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George F. Ward
Claudio C. Biltoc
Mary E. Boswell
Ashley N. Bybee
Ashton M. Callahan
Ivana Djak
Meg K. Guliford
Kongdan Oh Hassig
Eliza M. Johannes
Margaret D. Midyette
Andrea S. Pongo
Janette Yarwood
Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains the August 2011 through September 2011 issues of *The Africa Watch*. *The Africa Watch* is a twice-monthly report on trends and developments that might contribute to discontinuous change and instability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The August 2011 issue contains the following articles:

- Popular Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa; Refugee-Driven Sources of Conflict: The Case of Kenya
- Guinea: Potential for Regime Change
- Ghanaian Armed Forces Enter the Private Sector
- Horn Migrants Unwelcome in Southern Africa
- Another African Communications Revolution
- Trouble Looming Ahead of Elections in Cameroon
- Cameroon: Will Food Shortages Cause Instability
- Cote d'Ivoire: Situation Remains Fragile
- Colonial Boundaries and the Dilemma of the Nation-State in Africa
- Korea's Principled Push into Africa
- Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: A Growing Trend of Concern
- Niger: Migration Exacerbates Food Insecurity
- Guinea Bissau: Public Protests.

The September 2011 issue contains the following articles:


- Potential Post-Election Violence in Cameroon
- The Tuareg: Prospects for Rebellion in Mali and Niger
- Assessing Prospects for Ethno-Political Violence in Kenya's 2012 Presidential Elections
- Ethiopia's Hydroelectric Plans Masking Other Problems
- Uranium Mining: Risks Abound, But Expansion Continues
- Cameroon: Leadership Profile of Edith Kabbang Walla
- South Africa: Leadership Profile of Confrontational Youth Leader Julius Malema
- Uncertainty and Unrest Before November Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

AUGUST 2011



TO THE READER

Welcome to the first issue of *The Africa Watch*, a monthly publication of the Global Coverage Analyses Program – Africa (GCAP/A). As part of the Overwatch project of GCAP/A, IDA’s Africa analysts scan, on a continuous basis, a global array of information sources for trends and developments that relate to the stability of sub-Saharan African states. We give priority to issues and trends that are not being studied intensively elsewhere. *The Africa Watch* is the product of this monitoring effort.

Each issue of *The Africa Watch* will be divided into two sections – Analyses and Alerts. In the first section, IDA researchers will present brief summaries of their in-depth analyses of especially significant trends, patterns of developments, or the potential for discontinuous change in particular countries or sub-regions. This month, the Analyses section of *The Africa Watch* includes studies on refugee-driven conflict, the pattern of popular protest that has emerged across Africa in recent months, and the situation in Guinea.

The second section of *The Africa Watch* consists of shorter led Alerts. The Alerts fall into two categories. The first type highlights developments that might otherwise be missed. Alerts in the second category will strive to “connect the dots” or provide useful background on events and trends that have been reported in multiple sources. Our Alerts this month span the continent.

Since this publication is new, reader feedback is especially important. We hope you will give us feedback of two sorts – on individual articles and on the publication as a whole. Please tell us what is useful and what is not. In order to facilitate feedback, we have provided telephone contact information for the authors of the articles. For comments on the publication as a whole, please feel free to contact me.

Happy reading!

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

Tel. (703) 845-4394

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ANALYSES

Popular Protests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood; Tel. (703) 845-2510

Executive Summary

The demonstrations and popular protests that have spread across North Africa and the Middle East left many wondering whether sub-Saharan African countries would experience their own wave of revolts that would collapse governments. In a growing number of countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa, people are taking to the streets to protest election results, the failure of their governments to deliver basic services, the increasing prices of food and fuel, and to demand higher wages or to express other grievances with their governments. While these protests have not threatened governments in the near term, the increased mobilization signals that there is a growing desire for change as people attempt to demand accountability from their governments. Up to now, social media have not played a sizable direct role in protests, but the increasing penetration of modern communications technologies makes that a possibility.

Introduction

Some analysts claim that the 'Arab Spring' will completely bypass the rest of the African continent because the internet penetration rate in sub-Saharan Africa is far below that of Tunisia or Egypt.¹ Other media pundits argue sub-Saharan societies are so divided by ethnicity and so torn apart by tribalism that none can achieve the degree of unity necessary to confront political power successfully.² This position fails to take into consideration the other factors that contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings.

The image constructed in the media is that Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and youth energy came together in a wave of unrest that spread like wildfire in North Africa and the Middle East. While social media and young people certainly played major roles in the uprisings, what is hidden from view is that a variety of factors contributed to the revolutionary protests that ultimately toppled governments. In fact, the unrest had been building for years, with smaller protests occurring across the region for some time. In this context, what does the current wave of protest in sub-Saharan Africa signify?

¹ According to the website Internet World Stats, the internet penetration in Africa is 11.9 percent however this number includes Northern as well as sub-Saharan Africa.
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm>. According to data from the International Telecommunication Union, in 2008 African Internet user accounted for less than five percent of the world's online population.

² Mamdani, Mahmood. "Walk to work in a historical light." *Daily Monitor*. July 7, 2011
<http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1149498/-/view/printVersion/-/14ynqusz/-/index.html>

Social Discontent and New Struggles in Africa

North Africa is not the only part of the continent where a growing sense of discontent with the status quo is leading citizens to take to the streets. In countries like Gabon, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Uganda, Swaziland, Malawi, and South Africa, there have been large youth and student uprisings, worker strikes, and demonstrations. Since the emerging collective action is not uniform or manifested in the same way in each country, it has been dismissed as not symbolizing a broader movement for change. Yet it is clear that there is a growing anger brewing across the continent, and large numbers of ordinary citizens have become emboldened to find ways to express this to their governments and the world.³

In January 2011, while media attention was focused on Egypt, thousands of protesters took to the streets in the small West African nation of Gabon. The unrest in Gabon stemmed from the controversial 2009 presidential election in which Ali Bongo, son of former President Omar Bongo, who ruled for 41 years, was declared the winner despite what critics called widespread fraud.⁴ On January 29, thousands of opposition supporters marched in the nation's capital, Libreville, and were faced with violent suppression from the army.

Burkina Faso, another West African nation, faced increasing civil disobedience since February 2011. Anti-government protests grew in Burkina Faso following the death of a student in police custody. What started as student unrest eventually transcended the initial trigger and became a moment for citizens to express their anger over high commodity prices that threaten to push citizens further into poverty and destitution.⁵ Some of the marches were organized by the National Coalition against the High Cost of Living (CCVC), an alliance of trade unions, consumer organizations, rights groups, and small businesses. In Koudougou, a city 60 miles west of the capital, merchants set fire to the mayor's home, the police headquarters, and several other buildings. They were protesting an official's decision to shut about 40 stores in Koudougou's central market over unpaid rent.⁶ According to various media reports, the protesting students chanted "Tunisia is in Koudougou" and called for President Blaise Compaoré to step down from his nearly 24-year rule. Thousands of cotton farmers who were angry over low prices and increased taxes also marched in the country's second largest city, Bobo-

³ Thurston, Alex. "Do protests in Nigeria, Uganda, and Burkina Faso have anything in common?" *The Christian Science Monitor*. April 19, 2011. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/0419/Do-protests-in-Nigeria-Uganda-and-Burkina-Faso-have-anything-in-common>

⁴ Browning, Lynnley. "U.S. Report Details Money Laundering." *New York Times*. February 3, 2010

⁵ African Conflict prevention Programme (ACPP) Daily Briefings. April 18, 2011. Institute for Security Studies

⁶ Taoko, Herve and Adam Nossiter. 2011

Dioulassou.⁷ The uprisings continued to spread with soldiers joining to demand long overdue salaries, housing and food allowances.⁸

In April 2011, people took to the streets in Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya, to protest the increasing price of fuel and rising cost of living. The protest reflected growing tension due to rising inflation in the country. During the demonstrations, bad governance was highlighted as the major cause of the current high cost of basic commodities. The government attempted to address the frustration by reducing the tax on kerosene by 30 percent and diesel by 20 percent, but this move was dismissed because it did not give consumers enough relief.⁹ In the comment section of the website of *Capitalfm*, a popular Ugandan radio station, one user posted, "This is how it starts, people are fed up of people (*sic*) in government engaging in political games instead of creating jobs for the youth and eradicating poverty. Now that there is no hope for the youth they have nothing to lose and we (*sic*) may be seeing more of this crap in future."¹⁰ Kenyan trade unions also threatened to strike if they do not receive a 60 percent rise in the minimum wage.

The discontent and uprisings continued across the continent in Uganda, Kenya's western neighbor. In late April, more than 100 people were arrested and about 45 injured in a wave of civil disobedience as disgruntled Ugandans walked to work to protest high fuel and food prices. The walk-to-work demonstration, as it was called, began on April 11. A group calling itself Activists for Change (A4C) organized the demonstration, and opposition politicians heeded the call to take part to show they were concerned about discontent over rising prices.¹¹ The walk-to-work demonstrations received a violent government response, including shooting an opposition party leader and killing several protestors.

In yet another moment of citizens voicing their opposition to government action, protestors in Senegal marched in the capital, Dakar, to oppose changes to the constitution that opposition leaders say could benefit the longtime president and his family. The proposed law would have created the post of vice-president, which would be a departure from Senegal's European-style government that has a president and a prime minister. Critics claim that the position was being created so that 85-year-old President Abdoulaye Wade, who has been in office for 11 years, could nominate his son.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Burkina Faso: Students Anti-Police Brutality Protests Leave Some Dead, Wounded. AFP20110225636003 Ouagadougou *Lefaso.net* in French February 25, 2011
[Report by Cyrille Zoma: "Demonstrations at Koudougou: The contagion reaches Ouagadougou, Ouahigouya, Poa"]

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/Kenyanews/Peaceful-protests-over-rising-cost-of-living-12470.html#ixzz1RpEZWCVS>

¹¹ Namiti, Musaazi. "Uganda walk-to-work protests kick up dust." *Aljazeera* April 28, 2011. <http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/04/201142831330647345.html>

If the two were to win the election next year, it could create a mechanism for his son's succession.

