



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

## **The Africa Watch January – March 2013**

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March 2013

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains the August 2011 through September 2011 issues of *The Africa Watch*. *The Africa Watch* is a twice-monthly report on trends and developments that might contribute to discontinuous change and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The first January 2013 issue contains the following articles – The Kampala Talks and Peace in the Eastern DRC, Potential Effects of Rwandan Aid Cuts, Whither Kenya’s Muslims; Zimbabwe: Militia Activity Raises Risk of Violent Elections; Madagascar: Former President Agrees Not to Run in Upcoming Poll; and Sudan: National Umma Party Leader Steps Down.

The second January 2013 issue contains the following articles – The Fundo Soberano de Angola: Angola’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Sham; The “Great Taboo”: Racism and Conflict in West Africa; Chinese Investment in West Africa Continues, But So Do Troubles; Namibia: A Notable Political Comeback; Guinea Bissau: Paulo Gomes – A Candidate of Hope; Strong Show of Support by Foreign Allies Helps Halt CAR Rebellion; Picture of CAR Rebel Leadership Emerges, Bozize Risks Alienating Muslims and Inciting Youth Vigilantism; Sierra Leone’s Mines are Heating Up; and South Sudan Leadership Profile: Jonglei Rebel Leader Dak Kueth.

The first February 2013 issue contains the following articles – Nigeria: Healing the Host – Indigene-Settler Violence in Jos; Uganda’s Rebel MPs; Cote d’Ivoire: What to Watch in 2013; Burundi: Signs of Domestic Discontent; Sasolburg Protests Leave Four Dead in South Africa; Nigeria: Boko Haram Cease Fire; Nigeria: Signs of Change Following Ceasefire; Nigeria: Boko Haram’s Leader Abu Shekau; Djibouti: Opposition Leader Returns in Advance of February Elections; and Guinea-Bissau: Recent Economic Developments Could Facilitate Drug Trade.

The second February 2013 issue contains the following articles – Ghana’s Oil and Gas Sector: Recent Developments; Tanzania’s Gas Pipeline: Mtwara’s Warning; Angola: MPLA Dominates Civil-Military Relations; Chadian Military Involvement in Mali; Mali: Potential Impact of the French Intervention on Gulf Cooperation Council Engagement in Western Sahel; DRC: President Kabila Faces New Rebellions; Nigeria: Opposition Parties Merge; Cote d’Ivoire: Three Close Allies of Gbagbo Arrested; South Africa: Ramphela Launches New Party; and Leadership Profile: Rebecca Kadaga, Speaker of Ugandan Parliament.

The first March 2013 issue contains the following articles – Nigeria: Shifting Threat from Militant Groups; India and Africa: A Growth Story; Djibouti’s Parliamentary Elections: Protest, But No Revolt; Zambia: Sata Cracks Down Amid Increasing Political Violence; M23 Split: Implications for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo; DRC: Escalating Insecurity in Katanga Province; Botswana: 28 Arrested on Alleged Links to Somali Militants; Political Party Profile: Djibouti’s Union For National Salvation; and Guinea Names New Armed Forces Chief.

The second March 2013 issue contains the following articles – Is Eritrea Ripe for Revolution?; Guinea—Ever Closer to the Edge; Schism among Nigeria’s Governors; The Looming Power of Football Nationalism in Africa; Conflict and Instability in Central Africa; Malawi: Coup Plot Arrests Lead to Protests; Cameroon: President Calls for Elections, Opposition Threatens Unrest; Burundi: Outlawed Catholic Sect Clashes with Police; Benin’s President Yayi Survives Another Attempt to Oust Him; Guinea-Bissau: Political and Economic Updates; Senegal—Macky Sall Tackles Abuse of the Talibé-Marabout System; and Oman’s Expanding Engagement in Africa.





INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES



# THE AFRICA WATCH

JANUARY 2, 2013

## TO THE READER

Happy New Year! IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

***George Ward***

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward



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## ANALYSES

### The Kampala Talks and Peace in the Eastern DRC

**Researcher:** Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

#### Summary

- On November 20, 2012, M23, an armed group that had formed in the preceding March in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a break-away faction from the *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP), succeeded in taking the city of Goma and raising fears of a renewed war in the Great Lakes Region.
- After the United Nations' Group of Experts reported that Rwanda and Uganda were assisting M23 militarily and politically, a number of Western donors announced a reduction of development assistance to those two countries. Some suggest that this response by the international community explains the abrupt departure of M23 from Goma and the group's participation in peace talks with the government of the DRC in Kampala, mediated by the government of Uganda.
- Uganda's long history of intervention in eastern Congo and its specific implication in supporting the political wing of the M23 might have given it leverage in bringing M23 to the negotiating table. Uganda might have credibly conveyed to M23 the difficulty that the aid sanctions posed for its continued support of the group and the necessity for a political settlement.
- The Kampala talks do not show great promise for peace in eastern Congo. Many predict that the talks could result in an agreement similar to one reached in March 2009 between the CNDP and the DRC government, which lacked comprehensiveness and inclusivity. Uganda's intervention is thus a short-term measure that will certainly not end the wars in the eastern DRC.

#### Introduction

The Kampala talks, meant to end the fighting between the M23 armed group and the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC, Congolese armed forces) began on December 9 under the mediation of the Ugandan government. The M23 has voiced many objectives for the Kampala talks, including the departure of DRC President Joseph Kabila, who they contend won the 2011 elections fraudulently, and the full implementation of the March 2009 agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP – which included integration with the FARDC, release of political prisoners, return of refugees, and national reconciliation and reconstruction.<sup>1</sup>

The key questions related to the talks are:

- Can Uganda serve as an effective mediator, despite its complicity with M23?
- What outcome might be expected from Kampala's involvement?
- Can the Kampala peace talks result in peace?

### **Who Are the M23?**

The *Mouvement du 23 Mars* (Movement of 23 March, or M23) was formed in March 2012 by defectors from the CNDP. M23 is a reference to the March 23, 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the DRC government. They claim to have formed because the government failed to successfully integrate the CNDP and other armed groups into the national army, as called for in the March 2009 agreement, and because President Joseph Kabila won the 2011 elections fraudulently.<sup>2</sup> In fact, some analysts note that while the CNDP was meant to be integrated into the national army, it in reality operated independently. This afforded the CNDP an opportunity to continue to access a share of the vast reserves of minerals in eastern Congo. According to this interpretation, when the FARDC took steps to disrupt the networks plundering minerals, many in the CNDP began to defect. These mutineers formed the base of the 1,200-strong M23, which the FARDC has not been able to defeat.<sup>3</sup>

In June, a UN Group of Experts draft report presented evidence that Rwanda and Uganda were providing the M23 with military and political assistance. Both countries have vehemently denied involvement. In August, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which is charged with ending the violence in the eastern DRC and assembling a neutral force to help keep the peace, directed Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, the ICGLR chair, to convey a cease-fire order to M23.<sup>4</sup>

### **The Kampala Talks**

The battle with M23 took a sharp turn after the group took control of Goma in eastern Congo on November 20. As many began to fear a sharp escalation in violence and possibly a regionalization of the war, the contents of a November 15 UN Group of Experts report were slowly being digested. The report confirmed the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in assisting M23 militarily and politically, respectively. In response, many donors announced the suspension of development assistance to Rwanda and Uganda. Just days after M23 took control of Goma, the group suddenly announced its willingness to enter into dialogue with the Congolese government. Some see the Kampala talks, which also include representatives of the government of Rwanda, as a result of international pressure on Rwanda and Uganda generated by the Group of Experts' report.<sup>5</sup>

Uganda's current support to M23 does not differ materially from its past involvement in eastern DRC: it is primarily in the region to secure access to Congolese minerals. In this round of intervention, Uganda also seems to be protecting its newly found hydrocarbon resources around Lake Albert, which it shares with Congo. The Congolese government's inability to maintain law and order, suppress militias, and effectively administer local government provides Uganda with an additional incentive to intervene.<sup>6</sup>

### **Can Uganda Serve as a Credible Mediator?**

Research on mediation and negotiation indicates that an effective mediator must be viewed by all parties as capable of helping to draft a strong agreement. This objective could be facilitated by a neutral mediator, but not necessarily. In fact, studies show that mediators who are biased against one of the parties can prove credible, as they may be able to influence that party into taking actions to resolve a conflict.<sup>7</sup> More nuanced research shows that pro-government and pro-rebel mediators have different spheres of influence, depending on the concessions that must be made. For example, pro-government mediators are more effective in designing settlements costly to the government, such as territorial divisions. On the other hand, efforts by pro-rebel mediators are more likely to result in strong power-sharing agreements, since

concessions will include measures to ensure that rebels effectively participate in a post-conflict government.<sup>8</sup>

In this respect, it might appear that Uganda, biased toward M23, could be an effective mediator in bringing an end to the fighting between M23 and the Congolese government. As an M23-backer, Kampala can more credibly convey the DRC government's and the international community's resolve:<sup>9</sup> thus the swift decision by M23 to abandon Goma for the Kampala peace talks. Once the UN report named Uganda and Rwanda as supporters of M23, the international community – importantly including some of Uganda's and Rwanda's most ardent supporters – quickly responded by announcing cuts in development assistance. Even though Uganda and Rwanda vehemently denied their involvement, the quick organization of the Kampala talks suggests that the international community's response was effective.<sup>10</sup> The vulnerability felt by Uganda and Rwanda seem to have been conveyed to M23, which then likely concluded that peace talks might be the best strategy for securing its objectives.

### **Prospects for Peace**

Even though Uganda managed to bring M23 to the negotiating table, the process is not likely to result in a durable peace for eastern Congo. The negotiations seem narrowly concerned with the military actors in the conflict: M23 and the Congolese and Rwandan governments. A likely result, many analysts agree, will resemble the March 2009 agreement, which was negotiated under the arguably neutral facilitation of the UN's special envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and the African Union's representative, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. An additional possibility, due to the direct involvement of Uganda and suggested by research on pro-rebel biased mediators, could be a power-sharing arrangement with M23.

An agreement similar to one reached in March 2009 – even one that includes a power-sharing arrangement – would be short-sighted and would not address the roots of the conflict (though it would likely satisfy M23, Uganda, and possibly Rwanda). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that power-sharing arrangements are not stable strategies for ending wars as they often break down, generate spoilers, and spark other conflicts.<sup>11</sup> Just as the March 2009 agreement between the CNDP and the Congolese government broke down, a similar agreement with M23 could experience the same fate unless a broader array of stakeholders is introduced. Moreover, there are many other smaller armed groups in eastern Congo that could not only step in to fill M23's void,<sup>12</sup> but also attract support by Uganda and Rwanda, which might prefer to extract resources and shore up their border security apart from the weak authority of the Congolese government. Instead, a more comprehensive approach, advocated by the Enough Project, which directly addresses economic and security concerns, could bring peace. Such discussions would require the inclusion of a broad array of Congolese representatives, including civil society, business leaders, and the military.<sup>13</sup>

## Potential Effects of Rwandan Aid Cuts

**Researcher:** Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard and Ms. Ivana Djak

### Summary

- After allegations emerged that the Rwandan government had been covertly supporting rebels in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), several western countries suspended aid to Rwanda. Rwanda is one of the most heavily aid-dependent countries in the world.
- While the aid sanctions could affect Rwanda's budget to some extent, they also seem to have unified many Rwandans behind President Paul Kagame, making the overall effects of the aid sanctions hard to assess.

### Overview of Aid Cuts

Rwanda has long been hailed as a donor success story, effectively and efficiently using foreign aid for infrastructure and social development.<sup>14</sup> Rwanda is also one of the most heavily aid-dependent countries in the world with more than 50 percent of its budget supplied by foreign sources.<sup>15</sup> In May 2012, European donors pledged an increase in aid for the 2012/2013 budget cycle.<sup>16</sup> It was estimated that these sources alone would fund 20 percent of Rwanda's \$2.2 billion budget.<sup>17</sup> Beginning in July 2012, however, many of Rwanda's western allies cut or froze their aid and loan packages over its alleged backing of the M23 rebellion in the DRC.

The U.S., one of Rwanda's largest aid donors, cut \$200,000 in military aid to the Rwandan military.<sup>18</sup> This small but symbolically loaded cut – the U.S. donates more than \$200 million to Rwanda annually – was followed by substantial cuts by the Netherlands and Germany. In late July 2012, the Netherlands suspended \$6.6 million in aid that was to be used to improve Rwanda's judicial system.<sup>19</sup> Germany suspended \$26 million in aid programmed for 2012 to 2015.<sup>20</sup> In early August, Sweden froze aid to Rwanda pending clarification of the reports alleging its involvement in the DRC. The Swedish foreign ministry gave no detail of what the Swedish aid freeze would entail. In 2011, Sweden gave Rwanda €26 million in aid.<sup>21</sup> At the end of September 2012, another one of Rwanda's biggest aid donors, the European Union, froze aid to Rwanda. The EU allowed for existing projects to be completed, but direct budgetary support of \$92 million over six years has been suspended.<sup>22</sup> The UK's aid cut has been most controversial. The UK originally froze aid in July 2012, but then reinstated it in September 2012, despite protests by human rights groups. In November 2012, the UK again announced it would be withholding \$33 million in aid amid renewed allegations of Rwandan involvement in the DRC. Given that the UK is one of Rwanda's traditionally staunchest supporters, its decision to cut aid was a particularly big blow to President Kagame's reputation.<sup>23</sup>

### Effects of Aid Cuts

The purpose of the aid cuts is presumably to force Rwanda to end its support of the rebels in eastern DRC and to prevent aid funds from contributing to the conflict. The cuts probably did contribute to Rwandan pressure on the M23 rebel group to leave Goma. Otherwise, Rwandan support of the rebels continues, with no diminution in sight. But there have been some effects felt in Rwanda. The aid cuts have created gaps in the budget, putting many projects, ranging from judicial to military improvements at risk.<sup>24</sup> Kagame's government has allegedly had to borrow money at commercial rates to plug the gap left by aid cuts.<sup>25</sup>

### Top 10 Donors: Rwanda, 2010

Donor	Aid Contribution
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	\$263 million
U.S.	\$216 million
World Bank	\$121 million
European Union	\$98 million
Belgium	\$65 million
African Development Bank	\$49 million
Canada	\$49 million
UK	\$37 million
Sweden	\$31 million
Japan	\$31 million

Source: Aiddata.org

How effective these aid cuts will be remains to be seen. Most of the aid sanctions are being imposed by European countries that represent only a portion of the countries contributing aid to Rwanda. In response to the aid cuts, the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louise Mushikiwabo, said that the cuts were unfounded, and that they point to a conspiracy to slow down Rwandan growth. In the face of the betrayal of its “western friends,” Rwanda quickly turned to its “other friends” to plug gaps in the budget.<sup>26</sup> A meeting in July between Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe, one of the officials accused of orchestrating the recent chaos in the DRC, and Chinese ambassador Shu Zhan led to renewed pledges for further military cooperation.<sup>27</sup> August saw a series of high level meetings between Rwandan ministers and officials at the Chinese embassy. In September 2012, President Kagame met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to discuss growing bilateral ties. China promised to encourage its enterprises to invest further in Rwanda.<sup>28</sup>

President Kagame also launched the Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF), which calls on ordinary Rwandans and Rwandan businesses to make contributions to supplement the national budget. Rwanda's Finance Minister, John Rwangombwa, revealed that two weeks after its launch in September, the fund had already raised more than \$3 million.<sup>29</sup> The fund has become a point of national pride for Rwandans, who feel the international community is falsely accusing them and bullying them by cutting aid, putting important programs at risk. The fund has also been launched among Rwandan diaspora communities across the world. In addition, there has been evidence of a backlash against the West in Rwanda, with some praising the aid cuts for showing the country who its true friends are and for forcing Rwanda to become less aid-reliant.<sup>30</sup>

The National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) has attempted to paint a less worrisome picture. On December 12, 2012, the Bank governor said Rwanda's economy is expected to grow faster than projected given growing foreign investment and a boom in the financial sector. Clare Akamanzi, the CEO of the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), projects Rwanda will register more than \$1 billion in investments this year, surpassing the initial target of around \$800 million.<sup>31</sup>

Typically, economic sanctions of this kind take years to be effective, if at all, and can sometimes backfire.<sup>32</sup> There is evidence that abrupt aid shocks can create conditions ripe for domestic armed conflict, especially in repressive environments.<sup>33</sup> On the one hand, Rwanda is considered quite repressive. For example, in October 2012, President Kagame's main political rival, Victoire

Ingabire, was sentenced to eight years in prison after being found guilty of terrorism by the High Court.<sup>34</sup> Allegations of government-ordered grenade attacks and repression of the opposition are matched by reports of suppression of the press. Reporters Without Borders rates the Rwandan press climate as one of the worst in the world, ranking it 168 out of 179. Independent papers are regularly closed down when they publish criticism of President Kagame; editors and reporters who anger the government flee the country and sometimes are ruthlessly gunned down.<sup>35</sup>

On the other hand, economic sanctions typically do not affect the longevity of single-party regimes or military regimes as compared to personal dictatorships.<sup>36</sup> Rwanda, while autocratic, is not purely a personal dictatorship. Overall, while a substantial amount of aid is being withheld from Rwanda, it might not be enough to make a difference, and it could create more internal support for Kagame's government.



## Whither Kenya's Muslims?

**Researcher:** Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

### Summary

As Kenya enters the final stages of the campaign leading up to the March 2013 national elections, the country's Islamic community is split between traditional forces that support the mainstream and radical elements that are in violent opposition to the state.

Kenya's Muslims make up a sizable proportion of the country's population. Although united in terms of religious practices, they are divided by:

- Age groups
- Ethnicity and history
- Politics
- Wealth.

These divisions have reduced the capability of mainstream Islamic leaders to counter the growing appeal of extremist organizations, especially among disadvantaged youths. Some young Kenyans have become adherents of al-Shabaab and other extremist organizations, and have contributed to violence both outside Kenya and at home.

### Background

The Muslim population of Kenya is not homogenous. It comprises several different ethnic groups, including those of Arab, Somali, Bantu, South Asian, and mixed descent.<sup>37</sup> Estimates of the number of Muslims in the Kenyan population vary. Officially, the government counted 4.3 million Muslims, or just over 11 percent of the population, in its 2009 census.<sup>38</sup> That number is controversial, in that the census allegedly significantly undercounted the ethnic Somali population.<sup>39</sup> Other sources claim that 20 or even 25 percent of the Kenyan population is Muslim.<sup>40</sup>

Historically, there were two centers of Muslim culture in Kenya – the northeast, which is populated by ethnic Somalis, and the coastal strip, inhabited by descendants of Arab-African settlers and traders and indigenes who converted to Islam. More recently, large Muslim populations have emerged in parts of Nairobi, notably Eastleigh, and other cities.



A recent study by The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life is helpful in understanding Kenya's Muslims compared to Islamic populations elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> The following are some salient characteristics of Islam in Kenya:

- Religion matters to 95 percent of Kenyan Muslims, one of the highest percentages in the world.
- Orthodoxy rules – 61 percent believe there is only one true way to understand Islam's teachings.
- Sunni affiliation is dominant (73 percent).
- Adherence to Sufism, a mystical movement that emphasizes the possibility of gaining direct knowledge of God through euphoric worship and other practices is, at 25 percent, around the norm for East Africa, but much lower than in West Africa.<sup>42</sup>
- Mosque attendance (91 percent) is relatively high, but attention to required prayers is lower (76 percent).
- Proselytism is active – 11 percent of Kenyan Muslims are converts from Christianity.

Kenya's Muslims got off to a bad start politically in newly independent Kenya. Even as most Kenyans were engrossed in the struggle to gain independence and establish a state, Muslims in both the coastal belt and the northeast were preoccupied with the idea of secession. In the coastal belt, the secession movement was connected with the desire to preserve the privileged status accorded to the Arab population during British rule.<sup>43</sup> Although the secession movement was not successful, it has never been extinguished. Extended debates continue over the political status of the predominantly Muslim areas of the country.

### **Muslim Engagement in Kenyan Society**

During the one-party governments of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi, many Muslim leaders were co-opted into the political mainstream. Most governments have included at least some Muslims. Religious parties were prohibited, but Muslims organized in other ways. The National Union of Kenya Muslims (NUKEM), formed in 1968, was headed by two junior members of the government. NUKEM was followed, in 1973, by the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), which emphasized the obligation of Muslims to show absolute loyalty toward the President.<sup>44</sup> Other mainstream Muslim organizations include the National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF) and the Kenya Muslim National Advisory Council (KEMNAC). Both SUPKEM and NAMLEF are member organizations of the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya, which is a coalition of all faith communities that seeks to deepen interfaith dialogue and collaboration for common action.

These mainstream organizations are deeply engaged in the Kenyan political process, sometimes in controversial ways. For example, during the 2007 election campaign, the existence or non-existence of a memorandum of understanding between NAMLEF and presidential candidate Raila Odinga became an issue. The alleged text of such a memorandum, later revealed to have been bogus, was widely circulated and used to support the argument that Odinga, if elected, would favor Muslim causes.<sup>45</sup> Other engagements of the mainstream Muslim organizations with the political process are more straightforward. This is illustrated by the home page of the SUPKEM website, which lists 14 Muslim ministers and assistant ministers in the current Kenyan government.<sup>46</sup>

### **The Rise of Radicalism**

Outside these mainstream organizations, which have limited appeal to youth and the disenfranchised, Islamist radicalization has come to Kenya. One source of radicalization is spillover from Somalia. Al-Shabaab, the militant Somali Islamist movement, has built a cross-border presence in northeast Kenya and in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi.<sup>47</sup> In September 2012, al-Shabaab announced the creation of a Kenyan branch, led by Shaykh Ahmed Iman Ali, the founder of the Shabaab-allied Muslim Youth Center (MYC). Shaykh Ahmed announced that his group would avenge the loss of the port of Kismayo to the Kenyan Defense Force by killing “infidels.”<sup>48</sup>

The MYC became a powerful ally of al-Shabaab in the latter’s intensive recruitment campaign that focused initially on Somali nationals living in Kenya. That population is very large, although exact figures are unavailable. The preliminary results of the 2009 census reportedly counted 2 million Somalis in Kenya, but those results were controversially canceled.<sup>49</sup> Through the MYC and other means, al-Shabaab-inspired radicals have managed to take control of key mosques in Eastleigh and elsewhere. These mosques have served as recruitment and fundraising hubs, and have hosted visiting insurgent leaders.<sup>50</sup>

In parallel with these Somali-focused developments, Islamic-related radicalism has been experiencing a resurgence along the Kenyan coast. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) was formed in 1999. Until recently, it focused on alleged unfair treatment by the central government of the Coastal Province and on legal means of attaining independence for the region. Recently, it has been associated with a growing number of incidents of political violence.<sup>51</sup> Although the MRC is not an Islamic organization *per se*, its membership and leadership are largely Muslim.

In October 2012, the Kenyan government was successful in its application to outlaw the MRC, and security forces subsequently launched a crackdown on MRC leaders. The government seems to be fostering the idea that the MRC is allied with al-Shabaab.<sup>52</sup> Although there are probably contacts between al-Shabaab and the MRC, there is no direct evidence of a formal connection. In fact, the mixture of Islam and folk beliefs practiced by MRC followers is antithetical to the austere Salafism of al-Shabaab.

### **The Outlook**

Mainstream Kenyan Muslim organizations have mostly come down on the side of the government and against the MRC.<sup>53</sup> As long as the twin threats of Salafist radicalism and coastal secessionist sentiment remain relatively contained, the mainstream’s approach will work. A drawn-out Kenyan military engagement in Somalia or a decline in the tourism industry that supports the coastal economy could play into the hands of the radicals and disrupt the dominance of the mainstream Muslim leadership.

## **Zimbabwe: Militia Activity Raises Risk of Violent Elections**

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes and Dr. Janette Yarwood

### **Summary**

- Local reports indicate that militia groups have been revived and remain active ahead of a constitutional referendum and general elections tentatively scheduled for the first half of 2013 in Zimbabwe.
- While militia incidents are still overwhelmingly linked to President Robert Mugabe's party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), since 2009 there has been a rise in political violence tied to Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T).
- Although several civil society youth organizations have launched efforts to combat youth involvement in political violence, the power-sharing government has not successfully addressed the issue of demobilizing political and youth militias.
- Renewed ZANU-PF militia activity and increased levels of violence tied to MDC, among other factors, bode ill for the prospect of peaceful elections in the coming months.

### **Recent Incidents of Political Militia Activity**


Reports emerging from Zimbabwe claim that ZANU-PF militia groups have been revived and remain active ahead of a constitutional referendum and general elections scheduled for the first half of 2013. A December 7, 2012 report cites cases of political violence directed against MDC supporters in four regions of Zimbabwe over a two-week period.<sup>54</sup> Up to six different groups are reportedly responsible for harassing and intimidating citizens around the country, including the "Chipangano" in Harare, the "Top Six" in Chinhoyi, "Jochomondo" in Hurungwe, "Jambanja" in Marambapfungwe, and the "Alshabab" in Kwekwe.<sup>55</sup> ZANU-PF affiliated self-styled war veterans groups have also been implicated in recent incidents of political violence.<sup>56</sup>

The Chipangano militia, which was deeply involved in political violence in the lead-up to the second round of the 2008 elections, has reportedly stepped up their activities in recent months, with the group suspected to be behind a spate of 2012 violence in various parts of Harare.<sup>57</sup> There are reports that the militia, under the alleged direction of ZANU-PF Harare youth chairperson Jimu Kunaka, has been harassing MDC supporters and extorting money from commuter bus operators in the capital.<sup>58</sup> Another militia group, referred to as the Top Six, has reportedly been harassing residents in the name of ZANU-PF in Chinhoyi, a town in Mashonaland West Province. MDC rallies have been targeted by the group; Finance Minister Tendai Biti, for instance, was prevented from addressing a rally in Darwendale in August.<sup>59</sup> The Top Six militia has also been tied to violence perpetrated against the MDC during the 2008 election.<sup>60</sup>

There have been numerous reports of increased violence and harassment in Kwekwe, a city located in the center of the country, by a ZANU-PF militia that calls itself "Alshabab" (after the Somali terrorist group).<sup>61</sup> The group has been linked to Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa's associate, Owen "Mudha" Ncube,<sup>62</sup> and has reportedly evicted shop owners, attacked civilians, and has been linked to at least one killing.<sup>63</sup> In an interview conducted by an IDA researcher in November 2012, a youth activist from the region indicated that political violence had increased; however, he did not specifically refer to the group by name.<sup>64</sup>

### Spike in MDC-Linked Violence since Joining Government

Although political violence in Zimbabwe is still predominantly perpetrated by ZANU-PF-affiliated groups or state security sector officials, since MDC joined the power-sharing government in 2009, there has been a rise in incidents of political violence tied to that party. While the data for 2012 are still incomplete, an analysis on violent actors in Zimbabwe shows a spike in violence tied to MDC-T in 2010 and 2011, as seen in the graph below. Just recently, on December 13, eight MDC-T members were suspended from the party for their involvement in violence at a rally on March 24. Some within the party trace the fallout from the March violence to previous rivalries and disagreements stemming from the 2011 MDC-T Mashonaland East elective congress, where intra-party violence also flared.<sup>65</sup>



Source: ACLED<sup>66</sup>

### Violence against Civilians by Actor, Zimbabwe

#### Youth in Zimbabwe Organize Anti-Violence Campaigns

Youth from several different civil society organizations in Zimbabwe have embarked on an anti-violence campaign in an effort to discourage young people around the country from being used to perpetrate violence during the upcoming electoral season. In interviews conducted by an IDA researcher in September in Zimbabwe, a number of youth leaders said that they were in the process of forming a coalition to address youth across the country. Nkosilathi Emmanuel Moyo, Director of the Zimbabwe Organisation for Youth in Politics, stated: "We are tired; politicians and political parties in Zimbabwe have used the youths to perpetrate violence against political opponents in all previous elections. This time we plan to do something. We are tired and we want a change."<sup>67</sup> Another youth leader stated that their campaign would also encourage youths to become more constructively involved in the upcoming polls. He insisted, "Youth can make a difference in this election."<sup>68</sup> While this anti-violence coalition has yet to fully coalesce, those interviewed indicated that youth in Zimbabwe are desperate for change and are actively working to counter ZANU-PF efforts to coopt the youth into militias.

#### Government Failure to Demobilize Political Militias

Although fledgling civil-society efforts are underway to organize youth away from political gangs and militias, the power-sharing government has not made any serious attempts to disarm the militias that played a critical role in the 2008 electoral violence. The main reason for this failure

is Mugabe and ZANU-PF's intransigence regarding any efforts to dismantle the party's structures of violence or reform the politicized security sector. Since the "unity government" was stood up in February 2009, ZANU-PF has consistently and vehemently blocked MDC efforts to rein in the police, security forces, or party militias, often using parallel informal institutions, such as the Joint Operations Command, to circumvent and supersede formal institutions like the National Security Council.<sup>69</sup>

## **Outlook**

Reports of renewed ZANU-PF militia activity, a rise in political violence tied to the MDC, and historical spikes of militia violence during election years in Zimbabwe all suggest that high levels of violence are likely in elections scheduled for the first half of 2013. Moreover, as highlighted in the September 19, 2012 issue of *The Africa Watch*, ZANU-PF's newfound popularity in recent public opinion polls means national elections are likely to be exceedingly close, which increases the likelihood that Mugabe will use militias to unleash violence and intimidation.<sup>70</sup> A constitutional referendum is less likely to trigger high levels of violence, because the political stakes are lower.

While the increased political violence connected to the MDC-T has been mostly internal, this development could signal a possible shift, with the party more willing than in the past to resist ZANU-PF violence by fighting back. Speaking in July, Biti urged MDC supporters to hit back, arguing that next year ZANU-PF militias "are not going to beat us."<sup>71</sup> In 2011, Theresa Makone, MDC-T Co-Minister of Home Affairs, allegedly told supporters: "If you are beaten, hit back. We do not want people who just take it lying down."<sup>72</sup> Despite a potential shift toward a more muscular platform, MDC-T will remain outflanked by ZANU-PF's long-standing and centralized coercive apparatus. Without the presence of international election observers and robust monitoring by civil society and international groups, the continued prevalence of militias in the Zimbabwean political landscape bodes ill for the prospect of peaceful elections in 2013.

## ALERTS

### Madagascar: Former President Agrees Not to Run in Upcoming Poll

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

On December 12, 2012, it was reported that the former president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, who was deposed in March 2009 and has been living in exile in South Africa, had agreed not to run in upcoming presidential elections tentatively scheduled for May 2013 in Madagascar.<sup>73</sup> Ravalomanana's decision came out of ongoing talks between him and current President Andry Rajoelina, which are sponsored by the South African Development Community (SADC) and led by Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete. SADC has been pushing for both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina to sit out of the upcoming election in order to lessen tensions and resolve the political crisis.<sup>74</sup>

Ravalomanana, who has been refused entry back into Madagascar several times since 2009, said he will return home to work for peace and reconstruction.<sup>75</sup> After Ravalomanana agreed not to contest the poll, Kikwete stated that it was "my responsibility" to persuade Rajoelina to do the same.<sup>76</sup> Although Rajoelina cited "significant progress" in subsequent negotiations, thus far he has not agreed to follow suit and relinquish his candidacy, with reports that Rajoelina's advisors are "furious" with those pushing for him to do so.<sup>77</sup>

- Ravalomanana was pushed out of office in March 2009 by Rajoelina, the former mayor of Antananarivo, who had the support of several segments of the armed forces.
- Following the unconstitutional change of government, Ravalomanana was convicted in absentia for the killing of civilians during the standoff with Rajoelina and sentenced to life in prison.<sup>78</sup>
- The issue of amnesty for Ravalomanana has been a sticking point in the current SADC negotiations, as his conviction has been used by Rajoelina as a pretext to refuse Ravalomanana reentry to the country.

While Rajoelina's intentions regarding the vote remain unclear, Ravalomanana's decision is a positive development that lessens the prospects for a violent election and political instability in the near term. That said, as highlighted in the November 21, 2012 edition of *The Africa Watch*,<sup>79</sup> Malagasy society, and the military in particular, remain deeply divided over the issue of Ravalomanana's return.

## **Sudan: National Umma Party Leader Steps Down**

**Researcher:** Ms. Brittany Gregerson

Former Sudanese Prime Minister and head of the opposition National Umma Party (NUP) Imam Sadiq Al Mahdi recently announced his retirement from politics, effective at the end of December. This came amid public allegations by high-profile presidential confidant and advisor Nafie Ali Nafie that Al Mahdi and the NUP were intimately involved in the November 22 coup attempt against the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) government.<sup>80</sup> Nafie's previous statements on the coup had suggested that NUP played a role, but he had stopped short of explicitly casting blame on specific individuals.

The immediate factors behind Al Mahdi's decision to retire at the present time remain unclear. Sources sympathetic to the regime reported Al Mahdi's stepping down without reference to either Nafie's accusations or the coup attempt.<sup>81</sup>



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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES



# THE AFRICA WATCH

JANUARY 16, 2013

## TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

***George Ward***

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward



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## ANALYSES

### The Fundo Soberano de Angola – Angola’s Sovereign Wealth *Sham*?

**Researcher:** Dr. Ashley Bybee

#### Summary

- In October 2012, the government of Angola quietly announced the establishment of the *Fundo Soberano de Angola* (FSDEA) – Angola’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). The FSDEA is purportedly intended to develop Angola socially and economically and preserve the country’s great oil wealth for the use of future generations.
- There are numerous concerns surrounding the fund, such as the independence of its management, its lack of legal standing or investment strategy, and potential conflicts of interest among its board members, including the President’s son, Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos.
- The fund has not been well publicized in Angola, and the public there has little knowledge of it. Those who have heard of it believe it is a sham instituted by the President to enrich himself and his family.

#### Background

Like many countries endowed with great natural resource wealth, Angola has instituted a state-owned investment fund with an initial deposit of \$5 billion raised through the sale of oil. The FSDEA was launched in October 2012, although previous versions of the fund existed, the most recent of which was called simply the “*Fundo Petrolífero*” or “Oil Fund.” The Oil Fund was proposed in 2010 in response to calls from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Angola to create a more “medium-term approach” to its spending.<sup>1</sup> The fund is purportedly intended to invest in infrastructure, hospitality projects, domestic agriculture, sanitation, power generation, and other non-oil sectors of the Angolan economy that are predicted to exhibit strong growth in the coming years.

There are a number of aspects of the FSDEA that raise concerns – none of which have been reported in the Angolan press. The reports of exiled political activists (specifically Rafael Marques de Morais – an Angolan journalist who runs the anti-corruption watchdog website “*Maka Angola*”), some very limited foreign press reports, and IDA interviews in Luanda and Cabinda provide the bulk of insights captured in this analysis.

### Concerns over the FSDEA

The most disconcerting aspect of this fund is its management – a three-member board comprising Armando Manuel (a close advisor to the President); Hugo Miguel Evora Goncalves (a relative of former Minister of the Economy); and the President's eldest son, Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, commonly known as "Zenú." Appointing the President's son (who holds no official position in government) is a blatant example of nepotism and a clear indication of the Dos Santos' intention to exert personal control over the fund and ensure that the Dos Santos family is well-positioned to reap the rewards of its investments.



**Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos or "Zenú"**

(Source: [www.cabinda.net](http://www.cabinda.net))

The FSDEA's assets are managed by the Swiss investment firm "Quantum Global," where one of Zenú's close friends, Jean Claude Bastos de



**Jean Claude Bastos de Morais**

(Source: [www.quantumglobal.ch/about-us/advisory-board/jean-claude-bastos-de-morais/](http://www.quantumglobal.ch/about-us/advisory-board/jean-claude-bastos-de-morais/))

Morais, is a central player.<sup>2</sup> (Incidentally, de Morais was convicted in Switzerland for "repeated qualified criminal mismanagement" in 2011.<sup>3</sup>) De Morais and Zenú also co-own Angola's first investment bank, Banco Kwanza Invest, although Zenú purportedly resigned from his board position in October 2012.<sup>4</sup> Serving in both positions is a clear conflict of interest, although Zenú claims there is no connection between Banco Kwanza and the FSDEA. Other convoluted connections between Quantum Global and Banco Kwanza (on the surface unrelated to Zenú) raise additional conflict of interest concerns.<sup>5</sup>

Another issue regarding the FSDEA is its legal status, specifically, that no legislation or other documentation of its establishment was ever submitted to the Angolan National Assembly. As a result, the FSDEA has no legal standing or framework governing its operations, a fact admitted even by its board members.<sup>6</sup> An impressive website exists ([www.fundosoberano.ao](http://www.fundosoberano.ao)), which claims

that it is governed by the Santiago Principles, a voluntary set of principles and practices developed by the International Working Group (IWG) of SWFs in October 2008. Angola is not, however, an official signatory of the principles.<sup>7</sup> The fund has no official investment policies and is accountable only to President Dos Santos.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, the fund's managers operate as though it has the legitimacy and mandate of an official national SWF, even acquiring property overseas. For example, Quantum Global recently purchased a piece of prime London real estate for \$350 million on behalf of the FSDEA.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the concerns described above, journalists, analysts, and some informed citizens have noted obvious problems with the fund's stated purpose. For example, the international press reports that one of the fund's primary purposes is to develop Angola's tourism industry.<sup>10</sup>

This has prompted at least one political activist to ask how building hotels will meet Angola's chronic development needs and why/how prospective African hospitality students would want to study in the continent's most expensive capital, where little English is spoken.<sup>11</sup> Questions such as this have been raised by numerous observers, who believe the fund is a convenient way for the Dos Santos family to enrich itself while claiming to be acting in the best interests of ordinary Angolans. Moreover, given the performance of previous goodwill funds such as the Eduardo dos Santos Foundation (FESA) created in 1996 by the President and the more recent Lwini Fund controlled by the first lady, Ana Paula dos Santos, poor management and rampant corruption are expected to characterize this fund as well.

### **Analysis**

Given these concerns regarding the nature and management of the FSDEA, those who are familiar with it view it as a ruse that is being touted as a national asset aimed at developing Angola economically and socially and hedging against future price fluctuations in the oil market. In reality, it is a slush fund for the Dos Santos family and friends to enrich themselves. Interestingly, the FSDEA has not been well-advertised to the public for reasons that are unclear. While several foreign journalists came to Luanda following the fund's announcement and while the fund has received significant media coverage from such sources as the *New York Times*, CNN, and *Euromoney*, there has been very little mention or discussion of it in the local Angolan press. In fact, its establishment was announced immediately following the most recent elections, leading many to believe that Dos Santos was less interested in appealing to Angolans than impressing an international audience. It is also possible that he might have been embarrassed that the fund is so clearly flawed by nepotism, or that he might not have wanted to raise expectations and then be obliged to report on the fund's progress.

# The “Great Taboo”: Racism and Conflict in West Africa

**Researchers:** Ms. Betty Boswell and Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

## Summary

- The conflict in Mali has put a spotlight on the extent to which Arab-African racism and the taboo against addressing it openly contribute to instability and undermine conflict resolution.
  - Increasingly, journalists, analysts, and intellectuals are challenging the taboo, warning that, in the words of Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, “the doctrine of revisionism by concealment or elision” of Arab-African racism “merely postpones the day of reckoning.”<sup>12</sup>
  - This reluctance to face directly the role that racial prejudice and fear plays in mixed Arab-African societies is undermining conflict resolution and reconciliation across Africa’s belt of instability.
- Two prime examples are Mali and Mauritania.
  - Human rights organizations and other observers are warning that military intervention in northern Mali is likely to be a catalyst for widespread acts of collective punishment that could escalate into a “race war” that could spread to neighboring countries like Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso.<sup>13</sup>
  - Slavery will continue to be practiced in Mauritania despite its prohibition in the constitution as long as the government fails to discourage the practice by changing cultural norms regarding race, educating the enslaved, and prosecuting wrongdoers.<sup>14</sup>

## The Great Taboo

Ghanaian journalist Gamal Nkrumah, son of Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, represents the mainstream view that Black Africans and Arabs are natural allies in the fight against the legacies of Western imperialism. To the extent that Arabs and Africans find themselves in conflict, it is the product of the United States’ “political grip” on both the African and Arab countries and the “brewing challenge” to the global power system driven by the rise of China. “Arab-American relations,” he wrote, “cannot be properly understood without the magnifying glass of U.S. foreign policy and especially the U.S.-led international war on terrorism.”<sup>15</sup>

A more cynical view of why Black African leaders and intellectuals remained silent about Arab mistreatment of Black migrant workers and minorities in North Africa, ethnic cleansing in Sudan, the continuing practice of slavery in Mauritania, and the existence of systemic racism across the Arab Middle East and North Africa was that Arabs – and Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, in particular – had been “buying” goodwill by bankrolling the African Union (AU) and shoring up the finances of African leaders and elites.<sup>16</sup>

A new “generation” of African and Arab scholars and writers is emerging to challenge what they see as a distorted “post-colonial” view that neglects the complexities of Arab-African relations that have roots in the long history of Arab-African coexistence. Discrimination and racism, they warn, are major problems in both north and sub-Saharan Africa. They can be overcome only if

Arabs and Africans work together to understand all the “elements and contours” of racism and the history behind it.<sup>17</sup>

In his recently published book *Of Africa*,<sup>18</sup> Wole Soyinka addresses the “great taboo” head on, charging that the failure of Arabs and Africans to address the historical legacies of the trans-Saharan slave trade and its legacies in modern Arab racism is a direct contributor to crisis and violence in sub-Saharan Africa. African historians and thinkers, he charges, are too “West-oriented.” As a result, “the dispersal of Africans through the Arab world” and “the fate of their cultures and their social status in the Arabized parts of the [African] continent and the Middle East” are a “largely hidden chapter” that has “assumed a tragic immediacy in parts of the black continent.”<sup>19</sup> This “short-changing of the power of history” has led Africans to pretend that ethnic cleansing – whether in Sudan or Mali – and slavery in Mauritania are motivated by anything *but* racism.<sup>20</sup> The result, he warns, is that “the internal criminality of the past has translated into the impunity of the present. As long as that past is fictionalized or denied, Africa is doomed to the curse of repetition.”<sup>21</sup>

### **Risk of “Race War” in Mali?**

In Mali, where an uprising and coup toppled the government in March 2012, al-Qaeda-linked groups have been maintaining control of the northern part of the country. Reports are surfacing, however, that racial tensions within the Islamist ranks could be creating an exploitable weakness. Young non-Arab Africans, recruited on the promises of equality, freedom, and the dignity of true Islam, are defecting to return to their countries of origin and their former lives because these promises have not materialized.<sup>22</sup> They fear that if there is a war they would be cannon fodder on the frontlines.

The Islamist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is a majority Black organization that includes Blacks in its leadership ranks. In the city of Gao, which has a majority of Black Africans, the Arab and Tuaregs left because they did not want to be led by Blacks, even though they subscribe to the same jihadist beliefs. Similarly, the Black Africans refuse to be controlled by Algerian or Arab jihadists.<sup>23</sup> This rancor among the races has caused internal splits within the organization, creating a lack of trust and unwillingness to cooperate.

Recently Hicham Bilal, the only Black battalion leader within the MUJAO, defected to return to his native Niger because of the racism he was experiencing from within the group. When he was interviewed at the time of his defection, he told the reporter, “These lunatics from MUJAO are not children of God; they are drug traffickers. They do everything which goes against Islam and to them; a black man is inferior to an Arab or a white.”<sup>24</sup>

As Mali’s army reorganizes to combat the Islamists in northern Mali using sectarian militias Ganda Koy (Masters of the Land) and Ganda Iso (Sons of the Land), the specter of ethnic rivalries and personal animosities entering the conflict has become worrisome. Both groups have fought alongside the Malian Army against Tuareg rebels in past years and might still carry their own agendas of self-protection into the conflict.<sup>25</sup> Some of the rhetoric being employed by the militia members recently can be described as “quasi-genocidal toward light-skinned populations like Tuareg and Arabs.”<sup>26</sup> When the MUJAO fought and defeated the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in November 2012, the MUJAO leadership justified the fight by stating the MNLA were becoming like tyrants, oppressing Muslims, stealing their money, and refusing to implement Sharia law. In addition, a MUJAO spokesperson said, for the MNLA, “the black has no right and the white has the right,” an attitude that violated the Islamic concept of racial equality.<sup>27</sup>

Human Rights Watch released a report in December 2012 warning that unless Mali's new Prime Minister, Diango Sissoko, takes steps to address accountability for abuses by security forces and rising ethnic tension, the likely result will be widespread incidents of "collective punishment and ethnic violence" that would likely start "the moment the intervention kicks off."<sup>28</sup> RAND analysts Michael Shurkin and Stephanie Pezard warn that international intervention, if it focuses too narrowly on the AQIM threat without sufficient understanding of the complexity of the entrenched issues of race and ethnicity, risks unleashing a "race war" that would rapidly spread to Niger and other neighboring countries that share Mali's mixed Tuareg/Arab ("white") and Black African demographics. "Lots of people are involved in these groups for a lot of reasons, and very few of them include international jihad against the West." Shurkin warns, "For all the valid concerns about what's going on in northern Mali, there is a lot we don't know about these groups that could have serious impact on resolving the situation."<sup>29</sup>

### **Slavery in Mauritania**

Mauritania, one of the world's poorest countries, is a largely desert country with Moors of an Arab-Berber descent in the north and enslaved Black Africans known as Haratine in the south. Although officially banned in 1981, slavery is still practiced in Mauritania, the government's denials notwithstanding.<sup>30</sup> Especially in the remote areas of the desert where people do not know their rights, slaves account for about half the population.<sup>31</sup>

Slavery in Mauritania is a centuries-old practice – lighter-skinned people (White Moors) have historically owned darker-skinned people (Black Moors), and some who have been born to it accept that they are owned because they know nothing else. The government does not discourage the practice, and local Imams are in favor of slavery.<sup>32</sup> Anthropologist Malek Chebel believes slavery survives in Mauritania because "the mode of governance is patriarchal and is based on customs and allegiances between tribes. The laws have not been followed with action."<sup>33</sup> In April 2012, activists protesting slavery marched to Nouakchott, and in an act that has been condemned by both the government and the anti-slavery movement, burned an Islamic legal text that condones slavery. The president of the abolition group *Initiative pour la Resurgence du Mouvement Abolitionniste* (IRA) was jailed for several months.

Other Mauritanian human rights activists marked the 52<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of the country's independence from France on November 28 by marching to Inal, the city where the Mauritanian army executed dozens of Black African soldiers for no apparent reason in 1990. This same group had undertaken a similar march in 2011 to commemorate what they call "the Years of Ash," during which hundreds of Black Mauritians lost their lives in 1989 and 1990.<sup>34</sup>



# Chinese Investment in West Africa Continues, But So Do Troubles

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan

## Summary

- China is a key trade partner, financial lender, and builder of infrastructure for several West African countries. As the Chinese presence grows, locals are increasingly voicing opposition to China's involvement in their communities. Additionally, the *quality* of Chinese construction, education, and products is being questioned more frequently.
- The Chinese government and top party elites are using "soft power" to repair their poor image. Specifically, there is a greater focus on Africa by Chinese media, including an increased Chinese media presence on the continent.
- In order for China to solidify its progress on the continent, engagement must go beyond the government-to-government level. Chinese firms and immigrants need to engage with the local communities to overcome the xenophobic mentality demonstrated by both Africans and Chinese nationals.

## Introduction

China continues to lead foreign direct investment (FDI) with a specific focus on construction of infrastructure in West Africa, but is also increasingly facing backlash and opposition from local communities. Recent events as well as Chinese media have documented this growing problem.

In November 2012, China's *Xinhua News* published a report citing challenges to Chinese firms operating in Africa.<sup>35</sup> Such problems included the West's "exaggerated idea of neocolonialism," host countries' anger over illegal mining operations, business competition between Chinese nationals and locals, and a limited knowledge of African languages and cultures.<sup>36</sup> The report argued that China and Chinese enterprises must think "long term and strengthen understanding and respect to really resolve the contradictions" in order to achieve a "win-win situation."<sup>37</sup>

Shortly after the publication of that article, the state-owned *China Daily* launched *Africa Weekly*, a supplement to be published each Friday that will focus on Chinese involvement in Africa.<sup>38</sup> The cover story of the second issue, "Benefits Outweigh Problems," highlighted China's leading role in investment and development on the continent, but also conceded the above-mentioned challenges.<sup>39</sup> It seems that, at least at the government level, China realizes it has an image problem in Africa. The *Africa Weekly* publication appears to be part of China's "soft power" campaign to remind its African beneficiaries of what China has to offer.

The following are highlights of China's recent activity in West Africa, including new investments, opposition by local communities, and potential future problems for China in the region.

## Côte d'Ivoire

China plans to enhance military cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire. Military officials from both countries met in mid-December 2012 to discuss how to improve security in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly with regard to training and capacity building of the *Force Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI).<sup>40</sup> Given the significant security challenges facing Côte d'Ivoire following the 2011 post-election crisis, China runs the risk of getting caught in the crosshairs of any renewed conflict. Based on its policy of non-interference, China will likely avoid getting too deeply involved beyond its financial and equipment contributions. This approach has been the case even in the Sudan where China has significant oil interests at stake.<sup>41</sup>

China also remains engaged in building the infrastructure of Côte d'Ivoire. In January 2013, China's Export-Import Bank granted a \$500 million loan to Côte d'Ivoire for the construction of a 275 megawatt hydroelectric dam in Soubré.<sup>42</sup> This is the largest Chinese loan granted to Côte d'Ivoire in three decades. Sinohydro, a state-owned hydropower-engineering firm, will begin construction in February 2013.<sup>43</sup> The project, which will create 5,000 jobs, will build infrastructure for the local community. Sinohydro could face opposition if it fails to keep these promises or if the local community feels the company infringes upon its land rights. Specifically, in terms of land rights, there are already conflicts among Ivoirians and returning refugees that stem from the post-election crisis. Furthermore, failure to properly compensate local communities for land and/or degradation of the environment by Chinese workers/companies has been a common complaint in both Ghana and Liberia (see below).

### **Ghana**

In the past year, Ghana has seen a rise in tensions between locals and Chinese nationals who operate small-scale (illegal) gold mines in their communities.<sup>44</sup> Since IDA's reporting on the issue in October 2012, there have been three reported deaths of Chinese nationals in Ghana. On October 14, a Chinese national was killed, and more than 100 were detained by Ghanaian police for illegal gold mining in the Ashanti region. The incident, which was the third in a string of crackdowns, was the first time a Chinese national was killed during a police operation. The Chinese demanded a thorough investigation and action by the Ghanaian government to prevent future incidents. Following these demands, the detainees were released on bail.<sup>45</sup>

On New Year's Eve, two more Chinese miners were shot and killed during an armed robbery at their camp in the Upper Denkyira West District of central Ghana.<sup>46</sup> Since the Ghanaian government recently has adopted a tougher stance on illegal mining, incidents involving Chinese nationals could become more frequent in the future. It will be challenging for the Ghanaian government to control conflict between Chinese nationals and the local population, and to hold its own public security forces accountable for any inappropriate use of force.

In addition, responsible Chinese investment was an important issue leading up to Ghana's December 2012 presidential elections. The unsuccessful New Patriotic Party (NPP) presidential candidate, Nana Afuko-Addo, was critical of the quality of Chinese-built infrastructure and the inflated costs for gas infrastructure being built by China's Sinopec.<sup>47</sup> In fact, *quality* has become an issue for several African countries. During October 2012's IDA-sponsored private sector dialogue with prominent East African business leaders, the mantra was "you get what you pay for" when dealing with the Chinese. Participants were still willing to work with Chinese firms, but stressed that their governments should monitor Chinese activities closely.

### **Liberia**

In December 2012, it was announced that China will provide a \$4.5 million military grant to fund the training of Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) personnel and to purchase equipment.<sup>48</sup> In August 2011, 30 officers of the AFL enrolled in academic programs at eight military colleges in China.<sup>49</sup> In August 2012, 50 more AFL officers went to China for basic training and academic programs.<sup>50</sup> One article in the Liberian press notes that AFL members who have received specialized training in China have given some "negative" reviews, but does not elaborate.<sup>51</sup>

In late November 2012, there was also some debate regarding the quality of education Liberians were receiving from Chinese medical schools. In addition, the Liberia Medical and Dental Council (LMDC) warned non-medical practitioners (Chinese in particular) against posing as clinicians, or they would face prosecution.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, China Union's (state-owned mining company) plan to relocate six villages near the Bong mines has angered the local community. In 2009, the government of Liberia signed a long-term concession agreement with China Union.<sup>53</sup> Thus far, the company has not lived up to its "social obligations" to the local population. In November 2012, locals held protests in Monrovia over fair compensation [from China Union] for their ancestral lands.<sup>54</sup> Additional indigenous complaints include non-payment of \$8.9 million owed to former Bong miners, failure to repair the railway linking the mines to Monrovia and rehabilitate the highway between mines, poor standard of housing for employees, human rights violations, and desecration of sacred lands.

### **The Chinese Soft-Power Offensive**

China is a key trade partner, financial lender, and builder of infrastructure for several West African countries. Several governments are satisfied with no-strings-attached Chinese loans in exchange for access to their natural resources, but locals are increasingly voicing opposition to Chinese involvement in their communities. The problem has been recognized by the Chinese government and top party elites who emphasize the use of soft power in Africa.

In order to "win the hearts and minds" of African communities, China has increased its media presence within Africa to combat "Western dominance and bias."<sup>55</sup> Most of this increased presence has been focused on East and South Africa; however, *Xinhua* now has 28 bureaus on the continent covering 47 countries.<sup>56</sup> In addition, China established a CCTV Africa hub in Kenya in January 2012. *Africa Weekly*, previously offered in print only in Nairobi, is now available online and appears to be a key driver of the soft power campaign.<sup>57</sup> And on New Year's Day, China established its first organization dedicated to the promotion of soft power around the globe – the China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA).<sup>58</sup>

But China still has a long way to go. A Nairobi newspaper editor commented on the reluctance of Africans to trust Chinese reporting on foreign news, particularly from places like Sudan. "Kenyans are skeptical of a free lunch ... especially when it's made in China."<sup>59</sup> This perception of censorship is exemplified by China's policy of "positive reporting," which is viewed by some as a restriction on free press that could permeate or further repress African media outlets.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, one of the major complaints heard from business leaders at IDA's October 2012's private sector dialogue was that China tends to engage only at one level – government to government. In order to avoid future conflicts, Chinese firms and immigrants will need to expand their range, and work with African communities and civil society.

## Namibia – A Notable Political Comeback

**Researcher:** Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

### Summary

Hage Geingob's comeback win in the party election to become the designated successor to Namibian President Hifikepunke Pohamba and his subsequent elevation by Pohamba to the office of prime minister are significant in terms both of Namibian politics and, potentially, the country's foreign relations.

- Geingob previously served as prime minister, but was dismissed from the post in 2002 by Namibia's founding president, Sam Nujoma.
- If, as currently expected, he ascends to the presidency after the 2014 elections, Geingob would become the first non-Ovambo to hold that office.
- Geingob is U.S.-educated and has an affinity for American culture. He is likely to favor more moderate and Western-oriented policies than the current president. He would be less likely than the current president to give automatic support to the leaders of two of Namibia's closest allies – President Dos Santos of Angola and President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.



Source: <http://www.thevillager.com.na/articles/3053/Hage-Geingob-wins/>

### SWAPO's Political Dominance

Elections in Namibia have generally been considered to have been free and fair, but they have been uniformly dominated by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the party that contested South Africa's control during the decades-long Namibian liberation struggle. SWAPO consistently wins a majority of greater than two-thirds of the vote.

According to SWAPO party rules, the president of the party becomes its candidate for the national presidency except when the national president is term limited. That is now the situation, as President Pohamba is serving his second and final term. In this case, the next-senior party office holder, the party vice president, would become the party's presidential candidate. This rule made the 5<sup>th</sup> Congress of SWAPO, held in early December 2012, an important occasion. The congress was the final one prior to the national elections scheduled for 2014, and the contest for the party vice presidency became in essence Namibia's presidential primary election.

### Geingob's Political Comeback

Hage Geingob first became Namibia's prime minister at independence in 1990. The prime minister serves at the pleasure of Namibia's president; then-president Sam Nujoma unceremoniously removed Geingob from office in 2002. Nujoma gave no reason for his action, and offered Geingob a minor ministerial post. Geingob refused the offer, and soon afterward decamped for Washington, DC, where he became the executive secretary of the Global Coalition for Africa. This political exile lasted less than two years, when Geingob returned to Namibia in 2004, having won a place on SWAPO's list for the elections that year. Privately, he also cited

personal reasons for his return to Namibia, including the expense of maintaining properties in two countries.<sup>61</sup> Following his return – and after the retirement of former president Nujoma – Geingob began to climb back up the political ladder. He served as party whip in the legislature and later as minister of trade and industry, an important portfolio. In 2007, he was first elected as party vice president.

As noted above, the campaign for the party's vice presidency in 2012 carried high stakes, and it was hotly contested. Geingob assembled an impressive array of supporters, and he barnstormed the country in his Range Rover.<sup>62</sup> Geingob had two high-profile opponents – Minister of Regional and Local Government Jerry Ekandjo and Minister of Justice Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana. Ekandjo was widely viewed as the candidate of the SWAPO hard-liners, while Geingob was seen as a moderate. In the balloting at the party congress on December 2, 2012, Geingob won a convincing first-ballot victory, with 312 votes. Ekandjo got 200, and Iivula-Ithana received 64.<sup>63</sup>

### **A Second Advance for Geingob**

Pohamba, president both of Namibia and of SWAPO, remained silent for most of the campaign leading up to the party congress. In late November 2012, he finally endorsed Geingob for the party vice presidency.<sup>64</sup> Although Geingob was by then the leading candidate, Pohamba's endorsement might have sealed the victory. In a second move, Pohamba reshuffled his cabinet two days after the party congress, returning Geingob to the post he had left a decade earlier, that of prime minister. Notably, both of Geingob's opponents in the party election retained posts as ministers in the new cabinet.<sup>65</sup>

### **Why Does This Matter?**

As a democratic, sparsely populated, and peaceful southern African nation, Namibia rarely makes the news. Nevertheless, Hage Geingob's emergence as the country's future president is noteworthy for a number of reasons.

- First, the contested intra-party election was another step in cementing democratic processes within SWAPO. Since SWAPO has won every national election by a large margin and looks set to continue winning in the foreseeable future, democracy in Namibia depends in large part on the fairness and openness of intra-party processes.
- Second, Geingob's ascendancy is an important step in the evolution of SWAPO from an ethnically based party into an inclusive one. SWAPO emerged in 1960 from the former Ovamboland People's Organization. The Ovambo, a collective name for a dozen related tribal groups, are the dominant ethnicity in Namibia. Since SWAPO's inception, the party's leadership and the government have been dominated by Ovambo. Geingob is a member of the minority Damara tribe.<sup>66</sup> During his previous service as prime minister, Geingob felt that he was at a disadvantage within the party because of his ethnicity.<sup>67</sup> According to one widely believed rumor, Geingob divorced his first wife, an American citizen, in order to marry an ethnic Ovambo from an influential family. His second marriage was dissolved in 2008.<sup>68</sup>
- Third, Geingob's leadership will likely strengthen the voice of moderates within the government. Graham Hopwood, a leading Namibian political analyst, believes that the Geingob victory represents a rejection of a radical approach to the hot-button issues of land distribution and economic transformation.<sup>69</sup> The SWAPO youth organization has in the recent past mimicked the calls heard from political youth elsewhere in the region for expropriation of agricultural land without compensation. Geingob is also a capable administrator. During his first tenure as prime minister, he was known as the person to

go to when something needed to get done urgently. He told the author that international corporate CEOs were his “icons,” and that he sought to emulate them.

- Fourth, Namibia’s international positions may moderate. Since independence, Namibia has maintained correct and friendly relations with Western nations, who have provided generous assistance. At the same time, both former President Nujoma and President Pohamba have made clear that their deepest allegiances were to those who supported SWAPO during the liberation struggle. Cuba, Russia, Libya, Angola, and Zimbabwe have enjoyed special places of favor. The SWAPO party website regularly features articles that portray the U.S. as an imperialist power seeking to exploit Africa’s resources. Headlines on the website such as “Obama Stalking Africa’s Resources”<sup>70</sup> and “Colonial Powers Eye Africa’s Resources”<sup>71</sup> are common. Namibia’s anti-Western foreign policy bias was most pronounced during its 1999-2000 term on the UN Security Council, when it joined Russia and Belarus in attempting to block Western intervention in Kosovo.<sup>72</sup> It was perhaps no accident that coverage of the SWAPO congress by the Angolan Press Agency omitted any mention of Geingob’s election victory.<sup>73</sup> As Namibian president, we Geingob can be expected to continue to pay lip service to Namibia’s traditional friends while in practice orienting its relationships more toward the West and emerging Asian and Latin American powers.
- Fifth, in Geingob the United States will have a reliable friend, and U.S. interests will gain a fair hearing. Geingob is U.S.-educated (B.A. – Fordham University; M.A. – The New School) and has family ties to the U.S. He follows U.S. sports avidly, particularly the National Basketball Association. His background contrasts sharply with that of current President Pohamba, whose higher education was in the former Soviet Union.

## Guinea Bissau: Paulo Gomes – A Candidate of Hope?

**Researcher:** Dr. Janette Yarwood

### Summary

According to the electoral roadmap unveiled by the National Electoral Commission last year, legislative and presidential elections in Guinea Bissau are anticipated by April 2013.<sup>74</sup> Although it is unlikely that this target will be met, pre-electoral maneuvering has begun. Paulo Gomes, a former senior government official in Guinea Bissau who has spent most of the past 15 years outside the country, intends to enter the presidential race.

- Gomes does not intend to represent any current political party and has indicated that he might start a new party.
- He enjoys a high level of support from the diaspora and the international community, and he reports that leaders within the country have encouraged him to run.
- Gomes intends to position himself as the candidate of hope, with a future-oriented program that will include:
  - Security sector reform
  - Openness and a participatory approach
  - Building an “accountability ecosystem”
  - Economic rehabilitation.
- Gomes intends to build his campaign on a movement for change, and he is working with international political consultants with proven track records.
- It is too early to assess Gomes’s chances of success. Eventual threats against his personal safety by the power brokers in Guinea Bissau might be the best indicators that he is having an impact.

### Background

In April 2012, ahead of a second round of presidential elections, members of the armed forces staged a coup in Guinea Bissau. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes, Jr. (currently in exile in Portugal and no relation to Paulo Gomes) was arrested along with the interim President Raimundo Pereira.<sup>75</sup> These events were typical of this recognized narco-state. In the past three years, there have been at least six major political assassinations and three attempted coups.<sup>76</sup> No president has ever completed a full term in office since the country’s independence from Portugal in 1974. In addition to military involvement in politics, reportedly there has been a marked increase in drug trafficking since the coup.

### A Candidate of Hope?<sup>77</sup>

On October 11, 2012 at the African Leadership Network Conference in Accra, Ghana, Paulo Gomes announced his intention to run for the presidency of Guinea Bissau.

- Gomes is the founder and President of Constelor Investment Holdings (2006). Constelor, an investment management firm based in Africa and the U.S., is focused on natural resources, energy, financial services, real estate, agribusiness, and telecommunications in the Gulf of Guinea and broader West African region. The company has provided

services and strategic business advice to Mars, BHP-Billiton, Rio Tinto as well as countries such as Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in the area of mining.

- From 1998 to 2006, Gomes served in senior positions within the World Bank. He worked on issues such as regional integration, private sector development, investment promotion, development financing, capacity building, and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Gomes worked in the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Trade in Guinea-Bissau from 1987 to 1995. He led strategic planning activities; was also the principal advisor to the Minister on sectorial adjustment programs; managed Guinea-Bissau's investment budget; and supervised the implementation of development projects, including budgetary resource mobilization and balance of payments support.
- Gomes was educated in Paris and the United States. His family has been living in Dakar, Senegal. In order to ensure their safety, his family will relocate to the United States once he has declared his candidacy.

In his brief speech at the conference in Ghana, Gomes stated that he was disappointed with Guinea Bissau's path since independence and tired of the negative press about the country. He asserted, "I want to put Guinea Bissau back on the map through positive leadership and growth." In follow-up interviews with the author, Gomes claimed that he had been approached by those who staged the coup in April and asked to become Prime Minister.<sup>78</sup> He told them that he would not endorse a coup. He noted that, based on this conversation and others both within the country and with members of the diaspora, he realized that he could play a positive role in the future of Guinea Bissau. Gomes stated that within the country there is the impression that "even the military is tired of the way the country is going."

Gomes also claimed that some of the players in the country are aware of his intentions to enter the presidential race, but he does not intend to officially announce his candidacy until early February. He does not currently have a security detail and feels safe moving around the country. He has, however, met with Israeli officials to discuss his future security needs as a formal candidate and, subsequently, should he be eventually perceived as a threat by any of Guinea Bissau's military power brokers.

Gomes intends to position himself as a candidate of hope and a candidate of the future. He is in the process of developing a campaign strategy and manifesto and has indicated that he understands that he will have to appeal to multiple internal and external constituencies. That, according to Gomes, means his campaign will have to tailor its message to multiple audiences.

#### **A Platform of Reform and Renewal**

According to his developing draft political manifesto, Gomes's campaign will concentrate on the following:

- *Security Sector Reform* – Gomes acknowledges that he will have to use very careful language in order to appear non-threatening to the military and those involved in narcotics trafficking. With this in mind, Gomes said that, during the campaign, his message in this area will focus only on improving the conditions of the barracks. He argued that this strategy should appeal to the younger generation within the military because they do not benefit from the way things are going in the country. Although he does not intend to tackle security-sector reform or narcotics trafficking directly during the campaign, a draft version of the manifesto states:



*Security issues remain a critical blockage to progress. The role of the military in politics has undermined trust in the political system and perpetuated ethnic divides. The lack of a strong body that can enforce the rule of law and provide oversight to the army has led to much of the bad governance we have witnessed in recent years. A clear plan is needed to reform the security forces. First, it is imperative to reduce the size of the army to reflect the needs of the country and develop an elite group of Special Forces – with the appropriate infrastructure to protect Guinea Bissau's territory and resources. A plan of this sort would also require emphasis on building the capacity of the security forces to fight drug smuggling and instigate customs reform, among other issues. None of this can be done effectively without focusing on critical issues within the army including the mindset of officers; capacity of the forces as a whole; recruitment processes; and reliable payment and pension systems. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau would greatly benefit from more coherent partnership with its international partners (including Angola, Nigeria, Senegal, and ECOWAS) with regard to security challenges.*

- *Constructive Politics* – According to Gomes, this means politics must move beyond the closed inter-elite social networks and relationships and become a broad-based, participatory process, including all ethnic, gender and age groups, in order to convey and share information more openly and effectively.
- *Building an Accountability Ecosystem* – Gomes believes that the lack of accountability of institutions and organizations has been a key driver of instability in the country. He also argues that all branches and organs of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) and all funding channels have proven susceptible to corruption, patronage, and non-transparent processes. To address this issue, he intends to develop systems to encourage transparency and accountability. This accountability ecosystem will include the management of finances across government institutions, encouraging civil society and the media to become more vocal on issues of governance and accountability, and seeking international support in developing accountability and transparency systems.
- *Rehabilitating the Economy* – Gomes intends to focus on market linkages with other Lusophone countries, as well as Senegal and China.
- *International Support* – Gomes understands that Guinea Bissau is considered a narco-state and a failed state. He argues that this is a major concern for the international community because West Africa is a fragile region. He also states that given the instability in the Sahel region, there should be major efforts to ensure that countries further south are stable. Gomes is certain that given his professional background, he has international credibility.

### **Developing a Campaign Strategy**

Gomes recognizes that getting elected in Guinea Bissau will be very difficult given the recent political history of the country. He is working with a team both in Guinea Bissau and outside of the country to develop a detailed stakeholder's map in order to understand the essential relationships that must be built and strengthened. He is also in the process of thinking through a strategy for engaging military officials. Gomes intends to build his campaign as a social movement for change with a heavy focus on youth, women, and the diaspora. According to

Gomes about 400,000 people vote regularly during elections. He would like develop a voter registration drive and specifically reach out to youth on this effort. If effective, he feels he could secure a win through the additional support of many first-time voters and the vote of the diaspora in neighboring countries who often return to vote. He also believes that he will be able to attract some members of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (known by its Portuguese acronym PAIGC), as he thinks there will be a split after the party congress later this month.

Gomes has been working with the public relations and marketing firm Brand Communications based in London and Accra to develop materials for his campaign. He is in the process of developing his campaign messaging and is consulting with people in Guinea Bissau, individuals based in Dakar, and others. Gomes also had a recent meeting in Washington with a well-known American political operative to discuss hiring the latter as a campaign manager or consultant. During the meeting this person informed Gomes that he and his team have experience working with campaigns in difficult African environments.<sup>79</sup>

In an effort to build momentum for his campaign, Gomes will host a conference in Guinea Bissau on February 1 and 2 entitled, *Bissau Economic Forum 2013: for Guinea Bissau's economic transformation*.<sup>80</sup> Gomes has managed to get support from many well-known organizations including Google, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Samsung, Dangote, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank, and the Africa-South East Asia Chamber of Commerce.

Gomes is currently developing a fundraising strategy and has stated that he would like to raise \$5 million for this campaign.

### **Gomes's Prospects for Success**

In addition to the high level of support that he enjoys from the diaspora in both the United States and Africa, Gomes claims encouragement from leaders within the country. The economic forum that Gomes intends to conduct in February will provide an opportunity for IDA to gauge his chances as a candidate. Given the political facts of life in Guinea Bissau, the best indicator that Gomes is having an impact might come in the form of threats against his personal safety.

## ALERTS

### Strong Show of Support by Foreign Allies Helps Halt CAR Rebellion

Researcher: Ms. Ivana Djak

#### Summary

The Seleka rebellion in the Central African Republic (CAR) appears to be at a temporary standstill, in part because regional allies and South Africa, in a swift show of support notably absent in similar crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Mali, have sent troops to aid the government.

#### Foreign Show of Support Keeps Rebels at Bay

Talks on the CAR crisis began in Libreville, Gabon on January 9, 2013. Ministers of the ten member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), representatives of President Francois Bozizé's government, CAR political opposition and civic organizations, and rebel representatives were present. The key rebel demand is that Bozizé step down. The President has made clear he has no intention of doing that.<sup>81</sup> Failure to reach a lasting agreement in Libreville could threaten Bozizé's rule as rebels hold the northern part of the country and might have the capacity to take the capital. The presence of foreign troops is likely the factor that brought rebels to the peace talks and is keeping them away from Bangui.<sup>82</sup>



<http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/central-african-republic/>

On January 5, 2013, South African President Zuma announced he would deploy 400 South African National Defense Force (SANDF) personnel to CAR. The members of SANDF are to assist CAR's forces with capacity building and implementing disarmament programs. The move by South Africa has puzzled analysts, politicians, and diplomats.<sup>83</sup> South African presidential

spokesperson Mac Maharaj said President Zuma authorized the deployment of 400 soldiers for the period January 2, 2013 through March 31, 2018 as part of a military cooperation agreement signed in 2007 and renewed for another five years in 2012. The agreement provides CAR's army with an array of military training. Maharaj claims the timing of the deployment is coincidental, but that has not stopped speculation about its purpose.<sup>84</sup> Some see it as a move to counter non-African military influence. As the continent's powerhouse, South Africa might just be exerting its influence.<sup>85</sup> Other analysts say the troops were sent to prevent the fall of Bozizé, and to stabilize the region.<sup>86</sup>

The threat to President Bozizé was further eased when a temporary truce was signed on January 10. Rebel leaders warn violence will resume if Bozizé violates the agreement. Rebel leader Eric Massi told Reuters, "The ceasefire is contingent on several of our demands being met and we will judge Mr. Bozizé's sincerity in the coming days."<sup>87</sup> Florian Ndjadder, another Seleka leader, told media the fighters would use the week-long peace period to see if Bozizé could be trusted.<sup>88</sup>

## Picture of CAR Rebel Leadership Emerges, Bozizé Risks Alienating Muslims and Inciting Youth Vigilantism

**Researcher:** Ms. Ivana Djak

### Summary

- The Central African Republic (CAR) Seleka rebel coalition is unique in that it is led by an elite group of internationally-based men, including the sons of ousted government officials.
- President Francois Bozizé's recent labeling of the rebels as Islamist terrorists alarmed the Muslim leadership of CAR. Youth vigilantism appears to be on the rise in response to the President's remarks, and the Imam fears it could be channeled against the Muslim population.

