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The Nexus of Power Sharing and Security Reform in Togo: Has Inclusive Government Improved Civil-Military Relations and Prospects for Stability?

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Abstract: The extant literature does not adequately address the relationship between power-sharing government and civil-military relations. To what extent does inclusive government help advance civilian control and reform of the security sector, particularly in transitional contexts in sub-Saharan Africa where the military has historically played an active role in the political sphere? Building on the emerging literature on post-election power sharing, this paper examines the under-researched case of Togo. Based on interviews with stakeholders in Togo, the paper suggests that a combination of three international and domestic factors have shaped security sector reform outcomes under inclusive government in Togo. While the Togolese military continues to wield some political influence, international pressure, the strong security reform content of the power-sharing agreement, and a change in party leadership have helped achieve some real, if fragile, progress on security sector reform in Togo, especially from 2006 to 2010. Togo's experience with inclusive government and security reform offers generalizable lessons for other transitional countries with troubled civil-military relations that are experimenting with inclusive institutions, namely, that under certain conditions, security sector reform progress is possible, even in cases where the military has a long history of engagement in politics.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, security sector reform, power sharing, electoral violence, political instability, Togo

Introduction

Post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives have proliferated across sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade and a half. From 1999 to 2013, 20 countries in Africa have inked power-sharing pacts in an effort to resolve conflict.[1] Traditionally used as a mechanism to end high-intensity civil wars, inclusive, or "unity," governments—defined here as "formal institutions that distribute decision-making rights within the state"[2]—have become the default tool of local, regional, and international actors to terminate an array of lower intensity violent conflicts in Africa, as seen in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar in 2010 and Madagascar in 2009, as well as in the high-visibility cases of electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008. Although less publicized, the precedent for this trend of settling electoral disputes through power-sharing agreements was set by Lesotho and Zanzibar in 1999 and followed by Togo in 2006.[3]

Over roughly the same decade and a half, in the wake of Africa's "third wave"[4] of democracy in the early 1990s and as a response to long histories of military involvement in politics and political violence, a wide variety of SSR programs were stood up in Africa. Indeed, the continent is often described as "ground zero for SSR."[5] SSR is understood here as "efforts to depoliticize, professionalize, and establish democratic civilian oversight of the state security apparatus."[6] Multilateral institutions—including the United Nations (UN) Security Council—and scholars alike have identified SSR as a critical component in the stabilization, development, and prevention of renewed violence in post-conflict societies.[7]

While full regime transitions may be the most favorable conditions for overhauling civil-military relations,[8] inclusive governments and the political crises from which they arise are critical junctures that—by simply introducing a new party into governing institutions—

mark a shift in civil-military relations, especially in countries emerging from highly personalized, one-party, or militarized rule. Although fresh memories of violence can polarize political divides, such moments often offer great potential for reforming security governance, as power-sharing agreements frequently include some SSR provisions, particularly in contexts where security officials have played leading roles in political or electoral violence. Even if SSR is not directly addressed in the text of the pact, power-sharing negotiations and agreements almost always include institutional changes that effect oversight of the security sector, such as constitutional review initiatives or other political reforms.[9]

Despite these linkages, the prevalence of power-sharing arrangements and security reform programs on the continent, and SSR being seen as key to democratization and durable peace, the academic literature has generally ignored the relationship between power sharing and civil-military relations in Africa. Furthermore, as discussed below, the expansive political science literature on post-conflict power sharing has only recently begun to interrogate lower intensity, non-civil-war cases—such as unity governments formed in contexts of low-grade electoral violence—although the two types of cases differ in fundamental ways, particularly in political and institutional terms. What impact do inclusive governments have on relations between the civilian political leadership and the security sector? To what extent does post-election power sharing help advance reform of the security sector, particularly in transitional contexts where the military has historically played an active role in the political sphere? By analyzing the often-overlooked case of post-election coalition government in Togo, this paper seeks to better understand these questions and help bridge existing gaps in the literature.

Why Togo? As outlined by Bekoe, five countries in Africa have formed post-election power-sharing agreements: Lesotho (1999), Zanzibar (1999 and 2001), Togo (2006), Kenya (2008), and Zimbabwe (2008).[10] Of these five cases, Togo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe's power-sharing governments explicitly pledged to reform the security sector and, to varying degrees, included SSR provisions in the text of the political agreement. As it is only feasible to examine SSR processes in settings that have begun or promised to undertake such reforms, these three countries comprise the universe of possible cases if one is studying the SSR outcomes of post-election inclusive governments in Africa. Have Togo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe's respective power-sharing governments kept their SSR promises?