Hundreds of demonstrators gathered to protest what they saw as a power grab and forced the president to back down.¹² The angry protesters took to the streets of Dakar on June 23, burning tires, ransacking government buildings, and fighting riot police outside the National Assembly.¹³ The unrest in Senegal continued with protesters claiming they were angered by the frequent power cuts, the lack of employment, the high cost of living, and the bad economic situation. According to some reports, a movement called "*Y'en a Marre*" was behind the demonstrations. *Y'en a Marre*, which is French slang for "enough is enough," was launched by a group of rappers from the group "*Keur Gui*." *Y'en a Marre* began organizing concerts, demonstrations, and public debates to encourage Senegalese to take a non-violent stand. "We want a democratic revolution in Senegal, to change things by voting," said Fadel Barro, a journalist and one of the movement organizers.¹⁴ Additionally, rapper Cyril Touré noted that as the February 2012 election approaches, *Y'en a Marre* is leading a voter registration campaign under the slogan, "my voting card, my weapon."¹⁵

Resistance movements are also mobilizing in southern African countries. In Swaziland, there have been protests against Africa's last absolute monarchy. On April 12, 2011, South African-based Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) spokesman Lucky Lukhele said that demonstrations took place in the cities of Manzini and Mbabane, with protestors calling for the regime of King Mswati III to relinquish its monopoly on power and to give way to the legitimate aspirations of the people in a democratic Swaziland.¹⁶ The democracy movement comprises a loose affiliation of unionists, pro-democracy activists, student groups, and church organizations, modeled on the South African resistance struggle against apartheid.¹⁷

Malawi is the latest in the series of sub-Saharan countries to face political unrest in recent months. In a rare show of unity, Malawi's opposition parties and a coalition of civil society groups have united to organize protests targeting a range of issues, including repressive media laws recently passed by parliament, fuel shortages, and bad economic governance. Civil society groups, among them the influential Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC), have closed ranks with opposition groups, including the country's oldest party, the Malawi Congress Party. Led by an opposition Member of Parliament, John Tembo, they called for nationwide demonstrations. At least 10 people

¹² Nossiter, Adam. "After Protests, Senegal's President Backs Off Election Change." *New York Times*. June 23, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/africa/24senegal.html>

¹³ Fortier, Amanda. "Senegal's Youth Fed Up and Frustrated." *Voice of America*. July 4, 2011. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Senegals-Youth-Fed-Up-and-Frustrated-124967294.html>

¹⁴ Nossiter, Adam. 2011

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Zulu, Phathizwe-Chief. "Swazi Cops Prevent Protests." *IOL New*. April 12, 2011

¹⁷ Maxwell, Scott. "The Kingdom Underground." *The African.org*. June/July 2011.

died during two days of protests in this southern African nation, which has enjoyed relative peace and stability in the past decade.

Conclusions and Lessons to Be Learned

- In an effort to get the needs of their communities met, people across the African continent are organizing campaigns, demonstrations, and strikes. The increased mobilization taking place signals that there is a growing desire for change. Some of the uprisings described emerged spontaneously in reaction to a triggering event, as in Burkina Faso. In other countries such as Malawi, public protest – the act of taking on the state – is a new phenomenon, and perhaps quite meaningful for the future.
- Social media played a very small direct role in organizing the demonstrations and protests cited above. However, other events indicate the potential of social media for convening the masses in sub-Saharan Africa. On February 28, 2011, for example, one million Kenyans worldwide collectively sang their national anthem. This movement started on social media and spread with text messaging and offline.
- Because the conditions that generate unrest are different in each country, the way citizens come together to resist their specific conditions will also differ. Outside observers should not expect all collective action to utilize or solely rely upon new social media, in part because organizers are aware that their governments closely scrutinized the development of the Arab Spring. They understand that social media can be monitored or completely shut down by their governments.
- At this point it is unlikely that these protests will threaten governments in the near term. Further down the road, however, some of the movements cited could transform themselves into more tangible threats to regime stability.

Refugee-Driven Sources of Conflict: The Case of Kenya

Researcher: Dr. Eliza Johannes; Tel. (703) 845-2102

Executive Summary

Refugee camps and host-nation locales where significant numbers of refugees concentrate are commonly areas of focus for international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. Servicing human needs in these zones is an important endeavor; however, it is equally important to remain alert to the threat of conflict that they represent. Conflict imported from source countries, conflict over scarce resources with local populations, and conflict with host state authorities are broad categorizations for the pathways to destabilizing outcomes that refugee centers provide. Within a context characterized by relatively weak state power, the need to track the potential for refugee-driven conflict is significant; as such, conflict could threaten low-capacity governments.

The goal of this initial baseline paper is to outline the alternate dimensions of refugee-driven conflict, making clear that one-size-fits-all, “cookie cutter” approaches to resolve crises will prove woefully insufficient. Kenya is the initial case study. Additional cases will be considered as events progress and develop.

Introduction

Agencies of the international community, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Refugee Committee (IRC), support refugee centers and understand the security implications of such concentrations. Most often, however, international agencies have neither the mandate nor the resources to deal with threats to security. When host nations have a sufficient level of development and capacity for state action, they are able to attend to the economic needs of refugees as well as monitor their behaviors and enforce mechanisms that would prevent the refugees from breaking the law. Such is not the case for impoverished nations with weak, central governments – an all-too-accurate description of many African states. Even a state like Kenya, relatively well situated compared to its neighbors, confronts sometimes daunting challenges brought on by different aspects of refugee crises. The variety of threats posed by refugee concentrations include the transplanting of conflict from source nations into camps, conflict between camp residents and local populations, and outright challenges to state authority by way of participation in illicit networks, e.g., criminal smuggling, terrorism, and support of rebel movements.

The purpose of this brief is twofold. One focus is to shed light on the issue of refugee-driven conflict, effectively “putting it on the radar” to motivate relevant authorities to be proactive in their engagement on refugee crises throughout the continent. Another goal is to outline the alternate dimensions of refugee-driven conflict, making explicit the notion that one-size-fits-all approaches to resolve these crises will prove woefully insufficient.

The Case of Kenya

Kenya is a refuge for many people displaced by conflict. Countries of origin for the refugees include Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. This range of source countries for refugee populations has given rise to a number of violent conflicts. Camps like Kakuma I, II, III, Dadaab, and others in Garissa County serve as new homes to populations who arrive harboring ethnic differences, arms, and religious beliefs.

Inter-group conflict has frequently led to outbursts of armed violence, rape, and crime within refugee camps, such as in Kakuma and Dadaab. Just as political affiliations and ethnic associations produce a rugged terrain of complex social relations in source countries, migrating refugees tend to transport perceptions of these differences to camps. For example, historical antipathies pit the Sudanese Dinka, Bor, and Bahrelgazal against one another; however, these differences dissolve into a collective factional split with Nuer because of competing political loyalties, with the two sides respectively supporting the late John Garang and Riak Macher of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. Additionally, all of the groups share equal disdain for the Luo, ethnically Kenyan, whom they perceive to be outsiders.¹

Conflicts have also emerged beyond the confines of camps, where refugee camp inhabitants and members of local communities frequently vie for scarce resources. Turkana District, impoverished and desolate, has become one such place. Here more than 80,000 refugees compete with the ethnic Turkana pastoralists for scarce resources such as firewood, water, pastoral lands for grazing, and other such means used to eke out a living in the area. Swelling refugee populations make it difficult for the inhabitants to pursue their traditional, pastoral livelihoods of cattle raising and rustling amid decreased supplies of resources. Exacerbating antagonisms brought on by competition over scarce resources is the fact that impoverished indigenes perceive that refugees receive preference in the distribution of international assistance.²

Conflict in Kenya is not limited to that of non-state actor against non-state actor. Whether it is trying to stymie the efforts of terrorist insurgents, dismantle criminal networks, or prevent the two from merging, Kenyan authorities have their hands full when dealing with the numerous problems produced by refugee camps. Al Shabaab increasingly recruits from pools of the poor, neglected, and disgruntled found in the refugee camps.³ Growth in membership used to mean an improved capacity for gaining and holding territory throughout the Somali hinterlands, but it recently transformed into the ability to project strength abroad, witnessed July 27, 2011 by attacks with

¹ Ekuru Aukot.2003. "It is better to be a refugee than a Turkana in Kakuma": revisiting the relationship between hosts and refugees in Kenya." *Journal of Refuge Studies* 21 Issue: 3 Page: 73-83.

² Ibid. 76.

³ Abdullahi Jamaa; Issa Hussein; Muchemi Wachira; Dominic Wabala; Kevin J. Kelley. 7-Oct-09. "Somalia War: Kenya on the Spot over Secret Enlisting" *The Daily Nation*
<http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/669514/-/view/printVersion/-/mgrqqkz/-/index.html>

remotely detonated explosives in Mandera that killed a Kenyan police officer and injured three others.⁴

Contrasting with the relatively recent realization of a physical threat by Al Shabaab within Kenyan borders are problems posed by the presence of criminal networks spanning the region as a whole. In existence for nearly 30 years, the severity of problems brought on by smugglers in arms, drugs, humans, and other illicit goods will most likely increase as conflicts in surrounding areas worsen and demand for black market products grows.⁵ Kenyan authorities have sought to increase the interdiction of illicit arms, but endemic corruption, combined with sheer volume due to heightened demand are rendering many of their efforts ineffective. Additionally, there looms the ever-present possibility that criminal and terrorist or insurgent networks will merge into a single, large network that will further tax Kenyan resources already pushed near their limit.

⁴ Hassan Huka. July 27 2011. "Kenya: Police Officer Killed in Al Shabaab Attack" Daily Nation on the Web. <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201107271515.html>

⁵ Babere Kerata Chacha. 2004. "From Local Conflicts to Global Terrorism: Can Refugees and Regional Security Problems Jeopardise the Renewal of Kenya?" African Journal of International Affairs (7) 1&2: 57-59 and Adow Jubat; Boniface Onger. 12-Apr-11. "Exploiting Lax Security to Trade in Lethal Arms" The Standard Online <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/print.php?id=2000033129&cid=259>

Guinea: Potential for Regime Change

Researcher: Ms. Ashley Bybee; Tel. (703) 845-2288

Executive Summary

Although there is a multitude of underlying sources of instability in Guinea, the recent assassination attempt on President Condé highlights enduring tensions between the president and the military. Condé's subsequent suppression of the press, establishment of roadblocks, and other methods of intimidation reflect his determination to keep his critics quiet so that they pose no threat to his power in the upcoming elections. In reaction to these harsh measures, continued and perhaps heightened military unrest and disapproval by the Guinean population may ensue in the coming months.