### Rebel Leadership

The Seleka spokesman, Eric Neris Massi, 41, has become the face of the rebellion. He is the stepson of Charles Massi, a former minister and founder of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), who "disappeared" in 2009.<sup>89</sup> Eric Massi is currently a financial management consultant in Paris. In an interview with media on January 10, 2013, he stated that he is driven in part by the murder of his father. Massi says he is part of a new generation of politicians who want to rehabilitate CAR. He emphasized that if the rebels wanted to, they could capture Bangui, and that their restraint shows they want a political solution. He hopes negotiations will persuade Bozizé to step down. Massi said a violent takeover is not out of the question should Bozizé refuse to resign.<sup>90</sup>

The other leaders of Seleka include Michael Djotodia, the nominal head of the rebel coalition. He founded the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (*Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement* (UFDR)), the main component of Seleka. He had lost control of the UFDR when he was exiled to Benin in 2007, but he returned to power in 2012. Florian Ndjadder, the son of General Francois Bedaya Ndjadder, who was a former minister of interior and former director general of the National Gendarmerie under the regime of Ange-Felix Patasse and who was killed in an abortive coup attributed to Bozizé in May of 2001, is another leader of Seleka. He is also a leader of the Union of Republican Forces (*Union des Forces Républicaines* (UFR)). Other leaders are difficult to identify, since most are likely using false names to avoid scrutiny under international law.<sup>91,92</sup>

Despite the rebels' decision to attend recent peace talks in Libreville, Gabon, Massi warns that the group still has the capacity to seize Bangui.<sup>93</sup> The rebels are not only threatening to continue fighting and asking for Bozizé to step down, but they are also now also calling for him to be brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes.<sup>94</sup> Massi has expressed the desire for a peaceful transfer of power, but additional rebel demands and insinuations continue to be made even during the peace talks.<sup>95</sup>

Critics of the rebels argue that Massi and Ndjadder are both heirs to former rebel leaders and are avenging their parents' deaths, rather than attempting to lead the country forward. Analysts have also drawn attention to the fact that the rebel coalition is made up of long-time enemies, who have different motives. If the rebel coalition were to take over power, factions in the coalition might soon begin to fight each other.<sup>96</sup>

### **Bozizé Labels Rebels Islamist Terrorists and Alarms Muslim Community**

On January 8, a day before the start of peace talks in Gabon, CAR President Bozizé accused the Seleka rebel alliance of being a foreign terrorist organization. He said a religious cause, namely Islam, is behind the Seleka alliance. He claims Sudanese Janjaweed fighters are backing Seleka. Analysts doubt Janjaweed or other Islamist militants are behind the CAR rebellion, and have described the President's statements as a last-ditch attempt to garner Western support by portraying the rebels as terrorists and to incite CAR citizens to fight the rebels.<sup>97</sup> Bozizé urged citizens to be vigilant of the foreigners coming to steal CAR's minerals, oil, forests, and other resources. He asked the youth to guard Bangui from foreign invaders, urging citizens to "rise up."<sup>98</sup>

President Bozizé's rhetoric seems to have already been met by some action. A youth organization – the Coalition of Patriots against Armed Rebellion (*Coalition des Patriotes Contre la Rébellion Armée* (COCORA)) – has announced its intention to launch a national petition to bring international legal action against Eric Massi. The group accuses Massi, who was an adopted child, of not being a natural-born, CAR citizen.<sup>99</sup> COCORA is the organization that held rallies in front of the French and U.S. embassies in late December 2012.<sup>100</sup> The group put up roadblocks during curfew in Bangui and stopped people passing through to check their IDs. One activist explained, "We have responded to the call of the head of state. We must defend our fatherland."<sup>101</sup>

The Muslim community in CAR has expressed concern over the President's rhetoric and the youth organization's ready response to it. Oumar Kobine, the head of the Muslim community in CAR, where Muslims make up 15 percent of the population, warns that it is dangerous for the regime to present the crisis as a religious war. Clashes between Christians and Muslims in the country are easily ignited. In 2011, riots between Muslims and Christians in Bangui left four mosques destroyed and dozens of people injured. Imam Kobine warns that violence could ensue if the regime encourages youth in vigilantism, which could easily start to target the Muslim population.<sup>102</sup>

## Sierra Leone's Mines Are Heating Up

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

In the past year, tensions between local workers and foreign companies have risen at Sierra Leone's diamond and iron-ore mines. Violent incidents have dredged up memories of the country's 11-year civil war and have perpetuated fears of renewed conflict.

Conflict erupted at the Koidu mine in diamond-rich Kono district on December 18, 2012, resulting in two deaths. Trouble started when miners began a strike for better pay, improved working conditions, and an end to racism. Specifically, workers accused the Ocea Diamond Group, a South African company owned by Israeli billionaire Beny Steinmetz, of renegeing on its promise to pay employees a Christmas bonus equal to three months' salary.<sup>103</sup> Police responded and opened fire after being "overpowered" by an unmanageable crowd of protesters.<sup>104</sup> A nearby police station was set afire in retaliation, and local taxi drivers joined the strike.<sup>105</sup> The violence also left between 100 and 150 foreign staffers (most South African, but also Ghanaian, Zimbabwean, Namibian, UK, and Indian nationals) trapped in the mining compound. A resolution was reached at the end of December when Ocea agreed to a salary increase for miners.<sup>106</sup>

Sierra Leone's mines have a history of violent protests and clashes. A similar incident occurred at the Koidu mine in 2007 during which two people were killed by police gunfire.<sup>107</sup> In April 2012, clashes between mine workers and police occurred at the Bubmana iron-ore mine following protests over salary grievances and pollution of the town's main water source. The incident revealed "gross human rights violations" by police in Bumbana, but also "systematic abuses against workers and communities facing off against extractive companies nationwide."<sup>108</sup>

Based on these events and other similar strikes and violence at mines in South Africa and Guinea during 2012, tensions between foreign companies and the local workers are on the rise in several different locales and are increasing in severity. While strikes are not uncommon in these countries, the level of violence is worrisome and has the potential to escalate in the future. Furthermore, the perception compared to the reality of police brutality in quelling such protests is a problem that needs to be addressed by African governments.

## South Sudan Leadership Profile: Jonglei Rebel Leader Dak Kueth

**Researcher:** Ms. Brittany Gregerson

### Key Facts

- Known for his key role in arming and mobilizing the Lou Nuer *Bunam* (youth) in Jonglei state, South Sudan
- AKA: The Prophet,<sup>109</sup> Yong Deng,<sup>110</sup> The Magician<sup>111</sup>
- Rebel Pedigree: Dak Kueth is said to have fought alongside prominent rebel leader and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) defector George Athor before the latter's death in late December 2011<sup>112</sup>



Photo: Dak Kueth in Jonglei in March 2012 from *Sudan Tribune*

### About Him

Dak Kueth Deng portrays himself as a “prophet from God”<sup>113</sup> and spiritual leader to the Lou Nuer people, calling back to traditional sources of power and legitimacy among the Nuer.<sup>114</sup> To enhance his influence, Dak Kueth married the great-great granddaughter of the first such prophet – the still highly-revered Ngundeng Bong, who died in 1906.<sup>115</sup> He distinguishes himself from spiritual leaders in other parts of South Sudan by shunning common practices, including the use of spears in ritual demonstrations.<sup>116</sup>

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), among others, believes Dak Kueth to be centrally involved in arming the Nuer and organizing attacks by fighters from that tribe against the Murle in Jonglei.<sup>117</sup> His compound – and the area where his influence is greatest – is said to be in Uror County,<sup>118</sup> where key members of the local government and police are reportedly under his control.<sup>119</sup> Abductees report that Dak Kueth's compound is “well-equipped,” and the leader has been seen with both a satellite phone<sup>120</sup> and a coterie of heavily-armed youth bodyguards.<sup>121</sup>

Dak Kueth has turned down multiple offers of amnesty from Juba.<sup>122</sup> As of April 2012, his White Army was estimated to number 4,000 strong, with a 1:1 ratio of rebels to small arms<sup>123</sup> (NB: some reports cast doubt on Dak Kueth's specific position with the White Army, claiming that the group rejects traditional leadership hierarchies altogether<sup>124</sup>). Dak Kueth's knowledge of the region and wide area of operations – he has famously crossed into Ethiopia to hide on at least one occasion – has frustrated ongoing attempts to capture and/or disarm him and his followers.<sup>125</sup> Dak Kueth's cross-border stint is said to have resulted in augmentation of his support base to include a notable Ethiopian contingent, mostly Nuer from the Gajang area.<sup>126</sup>

### Involvement with David Yau Yau

The Government of South Sudan's civilian disarmament campaign has faced particularly stiff resistance from locals in heavily-armed Jonglei state and provided a convenient recruitment tool for Dak Kueth as well as more well-known local rebel leader David Yau Yau. The current status of the relationship between Yau Yau and Dak Kueth remains unclear, though rumors of an alliance appear in the media periodically.<sup>127</sup>

Yau Yau and Dak Kueth have a shared history – both fought alongside prominent SPLA defector and failed Jonglei politician George Athor, who likewise reportedly supplied both men with the weapons they initially used to mobilize youth from their respective tribes.<sup>128</sup>



### **Current Status and Looking Forward**

An NGO report from October 2012 described Dak Kueth as “powerful and controversial” but claimed that he was no longer the leader of Nuer youth, and “he has become less influential since the SPLA began hunting him.”<sup>129</sup> A *Sudan Tribune* report from the same month, however, reports a different state of affairs, quoting local officials as saying that insecurity in Jonglei was directly due to the influence of David Yau Yau and Dak Kueth, the latter having “vast influence among local people” and both bolstered by powerful allies hidden within the SPLA.<sup>130</sup> A letter from a Jieng (Dinka) group in Juba around the same time went further, alleging that “*most* Nuer generals in the SPLA have begun to support renegade Dak Kueth.”<sup>131</sup>

In mid-December 2012, Dak Kueth’s forces again clashed with the SPLA in Jonglei, resulting in the deaths of between 19 and 29 rebels and five soldiers.<sup>132</sup> As of early January 2013, Dak Kueth and his followers remained at large.

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- <sup>8</sup> For example, the website claims there are mechanisms in place to ensure its fair management, such as the requirement for an annual report to Parliament and the appointment of “internationally recognized independent auditors.
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- <sup>130</sup> “S. Sudan: Authorities Reportedly Arrest Army Officer Over Alleged Rebel Links,” *Sudan Tribune*, October 14, 2012, via “Highlights: Sudanese Daily Media Highlights October 17, 2012,” Open Source Center
- <sup>131</sup> Italics not in the original. See: “Dinka Community Supports the arrest of Maj. Gen. Gatwec Duel,” Press Release, October 14 2012, <http://www.southsudan.net/Jaangcommunity.html>
- <sup>132</sup> 19 according to “South Sudan army clash with prophet’s militia, 24 killed,” Reuters, December 19, 2012, via United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Media Monitoring Report, December 20, 2012, via Open Source Center – and 29 according to “SPLA attack tribal leader on Ethiopian border, five soldiers killed,” op cit





INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES



# THE AFRICA WATCH

FEBRUARY 6, 2013

## TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

*George Ward*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Nigeria: Healing the Host – Indigene-Settler Violence in Jos

**Researcher:** Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

#### Summary

- A December 2012 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) has revived the debate over the roots of sectarian violence in Nigeria's turbulent Middle Belt. Focusing on Jos city, the ICG report places the blame squarely on the failure of the Nigerian government to amend the 1999 Constitution and create broad-based citizenship to replace the divisive system of indigeneity.<sup>1</sup>
- While it might still have a cultural role to play in modern Nigeria – as in maintaining the autonomy of traditional leaders and governance – a consensus is emerging in Nigeria that “indigeneity” has become a dangerous anachronism as the foundation for distributing government patronage and economic and political opportunity. The divisions and hostilities it creates and perpetuates weaken the civic resistance of vulnerable communities across Nigeria, but particularly in the Middle Belt.
- The emerging consensus on the need to reform indigeneity policy, however, has not reached Nigeria's Plateau State, where a particularly bloody conflict has played out between some 40 different Christian “indigene” and Muslim “settler” communities since at least 2001. The lines of division are deep, and the epicenter of indigene-settler violence is the capital city of Jos.
- The ongoing crisis in Jos takes on added importance as it demonstrates how the dysfunctional Nigerian government and its failure to honestly confront the causes of conflict – namely, political and economic marginalization of large numbers of citizens on the basis of ethnic and religious stereotypes – have weakened the body politic, leaving it vulnerable to opportunistic parasites like Boko Haram, which take advantage of a debilitated host to pursue a more broadly disruptive ideological agenda.

#### The Indigene / Settler Dichotomy

The “indigeneity” concept has its roots in Nigeria's colonial past, when some 250 different ethnic groups with little or no historical or cultural affinity were bound into a single administrative entity. It was born of the need to ensure the cultural survival of smaller ethnic groups that feared they would be overwhelmed by larger, more politically and economically powerful groups. Since independence, and especially in the four decades since the end of Nigeria's catastrophic civil war, Nigeria's lawmakers have struggled to counter the atomizing effect of the country's ethnic complexity by “ensuring that the federal government is broadly inclusive in everything it does, thereby promoting both ‘national unity’ and ‘loyalty,’ across ethnic and religious communities.”<sup>2</sup> While, perhaps, noble in intention, this enforced “inclusiveness” – what Nigerians call the “federal character” principle – has been a dismal failure in practice by, in effect, providing legal legitimacy for overt discrimination that marginalizes large swaths of the population on residency grounds.

Two features of the way the concept of indigeneity is implemented are particularly problematic. First, while indigeneity is widely regarded as a central constitutional principle, it is nowhere clearly defined. The federal constitution establishes legislative set-asides for indigene representatives, but leaves it up to individual states to define who is and is not an indigene. As a result, local officials have used residency status as a convenient tool for denying not just political access but even basic services such as public education to large numbers of citizens simply on the grounds that they do not meet some dubiously defined standard for residence. As a Plateau State official told Human Rights Watch, no federal guidance is needed because “the Plateau State people know who is supposed to be an indigene and who is not.”<sup>3</sup> In Jos, local officials have been known to deny certificates of residency to members of their own indigene communities if they “look” like settlers or belong to a minority faith. The Nigerian constitution protects Nigerians from “any disability or deprivation merely by reason or circumstance of his birth,” but in practice any one of the millions of Nigerians who lack a certificate of indigeneity in their state of residence are deprived of any meaningful benefits of citizenship. Little wonder, then, that few Nigerians attach much meaning to Nigerian nationhood.

A second aggravating feature is the zero-sum nature of Nigeria’s political culture, what some Nigerians call the “scarcity mindset” – “the belief that the resources and opportunities are few, hence, we better secure it for ourselves and our children lest those outside come and take what is rightfully ours.”<sup>4</sup> Nigeria’s crisis of governance has stifled economic development and intensified the competition for government patronage, jobs, higher education, and political influence. In the North and Middle Belt, competition has become particularly acute regarding access to post-secondary education, with some states charging prohibitively high fees for non-indigene students and, even in the public education system, relegating students from “settler” communities to inferior schools or denying them access to public education altogether.<sup>5</sup>

The human fallout of the indigene/settler dichotomy can be perverse. To cite a few examples:

- A Birom indigene school principal in Jos explained Hausa parents’ complaints about the inferior quality of schools for their children by saying that they were “descendants of criminals or were born to prostitutes.” This, she concluded, made them “more hostile.”<sup>6</sup>
- A Christian indigene in Katsina State recounted the following: when she applied for an indigene certificate in her local government of origin she was denied it because of her non-Muslim appearance. When the officials saw her passport photograph, in which her head was uncovered, she said that they accused her of fraud, asking, “Why is she not covering herself if she is an indigene?” She was eventually given the form only after submitting another application with a photo attached showing her with her head covered with a scarf.<sup>7</sup>
- In Kaduna, Kano, and Plateau States, non-indigenes are hired for government jobs if there are no qualified indigenes available. Even those are hired on a contract basis can be fired without cause and without a pension at any time.<sup>8</sup>
- In the 1960s, most Nigerians were indigenes within one of the country’s three regions. The subsequent proliferation of state and local governments means that today’s Nigerians are indigenes of ever-smaller territories and strangers – with few effective rights of citizenship – everywhere else. Increasing numbers of Nigerians cannot prove they are indigenes anywhere.<sup>9</sup>

Nigerians as a whole are more likely than citizens of any other African nation to define themselves primarily in ethnic terms. A recent United States Institute of Peace Special Report concluded that “across the country, ethnic associations, mosques, and churches are where relationships are tended, disputes are settled, and deals are done. These places also can offer the shared sense of purpose and social safety net that government has not.”<sup>10</sup>

### **The Crisis in Jos**

The indigene/settler dichotomy is felt at the local level right across Nigeria, but its effects have been especially malignant in Plateau State in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. The ethnic tensions between the largely Christian/traditional indigene Berom, Anauta, and Afizere (BAA) people and the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers have deep historical roots, going back as far as the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when raiders from the far North seized BAA and other local people for the trans-Saharan slave trade and, later, sought to subjugate and Islamize the populations of the Middle Belt.

The British left the Christian and traditional tribes of the Middle Belt under the dominance of the Muslim North. The BAA gained effective political control of Plateau State upon its creation when, in 1967, the federal government carved six new states (which eventually were further divided into eighteen states) out of what had been the massive Northern Region. Successive waves of Hausa migration into the cities of the Middle Belt have resulted in a population in Plateau State that is nearly evenly divided between Muslim “settlers” and non-Muslim “indigenes.” General Ibrahim Babangida’s military government, in response to demands from the Hausa settlers around the capital city, Jos, created the Jos North Local Government Area in 1991, effectively giving the settlers a political voice and forcing the BAA to share access to traditional local chieftaincies. The BAA believe the system is vital to ensure the cultural survival in their own homelands. The result has been communal polarization and a protracted and escalating cycle of violence that continues to instill deep physical and psychological trauma among populations that “have now experienced mass destruction of lives, property, relationships, economies, and institutions for a generation.”<sup>11</sup>

### **Healing the Host**

The weakening of Nigeria’s body politic caused by the corrosive effects of the settler/indigene conflict and other forms of the deep identity politics that shape, and often twist, a vast majority of civic and government interactions creates a favorable “host” for the pathogen of violent groups like Boko Haram. The indigene/settler dichotomy is not unique to Plateau State, but the socioeconomic realities in the region around Jos render it particularly incendiary: the ongoing conflict between Muslim herders and Christian farmers (which has intensified with the desertification of the North); high unemployment rates in the region’s youth bulge, especially in urban Jos; and the politicization and securitization of communal identities that has led to increasing ethnic segregation.<sup>12</sup> In recent years, an opportunistic pathogen – Boko Haram – has moved into the region, taking advantage of existing social and ethnic tension to further its own ideological campaign against Nigeria’s federal government and further polarize the Muslim-Christian divide. Nowhere is reform of the indigeneity concept more urgently needed than in Jos, and nowhere are the short-term effects of any change likely to be more destabilizing.

The Nigerian political consensus is shifting toward recognition that the residency rules must change to afford greater rights and access to settler communities, but how best to accomplish that is a matter for debate. At one extreme are those who favor abolishing indigene privilege – at least as far as political access and government services are concerned – altogether and basing residency status on how long one has lived in a particular place, thus doing away with the

problem of millions of Nigerians “who cannot lay claim to any state as their own as they were born and bred in states other than those of their fathers.”<sup>13</sup>

Others warn, however, that a precipitous change that erases indigene political and economic preferences without taking into account the underlying cultural and ethnic sensitivities of privileged indigene groups (especially those that, like the BAA, are minority populations even in their home states) risks unleashing a “sense of siege” in ethnically diverse regions and “unwittingly create bottled up feelings and mark out members [of ‘favored’ settler groups] as targets of misplaced aggression.”<sup>14</sup> Any effort to eliminate or redefine indigeneity must, in this view, be preceded by an extended program of inter-communal confidence-building from the grassroots level up, including ending the “zero-sum” political culture and taking meaningful steps to end impunity, identify, and prosecute those – indigene and settler alike – who masterminded and perpetrated violence and killings.<sup>15</sup> Such a process, however, will be highly dependent on effective and sustained federal, state, and local government and civil society participation.

Given the dysfunctional nature of Nigerian governance and the weak and polarized nature of civil society in Plateau State, there is little cause for optimism in the near term.<sup>16</sup> In such an environment, as recent events in Jos demonstrate, the resulting atmosphere of communal tension is likely to continue to provide a breeding ground for Boko Haram and other opportunistic pathogens to further degrade Nigerian unity and human security and undermine the already weak legitimacy of the federal government.



## Uganda's Rebel MPs

**Researcher:** Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe


### Summary

- After the official autopsy of Cerinah Nebanda – a young and outspoken parliamentarian and member of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), who was found dead in her home on December 14, 2012 – revealed a drug overdose, a number of parliamentarians voiced suspicion at the conclusions.
- Declaring an intention to uncover the truth about Nebanda's death, some of these parliamentarians – including members of the NRM – supported a move to recall parliament, which had adjourned for the year, to relaunch an investigation into her death.
- After sufficient signatures were obtained, President Yoweri Museveni seemingly succeeded in forcing 10 MPs to withdraw their names, canceling the recall effort.
- Some MPs have taken the case to court, questioning the legality of removing one's name from a petition once it has been placed there. There are now rumors that Museveni could suspend parliament or that the army will take over.
- The recall effort is the latest skirmish between the parliament and the executive. It represents the increasingly weak internal organization of the NRM, the difficulty faced by a number of revolutionary movements in maintaining commitment to the central principles of the organization, and perhaps a broadening of democratization in Uganda. It can, however, open the door to increasingly strong-armed tactics by the government, as it tries to control dissent. A period of instability could ensue.

### The Cerinah Nebanda Case

Cerinah Nebanda, the women's representative for Butaleja district (eastern Uganda) died suddenly on December 14. Nebanda, who at 24 years old was the youngest Member of Parliament (MP), was an outspoken critic of President Yoweri Museveni, despite being a member of the ruling NRM. In this regard, Nebanda was one of many so-called "rebel" MPs.<sup>17</sup>

The circumstances of her death have so far not been explained. Four days after her death, the police blocked an independent investigation ordered by Mulago National Referral Hospital, parliament, and the police. They also arrested Dr. Sylvester Onzivua, the pathologist at Mulago Hospital, while he was en route to South Africa with samples to be further tested in order to determine Nebanda's cause of death.<sup>18</sup> To some MPs, the police action implicated the government, and some concluded that Nebanda had been deliberately killed for her outspoken attitude. Her death occurred one day after President Museveni said that MPs critical of the government were agents of foreign interests, whose actions would not be tolerated.<sup>19</sup>



Source: Uganda Picks, (<http://www.ugandapicks.com/2010/11/latest-map-of-uganda-with-all-the-new-districts.html>, accessed January 25, 2013)

### The MPs' Response

On December 18, parliament passed a resolution preventing Nebanda's burial until the cause of death was reliably determined.<sup>20</sup> Three MPs – Muhammad Nsereko (Kampala Central), Dr. Chris Baryomunsi (Kinkiizi East), and Theodore Ssekikubo (Lwemiyaga) – were subsequently arrested for criticizing the government over its actions surrounding Nebanda's death and signing a petition to recall parliament – which was in recess – for a special session to discuss the death of Nebanda.<sup>21</sup>

The detained MPs were eventually released, but their efforts were undaunted. The petition to recall was signed by 127 MPs, seemingly enough to direct the speaker of the house to recall parliament.<sup>22</sup> Some analysts speculated that Museveni not only feared being questioned on the Nebanda death, but that debate in parliament could veer into the issue of term limits, which had been removed in 2006. The restoration of presidential terms limits has been among some of the top demands of the rebel MPs.<sup>23</sup>

Museveni's threats to the petition-signers left little to the imagination. A resolution by the cabinet called for the expulsion of petition-signers who belonged to the NRM; Museveni said he would "sort out ... the 'bad boys.'"<sup>24</sup> After a ruling party retreat, 10 petition-signers requested their names be removed from the petition, effectively preventing the speaker of the house from recalling parliament.<sup>25</sup> In the latest development, Museveni threatened the petition-signers by saying that the army retained the option of taking over if "confusion" continues.<sup>26</sup>

### **NRM's Internal Weakening**

Multiparty politics in Uganda have not strengthened the ruling NRM. Some speculate that Museveni's introduction of multiparty politics in 2006 was in exchange for parliament's support for lifting presidential term limits. On the other hand, it might have also been a way to control parliament. Before the political parties were allowed, Uganda's parliamentarians could run only as independents. Over time, the body became much harder to control, and Museveni might have felt that by bringing in the structure of political parties, he could more easily impose party discipline and rein in troublesome MPs.<sup>27</sup> Now, however, there are some in his own party openly questioning his administration and, most importantly, the removal of term limits.

In fact, while the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) has posed a formidable challenge to the NRM, the ruling party has simultaneously been fighting dissenters internally. The standoff over Ms. Nebanda's cause of death is the latest sign of internal tension. In 2011, a number of NRM parliamentarians joined others in questions over corruption and the use of Uganda's oil money.<sup>28</sup> Internal dissension poses a bigger threat to the NRM than does opposition from other political parties. Internal dissension signals an erosion of the party's base and weak commitment to its basic principles. In short, the presence of the rebel MPs in the NRM is a direct threat to the party's survival.

Ironically, these developments within the NRM come on the heels of new evidence that show the Ugandan people have faith in democracy and have high expectations of their representatives. These are signs of democracy's deepening roots among Ugandans.<sup>29</sup> In contrast, the Museveni government has chosen to punish those demanding more from their government by intimidation, harassment, and detention.

The divisions in the NRM mirror the transformations experienced by other revolutionary parties, as the examples of Mozambique's *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) and South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) will illustrate. RENAMO today is not the same party that fought the government in the 1980s and 1990s; many postwar adherents of RENAMO joined the party with priorities different from those of their colleagues who had been "in the bush."<sup>30</sup> The new members reflect the priorities of their districts, which might not necessarily coincide with the party's revolutionary rhetoric. A case in point: the recent announcement by RENAMO's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, that RENAMO would be deploying 800 former fighters to its traditional base area, ostensibly to plan to combat the government,<sup>31</sup> has not resulted in a return to hostilities.

South Africa's seemingly formidable ANC has also shown signs of splitting. It suffered a public rift in 2008 when some members formed the Congress of the People (COPE). The breakaway group posed little threat to the ANC, but it offered the possibility of an alternative party to others unhappy with the ANC. Perhaps the most prominent sign that the ANC has moved away from its roots is the massacre that occurred at the Marikana mines: Police were ordered by the government to fire upon striking miners, killing 34. It was a stark departure from the days when the ANC, aligned its interests with unions and workers. Cyril Ramaphosa, a former secretary general of the ANC labeled the miners "dastardly criminals."<sup>32</sup> As such, some saw the Marikana massacre as a sign of the ANC's growing elitism and disconnection from its base.<sup>33</sup>

The ANC, RENAMO, and now NRM examples show that as revolutionary parties are integrated into the formal political structure and open their membership to a broader swath of the population, they can become more heterogeneous. This diversity can make it more difficult to

act as a single body. While the parties become more democratic, they are also prone to splitting.

### **Conclusions**

Cerinah Nebanda's death, the friction it has caused within the NRM, and the standoff between parliament and the executive are symptoms of the NRM's weakening. They are also signs of Uganda's deepening democracy. Most worrisome in the latest standoff, however, is the willingness of Museveni to publicly state his opposition to dissent and his threat to deploy the army to achieve his goals.

There is no reason to believe that the rebel MPs will remain silent even after the Nebanda issue is resolved. There are a number of contentious issues that could split the NRM further. As Uganda begins to drill for oil in earnest, many questions about how the state spends its resources are sure to arise. Another potentially contentious issue could include Uganda's continued involvement in Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo. As Mathias Mpuuga (Masaka Municipality MP) stated: "Whether the parliament is recalled or not, we have sent a clear message to the president that we are an independent parliament that function (sic) outside his whims and that national issues are bigger than his ego."<sup>34</sup> The likelihood of continued vocal opposition to Museveni could bring a rise in strong-armed tactics by the government. For this reason, the near future is likely to be characterized by political instability, intimidation, and harassment. A formal split in the NRM should not be ruled out.

## Côte d'Ivoire: What to Watch in 2013

**Researcher:** Dr. Ashley Bybee

### Summary

- Given the chronic instability in West Africa, most recently exemplified by the conflict in Mali, stability in Côte d'Ivoire is more important than ever as that country strives to be a regional leader in peacekeeping operations and in warding off Islamic extremism.
- Despite impressive economic development (8.6 percent growth in 2012<sup>35</sup>) the country is nonetheless fragile and on the brink of major instability. A number of issues will continue to plague the nation:
  - A highly politicized military that is insubordinate to civilian rule.
  - Anger over the selective prosecution of war criminals, i.e., President Ouattara's reluctance to go after his own supporters with the fervor he applies to his opposition's adherents.
  - The future of the governing coalition and Ouattara's ability to overcome internal divisions and resolve contentious issues within that tenuous alliance.
  - Instability on the western border with Liberia due to attempts by supporters of former President Gbagbo to destabilize the region, an influx of refugees, and disputes between Ivorian and foreign farmers.
  - The postponement of upcoming municipal and regional elections.

### Background

Côte d'Ivoire is divided politically, ethnically, and religiously between the north and the south. Southern Côte d'Ivoire, which is predominantly Christian and ethnic Baoulé, is relatively more affluent than the north. The north comprises a traditionally pastoralist Muslim population. The current President, Alassane Ouattara (of the *Rassemblement des Républicains* party or the RDR), is a Muslim northerner and a child of poor immigrant workers from Mali and Burkina Faso. His primary opponent, former President Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian from the southwest, leads the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and enjoys significant support in the south, despite the current case against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The root causes of the first civil war from 2002 to 2004 and the 2010-2011 political crisis both stem from these cleavages. Gbagbo's election in 2000 split the country between a rebel-held north and the government-held south. The 2010-2011 crisis was the result of Gbagbo's refusal to relinquish power after having been defeated in the November 2010 election by Ouattara, who finally took office in May 2011. The end of 2010 saw a series of sporadic outbreaks of violence between militias loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara's supporters, primarily in Abidjan, where both sides had large numbers of supporters. Heavy fighting then broke out in western Côte d'Ivoire at the end of February 2011 when the military (supporting Ouattara) sought to close the border with Liberia, where Gbagbo was reported to have recruited numerous fighters. Ultimately the violence lasted four months, claimed at least 3,000 lives, and displaced 1 million people.<sup>36</sup>

Gbagbo was eventually arrested in April 2011 and in November 2011 was extradited to the ICC, where he currently faces four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution, and "other inhuman acts." He is the first head of state to be

taken into the country's custody. His trial has been postponed indefinitely due to concerns over his health.

### **Important Issues for 2013**

Given the recent scourge of political instability, the following issues will be important determinants of Côte d'Ivoire's ability to recover and achieve political reconciliation in 2013.

#### ***Reining in and Controlling a Powerful and Politicized Military***

Although Côte d'Ivoire is currently experiencing a period of relative peace, the military continues to be a major source of instability. Côte d'Ivoire's army has a long history of insubordination to civilian rule and is highly politicized. Today, the *Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI), the national army, is largely loyal to Ouattara, a northerner, who enlisted the help of Gbagbo defectors to launch the offensive that ousted Gbagbo following the contested 2010 presidential elections. He also incorporated former members of the *Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire* (a rebel group that controlled northern Côte d'Ivoire from 2002 to 2010) into the FRCI. The police and gendarmes, on the other hand, are largely loyal to Gbagbo, and tensions run high between these factions. Ouattara has very limited influence with the police and gendarmes, who wield a great deal of power and prestige in the country.

To date, very little progress has been made toward controlling this significant source of instability. Rather than addressing the issues of insubordination and unprofessionalism within the armed forces, Ouattara has taken advantage of a situation where he currently enjoys a high level of support among the rank and file. He ensures soldiers are paid, thus guaranteeing their continued loyalty in the short-term. Although he has successfully co-opted the military for the time being, in doing so he has perpetuated a deeply rooted problem – the politicization of the military.

#### ***Fair Prosecution of War Criminals***

A major issue that is likely to incite some instability in 2013 is the perception of "victor's justice," which could undermine the fair prosecution of war criminals and other efforts to deliver justice to guilty parties. Specifically, Ouattara has received much praise from the international community for prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes committed during the post-election crisis. A large segment of the population, however, namely Gbagbo supporters, claim that he is playing favorites with the distribution of justice, failing to prosecute those of his own supporters who are equally guilty.<sup>37</sup> For example, although an incident in which soldiers loyal to Ouattara killed approximately a thousand civilians in the western town of Duekoue has been well-documented,<sup>38</sup> there has been no effort to bring these soldiers to justice for blatant human rights abuses, angering a significant number of Gbagbo supporters. Similarly, many farmers who have endured violence from all along the political spectrum thought they had a friend in the Ouattara government. Yet thus far, Ouattara has prosecuted only the pro-Gbagbo troops who committed violence against these farmers, ignoring many of his own supporters who are also purportedly guilty.<sup>39</sup>

Ensuring peace and reconciliation for all Ivorians will be extremely difficult as long as a significant portion of the population feels Ouattara is operating with impunity. Such a one-sided justice system will inevitably sow seeds of discontent that will blossom later.

#### ***Future of the Ruling Coalition***

Outtara's decision to dissolve his cabinet in November 2012 revealed major divisions within his tenuous governing coalition (called the *Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie*

*et la Paix*, or RHDP) and an urgent need for political reconciliation. Ouattara appointed some controversial figures, particularly from the *Parti Democratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), to the cabinet in 2011 as a gesture to the opposition, which clearly had a strong following in the country. Specifically, he appointed a PDCI member as Prime Minister as a reward for the party's support in the November 2010 election. Now, Ouattara's power rests precariously on these political alliances. Inter-party disagreement over the proposed amendment to the country's marriage law was probably only a pretext for the recent dissolution of the cabinet. In fact, deeper political grievances and personal loyalties might have been at play. The subsequent exclusion of the Movement of Future Forces (MFA) party from the RHDP coalition has fueled concerns over the future of the coalition.<sup>40</sup>

The effectiveness with which Ouattara will be able to govern will depend greatly on his ability to cooperate with all the parties of this coalition, without definitively burning bridges.

### ***Instability on the Western Border with Liberia***

For a number of reasons, Côte d'Ivoire's western border with Liberia is the site of significant instability. Historically, the western region has long been home to the country's cocoa and coffee plantations (Côte d'Ivoire's main agricultural crops). Recognizing the opportunity, many generations of foreign farmers, especially Burkinabes, have immigrated to Côte d'Ivoire, creating much resentment among indigenous Ivorians and raising major ethnic tensions in the region.<sup>41</sup> Although many of these foreign farmers were born in Côte d'Ivoire and lived their whole lives there, they – as descendants of immigrants – are not eligible for citizenship. These tensions periodically result in violence, such as a recent incident in the village of Koro (located 30 kilometers from Touba) where the indigenous population attempted to expel foreigners from their forests.<sup>42</sup>

In recent years, the border area with Liberia has been the site of considerable political violence perpetuated by pro-Gbagbo supporters seeking to destabilize the Ouattara regime and reinstate Gbagbo as President. Geography is an important facet of this complex issue, in that the vast majority of Gbagbo's supporters hail from the southern and western regions of Côte d'Ivoire, whereas many of Ouattara's followers reside in the north. This regional divide has allowed pro-Gbagbo forces a safe operating base from which to launch and sustain an offensive against government forces, even establishing rebel training camps there.<sup>43</sup> Human Rights Watch has reported cross-border raids and recruitment of child soldiers, identifying the culprits as Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militiamen who fought for Gbagbo, including former fighters in Gbagbo's youth militia.<sup>44</sup>

The third aspect complicating this situation is the return of refugees who fled the political violence in 2010 and 2011. These are mainly Gbagbo supporters who left when Ouattara took power but also include innocent victims of political violence. Estimates are that 100,000 fled to Liberia. Today, these refugees are starting to return home. Many have complained that, upon their return, they have found their farms and homes occupied by people who decided to stay amid the violence, creating further tensions in the region.

