U.S.–African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests

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Executive Summary

Introduction

On September 13, 2017, a symposium called “U.S.-African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests” was convened at the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Approximately 200 Africa specialists participated in the symposium, the second in a planned annual series. The event was co-sponsored by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and USIP. Men, women, and youth from a variety of communities were represented at the symposium, including U.S. government agencies and military commands, academia, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. The proceedings were enriched by the contributions of an authoritative array of speakers and panelists, both U.S. and African.

The program included the following elements:

- An opening statement by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Shannon
- An introductory conversation with two African leaders, focused on how Africans view current U.S.-African partnerships and on identifying which U.S. government programs and institutions support African interests
- Panel discussions on:
  - Governance, institutions, and effective partnerships
  - Prospects for enhancing economic partnerships
  - Opportunities and challenges in security sector cooperation
- A luncheon address by General Thomas Waldhauser, USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
- A summary closing conversation moderated by Kate Almquist Knopf
- Closing remarks by Ms. Susan Gordon, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

This report includes the following:

- A thematic summary
- A full report on the proceedings
Taking Overall Stock

Overall, the day’s proceedings illustrated how far U.S.-African partnerships have come and pointed toward avenues for more robust cooperation in the future. Under Secretary Shannon’s opening address, the first policy statement on Africa delivered by a senior official in the current administration, reflected a striking degree of continuity with the policies of past U.S. administrations, emphasizing peace and security, countering terrorism, increasing economic growth, and promoting democracy and good governance.

While agreeing in principle with U.S. policy priorities, several African speakers raised questions about the quality, depth, and strength of the U.S.-African relationship. They pointed out that both African civil society organizations and African governments perceive the United States as approaching Africa as a benevolent donor and patron bestowing gifts on relatively passive recipients rather than as an equal partner. This sort of paternalism is at odds with the relationship of equals that Africans, especially young Africans, desire. Further, Africans view the United States as too often focused on short-term security or economic objectives, while neglecting infrastructure projects and longer term programs that would empower Africans. They stressed the importance of constant nurture by the United States of its ties with Africa.

There was broad consensus among participants on the importance of the demographic trends at work in Africa. Africa’s population is growing rapidly, and that population is increasingly moving to urban areas. The principal challenges will be to foster equitable economic progress to create jobs for the growing population and to improve access to quality education to train young Africans for those jobs. African speakers urged the United States to move creatively beyond government-to-government programs and to forge new partnerships with young African entrepreneurs and civil society leaders based on equality and common interests. They endorsed the Young Africa Leaders Initiative (YALI), the Department of State’s Community Solutions Program, and USIP’s Generation Change programs as examples of successful programs that have had a positive impact on African youth.
Within the overall context of consensus on the major demographic and social trends underway in Africa, discussions at the symposium focused principally on governance, economic partnerships, and security sector cooperation.

**African Democratic Governance: A Mixed Picture**

Trends in African democratization are somewhat erratic, with examples of both progress and retreat. In some cases, advances and setbacks have taken place in the same countries. Viewed over the span of several decades, an increasing number of African states have embraced multiparty democracy. Over the past decade or so, however, the democratic wave seems to have plateaued, and new authoritarian trends have emerged. Africa seems to be going through something akin to a democratic recession.

While opposition parties have made genuine gains in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, Burkina Faso, and The Gambia, authoritarianism has emerged in key states such as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda. A number of factors seem to be propelling the negative trends, including flawed elections, executive overreach, corruption, and suppression of civil society groups and the media. Persistent inequalities in income and opportunity also seem to be playing roles. In countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, inequalities are becoming entrenched and, in some cases, are deepening. High levels of economic growth have not always translated into substantial poverty reduction, but unfortunately they have increased the economic rewards of political control.

Africans expressed mixed views on the U.S. role in supporting democracy on the continent. Some cautioned that not every issue requires American assistance. African forms of democracy should be respected, even when they differ from Western ideals. Speakers expressing those views argued that economic development partnerships were more important than assistance in the sphere of political governance. Others argued for a continued, active U.S. role in building democratic institutions. Strong U.S. support for democracy and consistent advocacy for democratic development are still needed. At the same time, some emphasized that while strong leadership is important, strong institutions are even more crucial.

**Prospects for Enhancing Economic Partnerships**

Despite the existence of some U.S. economic partnership initiatives in Africa, most participants agreed that the United States could and should be doing more. Compared with China’s massive investments in African infrastructure and its large loan portfolio, recent U.S. initiatives were seen as limited in scope and value. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the centerpiece of U.S. trade relations with Africa, is important, but also insufficiently transformational. AGOA’s positive results have been concentrated in the resources and textiles areas, and it has not proven effective in helping African
countries grow their manufacturing sectors. Power Africa, another U.S. initiative, has the potential to be more transformative for African economies than AGOA, if managed effectively.

Even though the U.S. initiatives were sometimes compared unfavorably with China’s, participants did not push for the United States to imitate China’s focus on heavy infrastructure. Instead, they advocated U.S. engagement in areas of comparative advantage, such as:

- Information and Communications Technology, particularly in the field of cloud computing, in which the United States is the global leader.
- Development of a regulatory framework to support African venture capital investment.
- Investment in education and training to grow technological skills. The initiative by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, in training software coders in Nigeria was cited as a positive example.

Looking ahead, participants forecast a bright future for U.S.-African economic cooperation. They stressed, however, that continued engagement by U.S. embassies in the commercial area would be crucial. In addition, they warned that the current delays in visa processing for Africans, if continued, could become significant impediments to business development.

Opportunities and Challenges in Security Sector Cooperation

In his luncheon address, General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander, AFRICOM, set the stage for a discussion of a range of security issues. Using examples from Libya and Somalia, the general outlined AFRICOM’s role in combatting transnational threats. He also described the command’s partnership-building activities, stressing the command’s view that prevention is always better than intervention. In commenting on Chinese military activities in Africa, including the establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, General Waldhauser stated that despite geopolitical differences between the United States and China, there are opportunities for cooperation with African countries, particularly regarding peace operations and training of African forces.

During the subsequent discussion of African security issues, the panelists and symposium participants painted a mixed picture. On paper, African multilateral security arrangements, including the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, seem to be comprehensive. In practice, there is a sizable gap between agreements on paper and operational capabilities. A number of African security organizations, military as well as police, have been hollowed out by neglect and politicization. Many African politicians
do not understand how the security sector should operate and therefore are unable to play an effective monitoring and oversight role.

Despite these shortcomings, African regional and subregional security arrangements are important because they reflect an African effort to assume responsibility for the continent’s security challenges and because they are legitimate in a constitutional sense. Even if ambitious projects such as the African Standby Force have not materialized as envisioned, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities continue to play important roles in legitimizing ad hoc efforts to address security problems. Endorsement by the African Union of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin region and of the G5 effort in the Sahel are examples.

Participants also painted a mixed picture regarding U.S. efforts to counter violent extremism. Depending on the metrics used, there have been both successes and failures. On the one hand, the number of attacks by violent extremist organizations (VEOs), the terrain controlled, and the casualties involved have increased. On the other hand, U.S. assistance has arguably prevented attacks on the U.S. homeland and has bought time for friendly governments to organize against VEOs. Overall, however, the level of capacity built over the decades of U.S. assistance does not seem to justify the sizable resources that have been committed to the effort. While it is important for the United States to sustain its security assistance efforts, it is also essential for the United States to develop means of evaluating the outcomes of programs and measuring progress toward transformation of the security sector in Africa.

**Conclusion**

During the final session, a young African civic activist told of his success in persuading a group of teenage soldiers in South Sudan to turn aside from violence. Inspired by this account, the symposium participants ended the day on a positive note, focusing on the opportunities ahead. As one speaker noted, Africa has the opportunity to become the largest democratic region in the world. Despite evidence of backsliding in some places, the dominant trends still point to greater democracy. Continuing along the democratic path will require providing economic opportunity for Africa’s rapidly growing population of young, and increasingly better educated, people. Strengthened U.S.-African partnerships will be needed for that effort to succeed.
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A. Welcoming Remarks and Opening Statement

- Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Ambassador Thomas Shannon, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

In his opening statement, Ambassador Shannon stressed that the extension of U.S. power and values around the globe have had transformative effects, especially in Africa. U.S.-Africa partnerships have reinforced the transition of authoritarian governments to democratic ones, exclusive societies to inclusive ones, autarchic markets to open markets with regional integration, and changed the paradigm of global isolation to vital involvement in the world.

The Centrality of Africa

Africa’s emergence as a point of global interest and strategic convergence requires that it be recognized for its centrality in world affairs: “Africa is no longer an addendum to global geopolitics. Instead, it is a bridge from the Indo-Pacific region to the larger Atlantic community, while also connecting directly to Europe and the Middle East.” All the geographic bureaus of the State Department and the geographic combatant commands of the Department of Defense connect to Africa. What happens on the continent in the next few years will shape the world. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the continent’s economic and demographic trends. Specifically:

- Six of the world’s 10 fastest growing economies are in Africa.
- By 2030 Africa will represent approximately 25 percent of the global workforce and 25 percent the world’s consumer base.
- By 2050 the continent’s population is projected to nearly double to almost 2 billion.
- The U.S.-Africa trade balance is close to parity as African states consistently draw strong investor attention from the United States.
B. New U.S. Policy toward Africa

President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and the rest of the national security team will focus on the following four strategic pillars when engaging African partners:

1. Advancing peace and security
2. Countering the scourge of terrorism
3. Increasing economic growth and investment
4. Promoting democracy and good governance

Each is discussed below.

1. Advancing Peace and Security

The administration envisions African partners leading regional conflict-resolution efforts. The United States will help by continuing to partner with the African Union (AU) and regional organizations to end violence and prevent mass atrocities. For the position of the United States to be financially sustainable, effective, and enduring, continuing contributions from existing assistance partners and greater political commitment from African leaders who value peace and stability in their countries and the region are required.

Activities for advancing peace and security also include building the numbers and capabilities of regional peacekeepers in Africa. Last year, peacekeepers from over 20 African countries received training for United Nations (UN) and AU peacekeeping operations. Training efforts such as these have resulted in Africans now comprising over 70 percent of the peacekeepers in Africa, up from 40 percent 10 years ago.

Humanitarian assistance also contributes to peace building through the provision of aid for vulnerable populations. In 2016, the United States provided $1.5 billion for the humanitarian operations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Approximately 1.8 million people in South Sudan receive life-sustaining humanitarian assistance on a monthly basis with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.

Last, U.S.-African partnerships have helped provide peace and security outside Africa’s borders. On the global front, African states are helping address the danger of North Korea by restricting their political and economic engagements with the nation, shutting down North Korean illicit trade networks operating on the continent, and opposing Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests. The ambassador commended all the efforts put forth to this purpose, but noted that more can be done.
2. Countering the Scourge of Terrorism

The second strategic pillar of the U.S. policy toward Africa is to leverage partnerships with African allies to counter and defeat violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and ISIS-West Africa. African countries’ greater ownership of regional and local efforts has produced some successes; notable among them is the collaboration between the AU and Somali security forces to defeat al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Partnerships have the potential of bringing American military, law enforcement, and intelligence experts closer to local African representatives of civil society, traditional authorities, and religious leaders. The resulting combinations can produce a comprehensive set of tools to address the root causes of conflict, marginalization, and weak economies that contribute to terrorism’s persistent threat. But progress resulting from these efforts can be undone if security forces resort to abusive and illegal behaviors.

3. Increasing Economic Growth and Investment

The administration wants to see the U.S.-African relationship move from aid to trade and investment and to further efforts to open markets that create jobs for Americans and Africans. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the centerpiece of U.S. bipartisan endeavors to support African economic development. AGOA has supported a 14 percent growth in U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa, which last year totaled $11 billion. Other economic highlights include (1) increases in U.S. investment in sub-Saharan Africa from $9 billion a year in 2001 to $34 billion a year in 2014; (2) the creation of 300,000 new jobs across Africa; and (3) an expansion in U.S. exports to Africa from $5 billion in 2000 to $25 billion in 2014. These successes and their contributions to strengthening democratic institutions and regional stability in Africa led the U.S. Congress in 2015 to reauthorize AGOA for 10 more years.

The U.S. will continue to support two-way trade and investment in Africa. Examples of this include the three trade hubs established by USAID to help the African private sector take advantage of AGOA and to increase their exports to the United States. The Millennium Challenge Corporation will also continue its presence in Africa by supplying economic assistance to governments that meet standards of good governance.