What's Happening

On July 19, 2011, Alpha Condé, president of Guinea, survived an assassination attempt at his home in the Kipe suburb outside Conakry, less than one mile from the U.S. Embassy. The attack lasted for nearly two hours before it was repelled by Condé's personal guard. During the attack, a member of the presidential guard was killed and two others wounded. In the days following the attack, the Attorney General reported the following objects had been seized from the suspects, which appeared to indicate military involvement: automatic weapons, rocket launchers, ammunition, radios, military uniforms, and drugs.¹ Based on reports over the last year, the probable motivation for the attack was soldiers' anger over their low salaries in light of Condé's campaign promise to increase them. Nonetheless, a statement from the military condemning the attack and expressing unrelenting support for President Condé would seem to indicate that the attack was carried out by a small cabal of disgruntled soldiers.²

Since that time, the Guinean Armed Forces arrested 39 soldiers (26 military officers and 13 civilians, though reports vary) including General Nouhou Thiam, the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the transitional government led by General Sekouba Konate in 2010, and a commander close to the former president, Lansana Conte.³ General Thiam was fired by Condé in one of his first moves as president to reform an army notorious for its lack of discipline. Most of the others arrested were also close allies of General Sekouba Konate and of former junta Chief Moussa Dadis Camara, who led the country between 2008 and 2009 after seizing power in a military coup.⁴ Alpha Oumar Diallo, regarded as one of the leaders of the assassination attempt, died in

¹ Conakry US Embassy Public Affairs Section, AFP20110812636028, August 12, 2011.

² "Guinea Military Condemns Foiled Attack, Reaffirms Support For President Condé," AFP20110719670002, Conakry Radio diffusion Television Guineenne Television in French, July 19, 2011.

³ "Cape Verdian President Condemns Attempt To Kill Guinean President," AFP20110725503004, [Lisbon Lusa in Portuguese](#), July 22, 2011.

⁴ "Six Appear in Court Over Attack on Guinea President's Home," AFP20110728309003, [Paris AFP \(World Service\) in English](#), July 28, 11.

prison custody on July 20. Reports stated that he “was not able to survive the torture he was reported to have been subjected to.”⁵

The following week, the premises of *Le Defi* weekly newspaper were raided by a group of unknown assailants believed to be supporters of President Condé.⁶ That same week, without warrants, soldiers began forcibly entering the homes of businessmen associated with Cellou Dalein Diallo, Condé’s primary political opponent. Some politicians reportedly even went into hiding for fear of being arrested for the attack on Condé.⁷ Continuing with these actions to suppress his critics, Condé instituted a ban on all media references to “the attack against the head of state, as well as any interactive broadcast of a political nature.” This measure was perceived by many media outlets as a violation of the constitution, while the Guinean online press boss, Mohamad Kamara, called the ban “censorship of the press” and vowed to defy it and continue to cover the attack on President Alpha Condé.⁸ Several days later, and largely in response to French and international criticism, Guinea’s National Council on Communication (NCC) lifted the media ban all while denying that it was in response to external pressure. The NCC described it as a “...sovereign decision....We wanted to avoid excesses, because many people complained to us.”⁹

In yet another act to monitor the activities of civilians and suspected opposition, soldiers erected roadblocks on the highways and roundabouts around Conakry, on the order of the Chief of Defense Staff Brigadier General Souleymane Kelefa Diallo.¹⁰ One witness noted “soldiers armed to the teeth embark upon a systematic search of all vehicles saying that they are looking for arms caches or suspected persons.”¹¹ Soldiers have reportedly committed abuses against civilians at these road blocks. One Russian expatriate who refused a vehicle search by soldiers was beaten to death.¹²

Meanwhile in Southern Guinea, there have been clashes between regional authorities and local farmers as the former have sought to expel the latter from their land in order

⁵ “Guinean soldier arrested over failed coup said dies in prison custody,” AFP20110727950024, Aujourd’hui en Guinée in French, July 25, 11.

⁶ “Unknown Persons Said Ransack Premises of Privately-Owned Weekly Paper,” AFP20110723950038, Aminata website in French, July 21, 2011.

⁷ Conakry Radio diffusion Television Guineenne Television in French, AFP20110726693005, July 25, 11.

⁸ “Guinea Media Protest Ban on Press Coverage of Attack Against President’s Home” AFP20110727683002, Paris AFP (World Service) in English, July 27, 11 and “Guinea Online Press Boss Defies Coverage Ban on Presidential Residence Raid,” CPP20110727968248 Beijing Xinhua in English, July 27, 11.

⁹ “Guinea Lifts Ban on Media Coverage of Attack on President,” AFP20110729651001 Paris AFP (World Service) in English, July 29, 11.

¹⁰ “Chief of Defense Staff Urges Citizens To Comply With Security Measures,” AFP20110803693001, Conakry Radio diffusion Television Guineenne Television in French, August 1, 11.

¹¹ “Radio Says Soldiers Committing Abuses Against Civilians Following Attack,” AFP20110730693004 Conakry Radio Liberte FM in French, July 29, 11.

¹² “Guinean Soldiers Reportedly in Violent Roadblock Incident with Russian,” AFP20110801950043 Guinea news in French, July 28, 11.

to make way for the construction of rubber and oil production facilities. Approximately 60 people were wounded in clashes while more than 100 people have fled their homes and are taking refuge with local aid agencies.¹³ Elsewhere around Guinea, large business deals have been made, largely in the extractive sectors, many of which have purportedly been awarded to companies associated with individuals close to President Condé.

What to Watch

Even before the assassination attempt, there were many underlying sources of instability in Guinea. The attack on Condé highlights continuing political instability, particularly between the institutions of the president and the military. Observers should watch for any or all of the following trends:

- **Military Unrest.** Given the recent attack on President Condé by elements from within the Guinean military and the military's long history of interference in national politics, observers should expect to see continued unrest among the Armed Forces and, potentially, a military coup. Moreover, the Guinean army has a history of and reputation for violence and brutality. Since Condé appointed himself as the Defense Minister, he wields extraordinary power over this institution and could well use elements loyal to him to crack down on supporters of Cellou Dalein Diallo, his chief political rival who conceded defeat in the last election. According to a recent report, the government in Burkina Faso has sent 150 Presidential Guard troops to serve as a protective detail for President Condé. This appears to be a trend in itself, as Burkina Faso previously sent Presidential Guards to the assistance of Ivorian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro.¹⁴ The deployment also may reflect Condé's lack of confidence in his own forces.
- **Popular Protests.** Given the severe measures Condé took following the attempt on his life (e.g., suppression of the media, road blocks) and assuming support from the opposition, popular protests among the Guinean population against Condé's undemocratic rule would not be surprising. These may also be predicated on dissatisfaction with Condé's delaying of legislative elections and his program to pursue voting reform that would create a larger voting base in his favor. Moreover, recent protests in neighboring Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso could likely inspire Guineans to follow suit. This would likely provide all the justification Condé needs for further repression of civil liberties, employing any means necessary, including possibly violence.
- **Ethnic Tensions.**¹⁵ The rivalry between Condé and his main political rival, Cellou Dalein Diallo, has reignited some ethnic tensions between the Malinke (to which

¹³ "Guinea Land Grab Displaces Dozens" *Voice of America*, August 3, 2011.

¹⁴ "Burkinabe Influence in West Africa," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, August 17, 2011

¹⁵ Guinea's ethnic groups exist along geographical regions, with the Soussou prevailing throughout Coastal Guinea (19 percent of the electorate), the Peuhl dominating Middle Guinea (23 percent), the Malinke in Upper Guinea (20 percent) and the Forestiers in Woodland Guinea (20 percent). In urban areas, ethnic groups tend to self-segregate, for example, in Conakry the Soussou make up the majority in Kalum and Dixien communes, while the Peuhl prevail in Ratomah and Matoto. Generally,

Condé and 30 percent of the population belong) and the Peuhl (to which Diallo and 40 percent of the population belongs). Moreover, watch for the return of Moussa Dadis Camara, the instigator of the 2008 military coup that seized control of Guinea immediately following Conte's death. According to rumor, Camara has cultivated or is cultivating an alliance with President Condé and might return from exile in Burkina Faso. Given the ethnic tensions he exacerbated while in power (e.g., the massacre in September 2009 of 150 largely Peuhl protesters by his Forestier militias) further ethnic violence may be expected. Ethnic tensions linked to cattle disputes in rural Guinea have also flared.¹⁶

- **Investor Unease.** Multiple international corporations are pursuing contracts in Guinea, particularly in the mining sector (e.g., bauxite, gold, iron ore). Given recent instability, there may be some reluctance on the part of these companies to engage the Guinean government, particularly when the future of the political leadership is unknown.¹⁷ Additionally, Condé has plans to revise Guinea's mining code to give the state more than double the current stake it can hold in mining projects and to toughen procedures for issuing development permits. Mining companies have also been targeted by Guinean labor unions (very strong institutions in the country), which have organized strikes and protests. Many Guineans are angry over the lack of basic infrastructure and utilities.¹⁸

ethnicity in Guinea is not as significant a cleavage as other African countries. Mixed marriages are legal, which has improved relations between ethnic groups. Many Guineans can speak French and 90 percent profess Islamic religion (its Guinean version is known for promoting religious tolerance).

¹⁶ Saliou Samb, "Ex-army chief held after Guinea's Condé escapes attack" *Reuters Africa*, July 19, 2011.

¹⁷ Saliou Samb, "Key political risks to watch in Guinea" *Reuters Africa*, August 1, 2011.

¹⁸ Saliou Samb, "Key political risks to watch in Guinea" *Reuters Africa*, August 1, 2011.

ALERTS

Ghanaian Armed Forces Enter the Private Sector

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan; Tel. (703) 824-9560

On July 29, 2011, Ghanaian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. J.H. Smith announced the creation of the Defense Industries Holding Company Limited (DIHOC). The company is a joint venture between the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and Knights SA of the Czech Republic.¹ The company will facilitate GAF ownership and operation of certain manufacturing enterprises in the country.² While Ghana has the fastest growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa, GAF involvement in the private sector could hinder future progress.³

- The creation of the company falls in line with the Defense Minister's program, "Civil–Military Collaboration for Socio-Economic Development in Ghana" (CIMCSED), which aims to encourage the establishment of factories and manufacturing plants to produce items of strategic importance to the Armed Forces.
- The first venture is the rehabilitation of the Kumsai Shoe Factory – to be followed by other projects in the garment, computer assembling, solar and renewable energy, pharmaceutical, and engineering sectors.⁴ The overall goal is to modernize certain industries and provide employment opportunities.
- GAF involvement in the private sector could lead to corruption and instability.⁵
 - The DIHOC concept is absent from 2011 budget. A GAF public relations officer stated that parliamentary scrutiny of the finances of DIHOC would be unnecessary, suggesting a level of financial autonomy that could lead to a lack of accountability.