Ultimately instability in the west resulting from political tensions, an influx of refugees, and the existence of a historical regional divide will be important determinants of the country's stability. From Ouattara's perspective, he needs to provide security to a region in which a large portion of the population does not trust his motives. These political tensions will remain high as Gbagbo's trial plays out over the next several years. Gbagbo did, after all, win 45 percent of the vote in the

runoff election and continues to enjoy a high level of support, ensuring that tensions will persist for the foreseeable future.

#### ***Upcoming Municipal and Regional Elections***

Municipal and regional elections are currently scheduled for February 24, 2013. There have been, however, some calls by opposition parties to postpone the elections. In December 2012, the opposition issued a statement declaring the Independent Electoral Commission (established following the electoral crisis to organize elections amid the violence) “null and void” given the cessation of conflict.<sup>45</sup> The FPI, Gbagbo’s party, specifically announced its refusal to participate in elections until a number of conditions are met, such as restoring public order by confining the army to its barracks, ensuring elections are monitored by the police and gendarmerie, and making progress toward the release of Gbagbo.<sup>46</sup> Since none of these conditions are likely to be met, the FPI’s subsequent actions will be important to monitor.



## **Burundi: Signs of Domestic Discontent**

**Researchers:** Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard and Ms. Ivana Djak

### **Summary**

- After a 12-year-long civil war, a fragile peace was crafted between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi government in Burundi. Several key issues related to the peace agreement remain to be resolved – for example, the reintegration of former rebels and the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. Both issues have the potential to destabilize the country.
- Corruption, repression, and political assassinations remain pressing issues for Burundi. The recent sentencing of a journalist for anti-state activities led to protests and a public outcry by elements of civil society.
- Efforts by Tanzania to repatriate all remaining Burundian refugees have led to a refugee returnee influx to densely populated southern Burundi.
- The returnee influx is adding pressure to an already tense land shortage crisis stemming from competing claims made by various generations of refugees who fled the 1972 Burundian ethnic violence and the 1993-2005 civil war.

### **Repression and Corruption**

Burundi experienced a protracted civil war from 1993 to 2005 in which Hutu rebels fought against a Tutsi-led government. Despite an internationally brokered peace agreement in 2005, tensions remain, and several key components of the peace agreement have yet to be implemented: namely, the repatriation of former rebels and the impaneling of a truth and reconciliation commission. In addition to these sustained points of contention, the government of President Pierre Nkurunziza has increased repression through persecution of journalists and political assassinations, especially in the aftermath of the disputed 2010 elections in which the opposition refused to participate.<sup>47</sup> One of the main rebel groups participating in the civil war, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), has been transformed into a political party, but it seems to be in the process of disintegrating. Its disputed leader Agathon Rwasa, who fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2010, has sporadically emerged to challenge the legitimacy of the Nkurunziza government. Other splinter factions of the FNL have recently called for a resumption of war against the government.<sup>48</sup>

In January 2013, a group of 50 journalists marched in the Burundian capital city of Bujumbura in protest over the final sentencing of journalist Hassan Ruvakuki, who had been charged with working with a criminal group.<sup>49</sup> Initially sentenced to life imprisonment for reporting on a newly formed rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Democracy-Abanyagiugu (FRD), in November 2011, Ruvakuki's sentence was reduced to three years by an appellate court. The government has alternately denied the existence of the aforementioned rebel group and accused Ruvakuki of consorting with terrorists by interviewing purported FRD leader Pierre Claver Kabirigi. The FRD was formed in 2011 in protest against scores of extrajudicial detentions and killings allegedly perpetrated by the government of President Nkurunziza. At the time of the group's creation, Nkurunziza's government had been engaging in an intelligence operation known as Safish (Swahili for "clean") that is believed to have been responsible for at least 300 opposition deaths.<sup>50</sup> A recent report detailing human rights abuses has also noted an increase in extrajudicial killings in 2011 and 2012.<sup>51</sup>

In January 2013, the government of Burundi announced plans to allow former rebels and civil war participants to return to the country in anticipation of elections scheduled for 2015.<sup>52</sup> Most rebels have up to now refused to return, fearing government repression and a disingenuous commitment to integration. The truth and reconciliation commission that was to be established as part of the peace process has also yet to be formed.<sup>53</sup> In addition to lingering issues associated with the reintegration of former combatants and the transition from civil war, Burundi remains one of the world's most corrupt nations.<sup>54</sup>

### **Refugee Repatriation**

Further complicating the situation, a continued refugee crisis and ongoing land disputes are threatening to destabilize the country. The December 2012 closure of the Mtabila refugee camp in Tanzania led to the repatriation of more than 35,000 refugees to Burundi. Mtabila is the ninth refugee camp in Tanzania to close in an attempt to push out the remaining Burundian refugees.<sup>55</sup> Recent repatriation efforts from Tanzania are part of an agreement between the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), Burundi, and Tanzania, which included the naturalization of 160,000 Burundians in Tanzania, but also called for the deportation of the rest. Over the past ten years, UNHCR has helped to resettle more than 500,000 Burundian refugees<sup>56</sup> who fled the country after the 1972 ethnic massacres carried out against the Hutu elites by the Burundian army, and after the civil war that broke out in 1993 following the assassination of President Ndadaye. The civil war lasted until 2005. In 2000, the peak year of refugee outflow, the UNHCR estimated the number of refugees at 570,000.<sup>57</sup> About 80 percent of all Burundians were displaced at least once between 1993 and 2002.<sup>58</sup> Many of these returnees were born in exile, and have never been to Burundi.<sup>59</sup>

Most of the people forced to leave Tanzania complained that they have nowhere to return to because their former land is now occupied by others. Many of the families that returned in the past few years are still living in temporary shelters that were originally supposed to house refugees during the transition. Some families have been assigned new parcels of land, but those parcels are too small for subsistence farming.<sup>60</sup> The returnees emphasize that they have no means of survival other than farming. One returnee from Mtabila explained to media that in the refugee camp he had developed a business and was able to support his family, but now his family is still in a transit center, and he does not know how he will feed them.<sup>61</sup>

Returnees also worry about going back to Burundi because of continued political tensions, repression, and corruption. Many see the rise in political killings and oppression of the opposition as simply a continuation of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Hutu President Pierre Nkurunziza's questionable election in 2005, his failed attempts at reintegrating rebel groups into the national forces, the continued work of rebel groups such as the FNL, and the subsequent political assassinations of those associated with the FNL lead refugees to believe the conflict is still ongoing.<sup>62</sup> The areas of Burundi that are most pressured because of the returnees are Bururi and Makamba provinces in the southern part of the country.<sup>63</sup>

### **Exacerbating Land Disputes**

The influx of returnees adds pressure to an already serious land shortage problem in Burundi. According to the United States Institute of Peace, Burundi is the second most densely populated country in Africa and one of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>64</sup> On average, population density is around 260 people per square kilometer and is double that in urban areas.<sup>65</sup> Because the economy of the country is so underdeveloped, 90 percent of the population depends on subsistence agriculture for its survival, yet there is insufficient land. The average family has to feed itself with only a bit more than one acre of land.<sup>66</sup> According to the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), land access issues are among the leading causes of conflict in Burundi. In the past few years, as many as 80 percent of the court cases in Burundi involved land disputes. Many localized outbreaks of violence were also related to land disputes. Because of backlogs in courts, many Burundians resort to firearms to settle land disputes on their own.<sup>67</sup>

Some land disputes can be traced to colonial legacies, but recent land conflict goes back to the 1972 when government forces killed hundreds of thousands of Burundians, forcing an equal number to flee. The abandoned land was redistributed by local officials and settled by people who left their own less-fertile plots elsewhere.<sup>68</sup> Many of the people who fled in 1972 returned in 1993 to participate in the election of a new government or to reclaim their land, only to be embroiled in new conflicts with those who had settled on their homesteads. Those land disputes in turn helped trigger the subsequent decade-long civil war. That war, in turn, produced a second large wave of refugees and IDPs.<sup>69</sup>

The National Commission on Land and Other Property (*Commission nationale de terre et autre biens* (CNTB)) was set up to resolve land disputes that local officials are unable to settle. The CNTB generally settles these disputes by splitting disputed properties between returnees and residents, thereby creating plots that are too small to generate enough food to feed either household. The CNTB is also often overruled when residents challenge its findings in court. It currently has about 10,000 unresolved land disputes.<sup>70</sup> Multiple generations of returnees at times also mean multiple claims on a single piece of land.<sup>71</sup> The land claims of the 1972 refugees and their descendants are especially complicated because land titles are often missing, and people who have been on the land for 35 years or more also legally have a claim on it.<sup>72</sup> Land disputes also have an ethnic dimension. A representative of the Association of Media of Central Africa (*Organisation des médias d'Afrique centrale*, OMAC) asserts that most internally displaced Tutsis who lost their homes after the 1993 crisis were able to recover their belongings because "they received preferential treatment from ... authorities."<sup>73</sup> An International Crisis Group report argues that during the 1972 crisis, land was often occupied by distant relatives or simply looted; in 1993, Tutsis often appropriated the belongings of exiled Hutus, and did so with the approval of authorities.<sup>74</sup>

The Ministry of Land Management has a difficult time finding land to settle those returnees whose properties have been occupied by others. When the Ministry does find land, it is often in areas without water, health centers, schools, or other infrastructure nearby.<sup>75</sup> Thousands of returnees are housed in peace villages, or Rural Integrated Villages (VRI), created by the Ministry of Land Management and the CNBT. There are nine such villages across the south of the country, but poverty there is a particular concern. These villages could become easy targets for traffickers.<sup>76</sup> Many families waiting for land dispute resolutions squat in public buildings such as schools and municipal offices, and in town squares.<sup>77</sup>

Land disputes are particularly volatile because of corruption and ethnic tensions. Many refugees had their land and property confiscated and illegally expropriated for private concessions by corrupt officials.<sup>78</sup> According to Serapion Bambonanire, President of the CNTB, land grabbing was widely practiced by war profiteers.<sup>79</sup> This history of corruption leads many returnees today to believe that officials involved in dispute resolution are corrupt and favor current residents.<sup>80</sup>

During a conference on the crisis in the DRC at the Great Lakes Policy Forum in Washington, DC on January 24, a speaker from Goma emphasized that land disputes are a persistent and underlying source of conflict in the DRC and the region at large, but noted that western media and NGOs consistently overlook this issue. Long-term stability and the prevention of another

civil war in Burundi depend on the government's ability to reintegrate repatriated populations and to solve land disputes

## ALERTS

### Sasolburg Protests Leave Four Dead in South Africa

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

Beginning on January 20, 2013, three days of violent protests left four dead and 256 arrested in Sasolburg, South Africa.<sup>81</sup> Thousands of residents reportedly joined the protests in Sasolburg, located 50 miles south of Johannesburg, demonstrating against a proposed merger between the Metsimaholo and Ngwathe municipalities (see map below).

Protesters, who primarily hail from Zamdela, an informal settlement in Metsimaholo, are against the merger because they claim neighboring Ngwathe is poorly governed and corrupt.<sup>82</sup> According to protester and Zamdela resident Sam Mthembu, “the Ngwathe municipality has run itself into the ground and we as residents of Metsimaholo do not want to be associated with those thieves.”<sup>83</sup>



Source: Mail and Guardian<sup>84</sup>

Protests quickly turned violent, with reports of widespread looting, burned vehicles, and an attempt to set the Zamdela police station on fire. Protesters reportedly also threatened journalists covering the unrest. Police fired rubber bullets and used teargas and water cannons to disperse protesters.<sup>85</sup> The Democratic Alliance opposition party also charged that police used live ammunition to break up the demonstrations.<sup>86</sup>

It is unclear to what extent criminal elements and opportunists were responsible for the looting and violence associated with the protests. The Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs

Minister, Richard Baloyi, argued that “clearly there are elements of criminality to the Zamdela protests.”<sup>87</sup> The ruling African National Congress condemned the violence, with spokesperson Jackson Mthembu stating: “Our utmost concern is the level of criminal activity taking place, including looting of shops...This will not only affect business in the area, but will also affect innocent residents.”<sup>88</sup>

In the wake of the protests, Baloyi announced that the incorporation of the two municipalities was on hold until a task force examined the proposed merger in detail, a decision that is likely to ease tensions over the proposal in the near-term.

## Nigeria: Boko Haram Cease Fire?

**Researcher:** Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

Nigerian military authorities are expressing cautious optimism – with a heavy emphasis on cautious – following the January 28, 2013 announcement by Sheikh Abu Mohammed Abdulazeez Ibn Idris, commander of Boko Haram in North and Central Borno, that the group had “come to terms and agreed to lay down our arms” after peace talks with the government of Borno State in Maidugari. Citing the “untold suffering” of Muslim women and children and the desire to allow “peace to reign in Borno and the country at large,” the Boko Haram commander said he was “appealing and calling on all our members through this medium to lay down their arms henceforth, till further notice.” The offer is conditional, however, on the government’s agreement to the unconditional release of all Boko Haram members from custody and other compensation. According to Sheikh Abdulazeez, Sheikh Abubakar Shekau, the shadowy leader of Boko Haram, was consulted during deliberations and agrees to the terms of the ceasefire offer.<sup>89</sup>

The Arewa Consultative Forum and other leading Muslim organizations in the North called upon the Nigerian government to use the announcement as an opportunity to open negotiations with Boko Haram. Some local sources, however, question Sheikh Abdulazeez’s authority to make the ceasefire offer and doubt that Shekau (who is believed to be outside the country) was involved in any negotiations.

Chief of Defense Staff Admiral Ola Sa’ad Ibrahim has called for a 30-day guarantee of peace before the government will consider agreeing to terms: “Let us assume that we can have a long period of about one month where no bomb explodes, where nobody is shot, nobody is beheaded. Where no church is bombed and where no mosque is threatened, if they can guarantee one month, then we can begin to talk. So we must take this (ceasefire) with a lot of caution.”<sup>90</sup> The statement from Abdulazeez announcing the ceasefire included a built-in escape clause that could undermine the 30-day test by claiming that “we are very much aware of the fact that some criminals have infiltrated our movement and continued attacking and killing people using our names.”

Malam Shehu Sani, who participated in past negotiations with Boko Haram, urges the government to hold off any official response until Shekau weighs in. Past claims of ceasefires, Sani warns, have turned out to be cover for changing the method of violence. “So in order to avoid raining this kind of fake hope, I think we need to hear from the leader of the group.” Declarations by lieutenants can easily be ignored or disavowed by followers, “but if the declaration is made by the leader of the group, it cannot be denied by anyone later.”<sup>91</sup>

## Nigeria: Signs of Change Following Borno Ceasefire

**Researcher:** Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

Longstanding roadblocks and checkpoints have disappeared along key routes in and around Maiduguri over the weekend following the January 29, 2013 ceasefire announced by Sheikh Muhammed Abdulazeez Ibn Idris. The Borno State Elders Forum had asked the Joint Task Force (JTF) to relax some of the controls that had been most taxing on local populations, especially the six-month blockade of Ahmadu Bello Way, a key access road to Maiduguri's Monday market. One taxi driver told a Nigerian paper that "we can now freely move our cars, and our passengers are happy because they get home early."<sup>92</sup>

At the same time that the JTF was relaxing its presence in parts of Maiduguri (perhaps as a partial gesture of good faith), it launched "special operations" on two Boko Haram training camps in the Sambisa Game Reserve in Bama Local Government Area and the Farin-Ruwa Forest near Domboa Local Government Area, both in Borno State. The JTF spokesman said of both camps: "The camps were properly sighted (sic) and fortified and had training facilities; armoury, accommodation, drugs store/medical, kitchen, vehicle holding area, latrine and (river) water points." He went on to explain that "the camps were used to conduct training and carry out recent attacks, killings, and bombings in Maiduguri, Musari, Konduga, Biu, Bama, and Damboa communities. ... Efforts by the JTF troops to destroy the camps led to fierce exchange of fire that resulted in the death of 17 Boko Haram terrorists, and one JTF personnel was killed."<sup>93</sup>

Nigerian Vice President Namadi Samboduring made an official one-day visit to Maiduguri on February 2 to consult with local and Borno State officials on the best way to proceed in the peace process. "With the current efforts of the government and good people of Borno State to broker peace and to ensure peaceful co-existence, I assure you that the federal government is consulting on the best approach to the peace process. We are happy with this development, and we are glad that the ceasefire offer is coming at a time when all hands must be on deck to address safety and security challenges toward a peaceful and prosperous nation," the Vice President told local officials at Maiduguri's Government House. He then condoled with local citizens over their losses to terrorist attacks, military retaliations, and last year's floods in the region. Borno Governor Kashim Shettina expressed his optimism and commended the JTF and other federal forces in the region for taking quick steps to lower the tension in Maiduguri.<sup>94</sup>



## Nigeria: Boko Haram's Leader Abu Shekau

**Researcher:** Ms. Betty Boswell

### Overview

Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad Shekau, familiarly known as Abu Shekau, is the acknowledged leader of Boko Haram. He was second-in-command to former leader Muhammed Yusuf, who died while in Nigerian police custody in 2009, and assumed the leadership position upon Yusuf's death. Shekau has not been seen in public since Yusuf's death, but has led the militant group via his selected deputies and through video transmissions on YouTube. Not the charismatic leader that Yusuf was, Shekau has preached his particularly rigid interpretation of the Quran and radical ideals with a focus on Jihad. He has justified Boko Haram's violent activities by citing the Prophet, "...we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad in Nigeria and our cause is based on the traditions of the Holy Prophet."<sup>95</sup> Shekau was last reported to be located in the portion of Mali controlled by Islamist forces.

### Background

Here are some facts about Nigeria's most-wanted man (Shekau and 18 others have been declared "Wanted" by the government for crimes bordering on terrorism).<sup>96</sup>

- He was born in Shekau village, Yobe State, either 34 or 43 years ago; some reports claim, however, he is in his 50s.
- He has two wives, one of whom is the widow of Muhammad Yusuf. When Shekau married Yusuf's widow and adopted her children, some speculated that it was a move made to preserve Boko Haram's cohesion, or purity.<sup>97</sup>
- He was a radical theology student at the same time as both Muhammad Yusuf and Mamman Nur, another radical Islamist thought to be responsible for planning the bombing of the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011.

There are two schools of thought surrounding Shekau as Imam: either he is a well-versed theologian with an expertise in Tawheed, the orthodox doctrine of the uniqueness and oneness of Allah, or, according to several mainstream Muslim clerics, he is not a scholar and has a questionable understanding of Islam.<sup>98</sup> That discrepancy aside, what is obvious is that his rhetoric is vehement, zealous, and filled with contempt. He has overseen a few bloody years of violence and insurrection in his efforts to establish Nigeria as an Islamic state, and has taken Boko Haram in a new direction, aligned with al-Qaeda and the global Jihad.<sup>99</sup>

Under Shekau's leadership, Boko Haram has embraced an al-Qaeda-like brand of terrorism – transitioning from drive-by shootings to the use of car bombs and suicide bombers. His videos, reminiscent of those made by Osama bin Laden, have included inflammatory statements such as: "infidels, hypocrites, and apostates: Do not think Jihad is over. Rather Jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury!" (recorded in July 2010).<sup>100</sup> And to his fellow Nigerians he reacted to criticisms of violence with these words: "We are just fighting those who are fighting us, soldiers and police and the rest; and anybody, even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the government, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow, in God's name."<sup>101</sup>

Abu Shekau's goal of creating a Sharia state throughout Nigeria is no closer to being realized than when Yusuf was leading Boko Haram. So far there have been no significant events in the predominantly Christian South, and there have been reports of inter-ethnic rivalries within the

sect that have created rifts and break-away factions. Since November 2012, Shekau and 18 of his lieutenants have had ransoms placed on their heads, wanted for crimes that range from arson and destruction of property to killings, bombings, and assassinations.<sup>102</sup> The offer of ransom is one of many parts of Operation Restore Order that was initiated by the government to counter the terrorist acts that Boko Haram has wrought in northern Nigeria.

These efforts by the government might have been the impetus for Shekau to escape rather than be captured and suffer a similar fate as Yusuf. An alternate explanation is that he chose to join the 100 or so of his sect members who had left Nigeria for Mali's Gao region to reinforce the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) efforts in northern Mali. Shekau was seen recently in Gao, receiving treatment for a gunshot wound he received when escaping Nigeria. Reports indicate that during his escape he was in disguise but was recognized at a security checkpoint and was then engaged in an exchange of gunfire. He escaped successfully and crossed into Mali at one of the border crossings without further incident.<sup>103</sup>

What remains to be seen is whether, having found refuge in Mali to escape the Nigerian government's crackdown on his sect, Abu Shekau will continue to lead Boko Haram. Shekau's recent rhetoric is more strongly aligned with al Qaida's, and his group has joined forces with the militants in northern Mali and across the Sahel. These circumstances bring an opportunity for Shekau to continue the jihad with new recruits from like-minded Muslims from across the Sahel and Western Africa.<sup>104</sup> Another possible outcome was reported in late January when Sheik Mohammed Abdulazeez Ibn Idris, allegedly speaking as second in command of Boko Haram, and on behalf of his leader Abubakar Shekau, announced that Boko Haram is ready for peace talks with the government. Stating that "our brethren in Islam, both women and children, are suffering unnecessarily, hence we resolved that we should bring this crisis to an end." He called for a laying down of arms. The government is not likely to act on a declaration by anyone other than Shekau, and has not responded to this putative ceasefire offer.<sup>105</sup>

## Djibouti: Opposition Leader Returns in Advance of February Elections

**Researcher:** Ms. Brittany Gregerson

Djibouti's next legislative elections are set to take place on February 22, 2013 under a new set of rules approved in November 2012 that mandate the use of a mixed-list system for selecting parliamentarians. As many as 20 percent of the seats under the new system can be awarded proportionally; under the previous system, the winning coalition filled every seat.<sup>106</sup> Djiboutian opposition parties and diaspora voices have eagerly welcomed the changes, which they believe will allow them to break the ruling Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP) coalition's nearly four-decade-long stranglehold on power.<sup>107</sup>

To maximize their competitiveness, three of the chief opposition parties in Djibouti have formed a new coalition – the Holy Union for Change (USC) – to be led by prominent politician Daher Ahmed Farah, who returned to Djibouti in early January following a decade in exile in Belgium. The USC's three founding members – the Republican Alliance for Development, the Djibouti Party for Development, and the National Democratic Party – have cast a wide net, inviting “all other opposition parties and figures” to join them and so bolster their chances in February.<sup>108</sup>

Though Farah's specific role in the USC beyond that of spokesperson (his official title) remains unclear, Abdolkarim Mahamoud, a founder of the Djibouti Party for Development, has said that the group tapped Farah for his leadership skills and political savvy – that “Farah's arrival would enable the USC to take on the UMP coalition more effectively.”<sup>109</sup> Farah's involvement also seems to have bolstered opposition morale. One diaspora blogger reported Farah's return thus: “Daher Ahmed Farah *est de retour, et soulève dans la population une vague d'espoir*”<sup>110</sup> [Daher Ahmed Farah returns, and the population crests in a wave of hope].

### Farah's Background

- Farah was born in 1962 in Dikhil in Djibouti's southwest.<sup>111</sup>
- He won a scholarship for African students to attend *l'Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr à Coëtquidan* in 1984 and subsequently studied business and IT management in Reims and public administration in Limoges.<sup>112</sup>
- From 1983 to 1991 Farah served in Djibouti's army, and in 1991 and 1992, he worked at *La Nation*, an official government newspaper, as a freelancer.<sup>113</sup>
- In 1994, Farah founded the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) with Mohamed Djama Elabé and Souleiman Farah Lodon; in 1997, he became its president.<sup>114</sup>
- Through the late 1990s and early 2000s Farah and his newspaper, *Le Renouveau* (Revival), were frequent targets of stop orders and fines imposed by the Djiboutian government. *Le Renouveau* was one of the country's sole independent publications and had a reputation for controversial articles such as one from an April 2003 edition that landed Farah a stint in solitary confinement and fines exceeding 14 million Djibouti francs.<sup>115</sup> Throughout this time period, Farah was held by the regime on at least three other occasions for charges ranging from leading an illegal political party to defamation.<sup>116</sup>
- Before its dissolution by government decree in 2008, Farah's Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development party (MRD) was an opposition touchstone and stalwart critic of President Ismail Omar Guelleh and his regime.<sup>117</sup>

- The state of the MRD today after Farah's long period in exile is unclear, though some news reports imply it never entirely disappeared.<sup>118</sup>
- Farah's brother, Houssein Ahmed Farah, has followed a similar path and received similar treatment from the Guelleh regime. As recently as August 2012, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that Houssein had been arrested and held without charges or access to necessary medications in retaliation for his continued work for *La Voix de Djibouti*, a European news website focused on the country.<sup>119</sup>

## Guinea-Bissau: Recent Economic Developments Could Facilitate Drug Trade

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

Two recent economic developments in Guinea-Bissau are noteworthy and should be monitored closely.

In January 2013, it was reported that Guinea-Bissau's Center for the Formalization of Enterprises (CFE)<sup>120</sup> approved the establishment of 644 companies between May 2011 and December 2012.<sup>121</sup> The Portuguese News Network reported that 297 companies have Guinea-Bissauan investors, 187 have foreign investors, and 160 are a blend of the domestic and foreign investors.<sup>122</sup> Beyond this information, no additional details (e.g., location, company names) are available at this time. Given Guinea-Bissau's role as a narcotics trafficking hub, such companies could serve as money laundering vessels or warehouses for storage of drugs moving between South America and Europe.

Specifically, CFE is described as a "one-stop-shop" where customers can notarize a company statute; register the commercial registry; obtain a tax identification number; apply for work permits for foreign investors; receive commercial, industrial, and tourism licenses; and schedule local business inspections.<sup>123</sup> While the CFE has made it easier for legitimate companies to incorporate in Guinea-Bissau, it could also make it easier for criminals to establish front companies as a cover for their illicit operations.<sup>124</sup>

Also in January 2013, it was announced that a group of Chinese businessmen had partnered with the Bissau-based company Cuba Limitada to "purchase all peanut production in Guinea-Bissau."<sup>125</sup> The company's managing director, Botché Candé, said the intention is to revitalize the sector and resume peanut (groundnut) exports.<sup>126</sup> No additional details are available on the Chinese companies or businessmen involved in the venture, but Candé's involvement in the transaction is notable.

Candé is a prominent businessman who served as Minister of Trade in several regimes during the past decade, including that of Kumba Yala.<sup>127</sup> Formerly a member of the *Partido para a Renovação Social* (PRS), he was relieved of his post as Minister of Trade following the April 2012 coup led by General Antonio Indjai. This dismissal is an indication that he did not (at least, at that time) enjoy good relations with the military leadership.<sup>128</sup> He was also one of 58 persons placed under a travel ban due to his support of the former ruling party, *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo* (PAIGC).<sup>129</sup>

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IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

*George Ward*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Ghana's Oil and Gas (O/G) Sector: Recent Developments

**Researcher:** Dr. Ashley Bybee

#### Summary

- Crude oil exports have contributed greatly to Ghana's economy since production began in January 2010. The Ghanaian economy grew by over 14 percent in 2012. No major obstacles have been encountered by the consortium of international oil companies led by London-based Tullow Oil. Failure to reach the projected production levels of 120,000 barrels per day (BPD) was due to minor technical glitches in the wells, which have since been rectified.
- New discoveries are being made with increasing frequency, including the Wawa-1 exploration well, located in the Deepwater Tano Block offshore.<sup>1</sup> Such discoveries are expected to continue, elevating the status of Ghana as one of Africa's major oil exporters.
- There have been several notable developments in the O/G industry since an IDA team visited the region in March 2012. Most significantly:
  - The arrival of new players in Ghana's O/G sector, specifically the Italian oil giant Eni SpA.
  - The imminent initiation of Ghana's gas sector at the National Gas Processing Plant in Atuabo.
  - Compensation awarded to farmers who have been negatively affected by the construction of the gas pipeline.
  - The improved provision of training available to students seeking employment in the O/G sector amid obstacles to local private sector participation in the O/G industry.
  - Inconsistent growth in the non-oil sectors, possibly attributable to government focus on the O/G sectors.
  - The lack of public oversight for the O/G sector, specifically the government's failure to fund the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC).


#### Current Status of the Jubilee Field

As of January 1, 2012, Ghana's total proven oil reserves stood at 660 million barrels, according to the U.S. Government's Energy Information Administration. Most of these reserves are located in the offshore Jubilee field, where Tullow (the British oil company that owns a 49.95 percent in the Jubilee project) states there are 500 million barrels.<sup>2</sup> Production in the Jubilee field began in 2010 and is currently pumping around 110,000 BPD.<sup>3</sup> Tullow has stated that the field failed to reach its peak production level of 120,000 BPD due to technical problems with the wells.<sup>4</sup> As of January 2013, however, Ghana was already inching closer to the peak production level after two new wells became operational.<sup>5</sup>

## Recent Developments and Outlook for the Future

### *A New Entrant in Ghana's Oil Sector*

The Italian oil giant Eni SpA recently announced the discovery of around 450 million barrels at its Sankofa East offshore oil field, approximately 30 miles east of the Jubilee field. Eni believes approximately 150 million barrels are immediately recoverable. Based on previous Ghanaian discoveries, Eni estimates it will take 5 to 7 years to reach full production. Eni's plans for exploitation of the reserves are already underway. This is a relatively small discovery for Eni, which is already pumping around 500,000 BPD in sub-Saharan Africa and has rights for reserves totaling more than 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent.<sup>6</sup> Yet for Ghana, Eni's discovery of 150 million barrels is significant—increasing the national total of recoverable reserves by more than 20 percent. It also introduces a major new player to the mix in Ghana's national oil industry, which is currently dominated by Tullow.<sup>7</sup>



Source: offshoreenergytoday.com

### *New Gas Sector Coming Online Soon*

To date, Ghana has capitalized only on the extraction and export of crude from its offshore oil fields. It is expected to begin the production of natural gas later this year from the National Gas Processing Plant in Atuabo, approximately 67 miles west of Takoradi. The Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC) estimates that between 120 million and 140 million standard cubic feet per day of gas will be produced once peak production is attained. The GNGC has stated that about half the gas produced from the Jubilee field will be re-injected into the field to boost oil pressure and production. The other half is to be utilized as feedstock for the Aboadze Thermal Plant (power generation) and for a fertilizer processing plant. The fate of the latter is already in question, however, as insufficient gas might be available to satisfy the 100 million standard cubic feet per day requirement to fuel a fertilizer plant.<sup>8</sup> The intent is to eventually attain gas production levels sufficient for commercial export to other countries in the subregion through the West Africa Gas Pipeline, which traverses Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana.<sup>9</sup>

President Mahama recently noted that Sinopec, the Chinese energy company, is currently constructing the gas and fertilizer processing plants, using about \$1 billion of a loan from the Chinese Development Bank.<sup>10</sup> To facilitate Sinopec's activities in the region and out of respect for the traditional authorities, the GNGC provided funding for various rituals in Atuabo and around the Ellembelle District before beginning construction. For example, the GNPC provided money to local chiefs to purchase the necessary items for the pacification of the deity tree "Hohor" before it was cut down by the Chinese contractors executing the project. This was a condition that the chief priestess required before she would allow the tree to be cut.<sup>11</sup> Other examples of such gestures to traditional authorities in affected communities cannot be confirmed, but this particular instance demonstrates commendable prudence on the part of the GNGC.

#### *Compensation for Farmers Affected by Gas Pipeline Construction*

The GNGC has begun to compensate farmers whose crops had to be cleared to pave way for the gas pipeline infrastructure. Per the recommendations of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment report conducted by the Lands Commission, a total of 1,498 farmers in 57 communities in 8 districts in the Western Region planned to claim compensation totaling about GH 5.6 million (\$3 million).<sup>12</sup> The current status of these claims has not been reported in the media, but by all indications they are proceeding unencumbered by the usual government bureaucracy, corruption, or other impediments. Given complaints from local fishing communities that have been negatively affected by the oil sector's operations,<sup>13</sup> this gesture by the government is a positive step in preventing potential social unrest that may have erupted had it not recognized the toll the pipeline's construction would take on local communities.

#### *Opportunities for Ghanaians*

There has been considerable debate about Ghana's ability to avoid the "Resource Curse" and whether massive new revenues will contribute to the development of the country and its people, as many have claimed. To date, there is evidence to both support and refute this claim. When an IDA team visited the Western Region in March 2012, it heard first hand from locals who claimed the O/G sector had brought little benefit to their communities in terms of employment opportunities or technical training for aspiring petroleum workers. At that time, very few technical courses were offered, and admittance into those programs was generally reserved for children of the local elite. Today, it appears some progress has been made toward the provision of technical training for a select group of students. GNPC and Hess recently awarded scholarships to 71 students from the Western Region to study in high schools, vocational institutions, and nursing colleges.<sup>14</sup> Takoradi Polytechnic has also opened a \$6 million petrochemical lab to train local youths in the skills and competencies required by international oil companies such as Tullow.<sup>15</sup> In addition, President Mahama has stated that he wants the O/G sector to provide alternate employment opportunities for small-scale illegal miners (galamsey), who, he said, were degrading the environment.<sup>16</sup>

With regard to Local Content (LC) (i.e., actions such as recruitment, training, and purchases of goods and services that are designed to develop the industrial infrastructure and skills of local Ghanaians) little progress has been made. Though government targets of 90 percent LC are commendable (generally measured as a percentage of investment, hours worked, equipment manufactured, or number of jobs created) most analysts agree they are overly ambitious and unrealistic.<sup>17</sup> A representative from the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (the prominent local non-governmental organization (NGO) monitoring Ghana's O/G industry) recently highlighted several obstacles to achieving this level of LC. These include the government's

requirement for local companies to have between \$1 and \$5 million in assets, which, in addition to high registration fees, discourages local participation in the industry.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Mixed Signals from the Non-Oil Sector*

Growth in Ghana's non-oil sectors has fluctuated throughout 2012. Data from Ghana's Statistical Service (GSS) indicate relatively weak growth in the second quarter of 2012 (Q212). The numbers suggest that the economy grew by just 2.5 percent, with agriculture contracting by 0.1 percent, industry growing by 4.5 percent, and services rising by 1.6 percent.<sup>19</sup> In Q312, the GSS reported that the services sector, which provides the largest chunk of GDP, shrank by 2.2 percent.<sup>20</sup> Industry, which includes output from manufacturers, grew by 3.6 percent in Q312, down from 14.7 percent and 4.5 percent in Q112 and Q212, respectively.<sup>21</sup> Agriculture did relatively better in Q312, recovering 4.6 percent following the 0.1 percent contraction in Q212. But only crop production contributed to the recovery, with the livestock, forestry, and fishing sectors all contracting.

Ghana's cocoa sector, the country's largest employer, remains strong, contributing approximately 35 percent of GDP.<sup>22</sup> But there is already speculation that revenues from the oil sector could eventually weaken the Ghanaian cedi, potentially decreasing the value of cocoa.<sup>23</sup> This is not currently a concern as the global supply of cocoa is down, but it is something for economists to monitor as supply increases.

The extent to which uneven growth in the non-oil sector is attributable to "Dutch Disease" (where the oil sector negatively affects the rest of the economy by fostering a strong, uncompetitive exchange rate) is unclear. Nevertheless, the government has already come under considerable scrutiny for supposedly neglecting the non-oil sector in favor of the more lucrative O/G sector. Critics point to skyrocketing imports since oil production began in 2010 as clear evidence of the dreaded Resource Curse.<sup>24</sup>

Government sources view the forthcoming surge in oil production as signaling a healthier economy in 2013, with analysts forecasting GDP growth to be between 8 and 9 percent.<sup>25</sup> The health of the non-oil sector, however, is what analysts ought to be monitoring very carefully.

#### *Lack of Oversight for the Oil Sector*

The Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) was established in 2011 under Section 51 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) to: (a) monitor and evaluate compliance with the Act by the Government and other relevant institutions in the management and use of petroleum revenues; (b) provide a platform for public debate on spending prospects of petroleum revenues in line with development priorities; and (c) provide an independent assessment on the management and use of revenues. Unfortunately, the PIAC has not yet received any government funding for its facilities, staff, or daily operations and is entirely dependent on funding from NGOs. As a result, its activities have been delayed. The PIAC's first report, which was not released until May 2012, identified several concerning developments. First, the report found that the government had violated the PRMA when the Ministry of Energy made payments from oil revenues into an account different from the one established by law.<sup>26</sup> The GNGC was also identified by the PIAC as being unable to account for GH 20 million, a claim the GNGC denies and which did not appear to generate much controversy in Ghana.<sup>27</sup> These findings validate the need for a PIAC, though political will for such an institution is clearly in question—a concerning trend for a country that has vowed to avoid the corruption that is so commonly associated with a large oil industry.