In previous work I investigated the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe.[11] Based on over a dozen interviews conducted with domestic and international stakeholders in Togo in July 2013, this paper builds and expands on that work by focusing on the under-researched case of Togo. My past work suggested that the balance of power between civilian and security officials and the strength of the security reform content in the text of the power-sharing agreement played a prominent role in shaping Kenya and Zimbabwe's divergent security reform outcomes.[12] Do these findings hold true in the case of Togo? This study finds that three main factors help explain Togo's experience with SSR: international pressure, namely, from the European Union (EU); strong SSR content in the power-sharing agreement; and a change in party leadership.

This paper consists of four parts. The first situates the study within the literature on civil-military relations, SSR, and power sharing and identifies remaining gaps in these bodies of work. The second discusses Togo's highly politicized civil-military history and analyzes Togo's experience with SSR from the beginning of inclusive government in 2006 to the legislative elections of 2013. The third highlights how three major factors have shaped the SSR landscape in Togo under coalition government. The fourth, the conclusion, considers

promising avenues of future research, and draws out the implications of the findings and how they can be generalized. Although significant progress has been made on SSR under President Faure Gnassingbé and coalition government in Togo, especially during the 2006–2010 period—which saw the highest levels of inclusive governance—this progress remains fragile and susceptible to backsliding.

Civil-Military Relations and Power Sharing: Gaps in the Literature
A rich interdisciplinary literature exists on civil-military relations, a field that can be broadly defined as studying "the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level."[13] Building on seminal works by Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer,[14] the literature on civil-military relations in Africa has principally focused on coups d'état, with an extensive, if slightly outdated,[15] body of work theorizing on the conditions that predispose African countries to military intervention in politics.[16] A more contemporary stream of the literature has focused on civil-military relations in transitional and democratizing countries,[17] with a few studies focused on the unique challenges Africa faces in developing professional and democratized militaries.[18] The literature, however, has not adequately addressed how civil-military relations play out in power-sharing contexts.

Much of the recent research touching on civil-military relations in Africa stems from the SSR subfield. Arising out of Western donor circles in the mid-1990s, the concept of SSR has faced difficulty escaping the influence of the policy environment from which it was born, with much of the SSR research to date driven and funded by international donor priorities. This has resulted in what Chanaa has identified as a "conceptual-contextual divide,"[19] where the literature has focused on the international and technical components of SSR programs, with little empirical attention paid to understanding how political and structural circumstances will affect such efforts.[20] As noted by Hills,[21] the fundamentally politicized role of African security institutions ensures that security reform outcomes will remain contingent on prevailing domestic political conditions, a relationship that has been analyzed by civil-military relations scholars but, for the most part, remains understudied in the security reform literature. In the same vein, there is a dearth of research analyzing SSR dynamics and outcomes under coalition government.[22]

The extant power-sharing literature has also generally neglected to examine the link between inclusive government and civil-military relations. Building on Lijphart's classic theory of consociational democracy,[23] power-sharing theorists have concentrated on whether the model is likely to lead to renewed conflict in cases of civil war. Two theoretical strands have emerged in the literature. Supporters of power sharing, such as Walter, Hartzell and Hoddie, and Call, stress the positive outcomes of power-sharing arrangements.[24] Hartzell and Hoddie delineate four different modes of power sharing and assert that the more power-sharing mechanisms included within a peace agreement, the higher the chances for enduring peace.[25] On the other hand, scholars such as Rothchild and Roeder and Jarstad are more dubious of power-sharing arrangements, pointing out their unintended consequences and substantial costs and failures—namely, constrained democracy and legitimacy, ineffective governance, and recurrence of civil war.[26] Due to the large number of power-sharing governments that have been used to resolve an assortment of conflicts in Africa, a sizable portion of the literature focuses on the continent. Overall, such studies have tended to side with the skeptical school of thought.[27]

Lively debates over the merits and trade-offs of power sharing have generated sound theories on the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of renewed violence in cases of civil war termination. But the literature has yet to fully understand the dynamics and outcomes of using power-sharing arrangements in cases of lower intensity conflict, such as electoral violence. While theory remains underdeveloped in these contexts, emerging power-sharing models have begun to engage with this "special" subclass of cases, although the existing studies tend to lump cases of low-level electoral violence together with civil war cases.[28] Moreover, the literature on inclusive governments has predominantly focused on binary outcomes of either long-term peace or relapse into civil war, while the causes and consequences of other outcomes—such as political or security reforms—have yet to be thoroughly investigated. By examining SSR under Togo's inclusive government, which was formed in the wake of tragic but relatively "low-grade" (in terms of duration and fatalities when compared with civil war cases) electoral violence, this paper seeks to help connect and contribute to filling the above gaps in the civil-military relations, SSR, and power-sharing literatures.