¹ The company was founded by a native Ghanaian in 1997 and "deals with the implementation of investment projects in sub-Saharan Africa and facilitating business contacts between the countries of Central Europe and economically stable countries in sub-Saharan Africa." [<http://www.knights.cz/>]

² 40 percent owned by Ghana Armed Forces and 60 percent owned by Knight AS. "Ghana Armed Forces to pursue aggressive private business" [<http://news.myjoyonline.com/business/201108/70288.asp>]

³ 21.4 percent real GDP growth in the first half of 2011. [<http://www.momentng.com/en/news/3542/ghanas-economy-fastest-growing-in-the-world-.html>]

⁴ "Ghana will benefit from DIHOC partnership – Defence Minister" [<http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2011/08/06/ghana-will-benefit-from-dihoc-partnership-%E2%80%93-defence-minister/>]; "Statement From Former Military Intelligence Officers" [<http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=216347>]; "The Dangers of Military Commercialization in Ghana" [<http://imanighana.org/?q=node/230>]

⁵ IMANI Report: The Dangers of Military Commercialisation in Ghana [<http://imanighana.org/?q=node/230>]

- The arrangement limits fair competition in the private sector, while fostering competition among senior military officers driven by personal ambitions and gains.

Horn Migrants Unwelcome in Southern Africa

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood; Tel. (703) 845-2510

According to reports, Somali refugees, mostly men, are entering Zimbabwe through the Nyamapanda Border Post at a rate of 300 a week and then heading straight for South Africa.¹ South African and Zimbabwean immigration officials are cooperating to address the “irregular movement of people” from the Horn of Africa.

- Immigration officials from South Africa and Zimbabwe met in February 2011 to address migration from the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, and the security challenges they bring to the region. At the meeting, they discussed the need to have other stakeholders involved because they are not convinced that all those seeking entry are genuine refugees.²
- In May 2011, South African and Zimbabwean immigration officials met again in Beit Bridge and agreed to deal jointly with the “irregular migration” between the two countries amid revelations that 64 Somali refugees had been rounded up in the border town as they attempted to cross the border into South Africa illegally.³ South Africa’s deputy director-general of immigration, Mr. Jackson McKay, said: “We denied the Somalis entry into our country because they didn’t have the required documents (asylum permits), which they were supposed to acquire from the first country of safety before proceeding to South Africa.”⁴

Until recently, Mozambique was another popular transit country for Horn of Africa migrants intent on reaching South Africa. However, the number of asylum seekers abruptly decreased in May as immigration officers in Mozambique started intercepting them and deporting them to Tanzania. Responding to questions from the BBC, Mozambique’s interior minister said that some of the migrants were pretending to be refugees but had criminal intentions and were being turned away to guarantee the country’s security.⁵

South Africa and Zimbabwe have vowed to take this issue to Southern African Development Community and the African Union if necessary. There are fears that these moves could generate regional tension if neighboring countries follow suit and decide to also bar the refugees from entering their countries.

¹ “Zim, SA in Somali refugee poser.” August 12, 2011. *The Financial Gazette*.

<http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/9423-zim-sa-in-somali-refugee-poser.html>

² Press Release. Transcript: Interaction with media by Minister Dlamini Zuma and her Zimbabwean counterparts. Department of Home Affairs Republic of South Africa. <http://www.dha.gov.za/>

³ Netsianda, Mashudu. “Home Affairs refuses admission to Somali asylum seekers.” <http://www.lhr.org.za/news/2011/home-affairs-refuses-admission-somali-asylum-seeker>

⁴ Ibid

⁵ “Africa Horn migrants heading south face arrest and deportation.” August 5, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011/aug/05/africa-horn-migrants-arrest-deportation>

Another Africa Communications Revolution?

Researcher: Amb. (ret.) George Ward; Tel. (703) 845-4394

Around the turn of the century, many African countries, lacking efficient land-line telephone services, embraced mobile technology. Experts who asserted that “most mobile telephone providers ... cannot operate their networks at affordable prices in the developing world” were refuted by history.¹ Mobile technology has found myriad imaginative uses in Africa, ranging from branchless banking to commodity market making. Now, two developments are laying the basis for another paradigm shift in communications technologies in Africa:

- Completion of a series of undersea fiber-optic cables around Africa’s periphery.² With these connections, Africa has moved from kilobyte/second to terabyte/second connection speeds.
- The availability of inexpensive smart phones powered by Android technology. With upscale models such as the iPhone beyond the reach of all but the most affluent, devices such as the Huawei IDEOS phone are becoming available for less than the equivalent of \$100 in African markets.³ Prices will quite probably go down even further.

Even though \$100 might seem a high price for the African context, it is approximately what simple cell phones cost a decade ago. At that time, imaginative entrepreneurs found ways of making an investment of \$100 pay off handsomely by renting air time and adding value. The same will happen in today’s environment, especially since a week’s data for a smart phone costs only the equivalent of \$3.00, a very small price for bringing the world’s knowledge to a village or urban neighborhood. One current estimate is that 69 percent of mobiles in Africa will have internet access by 2014.⁴

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the second African communications revolution. Smart phones will provide a lot more than the capacity to update Facebook profiles for millions of Africans. They are already facilitating elections monitoring and bringing citizen activists together in Nigeria.⁵ But the same technology that facilitated the simultaneous singing by one million Kenyans of their national anthem could also

¹ C. K. Prahalad and Allen Hammond, “Serving the World’s Poor, Profitably,” *Harvard Business Review*, September 2002

² Accessed at [http://www.eassy.org_and_http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:Cable_map18.svg]

³ Accessed at [[http://highbyfamily.com/blog/android-phones-africa-break-100-price-barrier, ...](http://highbyfamily.com/blog/android-phones-africa-break-100-price-barrier,...)]; also see [[http://www.androidza.co.za/android-a-bright-future-in-south-africa, ...](http://www.androidza.co.za/android-a-bright-future-in-south-africa,...)]; also see [<http://developeconomies.com/development-economics/technology-evolution-and-revolution-in-africa/>] (Link broken as of 8-12-2011. Copy available from IDA)

⁴ <http://moreintelligentlife.com/print/3430?page=full>

⁵ <http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2011/07/06/technology-social-media-and-nigerias-elections/> and “Tracking Social Media: the Social Media Tracking Centre and the 2011 Nigerian Election” (PDF)

before long provide an organizing medium for popular rage, especially as the gap between rich and poor in Africa's cities grows.⁶

⁶ <http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=198167370194267>

Trouble Looming Ahead of Elections in Cameroon

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan; Tel. (703) 824-9560

Cameroon is set to hold its presidential election on October 11, 2011. The current president, Paul Biya, reportedly announced his intent to run for reelection on July 17, 2011, although he has not confirmed this publicly. Given that the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) – Biya's ruling party – holds the majority of seats in ELECAM (Cameroon's electoral governing body), there has been concern about the likelihood of a free and fair election. Current trends suggest the months leading up to and following after the election could be filled with conflict and unrest.¹

- The Social Democratic Front (SDF) and other opposition parties have publicly addressed their discontent.
 - SDF claimed they would boycott and/or disrupt elections unless certain conditions were met to ensure a fair election.²
 - Anicet Ekane (presidential candidate) suggested elections be postponed three years while a transitional government revises the constitution and promotes a fair electoral process.³
 - President Biya made some concessions by expanding the vote to Cameroonians in the Diaspora and increasing the number of ELECAM members from 12 to 18 – although a program funded by Transparency International to register voters via SMS was recently denied.⁴
- CPDM does not appear unified and there may be political turmoil within the party.
 - CPDM has not publicly announced its position on the upcoming election, but their actions suggest they are unprepared.
 - Personal rivalries – senior party members have left the party to compete for the presidency – could lead to a battle for supremacy.

¹ <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Parties+renew+calls+for+Cameroon+to+postpone+elections/-/1066/1212656/-/qpdbee/-/>; <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Cameroon-Faces-Risk-of-Unrest-Before-2011-Elections-95426714.html>; <http://news.cameroon-today.com/cameroon-election-news-who-is-next/6251/>; <http://www.standardtribune.com/nation/49-politics/519-after-tunisia-a-egypt-eyes-turn-to-cameroon.html>

² The party asserts that the ELECAM must become an independent entity, able to autonomously oversee the election process from start to finish without the influence of the CPDM-majority. They recently joined the voter's registration, but the possibility of conflict still exists. [<http://allafrica.com/stories/201108081828.html>, <http://news.cameroon-today.com/elec-cameroon%E2%80%99s-leading-opposition-the-social-democratic-front-sdf-finally-joins-voters-registration/7497/>]

³ Idea not agreeable to many, despite recognition of the current biased electoral process.

⁴ CPDM still maintains the majority of the seats – 11 of the 12 seats are members of the CPDM party. [<http://www.cameroon-today.com/elec-cameroon-elections-cameroon.html>]

- Given the precedents of Tunisia and Egypt, is Cameroon next? Several factors point in that direction, including:
 - The unpopularity of entrenched leadership – Biya has been in power for 30 years;
 - Public frustration over poor governance, corruption, and high unemployment; and
 - Past social and political discord in response to rising food and fuel prices and Biya’s revision of the constitution so he could run for a third term (February 2008).⁵

⁵ http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1081.html;
<http://www.therichest.org/nation/cameroon-protestpolice-brutality-against-riots-in-cameroon/>;
<http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/28/cameroon-will-the-widespread-unrest-bring-political-change/>

Cameroon: Will Food Shortages Cause Instability?

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan; Tel. (703) 824-9560

Cameroon's poultry production is forecast to decline significantly in upcoming months due to a lack of sufficient corn to produce feed.¹ Given the instability of the market during the past five years and increased food prices globally, fears of civil unrest are on the rise.