## **Tanzania's Gas Pipeline: Mtwara's Warning**

**Researcher:** Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

### **Summary**

- Since December 2012, there have been three protests in the Mtwara region of Tanzania against the construction of a pipeline meant to transport natural gas to Dar es Salaam. In the last protest, on January 25–26, 2013, seven people were killed in clashes with police.
- The government of Tanzania lays the blame on the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) for inciting opposition to the gas pipeline and organizing the protests. While the CUF has publically supported the protestors, seven other political parties have been critical of the government's plans.
- Opponents of the pipeline feel that the revenues will only go to benefit the residents of Dar es Salaam, without any improvements in Mtwara's socioeconomic situation. The government has promised to establish a Sovereign Wealth Fund to ensure that the country as a whole benefits from the natural gas, but this has yet to occur.
- The protests in Mtwara are likely to continue. Moreover, a weak legal framework for natural resource management and Zanzibar's recent agreement with mainland Tanzania to manage the oil fields in its perimeter sets the stage for increasing contestation between communities and the national government, as communities try to ensure direct benefits from natural resources.

### **Mtwara's Natural Gas Fields**

Gas was discovered in Mnazi Bay, eastern Tanzania, in 1982, but the Mtwara–Dar es Salaam gas pipeline, operated by Canadian-owned Wentworth Resources<sup>28</sup> and spanning 532 kilometers, did not begin construction until July 2012. It is expected to be completed in July or September 2013.<sup>29</sup> While the benefits of lower gas prices—as much as a 200 percent reduction—for Tanzanians have been promoted by the government,<sup>30</sup> the residents of Mtwara see the gas fields differently. To Mtwara residents, the pipeline will only benefit the residents of Dar es Salaam; they believe that Mtwara will remain just as poor and underdeveloped as it is today. Opponents of the pipeline want its construction stopped and demand that the revenues from the natural gas field remain in Mtwara.

Since the government inaugurated the gas pipeline in July 2012, a sizable and vocal opposition has developed. Protests have taken place in the Mtwara Urban and Masasi districts of the Mtwara region. On December 27, the first of three protests, drawing tens of thousands into the streets of Mtwara Urban, took place. At the second protest on January 19 in Mtwara Urban, thousands accompanied the delivery of a petition, signed by 30,000 residents of Mtwara, demanding the cessation of the pipeline's construction.<sup>31</sup> The third protest, January 25–26 in Masasi, resulted in seven deaths and 53 people arrested, as demonstrators clashed with police.<sup>32</sup>





Source: The University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin,  
[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/tanzania\\_pol\\_2003.pdf](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/tanzania_pol_2003.pdf)

While the protestors may be calling for a halt to construction of the pipeline, they may also be looking to Zanzibar as a model. Using a similar argument, Zanzibari authorities negotiated an agreement in October 2012 with the government of Tanzania to manage the oil found in Zanzibar. The standoff between Zanzibar and the mainland had delayed exploration since Royal Dutch Shell was allocated four blocks in 2002.<sup>33</sup> Some have hinted that the purpose of the Mtwara protests may be to obtain a similar arrangement.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, in Tanzania's weak legal framework governing natural resource management,<sup>35</sup> Zanzibar's agreements reduces uncertainty of whether local communities will benefit from natural resources. The irony of Nigeria's Niger Delta—which produces the country's oil, yet is the poorest region—is widely known and feared.

A Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) can assuage fears that revenue from natural resources will be wasted or misappropriated. While the government has discussed the creation of an SWF, it is not yet in place. Even so, SWFs exist at the will of the political climate. The government of Chad

famously scrapped the Future Generations Fund intended to set aside 10 percent of the profits from the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline for investments toward future Chadians. It also included security in the priority sectors, which had comprised education and social development, when it was threatened with an insurgency, to enable it to spend more money on the military. The support in parliament for the amendment was strong: 119 MPs voted in support, while 13 voted against it.<sup>36</sup> Public surveys indicate that Tanzanians do not rate the government's performance on a whole range of issues very highly—including improving living standards, provision of social services, and infrastructure development.<sup>37</sup> Developing a credible SWG will likely face many challenges.

### **Political Dynamics of Mtwara: Is the Civic United Front behind the Protests?**

In the meantime, rather than address the concerns of the Mtwara residents, the government blames its foremost political opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF)—even though seven other opposition parties have supported the protests.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the government claims that its investigations indicate that the protestors were not from the region, but rather had been hired.<sup>39</sup> To be sure, the CUF has been the most visible political party, spearheading the collection of 30,000 signatures in protest of the project. But they deny instigating the residents of Mtwara, insisting that the government brought on the discord by its empty promises to the residents.<sup>40</sup>

In light of the successful agreement between Zanzibar, a CUF stronghold, and mainland Tanzania, however, the involvement of CUF is likely purposeful as well. CUF may be strategizing for ways to expand its base, as it has been recently challenged in Zanzibar by a new party. A by-election held in April 2012 to replace a parliamentary vacancy in Uzini district in Zanzibar placed CUF in third place. Second place went to a relatively new party, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA); it won 281 votes, while CUF received 222 votes.<sup>41</sup> The Mtwara constituency might be viewed as a fertile ground for the CUF: it was one of six constituencies on the mainland where CUF contested the 2010 parliamentary results.<sup>42</sup> In Mtwara Urban district (one of six in the Mtwara region), the reelection of Hasnain Mohamed Murji of the ruling Chama Cha Mapunduzi (CCM) to parliament in 2010 was unsuccessfully challenged by CUF's Uledi Hassani Abdalla. Abdalla protested that the election results were fraudulent, citing that in addition to the delay in learning of the results, he and CUF agents were not involved in the counting, tabulation, and announcement of votes.<sup>43</sup> Abdalla received 10,564 votes, while Murji received 17,004.<sup>44</sup> The High Court and the Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed the case for lack of proof, officially pronouncing Murji as the Mtwara Urban MP.<sup>45</sup> But in an interesting twist, MP Murji seems to be supporting the protestors, inviting the wrath of the leadership in CCM; he is being investigated by the party.<sup>46</sup>

### **Looking Ahead**

Protests are likely to continue in Mtwara and may spread to other natural resource sites. The government has not concretely addressed the protestors' concerns, though Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda and Home Affairs Minister Emmanuel Nchimbi visited the area for 3 days following the January 25–26 riots. The government has to provide a credible plan for how it will ensure that natural resources will be used for the benefit of all, including the communities from which they are sourced. Failing that, the Zanzibari model is the surest way for the region to avoid becoming like the Niger Delta. For such an agreement to materialize, gas pipeline opponents may calculate that continued protests are worth the risk. Moreover, the involvement and support of political parties and politicians only strengthens the pipeline opponents' positions.

## Angola: MPLA Dominates Civil-Military Relations

**Researchers:** Mr. Alexander Noyes and Dr. Janette Yarwood

### Summary

- Despite the potential for discontent from some within the rank and file of Angola's security sector, President José Eduardo dos Santos and the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) have a firm grip on the civil-military relationship in Angola.
- Dos Santos wields informal power over the military and security officials through extensive patronage networks funded by the state oil company, Sonangol, and by granting security leaders access to political power through positions in the state bureaucracy.
- Although the MPLA and dos Santos dominate the security sphere, unrest within the regime could arise from the lower ranks of the underfunded police and aggrieved war veterans, particularly if they formed alliances with other currently diffuse and ad hoc groups that have voiced disaffection with the regime, such as youth, democracy activists, and civil servants.

### The MPLA and Dos Santos's Informal Power Structure


Angola's military is one of the strongest in Africa, with over 105,000 troops supplemented by 10,000 paramilitaries and 10,000 more Rapid Reaction Police, known as the Ninjas.<sup>47</sup> Dos Santos, in power for over three decades, presides over a resilient informal political structure and patronage network that is used to coopt potential regime opponents and placate military and business leaders. These shadow institutions and expansive patron-client networks are funded through Sonangol (see figure below), which owns over 70 subsidiary businesses.<sup>48</sup>

Sonangol has been accused of endemic corruption and an acute lack of transparency, with an International Monetary Fund report finding \$32 billion unaccounted for in Angola's finances from 2007 to 2010, a portion of which was linked to Sonangol.<sup>49</sup> Although Sonangol provides the majority of funding for the spidery patronage networks used to keep the military in step with the regime, the security sector also has benefited from extensive involvement in Angola's diamond mining operations.<sup>50</sup>

A senior staff member at a leading civil society organization in Luanda told IDA researchers in February 2013 that security chiefs are simply not willing to stand up to dos Santos for fear of losing access to these networks, through which they accrue wealth and enjoy a lavish lifestyle.<sup>51</sup> As a result, and because there is no credible alternative to the MPLA, the interviewee contended that there are no real splits or factions within the military leadership jockeying to challenge dos Santos for political power. He claimed this is the case even though several senior military positions are held by former members of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),<sup>52</sup> the other major protagonist in Angola's three-decade-long civil war that ended in 2002. He maintained that the only real potential for revolt within the security sector comes from the rank and file of the police force, a body that holds a much lower position than the military in the MPLA hierarchy.<sup>53</sup>



## Angola's shadow state – 'All the president's men'



Source: Paula Cristina Roque, 2011, Institute for Security Studies.<sup>54</sup>

Whenever individuals in the security sector have appeared to be accruing too much influence, dos Santos has acted to sideline them. For example, General Ferando Miala, the former head of external intelligence, was sacked in 2006 and sentenced for an alleged coup attempt. Dos Santos has kept Miala close, however, pardoning him in 2009 and bringing him back into government.<sup>55</sup> Akin to Zimbabwe, security chiefs certainly have considerable political influence, but it appears that dos Santos and the MPLA are firmly in control of the civil-security relationship.

## **War Veteran Protests**

As highlighted in the July 18, 2012, issue of *The Africa Watch*, war veterans groups staged numerous protests in the lead-up to the August 2012 national elections,<sup>56</sup> threatening in July to block the polls if pensions promised to them went unpaid. “We are frustrated and tired of waiting...If the government does not act before the elections, we will prevent them from taking place,” stated Afonso Henriques Fula, a demobilized former combatant for the MPLA.<sup>57</sup> Veterans, reportedly numbering the thousands, staged two earlier protests in June, both of which were broken up by the police, who used tear gas, fired warning shots, and arrested 51 former combatants.<sup>58</sup>

Although war veterans did not disrupt the August elections, sporadic threats of protests have continued. According to a conflict mediation specialist based in Luanda, the war veterans issue is not a real threat to dos Santos and the MPLA because their grievances are purely monetary, as opposed to ideological, and they have limited military capacity due to old age.<sup>59</sup> If ex-combatants joined with other anti-regime groups, however, together they could pose a growing political challenge.<sup>60</sup>

## **Youth Group Ties with War Veterans**

Youth groups also stepped up protests against the government before the August elections. Since MPLA prevailed in the polls, youth collectives have remained relatively quiet, although smaller, low-level protests by civil service workers, including nurses and teachers demanding better pay and working conditions, have continued throughout the country. According to IDA interviews in Luanda, these protests indicate that various sectors among the population no longer fear the regime in the way they once did.<sup>61</sup>

An IDA group interview with 35 activists at the head of the growing youth movement revealed that youth and other pro-democracy activists have not lost momentum but rather have taken a moment to pause and reevaluate their strategy. According to these activists, one effort they have begun to consider is an explicit alliance with the disgruntled war veterans. One youth leader explained, “We always support the struggles of others in the country by informing each other of our protests, but we have come to understand that we have to grow our movement and find ways to get our bigger message out.”<sup>62</sup> In a first attempt at working together, the groups are allegedly planning a joint protest to call attention to the disappearance before the election of two veterans.<sup>63</sup>

The overall sentiment among the youth leaders interviewed is that a majority of the population is frustrated and angry at the regime and the current state of affairs. They claimed that their next step is to grow their movement by forging linkages with other opposition groups and finding ways to appeal to the broader population. When asked by an IDA researcher if their goal was to be organized by the next election, one youth leader stated, “We are always waiting for a moment...for something to happen that will make the people angry so that we can draw all of the people to the street.”<sup>64</sup>

## **Outlook**

Although the MPLA and dos Santos appear to dominate the civil-security relationship through informal economic networks, coercion, and co-option, pockets of discontent among lower ranks within the regime could lead to instability. For example, the underfunded police, who do not enjoy the same level of access to patronage networks as the military, have threatened limited strikes over pay and lack of adequate living conditions.<sup>65</sup> While war veteran grievances appear to be monetary as opposed to ideological, if low-level police officers and war veterans were to find

common ground with other embryonic and diffuse opposition groups that have voiced discontent with the regime—such as youth, pro-democracy activists, nurses, and teachers—the resulting alliance could pose a growing political threat to the MPLA in the medium term.

IDA interviews with youth group leaders suggest that despite some limited efforts to work together, serious coordination between these fledgling groups is unlikely in the near term, due to continued repression by the MPLA, infiltration by intelligence services, and insufficient levels of organization and cooperation among opposition groups.<sup>66</sup> One interviewee argued that real political change is unlikely in Angola until one of two developments occur: a severe decline in the international price of oil or the formation of a cohesive “third-way” political party to capture popular discontent with the ossified MPLA vs. UNITA political dichotomy.<sup>67</sup>

## Chadian Military Involvement in Mali

**Researcher:** Dr. Stephanie M Burchard

### Summary

- Many months after balking at the suggestion that Chad contribute troops to a military operation in Mali, President Idriss Déby Itno has now promised to contribute approximately 2,000 Chadian troops to the French-led operation in Mali. Chadian troops will make up the largest African contingent of the 7,700 troops proposed for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).
- Although they have experience fighting in desert terrain, Chadian military forces have in the past suffered from dissension and disarray within the ranks, resulting in several attempted coups against the government of Déby. Because President Déby has faced frequent challenges from within the military, he has restructured and reorganized Chad's forces several times. There is reason to believe that the Chadian military has been kept deliberately weak to preempt further challenges to Déby's rule.
- In addition, Chadian forces have been heavily criticized for human rights abuses, specifically in Central African Republic, and for the use of child soldiers.

### Chadian Involvement in Mali



Source: Financial Times

In July 2012, Chadian President Idriss Déby explicitly stated that he would not provide military support to efforts in Mali, especially if the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was involved. He went on to state that Chad would only consider its involvement if France and another international organization (i.e., the African Union or the United Nations) approved such action.<sup>68</sup> In mid-January 2013, it was announced that Chad would contribute approximately 2,000 troops to the French-led operation in northern Mali,<sup>69</sup> comprising approximately 25 percent of the 7,700 troops proposed for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).<sup>70</sup>

This about-face is most likely the result of the combination of international pressure and domestic support for such a deployment. France specifically enjoys a close military relationship with Chad. It has supported Chad during multiple threats to Déby's presidency, especially during

a coup attempt in 2008 in which it was alleged that France positioned snipers around the capital of N'Djamena and provided aerial intelligence to the Chadian government on rebel movements.<sup>71</sup> It has been rumored that the French sought Chad's assistance because they thought, given the religious issues underlying the conflict in Mali, that Chadian troops would be more easily accepted by northern Malians than troops from other countries, especially Mali itself.<sup>72</sup> An intelligence officer from Chad stated that because they are also Muslim it makes it easier for Chadian troops to fight in northern Mali.<sup>73</sup> It is expected that Chad will take the lead in AFISMA once French troops withdraw.<sup>74</sup>

For their part, many Chadians are reported as fearful that Islamist extremism will spread into their majority Muslim country.<sup>75</sup> There are reports that extremists in Chad have been cultivating close ties to Boko Haram in Nigeria with the objective of fomenting their own Islamic revolution.<sup>76</sup> In addition, it is believed that some members of Ansar Dine have relocated to Chad's neighbor to the east, Sudan.<sup>77</sup> Some analysts have noted that they would not be surprised if fleeing Islamists migrated to other weak states such as the Central African Republic (CAR)<sup>78</sup> or potentially to ungoverned spaces in northern Chad.

### **Chadian Armed Forces under Déby**

Déby is the head of Chad's military. He came to power in 1990 as the leader of a rebel army that deposed then-president Hissane Habré. Under Habré, Déby served as commander in chief of the Chadian army and chief military advisor.<sup>79</sup> He has since ruled Chad as a military dictator while allowing the pretense of elections. His family occupies many of the top positions in the military.<sup>80</sup> Déby's son, General Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, is commanding a Chadian contingent in the northern Mali city of Kidal.<sup>81</sup>

Chad has a long and storied history of military engagement with its neighbors the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan. The Chadian military participated in cross-border raids in CAR in 2008 and 2011<sup>82</sup> and assisted the government of President Francois Bozizé in dealing with rebels in 2012 and 2013.<sup>83</sup> For most of the 2000s, Chad fought a proxy war with Sudan. During the uprising in Libya, there were reports that elite soldiers from Déby's presidential guard were fighting alongside pro-Muammar Qaddafi troops in the early phases of the war, but once NATO and France became involved, Déby withdrew his support.<sup>84</sup>

Many have commented about how experienced the Chadian soldiers are at fighting in the desert terrain. It is true that the Chadian military has experience fighting Tuaregs hired as mercenaries by Libya; however, this took place in the 1980s in Chad, which does not share a border with Mali.<sup>85</sup> A spokesman for the Tuaregs stated that once the fighting moved into the Adrar Mountains, it would become more difficult for Chadian troops as they are not familiar with that terrain.<sup>86</sup>

### **Analysis**

During his tenure as president, Déby has encountered several threats to his leadership from the Chadian military. It is believed that members of the military attempted a coup in 2004.<sup>87</sup> In 2005, amid the threat of more unrest in the military, Déby dissolved his 5,000 strong presidential guard.<sup>88</sup> He reconstituted it as the General Directorate of Security Services and State Institutions (DGSSIE).<sup>89</sup> It has approximately 1,640 troops and is believed to be the best trained force in the Chadian military.<sup>90</sup> There are unconfirmed rumors that Déby was facing another rebellion and coup attempt as recently as July 2012.<sup>91</sup>

Although several sources in the media have referred to Chadian troops as well trained and well equipped,<sup>92</sup> there is evidence to dispute this assessment. From 2005 to 2007, Chadian troops

(most likely part of the DGSSIE) were accused of human rights abuses in northwestern CAR, including mass executions of civilians and indiscriminate burning of houses as part of a campaign to root out Chadian rebels.<sup>93</sup> In 2012, Chadian troops were again accused of human rights abuses in CAR.<sup>94</sup> In addition, the Chadian military is accused of using child soldiers, despite a ban in 2011.<sup>95</sup>

Because President Déby has faced frequent challenges from within the military he has restructured and reorganized military structures several times. He also promotes from within his own family and clan (the Zaghawa); promotions are not based on merit or service.<sup>96</sup> It stands to reason that the Chadian military may be kept deliberately weak to preempt challenges to Déby's rule. It remains to be seen how effective Chadian troops will be if they are tasked with a long-term operation in Mali.

## **Mali: Potential Impact of the French Intervention on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Engagement in Western Sahel**

**Researcher:** Dr. John Kringen

### **Summary**

- The French intervention in Mali is likely to stimulate several of the GCC countries—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—to increase their economic assistance to the countries of the Western Sahel, but wholesale changes in their aid profiles in the region are unlikely.
- The heightened public attention that the intervention gave to allegations of Qatari aid to Islamists in Mali's north is likely to impair Doha's efforts to play a role in the region.

### **France's Intervention and GCC-Country Interests**

France's intervention in Mali and in particular its efforts to garner GCC support for dislodging Islamic terrorists from the north of the country have focused attention on the policies of the GCC states toward the Western Sahel. Although the Western Sahel has not been at the top of the agendas of the GCC states, Mali and its neighbors have been among the smaller subset of sub-Saharan African countries in which several of them have been actively engaged. During 2005–2011, for example, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal were among the top African recipients of bilateral developmental assistance from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

While the enduring consequences of the French intervention remain unclear, the divergent reactions of the GCC states to it<sup>97</sup> raise questions about the prospects for their longer term engagement in the region. Qatar in many respects appears to have been “wrong footed” by the French intervention and the generally favorable African reaction it received; as a consequence, Doha may find it more difficult in the future to play a role in the Western Sahel. For Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, recent developments are increasing their attention to the region, but do not appear likely to precipitate significant changes in their engagement. The most uncertain scenario involves the UAE. France would clearly like the UAE to become a partner in its engagement in Mali, and the UAE has provided some military assistance, but the UAE's historically limited profile in the region will constrain its ability to engage locally in dealing with the fallout of the French intervention.

### **Qatar: The Potential Limitations of Doha's Business Model**

While Doha has expressed its concern about the French intervention, the more problematic development from Qatar's standpoint has been the stimulus that it has provided to the spread of long-standing allegations that Qatar has exploited its presence on the ground in Northern Mali to support radical Islamists. In the wake of the French incursion, allegations about Qatar's support have received worldwide attention. Originally attributed to an anonymous French intelligence source, this allegation was popularized in the wake of the French action by a researcher in Doha in an account titled “Here's What Qatar is Doing in Mali—and Why.”<sup>98</sup> The wave of international publicity prompted the Qatari Prime Minister to issue a denial that it was arming Islamist rebels in northern Mali. A subsequent Algerian press report that claimed that eyewitnesses in northern Mali had affirmed that medical and food supplies with Qatari markings were circulating in Islamist-controlled territory<sup>99</sup> suggests that this allegation will probably have long legs.

The merit of these allegations aside, their broad circulation in international and African media suggests that Doha may have more difficulty in gaining local support for a more expansive role in the region. In Sudan, Doha was able to leverage its humanitarian assistance, promises of additional aid, and its hosting of meetings with the conflict participants into a role as a mediator in the Darfur conflict. In the Western Sahel, Qatar Charity has been active in providing assistance to refugees in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger while the Red Crescent Society has been active not only in Mali, but also Niger. In late January the Qatari Prime Minister indicated that he had advised the President of Mali of Qatar’s willingness to play a mediating role there, but it is unlikely—given the allegations about Qatar’s assistance to Mali—that Doha will be regarded as an impartial player.

#### **Bahrain: Probably a “One-off” Contribution**

Bahrain was the only Persian Gulf country to make a pledge at the late January African Union (AU) donor conference to support the international military effort against the terrorists in northern Mali—offering \$10 million in financial aid to be split between the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the Malian military.<sup>100</sup> While some additional humanitarian assistance to Mali and the affected neighboring countries through Bahrain’s Royal Charity Organization (RCO) is possible, Manama’s pledge is unlikely to signal significant future engagement. Bahrain’s public statement in late January calling on the international community to preserve Mali’s territorial unity and stop the conflict there does not suggest government intent to engage significantly. Reflecting both its limited financial heft and focus on areas closer to home, Bahrain’s only significant provision of humanitarian assistance in Africa has been to Somalia. Given the criticism that Bahrain’s pledge of financial assistance to military operations in Mali has received at home, the prospects for additional aid to the military effort appear limited.

#### **Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: Probable Increases in Economic Assistance**

The governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have not specifically commented on the French intervention, but their track record of engagement in the Western Sahel suggests that their response to the crisis will likely emphasize economic aid. As indicated by the table below, Mali—along with the other nations in the region—has been a recipient of significant levels of development assistance from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in recent years. Both countries certainly have the financial capacity to increase their development assistance to Mali at least to those levels enjoyed regionally by Mauritania and Senegal, but because much of this assistance involves the provision of loans for infrastructure development, which typically have long lead times, a major increase in development assistance appears unlikely in the short term.

#### **Bilateral Development Assistance: 2005–2011**

	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
Burkina Faso	\$39 million	\$45 million
The Gambia	\$40 million	\$38 million
Mali	\$38 million	\$50 million
Mauritania	\$99 million	\$90 million
Niger	\$34 million	\$42 million
Senegal	\$124 million	\$63 million

Sources: Kuwait (AidData); Saudi Arabia (Saudi Development Fund annual reports)



The more likely response will be to provide increased humanitarian assistance. Saudi Arabia has in recent years been active in the provision of food assistance and financial aid to World Food Program activities in the Sahel. The early February Saudi air delivery of some 200 tons of food to Mali's government and the donation of \$4 million in financial assistance to international relief programs operating in Mali<sup>101</sup> is emblematic of the sort of assistance that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are likely to provide. Among the benefits of this approach is that it minimizes the potential that such aid will be viewed as part of an effort to radicalize local Muslim populations.

#### **UAE: Possibly Outside Its Comfort Zone**

Of the GCC states, the UAE appears to have been the most forward-leaning in supporting the French intervention. Public accounts indicate that in mid-January 2013 the French President requested UAE support for the intervention in Mali in terms of aircraft and financial aid. At least one public report suggests that the UAE subsequently provided some airlift support to French operations in Mali.<sup>102</sup> In mid-January the government signaled its support for humanitarian assistance to the citizens of Mali, but specifics of any such assistance are not available in the public record.

The Western Sahel has not been a priority for the UAE. While it has been aggressive in providing security and economic assistance to regional and international efforts to counter piracy originating from Somalia, its engagement in the Western Sahel has been limited. Compared with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been less actively engaged in the provision of aid to the countries of the Western Sahel. During 2005–2011, for example, it provided no development assistance to Mali, Mauritania, or Senegal, and it provided only \$10 million each to Burkina Faso, The Gambia, and Niger. Moreover, while UAE charitable organizations associated with royal family members have provided some assistance to Mali, the amounts have been modest: in 2011, for example, Dubai Cares—a charity associated with Sheik Maktoum, ruler of Dubai—provided \$6 million to several international relief organizations to support sanitation programs for children. While this more modest aid profile reflects in part the more limited wealth of the UAE, it suggests that the UAE probably lacks the knowledge and administrative infrastructure—and perhaps the will—to significantly ramp up direct assistance to the region.

## ALERTS

### DRC: President Kabila Faces New Rebellions

**Researcher:** Ms. Ivana Djak

#### Summary

- The March 23 Movement (M23) ended the first phase of the Kampala peace talks with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) prepared to deploy a stand-by force to the DRC.
- Several new threats to the Congolese government have emerged. Coup plots against President Joseph Kabila by Congolese rebels in South Africa and Angola were foiled in February, and Congolese police arrested a new rebel leader in South Kivu province.

#### Rebels Make Peace and SADC Readies to Deploy

On February 6, 2013, M23 rebels and the Congolese government completed the first phase of the Kampala peace process. Crispus Kiyonga, the Ugandan minister mediating the talks, explained that during this first of the four phases of the peace process, the parties reviewed the 2009 peace agreement between the precursor to the M23, the CNDP (Congress for the Defense of the People (*Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple*)), and the government. While both sides have taken responsibility for the failure of the 2009 agreement and have committed to continued negotiations,<sup>103,104</sup> some observers suggest the Kampala peace talks are futile as representatives of the Congolese people such as civil society leaders and clergy have been excluded from the talks.<sup>105</sup>

Negotiations for the deployment of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) stand-by force are ongoing. On February 8, the SADC Executive Secretary, Tomas Salomao, confirmed that a deployment plan has been drawn up and the community is now awaiting a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania have thus far pledged troops.<sup>106</sup> Salomao confirmed that unlike MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo), the 4,000-strong force would have the mandate and power to engage with elements destabilizing the DRC.<sup>107</sup>

#### South African and Angolan Security Forces Foil Coup Plots

On February 5, 2013, a South Africa elite police unit raided a farm in the northern region of the country and arrested 19 Congolese rebels planning to overthrow President Kabila.<sup>108</sup> The rebels are part of a Congolese opposition movement called the Union of Nationalists for Renewal (UNR). South African security agents discovered the elaborate conspiracy in September 2012. The rebels planned on stockpiling weapons, arranging for specialized military training, and going back to the DRC to dispose of President Kabila.<sup>109</sup> The rebels planned on posing as rangers undergoing anti-rhino poaching training.<sup>110</sup>

There are about 300,000 Congolese immigrants in South Africa. Pro-opposition exiled groups are common, but this UNR coup attempt marks the first highly organized effort by expatriates to overthrow Kabila.<sup>111</sup> Among the accused is dual-U.S.-DRC citizen James Kazongo, the alleged newly elected leader of the UNR. The organization claims to have as many as 9,000 supporters. Kazongo was listed as a leader of the group along with Etienne Kabila Taratibu and Major General William Amuri Yakutumba.<sup>112</sup> Etienne Kabila Taratibu, Joseph Kabila's half-brother, turned himself over to authorities in Cape Town on February 9.<sup>113</sup> He claims to be the "real" son

of slain Laurent Kabila, arguing that Joseph Kabila is adopted from Rwanda. Etienne Kabila has been an outspoken critic of President Kabila for years. He has the support of many in the exile community who believe President Kabila to be Rwandan. Major General William Amuri Yakutumba, the alleged military leader of the group, is still on the run. He founded the politico-military movement Mai-Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu in 2007.<sup>114</sup> The rebels appeared at the Pretoria Magistrates Court on February 14. A group of Congolese expatriates protesting the arrests gathered at the Magistrates Court and marched to the Congolese embassy, chanting "Death to Zuma, death to Kabila." The march disrupted traffic and one man at the embassy was injured. Police were eventually able to peacefully disperse the group.<sup>115</sup> The rebels' hearing was postponed until February 27 so that all accused could make bail applications. They are expected to be extradited to the DRC.<sup>116</sup>

In a press conference, DRC spokesman Lambert Mende revealed that 11 rebels preparing to carry out destabilizing operations against President Kabila were detained in Angola on February 9. The subversive elements planned to destabilize the DRC from Angolan territory. The detainees call themselves the National Congolese Council, the name of a battalion that served under Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko. Mende revealed the rebels have ties to opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, whom Mende accused of being involved with foreign interests.<sup>117, 118</sup>

### **Internal Turmoil Continues**

Inside the country, police captured the leader of a new rebel movement in South Kivu also seeking to overthrow President Kabila. Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadj, the leader of the Union of Revolutionary Forces of Congo (UFRC), was arrested on February 10 in Uvira, south of the provincial capital Bukavu. According to a statement by Bagayamukwe, the UFRC was created in January as a "politico-military" movement.<sup>119</sup> The group claims to have the support of civil society and political leaders from South Kivu.<sup>120</sup>

During a conference on the continued crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the Great Lakes Policy Forum in Washington, DC, on January 24, 2013, a civil society leader from Goma argued that the fraudulent elections of 2011 convinced the Congolese people that violence is the only recourse they have left to improve the situation in the DRC. Initially, there was hope after the 2006 elections that the democratic process would give the Congolese people a chance to affect the course their country takes, but the disenfranchisement of 2011 has created significant disillusionment with the electoral process. According to the civil society leader, the failure of the government to prevent the M23 seizure of Goma solidified this conviction and will lead to a continued rise in violence.

## **Nigeria: Opposition Parties Merge**

**Researcher:** Ms. Betty Boswell

### **A Merger with a Goal**

The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has been Nigeria's ruling party, winning every election since 1999, but several opposition parties want to change that pattern. To that end, the four main opposition parties announced a merger recently, intent on unseating the PDP in the 2015 election. On the strength of the agreement among 10 governors of participating opposition parties, the four parties, Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), agreed to form a new mega-party, the All Progressive Congress (APC). A spokesman for the merger committee stressed this movement is meant to strengthen the democratic process and to improve Nigeria's political culture. "A strong opposition will ensure that the party in power will be responsive to the criticisms of the strong opposition party and in that way, they will serve the people better."<sup>121</sup>

### **Issue Focus**

The next step for this newly formed party will be to agree on a political platform that will challenge the ruling party. Undoubtedly the issues most prominently on the minds of the people of Nigeria include corruption in government, unemployment, and civil unrest; all are issues that transcend ideology and geographic rivalries.<sup>122</sup> Most Nigerians have been adversely affected by one or more of these issues and might be inclined to embrace a party dedicated to addressing them. Previous attempts at opposition alliances have failed because of infighting and inability to agree on a common candidate. The hope is that the APC will be able to translate a common purpose, unseating the PDP, into a practical political program.<sup>123</sup>

### **Ruling Party Unconcerned**

The PDP does not appear to be concerned about the merger. Chief Ebenezer Babatropé, Minister of Transport and member of the Board of Trustees of the PDP, said that while the merger will make democracy in Nigeria strong, he does not see how the contradiction among the political parties can be overcome, and how those differences will not eventually destroy the movement: "[The] merger cannot withstand the PDP machinery at the 2015 polls," he said.<sup>124</sup> The national chairman of the PDP called the APC a "non-issue" and said in a speech to members of the PDP Board of Trustees that the PDP should not be swayed from its agenda and should spend its energies on rebuilding the nation and the party.<sup>125</sup>

In Nigeria there is hope among activists and concerned citizens who abhor the corruption within current politics that the new coalition is not merely a movement to unseat a political party, or one without positive direction, but instead that the new political party can change how Nigeria is governed and thereby the course of the nation's history.<sup>126</sup>

## Côte d'Ivoire: Three Close Allies of Gbagbo Arrested

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

In the past month, three close allies of ex-president Laurent Gbagbo have been extradited from Ghana and taken into Ivorian custody. As expected, the arrests have been denounced by Gbagbo's party, the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI), and its youth factions, which view them as inequitable and a hindrance to the reconciliation process. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute and became the 122nd member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on February 15. The Court will try Gbagbo and his wife, Simone, but it is unknown whether Gbagbo's allies will also be tried by the ICC. The following are short profiles for each of the recently arrested allies of Gbagbo:

- **Charles Blé Goudé**—Goudé is the leader of the *Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes* ("Young Patriots" or COJEP) and was arrested on January 17. Goudé will be tried for war crimes committed in the 2010 post-election crisis. Specifically, he is accused of recruiting and arming over 5,000 youths who fought for Gbagbo. The ICC has identified Goudé as one of Gbagbo's "closest supporters."<sup>127</sup>
- **Jean-Noel Abehi**—Abehi is the former commander of the *Groupe d'Escadron Blindé* (GEB, a pro-Gbagbo gendarmerie based in Abgan). He was arrested on February 4. Abehi has been accused of orchestrating more than two dozen attacks against army and UN security installations in Côte d'Ivoire since 2011.<sup>128</sup> He is also wanted for war crimes.<sup>129</sup>
- **Jean-Yves Dibopieu**—Dibopieu is the former head of the *Fédération Estudiantine de Côte d'Ivoire* (FESCI, a pro-Gbagbo student union linked to years of street violence beginning in the 1990s). He was arrested with Abehi on February 4. Dibopieu was also deeply involved in violence perpetrated against groups supporting President Ouattara in the post-election crisis.

Following the arrests, the FPI urged its supporters to remain calm, while the COJEP said the arrests will "increase rancor, deepen mistrust and division among Ivorians."<sup>130</sup> On February 2, 500 youth supporters of the COJEP protested for Goudé's release outside the home of Charles Konan Banny, Chairman of the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission.<sup>131</sup> Similarly, the *Jeunesse du Front Populaire Ivoirien* (JFPI), the youth wing of the FPI, called for a public rally on February 16 in support of Laurent Gbagbo.<sup>132</sup> The rally was banned (the day prior) by Interior Minister Hamed Bakayoko.<sup>133</sup>

The high-profile arrests are a certainly a "victory" for President Alassane Ouattara and his government, but will be yet another obstacle to reconciliation as they solidify the perception of victors' justice. The demands of the FPI and its youth factions (i.e., the release of Gbagbo and others) will go unmet and increase the potential for violence. Furthermore, the recent arrests signal that Ghana is no longer a safe haven for Gbagbo supporters, and it is unclear what actions those who remain in exile will take moving forward.<sup>134</sup> The situation should continue to be monitored closely, particularly in the run-up to local elections that were recently rescheduled for April 21.<sup>135</sup>

## South Africa: Ramphela Launches New Party

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

On February 18, 2013, Mamphela Ramphela, a respected anti-apartheid activist, ended weeks of rumors by announcing the formation of a new political party in South Africa called Agang, or “build.”<sup>136</sup> In announcing her bid to challenge the dominance of South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), Ramphela promised a fresh start with a focus on youth issues and ending corruption. “The country needs a new beginning...It is not going to happen with the current players,”<sup>137</sup> said Ramphela in her launch speech. She argued that the ANC had lost its way, and that South Africa’s “greatness is being undermined by a massive failure of governance.”<sup>138</sup> She added that one the party’s goals would be to “declare war on corruption.”<sup>139</sup>

- Ramphela is a familiar face in South Africa. As a political activist under the apartheid regime, she was involved with the Black Consciousness movement in the 1970s, having two children with Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko. Trained as a medical doctor, Ramphela held posts after the advent of democracy in 1994 at the University of Cape Town, the International Monetary Fund, and most recently, as chairwoman of the mining firm Gold Fields.<sup>140</sup>
- In her announcement speech she emphasized South Africa’s growing inequality and the ANC’s failure to adequately engage with and educate youth: “The dream has faded for the many living in poverty and destitution in our increasingly unequal society...my generation has to confess to the young people of our country: we have failed you. We have failed to build for you an education and training system to prepare you for life in the 21st century.”<sup>141</sup>

Ramphela faces an uphill battle in challenging the political hegemony of the ANC, as evidenced by the experience of other fledgling attempts to form new parties in South Africa, such as the now nearly defunct Congress of the People (COPE). This will be a particularly difficult endeavor for her with a reported staff of only five.<sup>142</sup> If Ramphela is able to forge working relationships with other opposition groups, however, in particular the growing Democratic Alliance (DA), the new party could have an impact on the political landscape in South Africa ahead of elections in 2014.