4. Promoting Democracy and Good Governance

The ambassador emphasized that good governance is the foundation for security and inclusive growth in free societies. Corruption, in contrast, is corrosive regardless of where it takes place. It worsens poverty and inequality, compromises citizens’ faith in government, deters foreign investment, fosters instability, and prevents institutions from delivering basic services. An AU study estimates that corruption costs the continent roughly $150 billion per year.
The United States will continue efforts to uphold this strategic pillar of good governance by partnering with regional organizations. The United States was proud to partner with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2016. The organization demonstrated its commitment to democracy when it joined regional leaders to pressure Gambian President Yahya Jammeh to give up power and allow for a freely and fairly elected president to succeed him. Democracy is not simply an academic concept—it can help individuals understand that they have a voice in defining their own destiny.

5. Conclusion
The U.S.-African partnership is a journey of trusted friends and partners focused on common goals of striving for peace, security, inclusive democracy, good governance, economic opportunity, a trained workforce, and an empowered civil society. Ambassador Shannon concluded his speech with an African proverb he thought embodied the relationship: “If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.”

C. Opening Conversation
- Moderator
  - Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Panelists
  - Yvonne Akoth, Founder and Director, Impart Change, Generation Change Fellow
  - Michelle Ndiaye, Director, Africa Peace and Security Program, Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Ambassador Carson initiated the conversation by asking the guests to describe how various communities of Africans view current U.S.–Africa partnerships, and which programs enacted by the U.S. government and U.S. institutions today support African interests.

1. A Matter of Perception
According to the panelists, African civil society organizations and policymakers alike view the current relationship between the United States and Africa in terms of “donor-recipient.” What Africans desire, on the other hand, is a relationship of equals. Paternalism is a term many Africans would use to characterize USAID and AFRICOM’s bilateral relationships on the continent. U.S. interests in Africa also tend to focus on issues of the moment and short-term priorities. The work of USAID is seen in this light by many. While its activities have brought significant support in health care and democratization, there is a desire to align the responses of U.S. partners more closely with the longer term plans of

African youth today appreciate the knowledge and skills of international partners, but they need partners willing to approach them with an understanding of African contexts. Advances in technology and social media have aided young people’s understanding of what is happening around them. They know when expatriates’ viewpoints do not correspond with their experience, and they know when African leaders are not acting in the best interests of their countries. Youth elites want to see changes that will improve their lives and end corruption. In Nigeria and Kenya, the “Not too young to run” campaigns have seen young people running for political offices in unprecedented numbers. Young people are not looking for someone to tell them what to do; they are looking to challenge the entrenched political landscape. They are ready to challenge the decision-makers, but need additional opportunities on the ground, not only abroad, to learn the skills to enact the changes they want to see.

2. Building on Success

An aspect of the relationship that has been particularly well received is efforts to lift up youth interested in poverty eradication, good governance, climate change, conflict and resolution, and peace and security. Former President Barack Obama unveiled the Young Africa Leaders Initiative (YALI) program in 2010. YALI has a transparent application program and reaches young people from rural areas who would otherwise have no way acquire the skills needed to become effective leaders. The Department of State’s Community Solutions Program provides practical experience. USIP’s Generation Change provides young people with the skills to address conflicts ranging from interpersonal to intergroup. These programs bring young people to the United States. Nonetheless, as these programs are facilitated at the government level, bureaucratic and financial obstacles can make participation difficult for many.

Young people are seeking more tangible, practical, and accessible forums to bring their own ideas for change to fruition. The previously mentioned programs tend to focus on technical skills, but one guest contended that training in “soft skills” such as social entrepreneurship and social investment are equally important for helping people improve their economic status, deal with conflict, and avoid radicalization. While there are some venues available to pursue these skills, finding support is an ongoing challenge, one in which the U.S. could intervene and offer additional support.

The conversation continued with a discussion on where U.S. and African interests are at odds with one another. While increased democracy and good governance are goals for both sides, the emphasis on “electoralizing” democracy ignores other factors that are equally important for addressing security challenges. Sanctions against corruption are
another tool of governance that could be looked at more closely as a means to bring about democracy. Supporting the young people of the demographic boom who will become the leaders of tomorrow is another.

3. Efforts to Support Peace and Security

One final theme of the conversation drawn out by Ambassador Carson’s questions was what can be done by the United States to align itself with the security sector partnerships that are currently growing in Africa. The United States could extend its reach to African youth by investing in both young people’s entrepreneurship projects and their ideas for social change, peace building, and combatting terrorism. Young Africans are directly affected by conflict, and one way to prevent them from drifting into violence and radicalization is to have them contribute their ideas to the policy formulation processes conducted by the AU and U.S. partners. It is not only “youth policies” that affect youth; all public policies affect youth. Young people have perspectives that could be extremely beneficial. One idea for supporting this effort of improved policymaking and engaging youth constructively would be to have them participate in AU missions as observers. The United States and the AU could provide platforms for this type of engagement. One guest gave the example of youths who had been recruited to join al-Shabaab who have returned to their communities and offered ideas for preventing recruitment.

The discussants stressed the importance of nurturing long-term commitments and investing in peace and security architecture. There is more to security than high-level agreements for military training. The United States should align its assistance efforts with the AU’s Africa Peace and Security Architecture. This would extend the reach of security objectives to include governance, peace, and post-conflict resolution. Moreover, it would articulate human security as a longer term perspective rather than a short-term priority.

D. Panel 1: Governance, Institutions, and Effective Partnerships

- Moderator:
  - Judd Devermont, (National Intelligence Officer for Africa, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence)

- Panelists:
  - Dr. Peter Lewis, Associate Professor and Director of African Studies Program, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
  - Moeletsi Mbeki, Deputy Chairman, South African Institute of International Affairs
– Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

The first panel explored trends in African governance and institutions. It was noted that Africans are taking their protests to the streets in record numbers. Despite a drift toward authoritarianism in other regions of the world, it appears most African citizens remain firmly committed to democracy. Some governments, however, are resisting their citizens’ calls. Governments are curbing civil society, shutting down access to the internet, and flouting judicial decisions. There is a robust ongoing debate over the most productive and appropriate role for the United States in navigating this divide.

1. Democratic Progress and Retreat

The story of democracy in Africa is one of both progress and retreat, sometimes in the same country. Indicators from a variety of different sources tell a consistent story: the number of democracies in Africa rapidly increased after the mid-1980s and has been relatively constant since. Democratization trends since 2000 have either remained frozen or stagnated, depending on your interpretation, and something of a democratic recession appears to have begun around 2010. Appendix E is the slide presentation used by Professor Lewis in illustrating these points.

Flawed elections, executive overreach, corruption scandals, and suppression of civic groups and the media raise serious questions about the quality of democracy on the continent and general trends of governance in the region. Many electoral democracies embody self-interested political classes, substantial corruption, and little policy innovation. There are rising and, in some cases, intractable inequalities in diverse countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana. Mechanisms such as transparency and improved electoral quality may not be enough to boost democratic outcomes. Transparency may not be linked to accountability, and elections may be utilized as strategies of control. Resurgent authoritarianism in countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda further complicates this picture.

Nonetheless, democratization has opened political space and fostered new social groups able to advocate for rights, liberties, and accountability. Opposition parties have made genuine gains in Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Gambia. There has also been evidence of institutional strengthening in new democracies. The Kenyan Supreme Court ruling on the August 2017 general election, the well-managed Nigerian 2015 elections, and the failure of third-term bids in Senegal and Nigeria are emblematic. Civic organizations and media are vibrant channels of information, discourse, and protest in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and numerous other countries.
2. Role of External Partners

From a U.S. foreign policy perspective, the Trump administration has said it would be seeking to expand on what has worked before based on U.S. national strategic interests. There are significant trade, investment, and economic opportunities all across the continent. By working together, the United States and its African partners can create jobs and opportunities for mutual benefit. The big message from the administration is that “we are listening and ready to engage.”

For African countries to continue to succeed, it was asserted that they need strong institutions, not strong leaders. Outgoing President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who is abiding by the two-term limit set out in the constitution, was praised for modeling good behavior for other leaders. Liberia was also mentioned as an example of a country that has undergone a remarkable transformation in a short amount of time, emerging from civil war in the early 2000s to become a recipient of a multimillion-dollar Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact today. Through the MCC, the United States has been working with Liberia on important issues like electricity production and youth employment, and seeing progress.

It was cautioned that not every issue requires U.S. assistance. Matters related to democracy and governance may be uniquely African issues. Industrialization, entrepreneurship, and innovation—areas in which the United States excels—are areas of which African countries need and want American partnership. Africa has the capital and resources but not the skills to fully develop and achieve its potential. Democracy, however, must be defined by the citizens that will live under its rule. Americans cannot define democracy for Africans just as South Africans can’t define democracy for Zimbabweans. It was also noted that the progress that has been made from the immediate post-colonial period of the 1960s to now should not be overlooked. Governments across the African continent are much more similar today than they ever have been before.

E. Panel 2: Prospects for Enhanced Economic Partnerships

- Moderator:
  - Jennifer Cooke, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

- Panelists:
  - André Pienaar, Founder and Chairman, C5 Capital Ltd.
  - Oren Whyche-Shaw, Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID

Africa’s economic outlook is promising, but there are significant hurdles to be overcome. Three important factors influencing Africa’s economic outlook are the decline
in global commodity prices, political uncertainty in several key countries, and rapid population growth.

1. Declining Commodity Prices
   The initial euphoria associated with high commodity prices that benefited many mineral-rich African countries has subsided, once again highlighting the importance of economic diversification to avoid over-dependence on commodity exports.

2. Political Uncertainty
   Whereas several African countries were once considered promising targets for investment, political uncertainty in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and even Tanzania has caused some investors to pause and reevaluate their prospects. The enduring challenges associated with corruption, illicit markets, and state capture continue to undermine healthy economic development. In some cases, countries like Mauritius and Rwanda have created an economic environment that is attractive to investors, despite their questionable political systems, demonstrating that autocratic government and economic development are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

3. Population Growth
   Between 2015 and 2030 there will be 29 million new entrants into the African labor market. Yet as it currently stands, the African job market will not produce enough opportunities for employment. This “tsunami” represents an important threat to stability. High unemployment exacerbated by a looming youth bulge may cause some to resort to criminality to provide their livelihoods.

   The economic relationships between the United States and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have, since 2000, revolved mainly around the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA. AGOA, which provides trade preferences for quota and duty-free entry into the United States for certain goods, was designed to transform eligible African countries into more market-based economies. It has been criticized, however, for facilitating the exports of African oil and minerals while neglecting other economic sectors.

   Power Africa, another popular U.S. government–led initiative, began in 2013 and seeks to add more than 30,000 megawatts of cleaner, more efficient electricity generation capacity and 60 million new home and business connections by 2030. Through this initiative, the U.S. provides a range of tools—financial, legal, advocacy—and private investors to the African public and private sectors to facilitate the delivery of power to millions of Africans. Some argue that Power Africa has the potential to be more transformative for African economies than AGOA.
5. Challenges and Opportunities

Despite the success of these important initiatives, the U.S. government and American private sector have not yet taken advantage of the full range of economic opportunities that exist in sub-Saharan Africa. In comparison, China has increased its foreign investment in Africa substantially in recent years. It has focused almost exclusively, however, on extractive industries and the construction of infrastructure, enabling the acceleration of the extraction and transportation of natural resources to China. Despite China’s massive investments in infrastructure, the infrastructure gap in Africa remains significant, representing a very lucrative opportunity for U.S. companies.

Natural resource and infrastructure sectors aside, Africa also offers opportunities for high-technology firms to find markets in Africa. The United States is currently the global leader in cloud computing. The leading company (Amazon Web Services) is 10 times larger than the next 14 competitors combined. If “data is the oil of the 21st century,” then cloud computing has the potential to truly transform the business sector by reducing startup and operating costs tremendously, thus offering opportunities for entrepreneurship that were previously cost-prohibitive. With the ability to access big data analytics based in the cloud, applications such as early warning systems, online education, and online banking have emerged as affordable and feasible opportunities for tech-savvy entrepreneurs.

The United States can also help African countries build their venture capital sectors. Today, there are many impediments to building thriving venture capital sectors, the most significant of which is high capital costs. Limited capacity in the regulatory sector to develop an ecosystem that is attractive to venture capitalists and stimulate the digital economy is also a challenge. This offers an opportunity for U.S. regulatory experts to transfer their knowledge to African partners, who could then build regulatory environments that appeal to venture capitalists.

Finally, investing in education to overcome the current skills gap would be hugely beneficial for both Africa and the United States. First, transferring skills to Africa’s youth could help alleviate Africa’s unemployment problem by suppling qualified entrants to the labor market. Transferring skills to Africa’s youth would also increase the pool of qualified workers to support American companies doing business on the continent. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan have made great strides in this area by investing millions in the Nigerian company Andela, which trains and deploys software coders in Africa. Imparting this skill not only provides Africans with a prospect for a better future, but it creates a skilled workforce in Africa capable of supporting high-tech foreign companies.