- The underlying causes:
 - As of 2008, statistics showed a mismatch between corn production and growth in population (consumption) resulting in a corn “crisis.”²
 - The northern part of the country is facing a shortage of maize due to poor rainfall; corn production is below 1.6 million tons for 2011 (vs. expected 1.8 million tons).³
 - Farmers in the northern region are reportedly inclined to sell their produce to bordering Nigeria and Chad because they are more profitable consumers.⁴
- Current effects on the poultry sector:
 - The shortage has created 10 to 15 percent increases in prices paid for chicken on the local markets and has raised fears about possible protests.⁵
 - Some poultry farmers are already deserting the business – some even going as far as euthanizing chicks to avoid investment costs for birds that will never reach the market.⁶

¹ Corn is said to be the most cultivated and most consumed cereal in Cameroon. It is a highly strategic crop in the country with regard to food security and food sovereignty. It is a source of income for many farmers as well as the main ingredient used in the preparation of livestock and poultry feed [http://allafrica.com/stories/200908250668.html; http://www.worldpoultry.net/news/feed-prices-take-toll-on-cameroon%E2%80%99s-poultry-industry-9217.html]

² Statistics show that cereal production is only increasing half as fast as population. Urban population is reportedly growing at 4.2 per cent per year while production is growing at 2.4 per cent [http://allafrica.com/stories/200908250668.html]

³ According to Paul Sokapin, head of the government run National Corn Support Program [http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?storyid=%7Bf130f7c7-3248-4b87-866a-ec872408004f%7D; http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=cm&commodity=corn&graph=production]

⁴ AFP20110804602006 Douala *La Nouvelle Expression Online* in French 26 Jul 11

⁵ According to Jean Paul Fouda Ottou, permanent secretary of the Poultry Inter-professional Board, known as IPAVIC, “Corn constitutes 70 percent of the ingredients used in making chicken feed.”

⁶ http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?storyid=%7Bf130f7c7-3248-4b87-866a-ec872408004f%7D

- Why is this important?
 - In 2006, when avian flu was at its peak, consumption of chicken and eggs fell drastically, and market prices declined 50 to 75 percent.⁷
 - Corn and chicken were among items whose scarcity and high prices ignited a nationwide uprising in February 2008.⁸
 - The issue also falls inconveniently close to the October 2011 presidential election (already a source of tension), and scarcity and/or high food prices could create a perfect storm.

⁷ <http://allafrica.com/stories/200905280524.html>;
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=58996>

⁸ 40 people died in clashes with troops.
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932008_world_food_price_crisis#Cameroon]

Côte d'Ivoire: Situation Remains Fragile

Researcher: Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens; Tel. (703) 845-2463

The government of President Ouattara faces four pressing challenges:

- Former Forces Nouvelles (FN) fighters, who back elected President Alassane Ouattara, are being favored in the process of integration into a military hierarchy that was deeply divided between supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo. Although Ouattara has given several senior security positions to officials who served under Gbagbo, much of the country remains under the control of FN area commanders leading badly trained, disorganized forces that are disinclined to impose the rule of law. The new president will lose legitimacy and credibility if the government fails to disarm FN area commanders and restore order.
- The Dialogue, Reconciliation and Truth Commission has begun consultations under the enthusiastic leadership of ex-Prime Minister Banny. The latter and the Commission enjoy a clear government mandate but are not seen as independent and, hence, lack popular credibility. Presidential pledges of impartial justice against war criminals are also called into question as, so far, charges focus disproportionately on Gbagbo allies despite well-documented cases of abuse on both sides. In particular, President Ouattara promoted two military commanders against whom there are serious allegations of extrajudicial killings of Gbagbo supporters and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the recent post-election violence. Chérif Ousmane has been appointed second in command for Presidential Security. He headed the Republican Forces in the Yopougon neighborhood where scores of Gbagbo supporters were allegedly executed. Marin Kouakou Fofié, who has since 2006 been on the UN Security Council Sanctions list for “grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law,” now heads a *Compagnie territoriale* in the northern town of Korhogo.
- Ouattara must take steps to normalize the political landscape by creating space for ex-Gbagbo supporters and other opposition parties to emerge. Gbagbo’s Ivoirian Popular Front (IPF) is in disarray, unable to form credible opposition according to its former head. No IPF members were named in new cabinet.

- Hundreds of thousands of IDPs remain unable to return home due to security fears. Ethnically targeted killings and attacks (largely against Guere, perceived as Gbagbo supporters) by militias have left refugees stranded in camps. Motorcycle militia patrols intimidate local residents in Duekoue, discouraging return. Militias are also manning checkpoints along major roads, a further deterrent. The inability of the government to disarm and demobilize militias and irregulars and establish security forces capable of ensuring the safe return of refugees and protecting all Ivoirians, regardless of ethnicity, will continue to undermine reconciliation.¹

¹ See:

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/c%C3%B4te-divoire-climate-fear-stopping-return-displaced-people-2011-07-28>.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/176-a-critical-period-for-ensuring-stability-in-cote-divoire%20.aspx>.


<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/05/c-te-d-ivoire-military-promotions-mock-abuse-victims>.

Colonial Boundaries and the Dilemma of the Nation-State in Africa

Researcher: Dr. Eliza Johannes; Tel. (703) 845-2102

The post-colonial partitioning of Africa meant that communities within newly constituted and independent African states had to learn how to coexist within internationally ascribed (and therefore largely artificial) borders. While international law defines states according to their sovereign territories, nations are cultural constructs linking groups of people according to shared ethnicities, languages, beliefs, and values. Post-colonially defined borders often produced states but not nation-states.

This artificial division of historically linked groups has created problems that persist in Moyo, Uganda, where 900 acres of land are currently under dispute by Ugandans and South Sudanese.¹ Since the land is legally within Uganda's borders, its current cultivation by South Sudanese farmers is perceived by Uganda as an illegal annexation.



(Source: <http://sosanews.com/2011/08/11/s-sudan-claiming-part-of-uganda/>)

- Tensions between the Ugandan citizens of Moyo and the farmers of South Sudan who claim customary rights to farm in the region are rising.²
- The primary point of contention is access to resources that have been shared communally over the years.
- During a tour of the disputed area with Ugandan President Museveni, South Sudan President Salva Kiir stated that his country did not intend to claim Ugandan land, but other South Sudanese leaders have cited the customary rights of Sudanese farmers in Uganda. Officials of Uganda have rejected the customary rights argument.

¹ <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-demands-ancestral-land,33455>

² <http://sosanews.com/2011/08/11/s-sudan-claiming-part-of-uganda/>

With the independence of South Sudan, issues that arise at the intersection between international law and customary rights will be reopened and debated. In the process, informal coexistence arrangements may be called into question. The issue of land use around Moyo is one such instance. To the extent that governments attempt to resolve these issues on the basis of international law, without taking prior customary arrangements adequately into account, tensions could be inflamed further.

Korea's Principled Push into Africa

Researcher: Dr. Katy Oh Hassig, Tel. (703) 845-2270

If Asia is the new Europe, Africa is the new Asia. Asia's large economies are involved in spirited competition for African markets and resources. Korea is a latecomer to this competition, but has recently caught the "African fever."

- Korean President Lee declared 2011 to be the "year of Africa," and major Korean corporations have been sending fact-finding missions to the continent and committed themselves to major infrastructure developments to obtain energy.
- The ROK's Agriculture Development Agency has administered three-month-long courses for 23 agricultural professionals from 15 African countries to train them in food processing technology and safety.
- Korea, as a leading "green revolution" nation, is promoting sustainable development in Africa to protect nature while developing local economies by employing optimal combinations of technology and training.

Korea's entry into the continent may be a welcome sign for African countries, which have harbored strong anxiety over the "reap-the-benefit-and-run" approach of foreign investors.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: A Growing Trend of Concern

Researcher: Ms. Ashton Callahan; Tel. (703) 824-9560

Pirates have operated in the Gulf of Guinea since the 1980s, but the increase in attacks over the past year represents a growing trend of concern in West Africa. There were no reported incidents off the coast of Benin in 2010, but 15 were reported during the first half of 2011.¹ While this figure pales in comparison to that of Somalia (163 attacks during the same six months), the increase in attacks is worrisome for three primary reasons:

- Attacks are believed to be underreported – about 60 percent of pirate attacks in Nigeria are not reported² – and this trend will likely continue.³
 - Shipping companies fear that reporting attacks will result in higher insurance premiums.
 - Numerous ships are carrying illegal cargo and will not report attacks on illegitimate activities.
 - Fishing boats attacked at dockside or close to shore do not meet the definition of piracy on the high seas and go unreported.
- Piracy in West Africa is “fundamentally different” from Somali piracy.⁴
 - Perpetrators, believed to be Nigerian, are stealing oil cargoes and selling them on the black market rather than demanding ransoms.

¹ No incidents were reported in 2010 according to the IMB Piracy Map 2010 [<http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre/imb-live-piracy-map-2010/piracy-map-2010>]. There were 14 incidents reported according to the IBM Live Piracy Map 2011 [<http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre/imb-live-piracy-map-2010>], although numerous media sources cite 15 incidents (one cited 18) [http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/08/11/general-af-west-africa-piracy_8618149.html; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14499784>; <http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2011/08/11/210406.htm#>; <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/15/idUSL9951481>; <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-gulfofguinea-pirates-idUSTRE76S25Z20110729>]

² Derived from quotation by John Drake, a senior risk consultant with security firm AKE [<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-gulfofguinea-pirates-idUSTRE76S25Z20110729>]

³ London-based insurers Lloyd’s Market Association added Benin to a list of areas deemed to be high risk due the escalation of pirate attacks. The move also placed Nigeria and other nearby waters to be in the same risk category as Somalia. [<http://www.economywatch.com/in-the-news/piracy-threat-off-west-african-coast-could-rival-that-of-somalia.15-08.htm>]; Derived from quotations by Nigerian Navy spokesman Cdre. David Nabaida and J. Peter Pham, Africa program director for the National Committee on American Foreign Policy [<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0115/Pirates-take-new-territory-West-African-Gulf-of-Guinea>]

⁴ Quotation from Paul Gibbins of maritime security company Protection Vessels International (PVI) [<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-gulfofguinea-pirates-idUSTRE76S25Z20110729>]

- The illegal sale of oil has created “a culture of lawlessness” – threatening international trade (and any derived revenues) and the local economies (e.g., fisheries) of the region.⁵
 - Piracy has the potential to threaten the economic future of aspiring oil countries such as Equatorial Guinea.
- There is no international security apparatus in place to deter piracy.
 - There are no international anti-piracy armada patrols.
 - Regional maritime forces are limited in capabilities and resources, and possibly witting to corrupt practices that facilitate piracy in the region.