## Leadership Profile: Rebecca Kadaga, Speaker of Ugandan Parliament

Researcher: Ms. Brittany Gregerson



Photo: Daily Monitor

Speaker of the Ugandan Parliament Rebecca Kadaga has been in the news in recent months for her leadership of the 9th Parliament at a time when it appeared to be asserting itself against President Yoweri Museveni over a panoply of controversial issues—among them corruption, the reinstatement of presidential term limits, and most recently the suspicious death of National Resistance Movement (NRM) MP Cerinah Nebanda in December 2012. The bungled police investigation of the case led to suspicions of official tampering and subsequent calls across party lines for the recall of Parliament and the relaunching of the body's own inquiry into her death.<sup>143</sup>

Museveni and his allies succeeded in preventing the recall through intimidation and coup threats,<sup>144</sup> and many in Uganda are blaming Kadaga. After announcing that she had enough votes to recall parliament, she reversed herself when 10 MPs announced that they intended to withdraw their names from the recall petition. Some dispute whether Kadaga could legally refuse to recall parliament after having received a petition with sufficient names (no matter the revised preference of the 10 MPs).<sup>145</sup> In the eyes of some critics, the recall campaign's failure proves that she, "like [others before her], really cared more about her place [at] the dining table than justice, the law or the interests of the country."<sup>146</sup> Another columnist writes that "Kadaga is finished...she has destroyed herself. She has done what Museveni wanted."<sup>147</sup> Her fall from grace is being reported as a victory for Museveni on many fronts—a victory for the executive in successfully stymying the latest assertiveness from the 9th Parliament<sup>148</sup> and a victory for Museveni personally in having diminished Kadaga's standing and thus neutralizing the threat from yet another potential successor.<sup>149</sup>

Additional controversies over media reporting on Parliament<sup>150</sup> have further weakened Kadaga's reputation for independence, and her political future is currently unclear. She is less than 2 years into a 5-year term as Speaker, but could be voted out of that post as James Wapakhabulo was in the late 1990s.<sup>151</sup> Before recent events, Kadaga's name was routinely floated as a potential first female president for the country, and her vocal support of what Western media dubbed the "kill the gays bill" was widely seen in Uganda as a brave defense of the country and its values.<sup>152</sup> Some Ugandan commentators believe that the bill—officially known as the Anti-Homosexuality Bill—is now a must-pass for Kadaga if she is to restore her reputation.<sup>153</sup>

## Background

- Kadaga was born May 24, 1956 in Kamuli, Uganda; she has represented the Busoga subregion of Kamuli in Parliament since 1989.<sup>154</sup>
- She studied law, with a focus on women's issues, at Makerere University in Kampala, the Law Development Center in Kampala, and the University of Zimbabwe in Harare.<sup>155</sup>
- Kadaga has served as the Secretary General of the East African Women Parliamentarians Association, the Ugandan Minister of State for Regional Cooperation, the Minister of State for Communication and Aviation, and the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs.<sup>156</sup>
- From 2001 to 2011, she served as Deputy Speaker of Parliament.<sup>157</sup>
- Kadaga was elected Speaker in a landslide in May 2011. She received over five times as many votes as her opponent, Forum for Democratic Change MP Nathan Nandala Mafabi,<sup>158</sup> and is the body's first female speaker.<sup>159</sup> The NRM's decision to back her over the outgoing speaker, Edward Ssekandi, was controversial.<sup>160</sup>



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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES



# THE AFRICA WATCH

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## TO THE READER

IDA's team of Africa researchers welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback on the contents of *The Africa Watch*. If you would like to discuss an article in this issue or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

With best regards,

*George Ward*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Nigeria: Shifting Threat from Militant Groups

**Researchers:** Ms. Betty Boswell and Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

#### Summary

- In recent weeks, three developments point to a likely shift in the focus and scope of militant Islamist groups in Nigeria. Taken together, they may indicate that some militant Islamist groups in the country are beginning to link their interests and operations more closely to external entities and agendas. Local observers express concern that this trend may escalate as the French intervention in Mali plays out and the United States begins drone operations in the region.<sup>1</sup>
- The Boko Haram splinter group Ansaru, which emerged in early 2012, has become more assertive in recent weeks. Its leadership is openly critical of the older group's tactics, which have focused on targets in northern Nigeria and have, as a result, harmed Muslims as well as Christians and security forces. Ansaru's established objectives include "protecting lives and properties of Muslims, retaliation on any unjust or terrorist act against Muslims, and reestablishing the dignity and sanity of Muslims." Its agenda is more overtly tied to Al Qaida's global jihadist rhetoric, and its attacks favor armed raids and kidnappings over Boko Haram's more blunt suicide bombings and motorcycle ambushes targeting churches, security forces, religious leaders, and political institutions.
- On February 21, 2012, Nigerian state security forces announced the arrest of three members of a Nigerian Shi'a group who were, allegedly under the guidance of Iran, plotting the assassination of high-ranking Nigerian leaders including former president Ibrahim Babangida. The group's leader, Abdullahi Mustapha Berende, had studied in Iran, where he was recruited to establish a terrorist cell to carry out attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets in Lagos.
- The kidnapping of seven French nationals by Boko Haram gunmen in Dabanga, Cameroon, on February 19, 2013, marks an unprecedented shift in tactics by Nigerian Islamist militants. Boko Haram has long sought cross-border sanctuary among Muslim communities in northern Cameroon, but this is its first instance of terrorist activity outside Nigeria's borders.

#### Boko Haram Splinter Group Raises Its Profile

Boko Haram has disrupted life in Nigeria since 2009, killing Christians and Muslims alike in pursuit of its jihad against an elite that it denounces as corrupt and too easily influenced by the West. In recent weeks, a Boko Haram splinter faction seems to be veering further from the ideological fold. This dissident faction Ansaru, whose full Arabic name is *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Bidalis Sudan* (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), first emerged in early 2012. Recently, the group has been more outspoken in condemning Boko Haram's leader Sheikh Abubakar Shekau Shekau for the killing of innocent people, whether Christian or Muslim, in the many bombings attributed to the group. Ansaru advocates tactics that target violence only against those who harm Muslims.<sup>2</sup> The group's guiding objective is

“protecting lives and properties of Muslims, retaliation on any unjust or terrorist act against Muslims, and reestablishing the dignity and sanity of Muslims.”<sup>3</sup> Ansaru seems to be hardening the breach with Boko Haram, stating that it will not ally itself with Boko Haram when the latter has “acted badly” (i.e., not in the best interests of Muslims). Ansaru compares its relationship to Boko Haram with that between al-Qaeda and the Taliban—they have similar objectives, but different leaders and scope.<sup>4</sup>

The heightened profile of Ansaru introduces a new and significantly complicating dimension to the threat the Nigerian government faces from its northern militants. Whereas Boko Haram’s focus has always been on Nigerian targets—bombings and assassinations in north and central Nigeria<sup>5</sup>—Ansaru is looking beyond Nigeria’s borders for both allies and targets. Its attacks are more sophisticated and less blunt—armed raids on government and international assets rather than suicide bombings—and may, as a result, be less likely to trigger local resentments that the Nigerian government has, in the past, tried to exploit (albeit to mixed effect) to isolate Boko Haram from local sources of support.<sup>6</sup>

Al Qaeda’s North African wing, AQIM, has long sought an alliance with Boko Haram, but the latter, with its narrow domestic focus, has held the international jihadists at arm’s length. A closer alliance between Ansaru and AQIM is, however, much more likely. If AQIM succeeds in gaining influence within Ansaru, the nature of the group—and Nigeria and the region’s security challenge—may change dramatically. The failure of the Boko Haram “cease-fire” announced on January 28, 2012, which collapsed in part because of Ansaru’s denunciation of Boko Haram’s spokesman, Sheikh Abu Mohammad Abdulazeez Ibn Idris, as “illegitimate,” is likely a sign of the complexities to come.<sup>7</sup>

### **The Tehran Connection**

On February 21, 2012, Nigerian security forces announced the arrest of three members of a Shi’a group based in Kwara State, including its leader, Abdullahi Mustapha Berende, who is known to have studied at the Imam Khomeini International University in Iran in 2006. The three are accused of plotting, under the guidance of Tehran, to assassinate several high-profile Nigerians, including former president General Ibrahim Babangida and former Sultan of Sokoto Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, who is the father of Nigeria’s National Security Advisor, Colonel Sambo Dasuki. In addition to being charged with the planned assassinations, the group was charged with spying on and planning attacks against American and Israeli nationals and interests in Lagos. Among their prospective targets were hotels frequented by Americans and Israelis, U.S. Agency for International Development and Peace Corps offices, Max Zim Intercontinental Shipping Company, A. A. Consulting, and the Jewish Cultural Centre (Chabad) in Lagos.<sup>8</sup> According to the Security Service’s spokesperson, Marilyn Ogar, Lagos was selected as the center for the plot because the Israelis are believed to have an intelligence facility there that is used to spy on Iran.

Berende and his associates attracted the attention of security forces after he had made several trips to Iran. A local Shi’a community leader, he studied Modern Shi’a Islamic Teaching (*Da’wa*) in Iran for six months in 2006, at which point he may have been singled out as a potential asset. He was not recruited until 2011, probably by Iranian agents in Nigeria. He has admitted to returning to Iran in 2011 and 2012 to receive training in weapons and the production and detonation of improvised explosive devices. He was tasked to establish terrorist cells across southwest Nigeria, and his Iranian handlers gave him roughly \$30,000 to establish a small business in Lagos as a cover for moving his family from his hometown in Ilorin.<sup>9</sup> While the arrest

of the Berende cell is important, it points to the likelihood of other, as yet undetected operations.

Nigerian Shi'a constitute a tiny minority of the country's roughly 76 million Muslims, but with the help of Iranian backers the more radical among their leaders have built considerable influence in the north. Prior to the February arrests, the highest profile Shi'a group was the Islamic Movement in Nigeria led by Sheikh Sayyed Ibraheem Zakzaky of Kaduna. Zakzaky and his group have not been implicated in the terrorism cell arrests, but they do represent another type of Iranian investment in Nigerian instability. In September 2011, Zakzaky attracted attention when he condemned the Boko Haram bombing campaign in northern Nigeria as "a hoax" perpetrated by "America and her cohorts" as "an act of subjecting Islam to ridicule." He went on to criticize Nigeria's Muslim leaders for failing to condemn the attacks "in order to protect their worldly positions." America's goal, he warned, was to destabilize Nigeria as it did Somalia. "They deliberately destabilized Somalia in order to benefit from its vast aquatic resources mostly fishes," and seek to do the same to gain access to Nigeria's abundant resources.<sup>10</sup>

Zakzaky's Islamic Movement is small, but media savvy and influential thanks to its daily newspaper, Hausa-language radio and television channels, and a growing "youth vanguard" that conducts military-style drills that "mimic the state security services."<sup>11</sup> While he consistently denies receiving direct support from Iran, Zakzaky is vehemently anti-American, an enthusiastic supporter of Iran's model of Islamic governance, and an advocate for the establishment of an Islamic State in Nigeria. He and his organization have broad support among both Shi'a and Sunni youth in and around Kaduna State. His movement stands as a (thus far) relatively nonviolent Islamist alternative to the disruptive Boko Haram movement. As one observer has pointed out, the presence of Iranian-influenced Shi'a groups in Nigeria, however small, shows that "Iran's covert war is clearly continuing and the arrests in Nigeria are a reminder that jihadists are not the only force capable of undermining stability in Africa."<sup>12</sup>

### **Kidnapping**

One of the markers of the "professionalization" of terrorist and insurgent organizations is diversification into kidnapping for ransom as a means of financing and expanding the terrorist enterprise. Until very recently, Boko Haram had stayed out of the kidnapping business. Its splinter group, Ansaru, has taken credit for kidnapping Europeans in Nigeria in 2011 and 2012.

Kidnappings targeting French nationals or those supporting the French operations in Mali have raised concern for the safety of foreign interests in Nigeria and the Sahelian countries.<sup>13</sup> In December 2012, Ansaru abducted a French national who was working on a wind power project in the northern Nigerian town of Rimi. Seven foreign construction workers in Bauchi suffered the same fate on February 18, 2012. The cross-border abduction of seven French nationals in Cameroon on February 19, 2012—who French intelligence believes are being held in northern Nigeria—may mark a dangerous shift in Boko Haram's operational profile.

While Boko Haram has long had cross-border ties in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, the February kidnapping is unprecedented and indicates that the group may be moving to strengthen and operationalize its support in neighboring states. Should this happen, the potential for further destabilizing the region and complicating Nigeria's attempts to tamp down violence in its northern region is great.<sup>14</sup> The Islamists justify their escalation into targeting foreign nationals, citing "the transgressions and atrocities done to the religion of Allah...by the European countries in many places such as Afghanistan and Mali."<sup>15</sup>

## India and Africa: A Growth Story

**Researcher:** Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward

### Summary

- While Chinese activities in sub-Saharan Africa are more often in the headlines, Indian engagement with the continent has also been growing at a rapid pace.
  - India is currently Africa's fourth-largest trading partner, behind the European Union, China, and the United States.
  - India's trade with Africa has expanded almost as rapidly as China's since 2000. Trade with Africa is proportionately more important for India than for China.
  - India is also a significant investor in Africa, with cumulative investments exceeding \$35 billion, compared with more than \$70 billion for China.
- India's trade with Africa is focused on importing oil, gas, and other raw materials and exporting manufactured products and services.
- Indian direct investment on the continent has been focused more on value-added enterprises than on infrastructure construction. This approach may be more conducive over time to technology transfer and job creation than the course followed by China.
- India's government, compared with China's, has played a relatively minor role in coordinating the country's engagement with Africa. This situation may be changing.

### India's Growing Engagement with Africa

India's relationships with Africa are by no means new. Trade relations between East Africa and the Indian subcontinent have existed since at least the 16th century. People-to-people ties are equally important. There are 2.8 million persons of Indian origin living in African countries.<sup>16</sup>

Until recently, however, two-way trade between Africa and India was modest. The past decade has seen an explosion of trade, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 24.8 percent. In absolute terms, trade grew from \$4.6 billion in 2000 to \$57 billion in 2011. Given this rate of increase, analysts believe that the target of \$90 billion by 2015 set by Africa-India trade ministers at their meeting in 2012 could be attained as early as this year. India is already Africa's fourth-largest trading partner, behind the European Union, China, and the United States.<sup>17</sup>

Even at this rate, India's trade with Africa is only around one-third that of China's, and it pales in comparison with that of the European Union, which exceeded \$300 billion in two-way trade in 2011. A similar situation exists with regard to foreign direct investment (FDI). As of 2011, India's investment stock in Africa was valued at \$35 billion, compared with more than \$70 billion for China.<sup>18</sup> India may, however, be catching up. Although annual FDI totals are quite volatile because they are heavily skewed by large projects, the numbers indicates that current Indian investments are similar in order of magnitude to those of China. One source states that India had \$11 billion in outbound FDI to Africa in 2007.<sup>19</sup> Another source puts China's FDI flows to Africa in 2011 at \$12 billion annually.<sup>20</sup> Africa is proportionately a more important trading partner for India than for China. Trade with Africa amounts to almost 8 percent of India's total trade, but only around 3 percent of China's.<sup>21</sup>



### **It's (Mostly) about Oil**

India is almost totally dependent on foreign sources for its petroleum needs. Its reserves of petroleum amount to only 0.5 percent of the world's total. It seeks to diversify its imports of foreign oil away from the Middle East, which as of 2011 provided 75 percent of its needs.<sup>22</sup> African oil represents around 20 percent of India's total fuel imports and 61 percent of Africa's exports to India. Other primary commodities, chiefly coal and gold, make up an additional 30 percent of Africa's exports to India.<sup>23</sup> The need for oil has caused India to reorient its trade relations with Africa away from East Africa, where the large Indian diaspora traditionally facilitated relations, to the oil-producing countries of West Africa, chiefly Nigeria.

### **Indian Enterprises Drive the Relationship**

Every traveler to sub-Saharan Africa quickly notices the proliferation of large building and infrastructure construction projects sponsored, funded, and implemented by Chinese entities. The deals that result in these projects are most often brokered by the Chinese government, which adroitly combines aid and debt in large funding packages. This approach is aimed at maintaining close connections with African governments.<sup>24</sup>

Indian projects of this nature are rare. Indian investments in Africa have in general been less tightly organized, and they have been led by commercial enterprises rather than the government. (Of course, some of the Indian enterprises are state-owned or related.) Compared with Chinese investments, which have been heavily concentrated in the mining and oil resource sectors, Indian companies have a broader portfolio. In 2010, the Indian mobile telephone operator Bharti Airtel paid \$9 billion for the African telecoms operations of Zain, which is headquartered in Kuwait. There have also been notable Indian investments in the African steel and agriculture sectors.<sup>25</sup>

Indian enterprises have made a number of investments that back up their claimed commitment to building African capacity. Investment in Botswana's diamond-polishing industry is one example. Another is the 2008 joint venture between an Indian pharmaceutical company, the government of Uganda, and a Ugandan pharmaceutical manufacturer to build a \$32 million plant in Kampala, Uganda, to produce anti-retroviral and anti-malarial drugs.<sup>26</sup>

### **The Indian Government Steps Up Its Game**

Recently, the Indian government, perhaps motivated by the success of the Chinese in winning oil and other resource concessions, has become more involved. The six-day visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Africa in 2011 was a watershed. Singh promised \$5 billion of loans on easy terms and another \$1 billion for education, rail transport, and peacekeeping.<sup>27</sup> Two India-Africa summit meetings in the past four years have also helped bring governments closer together.

The Indian government approach emphasizes "soft power." Whereas China has invested in heavy infrastructure and military-industrial relationships with Africa, the Indian government has emphasized its long-standing commitment to participation in United Nations peace operations on the African continent. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has invested in an ambitious portfolio of cultural and educational exchanges with India. These activities are publicized on a splashy website, "Indiafrica—A Shared Future." Other elements of the Indian Web presence on African issues reflect similar approaches. India-Africa Connect, a project of the Indo-Asian News Service, seeks to lessen the reliance of African media on Western sources for information about India.<sup>28</sup> The Africa Desk of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry focuses

on the services that the Federation provides firms, government departments, and individuals involved in the Indian-African relationship.<sup>29</sup>

### **Conclusion**

India's profile in Africa will not for some time match that of China. Nevertheless, India is already an important player on the continent, and its role will likely increase in the future. Its cultural knowledge of the African scene, supported by centuries of engagement, and its emphasis on soft power provide advantages. Worth watching will be trends in Indian investment, especially the extent to which promises of capacity building are translated into practice.

# Djibouti's Parliamentary Elections: Protest, But No Revolt

Researcher: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

## Summary

- On February 22, 2013, Djibouti held its third parliamentary election since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1999. The elections were significant because reforms in November 2012 made it possible for the political opposition to gain some seats in parliament, whereas up to now it has held no seats.
- Djibouti City, where 75 percent of Djiboutians live, is the capital and the source of 35 of the parliament's 65 seats. Unofficial results indicate that the capital may be evenly split between the ruling *Union pour la majoritaire Présidentielle* (Union for the Presidential Majority, UMP) and the opposition coalition *Union pour la Salut National* (Union for National Salvation, USN). The opposition alleges fraud and has supported street demonstrations.
- Perhaps surprised by voter support for the opposition, the government responded to the demonstrations by dispatching security officials, which resulted in injuries to several civilians and police officers.
- The government's harsh response resembles those of other electoral autocracies that feel threatened by opposition parties. It is also in line with Djibouti's response to wide-ranging antigovernment protests in early 2011. The clashes, while projected to continue, are not expected to threaten the state. Instead, the government's security clampdown will likely intensify, and the political space will become even narrower.

## Context of the Parliamentary Elections in Djibouti

There are nine political parties in Djibouti,<sup>30</sup> but three main parties competed in the February 22 parliamentary elections: the ruling coalition, *Union pour la Majoritaire Présidentielle* (Union of the Presidential Majority, UMP); the opposition coalition, *Union pour la Salut National* (Union for National Salvation, USN); and *Le Centre des Démocrates Unifiés* (Center for Unified Democrats, CDU), a centrist party.<sup>31</sup> The February elections marked the first time the Djibouti Parliament would likely include the opposition. The opposition's participation was guaranteed by a change to the law that specified that 13 parliamentarians would be elected by proportional representation, leaving 52 seats to be determined by usual first-past-the-post. This is a significant change; notably, in 2003, even though the opposition won 37.6 percent of the vote, it did not receive any seats in parliament because at the time, the law stipulated that the party receiving the most votes in a constituency won all the seats in the constituency.<sup>32</sup> The opposition's absence from parliament continued with its boycott of the 2008 elections. Therefore, the 2013 elections were critical.

## Aftermath of the Election

The domestic and international observer missions—which included 60 representatives from the African Union, the Arab League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference<sup>33</sup>—declared the elections free and fair.<sup>34</sup> The political opposition disagrees.

Preliminary results indicate that the UMP won in each of Djibouti's six constituencies,<sup>35</sup> with the UMP receiving 49 percent of the vote in Djibouti City and the opposition receiving under 48 percent; 75 percent of Djibouti's people live in the city, making it the most significant

constituency.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, Djibouti City has 35 representatives in the 65-seat parliament.<sup>37</sup> The USN disputes the preliminary results, alleging fraud.<sup>38</sup> The USN has published its own results on the Internet and invited the public to compare them to the official results.<sup>39</sup>

Starting on February 26, university students and other members of the opposition demonstrated in the capital.<sup>40</sup> According to one report, as many as 5,000 people protested in Djibouti City (about one percent of the city's population).<sup>41</sup> There are reports of arrests, burning vehicles, and injured demonstrators.<sup>42</sup> In the critical Djibouti City suburb of Balbala, where the opposition's support is strong,<sup>43</sup> there are signs of restiveness, according to social media reports.<sup>44</sup>

### **Implications of the Postelection Violence**

Despite escalating calls for protest, the political culture in Djibouti is unlikely to change. In fact, this is not the first time a significant number of people have protested against the regime. In early 2011, in the heart of the Arab Spring, there were widespread antigovernment protests and calls for the ouster of President Ismail Omar Guelleh. Demonstrations began with university students demanding educational reform and soon comprised a broad set of grievances, including an amendment to the constitution would allow Guelleh to run for a third term.<sup>45</sup> One report stated that as many as 20,000 people demonstrated against the government.<sup>46</sup> The government responded by ordering the security services to put down the demonstrations, which resulted in several injuries and arrests.<sup>47</sup>

Indeed, the government of Djibouti's response to the political opposition fits the pattern exemplified by other authoritarian regimes suddenly faced with competition, for example, Togo, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The outbreak of violence in Djibouti is particularly similar to the conditions surrounding the violence that erupted in neighboring Ethiopia's May 2005 parliamentary election. As in Djibouti, the Ethiopian opposition coalition, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), had been allowed relative freedom to campaign, and there were televised debates before the election; there seemed to be a sense that the country was progressing a bit further in the democratization process.<sup>48</sup> The atmosphere changed after a surprisingly strong showing by the CUD; in June the Ethiopian security forces clamped down on opposition members and protesting university students, as both the government and the CUD claimed victory.<sup>49</sup> Over the next five years, Ethiopia's ruling party systematically tightened the political space, broadened its patronage network, and intimidated political opposition groups, reversing any notion of democratic advancement.<sup>50</sup>

### **The Road Ahead**

Many analysts suggest that Guelleh may pursue a similar strategy of deepening the UMP's patronage network and increasing security.<sup>51</sup> In the near term, this means that while protests may continue, or even escalate, they will not likely succeed in engendering political reform in Djibouti. Indeed, it may not be out of the question, as Guelleh looks to shore up his patronage network, to see a splintering of the political opposition. This was the case in Ethiopia, as well.<sup>52</sup> Unless there is significant support for political reform from members of the international community or the ruling party begins to experience significant defections, Djibouti will continue to operate as an electoral autocracy.

## Zambia: Sata Cracks Down amid Increasing Political Violence

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

### Summary

- Zambian President Michael Sata and his ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party have escalated an increasingly harsh clampdown on opposition parties and groups in the wake of political violence surrounding by-elections in November 2012 and February 2013.
- This recent violence is a departure from previous elections in Zambia, which have been relatively peaceful.
- The leaders of the two main opposition parties, Nevers Mumba of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND), have been arrested numerous times in the last year on charges including defamation, corruption, and unlawful assembly. Hichilema has been arrested twice in 2013, most recently on February 25.
- In Zambia's tense political climate, limited outbreaks of political violence are likely to persist in the near to medium term, providing Sata and the PF with a convenient pretext to continue their suppression of the opposition.

### Violence Surrounding Recent By-Elections

Political violence broke out between government and opposition supporters in the weeks running up to parliamentary by-elections on February 28, 2013, in Livingstone and Mpongwe. In Livingstone, a PF supporter, Harrison Chanda, was killed with an axe on February 25 during a campaign event, allegedly by UPND supporters.<sup>53</sup> Riot police have been deployed and a curfew has been implemented in Livingstone, a tourist destination located near Victoria Falls, with tourists allegedly locking themselves into their hotels out of fear.<sup>54</sup> Political violence has also been reported in Mpongwe in the run-up to the February 28 election, with gangs of alleged PF supporters blocking roads and attacking UPND vehicles.<sup>55</sup>



Source: Aardvark Safaris, <http://www.aardvarksafaris.com/images/stories/images/camp-maps/map-Zambia-Royal-Livingstone-Hotel.gif>.

As outlined in the November 21, 2012 issue of *The Africa Watch*, violence also flared in earlier recent local by-elections in Zambia.<sup>56</sup> On November 8, 2012, a PF supporter was killed and two others hurt in Rufunsa, with Sata quickly pointing the finger at MMD and the UPND. Police immediately detained seven opposition members for questioning over the incident, including the UPND Lusaka province chairperson Adrian Bauleni.<sup>57</sup> The Coalition for the Defence of Democratic Rights (CDDR), an alliance comprising civil society and opposition groups, accused Sata of politicizing the incident: “For the president to accuse any political party prior to the completion of a full investigation represents an abuse of power and a risk of further destabilization.”<sup>58</sup>

### **Crackdown on Opposition**

As in the incident in Rufunsa, Sata’s government has responded swiftly to the political violence in Livingstone, with some reports indicating that over 20 opposition figures have already been arrested in connection with the violence, the most prominent being UPND leader Hichilema, along with other party officials.<sup>59</sup> These actions reflect Sata’s growing practice of resorting to harsh tactics when dealing with political opponents. Hichilema, leader of the UPND, and Mumba, head of the MMD, have both been arrested numerous times in the last year on charges including defamation, corruption, and unlawful assembly.<sup>60</sup> Hichilema has already been arrested twice in 2013. In addition, four media figures who had been critical of Sata and a former information minister were detained in January 2013 on various charges.<sup>61</sup>

Such hardline tactics from Sata have led to a chorus of domestic and international criticism, with some warning of an increasingly authoritarian government in Zambia. In January 2013, Hichilema asserted, “This country is deteriorating by the day and being run like a dictatorship...We are not being allowed to exercise our human rights of freedom of assembly, association or expression. The police are working against us and we are being taken in and out of detention on flimsy charges.”<sup>62</sup>

### **Opposition Takes Grievances Internationally**

Some opposition and civil society groups in Zambia have begun to court international opinion and take their grievances to international bodies. A group of opposition figures held a press conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in early February 2013 to draw international attention to Sata’s alleged abuses of democratic freedoms. At the meeting, Sakwiba Sikota, leader of the United Liberal Party, claimed, “The very fact that we were not able to hold this meeting in Lusaka gives you a sense of the situation.”<sup>63</sup>

In the same vein, the CDDR group appealed in January to the Commonwealth of Nations for support, urging Zambia’s suspension from the body and filing a report outlining Sata’s myriad alleged violations. The CDDR charged Sata and the PF with “politically motivated persecution of democratic opponents” and “repeated arrests of opposition figures on false pretenses, defamation, and fictitious accusations of criminal activity levied against opponents of the state.”<sup>64</sup> The Commonwealth has acknowledged receipt of the submission and is currently reviewing the document.

### **Outlook**

Recent incidents of poll violence in November 2012 and February 2013 mark a significant departure from previous elections in Zambia, which have been relatively peaceful. This violence, combined with the ensuing strong-arm reaction of Sata’s government, will further escalate political divisions in Zambia. In this tense political climate, limited outbreaks of political violence are likely to persist in the near to medium term. Violence is likely to be contained at the local

level. If opposition groups were to band together and protest Sata's clampdown, however, they could pose a threat to Sata and the PF's political fortunes, especially as the opposition gains traction with international actors concerned with Sata's increasingly hardline tendencies.

Sata has pushed back at his domestic and international critics, defending his government's actions as not politically motivated. Kennedy Sakeni, Sata's spokesman, asserted in January, "This perception that the government is authoritarian and is persecuting opposition leaders is neither here nor there...The police are working independently and there is no political persecution...we will not allow citizens to violate the laws and think they will get away with it."<sup>65</sup> Regardless of which party is ultimately responsible for recent electoral violence, such incidents provide Sata and the PF with a convenient pretext to continue their suppression of the opposition and frame their response as a law-and-order operation.

## ALERTS

### M23 Split: Implications for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**Researcher:** Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On February 24, 2013, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) signed a peace agreement with 10 of its neighbors and the United Nations to end the conflict in eastern Congo. On February 28, 2013, the main rebel group in eastern Congo, the M23, split into two factions behind Jean-Marie Runiga, formerly M23's political leader, and General Sultani Makenga, the group's military chief. The two factions are reportedly engaged in heavy fighting outside of Goma.

The split within the M23, which was not included in the most recent round of peace talks, does not bode well for the prospects of peace in eastern Congo.

#### Recent Events in Eastern Congo

On February 28—a mere five days after the signing of fresh peace accords by the leaders of 10 neighboring countries and the DRC—the M23 rebel movement announced that it had dismissed its president, Jean-Marie Runiga.<sup>66</sup> The dismissal of Runiga has led to the splintering of M23 and the creation of a new rebel group supporting Runiga as its leader. General Baudoin Ngaruye, previously the second in command behind General Makenga, is said to support the new group.<sup>67</sup>

A newly appointed spokesman for the group claims that Runiga was unilaterally pushed out by Makenga, whom they accuse of conspiring with the Congolese government.<sup>68</sup> Makenga and his supporting faction claim that Runiga is collaborating with fugitive rebel General Bosco Ntaganda, who is subject to an International Criminal Court arrest warrant. Some speculate that the reason for the split between Runiga and Makenga, in addition to disagreement over the role that Ntaganda should play within the M23, has to do with Makenga's desire to negotiate with the government and Runiga's desire to continue military operations in eastern Congo.<sup>69</sup> Shortly after the split was announced there were reports of heavy fighting between the two factions near Goma.<sup>70</sup> When asked about the current rift within the M23, Rwandan president Paul Kagame stated that he did not follow the activities of the M23.<sup>71</sup> Some allege, however, that Rwanda does not wish to see Bosco Ntaganda apprehended, which suggests that the Rwandan government would likely support the Runiga faction over the Makenga faction.<sup>72</sup>

The M23 was explicitly not invited to participate in the peace talks that were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.<sup>73</sup> Civil society organizations have also voiced their complaints over the peace accords, claiming that they were not consulted and that the peace deal did not address the main causes of the conflict, poverty and corruption.<sup>74</sup> Rather, the peace deal was a high-level agreement between international actors. As a result, some have argued that the agreement is doomed to fail as it does not involve the most relevant parties to the conflict. Furthermore, a fractured rebel movement complicates the picture, especially as one group appears more eager to resume its attacks in eastern Congo.



## DRC: Escalating Insecurity in Katanga Province

Researcher: Ms. Ivana Djak

### Summary

- Mai Mai and secessionist group violence in Katanga Province has intensified over the past few months, leaving hundreds dead and thousands displaced. The violence poses a serious threat to the Katanga mining industry.
- Local authorities fear that Mai Mai and secessionist groups are forming alliances to mimic M23 success in getting the government to the negotiating table on the issue of Katangan autonomy.

### Mai Mai and FARDC Clashes in Katanga

Increased fighting between numerous Mai Mai militias and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC)) in Katanga Province has caused residents to flee their homes and go into hiding in the bush.<sup>75</sup> According to Doctors Without Borders in Shamwana, Katanga, thousands of people have fled, leaving dozens of villages empty.<sup>76</sup> The head of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Special Representative of the Secretary General Roger Meece, recently warned that the situation in Katanga has reached “alarming proportions.”<sup>77</sup> The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates there are 316,000 newly displaced people in the province as of 2011. Security in Katanga began to significantly deteriorate after the 2011 prison escape of a leader of the Mai Mai Gedeon group, and the deterioration has particularly intensified over the past couple months.<sup>78</sup>



Source: <http://notwhatyoumightthink.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/thinking-aloud-rebellion-in-katanga/>.