Togo's Politicized Civil-Military Relationship
Togo, a small former French colony in West Africa, has an extended history of troubled civil-military relations, with frequent military intervention in politics and periods of militarized rule. Three years after Togo gained independence from France in 1960, the first elected president of the country, Sylvanus Olympio, was killed in a mutiny of demobilized soldiers that included Gnassingbé Eyadéma.[29] Although civilian rule returned after the 1963 coup d'état, in 1967 Eyadéma seized power in another military coup. With support from the highly politicized military, Eyadéma would hold power for 38 years, violently suppressing the country's efforts at democratization and political reform in the early 1990s and remaining in office until his death in 2005.[30] Over nearly four decades of largely unchecked rule, Eyadéma carefully cultivated the fealty of the armed forces by stacking the security sector with members of his own northern ethnic group, the Kabye, and appointing the brass to myriad party, political, and commercial positions.[31]

Revealing the enduring symbiotic relationship between Eyadéma's party—the Togolese People's Rally (*Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais*, or RPT)—and the armed forces, upon Eyadéma's death in 2005, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, who was a cabinet minister, was subsequently installed as "acting president" by the top echelons of the military. Further demonstrating the continuing political power of the security sector, the legislature complied with the military's wishes and hastily changed the constitution in an attempt to legitimize Gnassingbé's appointment.[32] Regional and international bodies decried this unconstitutional change of government, with the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) labeling the action as a military coup. ECOWAS stated: "The heads of state strongly condemn the military intervention which led to Faure Gnassingbé being installed as the successor to the deceased President...They agree that this constitutes a coup d'état and they condemn the subsequent manipulation of the constitution by Parliament."[33] After the AU and ECOWAS suspended and levied sanctions on Togo, Gnassingbé agreed to step down and hold presidential elections in April 2005, serving as head of the national assembly in the interim.[34]

Elections in Togo have been some of the most violent in Africa.[35] From the move away from a one-party state in 1991 to Eyadéma's death in 2005, elections followed a

familiar violent trajectory in Togo, with Eyadéma or the RPT confirmed as winners, the opposition either boycotting or calling fraud and protesting, and security forces and pro-RPT militia groups violently quelling dissidents.[36] The 2005 poll was no exception. Unsurprisingly, Gnassingbé was declared the winner, despite allegations that the military had manipulated the ballot.[37] The main opposition group, the Union of Forces for Change (*Union des Forces de Changement*, or UFC), which was led until 2012 by Gilchrist Olympio, the son of independent Togo's first president, claimed fraud and called for street demonstrations. In the aftermath of the election, clashes erupted between protestors and the security forces, with security officials reportedly exacting revenge on those opposed to the regime in the south of the country, which has long been an opposition stronghold for Olympio.[38] Up to 800 fatalities—the highest death toll of any Togolese election—were reported in the 2005 post-election violence.[39]

Although more than 10 efforts at political dialogue dating back to 1990 had been attempted between the government and the opposition, this acute electoral violence, along with increased pressure from international and regional actors—namely, the EU and ECOWAS—compelled Gnassingbé and the RPT to finally negotiate in earnest and sign the Comprehensive Political Accord (*Accord Politique Global*, or APG) power-sharing agreement.[40] Signed by the RPT, five opposition parties, and two civil society groups in August 2006 after a mediation process headed by Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, the APG led to the formation of a unity government and the establishment of various inclusive mechanisms aimed at resolving the political crisis and ushering in a number of significant electoral, institutional, and security reforms.[41]