6. Looking Ahead

The African continent has the potential to be an economic success story if it can capitalize on its massive (and rapidly growing) pool of human resources and create a
climate conducive to investment. The United States could help by working with African partner governments to improve regulatory environments and carry out economic reforms that support competitiveness. Through commercial diplomacy offices, U.S. embassies could provide critical support to U.S. companies looking to invest in Africa, but requiring assistance navigating the complicated regulatory structures. Cultivating transatlantic business relationships is also an important aspect of this partnership; current delays in visa processing for Africans wishing to travel to the United States for the purpose of business development are impediments.

F. Luncheon with Featured Speaker

- Dr. David S. C. Chu, President, Institute for Defense Analyses—Introduction
- General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander, U.S. Africa Commander—Speaker
- Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace—Moderator

General Waldhauser, the Commander of AFRICOM, highlighted the command’s major efforts on the continent over the past year. Ten years ago, AFRICOM was established as a stand-alone combatant command focused on the overarching purpose of fostering long-term strategic national interests in Africa. The AFRICOM mission statement describes three main tasks: to build defense capabilities, respond to crises, and deter and defeat transnational threats. General Waldhauser’s comments focused on two broad topics: the command’s ongoing efforts to support political objectives on the continent, using Libya and Somalia to illustrate, and AFRICOM’s strategic approach, which is focused on building capacity and supporting development on the continent. During the question-and-answer period, the idea of a review of AFRICOM’s first decade was raised, and General Waldhauser indicated that this might be a good idea.

1. Deterring and Defeating Transnational Threats: Libya

Libya and Somalia have been top priorities for AFRICOM over the past year. Efforts in these two countries demonstrate how U.S. military operations are only a small part of the U.S. strategic approach to Africa. In 2016, Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj publicly and privately requested assistance from the United States and other European allies to rid the country of ISIS-Libya, which had seized territory and established a foothold in the western coastal city of Surt. Over the course of about 5 months in 2016, AFRICOM assisted Libyan forces aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA). U.S. forces provided expertise and niche-capability assistance, such as advanced technology for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In all, the command conducted over 500 precision strikes around the city of Surt, which supported the UN-brokered GNA.

U.S. assistance had two important effects. First, it caused our Libyan military partners to redouble their efforts and sustain the fight, in spite of heavy casualties. Second, by
putting the remaining elements of ISIS on the run in the remote deserts, the command bought time and space for the Sarraj government to take on a stronger leadership role, as the UN had intended. The U.S. effort aimed to help create the space for the Libyans to find a political solution.

The campaign illustrates how the military instrument of power can be engaged as an element of statecraft, and in support of a strategic framework, to make a positive contribution. A number of questions remain about how Libya will sustain this peace and move forward. AFRICOM is working hard to ensure the military tool is in step with, and supporting of, the political process. While the United States can help, the resolution must come from the Libyans themselves. Roadmaps in Libya often quickly get overtaken by events, so it is best to think about progress in about six-week increments.

2. **Deterring and Defeating Transnational Threats: Somalia**

   Somalia provides another good example of how AFRICOM’s military efforts support partner nation governments. From next door in Djibouti and inside in Mogadishu, the command is working closely with the U.S. embassy to ensure military actions support President Farmajo’s strategy to defeat al-Shabaab and allow the federal government to eventually take over the security requirements for the country.

   The command is focused on coordinating and synchronizing international military assistance through a Somali-led strategy, called the “Comprehensive Approach to Security.” AFRICOM also partners with the Somali National Army to provide training, advice, and equipment as the army continues to develop its counterterrorism expertise. The command has been given enhanced authorization to keep up the pressure on the al-Shabaab network. AFRICOM has used this authority in a judicious but aggressive manner, with the intention of providing legitimacy and support for President Farmajo and his government.

   This is the first time in many years in Somalia that U.S. military kinetic actions are specifically linked to a federal government strategy, which provides a roadmap to use the military in support of overarching diplomatic objectives. Recently, AFRICOM assisted the Somalis with the defection of Muktar Robow, a former top leader in al-Shabaab. The Somalis led each aspect of the Robow defection operation. They are now in a position to leverage this tactical victory for strategic effect. AFRICOM is helping them get the message out to encourage more al-Shabaab fighters to disarm, defect, and take advantage of President Farmajo’s reconciliation efforts. These efforts are being widely disseminated through an information campaign that encourages education and jobs for former al-Shabaab members who pledge their support to the government.

   In terms of the withdrawal of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), there is no denying that AMISOM has made significant contributions. But over the last few years, the offensive nature of the force has been lacking. The Somali security forces must
step up and take ownership. Many people have been trained over the last decade. All the disparate actors involved in this training need to be pulled together and better synchronized. A key element in the withdrawal will be institution building in the army. The goal is that the Somali forces will be able to take over security for the next election, but this will need to be a gradual and transitional process.

3. Capacity Building and Development

A core tenet of AFRICOM’s strategic framework is a commitment to the use of the military instrument of power not on its own, but in support of U.S. diplomatic and development efforts. Very few if any of the challenges the United States faces in Africa can be resolved with military force as the primary agent. Indeed, in many ways, the military sees the value of diplomacy and development more than most.

AFRICOM’s framework with partner nations can be characterized as “by, with, and through” at the operational and strategic perspectives. The command conceptualizes this approach in the following fashion. First, security operations are conducted not by American service members but almost exclusively by the partner nation’s security forces. A good example is AFRICOM’s work with Burkina Faso’s counterterrorism forces. Through training, Burkina Faso has successfully enhanced its abilities to handle emerging security challenges.

AFRICOM also works with these forces based on their requests and their needs. Efforts may include training, advising, and assisting. In other instances, AFRICOM helps with equipment or simply education programs. A good example is in Tunisia, where the leaders of the defense forces are steadily transforming their military into an agile counterterrorism force.

Finally, AFRICOM’s strategic framework is achieved through a cooperative relationship in which AFRICOM plays a supporting role. Recent events in Chad serve as a good example. A couple of months ago, severe storms caused damage to the Chadian Air Force aircraft and hangar facilities. The United States stepped in and provided assistance to repair facilities that were ruined in the storm, and the command is helping these important partners keep up their efforts to maintain regional security.

African leaders often tell us how important it is to develop “African solutions to African problems.” The concept of “by, with, and through” recognizes the importance of host-nation ownership and of fostering enduring relationships based on trust. The command’s greatest investment is in the long-term objective of enhancing the capacity of U.S. partner nation defense forces through a whole-of-government approach. This tenet reflects AFRICOM’s view that prevention is always better than intervention. The role of the police is also important, but that is not AFRICOM’s focus. The State Department and the European Union conduct programs aimed at improving police capabilities.
4. **Chinese Activities in Africa**

China has completed significant and much-needed infrastructure projects as a part of its “One Belt, One Road” strategy. Trade between China and Africa in 2016 is estimated to be valued at over $300 billion. At the United Nations in September 2015, President Xi Jinping announced $100 million in aid to the African Union and an additional 8,000 Chinese police officers to support peacekeeping.

The Chinese also recently completed construction of their first overseas military base, located several kilometers from the U.S. facility in Djibouti. This presents unique challenges and opportunities. This summer, China assigned its first soldiers to this base and expressed interest in conducting amphibious training between Chinese forces and U.S. Marines. Across the continent, the United States has shared interests with the Chinese regarding African stability. We see many areas where we can cooperate with the Chinese military, particularly regarding UN peacekeeping missions and training with African defense forces. This fact does not obscure the reality of fundamental worldwide policy differences. However, we do not see these differences as insurmountable.

G. **Panel 3: Opportunities and Challenges in Security Sector Cooperation**

- **Moderator:**
  - Ambassador (ret.) George Ward, Coordinator, Africa Program, Institute for Defense Analyses

- **Panelists:**
  - Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, head of the Department of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
  - Ms. Amanda Dory, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
  - Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, Visiting Scholar and Acting Director for African Studies, the Elliot School of International Affairs, the George Washington University

Africa now has significant prominence on the international scene. While the continent is recognized for its political significance, Africa still faces significant difficulties in responding adequately to its own challenges. Indeed, the Ebola crisis showed that neglecting Africa can have real implications beyond its borders. In addition, challenges such as migration and terrorism have attracted greater attention by Western partners. New thinking on how to approach these security challenges is needed. Africa does, and will continue to, matter beyond its borders: its security challenges are not just African problems, but global challenges.

African multilateral arrangements seem excellent on paper; in fact, they contain world-class concepts. Translating these protocols into action remains a tremendous challenge, however. There is a huge dissonance between aspirational documents and the operational actions of the often hollowed-out and politicized uniformed forces of the continent. There is also a major leadership deficit in terms of actually responding to conflicts in an effective manner. Such a deficit exists at the African Union (AU) level as well as in some of the Regional Economics Communities (RECs). The important oversight role of politicians is also a challenge. Often the political classes do not adequately understand how security forces and sectors operate and therefore cannot play an effective monitoring and oversight role.

Frequently, African armies and police simply cannot deliver. The African Standby Force is a good example. In addition, existing multilateral efforts have limited capacity and capabilities, including a general lack of airlift capabilities. That said, AMISOM has sometimes demonstrated that it can be successful. And there have been some successes by the task force countering the Lord’s Resistance Army and by the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad basin.

Despite these numerous challenges and deficiencies, African multilateral efforts reflect indigenous ownership and legitimacy. Effectiveness can be linked to the number of participants involved, which is connected to the political will that is necessary to work well together. Good examples of this type of effort include the MNJTF, the G5-Sahel, and the AU. The AU does not always act fast, but it can bestow legitimacy on collective efforts and does move quicker than the UN. That said, some of the recent ad hoc multilateral arrangements are in fact some of the most dynamic.

2. Security Cooperation Effectiveness: The U.S. Side of the Equation

In terms of the United States, two major activities comprise U.S. support for fighting violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in Africa: (1) preventing radicalization in the first place and (2) disrupting and degrading extremists when prevention does not work. There is no singular approach to prevention, and effective prevention requires efforts that are deeply attuned to local realities. U.S. government tools and activities are being adjusted to reflect this reality. A number of multifaceted efforts aimed at prevention are being deployed, including in communications and social media, criminal justice reform, and strengthening civil society (especially the roles of youth and women). But many of these tools and programs are very new, meaning at this point it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of such preventive interventions. Indeed, it will even be difficult to do so five years from now. Yet there is now an entire community of monitoring and evaluation experts who are currently figuring out how to tackle this measurement issue.
In terms of disrupting and degrading the threat from VEOs, the State Department has the lead on law enforcement, while the Defense Department has the lead on engaging with African militaries. The programs and tools of the U.S. government include train and equip activities, advice, military education, and institution strengthening. In terms of effectiveness, it of course depends on the yardstick being used.

If the yardstick is preventing the fall of governments or creating time and space for diplomats and political actors to pursue political solutions, then we see some signs of success. Examples include the Sirte campaign in Libya, the Somalia government’s expanding its authority beyond Mogadishu, and the French prevention of the fall of Bamako in Mali. If the yardstick is preventing attacks on the U.S. homeland and overseas installations, then we have a favorable track record for the former and a mixed one for the latter. If the yardstick is lessening the number of VEOs, the number of attacks, civilians killed, and terrain controlled by VEOs, then the picture is very concerning. In these categories, there are increases across the board, with an estimated 4,000 attacks over the past five years alone. A good example of an increasingly active and deadly VEO is ISIS, which is currently organizing attacks in the Maghreb, Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin region.

3. How Can Partners Assist?

Billions of dollars have been poured into capacity building on the continent over the past 50 years, but by some measures there is significantly less capacity today than in the past. This means something is not being done right. The United States has to learn to listen to its partners and have the humility to ask basic questions about how help can be best tailored to particular contexts.

On this point, international partners can glean lessons from past experiences, including the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was stood up in the 1990s, along with a “friends of the Great Lakes” group comprising the major development partners. Working together was difficult in some instances because certain development partners thought they knew the issues better than the citizens of the region. This example underscores the importance of listening to and working closely with African partners. No country, not even the United States, can go it alone. Regional frameworks can play an important facilitating role in this regard, as many of these countries and conflicts are interconnected. For example, international partners cannot attempt to address the problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo without also addressing the role of Rwanda.

The lesson for the United States is to maintain sustained attention and not become overly focused on the crisis of the moment. Otherwise, U.S. actions can create perverse incentives where the only way to get the attention of the international community is to create a crisis. The United States can be most effective with engagement that is sustained
and concentrated on attaining durable solutions to the peace and security challenges in Africa. There is a current opportunity to improve burden sharing between the UN and the AU. The United States can also share institutional expertise, provide information and intelligence, and avoid contributing to distortionary research flows. The G5 secretariat based in Mauritania can offer lessons in this regard. Finally, there has been some success in pooling arrangements for airlift capability in different regions, which could be model to apply in other areas. AFRICOM engages the AU on this capability as part of its logistics forum, but reaching that capability is still some way off.

