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By Alexander Noyes

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CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TANZANIA—PART TWO

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On October 8, 2014, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete formally received a draft of the new proposed constitution from the Constituent Assembly. Whereas mere weeks before it had seemed this process would be postponed until after the 2015 elections, the Constituent Assembly forged ahead and delivered on its promise to conclude deliberations by the beginning of October. Controversially, this draft was approved without the participation and consent of a large number of opposition members who had staged a boycott of the proceedings, claiming that the government had hijacked the constitution-making process and that their voices were not being heard. There are several points of contention between supporters of the proposed constitution and those in opposition, but one of the most fundamental issues is the structure of the union between the mainland and Zanzibar.

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Prior Tensions

Ravalomanana was convicted and sentenced in absentia in 2010 to life imprisonment for the deaths of 30 protesters during the 2009 coup, but a 2012 deal brokered by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) included provisions for Ravalomanana to return unconditionally. Prior attempts by Ravalomanana to return had been stifled by Rajoelina, including a 2012 incident in which a plane with Ravalomanana on board was turned back mid-flight. Although Rajaonarimampianina has generally been amenable to the prospect of Ravalomanana’s eventual return and communicated with him in South Africa, Rajaonarimampianina has dragged his feet on the specifics of the issue since January of this year when he was sworn in. In May, Rajaonarimampianina referred to the issue as a “transitional” problem, arguing that he wanted Ravalomanana to return “in a fair environment; a peaceful environment,” but claiming that “I’m not sure that environment is already there.”

Detention and Fallout

On Monday, security forces detained Ravalomanana at his house in the capital, Antananarivo, hours after he arrived back in the country, reportedly dispersing his supporters with tear gas. It is unclear exactly where he is currently being held. Brian Currin, Ravalomanana’s envoy in South Africa, said he is being held in a resort in the north of the country, while AFP reports that he is being held in Antsiranana, a “military town” in the north. Ravalomanana’s family has accused the Rajaonarimampianina government of kidnapping him and demanded information on his whereabouts. When Ravalomanana arrived, he announced to hundreds of his supporters: “I am here and ready to bring peace for Madagascar.” He went on: “I’m not coming to bring trouble but to bring peace and work for Madagascar’s development.”

Ravalomanana then seemed to contradict these claims of peace, reportedly questioning Rajaonarimampianina’s legitimacy by saying that the latter is “not the people’s choice” and that he himself still retains “lots of power.” Before his arrival in Madagascar on Monday, Ravalomanana did not announce his return or discuss his plans with the government, and given that South Africa had seized his passport, it is unclear how he arrived in the country. “The Malagasy government was not informed about Marc Ravalomanana’s return and will take action because laws exist,” said Henri Rabary Njaka, head of President Rajaonarimampianina’s cabinet.
Rajaonarimampianina then **claimed** that the detention was not an arrest but a precaution to protect Ravalomanana: “It’s for his safety that he was arrested...Besides, it’s not an arrest but rather placement in a supervised area to ensure his safety...I reiterate my spirit of reconciliation. The initiatives [detention] I have taken are in this direction.” Although not mentioning what kind of danger Ravalomanana was in, Rajaonarimampianina **said** he faced “all kinds of threats.” Ravalomanana’s camp clearly sees the detention differently, with Currin **stating** that his arrest is “reminiscent of the actions of the coup regime.”

**Conclusion**

As reported on in the August 1, 2013, **edition** of *Africa Watch*, Madagascar has a history of coups and deeply troubled and factionalized civil-military relations. Like Rajoelina, Ravalomanana is believed to maintain some residual **support** among factions in the army and security sector. Since taking office, Rajaonarimampianina has taken several promising **strides** toward restructuring the country’s security sector, but this latest incident and its fallout have the potential to again split the military and security services, which would likely lead to violence. These competing allegiances in the military, coupled with the high levels of popular support Ravalomanana ostensibly enjoys (his proxy won 46.5 percent of the vote in the last election) means that Ravalomanana’s return and detention, if mishandled by Rajaonarimampianina, have the real potential to generate another crisis that would jeopardize the country’s newfound stability.

Ravalomanana **reportedly** felt Rajaonarimampianina was continually delaying the issue of his return and would never have allowed him to come back. While an agreement by both sides on the timing and specifics of the issue prior to Ravalomanana’s return would have been preferred, now that Ravalomanana is back in Madagascar, international actors are obliged to deal with the realities on the ground. The SADC roadmap clearly allows for Ravalomanana’s return. Therefore, the international community—particularly the 15 southern African states of SADC as well as France (which as Madagascar’s former colonizer retains significant ties)—would be wise to push both Rajaonarimampianina and Ravalomanana to negotiate in good faith and act judiciously during the coming weeks to promote political reconciliation and forestall violence. Some limits on Ravalomanana’s political activity, his pardon, and his recognition of Rajaonarimampianina as the legitimate leader of Madagascar are likely to be key issues of any discussions.

