



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Understanding New Regional Security
Challenges: Shaping Military
Capabilities in East Africa and the Horn**

George F. Ward
Ashton M. Callahan

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Executive Summary

Senior East African military officers, government officials, academics, and non-governmental organization leaders participated in more than two days of spirited discussions at the second roundtable conference on challenges to regional security organized by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and the Ugandan non-governmental organization Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE). The conference took place in Kampala, Uganda from October 24 to 26, 2012.

Three themes arose consistently throughout the conference sessions:

- Civil-military relations, including the role of the military in government
- East African regional integration
- Regional security issues, specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.

The discussions of civil-military relations focused on the role of the military in development and governance. All participants agreed that the military can play a major role in these areas. Some senior Ugandan officials went beyond this consensus to assert that the military should play the leading role, providing policy guidance to civilian authorities. Military leaders from Kenya disagreed, and those from South Sudan expressed ambivalence. The military leadership in Uganda is supporting a project for the establishment of a research institute in the field of security studies.

East African regional integration was seen by the conference participants as essential and even urgent, but fraught with difficulty. Fundamental obstacles are present. One is the absence of a single organization that includes all of the relevant countries. Another is the lack of a regional consensus on the meaning of democratic governance. Ugandan participants advocated a type of “guided” democracy in which pluralism would be limited. There was also a lack of consensus on the question of which aspect of regional integration should be the driver – political, military, or commercial.

The discussions of regional security issues revealed concern that bilateral disputes over borders, which have been exacerbated by resource concerns, could erupt into violence. Several of these disputes are focused on the region’s Great Lakes and waters of the Nile tributaries. There was considerable discussion of the conflict in the DRC. The most notable aspect of that discussion was the unapologetic attitude of Rwandan and Ugandan officials regarding their governments’ involvement in Congolese affairs. On

Somalia, Ugandan participants underlined the recent successes of the African Union effort, and they gave no indication of diminished commitment to the mission.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**GLOBAL COVERAGE ANALYSES PROGRAM – AFRICA
ELECTIONS, REGIME SUCCESSION, AND GOVERNANCE**



MULTILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

**UNDERSTANDING NEW REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES:
SHAPING MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN EAST AFRICA
AND THE HORN**

**GEORGE F. WARD
CAROLINE F. ZIEMKE-DICKENS
ASHTON M. CALLAHAN**

DECEMBER 11, 2012

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Introduction and Analytical Summary

The Setting

The Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), a Ugandan non-governmental organization, partnered with IDA from October 24 to 26, 2012 in Kampala, Uganda in a roundtable discussion of the security challenges facing the East and Horn of Africa. The Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) lent its cooperation and sponsorship. This conference represented a continuation of the regional security dialogue begun at the previous ACODE-IDA conference in Kampala on April 18 and 19, 2012. Compared to the April meeting, this conference included presentations on a wider variety of themes.

Attendees included senior military, civilian government officials, academics, and representatives of civil society from Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Uganda. Academics and officials from Israel, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone attended as resource persons. A full participant list can be found at Appendix A.

Proceedings

Prior to the conference, ACODE circulated a concept paper (Appendix B) that served to focus the proceedings. The conference itself was divided into five sessions, with 11 formal presentations. The program is included in Appendix C. A record of the proceedings is in Appendix D. The presentations covered a wide gamut of topics. Selected examples of the papers and presentations prepared for the conference are furnished in a supplement to this report.

The conference proved to be a valuable opportunity to gather insights into the attitudes and opinions of a wide variety of East African leaders. A number of themes, including the following, arose repeatedly in the discussions.

- Civil-military relations, including the role of the military in government
- East African regional integration
- Regional security issues, specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.

The balance of this section of the report is a synthesis of the discussions on these three themes, drawing on insights from all sessions of the conference.

Civil-Military Relations

Given their military and security backgrounds, virtually all of the participants believed that African armed forces have a role to play in government and society beyond that of defense. There were wide differences, however, in the conceptual underpinnings of the views expressed by participants. Some came at the question of the military's role in society from a perspective similar to that of Frederick the Great – the army as the “school of the nation.” A few went a bit further and prescribed the leading role in government to the military because only it could “get things done.” Others expressed neo-Wilsonian views, asserting that armed forces should contribute to development of the peaceful, democratic resolution of disputes. These diverse points of view came into play during debates about the role of the military in government and on the appropriate peace and security infrastructure for the region.

Role of the Military in Government

ACODE, which is one of the most influential non-governmental organizations in Uganda, has a complex relationship with the Ugandan government. On questions of economic development, ACODE and the government have sometimes been at odds, criticizing each other's points of view. At the same time, ACODE maintains close relationships with many key players in government and with senior officials in the UPDF and police. Through engagement with the military and security forces, ACODE hopes to promote a democratic vision for Uganda's national security structure. In keeping with that goal, ACODE provided a counterpoint to the expansive vision of the military's role in politics and society that was furnished by representatives of the UPDF and the Ugandan government.

The Ugandan official line was most evident during the extemporaneous presentation by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Major General (ret.) Kahinda Otafiire. The Minister, who formerly was the chief political officer of the Ugandan revolutionary movement, emphasized the role of the UPDF in providing guidance for the nation. He said, “The military must lead the civilians. We provide political advice.” He also characterized the existing political borders in the region as “arbitrary” constructs left behind by the former colonial powers. In principle, he claimed, those borders should be erased. In the meantime, he asserted that the countries of the region must resolve their own problems, such as the conflict in the DRC, without the mediation of outside powers such as the United States. In practice, Otafiire seemed to be saying, regional powers such as Uganda have an inherent right to influence developments in other regional states, especially in the DRC.

Participants representing ACODE and other elements of Ugandan civil society expressed somewhat cautious disagreement with their government's point of view. They emphasized the importance of civilian control of the military in a democratic society.

Democracies, they said, should not “throw in the towel” and appeal to the military to “make things happen.” Other representatives of Ugandan civil society were more accepting of the government’s attitude. Some participants doubted whether Western-style democracy is appropriate in the African context.

The opinions of representatives of other regional militaries were also divided. A senior representative of the South Sudanese armed forces indicated that it is not the prerogative of the military to decide whether to accept political guidance. At the same time, this officer seemed to regret that the South Sudanese army is being forced to dissolve its political branch. Kenyan military opinion, on the other hand, was unequivocally supportive of the principle of civilian control of the military. A senior retired Kenyan officer emphasized that the separation of the military from politics is crucial. East African integration would succeed only if that principle is maintained. The “Bismarckian theory,” he said is a very expensive route to state building and human security. The answer and solution are in democracy, not the military.

Peace and Security Infrastructure

As at the previous conference sponsored by ACODE and IDA in April 2012, Professor David Francis, a native of Sierra Leone who teaches at the University of Bradford in the UK, participated as an expert resource person. In his presentation at the meeting in October, he put forward a proposal that he had formulated since the April conference with the encouragement and support of the UPDF. Francis described his proposal for a “National Research Institute for Security Analyses” (NRISA) as a concrete step toward building regional capacity for dealing with future security threats and challenges. Francis described NRISA as an institution that would combine academic endeavors such as teaching, research, and publishing with think-tank functions such as advice to policy makers and the promotion of civic dialogue on security issues. Francis did not request financial assistance from IDA for this project, but said that he would welcome advice and counsel.

Professor Francis’s proposal sparked a spirited debate. Most, but not all, speakers were supportive of the concept. A Tanzanian participant urged that the institute be created at the regional level. A Ugandan civil society leader disagreed, noting that East African regional institutions have suffered from lack of governmental commitment to funding. In his view, the proposed institute would succeed only if one government, presumably that of Uganda, took ownership of the concept and saw it through to fruition. The only fundamental disagreement with the expansive concept presented by Professor Francis came from a South Sudanese senior military staff officer, who cautioned against any moves that would turn the military into an instrument of economic development and detract from the capacity to respond effectively to traditional security threats. “The

purpose of an army is to fight,” he said. “Other institutions are better at economic development.”

Following the formal sessions of the conference, representatives of IDA and ACODE met with Professor Francis to hear his ideas on moving forward with the think-tank concept. Francis reiterated that General Aronda Nyakirima, Chief, UPDF, is personally committed to the idea. Aronda had even set aside funding and premises for the institute, although the latter were in a location that is far from Kampala, and therefore less than optimal. Professor Francis planned to spend the weekend following the conference with Aronda and other UPDF leaders, and hoped to use that time to sharpen further his concept for the institute and UPDF support for it. He promised to furnish IDA with a more detailed concept (not received as of this report).

East African Regional Political and Military Integration

East African regional integration was the *leitmotif* of the conference, coming to the fore in one way or another in each of the sessions. The consensus was that the political, economic, military, social, and environmental threats confronting the East African region can be addressed effectively only through integrated efforts. At the same time, participants recognized that the average citizen has no awareness of the imperatives of integration or of the process that is required. The regional discussion of integration remains almost entirely at the level of academics and politicians. Until there is broader awareness and buy-in throughout civil society, the subject will remain an abstraction.

In this context, the conversation about regional integration focused on two aspects: structural and procedural questions and the challenge to security represented by environmental and demographic factors.

Structure and Process of East African Integration

Participants discussed a number of structural and procedural questions that will need to be resolved if East African integration is to proceed. These include the following:

- Which countries are to be included?
- What comes first – politics, security, or commerce?
- Is there a common regional understanding of democratic governance?

The most important structural obstacle to East African integration is the fact that no single organization includes all of the relevant countries. The East African Community (EAC) includes three charter members, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and two relatively recent accessions, Burundi and Rwanda. At various times, Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC, Ethiopia, and Somalia have expressed interest in joining. South Sudan is likely to make a

formal application and to be accepted as a member, but further expansion is not likely to happen very soon.

A second structural problem is that of overlapping memberships in African economic communities. Tanzania is attempting to maintain one foot in Southern Africa, through membership in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the other in the EAC. Kenya and Uganda are both members of the EAC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Participants pointed to these overlaps as minor problems now, but ones that will become more serious as political, military, and economic commitments to integration reach deeper levels and become more binding.

Another important question is procedural – what comes first? The EAC has its roots in a customs union, but the political and security aspects of integration have become increasingly important even as progress on the economic front has been slow. During the meeting, UPDF representatives voiced support for regional military commanders assuming the leading role in integration. An experienced Kenyan retired officer cautioned against this. He remembered an episode in which a Kenyan army chief of staff had gotten ahead of his civilian masters in arranging regional military cooperative activities, and had been embarrassed when his initiative was quashed.

Perhaps the most difficult question in the way of East African integration is the practical meaning of the word “*democracy*.” Virtually all participants seemed to agree that the styles, norms, and institutions particular to western democracies did not necessarily fit well into the African cultural context. All but the Ugandan military participants, however, seemed to have in mind a concept of democracy not fundamentally different from the western model. The views of the Tanzanian and Kenyan participants reflected lessons learned during their countries’ long and difficult evolution toward multi-party democracy. The South Sudanese seemed conscious of the need to say the right things in the conference setting, but at the same time a bit uncertain about how their country would get to real democracy. The Ugandan military participants were the outliers. They seemed to have in mind a “guided” democracy in the mold of Indonesia under Sukarno or, at best, Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore. It is difficult to imagine that such fundamentally differing concepts of democracy could co-exist inside a meaningful East African union.