Reforming (Un)civil Military Relations?
The APG, which built on a framework initially outlined in 2004 talks with the EU, was a wide-ranging document, calling for, in addition to a government of national unity, a revamped electoral commission (*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendent*, or CENI) with representation from the opposition and civil society; a new parliament based on fair and transparent legislative elections; a new census and voter's register; equal access to the media for all parties; women's candidate quotas; reconciliation processes; and constitutional, justice, and security reforms, among other provisions. A monitoring committee (*Comité de Suivi*, or CS), to be chaired by Compaoré and comprising all signatories of the APG, including representatives from the EU and ECOWAS, was tasked with monitoring and implementing the power-sharing agreement.[42]

A full two-page section of the APG was dedicated to security reforms and related items, which included calls for an apolitical security force; oversight by the constitution and relevant laws; and the clear delineation of the discrete roles of the military, police, and gendarmerie that make up the security forces in Togo. Section 2.1.1. of the APG reads: "necessary measures shall be taken for the solemn reaffirmation and the effective observance of the non-political role and national and republican nature of the Army and Security Forces…." Recognizing Togo's history of military interventionism, section 2.1.2. goes further, noting, "the Government will take all the useful measures to ensure that the Defence and Security forces do not interfere in any way in political discussions." Section 2.1.1 also notes the need for "distinction between the functions of the Army, and those of the Police force and the National Gendarmerie, so that the Army be dedicated to its mission of defence of the integrity of the national territory and the Police forces and National Gendarmerie to

their missions of law enforcement and public security." In addition, section 2.2.2. highlights that the signatories agree to establish a "Commission of Inquiry" tasked with investigating "the issue of impunity" and acts of political violence committed from 1958 to 2006.[43]

Prior to the APG, the government in Togo appeared to be extremely reluctant to partake in any SSR or oversight of the security sector, undoubtedly due to the mutually beneficial relationship between the regime and the military. Indeed, recommendations made during the 1991 national conference for a military overhaul and downsizing sparked fierce resistance from the armed forces and Eyadéma, prompting a military crackdown.[44] Although the 1991 national conference, subsequent constitutional reform efforts in 1992 and 2002,[45] and the 2004 dialogue with the EU all touched on issues related to security governance, Eyadéma and the RPT remained recalcitrant on the issue of SSR. A 2005 study by Bryden, N'Diaye, and Olonisakin assessing the state of SSR in several West African countries, which was published after Gnassingbé had stepped down before the presidential election, found "resistance to change" in Togo with "no commitment to reform" by the government. The study asserted that "nil" oversight of the security sector existed and that parliament was "heavily influenced by [the] military and executive arm."[46]

Given the military's high degree of political influence and the RPT's previous intransigence on SSR, the inclusion of a robust SSR component in the APG, as outlined above, marked a substantial shift on the SSR front in Togo. What explains this turn? To what extent were various iterations of unity governments in Togo able to advance and implement the SSR agenda laid out in the APG? What factors helped realize or impede progress?

SSR under Inclusive Government
The available evidence, as well as interviews conducted in July 2013 with local and international stakeholders in Togo's capital, Lomé, reveal that from the inception of the APG in August 2006 to the lead-up to the legislative elections in July 2013, significant, if uneven and fragile, progress has been made on implementing the APG's SSR provisions and improving Togo's civil-military relations. It appears that particular progress was made from 2006 to 2010, when a broad-based opposition participated most fully in inclusive institutions.[47] Despite progress, there have been setbacks, and a number of formidable challenges remain, as outlined below.

In 2007 and early 2008, a series of legislative bills and decrees were passed relating to SSR, including, among others, law no. 2007-010 on military personnel, which reiterated the political impartiality of the armed forces; decree no. 2008-006 on the "Powers of the Chief of the General Staff, Chiefs of Defense Staff, and the Inspector General of Police"; decrees no. 2008-007, 2008-009, and 2008-014 on the reorganization of the army, navy, and air force; and decree no. 2008-011, which established a "higher military council."[48] A former member of parliament, who is now the head of a local civil society organization in Lomé that regularly holds trainings with the armed forces, asserted that these statutes, particularly the 2007 law, were a big step forward for SSR in Togo because they provided an essential basic statutory framework for the security sector, which was previously sorely lacking.[49]

As a response to the detrimental role security forces have played in prior elections, another critical SSR development has been the establishment of special election forces, which are established by decree in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections. These forces, named the Legislative Election Security Force (FOSEL 2007, 2013) and Presidential Election Security Force (FOSEP 2010), comprise up to 6,500 people, primarily police and gendarmes,

who are outfitted with special uniforms to distinguish them from regular forces.[50] The 2010 FOSEP, created by decree no. 2009-278 in November 2009, was formed to "maintain the peace, ensure security and free movement of persons and goods on the entire national territory before, during and after the 2010 presidential election; take all necessary measures to maintain law and order during the organization of the elections," as well as ensuring "the security of places for meetings and public events…" and "observing absolute neutrality towards all."[51]