⁵ Quotation from Antony Goldman, analyst at London-based PM Consulting
[<http://www.economywatch.com/in-the-news/piracy-threat-off-west-african-coast-could-rival-that-of-somalia.15-08.htm>]

Niger: Migration Exacerbates Food Insecurity

Researcher: Ms. Meg Guliford; Tel. (703) 824-9540

As violence continues in Libya, many migrant workers and third country nationals (TCNs) have crossed Libya's southern border into Niger and Chad.¹ Current International Organization for Migration figures document 48,814 and 77,412 migrants and TCNs crossing into Chad and Niger, respectively, since the start of warfare.² These migration figures are most troubling for Niger, which, as one of the world's poorest countries with consistently high levels of child malnutrition, continues its recovery from a 2010 food crisis that threatened more than half of its population.

- This food shortage stemmed largely from irregular rainfall in 2009, which caused poor harvests and severe lack of water and grazing land for animals.³
- According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Sahel's rainy season is typically from June to September, during which it can receive 90 percent of its average annual rainfall.
- If the season is extreme (causing high flooding or severe drought), this may affect food sources.⁴

This year, aid workers estimate that since approximately two million Nigeriens are already at risk of not having enough food, regardless of the harvests, the influx of migrants and TCNs from Libya into Niger will further tax scarce resources.

¹ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/IOM-sitrep-MENA.pdf>

² <http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/IOM-sitrep-MENA.pdf>

³ <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/west/UN-Calls-for-Urgent-Action-in-Niger-Food-Crisis-92435149.html>

⁴ Note, this information is from a 1996 assessment, but is supported by FEWS-Net report http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Niger_FSOU_2011_08_fr.pdf.
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/assessments/assess_96/sahel.html.

Guinea-Bissau: Public Protests

Researcher: Ms. Ashley Bybee; Tel. (703) 845-2288

There have been three large public protests in Guinea-Bissau (July 14, 19, and August 5) organized by a coalition of 17 opposition parties, all calling for Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior to resign.

- Gomes has been accused of hindering the investigations of a spate of high profile political assassinations in 2009.
- After a tentative start with only a few supporters, the first protest ended with a showing of approximately 15,000 people chanting in front of the Attorney General's office for "justice" for the assassinations.
- Gomes Junior has dismissed calls to resign, but said he would be willing to step down if a motion of no-confidence were passed in parliament.
- He did, however, fire Attorney General Amine Michel Saad, who had refused to initiate a criminal investigation into the assassinations. The dismissal was perceived as a gesture to demonstrate Gomes' commitment to investigating the case. Former Deputy Director of the Judicial Police Edmundo Mendes was named as Saad's successor.



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

THE AFRICA WATCH

SEPTEMBER 2011



TO THE READER

The team of researchers at IDA welcomes your comments, questions, and feedback regarding this and future issues. If you would like to discuss a piece you read or provide suggestions for future research, please contact me at (703) 845-4394.

Happy reading!

George

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward

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ANALYSES

Potential Post-Election Violence in Cameroon

Researcher: Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

Executive Summary

Cameroon is set to hold presidential elections on October 9, 2011. President Paul Biya, who has ruled the country since 1982, is a candidate for reelection. Although the current regime is widely perceived within the country as illegitimate, the main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), is weak. The proliferation of splinter parties divides the opposition. One of those SDF-splinter candidates, Edith Kabbang Walla (“Kah” Walla) – named one of Africa’s leading female entrepreneurs by the World Bank in 2008 – is running a surprisingly strong campaign, energizing women and youth and attracting attention among the Cameroonian diaspora, which will be eligible to vote in the upcoming election. (For more on Kah Walla, see Leadership Profile) The security forces have conducted campaigns of intimidation and violence against opposition candidates and demonstrators.¹ Biya’s re-election is not seriously in doubt, but there is a real prospect of violence if he were to be widely perceived as having manipulated the election outcome. Three factors could increase this risk:

- **Popular resentment.** Although opposition forces in Cameroon are disorganized, popular anger over a stagnant economy, high unemployment, poor education and social services, corruption, and political repression is rising – especially among the roughly 50 percent of the population under age eighteen. In a sign of concern, the Biya regime moved to block “Arab Spring”-type opposition protests by blocking Twitter in March 2011.
- **History of violent incidents.** Cameroon has a historical pattern of stability achieved through repression and manipulation of ethnic identities, punctuated by periods of intense violence. In 2008, as many as 20 people died during four days of anti-government riots spurred by sharp increases in the price of food and fuel. Biya responded by shutting down some media and blaming the violence on an opportunistic opposition whose “objective is to obtain through violence what they were unable to attain through the ballot box.”
- **Cleavages between north and south.** The predominantly Muslim North is particularly vulnerable to political violence and unrest at a time when concern is growing that Nigerian Islamists, particularly the Boko Haram, are expanding their ties in the Northern Province of Cameroon. In the event of a contested election outcome, security forces are likely to split between those who back Biya and

¹Walter Wilson Nana, “Cameroon: Forces torture, arrest political leaders,” Africanews.com, posted on 24 February 2011, http://www.africanews.com/site/list_message/33430, accessed 8 September 2011.

Northern elements of the army, creating the serious possibility of widespread violence.

From Single Party Police State to Fragile Multi-Party Politics

Cameroon's pre-independence period saw the rise of a number of nationalist parties pressing for full independence from French colonial rule. French authorities outlawed the most radical of these, the *Union des Peuples du Cameroon* (UPC), a middle-class/labor movement, charging it with communist agitation and triggering a guerilla insurgency against colonial administration in the southern Douala region that would linger on into the mid-1960s. French authorities assisted the eventual leaders of independent Cameroon in crushing the nationalist opposition, encouraging a centralized state on the Gaullist model, while undermining the new regime's political legitimacy.

In Cameroon's first national elections after independence in 1960 a northern Muslim, Amadou Ahidjo, was elected president by a small majority. During five terms as president, Ahidjo presided over the establishment of a relatively stable and prosperous country. He also established a one-party state and co-opted potential political opposition leaders by emphasizing stability through national unity and doling out generous presidential patronage, including in his power base in the predominantly Muslim Northern Province. Ahidjo used the simmering UPC insurgency as justification for the single-party rule and strong emphasis on state and regime security that continue today. By 1962, Ahidjo had consolidated his power and largely wiped out any credible political opposition. Ahidjo's Cameroon National Union (CNU), established in 1966, became the only legal political party. In 1972, all remnants of federalism were eliminated by the establishment of a unitary constitution that did away with provincial prime ministers and further served to reduce the risk of the rise of regional power bases in opposition to the central government.

Ahidjo abruptly resigned the presidency in November 1982, citing exhaustion. His successor, then Prime Minister Paul Biya, a Christian southerner, seemed poised to allow some liberalization through the reformation of the CNU to allow more open policy debate and democratic choice. In 1985, in a bow to promises of improved party democracy, the party's name changed to the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM). Biya outlawed rival political parties, rendering toothless a November 1983 law allowing multiple candidates to stand for presidential elections. He won election in 1984 with 99 percent of the vote.

In the early 1990s, energized by the collapse of authoritarian regimes across Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall, civil society and opposition groups in Cameroon began to push for multi-party democracy. From March to August 1991, a general strike organized by opposition parties damaged the national economy and pressured Biya to open discussions with political opposition and civil society groups on a transition to democracy. In hastily called legislative elections in March 1992, Biya managed to eke out a majority coalition by co-opting elements of splintering opposition parties. The October 1992 presidential election triggered charges of electoral fraud and vote manipulation when the Supreme Court announced Biya's (almost certainly


fraudulent) “narrow margin” of victory over Fru Ndi, an Anglophone from the Bamenda in the Northwest Province. Widespread rioting ensued, ending with a harsh military crackdown and the imposition of emergency rule in the Northwest Province that deepened the rift between the Francophone central government and the minority provinces in the north. Over the next two decades, political opposition became increasingly marginalized into small, ethno-regional enclaves.²

In 2008, Biya rescinded a Constitutional limit on presidential terms to clear the way for his run for a third term in 2011. Since then, divisions have emerged within the ruling CPDM, including rumors of an informal opposition group within the party called the G11 (for “Generation 2011”) who oppose Biya’s unconstitutional attempt to run for reelection. The opposition, however, remains weak and divided. The Biya regime has cynically and successfully used ethnic identity politics to fragment and demobilize civil society and prevent the rise of unified, issue-focused civil society organizations as a possible focus for opposition.³

THE BOKO HARAM WILD CARD

The roots of the current concern over possible Islamist infiltration into Cameroon trace back to the colonial era.

Cameroon was created as a German colony in 1884 as part of its push to build a German *Mittelafrika*. A short Cameroon campaign in 1914-1915 ended when the British and French pushed the Germans out and partitioned the territory into British and French Cameroons. British Cameroon was further divided into Northern and Southern Cameroons. Both were administered as part of British Nigeria, although the cultural and economic ties between that region and the primarily Muslim Northern



² International Crisis Group, *Cameroon: Fragile State?*, Africa Report No. 160, 25 May 2010, p. 14, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/cameroon/160Cameroon%20Fragile%20State.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/cameroon/160Cameroon%20Fragile%20State.pdf), accessed 6 September 2011.

³ International Crisis Group, *Cameroon: The Dangers of a Fracturing Regime*, Africa Report No. 161, 24 June 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/cameroon/161%20CAMEROON%20dangers%20of%20a%20fracturing%20regime%20ENGLISH.pdf>, accessed 6 September 2011.

Province of French Cameroon remained strong and the border porous. In a UN-mandated post-independence plebiscite, Francophone Southern Cameroons elected to reunite with French Cameroon, but the Anglophone Northern Cameroons chose to join independent Nigeria, despite pressure from Ahidjo, whose power base rested in the Muslim Northern Province. Many Muslim families live on both sides of the border, where national identities blur.

The Muslim North played a major role in the first transition of presidential power in 1982, when Biya, in an attempt to consolidate his power, accused Ahidjo of masterminding a conspiracy to overthrow him through a military coup led by northern army officers. Ahidjo was prosecuted in absentia and sentenced to death, but his alleged co-conspirators were later granted presidential pardons. Tensions in the north flared again when, motivated by the perception that political patronage and economic opportunities heavily favored Biya's power base in the South, a group of northern officers in the presidential guard launched a coup attempt in 1984. Loyalist forces eventually put down the resulting mutiny, but there was much bloodshed. Thousands of Northern Cameroonians were allegedly extra-judicially killed and buried in mass graves. The result was the marginalization of northerners from top levels of the government and security forces, many of whom served long prison sentences while others fled into exile in Northern Nigeria.