Environment and Security

Dr. Joseph Shevel, President, Galilee International Management Institute, made an interesting presentation on the implications of environmental and demographic factors for national security. He outlined the potentially significant negative impacts on East African economies of climate change, and the challenges of rapidly growing populations. He pointed to the urgent need for improvements in the region’s education systems, which

provide the best hope of channeling the rapidly growing cohort of young people into economically productive activities.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this session was not Dr. Shevel's presentation, but the fact that, despite its somewhat alarmist tone, it sparked no debate. The themes that Shevel addressed, which hold so much interest for western societies, seemed to be of little interest to those most likely to feel the impact. The lack of a reaction by participants may have been partly due to the placement of the presentation near the end of the proceedings. More important, perhaps, was the somewhat fatalistic attitude of avoiding engagement with factors that were beyond the control of anyone in the room.

Regional Security Issues

In a region beset by security challenges, it was interesting that few were discussed in any depth or with passion. For example, neither the Ugandans nor the South Sudanese addressed, either during the formal proceedings or on the margins of the conference, the relationship with Sudan. The campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army was mentioned, but only to note the success of the UPDF in driving the LRA away from Uganda. The themes that did engage the passions of the participants were, first, the Great Lakes region and the DRC and, second, Somalia.

Great Lakes Region and the DRC

Several participants called attention to the increase in tensions over disputes in the border regions defined by Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Nyasa/Malawi, Lake Albert, Lake George, and the Nile tributaries. There are a surprising number of these, most of which have gained little international attention. Some examples: conflict over Mgingo Island in Lake Victoria between Kenya and Uganda (fisheries), disagreement between Tanzania and Malawi on border demarcation in Lake Nyasa/Malawi (potential oil and gas resources), and control of piracy on Lake Victoria. So far, none of these disputes has led to violent conflict, but that cannot be ruled out indefinitely. It is important, all agreed, to agree on procedures and modalities for resolving such disputes.

The conflict in the DRC was also the subject of considerable discussion. The Rwandan High Commissioner (Ambassador) in Uganda and senior officers of the UPDF were of like mind as far as the DRC is concerned. They viewed the DRC as an artificial creation of the West, a country that has never been properly governed and that therefore cannot be regarded as legitimate. Through this lens, the natural next step for the Ugandans and Rwandans was to rationalize their countries' involvement in the DRC as aimed simply at containing the chaos and preventing spillover. The Ugandan Minister of Justice asserted that there were no Ugandan forces inside the borders of the DRC and claimed that he personally had always opposed the M23 rebel group. ("I almost court-

martialed (the M23 leader); I ordered his arrest.”) The Rwandan High Commissioner in Uganda, a former senior military officer, referred to the UN report, then in draft form, implicating Rwanda in support of the M23 rebel group in the DRC as “rubbish” and “baseless.” He accused the UN of leaking the draft, unfinished report in order to harm Rwanda’s interests. (Comment: The UN subsequently released the final report, which continued to identify the Rwandan government as materially supporting M23.)

Somalia

Shortly after the conference, Ugandan officials, angered over accusations that their country was involved in support for the M23 rebels in the DRC, made veiled threats about possible withdrawal of the Ugandan contingent in AMISOM. Since the Ugandan force is by far the largest in AMISOM and plays a key role in maintaining the hard-won Somali government presence in Mogadishu, such a withdrawal could deal a fatal blow to the mission.

During the conference, Ugandan officials gave no indication that withdrawal was an option being seriously considered. In fact, they made clear their belief that the Somalia operation has been a major success for Uganda, and indicated that the effort would continue. Although there was not a great deal of general debate on Somalia during the conference, it figured prominently in the prepared remarks of Ugandan military and government leaders and in informal discussions during breaks and meals.

The keynote remarks prepared for General Aronda Nyahairima, Chief of Ugandan Defense Forces, and delivered by Major General Fred Mugisha, reflected Uganda’s commitment to continuing the mission in Somalia. At the same time, the remarks highlighted significant challenges, including AMISOM’s lack of air and naval components, the inadequacy of Somali military and police forces, and the threat of asymmetrical warfare by al-Shabaab. The concluding points of the remarks prepared for General Aronda were as follows:

- AMISOM remains relevant to the prevailing situation.
- The mission is challenged, but worth doing.
- The force level is still very low to effectively cover the expanded area of responsibility.
- There is a need for a maritime capability off the Somali coast.
- The absence of an aggressive media strategy has kept the mission’s story untold.
- An unstable Somalia will not allow for a stable and economically vibrant East Africa region.

- The recent political developments in Somalia are significant steps in the right direction.

Appendix A. List of Participants

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Developing the Capacity to Meet the East and Horn of Africa's Future Security challenges

	NAME OF PARTICIPANT	ADDRESS/TITLE/EMAIL
1.	Dr. Joseph Shevel	Israel/Galilee International Management Institute rmahir@galilcol.ac.il
2.	Gen. Charles Mwanzia (Rtd.)	Kenya/Kenya Defence Forces
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4.	Mrs. Florence Iheme	Nigeria/ECOWAS oruaf@yahoo.com
5.	Prof. David Francis	Sierra Leone/University of Bradford, UK D.J.Francis@bradford.ac.uk
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11.	Simon Opolot	Uganda
12.	Dr. Paddy Musana	Uganda
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14.	Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha	Uganda/ACODE
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22.	Major Jackson Kakuru	Uganda/Internal Security Organization (Kampala)
23.	Dr. Philip Apuuli Kasajja	Uganda/Makerere University E-mail:kasajja@yahoo.com
24.	Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire	Uganda/Minister of Justice & Constitutional Affairs
25.	Maj. Gen. Fred Mugisha	Uganda/UPDF mugisha_2002@yahoo.co.uk

26.	Col. Felix Kulayigye	Uganda/UPDF felixkulayigye@yahoo.co.uk
27.	Maj. Gen. Francis Okello	Uganda/UPDF
28.	Lt. Henry Isoke	Uganda/UPDF
29.	Ambassador George Ward	USA/Institute for Defense Analyses
30.	Ashton Callahan	USA/Institute for Defense Analyses
31.	Caroline Ziemke-Dickens	USA/Institute for Defense Analyses

Appendix B. ACODE Concept Paper



UPDF

Concept Paper Understanding New Regional Security Challenges: Shaping Military Capabilities in East and the Horn of Africa

Introduction

Violent conflicts of one type or another have afflicted Africa and exacted a heavy toll on the continent's societies, politics and economics, robbing them of their developmental potential and democratic possibilities. The causes of the conflicts are as complex as the challenges of resolving them are difficult. But their costs cannot be in doubt, nor the need, indeed the urgency, to resolve them if the continent is to navigate the 21st century more successfully than it did the 20th, a century that was marked by the depredations of colonialism and its debilitating legacies...¹

The increased security challenges facing the East and Horn of Africa and the growing role of the military and security forces in intervening in such complex emergencies outside their borders has prompted security analysts to propose the urgent need to shape and reposition the military to respond appropriately. For example, the threats to most regional states in East and the Horn of Africa are no longer the conventional interstate conflicts that would require militaries to mobilize and use conventional methods of warfare that would involve official declarations of war approved by Parliaments or requisite institutions, justification of the law, and conduct of war based on international law. Instead, regional security threats to states mainly come from non-state actors: rebels and extremist terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab who are based in Somalia but are terrorizing the entire Horn and East Africa; Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) - both Ugandan rebel forces with bases in DRC, Sudan and CAR. Other security challenges to region stem from constrained or failed democratic transitions resulting into ethnic violence as was the case in Kenya in 2008.

In such a security environment, conventional military warfare becomes irrelevant since there is no clearly defined frontline or enemy to attack. Consequently, it is suggested that regional militaries require specialized military training to be able to respond to the techniques employed by groups currently terrorizing the East and Horn of Africa with bases in Somalia but with cells and outfits spread across the region. The new security

¹ Zeleza, P. T. (2008) *The Causes and Costs of War in Africa: From Liberation Struggles to the 'War on Terror'*, Pretoria, UNISA Press.

threats facing the East and Horn of Africa and other parts of the world are largely asymmetric in nature. They are underpinned by terror tactics that target non-combatants indiscriminately. Regional militaries are required to play pivotal roles. They need to be equipped in terms of training and skills to meet these challenges. While military interventions in most war zones in Africa such as Sierra Leone, DRC, and Darfur have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council, and funded by the United Nations (UN), there is a growing trend where regional militaries either unilaterally or multilaterally have intervened to end violent conflicts in neighboring countries. Such interventions include the recent Kenyan military unilateral intervention in Somalia; several Ethiopian military interventions in Somalia, Uganda and Rwanda interventions in Zaire to oust Mobutu and subsequently Kabila senior; and the current Uganda and Burundi intervention in Somalia that was authorized by both the AU and the UN.

Other interventions have been organized under the auspices of regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Still other interventions have been undertaken by formal or informal coalitions—such as the Great Lakes conflict in the 1990s or unilaterally (at least initially) – such as the recent Kenyan invasion of Somalia following the terrorist attacks and kidnapping in Mombasa. These military interventions have taken place in a context characterized by complex humanitarian emergencies, fragile states, and a multiplicity of non-state actors (rebel groups) that threaten some of the regional states and the on-going democratization processes unfolding across most of African countries. It should be noted that these military interventions in most cases have achieved mixed successes and have sometimes pitted countries against each other given the competing strategic interests in the region.

Even though unilateral military interventions in neighboring states are sometimes triggered by compelling circumstances, they are also often resented by the affected countries and criticized by the international community. Consequently, the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), in collaboration with the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), are organizing a roundtable on multilateral intervention that brings together military experts, academics and civil society representatives to critically engage in a conversation to deepen the understanding of the security dynamics, threats, and possible response options in the East and Horn of Africa. The roundtable also is expected to engage military experts in a discussion of existing military capacities to respond to security threats. A thorough understanding of regional member states' military capabilities helps to determine the kind of investments, changes and tradeoffs that must take place at the operational level to ensure their success in responding to the threats at hand.

Background and Rationale of the Roundtable Conference

The East and Horn of Africa constitute vast and heterogeneous sub-regions of Africa that are largely endemic to conflict. Strong cultural, historical and political divides within the region make it difficult to attain a cohesive sense of 'region'. The fragility and fragmentation of the region is largely evident in the numerous overlapping sub-regional and intergovernmental organizations that countries have constructed including COMESA (The Common Market for East and Southern Africa); East African Community (EAC); and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The East and Horn of Africa suffer from porous borders, conflicting/competing political interests, and neighboring countries that have often provided safe haven or more concrete support to rebel groups opposed to other regimes in the region². Many regions, including areas bordering neighboring countries, are remote and without any state presence. As analysts point out, some international borders of regional countries exist merely in name, most especially for pastoralist communities who are constantly crossing international borders in search of water and pasture for their livestock. These borders have also been a source of tension and violent conflicts among regional countries such as the 1998 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Objectives and Sessions

The main objective of the multilateral regional security roundtable conference is to provide a framework for assessing regional peace and security threats in the East and Horn of Africa in the next 10 to 15 years. The results will inform military and political planning to address such challenges. Concept papers will be presented at the roundtable to bring to the fore the underlying regional security threats, security interests of the key actors at state, regional and international levels, defence objectives of individual countries and how they relate to regional objectives, and the present military capabilities and the required capabilities necessary for responding to the existing challenges. The concept papers will set the stage for the roundtable discussions, during which participants will identify the existing gaps if any in military preparedness at the operational level. In this regard, participants should think about both material factors such as weapons and equipment, logistics, defense industrial base/investments, intelligence, communications, and sociological factors such as leadership, training, military heritage, and morale. During the roundtable, participants will also engage in a discussion about China's interests in the region and whether its strategic interests enhance regional security or could constrain development and peace. Participants will also critically analyze the the necessary political and financial capability of governments or regional organizations to

² Grossman-Vermaas, R. Hurber, K. Kapitanskaya, A. (2010) *Minimizing Threat Convergence Risks in East Africa and the Horn of Africa: Prospects for Achieving Security and Stability*, Washington, DC 2006, The Fund for Peace.

meet the identified security threats; the link between democracy and the role of the military in promoting peace and security as well as the role of civil society and regional organizations/arrangements in promoting and maintaining/enforcing sustainable peace.

