also suffered from acute factionalism since their loss in the 2013 elections. The most intriguing potential coalition partner for Mujuru would be Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party led by former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T). Tsvangirai’s [reaction](#) to the BUILD platform suggests he is open to the idea: “Our side of the struggle is getting many new players every day... They deserve our support for their new sense of patriotism and the realization that together we are bigger, better, and more formidable.” MDC-T spokesperson, Obert Gutu, [added](#), “We would like to make it known that as a party, we are happy that



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President, Joice Mujuru. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

some former liberation stalwarts have seen the light and are now speaking the language of democracy.” Alliances have also been [discussed](#) with former Finance Minister Tendai Biti’s MDC-offshoot, MDC Renewal, and Dumiso [Dabengwa’s](#) African People’s Congress (ZAPU).

Conclusion

The release of the BUILD document signals Mujuru’s intention to return to national politics and challenge Mugabe in elections scheduled for 2018. A variety of factors suggest that her reentry into the fray could be a major political development in Zimbabwe. The first is Mugabe’s old age. This week, Mugabe apparently unwittingly repeated a [speech](#) he had given just weeks before, prompting MDC-T to question his “mental faculties” and call for his resignation. But if Mugabe dies in office or hands the reins to Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa before elections, ZANU-PF’s political fortunes might actually sink lower than if Mugabe (who would be 94 years old) ran, given Mnangagwa’s [lack](#) of broad political support and Mujuru’s perceived grassroots popularity among ZANU-PF supporters. Before she was sacked in 2014, Mujuru reportedly commanded support from nine out of 10 provinces in party elections. The country’s economic decline since 2013 also does not bode well for the incumbent party.

Finally, academic [research](#) shows that some opposition coalitions can greatly improve the chances of electoral turnover in semi-authoritarian regimes, a point recently illustrated by the case of [Nigeria](#). Given Mujuru’s national liberation credentials and Tsvangirai’s dwindling but still broad support base, a cohesive opposition alliance between the two would sharply increase the chances of a ZANU-PF defeat in 2018, especially if Mugabe were not a candidate. That said, there are a number of challenges to such a pact, namely deciding who would lead and who would play second fiddle, as both Mujuru and Tsvangirai see themselves in the leading role. Moreover, ZANU-PF will not go down without a fight—a Mujuru-Tsvangirai coalition would likely face harassment and violence at the hands of the state security apparatus, as seen in 2008 and previous election cycles in Zimbabwe.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

SECURING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Providing security is an essential feature of election management, especially in newly democratizing countries and post-conflict environments. In those situations—where trust in institutions and political actors is lacking and electoral processes are relatively new and unfamiliar—the need for impartial and professional security is great. The police and the military are frequently expected to provide security during elections, but problems have been associated with the involvement of each, especially in Africa. There appears to be a need for more and better training of security forces before elections are held.

Security Forces during Elections: Necessary but Problematic

Effective election management must address a multitude of security concerns, especially in newly democratizing countries, which seem to be [particularly prone](#) to election violence. Threat assessments and crisis response planning, candidate protection, ballot and polling station security, and crowd management are but a few of the many functions that security forces are expected to perform before, during, and after elections. In a best-case scenario, just the perception of an unprotected or insecure process could deter voters from participating; in a worst-case scenario, it could trigger widespread violence.

Due to constitutional limits on military deployments for domestic purposes, police forces are most often responsible for providing election security. Even when constitutional limits do not apply, potential voters and opposition supporters, especially in countries with a history of military involvement in political processes, are likely to interpret the involvement of military forces as a form of intimidation. For example, during the 2000 Ghanaian election, the ruling party conducted [military exercises](#) meant to intimidate opposition candidates and voters. In Zimbabwean elections, military personnel have been known to [man polling booths](#) to ensure the re-election of the ruling party.

On some occasions, however, there is little choice but to include the military in election management. Military forces may be directly called on to provide election security in countries emerging from serious conflict, such as post-apartheid [South Africa in 1994](#). In Nigeria, which has been fighting an insurgency in the northeast of the country, the armed forces provided security for the 2015 elections, although not without [controversy](#). Given Nigeria's history of military coups, some were [concerned](#) that the military was being called on to provide election security.

Finally, international peacekeeping forces have been known to provide election security for countries holding elections after the cessation of civil war, as was the case of [Liberia in 2005](#).

Because of the limited resources and capabilities of national police forces in many countries, [joint operations](#) between police and members of the armed forces are frequently temporarily authorized to assist in preparations for elections and to respond to emergency situations. Sierra Leone, Guinea, and South Africa generally rely on both police and national defense forces for election security.

Despite the obvious need for countries to provide security during elections, state security forces have also been a source of violence in several African elections, including those held in [Ethiopia 2005](#), [Togo 2005](#), [Kenya 2007](#), [Zimbabwe 2008](#), and more recently before the [Guinean election in 2015](#).

Potential Best Practices

The need for security during elections and the opportunity for it to be abused by parties in power present a serious challenge to effective election administration for many African countries. According to [a 2010 report](#) prepared in consultation with the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] Electoral Assistance Unit, despite the inherent requirement



Police provide security during local municipality elections in Cape Town, South Africa, May 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

of neutrality on the part of security actors, many countries in West Africa find it difficult to provide impartial security during elections. The report's authors find that this happens because neither citizens nor security forces themselves understand exactly what security forces are expected or allowed to do during elections.

USAID, in its electoral security [best practices framework](#), recommends that there be (1) clear guidelines for security forces providing election security and (2) consequences for those who act outside their prescribed roles. Citizens and security forces alike must believe that anyone who violates election laws will be punished.

Ghana's election management provides examples of best practices in action. Ghana draws its election security staff from a [combination](#) of the national police, prison officials, immigration and customs officials, and the national fire service. It also readies several thousand military troops that it keeps on standby for emergency purposes only (an estimated [4,000](#) before the 2008 election).

[Ghana's approach](#) underscores inclusiveness, forward-planning, transparency, and communication:

- It forms an Elections Security Taskforce using a multiplicity of actors and agencies.
- It identifies electoral hot spots and sends a "light peacekeeping force" to those areas as a precautionary measure.
- It ensures public awareness of the role of security forces during election through periodic press conferences and country-wide workshops.

Although every context is different in terms of key actors and specific security challenges, these fundamental tenets may go a long way toward keeping the peace during elections.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.