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Tanganyika and Zanzibar

Mainland Tanzania (known as Tanganyika during the colonial period) and the islands that comprise Zanzibar have very different histories. Tanganyika was under German and later British colonial rule. After defeating Portuguese colonizers in the late 1600s, Oman took possession of the islands of Zanzibar and used them as a major hub of the Arab slave trade. Around 1840, the Sultanate relocated its capital from Muscat in Oman to Stone Town in Zanzibar. In 1886, Zanzibar became a British protectorate after the 45-minute long Anglo-Zanzibar War. Due to the long history of trade and rule by Arabs, there was (and still is) a sizable Arab population in Zanzibar.

In the 1960s, the British initiated the process of decolonization of its colonial possessions. Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961. In Zanzibar, a series of elections were held to determine the composition of the post-colonial government, but each election produced a seemingly intractable deadlock between the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), which represented mostly black Zanzibaris, and a coalition of parties—Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)/Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZNPP)—that represented mostly Arab Zanzibaris. These elections reflected, and in some ways may have reinforced, a growing racial divide in Zanzibar.

In late 1963, Zanzibar declared independence from Great Britain and established itself as a constitutional monarchy with Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah as its leader and ZNP/ZPPP in control of the government. Within a month, a revolutionary coup took place. The leader of ASP, Aref Karume, was installed as president. In April 1964, after secret negotiations between Karume and Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere, it was announced that Zanzibar and Tanganyika would form a union called Tanzania, and each would have its own government, resulting in a two-tier system of government.

A Tense Union?

For a number of reasons, this arrangement has long been a source of tension for the government of Tanzania, but under single-party rule (1960s to 1990s), there was little opportunity to openly criticize the arrangement. It has been alleged that Karume’s government in Zanzibar was responsible for the detention and disappearance of hundreds of his critics. He was assassinated in 1972, and his successor, Aboud Jumbe, formally oversaw the merger of Zanzibar’s ASP and the mainland’s sole legal political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), into Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).

The population of Zanzibar, numbering approximately 1 million, is estimated to be more than 90 percent Muslim. The population of the mainland is close to 45 million and is believed to be nearly evenly split between Christians and Muslims.

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(approximately 45 percent of each faith). On the Zanzibari side, there have been demands for more autonomy. These demands have become much louder since the regime liberalized in the 1990s. On the mainland, there is some resentment of the preferential treatment Zanzibar appears to receive—Zanzibar has its own flag, national anthem, and parliament.

Violence has broken out after elections since the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1995. After several rounds of peace talks in the 2000s, it was announced before the 2010 elections that the main political parties in Zanzibar had agreed to form a permanent government of national unity, which ensures power-sharing regardless of the outcome of elections.

**Constitutional Review Process and Structure of the Union**

The constitutional review process initiated in 2011 has seen several different draft constitutions proposed. One of the most divisive issues in writing a new constitution has been how to structure the powers of the governments of Zanzibar and the mainland. Opposition parties and civil society groups on the mainland have long advocated for a system that devolves power away from the central government. Zanzibari opposition parties in particular have sought more autonomy to manage their own affairs.

The [first draft](#) and [second draft](#) of the new constitution each established a three-tier system of government, or a federal arrangement, for Tanzania. The draft approved by the Constituent Assembly, however, retained the two-tier system currently in place. The government contends that the current system is more than adequate to meet the needs of Tanzania and that a three-tier system (separate governments for the mainland and Zanzibar plus the union government) would be unnecessarily expensive and could potentially undermine national unity. The insistence by the government to continue with the status quo on this particular issue contributed heavily to the opposition’s decision to boycott the process.

Deliberation by the Constituent Assembly has been the most politicized part of the process. The Constituent Assembly is an ad-hoc body of more than 600 established by the government expressly to debate the merits of the second draft of the constitution. It is the only part of the process in which political parties have been able to influence the outcome because it combines the country’s parliamentarians and 200 members of civil society into one body. Despite the boycott, the Assembly was able to garner the votes needed (a two-thirds majority of members from the mainland and a two-thirds majority of members from Zanzibar) to pass this version of the constitution. By law, the proposed constitution must be voted on in a public referendum within [84 days of its passage](#), but it is not clear whether there is sufficient time to accomplish this before the 2015 elections.

**Conclusion**

The constitutional review process has offered Tanzanians, both from the mainland and from the islands, a unique opportunity to provide their input on how the government should be organized. Debate over the structure of the union, an issue that some felt had been partly resolved by the 2010 government of national unity in Zanzibar, was reinvigorated by the constitutional process. During the consultative process, [almost 200,000 Zanzibaris](#), some of whom reportedly thought this process might result in an independent Zanzibar, attended the various forums held across the islands. The fact that their preferences seem to have been dismissed or pushed aside could influence how they vote in 2015. It most certainly guarantees that this issue will play a central role in campaigns. Zanzibaris are overwhelmingly in favor of a three-tier system, or federal system of government, whereas support on the mainland seems more evenly divided, although some have argued that a majority on the mainland also prefer the three-tier system. Voters may be inclined to vote against the government if they believe that the new constitution does not adequately reflect their preferences. It is also possible that this process may have the unintended consequence of reviving calls for Zanzibari independence, something the Islamic extremist group UAMSHO (“The Awakening” in Swahili) has been advocating for the past few years. The next installment in this series will look at the origins, activities, and goals of UAMSHO.

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