In addition to the institutional changes in 2007–8 and the special election forces of 2007, 2010, and 2013, various local, regional, and international SSR training efforts have been launched, with many such programs continuing to the time of writing. Local civil society initiatives, led by rule-of-law groups such as COPED (*Centre d'Observation et de Promotion de l'Etat de Droit*), have conducted workshops focused on training the military, police, and gendarmerie on the role of security forces in a democracy and on human rights issues, as well as training the FOSEL and FOSEP forces on similar issues.[52]

An array of initiatives have also taken place at the international level. The UN's Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), under its African Security Sector Reform Programme (ASSEREP), has held a series of capacity-building programs with the government, political parties, and parliament in Togo aimed at establishing "good governance in defence and security institutions."[53] UNREC also has held programs that "train the trainers" of the police and gendarmerie in the lead-up to elections.[54] In 2010, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) completed a project in partnership with the Togolese armed forces that updated manuals on the laws of armed conflict.[55] The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung foundation, UN Population Fund, and West African Network for Peacebuilding have also undertaken similar programs.[56]

Have these training projects and formal institutional reforms translated from paper to practice? For the most part, the behavior of the security forces has been much improved since the APG was signed, as evidenced by their generally restrained conduct during 2007 and 2013 legislative elections and presidential elections in 2010. Although the RPT—which changed its name to the Union for the Republic (UNIR) in 2012—again triumphed, and the opposition again cited irregularities or fraud in all three elections, the security forces did not intervene or interfere, and electoral violence was limited, marking a departure from the cycle of violence seen in previous polls in Togo.[57] Indeed, a 2010 study on the role of security forces in elections in West Africa argues that since the 2007 legislative elections in Togo, the Togolese armed forces' "balance sheet of ensuring the security of elections is rather positive."[58] In addition to their seemingly improved professional behavior during elections, security forces have not been involved in severe acts of political violence—except for a few reports of excessive force[59]—during persistent large-scale civil protests in the wake of the 2010 poll and during the run-up to the 2013 legislative elections.[60]

Several interviewees noted that the legal changes, special election forces, and SSR initiatives discussed above have been particularly helpful in clarifying how the military, gendarmerie, and police conceptualize their discrete roles and responsibilities, which were previously highly blurred. They observed that since 2006 there has been a shift away from the military playing an internal security role, particularly during elections, which is now the domain of the police and gendarmerie.[61] One interviewee suggested that the Togolese military's increasing involvement in overseas peacekeeping missions, for example in Mali and Darfur, has also helped in developing a sense of professionalism and focus on traditional

military concerns, as opposed to internal regime security.[62] Likewise, a former member of parliament suggested that there is a new generation of more educated, savvy, and globally connected security officers emerging, which has also contributed to improved behavior.[63]

Despite progress on SSR since the beginning of inclusive government in 2006, there have been several setbacks, including reports of political interference from the military during 2012 proceedings of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission; allegations against the police for excessive use of force and torture; and ostensible impunity among the security forces for past acts of political violence.[64] In addition, rifts in the military were exposed during Gnassingbé's heavy-handed response to a rumored coup attempt in 2009 by his hard-liner half brother and former minister of defense, Kpatcha Gnassingbé, who played a role in bringing Gnassingbé to power in 2005.[65] In 2012, 33 people, including Kpatcha, were sentenced to 20 years in prison for plotting against the state.[66] While this incident reveals continuing divides and tensions in the civil-military relationship, Kpatcha's departure from the political scene could actually help advance the SSR process moving forward, as he was a leader of the "hawks" camp in the ruling party, which is strongly against any reform or compromise with the opposition.[67]

Other enduring obstacles to SSR in Togo are the continued presence of such hawks in UNIR and in the president's office;[68] the fact that members of the military still hold political and prefectoral positions, especially in local government;[69] persistent corruption in the security forces; and the familiar challenge in Africa of executive dominance, weak parliamentary oversight,[70] and the informal exercise of power in civil-military affairs. The above setbacks and institutional impediments illustrate the considerable challenges that remain on the path to achieving sustainable SSR and smooth civil-military relations in Togo. That said, and although scholarly criticisms of Togo's security reforms as "too timid" and primarily for international consumption[71] hold some validity, from the above discussion it is clear that significant SSR has taken place in Togo since the APG power-sharing agreement was signed in 2006.

