


OIL EXTRACTION IN KENYA—POLITICAL AND GEOLOGICAL HURDLES

By Dr. Eliza Johannes

Turkana County, an austere and historically marginalized region located in northwest Kenya, has recently seen a growing number of [intercommunal clashes](#) between the Turkana and Pokot communities. Whereas [cattle rustling and banditry](#) predominantly accounted for violence in the past, competition over ownership rights to land expected to contain at least [600 million barrels of oil](#) has altered the tenor and tone of violence in the area. Raiders from both communities, who in the past sought to steal prized cattle from their rivals, now allegedly torch villages and terrorize civilians in a “scorched earth” campaign meant to dislodge entire populations. Their apparent belief is that whoever remains can lay claim to the land and monopolize its riches. [more...](#)



Source: Kenya County Fact Sheets, www.worldbank.org.

Dr. Eliza Johannes is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE AHEAD OF POLL IN LESOTHO

By Alexander Noyes

On February 1, 2015, a [shootout](#) between the military and two bodyguards of Prime Minister Thomas Thabane took place at a checkpoint in Maseru, Lesotho's capital city. The violence left one dead and three wounded. Thabane was not with the bodyguards at the time of the shooting. After the incident, Thabane's press secretary [alleged](#) that “renegade” soldiers had deliberately targeted the bodyguards. Another senior adviser of Thabane's [asserted](#) that the bodyguards were perhaps targeted for previously tipping off Thabane about a coup attempt in August 2014, allowing the prime minister to escape to South Africa. The Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) [denied](#) blame for the incident, claiming that the bodyguards shot first. Renewed political tensions in the run-up to [elections](#) scheduled for February 28 have raised fears about poll-related violence in Lesotho. [more...](#)



In this Sunday, Aug. 31, 2014, photo, army personnel outside the military headquarters in Maseru, Lesotho. In August, Lesotho's prime minister fled to South Africa in fear for his safety. Defense Forces denied any attempt at a coup. (AP Photo)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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
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IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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


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past sought to steal prized cattle from their rivals, now allegedly torch villages and terrorize civilians in a “scorched earth” campaign meant to dislodge entire populations. Their apparent belief is that whoever remains can lay claim to the land and monopolize its riches.

Competing accounts offer different descriptions of the role politics plays in alternatively resolving and escalating this long-standing conflict. On February 3, 2015, the Turkana and Pokots separately [hosted](#) members of Kenya’s Senate Security Committee in [Kapedo](#). The committee chairman, Yusuf Haji, was on a fact-finding mission to determine causes and identify possible resolutions to the conflict. He and other national officials in attendance are seeking a politically negotiated settlement to take effect before the “[geothermal project](#), oil, and [gold](#) discoveries in the area go to waste” due to insecurity, an outcome feared by some investors. Other unnamed local politicians are allegedly promoting the violence, which purportedly stems from the belief that if one group wins outright, it will monopolize the rights of landownership. Politicians representing such a group are expected to be advantageously positioned to share the wealth. Turkana is a [trust land](#) owned by the community, a point activists have raised since at least 2012 in support of a negotiated solution—a solution they say will benefit local residents, not outsiders hiding behind questionable titles and deeds.

Against this backdrop of intercommunal conflict and contentious politics, British-owned Tullow Oil plc, the company responsible for oil exploration and development in the area, has pursued the goal of expanded operations in Kenya by working to appease both government leaders and locals. The [Tullow Kenya timeline](#) illustrates how since 2010, the company has prioritized exploring possible oil locations, established estimates for likely yields, and made arrangements for extraction. The [recent](#) drop in oil prices has made offshore drilling less attractive and focused the company’s efforts on developing Kenyan oil deposits in earnest.



Kenya Timeline. (Source: “Special Feature: Kenya,” Tullow Oil.)

To facilitate these efforts, Tullow [describes](#) how it has made \$21.7 million in government payments (e.g., taxes to national government), \$47.9 million in local content expenditures (e.g., locally sourced construction and maintenance projects), and \$1 million in social investment (e.g., investments in local development projects, such as schools, hospitals, and scholarships). While the nearly \$70 million in investments is considerable, it represents only part of an East African strategy that involves coupling extractions in Kenya with others in Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, which would all be shipped for export to a projected port on the Kenyan Coast near Lamu.