The roundtable has four specific objectives:

- First, to enable participants to discuss the evolving peace and security threats facing the East and Horn of Africa in order for them to define appropriate response options;
- Second, to enable participants to explore and interrogate the existing operational and organizational competencies of national militaries and other security bodies/agencies required to meet the regional security threats with a view of scaling up and improving military capabilities;
- Third, to enable participants to appreciate advantages and challenges of multilateralism in resolving regional security threats;
- Finally, the organizers aim to create a network of regional security experts who can be called upon to participate in conflict resolution.

Session: Keynote Address

“The Role of Multilateral Intervention in Regional Peace and Security: The Case of Somalia”

Session: 1 Working Dinner

The roundtable conference will begin with a Keynote Address on, ‘The Role of Multilateral Intervention in Regional Peace and Security: The Case of Somalia,’ delivered by the Chief of Defence Forces for Uganda Peoples Defence Forces. This Keynote Address is intended to provide a deeper understanding of the achievements and constraints of the multilateral intervention in Somalia where the UPDF is providing overall command/leadership. The keynote address is also expected to provide an assessment of the progress in state making and the future outlook of the multilateral intervention in view of the political developments unfolding in the country.

Session 2: Keynote Address:

“Regional Peace and Security Challenges in Eastern Africa: The Role of the Military in Fostering Peace and Security”

The Keynote Address on ‘Regional Peace and Security challenges in East Africa: The Role of EAC in fostering peace and security constitutes the official opening of the Multilateral Roundtable conference by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. This presentation is expected to highlight the role of the military in promoting regional security in the context of regional integration particularly in the East Africa Community (EAC).

Session 3: Key Regional Security Threats

This session will discuss key national and regional peace and security threats facing the East and Horn of Africa. A particular focus will be on the war on terrorism and the regional war on terror; transnational organized crime (drug trafficking, human trafficking, and small arms proliferation), and national security interests of regional countries. The session will be preceded by a presentation that focuses on the armed conflicts in Africa which demonstrates that regional threats are not limited to particular regions but the whole of Africa. The rationale here is to prepare participants to start thinking holistically rather than limit their focus on the affected region. During this session, participants will be able to analyze the strategic operational environment that gives rise to such security threats, how these threats are sustained, and the role of the military in their resolution. Most notably, the session will promote discussion of possible policy and security responses to resolve such challenges with particular emphasis on the role of the military and other security agencies.

Session 4: Role of Regional Organizations/Arrangements in Managing Peace and Security Initiatives

In recent years, the states in the East Africa and Horn of Africa have engaged in peace enforcement operations. This has been met with challenges in the areas of military capability, finance, logistics, and personnel. This session will therefore analyze the role of regional organizations in collaboration with the UN in scaling up the military capability of regional arrangements and participating states in ongoing regional peace enforcement operations.

Session 5: Military Operational Capacities, Military Hardware, Logistics and Intelligence

This session will engage a wide range of security issues related to regional military capabilities to respond to the contemporary security challenges. Such military operational capabilities include military equipment/hardware, logistics, intelligence gathering and analysis. The session will also discuss defence policies and strategies that meet the dictates of security challenges in a fast changing security environment. Particular emphasis will be placed on the security approaches of various regional countries in the context of regional integration. The session will also analyze the existence of defence doctrines/ policies and defence missions and their effectiveness in combating regional security threats.

Session 6: China's Growing Interests and Influence in the EAC and Environmental Sustainability

During this session, participants will discuss issues related to China's growing influence in the East and Horn of Africa sub-region and whether they constitute a threat to regional peace and security. In the last decade, the volume of trade between countries in East Africa and China increased tremendously, with China becoming the biggest importer of raw materials and exporter of manufactured commodities to the region. China has also invested massively in various sectors, especially in the construction sector which has greatly boosted economic development. However, because of China's questionable democratic credentials and lack of emphasis on its cooperation for democratic governance, most critics think that Chinese policies and programs could prop up and sustain dictatorships in power. While China denies this accusation, the debate continues to rage on. The session will provide an opportunity for participants to debate the issue in a frank and honest manner with a view of reaching a consensus on how the region could maximize benefits from cooperation with the Chinese

Session 7: Emerging Issues and Actionable Areas

During this session, participants will discuss the emerging issues that military planners and policy makers should focus on to ensure sustainable peace and security for the region. Participants are expected to agree on recommendations and action points for implementation in the short-run and long-term horizons

Expected Outputs

The following outputs are expected from this multilateral regional security roundtable.

1. A synthesis report of the proceedings: The proceedings of the roundtable will be synthesized and an analytical summary will be produced by the organizers.
2. Edited volume titled "New Directions in Regional Security: Shaping Military Capabilities in East Africa and the Horn" – The background papers will be peer reviewed, edited and published into a book. The book will be an invaluable academic contribution in an area that has not been researched for a long time.

Participation Approach and Participants



- The overall approach will be to learn by listening to diverse stakeholders from key countries in the regions, including military officers, defense officials, representatives of civil society, academicians, and policy analysts.



- The core of countries represented will include Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Rwanda.
- The conference will include two days of discussions based on the themes identified above.
- Attendance will be limited to no more than 25 expert participants drawn from member countries.
- Prior to the roundtable conferences, the partner organizations will prepare and submit their papers for circulation.
- In order to promote candor, discussions will be conducted according to the Chatham House Rule.



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Appendix C. Program

		
<p>ROUNDTABLE Understanding New Regional Security Challenges: Shaping Military Capabilities in the East and Horn of Africa <i>Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment & the Institute for Defense Analyses</i></p> <p>AGENDA October 24th-26th, 2012 Kampala, Uganda</p>		
DAY ONE PROGRAMME		
WEDNESDAY, 24th OCTOBER, 2012		
TIME	ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON
6:00pm	Welcome Dinner, Lake Victoria Serena Resort	ACODE
Keynote Address		
7:30pm-8:00pm	<i>The role of multilateral intervention in Regional Peace and Security: The case of Somalia</i>	Chairperson: Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha Presenter: Gen. Aronda Nyakairima
8:00pm-8:30pm	Plenary discussions	
1		



 		
DAY TWO PROGRAMME		
THURSDAY, 25TH OCTOBER, 2012		
8:30am	Continental breakfast	HOTEL
9:00am-9:20am	Welcome, Introductory Remarks	Mr. Godber Tumushabe-ACODE Ambassador George Ward-IDA
SESSION ONE		
<i>Keynote Address</i>		
9:20am-9:40am	<i>Regional Peace and Security Challenges in East Africa: The role of EAC in fostering peace and security</i>	Chairperson: Director General of ESO Presenter: Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Eriya Katigaya
9:40am-9:50am		
9:50am-10:20am	Plenary Discussions	
SESSION TWO		
10:20am-10:40am	<i>Building an infrastructure for Regional Peace and Security (Regional Institutions, Standby Force.)</i>	Chairperson: Major Gen. Fred Mugisha Presenter: Prof. David J. Francis Discussant: Major Gen. Frank Mugambage
10:40am-10:50am		
10:50am-11:20am	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
11:20am-11:40am	Tea break	HOTEL
2		

		
11:40am-12:00 12:00-12:10pm	<i>Terrorism and Regional Security in East and Horn of Africa</i>	Chairperson Presenter: Col. Felix Kulayigye Discussant: Major General Mac Paul
12:10pm-1:00pm	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
1:00pm-2:00pm	LUNCH	HOTEL
SESSION THREE		
2:00pm-2:20pm 2:20pm-2:30pm	<i>Regional Security Scenario Building for East and the Horn of Africa and Potential Response Options</i>	Chairperson: Col. Felix Kulayigye Presenter: Prof. Baregu Mwesiga Discussant: Prof. Elijah Mushemeza
2:30 pm-3:40pm	Plenary discussions	Chairperson
3:40pm-4:00pm	<i>An analysis of the capacity of East Africa's militaries to address future national and regional security threats: Operational Capacity; Arms, Equipment , Logistics & Intelligence</i>	Presenter: General John Koech (Rtd.)
4:00pm-4:40pm	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
4:40pm-5:00pm	Evening Tea	HOTEL
3		



DAY THREE PROGRAMME
FRIDAY, 26TH OCTOBER, 2012

8:00am-9:00am	Break fast	HOTEL
SESSION FOUR <i>Keynote Address</i>		
9:00am-9:20am	<i>Regional Peace and Security Challenges in East Africa: The Role of the Military in fostering Peace & Security</i>	Chairperson: Prof. John Ntambirweki Presenter: Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire Minister of Justice & Constitutional Affairs
9:20am-9:30am		Discussant: Brig. Gen. Andrew Rwigamba
9:30am-10:00am	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
10:00am-10:20am	<i>The Causes and Costs of Armed conflicts in Africa: The Role of the Military in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and peace building</i>	Chairperson: Director General of ESO Presenter: Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha Discussant: The Army Commander of Burundi
10:20am-10:30am		
10:30am-11:10am	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
11:10am-11:30am	Tea Break	HOTEL

		
11:30am-11:50am 11:50am-12:00	<i>Multilateral intervention and Regional Peace and Security: Lessons from ECOWAS</i>	Chairperson: Director General of ESO Presenter: Mrs. Florence Iheme Discussant: Prof. David Francis
12:00-12:40pm	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
12:40pm-2:00pm	LUNCH	HOTEL
SESSION FIVE		
2:00pm-2:20pm 2:20pm-2:30pm	<i>Environmental sustainability (Energy, water, oil & gas and demography) and its implications on National Security.</i>	Chairperson: Major General Francis Okello Presenter: Dr. Joseph Shevel Discussant: Prof. John Ntambirweki
2:30pm-3:10pm	Plenary discussions	Chairperson
3:10pm-3:30pm	<i>China's competing interests in Africa and its implications on regional security in Eastern Africa.</i>	Chairperson: Major Gen. Francis Okello Presenter: Dr. Philip Apuuli Kasaija
3:40pm-4:20pm	Plenary Discussions	Chairperson
4:20pm-5:00pm	Official Closing Wrap up: Next Steps, Networks & Follow up	Ambassador George Ward, IDA Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha
5		

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Appendix D. Kampala Multilateral Security Dialogue: Summary of Discussion

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) held a roundtable in partnership with the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) and the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) on October 24-26, 2012. Leading individuals from five East African countries (Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) met in Kampala to discuss issues related to the security challenges in the East and Horn of Africa. Three observers from the IDA listened to the discussion in order to gain insights on the attitudes and opinions of the participants. The discussions are summarized below.