Three Main Factors of SSR Progress

While a number of structural conditions, political dynamics, and other intervening variables have helped shape SSR outcomes in Togo, the available evidence suggests that three main factors explain SSR progress under inclusive government and the ruling party's shift from obduracy to grudging acceptance of an SSR agenda:

1. International and regional pressure, from the EU in particular.
2. The strong SSR content of the text of the APG, which gave international, regional, and domestic actors the necessary footing to help push the SSR agenda.
3. A change of leadership in the ruling party, as Gnassingbé has proved more willing and able to cast off the image of his father and forge his own path than those who put him in power anticipated.

Political and financial pressure from the EU—which had cut off ties and development assistance after the 1993 legislative elections, citing a "democratic deficit"—as well as the EU's involvement in negotiations, played a crucial role in forcing the RPT to concede on the institutional reforms outlined in the APG in 2006.[72] The promise of restored economic ties from the EU appears to have been particularly effective in bringing Gnassingbé and the RPT to the bargaining table and shifting the party's previous aversion to a broad SSR framework.

As argued by Bekoe, "By 2006, Togo was in dire need of international development assistance, and a resumption of EU engagement would pave the way for reengagement with the World Bank, the IMF, and the African Development Bank. Thus, Togo had great incentive to undertake the agreed-upon institutional reforms…."[73]

In addition to playing a major role in the reforms outlined in the text of the APG, this external pressure from the EU also seems to have been a catalyst for the flurry of reforms that took place under the first unity government—which featured opposition leader Yawovi Agboyibo as prime minister—in the lead-up to the relatively peaceful and successful 2007 legislative elections. This strategy of Gnassingbé's—delivering reforms and peaceful elections with the expectation of international financial support or, as Toulabor puts it, "democratization for money"[74]—did pay immediate dividends. After the very first meeting of the CS monitoring committee in November 2006, which later transformed into the *Cadre Permanent de Dialogue et de Concertation* (CPDC) in 2009, the EU restarted development assistance.[75]

After the 2007 legislative elections were deemed generally free and fair, the EU resumed full economic ties with Togo, the World Bank recommended forgiving $145 million of debt,[76] and a 2008 conference in Brussels with international donors was organized on Togo.[77] While the EU's great influence may have lessened once reengagement and financial assistance was underway, interviews confirmed that such pressures, combined with the various international training programs noted above, continue to play a role in ensuring movement on the SSR front.[78]

A second, related factor explaining SSR progress is the strong SSR content in the text of the APG itself. As I note in other work on Kenya and Zimbabwe, the reform content of post-election power-sharing agreements can set the stage for how the pact, and any resulting institutions, will be implemented and monitored.[79] Of the five post-election power-sharing agreements in Africa that Bekoe counts,[80] Togo's SSR provisions are some of the strongest and most extensive, with agreements in Lesotho, Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe containing none to very little SSR, and Kenya's including a fairly strong police reform component in Agenda IV.[81] The robust SSR content of the APG provided a solid foundation for SSR in Togo, allowing international, regional, and domestic actors to help push the SSR agenda and compel Gnassingbé to at least go through the motions of abiding by his reform promises, as highlighted by the numerous domestic and international SSR training programs noted above.

A third factor was a change in party and presidential leadership. Although some scholars[82] and many in Togo[83] see a politics of continuity in Togo, Gnassingbé has showed a willingness and desire to forge his own identity and, to a certain extent, depart from his father's strongman tendencies, particularly regarding SSR. Although Gnassingbé's reasons for embracing political and economic liberalization are undoubtedly not wholly magnanimous, he has surprised many hard-liners within his own party by not "doing exactly like his dad."[84] It appears that some of the old guard, reactionary forces that brought Gnassingbé to the presidency in the wake of Eyadéma's death have come to regret that action, viewing Gnassingbé as too beholden to reform elements within the party.[85] Gnassingbé's move to sideline the hard-line Kpatcha drew particular ire from the old guard and serves as further evidence of Gnassingbé's attempts to distance himself from Eyadéma's military coterie.[86]