With government forces stretched by the M23 in the east, tensions in Katanga have simmered unabated. The various Mai Mai groups have moved beyond their comfort zones in the north of the province, venturing into the south closer to mining operations. In January 2013, Mai Mai militants were reported near Likasi and other artisanal mining hubs. Their pillaging sprees are increasingly brutal, with more deaths, rapes, and acts of cannibalism reported. Local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have documented miles of burned villages, and the UN reports civilian executions by rebels and security forces.<sup>79</sup> The militants are killing or kidnapping local chiefs and leaders. Mai Mai militants kidnapped the Pweto chief and seriously hurt the Mitwabe chief.<sup>80</sup> The Bakata Katanga Mai Mai secessionist group attacked the city of Kinsevere during the week of February 18 and killed numerous local officials, including the judge, police officers, and the chief. The attack on Kinsevere was concerning because the town is only 25 miles from the regional capital Lumumbashi.<sup>81</sup> Hundreds of people have been killed since late 2012. During the period from January 22 to February 8, the Bakata Katanga Mai Mai killed 65 people in Mwemena town. The leader of the particularly vicious Katanga Bakata Mai Mai group is Tanda Imena, a known secessionist and criminal previously arrested in Zambia.<sup>82</sup>

As Mai Mai recruitment efforts have increased, local officials estimate there are as many as 2,000 militants roaming Katanga. Local populations are concerned because two known secessionist groups, CORAK (*Coordination pour le référendum de l'autodétermination du Katanga*) and CPK (*Congrès des peuples du Katanga*), have allegedly joined forces with the Mai Mai Gedeon. New alliances and increased recruitment efforts have led some analysts to suggest that local politicians are behind the surge in violence. Politicians are allegedly emulating M23 efforts in order to pressure the government to the negotiating table on the issue of Katangan autonomy.<sup>83</sup>

The frequent clashes have led to a health and food crisis. There has been a drastic drop in the numbers of patients seen at local hospitals even though it is peak malaria season. People are afraid to leave the bush.<sup>84</sup> It is also currently the peak harvest season, but people have abandoned their fields to flee. Food production has come to a complete halt in some parts of Katanga.<sup>85</sup> Local NGOs are demanding that the government restore security in the region.<sup>86</sup> People in the city of Kamina burned the central market down during the week of February 18 to protest insecurity. FARDC has since arrived in Kamina to rebuild the market and end any further demonstrations, but locals fear it is too little too late.<sup>87</sup> Resentment of President Kabila's government has made dissatisfied youths easy targets for the militants' recruiting efforts. Some villagers have even welcomed the militants as liberators.<sup>88</sup>

The government and local officials fear Mai Mai activity will compromise the mining industry. The last decade has seen billions of dollars invested in Katanga with the arrival of copper giant Freeport McMoRan, Glencore, and other corporations. Katanga's governor, Moise Katumbi, wrote to the UN in mid-January asking for help and reinforcement from MONUSCO to prevent a situation similar to the hostage crisis at an Algerian gas plant.<sup>89</sup>

### **Katanga's Strong Secessionist Roots**

Katanga has a long history of unrest. Its copper, cobalt, and uranium mines have always been Congo's richest revenue sources. At the Congo's independence in 1960, Katangan leaders resisted President Patrice Lumumba's rule. Secessionist leader Moise Tshombe, supported by American and Belgian mining interests, declared independence. Katanga remained autonomous for three years as President Joseph Mobutu was unable to suppress Tshombe's rebels until January 1963.<sup>90</sup> Separatist movements fought during the 1970s and 1980s, but were weak during the 1990s as President Mobutu stirred tensions between native Katangans and

immigrant Luba tribes. Native Katangans have long clashed with the Luba who came from Kasai during colonialism to run the mines. The 1997 seizure of power by Laurent Desire Kabila, a Katanga Luba from a northern part of the province, led to north-south tension in Katanga. Most of the resources are in the south, but northern elites manage and gain wealth from them. During the 1998 Congolese war, Laurent Kabila created Mai Mai militias to stop Rwandan forces, but these militias took on a life of their own.<sup>91</sup>

Secessionist elements continue to be active in Katanga. The province has a strained relationship with the central government, which many local politicians feel pockets Katanga's wealth but neglects its development. Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza, president of the provincial assembly and leading separatist politician, said in a January 2013 interview that he has 300,000 signatures in favor of Katangan autonomy.<sup>92</sup>

## Botswana: 28 Arrested on Alleged Links to Somali Militants

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

On February 18, 2013, local news outlets reported that 28 people had been arrested in Botswana for allegedly supporting militant groups in Somalia.<sup>93</sup> The ethnic Somali suspects were detained by Botswana's Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DIS) in a poor area of Francistown, the country's second largest city, and the Dukwi refugee camp, located about 80 miles outside of Francistown.<sup>94</sup> Although DIS chief Isaac Kgosi "would not deny or confirm the allegations," the report states that the detainees own a network of used-car dealerships and are suspected of laundering Somali pirate money and smuggling illegal immigrants into Botswana.<sup>95</sup>

The local report also alleges that the detainees have admitted their fealty to Somali militant groups: "Under interrogation, a majority of the suspects confirmed their allegiance to some terror groups."<sup>96</sup> The group of 28 is now being held in Botswana's Centre for Illegal Immigrants in Francistown.



Source: Botswana Travel Service, <http://www.botswanatravelservice.com/francistown-botswana.html>.  
Map © 2010 madbookings.com.

- The suspects have allegedly smuggled Somalis from Kenya and Somalia into Botswana using haulage trucks that come through South Africa's Durban port. The network of car dealers then assists illegal immigrants in gaining access to travel documents and opening businesses.<sup>97</sup>
- The DIS had apparently been planning the operation since last year.<sup>98</sup>
- The Dukwi refugee camp holds over 3,000 refugees of 16 nationalities, with most hailing from Angola, Namibia, and Somalia, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.<sup>99</sup>

While the operation has been underreported and details remain unclear, the arrests reveal the need to closely monitor radicalization within Somali diaspora communities in southern Africa, even in middle-income and stable Botswana.

## Political Party Profile: Djibouti's Union for National Salvation (USN)

**Researcher:** Ms. Brittany Gregerson

### What is the USN?

The USN is a coalition of six Djiboutian opposition parties:

- Republican Alliance for Development (ARD).
- Djiboutian Party for Development (PDD).
- National Democratic Party (PND).
- Union for Democracy and Justice (UDJ).
- Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development (MRD).
- Movement for Development and Liberty (MoDel).<sup>100</sup>

Djibouti's February legislative elections were the first for the Union for National Salvation, or USN (from the French *Union pour le Salut National*).<sup>101</sup> Formed in December 2012,<sup>102</sup> the USN was originally dubbed the Holy Union for Change, or USC (from the French *Union Sacrée pour le Changement*).<sup>103</sup> The USN platform focuses on bolstering democracy; strengthening the media; fighting "tribalism, corruption and nepotism";<sup>104</sup> and reinstating "human rights and individual and collective freedoms" in Djibouti.<sup>105</sup>



Photo of a USN rally via the group's Facebook page. Source: Union pour le Salut National—USN on Facebook: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Union-pour-le-Salut-National-USN/160093767475493>, accessed February 26, 2013.

The ARD, PDD, and PND were the original members of the alliance and are considered its key anchors. Although the USN was successful in expanding its membership before the February elections, it fell short of its original goal of "[absorbing] all other opposition parties and figures."<sup>106</sup> In addition to the support of its member parties, the USN was backed by both the

local Muslim Brotherhood chapter<sup>107</sup> and the independent Rally for Action, Democracy and Development (RAAD) party of Abdurahman Mohamed Guelleh, popular mayor of Djibouti City.<sup>108</sup> USN officials claim they also have strong support from the Djiboutian diaspora;<sup>109</sup> despite this wide base of support, however, the USN is said to operate on “a shoestring budget,” having no reliable or particularly robust sources of funding.<sup>110</sup>

### Use of New Media

Since late 2012, the USN has used social networks extensively. During the recent election, it published its own vote totals on Facebook and Twitter, enlisting supporters to compare them to officially released numbers.<sup>111</sup> Afterward, the USN and some of its constituent parties used their Twitter accounts to announce the location of planned demonstrations, report instances of intimidation and violence, and list their grievances.<sup>112</sup> The ruling Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP) used social media as well, particularly Twitter.<sup>113</sup> At the time of the election, follower and friend counts for the USN and UMP were relatively low. It is unclear how useful social media tools were to Djiboutians during the campaign and election period.

### Key Figures

**Ahmed Youssouf Houmed**, 77, USN leader,<sup>114</sup> is also currently the head of USN member party Republican Alliance for Development (ARD). Before joining the opposition, he held ministerial positions in President Guelleh’s government.<sup>115</sup>



Source: “Djibouti Vote Rigging May Cause New Mass Protests,” *Afrol News*, February 25, 2013, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/38168>, accessed February 27, 2013.

**Ismail Guedi Hared**, 73, the USN leader in Djibouti City, is a veteran politician and former high-level aide to Hassan Gouled Aptidon, Djibouti’s first post-independence president.<sup>116</sup> Hared managed Aptidon’s cabinet from 1977 to 1999. Afterward, he led the Union for a Democratic Alternative (UAD), an opposition coalition that predates the USN, and was the leader of UAD member party Union for Democracy and Justice (UDJ).<sup>117</sup> During the violent upheaval that followed Djibouti’s February 2011 elections, Hared was arrested along with fellow high-profile opposition leaders Aden Robleh Awaleh and Mohammed Daoud Chehem and accused of having organized the protests.<sup>118</sup>





Source: “Djibouti vote rigging may cause new mass protests,” Afrol News, February 25, 2013, <http://www.afrol.com/articles/38168>, accessed February 27, 2013.

**Daher Ahmed Farah**, 50,<sup>119</sup> USN spokesperson and prominent dissident voice, is the formerly exiled head of the Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development (MRD).<sup>120</sup> Prior to his career in politics, Farah served in the Djiboutian army and edited government newspaper *La Nation*; after leaving, he established the independent newspaper *Le Renouveau*.<sup>121</sup> He spent the past nine years in Belgium and was arrested upon his return to Djibouti but released in advance of the elections.<sup>122</sup> Farah’s return to Djibouti to join the opposition coalition is cited as a key moment in the USN’s development.<sup>123</sup>



Source: “Djibouti: ‘Guelleh Step Down and Somalia Remove Your Police’—Opposition Statement,” *Somaliland Press*, February 22, 2011, <http://somalilandpress.com/djibouti-guelleh-step-down-and-somalia-remove-your-police-opposition-statement-20366>, accessed February 27, 2013.

### Detractors

Common criticisms of the USN include that it has a flimsy or “hate-based” platform, with little substance beyond opposition to the UMP<sup>124</sup> and that it is looking to encourage social disruption—“calling for a [Arab] Spring that has no place [in Djibouti].”<sup>125</sup> Others have taken issue with USN leadership, suggesting that Djibouti needs more stark change than Houmed, Hared, and Farah—all of whom have held government positions in the past—can realistically be expected to provide.<sup>126</sup>

## Guinea Names New Armed Forces Chief

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

President Alpha Condé has named Brigadier General Namory Traoré as Chief of Guinea's armed forces.<sup>127</sup> Traoré previously served as Deputy Chief under his predecessor, General Souleymane Kelefa Diallo, who died in a plane crash with five other senior military officials on February 11. General Traoré, a close ally of President Condé, will likely continue to advance the United Nations-backed military reforms in Guinea. Information on General Traoré is limited, but his appointment has been described as a move of "continuity" for the army reforms that retired 4,000 soldiers under the leadership of Diallo in December 2011.<sup>128</sup>



Brigadier General Namory Traoré.

Source: "Guinea Replaces Military Chief Killed in Plane Crash," VOA News, [http://www.voanews.com/content/guinea\\_replaces\\_military\\_chief\\_killed\\_in\\_plane\\_crash\\_traore/1611161.html](http://www.voanews.com/content/guinea_replaces_military_chief_killed_in_plane_crash_traore/1611161.html).

Guinea's armed forces are a serious threat to stability in the country. The forces are notoriously oversized, undisciplined, poorly trained, and have been persistent perpetrators of violence and coups since the country's independence in 1958.<sup>129</sup> The following is a summary of recent misconduct:

- In 2008, military officers seized power after former President Lansana Conté died. Captain Moussa Dadis Camara declared himself president.
- In 2009, soldiers killed 157 people, injured over 1200, and raped 131 women during an opposition protest calling for Camara to step down. Three years later, perpetrators of the September 28 Stadium Massacre still enjoy impunity.<sup>130</sup>
- In July 2011, shortly after Guinea's first democratic elections, around 30 soldiers were arrested after an assassination attempt on President Condé. Gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades were used in the attack.
- Throughout 2012, both the army and security forces<sup>131</sup> have used inappropriate force to squash opposition rallies protesting the organization and delay of legislative elections, as well as smaller protests outside Conakry.

Given the approaching legislative elections, it will be critical for President Condé and General Traoré to keep the armed forces under control and continue moving forward with army reforms.



In light of the army's historical insubordination to the civilian government, this will be a difficult task.

Furthermore, the opposition coalition has promised to boycott the May 12 legislative elections. On February 26, 130 were injured during an opposition protest when security forces responded to the demonstration.<sup>132</sup> While the police and gendarmerie are not as well armed nor as unruly as the armed forces, any future opposition protests (and subsequent military and/or security responses) have the potential to reach the level of or exceed that of the September 28 Stadium Massacre.

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES



# THE AFRICA WATCH

MARCH 20, 2013

## TO THE READER

With this issue of *The Africa Watch*, IDA's team of Africa researchers says farewell, at least for a time. We hope that our analyses of African trends and developments have been useful to you in your service to our national security.

With best regards,

*George Ward*

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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## ANALYSES

### Is Eritrea Ripe for Revolution?

**Researcher:** Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

#### Summary


- On January 21, 2013, between 100 and 200 dissident Eritrean soldiers forced their way into Asmara's Ministry of Information building, known as "Forto." They compelled the director of Eritrean Television, who was also the acting Minister of Information, to read a statement of their demands for the implementation of the 1997 constitution, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of a transitional government.
- The television station was quickly surrounded by Eritrea's Special Brigade, and the incident, popularly known as Forto 2013, was soon over. A few high-ranking officials were arrested in the days following Forto 2013, but there has been no news so far of consequences suffered by the dissident soldiers.
- The international attention and the discussion on Eritrean diaspora websites were hyperbolic, with some predicting regime change on the way. While the incident generated speculation about the weakness of the regime of President Isaias Afewerki, it is not clear that political revolution is imminent.
- Political revolution would need both a substantial popular response and diaspora support. To date, while the diaspora is just starting to coalesce around Forto 2013, the internal response has been muted.
- Another incident by Eritrean soldiers might elicit a more robust response from Eritrean citizens, as the atmosphere of fear begins to lift. Until then, Forto 2013 remains an indicator of dissatisfaction with the state, but not of impending regime change.

#### Forto 2013

On January 21, between 100 and 200 Eritrean soldiers stormed the Ministry of Information in Asmara around 10 a.m. Once at "Forto," the common name of the ministry, which also houses Eritrean State Television, the dissident soldiers took an unknown number of employees hostage, including President Isaias Afewerki's daughter.<sup>1</sup> The soldiers, led by Colonel Saleh Osman, who served in the South Zone (Debub, see map),<sup>2</sup> forced the Director of Eritrean Television and acting Minister of Information, Asmellash Abraha Woldu, to read their demands, which included the full implementation of the 1997 constitution, a transitional government, an end to corruption by senior officers, and the release of political prisoners.<sup>3</sup> But the transmission was soon jammed, and only part of the broadcast was heard by TV viewers.<sup>4</sup>

The rationale behind Forto 2013, as the incident has come to be known, is not clear. Some have said that Forto 2013 was a means to start a conversation about democracy in Eritrea.<sup>5</sup> Others argue that it was a failed coup.<sup>6</sup> Some question whether the interrupted broadcast meant that reinforcements were not able to arrive as might have been planned, thus undoing the coup attempt.<sup>7</sup> Still others postulate that the incident was due to increasing tension between Afewerki and some senior government officials. The latest clash stemmed from the president's

decision to distribute weapons to citizen militias, without the knowledge of the Defense Minister. The senior government officials opposing the decision have been sidelined; some say Forto 2013 was an attempt to show that they are still relevant.<sup>8</sup>



Source: <http://www.eritrea.be/old/eritrea-geography.htm#zobas>, accessed March 13, 2013.

A brief firefight ensued between the dissident soldiers and Eritrea's Special Brigade—two dissident soldiers were wounded, one of whom died. Afterward, the rest were allowed to return to their barracks. Arrests, however, began within a couple of days.<sup>9</sup> A total of approximately 200 people were arrested, including number of high-profile members of the ruling party, such as Abdella Jaber, Director of Organisational Affairs; Mustafa Nurhussein, Governor of the South Zone; and Suleiman Hajj, the Mayor of Mendefera (provincial capital of Debub) and Nurhussein's deputy.<sup>10</sup> There has been no news about what specifically happened to the dissident soldiers.

Forto 2013 followed several notable incidents. In November 2012, Ali Abdu, Eritrea's powerful Minister of Information, defected, possibly to Australia.<sup>11</sup> The TV producer with whom he had been traveling, Daniel Kiflom, is also suspected of having defected.<sup>12</sup> Also in November, Afewerki arrested his long-time military adviser, Major General Filipos Woldeyohannes. Some analysts say that Woldeyohannes was behind the attempted coup.<sup>13</sup>

The uprising was particularly surprising in the context of Eritrea's tightly controlled autocracy. The Afewerki regime strictly controls information and the movements of its citizens, especially the youth. After high school, youths either join the army or a civilian sector national service.<sup>14</sup> There is no release date from national service—it was extended indefinitely in 1998, the start of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict. The government exercises very tight control over the movement of national service members to prevent defection. Police are stationed at checkpoints to catch deserters. There are also unpredictable round-ups of deserters, which amplify the fear of national service members. If national service members are caught, they face severe consequences, including beating, torture, and months-long detention.<sup>15</sup> Organizing a

protest thus seems like a gargantuan task. In fact, the last uprising occurred in 1993; it featured soldiers demanding a pay increase.<sup>16</sup> Forto 2013's demands are more substantial and thus even more unexpected.

### **Eritrean Diaspora and Forto 2013**

While Forto 2013 did not incite the Eritrean citizenry to rise up against the Afewerki regime, it did galvanize the diaspora. In a show of support, Eritreans in London and Rome stormed their embassy; the Eritrean communities in Stockholm, Toronto, Ottawa, and other cities demonstrated; and 3,000 Eritrean refugees in Mai Aini camp in northern Ethiopia came together in a similar show of support.<sup>17</sup> Eritreans in Addis Ababa also marched to the African Union headquarters. Many diaspora news sources published positive news articles about Forto 2013. In Toronto, one month after the demonstrations, the effects were still being felt; at the end of February, Eritreans in Toronto formed the "Forto 2013 Support and Solidarity Committee."<sup>18</sup>

Eritrean diaspora communities are not insignificant to the home country: the remittances they provide amount to approximately 38 percent of GDP, the highest proportion in Africa.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the diaspora can use its remittances to effect political change. Angela Mahony finds that migrants send money home during times of elections—which signal the possibility of political transition. Forto 2013 was viewed by many in the diaspora as an important moment for Eritrea and a canary in the Afewerki mineshaft.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, the diaspora's use of cyberspace to mobilize demonstrations, raise money for war, and influence government has been well documented.<sup>21</sup> The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) mobilized the diaspora during the Eritrean war for independence.<sup>22</sup> But the diaspora has also been ambivalent in its regard of the Afewerki regime. While the critics of the regime are the most vocal, it is not a universal position. The regime also has its supporters in the diaspora. Some connect this heterogeneity to the inability of the diaspora to spur political reform in the 16 years since the new constitution was adopted.<sup>23</sup>

### **Is Eritrea Headed for Political Revolution?**

Timur Kuran's theory of unanticipated revolution posits that a seemingly timid and compliant populace (which privately despises the regime) rises up when there is evidence not to be afraid of the dictatorship. Such evidence could come in the form of strategic errors on the part of the regime or an act of defiance by one person.<sup>24</sup> It is a variation on the resolution of the collective action problem: getting groups to act is costly. It becomes worthwhile when the cost of the action is outweighed by the possibility of achieving the goal. Certainly, one can adopt this framework for the events in Tunisia in 2011: a population that was previously thought incapable or uninterested in challenging their autocratic regime seemed to rise as one once Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in desperation and gave voice to many millions who felt the same.

Forto 2013 is one indicator that there are some that are willing to rise up against the regime, notwithstanding the certain harsh response that will await them. The still-unresolved purpose of the incident muddies the signal it sends: was it a coup, a message from disgruntled members of Afewerki's government, or an attempt to start the implementation of the constitution? But the important question is whether this will start a protracted resistance movement against the Afewerki regime. The diaspora has the power to fuel such a movement. It was instrumental in the war of independence, and can be instrumental again. If more diaspora communities, such as the one in Toronto, form Forto 2013 committees, then there is a likelihood that the diaspora might be working toward an active opposition movement. More indications of freedom from fear are needed. The state still has a long reach outside Eritrea's borders—evidenced by its

ability to assess the 2 percent levy on incomes of Eritreans in the diaspora. Moreover, the diaspora is not homogenous. Perhaps political revolution is not imminent, but it is certainly more of a possibility than it was before Forto 2013.



## Guinea—Ever Closer to the Edge

**Researchers:** Amb. (ret.) George F. Ward and Ms. Ashton Callahan

### Summary

Guinea, never the most stable country in West Africa, is moving ever closer, both politically and economically, toward a downward spiral.

- Political violence, with ethnic overtones, has increased, with eight recent deaths and over 100 injuries.
- Plans for parliamentary elections on May 12, 2013, have been thrown into question, with another postponement the likely outcome.
- Foreign investors are pulling back from new ventures, concerned over political unrest and the hurdles presented by revisions made to Guinea's mining code in September 2011.

In similar situations in the past, Guinea's historically insubordinate military has stepped in. The loyalty of the military to the government of President Alpha Condé in the current circumstances is unclear.

### Violence Diminishes Hope of Political Progress

Around the turn of the year, international observers held out hope that the work of the newly reformed National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) would result in agreement on legislative elections, which have not been held in Guinea since 2002. An outbreak of political violence beginning during the last week of February resulted in the deaths of at least eight people. The trigger for the violence was an opposition march in Conakry that spread to suburbs and culminated into ethnic violence in the following days.<sup>25</sup>

Despite concessions (a new CENI president and equal representation of opposition, ruling party, and civil society members), the opposition continues to demand the replacement of Waymark, a South African company responsible for the electoral register, and the right to vote for Guineans living abroad. The consensus among opposition members is that President Condé is trying to rig the elections in his favor. Given the multitude of opposition protests over the past year, it is unlikely that the opposition will waiver on these demands.

In the wake of the violence, President Condé met with opposition leaders and others on March 4. The meeting lasted for about one hour and seems to have produced no concrete results. Former Minister Aboubacar Sylla, a senior opposition figure, said he was disappointed with the meeting: "We came here for nothing. The President told us he would implement a permanent framework under the aegis of the prime minister who will contact us at an unspecified date, but there's no schedule, no agenda."<sup>26</sup> In the aftermath of this inconclusive meeting, figures such as the European Union's foreign policy chief and the spokesperson of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have voiced concern. On March 15, Guinea's main opposition parties agreed to participate in preliminary talks with President Condé. The agreement was made in exchange for CENI suspending its activities for one week.<sup>27</sup>

### Condé's Promise Fades

In 2010, Alpha Condé came into office amid promises of a new era of accountability and transparency. He has done better at pleasing his international partners than the domestic audience. Under his administration, the budget deficit has been reduced and inflation is down

slightly. He managed to obtain cancellation of \$2.1 billion of Guinea's approximately \$3 billion external debt.<sup>28</sup> The Guinean population has not seen this macroeconomic success translate into tangible benefits. Water, sanitation, electricity, health care, education, and public transport are all in short supply.

Condé's loose political coalition of convenience has broken apart, and he has been thrown back on his own party for support. As exemplified in the recent meeting, there is little dialogue with the opposition. The protests have also fueled hostility between Guinea's two main ethnic groups, the Malinké (Condé's ethnicity) and the Peulh (which dominates the opposition).<sup>29</sup> Ethnic tensions have not always been the rule in Guinea, and the two major groups have often managed to get along. Even now, community and religious leaders have been working to prevent inter-communal conflict.

The parliamentary elections, scheduled for May 12, are very likely to become a casualty of the inflamed tensions. President Condé was reported to have said on March 10 that he would like the electoral commission to suggest a new date for the polling. Allegedly, Condé wants "all the conditions to be met before he would consider summoning the electors to the polls."<sup>30</sup> With many issues separating the government and the opposition, a substantial delay is likely.

### **Mining Sector in Turmoil**

As if political difficulties were not enough, President Condé also faces significant economic challenges. The adoption of new mining code in September 2011 continues to be an impediment to the development of mineral resources, especially iron ore. Rusal, the Russian aluminum giant, foreshadowed the current difficulties with its initial reaction to the code in 2011. At the time, Rusal stated that the new mining code "increases considerably tax pressure on mining companies, making it senseless to invest in development and new projects...Any investor of good sense will look for investment opportunities somewhere outside Guinea."<sup>31</sup>

As reported on December 5, 2012, in *The Africa Watch*, ongoing controversy has surrounded rights to exploit the world's highest quality iron ore deposit, located in the Mount Simandou area. In the latest developments, Rio Tinto, the Anglo-Australian mining giant, which holds rights in the Simandou complex, has threatened to back away from develop of the prospect unless an investment agreement and infrastructure financing are put in place quickly.<sup>32</sup> It is unlikely that the Guinean government will find the means to participate meaningfully in financing for the Simandou prospect. Meanwhile, Rio Tinto's enthusiasm for the project is said to have been shaken by the latest political violence and concerns about corruption.<sup>33</sup> Rio Tinto's reluctance may also reflect projections for falling iron ore prices over the next few years.<sup>34</sup>

Guinea's other great natural resource is bauxite. Rusal is the major player in Guinea bauxite and its semi-refined product, alumina. Australian and Chinese mining interests are also involved. All the investors in the aluminum sector have either cut down their engagements or placed activities on hold. Rusal has slowed down production and apparently dropped plans for an alumina smelter.<sup>35</sup> BHP Billiton is reportedly seeking to sell its stake in an alumina project, and China Power Investment's plan for a bauxite refinery, port, and power station is on hold.<sup>36</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Political instability, a crumbling political constituency, increasing violence, and negative economic developments seem to constitute a "perfect storm" for the administration of President Alpha Condé. Also, as mentioned in the March 6 edition of *The Africa Watch*, the notoriously oversized and unruly army is under new leadership. Based on the current political situation and there being a previous assassination attempt on President Condé in July 2011, it is

unclear how loyal the military will be to the government moving forward. President Condé may not quite be on the edge of the whirlpool, but he is getting very close.

## Schism among Nigeria's Governors

**Researchers:** Ms. Betty Boswell and Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

### Summary

- Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan recently announced the establishment of a Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) Governors' Forum in what many see as an attempt to blunt the influence of the National Governors' Forum (NGF) and its popular chairman, Chibuike Amaechi of Rivers State, in the run-up to the 2015 presidential election. Amaechi has hinted that he would stand as an opposition candidate for Vice-President against a Jonathan-led PDP ticket in 2015.
- The move came after a failed attempt by Jonathan loyalists, led by Governor Godswill Akapbio of Akwa Ibom State, to oust Amaechi. Akapbio was tapped to head the new PDP Governors' Forum. He has since headed a PDP campaign to discredit Amaechi, accusing him of "mischief and passing misleading information to the public," disrespecting the president, inciting citizens of Rivers State against Jonathan, and "political rascality."<sup>37</sup>
- The events surrounding Amaechi's bid for a second term as NGF head have revealed deep divisions within the ranks of Nigeria's state governors, especially in the South-South region, from which both Amaechi and Jonathan hail. These divisions are likely to solidify and intensify as the 2015 election approaches.

### Schism

A long-brewing political feud between President Goodluck Jonathan and Governor Rotimi Amaechi, chairman of the National Governor's Forum, came to a head in late February 2013 when an unsuccessful attempt to oust Amaechi resulted in the establishment of a parallel PDP Governors' Forum. This splintering within the powerful union of governors, which has been described as wielding overbearing power just as the governors themselves exercise almost dictatorial powers within their states, is perceived as an effort to dilute some of Amaechi's influence.<sup>38</sup> The new organization is seen, more broadly, as a move to dilute the power of state governors, especially those critical of Jonathan's intention to run for a second term. Amaechi had broad support from governors from Northeastern and Northwestern zones, but several from the Southern zones seem to fear that his chairmanship risks dividing the south politically, endangering Jonathan's chances for reelection.<sup>39</sup>

The move may have backfired for Jonathan. Several governors, even among Jonathan supporters, expressed dismay at the inappropriate meddling by the president in the internal workings of the NGF. As one put it, "The governor's forum is a bipartisan body.... Why this partisan interest? Without the forum, governors can exist and relate with like minds, but the forum serves as a gauge for peer review for the overall interest of the federation."<sup>40</sup> For his part, Jonathan claimed that his intervention was a good-faith effort to heal a breach among the governors. "The president," according to a spokesman, "wanted to mediate as a father in this unsettling affair."<sup>41</sup>

### Governor Rotimi Amaechi

Rotimi Amaechi became governor of Rivers State after the Supreme Court nullified the election of Sir Celestine Omechia because of PDP irregularities in 2007. His 2011 election victory by a whopping 10–1 margin put to rest any lingering questions about his legitimacy and amounts to

an affirmation of his leadership and the improvement in the day-to-day lives of the Rivers citizens. Under Amaechi's administration, Rivers State has seen the following:

- The construction of new model primary and secondary schools.
- Expansion in the number primary health centers.
- Improved power generation.
- Construction and reconstruction of roads throughout the state.
- Improvement of security throughout the state.<sup>42</sup>



Rt. Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi, PM News Nigeria

Amaechi has amassed a lot of influence within the NGF by serving as its chairman since June 2011. Although a member of the PDP, he is supported by the 10 governors of the All Progressives Congress (APC), much to President Jonathan's displeasure. The president and some of the PDP governors have pressured Amaechi not to run for another two-year chairmanship. In fact, President Jonathan reportedly called together several PDP governors to view videos that allegedly demonstrated Amaechi's disloyalty to Jonathan. Amid much squabbling and a shouting match among the governors of the PDP and governors of the APC, a final vote on the NGF chairmanship has been postponed until May.<sup>43</sup>

Amaechi's governorship has not been without controversy. He has received a lot of criticism for having spent \$45.7 million on a new jet for his use at a time when hundreds of thousands of Rivers State residents had been displaced by floods.<sup>44</sup> He has also been the subject of tabloid-style stories linking him with a Nollywood actress.<sup>45</sup> But as confirmed by a recent "vote of confidence" within his state, Amaechi is a well-respected politician, inviting rumors of a potential vice-presidential bid in 2015, in which he would run with a northern presidential candidate, perhaps Sule Lamido of Jigawa State.<sup>46</sup>

### **Godswill Akpabio**

Akwa Ibom State governor Godswill Akpabio, a PDP and Jonathan loyalist, was named chairman of the parallel Governors' Forum.<sup>47</sup> Like Governor Amaechi, Akpabio is a South-South governor and is well-liked by his constituents. He was elected in 2007 with the mandate to re-brand and re-position Akwa Ibom State through programs for industrialization, poverty reduction, community entrepreneurship, and food security. Governor Akpabio has delivered on many of his

promises and has kept Akwa Ibom out of tribal wars, away from militancy, and away from crime.<sup>48</sup>

As the newly appointed head of the PDP Governors' Forum, Akpabio declared his mission to be flushing out anti-Jonathan governors elected on the PDP platform—to get rid of the “Judases” among them. He went on to say that the new forum is not meant to weaken the NGF but rather to strengthen it, as well as give the PDP governors a venue to meet as a bloc.<sup>49</sup>

This move to consolidate power in the PDP with Jonathan loyalists appears to be an attempt to counter the groundswell of opposition from the new APC. Governor Akpabio, speaking to the PDP Governors' Forum, said there is a cleansing going on within the party, and those who “have been working against the interest of the party” will soon be purged from the party. He went on to say that the formation of the APC, while perhaps a move toward a true two-party system, will not derail the party or Jonathan's support within the party.<sup>50</sup>



Governor Godswill Akpabio, Nigeriaspirit.com.

# The Looming Power of Football Nationalism in Africa

**Researcher:** Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

## Summary

- Egypt's Ultras, along with numerous other football clubs across Africa, are the products of a sometimes calculated strategy by autocratic regimes to provide an outlet for the frustration of the unemployed youth that increasingly crowd the continent's inner cities. Sub-Saharan Africa has its own rich history of politicized football going back to the early 20th century, when European colonial powers introduced football to "distract Africans from political engagement and provide an example of the supposed 'benefits' of membership" in the empire.<sup>51</sup>
- There is evidence that under the right circumstances, football in sub-Saharan Africa has the potential to mobilize popular demands for transformational change. It has already demonstrated its potential as a force for healing and reconciliation in post-conflict situations.
- While much will depend on who mobilizes the "nationalist" potential of football and to what purpose, its capacity to create new, cross-cutting identities and promote reconciliation between conflicting ethnic, religious, and tribal groups is real and measurable.

## A Tale of Three Countries

Barely hours after French President Francois Hollande took a victory lap through the streets of Mali's newly-liberated Timbuktu, French forces had reconnected the power supplies that fleeing jihadists had cut, and "the lights [were] flickering in the hotels of Timbuktu... [and] televisions screens [were] switching back to life in time for people to witness an important national event." After 10 months of jihadist occupation, during which both television and playing football were banned, Mali's national football team, the Eagles, was set to play Nigeria in the semifinal round of the Africa Cup of Nations. "We will win everything," one resident said. "First we will win the war, then we will win the cup. It will bring us all together." Four days earlier, Timbuktu's residents poured into the streets to chant and honk horns after the Eagles had defeated South Africa to reach the semifinal. "The Islamists banned everything," another resident told Reuters, "But now I can watch games as loud as I want."<sup>52</sup> The Mali team—which eventually finished third in the tournament after losing to Nigeria—had announced they would take smaller bonuses to help defray the costs of the war, a symbolic move that added to the sense that football could help reunify the country.<sup>53</sup>

In October 2012, Senegal's national team lost its opportunity to play in the same African Cup tournament after a fan riot forced officials to stop a match against Côte d'Ivoire. Senegalese fans, angered over their team's poor play, threw "food, drinks, and anything that could be thrown" onto the field and set fires in the stand at Leopold Senghor Stadium.<sup>54</sup> Players and Ivorian fans huddled for safety at the center of the field while Senegalese police fired tear gas into the stands. Senegal's President Macky Sall officially apologized to the Ivorian people; the first vice president of the Senegal Football Association resigned; the Senegal Football Federation was fined \$100,000; and the Senghor stadium received a one-year suspension, which will force the national team to find an alternative venue for its 2013 World Cup qualifying matches. According to Senegal's Sports Minister, El Hadji Malick Gackou, the government immediately undertook "diplomatic talks with the African officials to reduce sanctions that will probably hit

Senegal.... We have a young team that could bring us satisfaction in the future so we don't need to sacrifice them.”<sup>55</sup>

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi declared a “state of emergency” in January 2013 after a protest against the verdict in a “soccer riot” trial triggered street protests that eventually morphed into a widespread protest against the government and the new Egyptian constitution. The proximate cause of the protest was the failure of the courts to hold security forces at least partly responsible for a 2012 football riot in Port Said that left 74 people dead. Most of the dead died of asphyxiation after being crushed against locked stadium gates that security forces either refused, or failed, to open. The incident has since come to be seen as an attempt by the security forces to cut the highly politicized and street-savvy Ultras down to size. As one Egyptian observer put it, “The government is getting back at the Ultras. They are saying ‘You protest against us, you want democracy and freedom. Here is a taste of your democracy and freedom.’”<sup>56</sup>

General strikes, street protests, and clashes with security forces led by Egypt's hyper-fan clubs, such as the Ultras, have continued to pose a very real threat to Morsi's government. The Ultras came to prominence during the Arab Spring uprising. At that time, the Ultras played a pivotal, paramilitary role in securing the protestors, setting up checkpoints, and fighting off the police. The Ultras have proven to be one of the most resilient political forces in Egypt as they continue to push for meaningful political and constitutional change. At the center of the Ultra's agenda is the demand for a thorough reform of the police and security forces. According to sports journalist Dave Zirin, “what is clear is that the Ultra clubs aren't leaving the stage of Egypt's history until there is justice and those in the state and military apparatus are held accountable not only for what took place in Port Said but for all the hundreds who've been killed protesting over the last two years.”<sup>57</sup> The Ultras continue to enjoy broad popular support in Egypt, where they are increasingly “being viewed as being the most courageous and consistent fighters against a regime that is growing in unpopularity.”<sup>58</sup>

### **African Football's Mixed Legacy**

Egypt's Ultras, along with numerous football clubs across Africa, are the products of a sometimes-calculated strategy by autocratic regimes to provide an outlet for the frustration of the unemployed youth that increasingly crowd the continent's inner cities.<sup>59</sup> Autocrats afford a certain leeway to the hyper-intense football clubs as a social “safety valve.” As Zirin explains it, they “give these Ultras far more liberty in the streets of the country than other...more traditional political protestors would have. It's generally seen as something that they can [do to] blow off steam. They go in the streets. They fight. They fight the police. They fight each other. They set off fireworks and people like Hosni Mubarak thought for decades that, well, this is fine because it's not political.”<sup>60</sup> It has always been a calculated risk, however. Football “ultras” were a decisive force in the fall of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia in 2000. Milosevic, recognizing their potential, had politicized Croatian and Serbian ultras during the civil wars of the 1990s. Some were even mobilized as paramilitary units. By 2000, however, he had lost their support and the ultras turned most football matches into “anti-Milosevic rallies.”<sup>61</sup>

Sub-Saharan Africa has its own rich history of politicized football. According to sports historian Peter Alegi, European colonial powers introduced football to “distract Africans from political engagement and provide an example of the supposed ‘benefits’ of membership” in the empire. What actually transpired, however, was the emergence of “embryonic national identities” that would serve to unite the ethnically diverse “citizens” of colonial entities and, in so doing, contribute mightily to the emergence of anti-imperialist independence movements.<sup>62</sup> African



football victories over colonial teams served both to debunk imperialist racial ideologies and nurture in Africans the self-confidence to resist colonial rule. According to historian John Akude, as African independence movements emerged in the 1930s, football matches were often “one of the few ‘neutral’ arenas where aspiring nationalists could address relatively large audiences without fear of immediate arrest.”<sup>63</sup> African nationalist figures like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Nnamdi Azikwe in Nigeria believed strongly in football’s nation-building capacity through its power to surmount ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, and generational barriers.<sup>64</sup>

In post-colonial Africa, football continued to play an important role in promoting the sense of nationhood. As newly independent nations experienced the social dislocations of urbanization, access to Western-style education, and mass communication, “the passion for the game among cosmopolitan African nationalists strengthened the connections between football and politics,” creating one of the few overarching symbols of “national culture.” National football stadiums became symbols of modernity and the focuses of national pride—“almost sacred ground for the creation and performance of national identities.”<sup>65</sup>

As the optimism of the early post-colonial era gave way to endemic corruption, conflict, and the rise of autocratic regimes, African football lost much of its populist power. At the same time, the rise of satellite television and the global marketing of European football—especially the British Premier League—further undermined the appeal of local and national sides as African fans began to identify with European teams. National teams came increasingly under the control of politicians, who often used them to “distract” the population’s attention from their regimes’ failures. In 1990, for example, Cameroonian president Paul Biya forced a star player out of retirement to ensure the national team’s success in the World Cup and, he hoped, put a damper on rising demands for democratic reform and the threat of a general strike.<sup>66</sup>

When African players began to become stars on European teams, the social role of football shifted again. Increasingly, urban youth with few social and economic prospects at home began to quit school and enroll in “football academies.” As one Chadian journalist described it, for every African footballer who makes it big in the European leagues, “there are thousands of others investing millions of hours of practice—time that could be spend on school work or learning another trade—without reaching even the first hurdle. Only a handful of each year’s intake to the top schools will ever make a living from football. The rest are destined to be turned loose at 18 to fend for themselves.”<sup>67</sup> Autocrats in sub-Saharan Africa have not hesitated to cynically exploit football for political purposes as Hosni Mubarak did in Egypt and Biya did in Cameroon. Africans bemoan the fact that when China makes “soft power” investments in communities that desperately need medical clinics and schools, they too often build football stadiums that corrupt politicians use to primarily to hold political rallies.