In order to encourage candor, the conference was conducted under the "Chatham House Rule." Thus, most statements in the following record are not attributed to specific participants. The following notes reproduce the dialogue as it took place.

Welcome Dinner Keynote Address

On October 24, a Welcome Dinner was held at the Lake Victoria Serena Hotel for the participants. The keynote address was given by former AMISOM Commander, Major General Fred Mugisha of the UPDF, who drew from remarks prepared by General Aronda Nyakairima, Chief of Defence Forces. The topic of discussion was the role of multilateral cooperation in regional peacekeeping and security. His address focused on the successes and challenges of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The following are highlights from his speech:

The intervention in Somalia brought back the spirit of pan-Africanism. With the UN's blessing, troops from Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda are working together. We currently have 17,731 troops and anticipate the exit of African Union (AU) forces down the road. Our achievements include:

- al-Shabaab no longer controls Mogadishu or other strategic towns
- Democratic elections were held and Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud was elected president

The AU has a long way to go as an organization and the mission has shown us that intrastate conflicts are more complicated than thought. Several challenges remain, they include:

- Clan rivalries. The Somali parliament has the support of clerics, local clan leaders, and elders, but clan rivalries remain. What can we do about this?

- Security infrastructure. Can Somalia maintain and sustain AMISOM efforts? Capacity building for the Somali military and police force reconstruction will be critical to this goal. National militias also need to be united under one umbrella.
- Media influence. The media needs to report responsibly.
- Helping the Somali people. The UN funds the AU military effort, but doesn't provide the peacekeepers with the means to help Somali civilians.

The ambiguous mandate of the mission – peacekeeping or a “war on terror” – has also been a challenge. Our ultimate goal is to liberate and improve (with an emphasis on the latter).

A question-and-answer session followed the keynote address.

Q: Why has it taken so long to mobilize a coalition of the willing in Somalia?

A: The CNN effect and selfishness of nation states are the main reasons.

Q: Is there any documentation of the Ugandan intervention in Somalia?

A: This needs to be reexamined. We need to make sure we produce documentation.

Q: What's been done to “win the hearts and minds” of the Somali people?

A: This is often determined by the availability of resources. Contradictions by the UN complicate this. No local capacity.

Q: Reconstructing the Somali state is a challenging process. Civil society needs to be included, but the group must be stable and coherent. Is AMISOM trying to reconstruct Somali society?

A: We risk losing our military achievements if we don't have a parallel reconstruction process.

General Discussion about Somalia – Major Points:

- The reconstruction of the Somali state has been managed by two committees, with an emphasis put on the military, using a 4.5 formula (four main clans and a half clan). There is a charter with amendments; however, the military process was not followed by a political process. This did not do much for national reconciliation. How do we institute a process that accommodates all of these clans?
- The two committees were useful to attend, but there were never visible results. There is a gap between theory and practice. For example, who is going to pay the police? There are theories, but no solutions.
- How do we fund reconstruction? There is no tax system. This will be a big challenge to the current and future administration.

- Understanding the Somali clan structure has been an issue in itself. There has been false intelligence information. The conflict was brought to our doorstep and we had to act.
- It took us awhile to intervene for several reasons. The media/CNN effect, the selfishness of other states, and lack of resources were all barriers.
- Yes, it was about resources, but I think it was more about political will and lack of understanding of the problem. Reconstruction will be an issue. The Somali forces have no effective command structure or training.
- The lack of political structures and local leadership is a problem. Back to the troops committed to AMISOM. It was viewed as a substandard mission, salaries are/were not acceptable for some contributors, and countries wanted equipment reimbursements before committing to the mission.
- On EAC integration – 76 percent of the funding has been covered by donors rather than by participant nations. Of these funds, about 55 percent goes to the African Union.
- We are facing many challenges in the region: M23, sustaining ourselves (lack of will/commitment). We have relied on China – they built the new HQ for the African Union. It's a “catch 22” situation. Is there regional interest in reconstructing the Somali state? We should recognize that this may not be possible. What does this mean politically? Do we recognize this as a common interest or necessity?
- You should invite the Arab League to help with the cost of rebuilding and developing Somalia.
- The main barrier to reconstructing the Somali state is the lack of a sense of national unity. In terms of Somaliland, if you have a confused identity then you will never have it right. Ethiopia should be keenly interested in seeing Somalia turn around. Look at the EU (post-WWI and WWII); member states were united by a need for common survival. We need to correct this ideological confusion in our region.

Day One: Roundtable Dialogue

On October 25, the participants began a two-day roundtable dialogue on security issues in the East and Horn of Africa. The first day consisted of three sessions with a total of five presentations. Each session included a round of plenary discussion. The topics included security challenges to the region, the infrastructure needed to deal with them, the effects of terrorism in the region, potential response options to security challenges,

and an analysis of the capacity of East Africa's militaries to address current and future security threats. The following is a summary of the discussions:

Session 1: Regional Peace and Security Challenges in East Africa

General Odong made the following points:

- We are here to reflect on the security challenges facing the region and how to shape and reposition the military and security forces to appropriately respond to such security challenges. The timing of this roundtable is significant given the evolving nature of regional challenges and the need to develop appropriate mechanisms and strategies. The main security threats are asymmetric in nature and often require responses beyond conventional methods of warfare. In addition, many security threats facing the region are orchestrated by non-state actors (e.g., al-Shabaab, Allied Democratic Forces, Lord's Resistance Army, and M23 rebels).
- Security challenges have different origins. Conflicts manifest over ownership, control, and use of natural resources (e.g., pasture land and water). For example, there is a close relationship between conflict, drought, and scarce resources. This has triggered cross-border disputes among pastoral communities in Uganda and Kenya. The discovery of oil also adds a new dimension to the resource challenge. The ramifications are becoming clearer – managing foreign and domestic interests will be a challenge, resources will generate and direct undue pressures, and we may face complacency, anger and ill-will from local communities. There has been an increase in tensions over ownership rights as well. For example, Lake Malawi could escalate into full-blown interstate conflict if we are not careful. This is one area in which regional integration could play a critical role. Also on the list of security threats are maritime security, religious extremism, and global terrorism. Security threats at the regional level have resulted from constrained or failed democratic transitions that have sometimes resulted in ethnic violence.
- What is the role of regional integration in addressing security threats? Peace and security are needed for the EAC (and, in turn, integration will also foster peace and security). Good leadership in region also important. We have seen some cooperation in defense (i.e., joint military exercises) aimed at creating foundations for a super-state (protocol signed in April 2012). The EAC established a customs union in 2005. This opened regional economic space and intraregional trade has grown to 13 percent of the total trade of EAC member states. We are still lacking in many areas. For example, security services need to communicate with one another and be able to work across the region. Regional infrastructural development is also a critical component. Our unity should be anchored in ICT. In addition, we must ensure that achievements made thus far are sustainable and emerging challenges must be managed within the region.

- With this context in mind, the regional peace and security strategy has fifteen goals, including, but not limited to:
 - Enhancing the exchange of criminal intelligence between states
 - Increasing joint operations and shared border control. For example, the success of AMISOM and fight against al-Shabaab can only be sustained through engagement with the government with Somalia.
 - Curbing piracy, particularly in the case of Lake Victoria;
 - Addressing cross-border disputes. For example, a bilateral agreement between Uganda and Kenya has been put into place to address the cattle problem.
 - Reducing money laundering and deterring cybercrimes;
 - Encouraging proper management of oil and gas resources. We should share our experiences. There is a protracted debate on local or foreign refinery: do we export or import? Degradation of the ecosystem is a concern. Currently, the debate skewed in favor of export. We need to look at the issue from a regional perspective. We are grateful for support from the EU, including counter-piracy operations and facilitating high level meetings for regional strategy.
 - Implementing good governance through EAC legislation. Conflict management and resolution will be facilitated by the elimination of small arms light weapons (SA/LW). Sudan is a concern. EAC states should raise the flag of concern when necessary – a sort of early warning mechanism.
 - Concentrating on confidence-building measures at all levels. We have strong relations with the AU and other regional communities. Development depends on regional economic communities. Defense forces need greater capacity. For example, the East African Standby Brigade has ECOWAS as a model.
- Based on the security threats to the region, I believe the next conflict will be among tribes for food and water. Food security will take center of global problems. Will there be water wars, food wars, and oil wars? We cannot rely on international markets. These are the scenarios we need to consider during our discussions.

Plenary Discussion

(Uganda) We have been working on integration for a while, and I can't see it happening within the next decade. The main issue is that we don't yet have rotational presidencies within the EAC. Integration is similar to the state-forming process and we need to study what this entails. The military should play a key role as an institution in leading the way.

Political integration will be difficult – we have different interests and power cannot be ignored.

(Presenter) War has been an instrument of unification. It is important to note that we are governed by constitutions that place power with the civilian authorities and the military is subordinate. The military can play an important role, but unless we consider revising those constitutional relationships then this will not change.

(Uganda) The control and use of natural resources drives much of the activity of non-state players. States have financial constraints – what is your comment on the relationship between the EAC and the UN in mediating and helping states with limited resources to resist pressures? What would you suggest for land reforms to deal with issues of food security?

(Presenter) We do not have the financial capacity right now and we are being pulled in different directions. I cannot give specific reforms, but look at what is happening in Uganda – right of ownership to citizens.

(Unknown) I think your speech is too enthusiastic and unrealistic. There are still serious problems facing the region. Tanzania is part of the EAC, but also a member of SADC. From an academic perspective, this is a dream. Everyone is looking a different direction. I won't be surprised if integration doesn't happen.

(Presenter) Someone said the African Union is a good venture in the wrong direction; the premise upon which it is being built is false. There is room for enthusiasm, but we shouldn't be complacent. We need to recognize the contradictions in our aspirations and realities. At times, those who have the financial capacity pull in different directions than those most important to the region.

(Uganda) The discovery of oil in Uganda and Kenya could be a curse. For example, there has been no meaningful change in the life of the average person in Nigeria. How do we ensure oil becomes a blessing?

(Presenter) We need to work together proactively to keep this from happening. We need to be aware of the lessons-learned for other countries and implement best practices. Uganda is debating which direction it should go right now.

(Uganda) EAC integration may need to move toward the formation of an East African state process that could better ensure the security of the population.

(Kenya) In earlier attempts to integrate security, the military got out ahead of civilian authorities, and those initiatives were “killed.” If it were up to the militaries of the region, military integration might have already occurred.

(South Sudan) The military has a single constituency – the nation. At the same time, the military should be under the civil government. Military forces should not take law

into their own hands. We [the military] should not reinvent the wheel. Do we have a mechanism of implementation? We have identified the gaps, but we always fail to implement the proposed solutions.

(Presenter) We don't have mechanisms for implementation. Many of these arrangements are negotiated on the battleground of national interests. The overriding interest is lost in the negotiation process. So no, what exists is not good enough in terms of implementation.

(Uganda) While we are under civilian authority, we do face a contradiction: The young generation (vs. older generation) wants quicker and better results, yet they see politicians and the government looking after their own interests first. Thus, the military seems to be the only institution that can meet these demands. Simply put, our political leadership is not moving at the pace we want to take our region to the next level. We are not the US, China, or Russia. How will we survive in this increasingly competitive world? If we don't find a way to get things moving then the people may demand radical change.