H. Closing Conversation

- Moderator
  - Kate Almquist Knopf, Director, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- Participants
  - Ambassador (ret.) Reuben Brigety, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
  - Ambassador (ret.) Jendayi Frazer, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
  - Victor Ochen, Executive Director, Africa Youth Initiative Network

The symposium’s closing conversation explored key opportunities for U.S. partnerships in Africa in the years ahead.

1. Amplifying Voices and Building Trust

  Ugandan activist and 2015 Nobel peace prize nominee Victor Ochen, the youngest African to ever be nominated for the prize, spoke of a recent encounter he had that exemplified the type of support and partnership he believed Africans in conflict most needed from the United States. While Mr. Ochen was organizing a refugee summit in Kampala, Uganda, he received a request from peace activists in South Sudan that he travel to meet with a group of young militia members. Even though he was concerned for his safety and had no military background, he believed he should go.

  A few hours outside of the capital city Juba, he met with 80 armed youth representing more than 2,000 local militia members. They told him that were from many local tribes and that they were responsible from protecting their communities. They had heard about him and what he was able to accomplish in Uganda and wanted to talk to him. “You were once one of us so how did you not fight?” they asked him. He listened to their concerns. “Our government does not trust us.” “We are called terrorist.” “We are called rebels.” “No one listens to us.” “We want security.” “We want health.” “We want food.” “We want a
future.” “We feel hated.” “The international community hates us.” They wanted to know why.

Mr. Ochen said that his decision to meet with the rebels in South Sudan was the best and most risky decision he could have made. He didn’t go as a United Nations delegate but as private African citizen to address a common African problem. Since his meeting, he was informed that over 50 of the 80 youth leaders have walked away from the battlefield and are now refugees in Uganda. Two hundred of their followers have also crossed. They have said that it is better than being in the bush. This raises the question about who the terrorist is. These rebels don’t need money. They need a voice and they need to be trusted. The African and U.S. partnership should focus on trust building, especially between generations and across tribes.

2. Nontraditional Partnerships

There are also opportunities related to youth leadership, the digital economy, and Africa’s ownership of its security challenges. The Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the Mandela Fellows programs are two ways in which the United States can continue to support youth leadership. Energy and innovation favor the youth. The United States now has an advantage in terms of innovation. Future innovators will come from Africa. M-Pesa, the mobile banking system used in Kenya, is ahead of the game. The United States can and should be engaged with the transformation of digital economy.

Several years ago, the Chinese made a strategic decision to invest in Africa. They have poured resources into the continent ever since. The United States needs to catch up and should consider working with the Chinese in Africa. There are many unique opportunities for multilateral partnership in Africa. In terms of security issues, African leaders are doing the hard work. They are mediators. African forces are a major actor in peacekeeping operations, not just in Africa, but globally as well. This is also an area in which Africans need continued backing.

3. Debate over Support to Democracy

Finally, echoing a theme heard many times throughout the day, the role of the United States in supporting African democracy was discussed again. It was noted that Africa has the potential to be the largest democratic region in the world. Africa includes more sovereign countries than any other world region, and recent inspiring advances in The Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria, for example, have spurred lively debates over how countries govern themselves.

For many years Western Europe and the United State provided attractive models of development and stability, but now African countries can look to China and internally to Rwanda and Ethiopia for alternatives. As the continent’s demographic bubble comes of
age, more and more countries will have to decide how to rule themselves. From a security perspective, democratic countries don’t go to war with other democracies. In terms of engendering global peace, promoting democracy seems the right course. The alternative future is that democratic space will always be contested and often violently repressed. Unfortunately, we may be headed in that direction because of an attitude of indifference on the part of the U.S. government.

But where does the demand for democracy come from? The ownership, the actual practice of governing, the services, all must come from within the country itself. The United States is but one actor, and not the most important one at that. Domestic actors reign supreme. There have always been different models. During the Cold War there were different models. The Singaporean model was popular in the post-colonial period. The United States can support democracy, but how countries get there is up to them. Democracy is messy. Give Africans space to figure it out, but have a respectful dialogue.
Appendix A.
Conference Program
Symposium Agenda

8:15–9:00 AM  Registration
Continental breakfast

9:00–9:10 AM  Welcome Remarks
Greetings/Administrative Announcements (USIP)
Dr. J. Scott Cameron, President, National Intelligence University
Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace

9:10–9:30 AM  Opening Statement by Featured Speaker
Introduction
Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Featured Speaker
Ambassador Tom Shannon, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
U.S. Department of State

9:30–10:15 AM  Opening Conversation
Panelists
Ms. Yvonne Akoth, Founder and Director, Impart Change,
Generation Change Fellow
Dr. Michelle Ndiaye, Director, Africa Peace and Security Program,
Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Moderator
Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace

10:15–10:45 AM  Coffee Break
Symposium Agenda (continued)

10:45–12:00 PM  **Panel 1:** Governance, Institutions, and Effective Partnerships

*Panelists*

- **Dr. Peter Lewis,** Associate Professor and Director of African Studies Program, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
- **Mr. Moeletsi Mbeki,** Deputy Chairman, South African Institute of International Affairs
- **Ambassador Donald Yamamoto,** Acting Assistant Secretary, Africa Bureau, U.S. Department of State

*Moderator*

- **Mr. Judd Devermont,** National Intelligence Officer for Africa, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

12:00–1:15 PM  **Panel 2:** Prospects for Enhanced Economic Partnerships

*Panelists*

- **Mr. André Pienaar,** Founder and Chairman, C5 Capital Ltd
- **Ms. Oren Whyche-Shaw,** Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID

*Moderator*

- **Ms. Jennifer Cooke,** Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

1:15–2:30 PM  **Luncheon with Featured Speaker**

*Introduction*

- **Dr. David Chu,** President, Institute for Defense Analyses

*Featured Speaker*

- **General Thomas Waldhauser,** Commander, U.S. Africa Command

*Discussion Moderator*

- **Ms. Nancy Lindborg,** President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Symposium Agenda (continued)

2:30–3:45 PM Panel 3: Opportunities and Challenges in Security Sector Cooperation

Panelists

**Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning**, Head of the Department of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

**Ms. Amanda Dory**, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Moderator

**Ambassador George Ward**, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses

3:45–4:30 PM Closing Conversation

Panelists

**Ambassador Reuben Brigety**, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University

**Ambassador Jendayi Frazer**, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

**Mr. Victor Ochen**, Executive Director, Africa Youth Initiative Network

Moderator

**Kate Almquist Knopf**, Director, Africa Center for Strategic Studies

4:30–4:45 PM Closing Remarks

**Ms. Susan Gordon**, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

4:45–5:45 PM Reception
Biographies

Organized in Alphabetical Order:

Ms. Yvonne Akoth

Ms. Yvonne Akoth is a peace advocate, a violence prevention strategist, and a social entrepreneur. She is also a Generation Change Fellow of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and a Post 2015 Ambassador of the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS). Ms. Akoth started a local non-profit organization 'Impart Change' which uses art as a tool to champion sustainable peace and promote violence prevention among youth in informal settlements. Impart Change also empowers young men and women with conflict management and social-entrepreneurship skills and knowledge, and links them with business opportunities with support from partner organizations.

Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning

Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning is the Director of the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. Prior to joining the KAIPTC, he held several high-level positions with the government of Ghana, the African Union, UN and academia. These positions are: Director, Governance Unit, Institute of Economic Affairs; Expert on Common African Defense and Security Policy and Counter-terrorism, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Ghana; Research Director, African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra, Ghana; Visiting Professor, European Peace University, Austria; Director, Institute of Economic Affairs, Governance Unit, Accra, Ghana. Dr. Aning's rich experience in security issues has been tapped by a number of organizations including the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) where he has held high-level leadership positions. He is currently a member of the World Economic Forum’s Council on Conflict Resolution and a member of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Group on the Peacebuilding Fund. Dr. Aning has written numerous dissertations and books, book chapters, monographs, and articles in several journals. His 2017 publications include among others:

(a) ‘West Africa’s ebola pandemic: towards effective multilateral responses to health crises’, Global Governance, Vol. 23, No. 2 with Obinna Ifediora;


(c) ‘Between conflict and integration: border governance in Africa in times of migration’, International Reports, No. 1 with John Pokoo;

Ambassador Reuben E. Brigety II

Ambassador Reuben E. Brigety II is the Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. Ambassador Brigety most recently served as the appointed Representative of the United States of America to the African Union and Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Prior to this appointment, Ambassador Brigety served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from November 14, 2011, until September 3, 2013, with responsibility for Southern African and Regional Security Affairs.

From December 2009 to November 2011, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. In this capacity, he supervised U.S. refugee programs in Africa, managed U.S. humanitarian diplomacy with major international partners, and oversaw the development of international migration policy.

A native of Jacksonville, Florida, Ambassador Brigety previously served as Director of the Sustainable Security Program at the Center for American Progress from January 2008 to November 2009 and as a Special Assistant in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, at the U.S. Agency for International Development, from January 2007 to January 2008. From November 2008 to January 2009, he also served as a senior advisor for Development and Security to the U.S. Central Command Assessment Team in Washington and in Doha, Qatar.

Prior to his work in the policy arena, Ambassador Brigety served as an assistant professor of government and politics at George Mason University and at the School of International Service at American University between August 2003 and April 2009. In addition, Ambassador Brigety was a researcher with the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW) from August 2001–May 2003, where he conducted research missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Before joining HRW, Ambassador Brigety was an active duty U.S. naval officer and held several staff positions in the Pentagon and in fleet support units.

Ambassador Brigety is a 1995 distinguished midshipman graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a B.S. in political science (with merit), served as the Brigade Commander and received the Thomas G. Pownall Scholarship. He also holds an M.Phil. and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Cambridge, England. Ambassador Brigety is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a recipient of the Council’s International Affairs Fellowship.
Dr. J. Scott Cameron

J. Scott Cameron became the President of the National Intelligence University (NIU) on 25 August 2017.

Prior to this Dr. Cameron served at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from its inaugural year of 2004. In 2013 he assumed the role of Director, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Counterterrorism. As the Director of WMD Counterterrorism, Dr. Cameron served as NCTC’s senior representative and as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s focal point to the U.S. Government on matters of WMD counterterrorism through the integration of analysis, collection, operational planning, and science and technology, in support of U.S. senior leadership, counterterrorism operations, and policy development. In 2016, on behalf of NCTC and ODNI, Dr. Cameron and his office were assigned, by Presidential Directive, the role of coordinating U.S. WMD counterterrorism efforts by integrating intelligence and strategic operational planning across the U.S. Government.

Previously, Dr. Cameron served as NCTC’s Assistant Deputy Director for WMD Terrorism, providing senior leadership for issues of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism at NCTC. Early in his tenure in leading NCTC's WMD counterterrorism efforts, Dr. Cameron led the development of a joint analytic organization with CIA that drove integrated operational, strategic, technical, and policy support analysis, with global impact.

Dr. Cameron is a broadly trained biologist who, for over 30 years, has served in senior roles in academia and federal service leading science and national security issues both nationally and internationally. He earned academic degrees from Michigan State University (Ph.D.), the University of Florida (M.S.), and Delaware Valley University (B.S.). He is a member of the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS), is certified in the Senior Executive Service (SES), and is a graduate of the Department of Defense CAPSTONE program.

Dr. David Chu

David Chu serves as President of the Institute for Defense Analyses. IDA is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest. Its three federally funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring extraordinary scientific and technical expertise.

As president, Dr. Chu directs the activities of more than 1,000 scientists and technologists. Together, they conduct and support research requested by federal agencies involved in advancing national security and advising on science and technology issues.

Dr. Chu served in the Department of Defense as Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness from 2001-2009, and earlier as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation from 1981-1993.
Dr. David Chu (continued)

From 1978-1981 he was the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office for National Security and International Affairs.


Dr. Chu is a member of the Defense Science Board and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service with Gold Palm, the Department of Veterans Affairs Meritorious Service Award, the Department of the Army Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Department of the Navy Distinguished Public Service Award, and the National Academy of Public Administration’s National Public Service Award.

Ms. Jennifer Cooke

Ms. Jennifer Cooke is director of the CSIS Africa Program, where she leads research and analysis on political, economic, and security dynamics in Africa. She is a frequent writer and lecturer on U.S.-Africa policy and provides briefings, testimony, and policy recommendations to U.S. policymakers, the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. military. Recent projects include an examination of militancy and extremism in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, religious authority and the state in Africa, energy trends in sub-Saharan Africa, and the launch of the “Spotlight on Africa” conference series, which provides an in-depth look at political and economic developments in Africa’s largest and most dynamic economies.