### **Football Nationalism**

Football has been a political tool in Africa since before independence, but does it have the potential in sub-Saharan Africa to mobilize popular demands for transformational change as the Ultras have in Egypt? There is evidence that under the right circumstances, the answer to that question could be “yes.” To be sure, African football has its explosive, destructive moments—as displayed in the Senegal riots and the 2010 Angolan insurgent attack on the Togolese national team that killed three and injured several players.<sup>68</sup> Football management, like most management in sub-Saharan Africa, suffers from a dual curse of resource limits and corruption.

On the positive side, football clubs in sub-Saharan Africa have not developed the sort of paramilitary/criminal character of those in Egypt and Eastern Europe. Even when African fans

are aware that regimes are trying to co-opt the success of their beloved teams, they continue to remain loyal supporters. In the long run, this could enhance the ability of football to play the positive, healing, and unifying role in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in post-conflict societies like Mali.

There is historical precedent. The national football club in Côte d'Ivoire is officially known as *les Éléphants*. But among the Ivoirian population, it is unofficially known as the “the men who ended the war.” When *les Éléphants* qualified for the World Cup finals for the first time in 2005, Côte d'Ivoire was a nation divided by civil war and ethnic violence. The football team was the one thing all Ivoirians—the Muslim north and the Christian south—supported without reserve. Ivoirians watched their national team—composed of players from all ethnic groups and all parts of the country—with pride. As one player described it “We played together and qualified for the World Cup. That showed all the people in our country how important it is to work together. We would not have qualified if we had players from just one part of the country. We showed how important it is to be united.”<sup>69</sup>

It would be two more years before a peace accord officially reunited the country. Shortly after the peace accord was signed, *les Éléphants* played Madagascar in a World Cup qualifying match in the former rebel stronghold of Bouaké. Former rebel commander Famoussa, who handled security for the match, described that day: “The peace accord had been signed, but there was still a lot of mistrust. In soccer, everyone is together, praying for the same thing. When you watch it, you watch it as an Ivorian. You are there for the whole team.... From the first moment of the match I hoped peace was possible.” When he watched the match on video, he noted, “it made me realize how thirsty people were for peace...that’s when I knew that peace was possible.”<sup>70</sup>

Nigeria saw a brief interlude of national unity and pride when its national team, the Super Eagles, won the African Cup of Nations in February 2013. Nigerian soccer at the club level is notoriously corrupt. Before the team’s success at the African Cup, there were rumors that a loss might lead to anti-regime violence. The victory marked Nigeria’s first African championship in 20 years and its first ever won under the direction of a black African coach.<sup>71</sup> As a Nigerian soccer entrepreneur explained in the lead-up to the World Cup in South Africa in 2010, football rises above the political and religious divisions that plague the country: “All this talk of balancing between north and south, Christians and Muslims. In soccer, nobody cares. The team could be eleven Christians or eleven Muslims. The only religion that unites Nigeria is soccer.”<sup>72</sup>

African civil society leaders are rediscovering the power of football in creating shared civic identities, especially among disaffected urban youth in Africa’s teeming megacities. Nongovernmental organizations across Africa are creating youth soccer programs—like the Mathare Youth Sports Association in Kenya—that couple sport with public service. While much will depend on who mobilizes the “nationalist” potential of football and to what purpose, its capacity to create new, cross-cutting identities and promote reconciliation between conflicting ethnic, religious, and tribal groups is real and measurable. In her article “Banal Nationalism,” social anthropologist Bea Vidacs argues that “one of the reasons why international borders have endured in Africa is that these borders, as well as the countries they contain, become a new reality.... Roads, railways, and traffic hubs create their own logic.” Through a study of talk radio in Cameroon, she shows how football contributes to that reality: “television and radio make possible the imagining of the nation by creating an awareness that there are millions of other Cameroonians in all corners of the country watching or listening to a broadcast of the same

match. Further, people are also aware that every one of these listeners is intent on the same outcome: that the national team win.”<sup>73</sup>

## Conflict and Instability in Central Africa

**Researcher:** Dr. Stephanie M Burchard and Ms. Ivana Djak

### Summary

- Massive population shifts—the result of various conflicts around the region in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, and Cameroon—may fuel further instability in the region as new settlements begin to place competing demands on already scarce resources.
- In addition, the number of ungoverned spaces in the region makes central Africa fertile ground for a proliferation of rebel movements. Central Africa's weak and ineffective states compound this likelihood.
- Just as the unrest in Libya in 2011 can indirectly be linked to the current conflict in Mali, it is likely that ongoing conflict in the DRC and CAR could have significant effects on the region as rebels disperse and regroup in new configurations and networks.

### Overview


As consequences of the multitude of rebel movements and conflicts in Central Africa, substantial population shifts are taking place in the region. Congolese are fleeing en masse to neighbors, including Rwanda and Uganda. Refugees from the CAR are settling in the DRC and Cameroon. Almost 300,000 Sudanese are believed to be in Chad. Cameroon hosts at least 100,000 refugees from CAR, Chad, and Nigeria. Porous borders facilitate population exchanges and, with these movements, the possibility of conflict looms. Most rebel groups in Central Africa have cross-border relationships.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, ungoverned spaces in countries such as Sudan, Chad, and Cameroon provide new opportunities for refuge. Unrest in one country can spark massive unrest across the region. The following examines some of the potential sources for future conflict in Central Africa.

### Democratic Republic of the Congo

New violence erupted in the eastern DRC just as the government announced it was attempting to sign a peace agreement with the M23 rebels. Negotiations between the government and M23 are ongoing, but given divisions within the M23 between the Sultani Makenga and Jean-Marie Runiga factions, it is difficult to see how the rebels can credibly negotiate and agree to a cessation of hostilities.<sup>75</sup> Things have apparently gotten so bad in eastern Congo that Runiga has sought refuge in Rwanda.<sup>76</sup> In another unexpected turn of events, DRC warlord Bosco Ntaganda has turned himself into the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, and requested to be transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague where he is currently wanted on charges.<sup>77</sup> It is unclear what Ntaganda's motives are, but some analysts are suggesting that this is a move of desperation and that he may be threatening to reveal sensitive information about others participating in the conflict in the DRC.

Meanwhile, at least 80 people were killed and thousands fled their homes in the town of Kitchanga in North Kivu province after fighting between Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) broke out on February 27, 2013. By March 3, the APCLS allegedly captured the town. By March 5, about 10,000 people had gathered around the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) base in Kitchanga seeking refuge. Kitchanga is in the Masisi region of North Kivu, close to where M23 rebels continue to hold their ground.<sup>78</sup> The International Committee of the

Red Cross warns that the area has turned into a combat zone.<sup>79</sup> Aid workers estimate that about 120,000 people have fled the region, mostly taking refuge in the bush.<sup>80</sup>



Source: "Mapa Político de África Central 1997," <http://www.zonu.com/detail/2009-09-17-27/Mapa-Politico-de-Africa-Central-1997.html> (source of map on website: CIA).

The APCLS is a longstanding rebel group that fought former Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko during the 1990s.<sup>81</sup> APCLS militants arrived in Kitchanga in January 2013 for talks with the government about the possibility of reintegrating into the army. Those talks broke down on February 24. An aid worker for Oxfam said the fighting began after the rebels tried to break up an internally displaced persons camp where they claimed ethnic Tutsi had hidden weapons and were forming a militia. The army protected the camp, and fighting broke out between the APCLS and the army. The local population warns that the conflict has taken on strong ethnic undertones. APCL members, who are mainly from the Hunde community, are seen as targeting Tutsis. The conflict has spread beyond the militants as civilians also started targeting the houses of the other ethnic group. Kingi Mbayo, an APCLS spokesman, denies it is waging an ethnic war against the Tutsi but does acknowledge there is a problem with what he called "fake refugees" pretending to be Congolese Tutsi and claiming a right to land in the DRC. APCLS military spokesman Jannot Makale Kale says his group is not against the government and is ready to collaborate with the army.<sup>82</sup>

Continued M23 clashes and new instability in the DRC have caused tens of thousands of refugees to spread across the region. Nearly 30,000 Congolese refugees have arrived in Rwanda since the M23 clashes began in April 2012. Kigeme camp in Southern Province, which was established in June 2012 to house the new refugees, now hosts about 17,000. Nkamira Transit Center in Western Province is facing severe congestion issues.<sup>83</sup> There are about 69,000 Congolese refugees in Rwanda.<sup>84</sup> About 20,000 Congolese have fled into Uganda just since the beginning of March 2013.<sup>85</sup> There are about 119,000 Congolese refugees in Uganda, of which about 50,000 arrived since the start of M23 clashes last year.<sup>86</sup> In total, there are nearly 500,000 Congolese refugees spread across the Central Africa region. Large population displacements

have led to the formation of militant groups currently active across the region—and further displacement and large population shifts can only breed more disputes and discontent.<sup>87</sup> In addition, many Central African rebel groups (M23, Allied Democratic Front in Uganda, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) operate in multiple countries. These rebels in particular are known to take advantage of large population shifts to find new breeding grounds. In sum, when people shift, rebels shift.

### **Central African Republic**

On March 11, the Seleka rebel coalition attacked and seized the CAR towns of Gambo and Bangassou, near the border with the DRC. These attacks are the newest in a string of violent incidents perpetrated by the Seleka rebel coalition since they began their offensive in December 2012. Their attacks have continued even after signing a peace accord on January 11 in Libreville, Gabon, which provided for a new national unity government. The rebels claim President Bozizé failed to release all the political prisoners that they demanded and that he shortchanged them in the distribution of coalition positions. Rebels claim President Bozizé is planning to rearm and re-attack their positions.<sup>88</sup> It is likely that Bozizé's government would have fallen in December 2012 had it not been for the Chadian military intervention. With Chad now stretched by its participation in the intervention in Mali, it is unclear whether Bozizé can count on continued strong military backing from Chadian President Idriss Deby.<sup>89</sup> Further complicating the situation are rumors in the capital, Bangui, that the rebels are backed by other neighboring countries.<sup>90</sup> Regime change in CAR would have significant repercussions within the region.

The instability in CAR led thousands of refugees to flee into neighboring nations that are themselves equally unstable. Approximately 22,000 civilians from CAR fled to DRC's Equateur province and 2,000 to Orientale Province. In Equateur, most of the refugees are staying with host families in and around the towns of Gbadolite and Mobayi-Mbongo. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Food Program are only now mobilizing to send extra food, supplies, and staff to register the refugees. The local population has been generous in hosting and helping refugees, but those communities have very limited resources themselves and only face increasing insecurity and pressure locally.<sup>91</sup> In addition, about 150,000 Central African Republican refugees are scattered across the region, mostly in Cameroon and Chad.<sup>92</sup> The continued flight of refugees from unstable nation to unstable nation—in this case, from CAR to the DRC—precludes the possibility that the receiving unstable nation will have the time needed to recover from its own destabilizing events.

### **Chad**

Chad is also heavily involved in the French and African battle to free Mali from radical Islamist groups Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and Ansar Dine. The Chadian government has promised to deploy more than 2,000 troops in support of the action. It has deployed over 1,000 already and is currently doing much of the fighting in the north of Mali.<sup>93</sup> The Chadian population continues to criticize the involvement as more Chadian soldiers die (26 last week alone) while ECOWAS delays sending more troops and the UN is not sending peacekeepers. The Chadian population is concerned that extremists sympathetic to the Malian extremist cause, or tied to it, could begin retribution attacks against Chad.<sup>94</sup> Opposition officials embarked on a visit to Chadian troops in Mali during the week of March 8 to investigate why Chadian soldiers are being sent alone to the far north and why there is no reinforcement. The opposition and parliament largely approved sending troops but now want more information on the mission and its repercussions.<sup>95</sup>

Prolonged Chadian intervention in Mali could cause domestic trouble for President Deby. Chadians are apprehensive about further regional excursions because their troops have been particularly active in the region for the last decade. As militants strengthen their networks, the fear is that further regional involvements will result in insecurity for Chad. These militants could easily infiltrate the country, with its large refugee population. Chad hosts about 366,000 refugees, of which 288,700 are from Sudan and 56,700 are from CAR. The security situation is stable right now due to the work of the joint Chadian-Sudanese border monitoring force, but the large refugee population weighs heavily on Chad's resources, and, given the volatile situations in Sudan and CAR, large-scale voluntary repatriations are unlikely.<sup>96</sup> In addition, thousands of Chadians are in the process of being repatriated from Libya and will likely cause additional stress to an already tense situation.<sup>97</sup>

### **Cameroon-Nigeria Corridor**

To the west of CAR, Boko Haram is reportedly recruiting young Muslims in Cameroon. Mefire Aliu is the imam of a mosque in Ekoudou area, and worshipers at his mosque regularly report that they are being recruited by the sect. Some of the youth in his mosque have even confided that they plan on joining because the group leaders promised to show them "real Islam." The imam argues that as extremists are being hunted out of Nigeria, they are increasingly venturing into Cameroon and the rest of the region.<sup>98</sup>

Analysts of Cameroon fear that the recent kidnapping of seven French citizens near the border with Nigeria is only the beginning of a wave of kidnappings across the region. Oil industry analysts fear that the French intervention in Mali is leading other extremist groups across the region to take up the Malian extremist banner and push to the center stage to connect with militants across the region. Groups have been usually geographically confined may become bolder in the coming months.<sup>99</sup>

The recent kidnapping of seven French citizens in Cameroon demonstrates how porous borders in the region are and how closely the Lake Chad basin needs to be watched as a potential danger zone. The Lake Chad basin is a buffer zone between the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa—it forms a triangle of insecurity between Northern Cameroon, the capital of Chad, and Maidaguri, Nigeria. The region makes most headlines for the activities of Boko Haram, but economic discontent in Northern Cameroon has been bubbling for a long time, and the population is increasingly vulnerable to recruitment efforts by extremists. The failure of regional and pan-African cooperation has benefited extremists who have sent members to neighboring countries to learn how to terrorize. Evidence suggests militants from across the West and Central African regions are meeting and exchanging tactics through their membership in the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Nigerian terrorists have traveled to Mali to learn how the elements of insurgency operate.<sup>100</sup> The constant shifting about of populations in Cameroon also contributes to instability. Cameroon hosts about 104,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from CAR, Chad, and Nigeria. Militants infiltrate into neighboring nations with large refugee populations, and with them, trafficking rings and militant networks shift as well.<sup>101</sup>

The Central African region faces a multiplicity of complex and interconnected challenges to its stability. Rebel movements in one country cause displacements that affect neighboring countries. These displacements, in turn, may lead to the formation of new groups that then threaten inherently weak and unstable governments. In addition, the large-scale movement of people allows for the transfer of strategies and tactics and creates collaborative networks of rebels throughout the region. It is not unreasonable to think that rebel groups in Central Africa could have an effect in other less obvious countries or regions in Africa.

## ALERTS

### Malawi: Coup Plot Arrests Lead to Protests

**Researcher:** Mr. Alexander Noyes

On March 11, 2013, police in Malawi arrested 12 people, including several former and current senior officials, for an alleged attempt to block then-Vice President Joyce Banda from ascending to the presidency following the death of 78-year-old former President Bingu wa Mutharika in April 2012. The coup plot suspects include Peter Mutharika, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, brother, and heir apparent to Bingu wa Mutharika; Goodall Gondwe, the Minister of Economic Planning in President Banda's government; and a handful of other former senior civil servants and ministers.<sup>102</sup> Duncan Mwapasa, former Presidential Guard Commander, was also arrested, although he has since been released on bail.<sup>103</sup>

As outlined in the April 18, 2012 issue of *The Africa Watch*, after Mutharika's reported death in April 2012 fears of a succession crisis were sparked by the government's two-day silence and the tense relationship between Banda and Mutharika.<sup>104</sup> It was during this two-day interregnum that the alleged coup plot took place. On March 11 it was reported that Peter Mutharika was being charged with "perjury and soliciting to break the law,"<sup>105</sup> but on March 13 it was revealed that the group of suspects would face the much harsher charge of treason.<sup>106</sup> Moses Kunkuyu, Banda's Information Minister, asserted that the arrests were part of an ongoing investigation and that "It's not political. It's not about Joyce Banda."<sup>107</sup>

The arrests have ignited widespread protests by supporters of Peter Mutharika and the former ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party. On Monday, March 11, police attempted to disperse a crowd of around 500 protesters with tear gas outside police headquarters in the city of Blantyre. Another group of demonstrators in Blantyre, estimated to be in the thousands, blocked the highway to the capital, Lilongwe, with boulders.<sup>108</sup> Another round of protests was reported to have erupted on Wednesday, March 13, outside of bail hearings for the suspects.<sup>109</sup>



Source: Agence France Presse, "Protests erupt in Malawi over coup plotters' bail hearing," *Mail and Guardian*, <http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-13-protests-erupt-in-malawi-amid-coup-plotters-bail-hearing>.



If mishandled, the political fallout from the arrests and prosecutions could be substantial for Banda, as some protesters are already alleging that the charges are politically motivated.<sup>110</sup> Current discontent with Banda is undoubtedly being compounded by popular grievances over rising living costs caused by currency devaluation and budget cuts, policies that have been applauded by the international community but have led to previous large-scale protests in Malawi.<sup>111</sup>

## Cameroon: President Calls for Elections, Opposition Threatens Unrest

**Researcher:** Ms. Ivana Djak

On February 27, 2013, Cameroon's President Paul Biya announced that Senate, National Assembly, and local council elections would be held on April 14. National Assembly and local council elections were scheduled to take place in 2012 at the end of the five-year term for officials elected in 2007, but were delayed because of voter registration issues. The Senate elections will be the nation's first. The 1996 Constitution called for the creation of a Senate, but President Biya delayed the elections because of an alleged lack of funding. The Senate will be made up of 100 senators; 10 for each of the nation's 10 regions. Seventy senators will be elected and 30 appointed by President Biya.<sup>112</sup> Analysts warn of chaos if 80-year-old President Biya, who has had an iron grip on the country for over 30 years, dies or retires before creating the political space for a possible successor.<sup>113</sup>

Cameroon's main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), has promised to disrupt the April 14 polls if President Biya does not consult with them about what they claim is the illegality of the upcoming vote. Ni John Fru, SDF Chairman and 2011 presidential candidate, told reporters that he would instruct his followers to "sharpen their machetes."<sup>114</sup> The SDF claims President Biya is holding elections now to ensure that his party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), takes a majority of the 100 seats in the upper house of parliament, the Senate. Biya wants the CPDM to have a central role in determining who succeeds him. The constitution stipulates that the head of the Senate assumes interim power in case of a mid-term presidential vacancy.<sup>115</sup> The SDF also criticized an amendment to the electoral code in 2012 that allowed President Biya to single-handedly organize the election. The amendment allowed him to bypass consulting with the opposition on the organization of elections and, according to the opposition, offers the CPDM an unfair advantage.<sup>116</sup> President Biya, the CPDM president, has been heavily involved in the current party nomination process. He is working to ensure that the CPDM maintains control of the national assembly and gains a majority in the new Senate.<sup>117</sup> The CPDM controls 300 of 360 municipalities in Cameroon. The CPDM outnumbers all parties in the lower house of parliament, the 180-seat National Assembly.<sup>118</sup>

Critics claim the election will not be free and fair because Cameroon's electoral commission, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), an 18-member body, was appointed by President Biya and is made up of municipal councilors whose term expired in 2012. The memory of the fraudulent 2011 election during which President Biya won another seven-year term is also recent enough to lead many citizens to doubt the democratic process in Cameroon.<sup>119</sup> A recent visit by High Commissioners from Britain, Canada, South Africa, and Nigeria to ELECAM also highlighted the fact that voter registration is still ongoing, which could lead to complications with voter lists on Election Day.<sup>120</sup> ELECAM claims voter registration was extended to increase voter turnout after only 25 percent of the population voted in 2011.<sup>121</sup> Political parties had until March 14 to submit their nominations. About seven parties are expected to run, although it is unlikely that many will gain seats in all 10 regions. Some parties may boycott the election, and the CPDM will likely be able to gain a majority. It remains to be seen whether violence attends the election.<sup>122</sup>

## Burundi: Outlawed Catholic Sect Clashes with Police

**Researcher:** Ms. Ivana Djak

Six people were killed and 35 injured when police tried to disperse followers of a cult leader in Kayanza region, Burundi. The dead are believed to be sect members, while several police officers were seriously hurt. Zebiya Ngendakumana, 30, claims to see visions of the Virgin Mary on the 12th of each month. For over a year, she has been gaining a hundreds-strong cult-like following. On March 12, 2013, police attempted to break up a group meeting, but members armed with stones and clubs attacked officers. In response, the officers opened fire, leading to violent clashes. The police have since said that the matter should have been handled differently. The police worked at the request of the central government, which has been uneasy about the sect's growth. Last year the police destroyed a sanctuary of the sect in Kayanza. In response, the sect's followers broke up a Sunday service at a local Catholic Church. The government's interior ministry has banned the sect, outlawing the group's monthly pilgrimage to the site in Businde village.<sup>123</sup> The local Catholic Church has distanced itself from the group and the Catholic Bishop of Ngozi, Monsignor Gervais Banshimiyubusa, has called on Ms. Ngendakumana to stop all activities that harm the integrity of the Church.<sup>124</sup>



Source: BBC News Africa, "Burundi: Catholic sect 'clashes with police kill six'," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21755724>.

Ms. Ngendakumana has traveled to Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Ethiopia to share her visions.<sup>125</sup> Her followers have compared her apparitions to those reported in Fatima, Portugal, almost a century ago and point out that the children who reported the Fatima apparitions were also harassed by the police at first. Her followers are comparing Ms. Ngendakumana to a saint and martyr and promise to continue sharing her visions.<sup>126</sup>

Authorities are worried the sect will threaten public order as it continues to grow. Relations between the group and the government are increasingly tense. The sect has urged its followers to boycott the government's community service programs.<sup>127</sup> The government's reaction against the movement may reflect a fear that anti-government militants could attach themselves to Ms. Ngendakumana's sect. The Lord's Resistance Army started as a civilian resistance movement led by Alice Lakwena, who believed she was inspired by the Holy Spirit and whose followers were initially nonviolent. Joseph Kony's militants were able to attach themselves to her movement and use her messages to build their base.<sup>128</sup>

## Benin's President Yayi Survives Another Attempt to Oust Him

**Researcher:** Ms. Betty Boswell

Beninese President Yayi has some highly motivated enemies. Astute Beninese authorities thwarted an attempt by coup plotters to prevent him from returning to Cotonou after a trip to Equatorial Guinea. The unsuccessful coup attempt, led by army commander Pamphile Zomahoum and businessman Johannes Dagnon, resulted in their arrests and the promise from the security minister that everyone involved in this attempt to overthrow the democracy and install a military regime in Benin would be jailed.<sup>129</sup>

As reported here last November, President Yayi survived an attempted poisoning in October 2012 by people he trusted—his niece, his physician, and a former ally and supporter.<sup>130</sup> Patrice Talon, the cotton magnate who had helped finance Yayi's two campaigns for president, is in exile in France, having left Benin when he was warned of his impending arrest. He is expected to appear before a Paris appeals court sometime this year to face charges. Of note is that Dagnon is a cousin of Talon, prompting speculation that the two incidents are somehow connected and related to contracts in the cotton industry.<sup>131</sup> In fact, both Zomahoum and Dagnon have implicated Talon as the instigator of the attempted coup, which has resulted in a second international arrest warrant being issued against him.<sup>132</sup>

Before these two coup attempts Yayi was also the victim of a 2007 assassination attempt. His motorcade was attacked with gunfire during legislative elections, one year into his first term of office. At the time reports varied on motive and responsibility. Was it the act of robbers, or was it the work of politicians unhappy with the promised corruption reforms the previously unknown Yayi supported?<sup>133</sup>

In an interview in February, President Yayi declared he would retire from politics in 2016. Factions within Benin apparently do not want to wait or work within a democratic system; rather, they feel that the country would be served better by a military regime than a democracy. President Yayi has just finished one year as president of the African Union, which has included dealing with the crisis in Mali and its effects on neighboring countries. He has survived scandal, corruption, devastating floods, and multiple attempts to unseat him during his terms of office. It is no wonder that President Yayi told his interviewer that he is "counting the days that are separating me from my end [of his term as president]..."<sup>134</sup>

## Guinea-Bissau: Political and Economic Updates

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

Several political and economic developments in Guinea-Bissau are noteworthy and should continue to be monitored closely.

### Revised Election Time Line

After citing financial and technical difficulties on numerous occasions, Guinea-Bissau's May 2013 elections were postponed on February 28. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to extend the 12-month transitional period by six months, until December 31, 2013. Previous and subsequent meetings between political leaders, military officials, and civil society members suggest that even December 2013 may be too ambitious.<sup>135</sup> Proposed dates have included October 2013 and November 2014, but it will depend upon political will. The National Assembly has met twice since February, but failed to elect a new president of the National Elections Commission.<sup>136</sup>

### Antonio Indjai's Paranoia Continues

Armed Forces Chief General Antonia Indjai continues to squash perceived threats to his power. On February 3, Julio Mambali, the former chief of the security corps (aka *praetorian* guard, which protects Indjai) and "right hand man" of Indjai, was beaten and arrested for treason. Several other officers and junior personnel were also arrested, but no additional details are available. Mambali died in custody at the end of February, allegedly due to self-inflicted starvation.<sup>137</sup> In addition, instability within the army barracks could be exacerbated by the trial before a military tribunal of 17 officers accused of an attempted coup in October 2012.<sup>138</sup> The trial began March 12 and will likely be used as a platform to deter threats to Indjai's power. As exemplified by Indjai's on-again, off-again alliance with former Navy Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, he will stop at nothing to protect his position.

### Tension Among Political Elites

A shuffle of the transitional government may be coming in May. Speaking at the opening of a March meeting between civil society and the military, Transitional President Serifo Nhamadjo said he is tired of disagreements "motivated by selfish interests among politicians and would resign if such disagreements persist."<sup>139</sup> An article published by *Africa Monitor* in February 2013 reported on the tense relationship between Nhamadjo and the rest of the government, namely Prime Minister Rui Barros, who are seen as allies of General Indjai.<sup>140</sup> The Socialist Renewal Party (PRS) agrees that a "deep" government shuffle is needed, but only if Barros remains in his post.<sup>141</sup> Last, the status of the current legislative body remains an issue of contention between the PRS and the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde).

### Official Ban on Timber Experts

In March, Guinea Bissau's parliament promised to enforce the ban on timber exports to China. Timber exports have been illegal since 1974, but the law has never really been enforced by the government. Renewed calls for the ban follow violence between youths and Chinese loggers in Colibuia (150 km southeast of Bissau) on March 5. A youth leader said the illegal loggers are able to "operate with the complicity of senior officials in the administration or the army."<sup>142</sup> Given that the previously mentioned authorities' suspected involvement in other corrupt practices (i.e., narcotics trafficking), the ban will likely continue to be circumvented by illegal trade. Thus, additional clashes between youths (and other advocates) and Chinese loggers can be expected in the future.

## Senegal—Macky Sall Tackles Abuse of the Talibé-Marabout System

**Researcher:** Ms. Ashton Callahan

An estimated 50,000 children in Senegal are exploited by religious teachers, known as *marabouts*, who force their disciples (*talibés*) to beg for money in the streets as part of their Quranic education.<sup>143</sup> Following a fire that killed nine *talibés* at a Quranic school (*daara*), President Macky Sall said the government will close all Islamic schools that do not comply with basic safety standards, but will build 60 new, modern *daaras*.<sup>144</sup> Prime Minister Abdoul Mbaye also announced an official ban on child beggars and warned that those posing as Quranic teachers would face legal consequences.<sup>145</sup> Given the deeply-rooted economic and political influence of *marabouts* in Senegalese culture, the crackdown could have significant ripple effects down the line.



Ninety-five percent of Senegal's population is Muslim, and the majority belongs to one of the four Sufi brotherhoods (Mouride, Tijani, Qadiri, and Layene).<sup>146</sup> The brotherhoods form the basis of religious civil society and are extremely influential political and economic forces in Senegal. Religious leaders (*marabouts*) enjoy a "social contract" with their disciples whereby a disciple declares allegiance to his selected *marabout* in return for social and economic security.<sup>147</sup> But the brotherhoods have failed to speak out against the wayward practices of some *marabouts* who for their own monetary gain force young boys to beg (while living in squalid conditions). Some of them can make up to \$100,000 a year, according to Human Rights Watch, which reported in 2010 that a *marabout* in Guédiawaye made \$116,000 in one year from more than 150 *talibés*.<sup>148</sup>

Senegalese parents have sent their children to *marabouts* to study the Quran for centuries, but child exploitation did not begin until the 1970s when drought ravaged the peanut industry. Rural, impoverished families could not afford to care for their children and began sending their young boys to *daaras* to live and study the Quran. While the lesson of 'humility' is partly learned through begging and prayer, the problem today—forced begging—is not accepted by Islam.<sup>149</sup> In a March 2013 speech President Macky Sall said, "The...phenomenon is ancient, it is religious education...but it is very informal and has not been supported by the government, which has led

to some abuse.”<sup>150</sup> His predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, passed a law banning child begging in 2005, but it was reversed in 2010 to ensure that Wade had the support of the brotherhoods leading up to the 2012 presidential elections.

Sall has taken significant steps to crackdown on corruption in Senegalese society and has also distanced himself from the brotherhoods. It will be critical for Sall’s government to remain firm on the implementation of the ban and the reform of *daaras*. But the root cause of the problem—poverty—will continue to be a hindrance and could be exacerbated by young boys returning to their families who cannot support them. In addition, it is unclear what legal consequences violators of the ban will face, but prosecution of legitimate *marabouts* will not sit well with the brotherhoods.

## **Oman's Expanding Engagement in Africa**

**Researcher:** Ms. Brittany Gregerson

Despite uniquely close historical ties to East Africa's Swahili Coast and Indian Ocean states, Oman's overall engagement in sub-Saharan Africa has paled in comparison to that of its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (save Bahrain). Recent efforts appear designed to narrow the gap, as the Sultanate greatly expands its outreach on multiple fronts. Though its greatest efforts continue to be in areas where the historical bonds are strongest, there are notable exceptions across the continent, and the picture is rapidly evolving. In the first three months of 2013 alone, Oman signed new memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with Tanzania, Zanzibar, Somalia, the Seychelles, and Nigeria.<sup>151</sup> Other notable changes include an expansion of diplomatic outreach, humanitarian assistance, trade and investment decisions, and security and defense policies.

### **Diplomatic Outreach**

Over the past few years, diplomatic visits of African officials to Oman and of Omani officials to Africa have been frequent. Since early 2012, Omani government officials have met publicly with multiple delegations from Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.<sup>152</sup> This is in addition to myriad other meetings with African representatives that have taken place on the sidelines of gatherings of multilateral organizations, such as the February 2013 meeting between Nigeria's Securities and Exchange Commission and Oman's Capital Market Authority that resulted in enhanced cooperation between the two states in securities market development and financial oversight and regulation; the two parties were both in Dubai for a meeting of the African and Middle East Regional Committee (AMERC).<sup>153</sup>

Oman maintains only three embassies and three "honorary consulates" in sub-Saharan Africa: embassies in South Africa, Sudan, and Senegal and consulates in Mauritius, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.<sup>154</sup> The Sudan outpost is a recent addition, and in March 2013, Sultan Qaboos announced that an Omani embassy in Nairobi was forthcoming; the opening was portrayed as a key element of a broader push to rekindle the countries' historically close relationship and expand travel, trade, and cultural exchange.<sup>155</sup> The Sultanate hosts foreign missions at home from Sudan, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, and Somalia.<sup>156</sup>

### **Humanitarian Aid**

The Oman Charitable Organization (OCO) has generally provided less humanitarian aid to African countries than other GCC states (save Bahrain), and little detailed information on this aid is available. However, Zanzibar has been a consistent recipient of Omani aid for schools, mosques, and health care—and a large Omani donation of medical supplies, food, and other items to Somalia in early 2012 was widely touted by the Sultanate in press releases and government documents.<sup>157</sup> This and other press statements suggest a desire on the part of Oman to be seen as a greater player in humanitarian aid to Africa going forward.

### **Trade and Investment**

In trade and investment, Oman has focused its efforts in Africa on the energy and mining, financial services, manufacturing, tourism, and defense/armaments industries.<sup>158</sup> Unique among the GCC states, Oman has not made significant African investments in agriculture or food production.<sup>159</sup>



Oman is involved in a slew of bilateral and multilateral organizations and events designed to protect and grow its trade relationships on the continent, including the South Africa-Oman Business Forum,<sup>160</sup> the International Conference on the Omani Role in East Africa,<sup>161</sup> and the Tanzania and Oman Joint Permanent Commission, among others.<sup>162</sup> Oman also serves on the board of directors of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and hosted the board's first regular meeting in early March 2013.<sup>163</sup>

### Security and Defense

The sultanate's security engagement with Africa has focused on arms procurement and anti-piracy efforts. Oman was first in the Gulf to buy South African military hardware, which it has now done consistently for over a decade.<sup>164</sup> On the piracy issue, Oman has cooperated extensively with South Africa, Somalia, and the Seychelles on both policy and tactical matters.<sup>165</sup>

### Tensions

Overall, Oman's enhanced outreach to sub-Saharan African and Indian Ocean states has been very well-received. The only significant recent tensions in these relationships have arisen over perceived abuses of migrant laborers in the Gulf, specifically those from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.<sup>166</sup> The system known as *kafala*, which gives the resident employer near complete control over the laborer during their time in the country, has been derided as exploitative by labor-sending countries. On multiple occasions over the past decade, Oman has announced *kafala* reform initiatives—as have Bahrain and Qatar—but little change has taken root.<sup>167</sup>

**Table 1: Select Omani Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2011–2013**

Country	Nature of Engagement				
	Embassies and Consulates	Diplomatic Visits	Aid	Trade and Investment	Security and Defense
Comoros		X		X	
Ethiopia		X		X	
Kenya	X	X		X	
Mauritius	X			X	
Nigeria				X	
Seychelles		X		X	X
Somalia (including Somaliland)	X	X	X	X	X
South Africa	X	X		X	X
Sudan	X	X	X	X	
Tanzania (including Zanzibar)	X	X	X	X	

Source: Data compiled from the sources cited elsewhere in this paper and other African and Gulf media reporting available in English online

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