(Tanzania) This discussion builds upon last night's issues, particularly in relation to a clear articulation of interests. Tanzania lacks the political will in this case. Personally, I don't mind if the military were to bring this about, but I don't think the military has a clear vision of its own. For regional integration between economies, there needs to be a clear recognition of necessity. In the case of the EU, the French and Germans agreed they could not survive another world war. While it started with economic integration, collective security interests became the driving force. To what extent does the EAC have a clear perception of a collective threat? For true integration, it's not because we love each other, we gain something, we combine forces, but rather we need each other to survive. How do you bring political leadership to this point? What is the imperative for unity that is driving all of us? The idea becomes that we don't have a choice. Take arranged marriages for example, they last longer. In the end, the challenge is political and not really about the military. But there is no clarity at this level and visionary leadership is necessary.

(Uganda) What imperatives will drive us toward integration and how do we get there?

(Uganda) In looking at different facets of regional integration, I would argue that the security imperative is there and senior military officers know what is at stake. Yes, the problem is more about realizing the political imperative. The economic imperative also has deficiencies. The EAC is supposed to be a private-sector, market-driven initiative. Many of our countries have no private sector and we are still five partner states of poor people (30 percent live below the poverty line). We need to invest in building the market. Part of our challenge is that integration is abstract. Citizens are not involved in this process – it is mainly political and technocratic conversations – how do we bring them in? This imperative is not really developed.

(Presenter) We are negotiating integration from the perspective of “tiny national interests” and this is a problem. Is the essence of integration in East Africa the right one? We must start from the premise of old professors of international relations. It’s a realist’s world and self-preservation is the driving force. Human beings are greedy. We need to look for a critical mass in East Africa and we need to agree on this threat. It’s about survival of the state in an anarchic world. Maybe one or two leaders understand. It shouldn’t be laissez-faire, but a matter of survival.

(Uganda) In the case of the EU (and economic integration), I would like to point out that Sweden did not adopt the Euro, but they did turn their security over to NATO. Once we know that our security is handled collectively then this will invite investment and the economic aspects of integration will fall into place.

(Kenya) The Bismarckian theory is a very expensive route to state-building and human security. The answer/solution is in democracy and not the military.

(Uganda) Your speech was very rational. We need to go back to history. Under the British Empire, it was about economic integration. Security/politics is definitely a recent occurrence. I think Tanzania will be fine. The EAC, SADC and COMESA will eventually evolve into one organization.

(Nigeria) You should take note of the ECOWAS experience. We were originally established as an economic block, but we started thinking about a security architecture following the Cold War. It is good that this conversation is going on. It is important that each community devises what is suitable to its particular context. ECOWAS still has contradictions involving supra-nationalism and sovereignty.

(Israel) Sometimes we need to evolve. There are changing needs and they will continue to change. For example, climate change will become a key issue for integration. Any arrangement needs to be responsive to these changing needs and challenges within the region.

(Uganda) I was inspired by your presentation. Is there a high enough degree of appreciation of the security imperative to make the integration process sustainable? We need to understand the agendas of those who are hostile to integration so that we may counter them.

(Uganda) Are we prepared psychologically to turn six countries into one? We still live in our villages – how do we overcome this mentality?

(Tanzania) Democracy is not an African concept. What is its meaning? Governance is supposed to be a reflection of cultural aspirations of a given society. Does this winner-take-all philosophy work for us? We should review this concept and adapt according to Africa standards.

(South Sudan) This debate we are having now is interesting because it is parallel to what is going on now in South Sudan. Is the timing right for us to enter EAC? During liberation we monitored the EAC integration progress closely. Integration is a process and such debate will continue.

(IDA) Yes, it is a process. European integration began in 1951. Other nations have attempted to integrate (e.g. the OAS and some in Asia), but with limited success. Others have failed, including Southeast Asia. Europe is really the only successful example and it started with infrastructure. Also, you should recognize that integration does not occur at the same pace in all fields. For example, EU countries rely on NATO for military needs.

(Israel) Can we establish a NATO-like arrangement for East Africa?

(Uganda) I think two points stand out in this discussion. First, integration is a process and it will take a long time. This fact should give us encouragement rather than disillusionment. Second, it is important for this region to recognize that in this globalized world, it is under threat. We need to mitigate these threats. National security is about political threats, economic threats, military threats, social threats, and environmental threats. If we are able to generate a regional understanding of these threats this will be the answer to some of our integration problems.

Session 2: Building an Infrastructure for Regional Peace and Security

The first presentation [included in this report] of the second session was given by Prof. David Francis, a national of Sierra Leone who teaches in the UK. He addressed the issue of building regional infrastructure, specifically peace and security institutions. The following are highlights from his presentation:

Why do we need political stability and peace and security institutions? What added-value would a standby force provide? It's about the "fire next door" and realizing we need a regional security complex. For example, look at the issues around post-war state construction in Somalia. It is critical that we move beyond discussion and towards concrete capacity building strategies so that we may better understand and anticipate security challenges.

Presently, we face two dominant security challenges: (1) Military security threats – regional terrorism, democratization wars [post-election violence on the rise in next 5-10 years; post-strong man politics of transition, contestations] and armed conflict; and (2) Human security threats – water wars, food security, increasing poverty and youth unemployment, increasing human rights violations and lack of fundamental freedoms.

What are our response options to these security threats? (1) National – military and security agency response, disaster management, etc. and (2) regional/continental – coalition of willing states/peacekeeping and confliction stabilization, regional hegemonic leadership, IGAD peace and security architecture, EAC peace and security architecture,

AU peace and security architecture, and UN peace and security architecture. Each option is traditional in its orientation (militarization of security issues) and the threat of/use of force is the instinctual response. But they can't address unemployment, poverty, etc.

What is the role of military in peacetime democratic societies? We are seeing the emergence of a new strategic thinking and the recognition that peace cannot be imposed and security cannot be maintained by the barrel of the gun. To what extent is this reflected in operational practices? We need to respond to the gaps. We can do this by developing a national peace and security infrastructure. I propose establishing a think-tank: the National Research Institute for Security Analysis. It would be the first ever African national research institute established within the framework of civil-military relationships, in partnership with universities, think-tanks, etc. The Institute would produce critical and evidenced base research. Ideally, it would transform the military into a leading agent for national development.

What will the Institute do? Popularize the imperative for integration through research, publication, and historical documentation of events; provide policy input and dialogue; and act as a regional hub for training and the "soft" side of capacity-building. The Institute will also develop an academic program and offer international fellowships and internships. The target beneficiaries will be the UPDF, government of Uganda, universities and think-tanks, etc. Implementation of strategy and timeline? We are hoping for November 2012 to October 2013. The fundamental question: how is this relevant and how will it help?

Plenary Discussion

(South Sudan) Human rights have become part of the problem here. How do we define HR as Africans? How do we reconcile cultural differences and traditional with universal standards?

(Presenter) The conception of HR is ambiguous. There is always debate over cultural standards for HR, yet there are still fundamental elements of human rights that are applicable to Africa (i.e. respect for women and children). HR can be tailored to cultural and traditional contexts.

(Uganda) Academics always present analysis, but don't usually provide concrete proposals. I think you did a good job, but you should consider going beyond the national (Uganda) focus and bringing in other security sector actors. Otherwise, your vision and everything else is good. Dissemination will be an issue. Perhaps, you could publish short and precise position briefings. A literature review for example.

(Presenter) In construction of the institute, there was the notion that it would be owned by security stakeholders (i.e. the UPDF) in the Ugandan government. This research will be taken to our leaders and policy makers so they will be informed. The security

landscape is changing and this could be scaled toward a regional context if that was the decision.

(South Sudan) You actually raised a lot of issues we are grappling with at the moment. Should we push defense institutions to do things they aren't expected to do? The additional burden could be distracting.

(Uganda) There is no consistency across the conflict spectrum and no blanket solutions. Which threats come first – military or human security? Isn't military security a prerequisite to human security? What do you do with soldiers when war ends? It is important to create peacetime avenues for military professionals so that retired soldiers don't become a source of instability. Perhaps we need to transform the psyche of the political class in Africa.

(Uganda) What do we do with weak/fragile states (e.g., the DRC)? Economic growth is difficult in some countries with no plan and a large unemployed youth population. Disease/pandemics can bring nation-states down. The time has come to reshape militaries to new and emerging threats in the region. This does not mean diluting their conventional capacity, but rather expanding their capacity and flexibility. For example, consider recruiting engineers and doctors.

(Kenya) What is your opinion on the management of the media? They pose a certain threat, particularly in the case of election violence. Also, look at how social networks contributed to the Arab Spring? How do we manage such challenges?

(Tanzania) Two issues need to be defined. One issue is national defense. Does each country have a framework? A second is strategic interests. It is not clear what policies inform decisions. Also, more will be accomplished with a regional lens rather than country-by-country.

(Kenya) We need more literature and there is still a R&D (technological) gap. In many countries, the military is at the forefront of innovation and is able to contribute to the long-term economy development of that country.

(Kenya) The military institution could be much more viable for East Africa. The military has a way of going through the process more quickly. It is a good source of policy and intellectual analysis, but it should be linked with civilians and academicians. In feasibility studies, it is important to look at what national defense colleges/universities are doing.

(Uganda) I disagree with the regionalization of the Institute. In order to succeed, institutions need a single, invested sponsor. If you attach the institution to a single government then you will do better to ensure funding. International institutions have trouble getting support from individual member nations.

(Uganda) What should we do to prepare militaries for life after their service?

(Presenter) I am happy to hear your comments in support of this initiative, and I am surprised about the consensus. The question of how we build a peacetime military is important. It will require an evolving mindset that starts with training of recruits to instill standards of human rights and professionalism. There needs to be life after the military otherwise countries become a breeding ground for armed violence and conflict. In terms of the media, they are never neutral, but they can serve as constructive actors for building peace and democracy. This will require engagement among all sectors of society.

Session 2: Terrorism and Regional Security in the East and Horn of Africa.

The second presentation of session two was given by Col. Felix Kulayigye, Chief of Public Affairs, UPDF, and addressed terrorism in the East and Horn of Africa. The following are highlights from the presentation:

- The purpose of terrorism is not only to kill and maim the innocent; it is to put despair and anger in people's hearts... (Tony Blair).
- Terrorism is an asymmetric security threat that knows no borders or color.
- War is costly and so unconventional warfare is more practical for non-state actors.
- I feel personally connected to the 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala. My neighbor kept the bomb at his home.
- The impacts of terrorism can be mitigated, but awareness is critical as well as regional cooperation.

Plenary Discussion

(South Sudan) I can also identify (with this theme) as Osama bin Laden lived in Khartoum. We have terrorism in Somalia, North Africa, and West Africa. Boko Haram is wreaking havoc in Nigeria.

(Uganda) We must also remember that sometimes the state can terrorize. This happens in Uganda. The emergence of terror caused our leaders to panic and create anti-terrorism laws that broadly define terrorism. For example, if people demonstrate or protest and someone dies or property is destroyed then this can be considered terrorism.

(Unknown) I wanted to hear you say something about the root cause of terrorism. It is a reaction, a response to conditions that appear to be insurmountable to some group, an organizing pillar. So what are the roots? What means can we use to respond to that root cause?