Cooke is a frequent commentator in print, on radio, and on television, and she has testified before Congress on Boko Haram in Nigeria, the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, and the African Union. She travels widely in Africa and has been an election observer in Sierra Leone, Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana. Growing up, she lived in Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, as well as Belgium, Italy, and Canada. Prior to CSIS, she worked at the National Academy of Sciences in the Office of Human Rights and the Office of News and Public Information and in the U.S. Congress on the House Subcommittee on Africa. She holds an M.A. in African studies and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in government, magna cum laude, from Harvard University.
**Mr. Judd Devermont**

Mr. Judd Devermont is the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. In this position, he leads the US intelligence community's analytic efforts on all sub-Saharan African issues and serves as the ODNI's personal representative at interagency policy meetings. He previously was the US Government’s senior political analyst on sub-Saharan Africa. From 2011 to 2013, Mr. Devermont served as the National Security Council Director for Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel, and the African Union. He spent two years abroad working at the US Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria from 2008 to 2010. He also has lived in South Africa and Côte d'Ivoire. Mr. Devermont is a lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs where he co-teaches a course on US intelligence analysis on Africa from the 1950s to early 1990s. He has a master’s degree in African Studies from Yale University and bachelor’s degree in History from the University of California, Los Angeles.

**Ms. Amanda J. Dory**

Ms. Amanda J. Dory joined the National War College faculty in 2017. She is a career member of the Senior Executive Service. From 2012-2017 she served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). She served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy from 2008-2011 and as the Principal Director for Policy Planning in OSD. In both capacities her responsibilities included strategy development, force planning scenarios, and long-term trends analysis. She has worked on multiple Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs), to include as the chief of staff to lead implementation of QDR execution roadmaps for Building Partner Capacity and Irregular Warfare in 2007-2008. In addition to strategic and Africa regional assignments, Amanda has also served in OSD’s Homeland Defense office as the director for planning and integration. In 2002, she was selected as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and conducted an independent research project based at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on civil security. Amanda received the Presidential Rank Award in 2010 and 2015, as well as awards for exceptional and meritorious civilian service. She is an alumna of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and received a master’s degree with concentrations in international economics and African studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Dr. Jendayi E. Frazer

Dr. Jendayi E. Frazer is adjunct senior fellow for Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Frazer is a visiting professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. She was a distinguished public service professor at Carnegie Mellon University from 2009 to 2014, where she was on the faculty of Heinz College’s School of Public Policy and Management. Her research focused on strengthening regional security cooperation and economic and political integration in Africa. She was the director of Carnegie Mellon’s Center for International Policy and Innovation (CIPI), which focuses on utilizing technology and applying innovative solutions to core issues of development and governance in Africa. The author of and contributor to a number of articles, journals, and books, she is the co-editor of Preventing Electoral Violence in Africa (2011), which grows out of her work with CIPI.

Frazer served as the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 2005 to 2009. She was special assistant to the president and senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council from 2001 until her swearing-in as the first woman U.S. ambassador to South Africa, in 2004. She previously served in government from 1998 to 1999 as a CFR International Affairs Fellow, first at the Pentagon as a political-military planner with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working on West Africa during Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule, and then as director for African affairs at the National Security Council, working on Central and East Africa. Frazer was also an assistant professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and assistant professor at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies.

She has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award bestowed by the secretary of state in recognition of her public service. In 2010, she was given the distinction of Dame Grand Commander in the Humane Order of African Redemption by Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. She was also honored with the 2008 Distinguished Leadership Award from Boston University’s African Presidential Archives and Research Center.

Frazer received her BA in political science and African and Afro-American studies, MA in international policy studies and international development education, and PhD in political science, all from Stanford University.
Ms. Susan (Sue) Gordon

Ms. Sue Gordon is the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Prior to her role at ODNI, she served as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) sixth Deputy Director after more than 25 years of service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ms. Gordon previously served concurrently as Director of the CIA’s Information Operations Center and as the CIA Director’s senior advisor on cyber. She was responsible for fully integrating advanced cyber capabilities into all of CIA’s mission areas, while protecting against the cyber threat to the CIA’s information, operations and officers.

Ms. Gordon began her career with the CIA in 1980 as an analyst in the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research in the Directorate of Intelligence, responsible for technical analysis of foreign space and missile systems. She later held several engineering development positions in the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, working both national systems and new concepts before moving into a succession of analytic and technical management positions.

Ms. Gordon served later as the executive assistant to the Executive Director of the CIA and then became the architect and first director of the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools. In 1998, she was named special assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence and was responsible for designing and implementing In-Q-Tel, a private, non-profit company whose primary purpose is to deliver innovative technology solutions for the agency and the intelligence community.

Following a break in service to raise her children, Ms. Gordon was appointed Director of Special Activities in the Directorate of Science and Technology, focusing on supporting counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. She was also the Intelligence Community’s focal point for related biological research, development and engineering capabilities for collection and operations. She served as deputy chief of the Information Operations Center from September 2009 to December 2011 and then as the CIA’s Director for Support from January 2012 to November 2013.

Ms. Kate Almquist Knopf

Ms. Kate Almquist Knopf has served as director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, an academic institution within the U.S. Department of Defense, since July 2014. Established by the U.S. Congress for the study of security issues relating to Africa, the Center serves as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, and the exchange of ideas. It aims to be an objective source of strategic analysis on contemporary and over-the-horizon security issues for African security sector professionals, policymakers, scholars, media, and civil society, as well as international partners.
Ms. Kate Almquist Knopf (continued)

Ms. Knopf has spent most of her career focused on the intersection of security and development in Africa. From 2001 to 2009, she held several senior positions at the U.S. Agency for International Development, including as assistant administrator for Africa, Sudan mission director, deputy assistant administrator for Africa, and special assistant and senior policy advisor to the administrator.

Ms. Knopf has also been a senior advisor for the Crisis Management Initiative, a conflict mediation organization founded by former Finnish President and Nobel Laureate Martti Ahtisaari, and a visiting policy fellow at the Center for Global Development. Prior to federal service, she was chief of staff for the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and for the Executive Office for Administration and Finance of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. She began her career at World Vision, an international nongovernmental organization.

Ms. Knopf holds an M.A. in international relations with concentrations in African studies and conflict management from Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and a B.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, MD.

Dr. Peter Lewis

Dr. Peter Lewis is Associate Professor and Director of African Studies Program at Johns Hopkins. Dr. Lewis’s research and teaching focus on economic reform and political transition in developing countries, with particular emphasis on governance and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has written extensively on questions of economic adjustment, democratization, and civil society in Africa; democratic reform and political economy in Nigeria; public attitudes toward reform and democracy in West Africa; and the comparative politics of economic change in Africa and Southeast Asia. His most recent book, Coping with Crisis in African States, examines sources of resilience and fragility across African countries and presents a series of critical cases. His previous book, Growing Apart: Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria is concerned with the institutional basis of economic development. Dr. Lewis has published several other coauthored and edited books, numerous book chapters, and articles in World Politics, World Development, the Journal of Democracy, the Journal of Modern African Studies, African Affairs and others. He is a member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Research Council of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has consulted for the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carter Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, Freedom House, USAID, and the World Bank. He received a BA degree from the University of California, Berkeley, and MA and PhD degrees from Princeton University.
U.S.–African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests

Ms. Nancy Lindborg

Ms. Nancy Lindborg has served since February, 2015, as President of the United States Institute of Peace, an independent institution founded by Congress to provide practical solutions for preventing and resolving violent conflict around the world.

Ms. Lindborg has spent most of her career working in fragile and conflict affected regions around the world. Prior to joining USIP, she served as the assistant administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) at USAID. From 2010 through early 2015, Ms. Lindborg led USAID teams focused on building resilience and democracy, managing and mitigating conflict and providing urgent humanitarian assistance. Ms. Lindborg led DCHA teams in response to the ongoing Syria Crisis, the droughts in Sahel and Horn of Africa, the Arab Spring, the Ebola response and numerous other global crises.

Prior to joining USAID, Ms. Lindborg was president of Mercy Corps, where she spent 14 years helping to grow the organization into a globally respected organization known for innovative programs in the most challenging environments. She started her international career working overseas in Kazakhstan and Nepal.

Ms. Lindborg has held a number of leadership and board positions including serving as co-president of the Board of Directors for the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition; co-founder and board member of the National Committee on North Korea; and chair of the Sphere Management Committee. She is a member of Council on Foreign Relations.

She holds a B.A and M.A. in English Literature from Stanford University and an M.A. in Public Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman is Senior Advisor to the President at the United States Institute of Peace. Ambassador Lyman served as United States special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 to March 2013. As special envoy he led U.S. policy in helping in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Ambassador Lyman previously held the position of Ralph Bunche Fellow for African Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He was also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS). From 1999 to 2003, he was executive director of the Global Interdependence Initiative at the Aspen Institute.

Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman (continued)


Mr. Moleletsi Mbeki

Mr. Moleletsi Mbeki is director of several companies and is Chairman of KMM Investments (Pty) Limited and Endemol South Africa (Pty) Limited. He is Deputy Chairman of the South African Institute for International Affairs, an independent think tank based at the University of the Witwatersrand. He is a frequent political commentator on African and South African affairs.

After returning to South Africa from exile in 1990, he was appointed Head of Communication for the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) and Media Consultant to the African National Congress. During most of the 1980s he was a Senior Journalist for Zimbabwe Newspapers. As a result of the outstanding work that he did for Zimbabwe Newspapers Features Department, he was awarded a Nieman Fellowship by Harvard University for the 1988–1989 academic year.

Mbeki began his journalism career in London in 1979 as a contributor to Africa, New African, Africa Now magazines and the BBC Africa Service. He has a Master’s degree in Sociology from the University of Warwick, obtained in 1982.
Ms. Michelle Ndiaye

Ms. Michelle Ndiaye is the Director of the Africa Peace and Security Program (APSP), a joint program between the African Union and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), with support from GIZ and other development partners. She is also the Coordinator of the annual Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa. Before joining IPSS, Michelle was the Managing Director of the Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS). Between 1999 and 2011, she headed several African and international organizations including Executive Director of Greenpeace Africa, CEO of the African Institute for Corporate Citizenship (AICC), Founder and Manager of Africa Projects for Akena Research and Consulting, and Regional Director of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters.

Michelle holds a BA and MA in Political Science from Quebec University in Montreal, Canada and an MA in public law and a post graduate degree in Political Science (DEA) from University Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar, Senegal. She is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the University of Leipzig, Germany.

Mr. Victor Ochen

Mr. Victor Ochen, the United Nations Global Goals Ambassador for Peace and Justice, is a 34-year-old peace activist from Uganda. His organization, the African Youth Initiative Network, helps thousands of victims of the Ugandan civil war to obtain treatment and overcome the traumas of the war. The organization also organizes many youth programs with the goal of making wars less common in Africa.

In 2015, Mr. Ochen was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize and endorsed for the prize by Mahatma Gandhi’s family. He is the youngest African and first Ugandan to receive the peace prize nomination. Despite spending most of his life surrounded by war, crimes against humanity, and often surviving on one meal per day, Mr. Ochen maintained a deep love for peace and powerfully activated his community.

Mr. Ochen was born and raised in Lira district in northern Uganda. His experience growing up in a camp for internally displaced persons shaped his desire to be part of the peace building and community development process.

Mr. André Pienaar

Mr. André Pienaar is Founder and Chairman of C5 Capital Ltd. Mr. Pienaar is an entrepreneur and private investor with a record of building and leading fast-growing businesses. He is the Founder of the Good Governance Group, a leading international strategic advisory firm. Previously he built and led Kroll’s Africa & Natural Resources Division out of London. Mr. Pienaar is an Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa.
Ambassador Tom Shannon, Jr.

Ambassador Tom Shannon, Jr. was confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 12, 2016. Previously Ambassador Shannon served as Counselor of the Department. Ambassador Shannon had served briefly as Senior Advisor to the Secretary following his return in September from Brazil, where he served as United States Ambassador for nearly four years. He is a Career Ambassador in the Senior Foreign Service of the United States. Ambassador Shannon is only the seventh Foreign Service Officer to hold the position of Counselor since World War II, and the first in 32 years.

Prior to his tenure in Brazil, Ambassador Shannon served as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 2005 to 2009. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council from 2003-2005. From 2002 to 2003, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State, where he was Director of Andean Affairs from 2001 to 2002. He was U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), with the rank of Ambassador, from 2000 to 2001.

Ambassador Shannon also served as Director of Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council from 1999 to 2000, as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, from 1996 to 1999, and as Regional Labor Attaché at the U.S. Consulate General in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 1992 to 1996.

During his thirty-year career as a Foreign Service officer, Ambassador Shannon also served as Special Assistant to the Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia, Brazil from 1989 to 1992, as Country Officer for Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe from 1987 to 1989, and as a Consular/Political Rotational Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, Guatemala, from 1984 to 1986.