Violence and political drama grab headlines, but they are not the most significant hurdles Tullow potentially faces in the region. The company [estimates](#) that every barrel of processed crude oil requires 50 gallons of water. Given the estimates of 600 million to 1 billion barrels of oil in the area, the water requirement is 30–50 billion gallons. Tullow's need for water occurs in a region [renowned for water shortages](#), where the poor are more likely to beg for water than food or money. Currently, Tullow has established what its and the local population's water needs are and is now mapping [subsurface](#) water to estimate the extent of Turkana's aquifers. In 2013, satellite imagery and radar identified the presence of [large water sources](#) underneath the arid land. To date, however, the government has yet to deliver a comprehensive plan for extracting and distributing the "[liquid gold](#)." In the meantime, disputes over scarce water and oil prospects are likely to remain drivers for conflict in the region.

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In this Sunday, Aug. 31, 2014, photo, army personnel outside the military headquarters in Maseru, Lesotho. In August, Lesotho's prime minister fled to South Africa in fear for his safety. Defense Forces denied any attempt at a coup. (AP Photo)

History of Tensions

Lesotho is a small, landlocked country surrounded entirely by South Africa. Although the country has a long history of military coups and political instability, the formation of a 2012 coalition government was hailed as democratic [success](#) story. The coalition consists of Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), led by Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing, and the Basotho National Party (BNP). As highlighted in the October 3, 2014, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, hopes for stability sank relatively quickly. Deep tensions within the coalition government can be traced back to June 2014, when Thabane suspended parliament to thwart a no-confidence vote. A coup attempt, followed by clashes between the military and police on August 30, 2014, brought tensions to a head.

Agreements and Security Environment

After the June suspension of parliament, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) began work to facilitate a resolution. An October 2 [agreement](#) negotiated by Cyril Ramaphosa, deputy president of South Africa, allowed for the reopening of a caretaker parliament on October 17, with elections moved up to February 2015. A follow-on [deal](#) agreed to on October 23 attempted to resolve the security situation and deadly rivalries between the military and police. The police are [seen](#) as standing behind Thabane, while the LDF is seen as supporting Deputy Prime Minister Metsing. The deal specified that the three top security officials seen as most responsible for the violence would step down and take "leaves of absence" outside Lesotho. As agreed, Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli, former head of the LDF, is now in [South Africa](#), while Khothatso Tsooana, former police commissioner, and Maaparankoe Mahao, whom Thabane appointed as Kamoli's replacement in the wake of the coup attempt, are in Algeria and Sudan, respectively.

Despite the temporary removal of Kamoli, Tsooana, and Mahao, unstable civil-military relations in Lesotho have persisted, with Khoantle Motsomotso, the acting LDF commander, [defying](#) Thabane on a number of directives. After Tsooana stepped down, Thabane [clashed](#) with his replacement, acting police commissioner Masupha Masupha. The latter recently took early retirement. In January, Thabane went so far as to attempt to recall his ally Tsooana from Algeria, but was thwarted by Ramaphosa. During the first week of February 2015, Home Affairs Minister Joang Molapo [argued](#) that previous agreements did not go far enough: "The insistence by Mr Ramaphosa that the security situation is fine and completely under control, has unfortunately proven to be the opposite. . . It should be clear to everybody there are still issues that need to be dealt with."

Conclusion

As forecast in the October 3 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, it appears previous agreements have not been sufficient to decrease political tensions and resolve deep-seated and violent intra-security sector rivalries. The shootout on February 1 was the latest manifestation of a deteriorating security environment in Lesotho. On February 5, four LDF soldiers were arrested in South Africa, where they [allegedly](#) planned to kill the two bodyguards from the shootout, who were in a South African hospital.

To address rising tensions and the security situation, South African President Jacob Zuma, under the auspices of SADC, paid a visit to Lesotho on February 9. After meeting with coalition partners, Zuma [declared](#) that elections would go ahead as planned: “The meeting expressed its confidence that the climate for the holding of elections on 28 February remains on course.” To make this seemingly optimistic rhetoric a reality, South Africa, SADC, and international actors may have to pressure Lesotho’s coalition partners to denounce violence. Stakeholders could also lay out concrete repercussions for parties that do foment election-related violence. In the longer term, the failure of recent piecemeal agreements to adequately resolve political violence suggests that comprehensive [peace-building](#) and security sector reform initiatives will be necessary to help end Lesotho’s recurring bouts of political instability.

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