(Unknown) When you look at the history of liberation movements in Africa, you definitely see terrorist methods based on this broad definition. So do you think these liberation movements would have difficulties addressing terrorism today? Can we make a distinction? Even political parties sometimes engage in terrorism.

(Unknown) Terrorism has an ideology and it has become a new form of warfare. What tactics are successful in dealing with suicide terrorists?

(Unknown) I think our first step needs to be to decide on an appropriate definition.

(IDA) In my experience, it is less useful to decide how to define terrorism; rather you should look at the root causes. Where is the line between the innocent and the combatant? What are the phenomena giving rise to this political activity? What can the countries in the region do to address the problem? You can come to these answers through forums like this. For another program (Asia), we brought in former members of terrorist organizations (reformists, teachers from madrasas) to share their experiences. In terms of prevention, one area to focus attention on is the youth. Governments need to deal with young people collectively and respond to needs before radical ideologies take hold. It is also important to understand that there is not a single set of root causes; they could be localized or global. All in all, it's about the young people – teaching tolerance and empowerment in other ways outside of political violence.

(Presenter) Demonstrations in Uganda are constitutional, but once you riot then you are outside of the law. I am a victim of rioters. The purpose of the terrorist is to convince others that the government has failed them. Causes are not homogenous and may be social in nature. Terrorism should be the last method of struggle.

Session 3: Regional Security Scenario Building for the East and Horn of Africa

The first presentation of session three was given by Prof. Baregu Mwesiga of Tanzania. His topic of discussion was potential response options to regional security challenges. The following is a summary of his main points:

I developed something I call the African Conflict Matrix (more details can be found in my book, *Understanding Obstacles to Peace* in the Great Lakes). I was personally dissatisfied with conventional conflict analysis and wanted to develop a methodology on addressing protracted conflicts. I looked at whether or not one could understand conflicts according to root causes (and the passage of time). Have there been changes? Has there been attempt to resolve them?

Instead of looking solely at root causes, why not the obstacles to peace? If root causes remain obstacles to peace then you will see them, but this doesn't work the other way around. Based on this assumption, my methodology is as follows:

- Shift from focusing on the root causes to obstacles to peace
- Political will guides interests
- Shift from static actors to dynamic actors

- Abandon the preoccupation with state actors and include a more comprehensive list
- Separate internal and external actors and look at actor interaction
- Develop an inclusive list of actors and try to identify the most strategic/dominant actor(s)
- Abandon the idea that peace is a consensual goal, rather it is a contested goal
- Identify/name actors by interests, describe their behavior as dictated by these interests (e.g., plunderers, drug traffickers, mercenaries, warlords in power and those out of power, peacemakers, peace blockers, opportunists)
- The higher the level of interaction, the more strategic the actor, and the greater the need for them to be involved in negotiations.

Following the presentation, Prof. Elijah Mushemeza provided his thoughts. The following is a summary of his talking points:

- This thinking is inspiring to young scholars because it gives them license to question traditional approaches.
- I like the idea of identifying actors by their concrete interests. This is useful for our policymakers.
- Agree with dissatisfaction on the idea of political will. Political will always depend on the interests of those in power.
- What about strategic actor who is not dominant?
- On peace as a contested goal, it's not about who wants peace, but rather whose peace.
- The fact that root causes emerged a long time ago doesn't mean conflicts don't have root causes.
- This offers a new paradigm that leads us to conflict transformation.

Plenary Discussion

(Uganda) Your matrix was informative. Interests drive conflicts in all of countries within the region. For example, the state apparatus in the DRC has failed. The UN is partially responsible for this crisis – conflict has grown despite their presence. When the conflict ends, there will be no more jobs for peacekeepers. Africans must rely on themselves to solve the conflicts.

(South Sudan) What about interests in terms of multinational organizations? When South Sudan signed the peace deal in 2005, the mandate of UN mission was based on Ch. 6. It was a very critical moment, and later the UN mission was reconfigured and became

Ch. 7 to protect the civilians...but from whom? There was the assumption that we are likely to be a failed state. Our territorial sovereignty is constantly violated. If UN was there to protect civilians...why are allies threatening to impose sanctions? Can you protect civilians against one another (because then you are picking a side)?

Session 3: Capacity of East Africa's Militaries

The second presentation [included in this report] of session three was given by LTG (ret.) John Koech of Kenya. His discussion focused on the capacity of East Africa's militaries to address future regional security threats. Specifically, he analyzed operational capacity in terms of arms, equipment, logistics, and intelligence. The following are highlights from his presentation:

- National interests must be defined, but regional interests must also be recognized by states. We are living in a resource rich area with coltan, diamonds, uranium, and oil.
- There are certain approaches to developing a defense strategy – mission analysis, factors/events/threats, and capacity building/force generation.
- Strategic planning factors to consider are poverty, unemployment (radicalized youths), hotspots (instability and failed states), terrorism/piracy, and lack of interstate networks.
- Opportunities are in regional integration and regional institutions (i.e., IGAD, NEPAD and COMESA protocols)
- In terms of force generation, we need the appropriate size and mix. There needs to be awareness of a competing need. This will help accelerate regional integration alongside regional collective security.
- Also, the Indian Ocean is our lifeline. We must develop a maritime capability.
- The way forward is about political federation, developing and encouraging trade and investments, developing interstate infrastructure, encouraging and facilitating military cooperation instead of cooperation, joint training exercises to build on East African standby brigade, and developing defense for mutual defense.

Following the presentation, Maj. General Frank Mugambage of Rwanda offered some comments in response:

- Linking military strategy to national interests is useful, but we need to look at regional interests as well. Conflict happens when these interests clash. Reaching some sort of consensus on regional interests will be critical for integration.

- Look at the Great Lakes region: resources are abundant, but the people continue to be poor. It is important that we develop infrastructure in the region while working on the harder processes (political integration).
- Some of us believe that we already integrated, but we need to actualize this (artificialness of borders). We will continuously find constraints in the integration process. As we speak, joint military exercises are going on in Rwanda.
- Military efforts should always support political frameworks.
- We need to look at the whole issue of governance or lack of it. There is a serious governance problem in DRC. We better confront the challenge because genocide can happen anywhere (mention of Rwanda). The epicenter can shift and conflict can cascade. Kenya didn't believe it could happen to them.
- Whatever we do in developing security structure, we must adopt a collaborative and cooperative framework. The closer you are to the problem the better solution you will find.
- We cannot ignore the political causes of crises; we cannot pretend that these protracted conflicts started just yesterday.

Plenary Discussion

(Uganda) I agree with your point on national interests. Although, I wish you would have commented on (1) intelligence and (2) accountability (financial and service delivery) of security agencies. The issue of technology is critical as well as the management of logistics (equipment, financial, etc.)

(Uganda) A recent UN report has accused Uganda and Rwanda of abetting conflict in the DRC. What about the French interests at stake? Uganda and Rwanda have denied the allegations. What are Rwanda's strategic interests in the Congo? What are Uganda's strategic interests in the Congo? In this region, intelligence tends to be regime-based when in reality it should be nation-based.

(Israel) I want to remind you that Israel doesn't have oil or any other resources. A strong education system has helped us get to where we are today. Take note of Tony Blair's three priorities – education, education, and education. It is essential to capacity building. Have a “yes we can” mentality.

(Presenter) National interests should be followed because peace and stability will contribute to national development. The problem is being addressed in Somalia, but at a higher cost. In terms of accountability, we have mechanisms, but do we use them? On intelligence, it should be strategic and tactical, but not to protect the regime. The most important resource is the people. Also, the military must be built on a strong economy.

(Rwanda) Sovereignty must be accompanied with responsibility. In the DRC there is no governance and no infrastructure. It has been a cycle of violence/conflict. As for Rwanda's interests, our number one priority is the human resource (ICT, we want to be a service hub) and the mining industry needs to be organized. You must also consider that the UN report was not yet ready to be presented and so its credibility is questionable. Has there been punishment for its leaking? We need an opportunity to respond to allegations because they are rubbish, baseless.

(Uganda) Intelligence is really an organ of the state and provides protection. This shouldn't be seen as a negative aspect. Current intelligence is doing what it's supposed to do. As the military professionalizes so does intelligence. We should operate openly, but keep some things confidential. I think that responding to terrorism has shown our capabilities. On budgets, we need to be very fair. There is a feeling that not a lot of money is spent on security. Funding is the challenge to intelligence.

(Sierra Leone) We focus so much on the economics without the heart of the matter – physical integration (infrastructure). Roundtables are valuable for confidence-building.

(Uganda) Is there doctrine for joint exercise training? Do we have well developed national doctrines? There is no way that intelligence will ever be open.

(Kenya) It is true that East African forces have come a long way. Even without integration, we worked together in Somalia. On intelligence, services are going through security sector reform to become more accountable to the people and professional.

(Uganda) Certain aspects of intelligence are open. This is especially important vis-a-vis the role of the military in peacekeeping.

(Kenya) There have been many exercises in Rwanda, and going to South Sudan would be a great idea. We must realize that procurement of resources is a process.

Day Two: Roundtable Dialogue

On October 26, the participants concluded the two-day roundtable dialogue on security issues in the East and Horn of Africa. The second day consisted of two sessions that included five presentations and rounds of plenary discussion. The topics included security challenges to the region, the role of the military, democracy, multilateral intervention, environmental sustainability, and China's interests in the region. The following is a summary of the discussions:

Session 4: Regional Peace and Security Challenges in East Africa: The Role of EAC in Fostering Peace in Security

The keynote address was given by Maj. General Kahinda Otafiire who serves as the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in Uganda. The following is a summary of his presentation:

I want to look at the origins of the region and the actors who cause a lack of peace and why. Is the interest in peace for state actors or the population? What lens are we using when we study regional security? Is it the lens of those who divided us (colonial powers)? Or is it that of the people of the region? Why should there be insecurity in this region? The legacy of colonialism cannot be denied. We are protecting entities that were not designed by us. Europe has a history different from ours. Before we talk of peace we need to know whose interests we are serving. We can only have peace when those who control methods of coercion protect those in the population. We are one people. I have long advocated the removal of borders in the EAC. Americans defend American interests abroad – they have combatant commands and oil interests in certain countries. So whose interests are we protecting?

This brings me to the idea of democracy. We are fishing in troubled waters. What is the end state when we stabilize? Peace and security are not dependent on weapons, but rather the ideological consciousness of the interests of our people and the direction of Africa. It is our duty to protect our region. We need to sit down and discuss our differences. Uganda is not involved in the Congolese conflict, but even if we were involved, it is a war between brothers. What's wrong with us sitting together and trying to mediate? It is not America's role to mediate in the DRC any more than it would be for Uganda to mediate when America quarrels with Canada or Mexico. Likewise, they don't use their militaries to solve conflicts because it would destroy interests. My submission is that peace and security in this region can only be guaranteed by our patriotic responsibility. You should only fight a war where you have a stake.

Plenary Discussion

(South Sudan) What are the national interests of this region? We are trying to understand our interests. You have raised a very important point. I have discovered that South Sudan is inseparable from the region. We have the same people in Uganda and South Sudan. If the national interests of each state in the region are connected then it means they should be one. But what is the national security policy of each state in the region? I just want to support what you have said. We in the army, civil society, and academic world believe that peace and security are for everyone and not just the government.