Ambassador Shannon graduated with high honors from the College of William and Mary in 1980, having studied government and philosophy. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He then studied at Oxford University, where he received a M. Phil in Politics in 1982, and a D.Phil in Politics in 1983. He speaks Spanish and Portuguese.
United States Marine Corps General Thomas D. Waldhauser

United States Marine Corps General Thomas D. Waldhauser is the fourth Commander of the United States Africa Command. In this capacity, General Waldhauser is responsible for building defense capabilities, responding to crises, deterring and defeating transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity, all in concert with interagency and international partners.

A native of South St. Paul, Minnesota, General Waldhauser graduated from Bemidji State University and was commissioned in 1976. He has served as an infantry officer at all levels in the U.S. Marine Corps, including command of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. His General Officer commands include the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command.

General Waldhauser’s flag officer Joint assignments include Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff Director of Operations J3 (Acting), and Joint Staff Director for Joint Force Development J7.

General Waldhauser attended U.S. Army Ranger School, Jumpmaster School, Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College where he earned a Master’s Degree in National Security Strategies.

Ambassador George Ward

Ambassador George Ward has been at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he coordinates Africa projects, since 2011. From 2005-2011, he was Senior Vice President for International Programs at World Vision, where he led a group responsible for the design and management of relief and development programs in over 80 countries, including 26 in Africa.

From 1999-2005, he was Vice President and Director of the Professional Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace. There, he created and implemented programs aimed at conflict prevention and management in Africa, the Balkans, Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East. Amb. Ward was seconded to the Department of Defense in 2003, serving as coordinator for humanitarian assistance in Iraq.

Amb. Ward was a Foreign Service Officer for thirty years. He was ambassador to Namibia from 1996-1999 and principal deputy assistant secretary of state for international organizations from 1992-1996. As deputy chief of mission in Germany from 1989 to 1992, he played a senior role in the negotiations that led to German unification. During other Foreign Service assignments in Italy, Germany, and Washington, he focused primarily on international security and political-military issues. Before his Foreign Service career, he was an officer in the Marine Corps, serving in the United States and Vietnam.
Ambassador George Ward (continued)

Amb. Ward received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award for his contributions to German unification and is the recipient of several other U.S. civilian and military awards. He received a B.A. in history from the University of Rochester, and he earned an M.P.A. from Harvard University.

Ms. Oren E. Whyche-Shaw

Ms. Oren E. Whyche-Shaw is Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Bureau and Coordinator for President Obama’s Trade Africa Initiative. Ms. Whyche-Shaw leads the Bureau’s private sector, financial access and trade development activities on the continent and the USAID engagement with African diaspora in the United States. Prior to this position, Ms. Whyche-Shaw’s led the Africa Bureau’s Office of West Africa and the Office for Sustainable Development. She also served for three years as the Africa Bureau’s Principal Advisor to the Assistant Administrator for Africa.

Prior to joining USAID in 2011, Ms. Whyche-Shaw served as the Director for the Office of African Nations and Senior Advisor in the Multilateral Development Bank Office of the Department of Treasury. Ms. Whyche-Shaw’s diversified career includes leadership positions in the private, financial, not-for-profit and multilateral sectors. Ms. Whyche-Shaw led the agricultural and entrepreneurial development projects as Vice President for Africa with Technoserve, Inc. Ms. Whyche-Shaw also has held leadership positions in Private Sector Investments Department at the African Development Bank; Chair of Plan International USA; an investment banker at Citibank, N.A. and J.P. Morgan; Manager of Global Acoustic Businesses at Owens-Corning; and, Manager of Global Banking for R.J.Reynolds Industries, Inc.

Ms. Whyche-Shaw holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Theoretical Mathematics and French from Capital University in Columbus, OH. As the first Citibank Fellow, she received a master’s degree in Finance, Money and Financial Markets, and International Business from Columbia University’s Business School. Ms. Whyche-Shaw served as the Senior Special Advisor to the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission when selected to be a White House Fellow in 1983. Ms. Whyche-Shaw has lived and worked internationally for more than 30 years.
Ambassador Donald Yamamoto

Ambassador Donald Yamamoto served as Senior Vice President of the National Defense University until September 5th 2017, when he began to serve as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at the U.S. Department of State. Ambassador Yamamoto previously served as a senior advisor to the Director General of the Foreign Service on personnel reform, from 2015 to 2016. He recently served as Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Mission Somalia office in Mogadishu in 2016, and in senior positions in Kabul, Mazar e-Sharif and Bagram, Afghanistan, 2014-2015. He was the Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs in 2013 and was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary from 2009 to 2013. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2006 to 2009 and to Djibouti, 2000-2003. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006. He holds the rank of Career Minister.

Ambassador Yamamoto entered the Foreign Service in 1980, serving primarily in Africa, with assignments in the Middle East and Asia. He received a Master’s Degree from the National War College in 1996 and worked on Capitol Hill on a Congressional Fellowship in 1991. Ambassador Yamamoto graduated from Columbia College and received a Master’s degree in International Affairs from Columbia University. He is the recipient of a Presidential Distinguished Service Award, Presidential Meritorious Service Award, Secretary’s Distinguished Honor Award, over a dozen Senior Performance Awards, the 2006 Robert Frasure Memorial Award for advancing conflict resolution in Africa, and numerous other awards.
Appendix B.
Remarks by Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., Under Secretary for Political Affairs
(As prepared)

Introduction

Good morning. Thank you President Lindborg for your very kind and generous introduction. To you and to Ambassador Carson I am grateful for the invitation to participate in this important and timely symposium.

It is always a pleasure to cross 23rd street and leave behind the 1950s federal architecture of the State Department for the soaring beauty of the United States Institute of Peace.

USIP has proven itself to be a unique and vital institution within our policy landscape. It is not only the keeper and dispenser of remarkable expertise in the practice of peace building and conflict resolution, but is also a convener and convoker of first category. USIP brings together some of our best strategic thinkers and most interesting organizations to discuss, debate, and shape American foreign policy.

Today is one such occasion. I am honored to help open this symposium on the relationship between the United States and Africa, with a special focus on the emerging partnerships that will define that relationship in the 21st century.

As Nancy noted, I am long-in-tooth as a diplomat. I have served our great Republic for 34 years. Curiously, I have spent 17 years of that career in the 20th century and 17 years in the 21st century. This fulcrum has allowed me to witness and participate in some remarkable moments of transformation and change. It has also taught me that history does not end, it accelerates. Today, change has velocity, driven by technology and connectivity. My experience has taught me that American power and American values can have a transformative impact on global change. I believe this is especially true for Africa. The partnership that we offer is especially relevant for countries in the midst of profound transitions from authoritarian to democratic governments, from exclusive to inclusive societies, from autarky models of development to ones based on open markets and regional integration, and from global isolation to intense participation in world events.

Setting the Global Stage

As we consider the purpose and nature of our relationship with Africa, it is important to note two things. First, Africa’s emergence as a point of global interest and strategic convergence. What happens on the continent over the next few years will shape the world’s economy, security, and well-being. Africa is no longer an addendum to global geopolitics. Instead, it is a bridge from the
Indo-Pacific region to the larger Atlantic community, while also connecting directly to Europe and the Middle East. In the State Department it touches every geographic bureau, and at the Defense Department it connects to every geographic combatant command. In short, Africa's centrality makes it immediately relevant to our success and demands attention and engagement.

Second, as far as the United States is concerned, Africa is already a continent of allies and partners. With a few notable exceptions, the vast majority of African states share our commitment to free markets, equitable trade, democracy and the rule of law, secure borders, and effective responses to global terrorist threats.

African states' progress towards open markets and free trade have spurred economic growth, development, and tremendous opportunity across the continent. Indeed, six of the world’s ten fastest growing economies are in Africa. By 2030, Africa will represent almost a quarter of the world’s workforce and consumers, and by 2050 Africa’s population is projected to double to two billion people.

And our balance of trade with Africa is near parity—thanks to booming demand for infrastructure investment, aircraft, consumer products, and services. African states consistently attract strong investor attention from American companies.

Democracy and the rule of law are also advancing on the continent. Competitive, participatory elections are becoming the norm. Just two weeks ago, we witnessed the Supreme Court of Kenya's decision to overturn the August 8 Presidential elections, and President Kenyatta's mature decision to respect that ruling. The independent legal process, and broad support and respect for the Court's decision, reflect the strength of Kenya's democracy.

Finally, African allies and partners are stepping forward to lead regional initiatives to address long-running conflicts and humanitarian crises. In the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon formed the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, and are coordinating military operations, civilian security, and humanitarian assistance. The United States is proud to support this and other regional initiatives to bring security and stability to citizens affected by conflict and food insecurity.

**Strengthening our Relationship: The Path Forward**

Though there is much to commend in recent developments on the continent, we all know that African states continue to face significant challenges. And any relationship, however strong, requires care and nurturing if it is to grow. As President Trump, Secretary Tillerson, and our national security team engage with our African partners, they will be guided by four strategic purposes.

**Advancing Peace and Security**

First, advancing peace and security. Doing so, yields dividends for citizens in Africa, and advances our own national security.

We are looking to African partners to take the lead in resolving regional conflict, and we will continue to partner with the African Union and regional organizations that lead successful efforts to end violence and prevent mass atrocities. While our hope and commitment to seeing an end to the devastating man-made crises in DRC, South Sudan, and other locations is enduring, the long term sustainability of our financial commitment requires continuing contributions from our assistance partners. We will also require greater political commitment from African leaders who want peace and stability in their countries and in their region. This will ensure that our support and investment is effective and enduring.

On the continent, we are working to build the capacity of regional peacekeepers, whose numbers continue to increase in Africa. In the past year, we have provided training to peacekeepers from over 20 African countries actively engaged in UN and African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations. This engagement has allowed more than ten battalions to deploy more effectively into some of the
world’s most dangerous operations in Somalia, Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. Generously, Africans now comprise over 70 percent of the peacekeepers in Africa, up from 40 percent ten years ago. We acknowledge that peacekeeping comes with a tremendous risk. We both mourn and honor those Africans who have given their lives in peacekeeping operations.

The United States also addresses peace and security through humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations such as refugees and internally displaced people. In 2016, we provided more than $1.5 billion to UNHCR’s humanitarian operations. With the support of USAID and the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration – for example – an estimated 1.8 million people in South Sudan receive life-saving humanitarian assistance every month.

Our work to advance peace and security is not just regional. Increasingly, it is global. African states are partnering with us to address the danger that North Korea presents to the world. We asked African countries to join us in restricting political and economic engagement with North Korea, shutting down North Korea’s illicit trade networks, and publicly opposing North Korea’s reckless missile and nuclear tests. Numerous African partners have taken concrete actions, but more needs to be done.

**Countering the Scourge of Terrorism**

Second, countering the scourge of terrorism. This Administration seeks to partner with African allies to confront and counter terrorism in Africa, including defeating Boko Haram, al-Qaïda in the Islamic Maghreb, and ISIS-West Africa. In recent years, African countries have intensified their regional and domestic efforts to take greater ownership on this front, often with great success. In Somalia, the African Union and Somali security forces are driving out al-Shabaab. Working through AU leadership, regional peacekeeping partners such as Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Djibouti are helping to lead the way in this effort.

Military, law enforcement, and intelligence tools are vital to defend against these threats, but military force alone is not enough for a sustained peace. We must work with our partners, including civil society, traditional authorities, and religious leaders, to address the root causes of conflict, combat marginalization, and create economic opportunity. There is no long-term solution to terrorism absent this comprehensive approach.

Any progress in our counter-terrorism efforts, however, will be undone by abusive and illegal behavior by security forces. We will continue to hold our allies to the highest standards and ensure that individuals who fail to respect human rights in this important fight are held accountable.

The challenge now is for our African partners to complement their successes on the battlefield with trained law enforcement personnel to provide civilian security and economic policies to kick start moribund local economies.

**Increasing Economic Growth and Investment**

Third, promoting prosperity through economic growth and investment. This Administration seeks to do business not just in Africa, but with Africa, moving the focus of our economic relationship with the continent from aid to trade and investment. Trade will be free, fair, and reciprocal, and our investors will be more competitive. This is about creating jobs for both Americans and Africans throughout the continent.

One of our most important bipartisan endeavors in the economic arena is the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA. AGOA has been the cornerstone of U.S. economic engagement with countries of sub-Saharan Africa since 2000.

To highlight a few of the achievements:

U.S. investment in sub-Saharan Africa increased from $9 billion a year in 2001 to $34 billion in 2014 and created over 300,000 jobs across Africa.

U.S. exports to Africa rose at an even faster rate, from $6 billion in 2000 to $25 billion in 2014.
U.S. imports from sub-Saharan Africa under AGOA totaled almost $11 billion in 2016, a 14% increase from the previous year alone. These successes, and the knowledge that trade helps strengthen democratic institutions and reinforce regional stability, are prime reasons the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly approved legislation in 2015 to re-authorize AGOA for ten more years.