While there has been some reconciliation between Biya and Muslim politicians and military officers, the regime still has cause for worry. Loyalty to Ahidjo (who died in exile in 1989) and resentment of the current regime runs deep in the Muslim north. As a Northern political activist, Hammidou Yusuf, explained "The northern Muslims are still sympathetic to their man Ahidjo. They are slow to forgive. If Biya continues to deceive himself that northerners support him, then he could be in for a very big surprise with the arrival of the Boko Haram in Cameroon".⁴

The Northern party in the current CPDM coalition, the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUPD) has already expressed its intention to field a candidate, although that is unlikely to be its current leader, who is a member of Biya's government. Despite the legacies of the 1984 coup, Northern Muslims are heavily represented in the ranks of the Cameroon army, although frustrated by their under-representation in the elite forces and higher ranks. In addition, in the run-up to its 2010 presidential election, Nigeria deported to Niger, Cameroon, and Chad several hundred illegal migrants suspected of having ties to Boko Haram.⁵ While the number sent to Cameroon is unclear, if they include any of the 1984 mutineers implicated in the 1984 coup or Boko Haram members or sympathizers, they could pose an additional threat to post-election

⁴ Bison Etahoben, "Cameroon: Fears of Infiltration by Nigeria's Boko Haram," *Africa Review*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.africareview.com/News/Cameroon+Fears+of+infiltration+by+Boko+Haram/-/979180/1219152/-/p14a3tz/-/index.html>, accessed 6 September 2011.

⁵ Ibrahim Mshelizza, "Nigeria deports 700 immigrants in sect crackdown," *Reuters Africa*, 4 November 2010, <http://af.reuters.com/article/cameroonNews/idAFLDE6A31WB20101104?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>, accessed 6 September 2011.

stability – at least in the already disaffected Northern Province. To date, there have been relatively few indications that radical Islamism is significantly on the rise in Northern Cameroon. However, growing political disaffection and a long-standing perception of government discrimination against the Muslim North could contribute to identity-based opposition centered on Islamist ideologies -- especially among youth – in years to come.

The Tuareg: Prospects for Rebellion in Mali and Niger

Researchers: Meg Guliford, Betty Boswell, and Meg Midyette

Executive Summary

With the defeat of ex-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, forces loyal to him are fleeing to neighboring countries. Among them are ethnic Tuareg, who were recruited to fight rebel forces in Libya. Open-source reporting suggests the return of these fighters poses a threat to security in Niger, Mali, and potentially the entire Sahel region, for the following reasons:

- They are armed.
- They are highly mobile.
- They have gained additional expertise in combat operations while in Libya.¹
- They have a history of violent insurrection in the Sahel region, particularly when marginalized in their home countries.
- They have significant bases of support in the Sahel region, despite a history of disenfranchisement.²

This analysis first provides a brief history of the Tuareg and an overview of the current situation in the Sahel. It then discusses key personalities, their current conditions, and how they may be related. It also presents the prospects for rebellion and potential threats in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. It concludes with questions to be investigated further.

¹ Alex Thurston, "Qaddafi's African Mercenaries Head Home. Will They Destabilize the Sahel?" *Christian Science Monitor*. 30 August 2011.

² Alex Sehmer and May Welsh, "Unrest in the Sahara- Niger's nomads fight for rights," *Al Jazeera*, 15 July 2008. <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/unrestsahara/2008/07/2008710121834923863.html>, accessed 16 September 2011.




Figure 1: Tuareg Territory across the Sahel (shown in gray)

Source:http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/yvke/files/img_noticia/t_map_touareg_894.jpg

The Tuareg have a long history of rebellion and adversity. Since the seventh century, this community of approximately 1.5 million nomadic pastoralists has wandered throughout the Saharan regions of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria, and Libya searching for water and fertile pastures in one of the world's harshest environments.³ The French marginalized the Tuareg, whom they viewed as a fierce and rebellious people, during the colonial period.

When Niger and Mali gained independence in the 1960s, there was little change in this policy. The Tuareg continue to be disadvantaged and underrepresented within governments largely ruled by sub-Saharan ethnic groups.⁴ Figure 1 shows Tuareg-dominated territories as the gray shaded region, and the principal cities discussed in this paper are circled.

Current Events and Status Quo

In ex-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the Tuareg had a powerful ally, with his visions of forming a Tuareg federation across the Sahara and the support he lent them when other nations, such as Niger and Mali, marginalized them. In 2008, Gaddafi told a group of Tuareg fighters, "I will personally take charge of checking if really the Tuaregs are the

³ Stefan Simanowitz, "Blue Men and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger," *Contemporary Review*, Spring 2009, 70-74.

⁴ Stefan Simanowitz, "Blue Men and Yellowcake," 70-74.

object of discrimination in Niger and Mali.”⁵ This statement is one of several that demonstrate how Gaddafi came to be perceived as a Tuareg supporter.

Given Gaddafi’s support throughout his 42 years in power, it is not surprising that over 800 Tuareg fighters from Niger and Mali traveled to Libya to assist his regime in quelling the festering rebellion that began in February 2011.⁶ Tuareg efforts were further incentivized in April when Gaddafi loyalists came to the Tuareg-dominated Agadez region in neighboring Niger and provided EUR 3,000 to each recruited man willing to fight in Libya against rebel forces.⁷

Within six months, the four decades of Gaddafi’s rule abruptly ended with Libyan rebels seizing Tripoli and establishing the National Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya’s transitional government. During this time, Libya began to experience a mass emigration of third-country nationals, migrant workers, and Gaddafi loyalists to neighboring nations.⁸ While Gaddafi’s whereabouts remain unknown, it is reported that at least 32 members of his inner circle have arrived in Niger via convoy from southern Libya since 2 September 2011.⁹

The specific type and the extent of materials that have streamed into Niger along with migrant populations remain unclear, although sources have begun to give vague descriptions. The NTC reports that on 5 September 2011 a convoy carried gold and large amounts of cash in dollars and euros from the Central Bank.¹⁰ Furthermore, Tuareg mercenaries fighting for Gaddafi in Libya were heavily armed to fight the rebellion, and the dangers of them returning home with these weapons cannot be underestimated. According to Bamako University professor Mamadou Diallo, “Countries like Mali and Niger are not prepared to deal with this situation...What’s going to become of these fighters? They have vehicles, weapons, and expertise. This is dangerous.”¹¹

Persons of Interest

In addition to Interpol adding Gaddafi to its Most Wanted List, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had previously issued arrest warnings for the former Libyan leader, his son

⁵ Boureima Hama, “With Kadhafi’s Fall, Tuaregs Lose Powerful Ally,” *AFP*, 9 September 2009. http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidANA20110909T075100ZHKA68/With_Kadhafis_fall_Tuaregs_lose_powerful_ally accessed 12 September 2011.

⁶ Andy Morgan, “Gaddafi and the Touareg: Love, Hate, and the Petro-Dollars,” 16 March 2011. <http://www.andymorganwrites.com/gaddafi-and-the-touareg-love-hate-and-petro-dollars/> accessed on 09 September 2011.

⁷ Boureima Hama, “Kadhafi-recruited Tuaregs Return to Niger,” *AFP*, 3 September 2011. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALEqM5iLnNi3KVdAVMnzdxw3FGwIBuyQAQ?docId=CN.G.899d14d087f6998208d6ab992ccb6ac4.f1> accessed 13 September 2011.

⁸ Aislinn Laing, “Libya: Timeline of the Conflict,” *The Telegraph*, 22 August 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8714379/Libya-timeline-of-the-conflict.html> accessed on 13 September 2011.

⁹ “Niger ‘To Detain Son of Gaddafi,’” *Reuters, Sapa-AFP*, 13 September 2011.

¹⁰ Thierry Obderle, “Libya: Tuareg Chief Urges Negotiations to Halt Fighting,” *Le Figaro*, 9 September 2011.

¹¹ Alex Thurston, “Qaddafi’s African Mercenaries Head Home. Will They Destabilize the Sahel?” *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 August 2011.

Saif, and Libyan intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi on charges of crimes against humanity. While these individuals have garnered international attention, there remain notable individuals whose activities, situations, and relationships warrant attention given their prior positions in the Libyan government or previous Tuareg rebellions, or their known relationships with Gaddafi. These individuals include:

- *Saadi Gaddafi*: Intercepted in a convoy crossing the southern border of Libya headed to Agadez, Niger, Saadi was transported to Niger's capital city Niamey, where he and three Libyan generals who accompanied him in the convoy have now requested political asylum.¹²
- *Mansour Dao*: A Gaddafi cousin, member of his inner circle, and former commander of Libya's Revolutionary Guard, Dao also served as Gaddafi's chief of security.¹³
- *Agaly Ag Alambo*: Alambo is a Nigerien Tuareg rebel who once led a failed rebellion in northern Niger. Believed to have fought for Gaddafi in Libya, Alambo arrived in Niamey in the same convoy with Mansour Dao.¹⁴
- *Ibrahim Ag Bahanga*: Bahanga was a Malian Tuareg rebel leader killed on 26 August 2011 in northeastern Mali reportedly in an accident after a dispute with fellow traffickers while moving weapons from Libya.¹⁵ To date, no open sources have provided details on the type or model of these suspected weapons or their final destination. Bahanga was exiled to Libya in 2006, after leading an unsuccessful uprising in northern Mali, and was believed to have been recruiting fighters to launch new rebellion in Mali's Kidal region.¹⁶
- *Hassan Ag Fagaga*: Fagaga was a prominent Malian Tuareg rebel leader linked to the Alliance for Democratic Change, who was twice integrated into the Malian army and defected both times to rejoin rebel factions. He is linked to Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Ag Bahanga.¹⁷ Since peace accords in 2008, Fagaga has

¹² Rukmini Callimachi, "Gadhafi's Son, 3 Generals in Niger Ask for Asylum," *The State*, 13 September 2011.

¹³ Dalatou Mamane and Rukmini Callimachi, "Libyan, Tuareg Convoys Heads for Niamey, Niger, Carrying Gaddafi Troops: Report," *The Huffington Post*, 6 September 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/06/libya-tuareg-niger-gaddafi_n_949961.html accessed on 13 September 2011.