(South Sudan) You raise a very important question. If you give the military the leverage to decide to refuse or accept commands when we are in crisis then what happens to the constitution? The constitution is clear that the military is subordinate to civilian authority.

Should the military be isolated from politics? We are failing to utilize our resources because of politics. The army in South Sudan is currently making the transition from a revolutionary army to a peacetime army. In preparing our military strategy, we asked for funding for a trip and were given conditions so we told them no thank you. Due to international security reform standards, the army is being forced to dissolve its political branch (which they say is used to train soldiers to make the transition to civilian life).

(Uganda) Politicians frustrate the military because the military wants things to move faster. You raised the issue of the military being in parliament, should that be the model for Africa? Once we have the military in parliament then things can move faster. Maybe you can educate us your experience?

(Kenya) The separation of politics and the military is important. We have to agree on certain standards for regional integration and separation of powers is essential. Yes, history (colonialism) has imposed certain things on us, but we cannot dwell on this. I would like to hear your take on regional integration. Maybe eventually the Gaddafi dream of a United States of Africa can happen.

(Presenter) How am I dressed? I am a civilian, but in essence I am a soldier. I also used to be a politician. The military must lead the civilians. Politics is about solving people's problems and not about being "an excellency." Institutions elsewhere are stable and time-tested. Did Washington start as a soldier or politician? The military must uphold the constitution. The military should also be cautious in the use of the constitution. In South Africa there were apartheid rules that were unfair. You should only obey lawful orders. Even methods of violence can be used in democracies – Hitler's misuse of the army to exterminate the Jewish population. It was legal, but was it legitimate? Likewise, the South African army was used against the people.

(Uganda) There is a general consensus here about civil-military relations. Uganda is a post-conflict society in which generals are put in/remain in power by mistake. We need to phase the military out of politics. The military can help build institutions, but then they must transition out. The role of the military in a revolutionary society is very different in that of a democratic society.

(Uganda) ACODE is also commanded by the military in case you have forgotten. So don't talk badly about the military. (Editor's note: ACODE's chairman of the board has a military background).

(Israel) Tomorrow night is the memorial of our late prime minister who was assassinated. He had a famous saying: when he was a soldier, he was a soldier; but when he became a politician, he became a soldier of peace. He made a clear distinction between being a soldier and a civilian. I think that not separating the two is very dangerous. The military is under the government. The price of democracy is that the

government moves slower than the military. There can be limited military involvement in policy-making or government positions, but the government has a final say.

(South Sudan) Do the histories of militaries determine civil-military relations? The notion of a political soldier informed a lot of liberation movements. More often than not, the military seems to be way more advanced than political institutions (at least in South Sudan). Parliamentarians do not understand civil-military relation issues. Maybe the evolution of civil-military relations (in societies where the military is the driving force of revolution) is an area worth studying. The point of fusion is not necessarily state interests, but those of the people.

(Unknown) Can you comment on your experience as a freedom fighter in DRC? We have had a lot of discussion on the DRC. What do you think is the main problem? What is the chance of an African force succeeding in restoring law and order?

(Presenter) You cannot phase the military out of politics. I watched the Obama-Romney debate (Obama: “I give the military what they demand and no more”). On the DRC, this is my personal view, and not the position of Uganda. The problem of the Congo is its history. Congo has never had leadership; it has always been managed by agents. That is, agents of foreign interests. If gold is there, why are the poorest people in the Congo? You have never seen poverty, but I have seen it. Whoever manages the Congo becomes an agent of one of those interests. There are no true Congolese patriotic forces. Others have attempted to thwart Uganda’s participation in fixing the problem. Francophone, Anglophone – where are the Africans? Where are the Congolese? Whose language do they speak? We have a common cause to overcome poverty and deprivation. We are all short people, but the US and Great Britain are giants. On terrorism, al-Shabaab and AQIM are examples of lack of direction. Who says God needs military assistance? On comments made by Israel, military has not left politics there – I believe the generals in uniform simply obey the generals out of uniform. They are “chickens with different colored feathers.” I agree that the army should obey the civilians, but they should also think in line with the militaries. The armies in the region should not be confronting one another – we have a joint responsibility to fight against poverty, the lack of democracy, and for the rational use of natural resources.

Session 4: Democracy and the Role of the Military in Regional Peace and Security in East Africa

The second presentation of session four was given by Dr. Arthur Bainomugisha of ACODE. His presentation [included in this report] focused on democracy and the role of military in keeping peace and securing the region. The following are highlights of his presentation:

- The East and Horn of Africa suffer from conflict and armed violence. These conflicts cost us \$300 billion.
- One threat that hasn't been discussed is corruption. It underpins the whole governance problem. The difference between us and democracies is the rule of law. We fail at punishing those who commit corruption. Corruption stifles service delivery. For example, we are staying in a five-star hotel without a proper road to get us here.
- Does democracy offer a solution to conflict-prone East and Horn of Africa? Societies and the development of a democratic culture and norms emphasize rational debate, toleration, negotiation of differences, reconciliation and conflict resolution.
- What is the meaning of democracy? Plurality of opinions, freedom of expression, rule of law, human rights, etc. It does not answer all problems, but no other system holds so many possibilities for Africa. Power comes and resides with the people.
- In brief, democracy is the answer for conflict-prone societies because it is representative of institutions and conflict management mechanisms for addressing competing interests. Some say we have two Ugandas (one in the north and one in the south). Democracy offers a foundation for national reconciliation and nation-building, internal security, building government infrastructure, regional stability, and economic recovery. It is the young democratic culture that is evolving in the region that has brought us to this forum.
- Lastly, the role of the military should be promoter and protector of democracy; not regime defense.

Plenary Discussion

(Uganda) The military should protect efforts meant for or in pursuit of peace, security, and stability. Can democracy answer the challenges we face in Africa? This question has generated debate. First, we must address certain questions. What form of democracy are we talking about? What design (and by who)? What interests will it protect? In terms of people choosing their representatives, we must first ask whether people are aware of their own problems and can they design their own solutions? In some cases, democracy has created more conflict than resolution (e.g., elections). Take the DRC for example; are the Congolese aware of their problem? They have not elected leaders that carry out their interests.

(Uganda) This point on elections reminds me of a personal experience in my home town. We were holding elections for our Local Council. A drunkard was running and we mobilized against him, but he still won and our infrastructure remained poor. Does the rule of law answer the problem here?

(Uganda) Sometimes we all agree that democracy is good, but there are two things that we tend to overlook. In certain situations, you cannot have democracies the way it is practiced in America. The elections in Congo cannot be like those in Florida. South Sudan cannot have elections like Britain. These things cannot be achieved over night. We remain with dictators in democracy because of vote-buying. Voting does not necessarily equal democracy.

(Uganda) What about the notion that democracies don't fight each other? Look at the US, Great Britain, and China. What about the Cuban missile crisis? Perhaps it is just military deterrence (nuclear weapons). As a form of governance, it should be to deliver the common good. Is it really this?

(Nigeria) Elections have become key elements in the democratization process, but it is true that they result in conflict sometimes. We have situations when the people in power don't want to give it up (e.g., Cote d'Ivoire). People in government are tinkering with the democratic process. What role do elections play in our countries? Look at the fragile situations in Guinea Bissau and Mali. They have a timeline to hold elections, but it does no good to push them if they are not ready, then elections will not be free and fair.

(Uganda) This is a song that some of us have heard. What form of democracy, design, and model? Is it possible for us to think beyond the textbook model and look for possible alternative indigenous models that can be applied in our different context? What are the challenges to democracy in Africa?

(Uganda) The problem is that most of us are pretenders of democracies (or in between democracy and dictatorship). We get to vote, but the process is flawed. The electoral process is corrupt. If you are not part of the ruling party then you are deemed an enemy of the state.

(South Sudan) The institution ACODE should try to look at practical case studies.

(Sierra Leone) I agree with contestations about democracy, but I was expecting us to come back to the focus of the roundtable. I can appreciate the opportunities democracy offers. What role the military can play in democratization?

(Uganda) I am not aware of any other system that is better. It is important for the military to protect institutions that support democracy (e.g. electoral commissions). People react faster when their civil and political rights are challenged.

(Presenter) I know democracy will be resisted by many, but it has an important role to play. The military is increasingly involved in interventions (example of AMISOM), preservation of national security, and nation-building. What form of democracy is right for us? We are not transplanting the Western idea, and it is not one-size-fits-all, but certain values are universal. Uganda took five years to write a constitution. Most liberation struggles are fighting for democratic freedoms, but end up in dictatorships.

Power is sweet, but it is sweet for everyone. People have been corrupted in this country and this has led to poor service delivery. We have a willing seller and a willing buyer. Democracy is not just about voting and elections. We have a half-built democracy and we need to deepen it.

Session 4: Multilateral Intervention and Regional Peace and Security

The third presentation of session four was given by Ms. Florence Iheme, a Nigerian national who is an official in the early warning center of ECOWAS. She discussed the role of multilateral intervention in regional peace and security in the context of lessons-learned from ECOWAS. The following is a summary of her presentation [paper included with this report]:

Post-independence, the region had slow economies, ethnic tensions, and civil wars. The Treaty of Lagos (1975) was the beginning of ECOWAS. It brought together fifteen member states with different colonial histories. Thus, the integration process was slow. Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone compelled us to come together and create a regional intervention force (ECOMOG). The conflicts were brought to an end, but at high costs (casualties). Some also questioned the motivations behind the ECOWAS intervention (Nigeria's motives in particular). The ad-hoc nature of the body has brought its own challenges as well (i.e., command and control). Security threats spread across borders due to certain protocols. For example, the free movement of people led to an increase in arms trafficking.

We operate in the mindset of African solutions to African problems. The goal is timely resolution of inter- and intrastate conflicts. An infrastructure of conflict prevention, management, and resolution becomes necessary. You do not win hearts and minds through military defeats so we developed institutions to address these issues. Heads of state have the ultimate responsibility, but a Security Council votes on any intervention/peacekeeping mission. Two-thirds of members must be present for any decision. The Council of the Wise helps with conflict prevention and mediation. The ECOWAS Standby Force has been trained, equipped, and ready for diplomacy when necessary. This component is still a work in progress, but there is a broad outline for intervention. We are also working on an Early Warning System. There are six indicators we go by, field monitors in each state, and active civil society participation.

ECOWAS has notable achievements. We have a peace and security framework that guides activities and member states abide to it. Institutions have been effective in preventive diplomacy (examples of Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Liberia, and Mali). And we are inclusive of civil society.

What are the lessons-learned and challenges of integration? You must understand that it is not a job for just one decade. We face constant tensions between sovereignty and

supra-nationality. There is also a lack of specificity for the threshold of intervention. Logistics and funding for multilateral operations is always a challenge. We have not yet developed a structure/framework for peace building and we still have to rely on the AU. In short, the discussion shouldn't be whether there is a need for multilateral intervention, rather it should be on the nature of the intervention. What framework will guide it? You need buy in of all member countries.