We remain committed to our economic partnerships with Africa and will continue to seek opportunities to strengthen two-way trade and investment. USAID, for example, has established three trade hubs to help the African private sector take advantage of AGOA and expand exports to the United States. Additionally, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, or MCC, provides economic assistance to governments that have already established good policy environments. Most of the MCC's work has been and continues to be in Africa.

Promoting Democracy and Good Governance

Finally, promoting democracy and good governance. Efforts to secure enduring peace are undermined when governments fail to provide good governance and uphold the rule of law – the foundation for security and the driver of inclusive economic growth in free societies.

We see the corrosive effects of corruption as fundamentally detrimental to the future success of African societies. An AU study estimated corruption costs the continent roughly $150 billion per year. Bribes and low-level corruption worsen poverty and inequality, and harm citizens’ faith in government. Corruption - particularly at the highest levels - deters foreign investment, foments instability, and diminishes the capacity of security forces and other institutions to deliver basic services.

The United States will continue to partner with regional organizations to advance good governance and the rule of law. In The Gambia, when President Jammeh reneged on his commitment to accept the results of the presidential election in December 2016, the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, stepped up with other regional leaders and took a principled stand for democracy. ECOWAS and regional leaders organized a strong diplomatic campaign to influence President Jammeh to give up power. He ultimately stepped aside, peacefully ceding power to his democratically elected successor, President Barrow. This was an excellent example of an African-conceived and African-managed effort in strengthening democracy, and one that we were proud to support.

Conclusion

Africa is a place of trusted friends and partners. We must continue to journey together in our quest for peace and security, inclusive democracy and good governance, a trained work force with economic opportunities, and an empowered civil society. As an old African proverb says, "If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together." We plan to go together with our African partners.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today and for your commitment to advancing the longstanding ties between the United States and Africa.
Appendix C.
Prepared Remarks by General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander of U.S. Africa Command
It is great to be here again among friends and colleagues, and it is a privilege to be in the company of so many senior officials and distinguished experts.

Dr. David Chu and the Institute of Defense Analyses: I appreciate the invitation to speak with you today. Ms. Nancy Lindborg and the US Institute of Peace: thank you for hosting today’s event. I appreciate the dialogue and discussion this morning, and I also thank you for allowing me to share some thoughts over lunch.

At the outset, I would simply like to say that the men and women of AFRICOM -- including our service components and interagency partners -- are dedicated to tackling the many challenges on the African continent each and every day.

We are all very fortunate to have these fine people serving our nation and the people of Africa.

This afternoon, I will focus my comments on two broad subject areas, and hopefully make this engagement useful to you. If there is time and interest, I will be happy to take a few questions. Clearly, there are many topics I could address this afternoon. However, I chose two that I thought would be worthwhile.

The first topic will focus on The United States Africa Command, and specifically our ongoing efforts to support political solutions in Libya and Somalia. The second topic will look at our strategic approach, alongside allies and partners, primarily in capacity building and development.

AFRICOM

Let me begin briefly with some background.

Ten years ago, US Africa Command was established as a standalone Combatant Command in the US Department of Defense, with the overarching purpose of fostering our long-term, strategic national interests in Africa.

Ten years ago, many of you were already working on policy and matters in Africa. You may remember there was quite a bit of discussion about how AFRICOM would complement and reinforce broader US Government engagement.

Since then, AFRICOM has made great strides over this brief period, maturing into an organization viewed by many today as “value added” to the challenges we face.

In this first decade of service, the Command has contributed significantly to our national interests by working closely with various countries' national governments, and by building trust with partner nation militaries.

Our mission statement describes our three main tasks: to build defense capabilities, respond to crisis, and deter and defeat transnational threats.
As you might expect, the last of these, to deter and defeat transnational threats, is something we focus a good deal of our attention on.

So, I would like to begin this afternoon by talking with you about Libya, as this has been a top priority for AFRICOM for the past year.

Our discussion will show how US military operations are only a small part -- and by no means the only part -- of our strategic approach in Africa.

Libya

In 2016, Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj publicly and privately requested assistance from the US and our European allies to rid the country of ISIS-Libya, which had seized territory and established a foothold in the western coastal city of Surt.

ISIS had, for several years, imposed their oppressive will on the citizens and destabilized an already fragile economy.

Over the course of about 5 months in 2016, AFRICOM assisted Libyan forces aligned to the Government of National Accord. US forces provided expertise and niche capability assistance, such as advanced technology for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.

Moreover, our accurate and consistent Close Air Support augmented ground forces with a much-needed capability.

In all, we conducted over 500 precision strikes around the city of Surt. In doing so, we supported the United Nations-brokered Government of National Accord and the militias who did the very heavy lifting in the restricted terrain and urban confines during the battle over Surt.

Between AFRICOM, our US Ambassador and Country Team, and the fledgling Government, we established a strategic and trusting relationship based on the shared vision of a peaceful political resolution -- led and implemented by the Libyans themselves.

Our assistance had two important effects.

First of all, it caused our Libyan military partners to redouble their efforts and sustain the fight, in spite of heavy casualties. All of the partners focused their efforts around the common goal to expel ISIS from Surt.

Second, by putting the remaining elements of ISIS on the run in the remote deserts, we bought time for the Sarraj Government to take on a stronger leadership role, as the United Nations had intended.

Now, we are focused on continuing to support the GNA; to keep the pressure on the counter-terrorism fight primarily against ISIS; to work to open a line of communication with General Khalifa Haftar, the leading figure with the rival Libyan National Army, and last but not least, to work to prevent an all-out civil war in the country.
Again, all of these efforts are geared toward a political solution in Libya. Our work there illustrates how the military instrument of power can be engaged as an element of statecraft, and in support of a strategic framework, to make positive contributions.

Let me illustrate another example.

This past June, in support of our Ambassador’s efforts to reaffirm US commitment to a political solution in Libya, we provided the necessary security for him to fly into Tripoli, where we visibly demonstrated US presence and continued the dialogue.

This was the first time in nearly five years that senior US officials were on the ground in Libya. Without overstating the case, this was a significant event, especially in the eyes of the Libyan people and the GNA.

As the Libyans turn their attention to ongoing concerns, such as bringing oil production back on line, we will continue working with the international community and other US agencies such as USAID to foster their stability.

We will also continue to monitor transnational trends.

As ISIS comes under increasing pressure in Iraq and Syria, some fighters continue to attempt to establish a foothold in Libya. And while each day without civil war is a day of peace, a number of questions remain about how Libya will sustain this peace and move forward.

• How will Prime Minister Sarraj gain and maintain his support throughout the country?
• Will General Haftar attempt to move to Tripoli and take it by force?
• How will the efforts of the Egyptians, Europeans, and Russians influence the future?
• Will they hold democratic elections in 2018, as both Sarraj and Haftar have stated they support?
• How will recently assigned UN Secretary General Ghassan Salamé make a difference?
• How should AFRICOM best support Libya’s neighbors and the multinational coalition known as the Sahel G5 as they work to protect their borders from terrorism and trafficking emanating from Libya?

I could go on. But, as this story unfolds in the days and months ahead, the message from AFRICOM is that we are working hard to ensure the military tool is in step with, and supporting the political process. And while the US can help, the resolution must come from the Libyans themselves.

Somalia
Somalia is another example of our military efforts in support of a national government -- in this case, of the recently-elected Federal Government of Somalia.

From next door in Djibouti and inside Mogadishu, we are working closely with our embassy and country team to ensure our military actions support President Farmajo's strategy to defeat Al-Shabaab and allow for the Federal Government to eventually take over security requirements for the country.

This January, he became President in the first elections in nearly two decades, and he is making every effort to strike the right balance with the tribal and clan dynamics in order to establish a legitimate federal government.

I have had the opportunity to engage with President Farmajo on several occasions over the past several months. He is fully aware of the challenges he faces, and he is fiercely committed to making the Federal Government relevant for the people of Somalia.

I also accompanied Secretary of Defense Mattis when he attended the London Conference on Somalia with leaders from the international community.

The purpose of the meeting was to accelerate progress on security sector reform, build on the international response to the ongoing drought and humanitarian crisis, and agree on the new international partnership needed to keep Somalia on course for increased peace and prosperity by 2020.

Additionally, at this conference, President Farmajo unveiled his National Security Framework for a National Army, Police, and Federal and State security forces, with the intention of providing for the country's overall security.

AFRICOM's efforts are a component of the Federal Government of Somalia's commitment.

We are focused on coordinating and synchronizing international military assistance through the Somali-led strategy, called the "Comprehensive Approach to Security."

We also partner with the Somali National Army and provide training, advice, and equipment as they continue to develop their counter-terrorism expertise.

This past spring, we recognized the need for our operations to cover greater distances in a country the size of the entire US eastern seaboard.

Accordingly, we have been given enhanced authorization to keep up the pressure on the Al-Shabaab network, which continues to conduct terrorist attacks on Somali citizens.

We have used this authority in a very judicious but aggressive manner -- with the intention of providing legitimacy and support for President Farmajo and his government.

This is the first time in many years in Somalia where our kinetic actions are specifically linked to a strategy of a Federal Government. This is a very important point, and again, provides a roadmap to use the military tool in support of overarching diplomatic objectives.
Recently, we assisted the Somalis through our intelligence collection capabilities as they facilitated the defection of Muktar Robow, a former top leader in Al-Shabaab.

In a significant boost to President Farmajo’s leadership, Robow publicly swore allegiance to the FGS and said he was committed to taking down Al-Shabaab.

This particular defection offers some important insights.

First, the Somalis led each aspect of the Robow Defection operation, overcoming friction and hurdles along the way which in the past might have derailed their progress.

Second, they are now in a position to leverage this tactical victory for strategic effect. We can help them get the message out and encourage more Al-Shabaab fighters to disarm, defect, and take advantage of President Farmajo’s reconciliation initiative.

This has been made the widely known through an information campaign that encourages education and jobs for the former Al-Shabaab members who pledge their support to the FGS.

Overall, by facilitating improvements in security conditions, our military efforts support the Somali strategy for stable governance and a stronger economy, as well as the objective of holding democratic elections in 2021.

So again, a legitimate federal government, elected by the Somali people, provides the framework and legitimacy for our military assistance.

In sum, I hope you can see the common thread throughout our efforts in Libya, Somalia, as well as across the continent, is a collaborative approach with the African nations in the lead. We believe this is the best way to make the greatest contribution toward peaceful solutions.

A core tenet of AFRICOM’s strategic framework is a commitment to the use of the military instrument of power not on its own, but in support of US diplomatic and development efforts.

In fact, very few if any of the challenges the US faces in Africa can be resolved via military force as the primary agent.

Instead, our strategy places an emphasis on US military capabilities employed in a supporting role with nations that have compatible objectives.

By, With, and Through

I would like to transition to my second main topic this afternoon, which will explore capacity building and development, and I will begin with the idea of working with our partner nations in the framework of “By, With, and Through” at the operational and strategic levels.

Let me talk briefly with you about how we broadly conceptualize this approach.

First, security operations are conducted almost exclusively By the partner nation’s security forces, and specifically not American service members.
- Events in Burkina Faso provide a very good example of this concept. In January 2016, a group of terrorists attacked a hotel and held a number of hostages. The government received criticism for the slow response and appearance of relying on Western forces to resolve the situation.
- Since then, the Burkinabe counter-terrorism forces continued to train with AFRICOM to handle the expanding threat of extremists.
- A few weeks ago, a group of armed men attacked another hotel, and in this real-world test of their readiness, the Burkinabe security forces quickly responded. They effectively mitigated the situation.
- What is interesting is that in the process, they turned down offers of assistance from a US military medical team and from a French counter-terrorism force.
- When we compare these two attacks 18 months apart, we can see how Burkina Faso has successfully enhanced their abilities to handle emerging security challenges. AFRICOM has served in an enabling role to this progress, and by doing so, we also support President Roch Marc Kaboré’s stated priority of bolstering national security.

In terms of the second element of the "By, With, and Through" framework, AFRICOM works With these forces based on their requests and their needs. Our efforts may include training, advising, and assisting where we have specific capabilities or high-end technology which the partnered forces lack. In other instances, we help with equipment or education programs.

- A good example is in Tunisia, where the leaders of the defense forces are steadily transforming their military into an agile counter-terrorism force.
- Through the National Guard State Partnership Program, soldiers from Wyoming have worked with their Tunisian counterparts on an ongoing and consistent basis.
- One of their collaborative initiatives established an academy for professionally developing the Tunisian non-commissioned officers. This type of relationship supports our aligned objectives for the long-term growth of their defense forces.