Indeed, while Gnassingbé has self-interested reasons to be seen as open to SSR and other reforms, officials involved with SSR initiatives in Togo suggested that that support from Gnassingbé seems genuine.[87] Although legacies of a one-party state and Eyadéma's

personalized rule undoubtedly persist, the change in party leadership—which gave Gnassingbé the opportunity to at least try to escape the shadow of his father and break some entrenched patterns of military patronage—provided an opening for SSR that, when coupled with the other two factors noted above, has allowed significant, if fragile, SSR progress in Togo since the APG power-sharing accord.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that while the military in Togo continues to wield some influence in the political sphere, international pressure, the strong security reform content of the 2006 APG power-sharing agreement, and a change in the ruling party's leadership have allowed several successive inclusive governments to achieve some real progress on SSR in Togo, which has translated to less military engagement in politics and improved behavior during elections. It appears that particular progress was made during the first few years of inclusive government, as international and regional pressures to deliver on reforms were at their peak; relations between the UFC, other opposition parties, and the ruling party were at their best; and as a result, the opposition participated most fully in various inclusive institutions established by the APG.

This paper has also discussed a number of setbacks and enduring obstacles to realizing sustainable SSR, healthy civil-military relations, and stability in Togo. Underscoring the fragility of SSR in Togo, one interviewee noted that the durability of reforms will not truly be tested until Gnassingbé and UNIR's hegemony are threatened at the polls.[88] In such a scenario, SSR progress could well unravel, as old guard forces, and perhaps Gnassingbé himself, would likely fight to maintain their wealth and access to power. Another potential problem on the SSR front is susceptibility to backsliding. This is particularly true in light of the July 2013 legislative election results, which gave Gnassingbé and UNIR a more formidable majority and a potential opening to reverse recent progress on reforms. That said, one of this paper's central findings—that international actors can help drive progress on SSR—suggests that the international community can play an important role in preventing such a scenario.

Although beyond the scope of this study, it must be noted that power sharing has taken many forms in Togo over the 2006–13 period, with different dynamics, degrees of inclusivity, and coalitions taking shape from 2006 to 2007, from 2007 to 2010, and from 2010 to 2013.[89] An interesting avenue of further research on the topic would be to undertake a fine-grained analysis of how different iterations of inclusive governments in Togo have approached and shaped institutional reform efforts. The low-grade conflict cases of power sharing in Madagascar and Zanzibar also remain as promising topics for further research on the relationship between civil-military relations and unity government.

Togo's experience with inclusive politics and SSR provides generalizable lessons for other transitional countries with troubled civil-military relations that are experimenting with inclusive institutions—namely, that international pressure, the content of the power-sharing agreement, and changes in party leadership have the potential to drive the reform process. These findings are important because they imply that under certain conditions, some progress on SSR can be achieved even in cases where SSR is least likely to succeed but is needed most—that is, in countries with histories of military intervention in politics and where the security sector enjoys high levels of political influence.

Acknowledgments

Notes

[1] Andreas Mehler, 2009, "Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa," *Africa Spectrum* 44, 3, 2–10. Mehler identified 17 agreements from 1999 to 2009; I have updated his findings to include Zanzibar (2010), as well as Togo (2006) and Lesotho (1999), both of which were not included in his dataset.

[2] Donald S. Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder, 2005, "Power-sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy," in *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars,* ede. Donald S. Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press), 30.

[3] Dorina Bekoe, 2012, "Postelection Political Agreements in Togo and Zanzibar," in *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,* ed. Dorina Bekoe (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace), 118–19.

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14. ABSTRACT
The extant literature does not adequately address the relationship between power-sharing government and civil-military relations. To what extent does inclusive government help advance civilian control and reform of the security sector, particularly in transitional contexts in sub-Saharan Africa where the military has historically played an active role in the political sphere? Building on the emerging literature on post-election power sharing, this paper examines the under-researched case of Togo. Based on interviews with stakeholders in Togo, the paper suggests that a combination of three international and domestic factors have shaped security sector reform outcomes under inclusive government in Togo. While the Togolese military continues to wield some political influence, international pressure, the strong security reform content of the power-sharing agreement, and a change in party leadership have helped achieve some real, if fragile, progress on security sector reform in Togo, especially from 2006 to 2010. Togo's experience with inclusive government and security reform offers generalizable lessons for other transitional countries with troubled civil-military relations that are experimenting with inclusive institutions, namely, that under certain conditions, security sector reform progress is possible, even in cases where the military has a long history of engagement in politics.

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