Following Ms. Iheme's presentation, Prof. David Francis provided some commentary. The following is a summary of his points:

- What you said is spot on and the historical context is informing about an organization like ECOWAS is possible.
- ECOWAS has not been able to achieve economic objectives, but has focused on security in the region. This is an important lesson for the EAC in understanding that integration is a gradual process.
- ECOWAS was able to expand into the peace and security domain by establishing ECOMOG. This was driven by the interests of Nigeria and led to a UN/ECOWAS co-deployment.
- Security imperatives in the region have been the driving force for ECOWAS – civil wars, unrest, refugees. There was an organic evolution from economic reasons to peace and security. They are building a regional peace and security architecture.
- Engagement with different actors has been helpful. Getting the chiefs of staff from the region to share ideas, confidence-building measures, and military diplomacy – this is what the “fire next door” dynamics are about. Engagement with civil society is good.

Plenary Discussion

(Uganda) Regional security organizations also require democratic hegemony. In case of the East Africa, it should be the DRC (due to resource capacity), but this is not possible for obvious reasons. Uganda has been trying. Do you think it would be important to get one country to take leadership?

(Presenter) I want to remind you of ECOWAS Vision 2020 (we are not there yet). With the early warning system, we are also trying to decentralize and harmonize the early warning framework. We are not fully democratized. On regional hegemony, you need someone to lead the pack. Nigeria became the natural leader given population and resources. For the EAC, a few countries should be promoted to take the lead.

Session 5: Environmental Sustainability

The first presentation of session five was given by Dr. Joseph Shevel of Galilee International. He discussed the implications of climate change on regional security. The following are a few highlights from his presentation [included in this report]:

- Climate change impacted empires previously. Drought and lack of water led to an increase in food prices (and subsequent security challenges).
- You can't avoid climate change, but adequate preparation can minimize the effects.
- A USAID study in the Horn and East Africa projected a 54 percent increase in wars by 2030. Lack of water and increased urbanization will be the main challenges.

Following the presentation, Prof. John Ntambirweki of ACODE elaborated on/added to some of the environmental/resource challenges facing the region. The following is a summary of his main points:

- Shared waters have led to conflict between ethnic groups in northeast Uganda and northwest Kenya. The Nile Basin could be the next battleground in the region. Other conflict areas include Lake Albert (Uganda vs. Congo), Lake Victoria (Miging Island), and Lake Nyasa (Tanzania vs. Malawi, boundary and resources). The coastal area faces challenges of piracy and illegal fishing boats. South Sudan (Abyei) is of concern as well.
- There are internal issues too. Water resources management vs. water development and supply, water rights, water quality, water availability, fisheries, institutional capacity and capability, oversight, and water-related natural disasters.
- Energy, oil and gas issues: relationship between energy and water (hydropower), delimitation of maritime boundaries, exploration and recovery of oil (Kenya vs. Somalia, Uganda vs. Congo), the case of South Sudan (pollution), and human security issues.
- Other environmental challenges are land management issues, mineral exploitation, vulnerable resources, and natural disasters.
- The bottom line – we need to take a holistic look, make clear assessments, apply the lessons of history, progress realistically (based on capacity and capabilities), and cover the ground.

Plenary Discussion

(Sierra Leone) I like how you showed future projections of the climate change impact on the region. How did we get the states to discuss climate change?

(Kenya) Climate change is not for the military and a military strategy cannot be applied in this case. You were talking to me about the capital credit system with me in a side

conversation – can you explain how it can benefit us and be exploited? I guess the point is that we can keep the world green, but not for free.

(Unknown) Meetings like this may bring about the awareness of governments. On education, you raised some very important issues. What kind of education must transform a country? The system in Uganda cannot deliver us to the Promised Land. So what kind will work?

(Unknown) We had all kinds of technical institutes, but they have been converted to secondary schools.

(Israel) Results will come in the next generation and this is why politicians don't like it. They need immediate results to be reelected. On education, universities are important. On China, there is a rumor that the Chinese are sending prisoners as workers in Tanzania (on the condition that they never come back). This is unfair competition and African countries get stuck with them. (Editor's note: IDA knows of no evidence to support the claim that China uses prison labor in Africa).

Session 5: China in Africa

In the final session, a presentation [included in this report] was given on China's competing interest in Africa and its implications on regional security in East Africa. The following are highlights of the presentation as well as a summary of the question and answer session.

- China in Africa is not a recent phenomenon. Cooperation between Africa and China covers investment, agriculture, natural resources and energy, education, etc.
- Africa is relatively unexploited and resources need a safe environment, and the Chinese want to secure the market.
- China contributes the most troops to peacekeeping in Sudan. They have helped with mine clearance along the Eritrea/Ethiopia border.
- According to SIPRI, there are a large amount of Chinese arms in East Africa, particularly in the DRC. Involvement driven by resources and market security.
- They have a growing presence in the region. It has become a problem in Dar es Salaam.
- We think that China is an emerging power.

Plenary Discussion

(Unknown) The West has a tendency to discount history and culture relations with China. On China, we must maintain a balanced viewpoint – there are mutual benefits, but should proceed with caution.

(Israel) Someone mentioned that the Chinese don't drink coffee and therefore this is not a possible profitable African export. So teach them how to drink coffee.

(Uganda) I think that China also has expansionist imperial objectives. There is the fear that they are not interested in democracy. They have promoted a lot of corruption, particularly in the case of under-the-table deals with leaders.

(Sierra Leone) China has been here for a long time. I am disappointed in our leaders because they see one big bandwagon and jump on it without asking questions. It's about natural resources, and this is no different from the West. There is no free lunch. We must be aware of the dangers associated with China's presence, particularly in terms of South-South exploitation. We should try to inform the politics of the day.

(South Sudan) We have been focusing on threats, but we should start thinking about the vulnerabilities and risks.

(Unknown) There is a "wildebeest mentality" and we need to address this! If the Chinese were to be denied access, do you see them going to war? This is becoming complicated because some local communities are getting angry and the local government is intervening to deflect conflict.

(Uganda) On Chinese imperialism, you may be right. The Chinese give us money and ask no questions. Is war a possibility? Maybe.

(Uganda) China is not interested in democracy and we need to be careful. We are very vulnerable. Personally, I was disappointed when China did not help Libya. Why do you think they did not help Gaddafi? The African Union had a good proposal for solving this crisis that would have provided a softer landing (in comparison to what actually happened).

(Uganda) Gaddafi decided to commit suicide a long time ago when he replaced security institutions with his sons' special forces. The regular army did not have any equipment and the Special Forces did not fight. He started the road to suicide about 20 years ago.

(Uganda) One of the biggest sources of security is the citizens. With China, there are major challenges, and we are engaging blindly. In the East African sub-region, there is no research program that focuses on understanding China and other players. Policymakers are left at sea. How do you really engage with China? As scholars, we are letting our leaders and policymakers. China is definitely going to deal with individual leaders and they are not interested in democracy. In the end, China doesn't care about us as long as they get what they want.

(Nigeria) I don't know if it's the lack of recognition that China is trying to exploit Africa, but they are not demanding that our rulers stop their bad behavior.

(Uganda) The belief in 1973 was that the force that would intervene would protect civilians and not regime change. This is the problem in dealing with Syria now because everyone remembers Libya. Jean-Ping (Gabon) lost the AU chairmanship because of Libya.

Wrap Up, Conclusions & Future Endeavors

(Sierra Leone) We have shared brilliant ideas. How do we begin to influence the principles beyond this room? Academic publication is one route.

(ACODE) I want thank everyone for their attendance and for participating in this rich discussion. A roundtable such as this is essential to the evolution of African militaries. I hope this network will continue to engage in the future. I am glad we had representation from South Sudan. In their case, it is important to "bend the stick when it is young."

(IDA) I would like everyone to provide their individual evaluations of this roundtable. What should we do more of, what should we do less of, what about future endeavors?

(Unknown) It has been a very rewarding three days, but I was thinking that it would have been helpful if we had had a minister in charge of East African Affairs at this discussion. It would be helpful to hear their thoughts about regional integration. I could volunteer to do this in Kenya. In terms of future discussions, perhaps there should be a session just on the DRC. Overall, this is definitely a forum that can provide solutions to the problems facing us as a region.

(Unknown) We should extend invitations to representatives from the Congo and Somalia.

(Kenya) I attended the first roundtable. People were not opening up. The second one has been a freer exchange. This is in part due to the exclusion of the media. We should consider holding the next roundtable in another country. The dialogue should not appear to be a "Ugandan thing."

(Unknown) We have made a lot of progress since the last meeting. As much as we would like to keep the media away, it is a way to promote what we are doing. Perhaps we could just promote ACODE and IDA activities in this region and release limited information to the media.

(Unknown) A scenario session would be a good idea. That component was missing.

(Unknown) With this Institute idea, there is the obvious issue of funding. If we involve parliament, someone who is very influential, in future discussions we could gain their support and potential funding. We are debating issues of the future so it is important to mix up the group. Gender balancing – we need more female representation. We should also consider inviting well-informed youth.

(Uganda) It gives us encouragement as Ugandans to have the opportunity to host this kind of forum. We hosted in April and it was very interesting and successful. It's even more gratifying this time. The representation has been extremely good – South Sudan, distinguished academicians, and senior military officials. Uganda is moving in the right direction. It was inconceivable that this kind of discussion would have happened 15 years ago. We have talked in a very frank and open manner which has been beneficial to everyone. We are moving forward and making strategic partnerships. We don't have any other option apart from integrating as a region; it is the way to go. In terms of representation for next meeting, senior policymakers should dedicate enough time to stay the length of the roundtable. If you go in and out then you miss a lot. Some of the presentations were extremely crucial to see. The ideas developed from our discussions can cascade downwards.

(South Sudan) Initially we had reservations when we received the invitation to this roundtable, but now we are glad we came. The issues raised are not new to us. Our security architecture is quite advanced and civil-military relations are discussed openly. We all came here with an assumption that we know each other's countries. For future discussions, it would be helpful if we could see some of the policy documents that are relative to the themes being discussed so we have some knowledge ahead of time. We should discuss at greater depth the security capabilities to meet challenges as a region and individual countries. As far as inviting other parties, it could lose the purpose if we bring in youth. Maybe we should just replicate the discussion at various levels. For example, we could widen the network to talk to CSOs to develop common thinking.

(South Sudan) We (the military) have our own way of doing things. There is no democracy in military. I don't believe think this is the forum for scenarios either. This discussion only matters if we implement what we say. We need to find a way to influence policymakers. We are ready to host the third round in South Sudan.

(Unknown) I agree that the level of openness and frankness was much better this time. On the issue of politics and military, can we have more involvement? We should consider inviting someone who is a politician and not a general. I think we'll get different results. We should also bring other regional bodies (e.g., COMESA) and continue to keep number of participants small.

(Unknown) The circulation of a detailed concept note prior to the meeting was critical in gauging interest. Perhaps we may have country-specific roundtable in the future. Is there a possibility for any of us to have some of these generals meet with civilians and discuss these same issues? Is it possible to have discussions beyond these annual or bi-annual meetings?

(IDA) Thank you to all the participants for your feedback and attendance. I especially want to thank those who came from South Sudan. Most importantly, thank you to our partners, ACODE and the UPDF.

(ACODE) I think the most important takeaway from this roundtable is that we shall either swim or sink together. We need each other and the threats are many. The capacity to get together and tackle them is also there. In the next meeting, we should discuss the methodology of how to deal with the challenges facing us. Where are we weakest? Where are we strongest? In this forum, we mostly concentrated on things military, but we need to consider human security, which can also translate itself into military threats if not addressed. ACODE is committed to ensure that we move forward. We are all intertwined; I have a home in Juba and I spent my youth in Kenya.

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