In the third element of AFRICOM’s strategic framework, the compatible strategic objectives of both the US and the partnered nation are achieved through a cooperative relationship in which AFRICOM plays a supporting role.

- A couple of months ago, severe storms caused damage to the Chadian Air Force aircraft and hangar facilities. In a country about the same size as Alaska, their air mobility is vital to maintain border security and to conduct resupply missions.
- However, Chad is a poor country with limited flexibility to meet unanticipated expenses. And by the way, Chad is a vital partner and member of the Multinational Joint Task Force protecting civilians from Violent Extremist Organizations operating in the region.
- The US does have the means to assist Chad, and by stepping in and providing assistance to repair facilities destroyed in the storm, we are helping them keep up their efforts to maintain regional security.

In sum, this framework of "By, With, and Through" rests on 2 key elements.
First, US and partner nation strategic objectives are compatible and aligned, and second, the operations are conducted primarily by the partner nation forces with the US in a supporting role.

African leaders often tell us how important it is to develop "African solutions to African problems."

We can appreciate how difficult it is for a proud nation to accept help from outsiders. The concept of "By, With, and Through" recognizes the importance of host nation ownership and of fostering enduring relationships based on trust.

At the same time, AFRICOM’s interests are fully vested in the "3D Approach" of Diplomacy, Development, and Defense to synchronize our efforts and make the most of our collective talents.

In addition, we work alongside our allies -- from our historic Western allies to non-traditional partners in Africa such as Turkey and the UAE -- and members of the European Union, African Union, and the United Nations.

All that said, our greatest investment is in the long-term objective of enhancing the capacity of our partner nation defense forces, ideally with our partners and through a whole-of-government approach. This tenet reflects our view that prevention is always better than intervention.

Over the course of a year, we conduct some 3,500 exercises, programs, and engagements. These tailored efforts span a range, from training soldiers who serve as medics to exercises at sea to respond to piracy.

For example, we recently conducted an exercise named AFRICAN ENDEAVOR, which focuses on cybersecurity and communications.

This year’s event, hosted by the Malawi Defense Forces, brought together a truly diverse group, representing 42 African countries, experts from businesses including Microsoft and Barclays Bank, academic organizations and training centers such as the UN Signal School, and even the Dutch Computer Emergency Response Team.

AFRICAN ENDEAVOR focused on how to improve communication between various organizations and countries during peacekeeping and disaster response operations.

The focus on cybersecurity also created an opportunity in an area we all need to improve upon.

This type of exercise and the accomplishments of the 5-to-6,000 US service members working on the continent every day will not necessarily make headlines around the globe.

Nevertheless, the bottom line is that day in and day out, these efforts proactively and consistently build the capacity of our partners to protect their own citizens and respond to crises and threats.

Chinese Activities in Africa
Before I conclude, let me take a brief moment to discuss China on the continent and the opportunities we have with them as we move forward.

China has completed significant and much-needed infrastructure projects as a part of its "One Belt, One Road" strategy -- which it likens to a modern day Silk Road connecting markets worldwide.

Trade between China and Africa in 2016 is estimated to be valued at over $300 billion dollars. Before the United Nations in September 2015, President Xi announced $100 million in aid to the African Union and to supporting UN peacekeeping missions with an additional 8,000 police officers.

This investment has the capacity to transform the African continent, improving households, livelihoods, and macro-economies.

Better ports, better roads, better railways, better power grids -- these are all desperately needed.

The Chinese also recently completed construction of their first overseas military base, located a few kilometers from US facilities in Djibouti. And as you would expect, this presents unique challenges and opportunities found nowhere else in the world.

This summer, China assigned the first soldiers to this base and expressed interest in conducting amphibious training between Chinese and US Marines.

Across the continent, we have shared interests in African stability. We see many areas where we can cooperate with the Chinese military. For example, we both support UN peacekeeping missions and training with African defense forces.

The fact that we have mutual interests in Africa means that we can and should cooperate.

This fact does not obscure the reality of fundamental policy differences.

However, these differences are not insurmountable.

Earlier this year, Secretary Mattis pointed out, "Our two countries can and do cooperate for mutual benefit. And we will pledge to work closely with China where we share common cause."

In sum, our goal is to work with China in Africa as fellow stakeholders in peace, security, and stability on the continent.

In closing

This afternoon, I hope I have given you a better sense of how AFRICOM approaches the three tasks I described in our mission statement: to build partner capacity, respond to crisis, and deter and defeat transnational threats.
When we consider how Africa will need an estimated 20 million new jobs each year to keep pace with the growing population, we realize how compelling the reasons are to work together to create the conditions for those jobs, of course, and also hope for the future.

Today's Symposium certainly accelerates our understanding of how all of us, and the organizations we represent, can develop our best thinking and most innovative approaches. Let me close by thanking USIP and IDA for this opportunity. It has been an honor to be with such a distinguished group, and I will now turn the floor over to you for discussion.
Appendix D.
Remarks as prepared for delivery by The Honorable Susan Gordon, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
• Good afternoon. It’s a pleasure to join you for today’s symposium.

• Thank you to USIP for hosting us and sponsoring the symposium along with the ODNI, the National Intelligence University, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

• I’m proud to be here representing the Intelligence Community. So much of our work is necessarily classified and happens behind closed doors. But the Intelligence Community also has a commitment to transparency and to a conversation with the American people. That commitment is more than just releasing
documents, it also means engaging publicly with experts on issues of contemporary concern.

- You have heard from a range of those experts today, including several of our top US policymakers on Africa. As an intelligence officer, I defer to their judgments on the merits of US policies toward this complex and ever-evolving region.

- In the Intelligence Community, our role is to study the region, develop deep expertise, identify trends and threats, explain the implications for the United States, and enable good decision-making. Intelligence is, fundamentally about advantage – a little more, a little sooner, a little deeper, a little further.

- So what I want to talk about today is the trends that we see in Africa, and why these trends matter for the United States. I also want to discuss why the community of Africa experts and practitioners—you—are critical to support US decision-making for this region.
• For years now, we in the IC have been looking at the world’s growing interconnectedness and analyzing the national security implications.

• Of course, we see interconnectedness in Africa, particularly across several trends with profound implications for the United States:

• First, population growth. As Kate mentioned, the UN projects that Africa’s population will double by 2050, at which time one quarter of the world’s population will reside on the continent. This presents an opportunity for the U.S. to attract new sources of talent, build new relationships, and find new technological advances. At the same time, substantial population growth poses significant challenges:

  o Our global trends groups look at potential scenarios that population growth may have on the region, including strains on food and water resources, health care and education infrastructure.
These limited resources may in turn strain other regions of the world, and spur migration to the West.

- Second, the economy. As you all know, Sub-Saharan Africa remains a critical source for commodities—including oil and precious minerals—as well as a source of farmland and labor. The region is a growing market for US companies, with investments in sectors like agriculture, technology, and resource extraction.

- And third, political instability. Eighteen of the top 25 countries on the Fragile State Index are in Africa. Unless these trends reverse, unstable governance and political instability will produce humanitarian crises, violent conflicts, and terrorism that spill across borders…

  - …and frequently require foreign intervention. The United States currently provides support for 12 UN,
African Union, and regional peacekeeping missions to contain potential unrest.

- Our competitors, like China and Russia, see these trends as well and are increasingly operating in Africa, expanding their political, economic, and military influence.

- As US decision-makers grapple with how to formulate policy toward Africa and meet the challenges and opportunities posed by these trends, they rely on the experts and practitioners gathered here today.

- As a leader in the Intelligence Community, I have seen how expertise informs policy decisions.

- Prior to my appointment as the Principal Deputy DNI, I served as the Deputy Director at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency – NGA. This is the element of IC that collects and analyzes overhead
imagery, and produces a variety of geospatial products based on its fundamental knowledge of the earth and a history of mapping, geography, and cartography.

- Shortly before I arrived in 2015, the Ebola crisis ravaged parts of West Africa, creating a local humanitarian crisis and striking fear about the prospects for the disease to migrate.

- As the administration developed and implemented a response to the crisis, our Africa specialists at NGA worked with experts from around the IC and the government—including from the US Army Medical Corps and the Department of Health and Human Services—to provide policymakers with comprehensive and timely appraisals of the situation.

- Our NGA team also pinpointed the location and patterns of incidents, which helped responders find the best placement of treatment units, personnel, and equipment. As part of this effort, we provided open geospatial
intelligence data on our public web page – a first for NGA and the IC.

- More recently, I’ve seen how our expertise in the IC feeds into the ongoing deliberations about sanctions on Sudan.
  - Last June, the US signed a “Five-Track Engagement Plan” with the Government of Sudan, laying out a roadmap for the suspension of most sanction in return for Sudanese progress on five criteria identified by the US.
  - The IC’s analysis helped to inform the administration’s decision in January to suspend most of the sanctions, and as well as the decision in July to postpone a further decision to permanently remove the sanctions. Our analysts’ insights continue to guide the policymaking
process as prepare for a decision in October on lifting the sanctions.

- To develop this expertise, especially on topics or regions in Africa where the US government has limited resources, we need effective partnerships.

- We need traditional partnerships—with governments—but also with non-traditional partners outside of governments.

- This is one of my priorities at the ODNI, and it is particularly consequential in Africa. The relations don’t just benefit us – the information and capabilities that we share can help build local capacity.

  o Turning back to the Ebola crisis. At NGA, we deployed an analyst to Liberia, embedded with the 101st Airborne Division as they supported the logistical efforts against the disease. He also provided GIS training to Liberian government
agencies – a capability these agencies continue to employ as the country responds to other diseases in the region, such as malaria.

- And in addition to tactical cooperation, these partnerships can yield long-term collaboration on strategic campaigns against US national security threats, as we have done in Nigeria:
  - For almost a decade, we and other US government agencies have worked against the threat from Boko Haram, and now ISIS-West Africa, in northeastern Nigeria.
  - The IC and other US government partners have worked to provide a comprehensive, multi-sector approach to stopping these groups, including advisors, training, logistical support, and equipment.
• By investing in and growing these partnerships in Africa, we will position the United States to...

  o gather the latest information about events on the ground;

  o Develop our own expertise to understand and analyze this information;

  o And help our allies in the region to combat threats and take advantage of opportunities for economic and political development.

• In the Intelligence Community, we study trends and evaluate the implications for the United States and her interests, as well as for global security. In our view, the activities on the African continent present potential threats but also possibilities for human advancement across economic development, health, governance, and security.
The consequences are profound for us and our allies.

- In Africa we see an intersection of population growth, vast economic resources, political instability, and great power competition. It is a combustible mix of manmade issues and Mother Nature that is inherently and largely unpredictable.

- The United States and Africa are bound by a complex history. And this continent—its people, its states, its ideologies, its economies—will only grow more important for the US in the years and decades to come.

- For those of you in this room, this is reminder that while your work might at times seem unappreciated or lost in the whirlwind of other national security challenges, it certainly is not.

- Your diligence and your expertise are critical to our policymakers. Without you, dynamics of Africa will
remain opaque. And without clarity, suitable policies will remain out of reach.

- Thank you for you participating in today’s symposium, and thank you all for your dedication and your service to these crucial issues.
Appendix E.
Democratic Trends in Africa, Peter Lewis, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Democratic Trends in Africa

Peter Lewis
Johns Hopkins SAIS
Map of African regimes over three decades
[Polity Data]

Political regimes in Africa – 1985 vs. 2015
Shown is the Polity IV score for each country. This score can range from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). Regimes that fall into the middle of this spectrum are called anocracies.

Data source: Polity IV
This data visualization is part of AfricaInData.org – an Our World in Data project.
Licensed under CC-BY-SA by the author Max Roser.
Trends in broad regime type
[Polity Data]

Figure 1. Governance Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa

Autocracies
Intermediate Regimes
Democracies

Source: Based on data from Polity IV.³
Democratic Consolidation: Africa outpaces degree of global change

[Polity]

**FIGURE 6.2. TRENDS IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA**

Progress towards democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has been on the upswing, especially since the 1990s, though the way has not been smooth.

African regimes through three decades, 1983-2013

[Freedom House data]
Possible democratic recession since 2010?
Source: Economist [Freedom House/World Bank data]
Electoral Democracy, 1980-2012

Source: Varieties of Democracy
# U.S.–African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests

## ABSTRACT

This report summarizes the proceedings of a symposium called U.S.–African Partnerships: Advancing Common Interests convened at the Washington, D.C., headquarters of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on September 13, 2017. Approximately 200 Africa specialists participated in the symposium, the second in a planned annual series. The event was co-sponsored by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and USIP. Men, women, and youth from a variety of communities were represented at the symposium, including U.S. government agencies and military commands, academia, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

## SUBJECT TERMS

nongovernmental organizations; U.S.-Africa partnerships; terrorism; counterterrorism; protests; transnational threats; security cooperation; China; democratic trends in Africa

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