¹⁴ Hadeel al-Shalchi and Maggie Michael, "Top Gadhafi Official Flees to Niger In Desert Trek," *The Times Leader*, 7 September 2011. <http://www.timesleader.com/news/Top-Gadhafi-official-flees-to-Niger-in-desert-trek.html>, accessed 15 September 2011.

¹⁵ WW4 Report, August 27, 2011 (8:48pm), "Mali: Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim ag-Bahanga killed in 'accident'- link to Libya?" *World War 4 Report Blog*, August 27, 2011, <http://www.ww4report.com/node/10261>.

¹⁶ "Former Malian Rebel, Linked to Libyan Arms, Killed," *Reuters*, 29 August 2011.

¹⁷ "People Record – Hassan Ag Fagaga," *AfDevInfo*, 24 June 2008. http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/peo/peo_47483.html, accessed 15 September 2011.

repeatedly threatened to resume insurgency if the Malian government does not implement the terms of the agreement.¹⁸

- *Brigi Rafini*: Rafini is the current Prime Minister of Niger and a Tuareg, who was born and educated in Agadez, an area with which he maintains extensive connections.¹⁹
- *Rissa Ag Boula*: Boula is a Niger native, who sought refuge in Libya after he led a failed rebellion for independence for ethnic Tuaregs. He is considered to have a close relationship with Gaddafi.²⁰

Niger and Mali: Prospects for Rebellion

Given the available information, IDA concludes any Tuareg rebellion will likely occur in Mali:

- Perceptions of marginalization have been trigger points in the past. If there is evidence of extreme marginalization or uneven distribution of funds, the Tuareg may initiate another uprising.
- Mali also hosts a Tuareg region – Kidal – that is self-governing and could be a staging ground for additional violence.
- Reports indicate that armed Tuaregs have already arrived in Northwest Mali and that provincial officials are monitoring the situation, although exact control and mitigation measures have been vague.²¹

IDA further concludes that Niger may serve as a safe haven for Tuaregs who could participate in a rebellion in Mali.

- **Freedom of Movement**: Convoys carrying Gaddafi supporters from Libya have traveled throughout Niger with little military intervention. In fact, media reports indicate the Niger military escorted one convoy from its interception point just south of the Libyan border to the capital city Niamey.²²
- **Historic Gaddafi Support**: Agadez, a market town where the majority of the population is Tuareg, continues to maintain high levels of support for Gaddafi.

¹⁸ The Jamestown Foundation, "Has Al-Qaeda Started a Feud with the Tuareg?" *Terrorism Monitor* 8:33(19 August 2010).

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36764&cHash=28be26f211, accessed 15 September 2011.

¹⁹ "Niger: Country Outlook," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1 August 2011.

²⁰ Dalatou Mamane, "Libyan, Tuareg Convoys Heads for Niger Capital," *Associated Press*, 6 September 2011.

²¹ "Le retour des Tuareg pro Kadhafi inquiète le Mali," *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*, 30 August 2011. <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201108300697.html>, accessed 15 September 2011.

²² "Gaddafi 'surrounded'," *Shabab Libya*, 7 September 2011. <http://shabablibya.org/news/gaddafi-%E2%80%9Csurrounded%E2%80%9D>, accessed 15 September 2011.

One resident of Agadez stated, "He was like our guardian angel, he will always be in our hearts."²³

- Leadership Support: Nigerien Prime Minister Brigi Rafini is an ethnic Tuareg who was born and educated in Agadez. Thus, the Tuareg have not only government representation but also a sympathetic ear in a high position in Niger.²⁴
- Signs of Protection: In Niger, pro-Gaddafi supporters and even Gaddafi's son are not being held for questioning. Instead, though under surveillance, reports indicate such measures are taken to protect these persons, rather than treat them as a threat.²⁵

Burkina Faso: The Wild Card

Another potential player in the Tuareg threat is Burkina Faso. Burkina was notably absent during a regional meeting of defense ministers on the question of post-Gaddafi security in the Sahel. This sparked rumors Burkina may be open to offering Gaddafi asylum or at least is sympathetic to pro-Gaddafi elements.²⁶ Although President Blaise Compaore has denied allegations that Gaddafi has already taken refuge in his territory, he also stated he has no knowledge of any Libyans in Burkina. Such statements indicate continued lack of clarity surrounding the presence of such persons in the country, and rumors have continued to circulate that some of the armed convoys entering Niger from Libya are ultimately destined for Burkina Faso.^{27,28}

Furthermore, in an attempt to reassert authority over its armed forces, the Burkina Faso Government has purged over 500 soldiers from the ranks of the national army – of which 200 have been imprisoned on charges of involvement in the June-July 2011 unrest in the country. This presents several potential security problems, as over 300 persons with military experience are now unemployed and reports of increased banditry in Ouagadougou have appeared in national news media. Rumors have surfaced that those responsible for this spike in insecurity are ex-soldiers.^{29,30} As previously

²³ Boureima Hama, "With Kadhafi' Fall, Tuaregs Lose Powerful Ally," *AFP*, 9 September 2009.

²⁴ "Niger- Country Outlook," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1 August 2011. ProQuest.

²⁵ Damien MnElroy, "Gadhafi's son 'detained' in villa in Niger," *The Daily Telegraph*, 15 September 2011. <http://www.thestarphoenix.com/news/Gadhafi+detained+villa+Niger/5405388/story.html>, 15 September 2011.

²⁶ Cyr Payim Ouédraogo, "Réunion d'Alger sur la sécurité - Et le Burkina dans tout ça!" *L'Observatoire Paalga*, 7 September 2011. <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109071349.html>, accessed 15 September 2011.

²⁷ Sandrine Sawadogo, "'Kadhafi est un être humain et le Burkina doit accepter de l'accueillir'," *Fasozine*, 8 September 2011. <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109090366.html>, accessed 15 September 2011; Abdou Zoure and Ambeternifa Crepin Somda, "Blaise Compaoré - "Nous n'avons pas d'information sur la présence de Libyens au Burkina." *Le Pays*, 7 September 2011. <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109091012.html>, accessed 15 September 2011.

²⁸ "Libya: September 6 as it happened," *The Telegraph*, 6 September 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8746098/Libya-live.html>, accessed 15 September 2011.

²⁹ Aime Nabaloum, "Armée nationale - 566 militaires radiés, 217 en prison," *Le Pays*, 14 July 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201107150557.html>

demonstrated in Iraq, unemployed and militarily trained citizens present a host of potential threats to security. It is also worth noting that, although the Tuareg population in Burkina Faso is small, it offers quick access to Gao in Mali, where pro-Gaddafi armed Tuaregs are rumored to have already appeared.

Questions for Further Study

- What is the probability that Niger or Burkina Faso will be used as a staging location for Gaddafi loyalists to launch a rebellion against Libya's transitional government or an incursion into Mali, especially now that both nations have promised not to offer Gaddafi asylum?³¹
- What additional groups may be leveraged if a large-scale, heavily resourced and well-armed rebellion takes place?
- What kinetic capabilities do Tuaregs have in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali?
- How will trade and trafficking routes play into this threat?
- How might Tuareg tensions with other ethnic groups feed the threat?
- What were the circumstances surrounding the slaying of Bahanga? Was his death actually the result of an argument over weapons smuggled from Libya? If so, what type of weapons were smuggled, where are they currently located, and who controls them?
- Given his ethnicity and his hometown, might the current Nigerien PM have participated in or supported any of the former Tuareg rebellions or have close advisors with such affiliations to Tuareg rebellions?

Given the complexity and fast-moving nature of the movements of arms and Gaddafi loyalists into Libya's neighboring countries (particularly Niger and Mali), IDA will continue to monitor these issues and to provide timely analysis.

³⁰Sidzabda, "Insécurité à Ouaga - Une recrudescence inquiétante," *Le Pays*, 12 September 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109131385.html>.

³¹Elise Keppler, "Le Burkina Faso et le Niger se rangent aux côtés des victimes libyennes," *AllAfrica.com*, 14 September 2011, <http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201109141423.html>, accessed on 16 September 2011.

Assessing Prospects for Ethno-Political Violence in Kenya's 2012 Presidential Elections

Researcher: Dr. Eliza Johannes

Executive Summary

The 2012 presidential election in Kenya might be delayed until December 17. According to several reports, the cabinet approved a bill to amend the constitution in a meeting moderated by President Kibaki. It would allow the government to move the August 2012 elections to December 2012.^{1,2} The proposed election delay is under review by parliament but has already provoked objections among some Kenyans who accuse lawmakers of wanting the delay to extend their tenures and pay.³ The international community wants Kenya to decide a date in order to avoid the violence seen in 2007 and 2008.

Levels of ethno-political violence in Kenya have grown with each election following the end of one-party rule under President Daniel Arap Moi in 2002. Each time, violence erupted because ethnically divided political elites and their supporters pursued politics by other means following election defeats and other results incongruent with their political preferences.

In the run-up to 2012 elections, however, stability-minded groups in Kenyan society – business interests who seek to avoid disorder and political elites intent on maximizing their chances of gaining or retaining political power – have cooperated in the creation of a coalition party, the United Democratic Front (UDF). Should the coalition remain intact, it represents one of the best chances of minimizing, although not eliminating, political violence. Key indications that the 2012 presidential elections could likely turn violent are:

- The ongoing prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of key Kenyan politicians Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto of the UDF.
- Forecasts of widening disparity in support between the current Prime Minister Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the UDF.
- Lack of effort by the Kenyan government to demobilize groups such as the Mungiki, who were recruited for the 2007 violence.

¹ "Cabinet Moves to Change Kenya's Election Date," *Daily Nation*, September 13, 2011. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Cabinet+moves+to+change+Kenya+election+date/-/1064/1235616/-/nvdkyn/-/index.html>

² "Cabinet Moves to Change Kenya's Election Date," *Daily Nation*, September 13, 2011. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Cabinet+moves+to+change+Kenya+election+date/-/1064/1235616/-/nvdkyn/-/index.html>

³ Wangui Kanina and Richard Lough, "Kenya Cabinet Proposes 2012 Election Delay," *Reuters Africa*, September 13, 2011. <http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E7KD3CD20110913>

- Persistent hostility among ethnic groups, demonstrated by the continued displacement of Kenyans living in camps following post-election violence in 2007-2008.




Figure 1: Kenyan Ethnic and Electoral Maps, 2007
Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#map>

The Violence in 2008

In January 2008, large-scale and widespread ethno-political violence overtook Kenya in the wake of disputed presidential elections. Exit polls depicted conflicting reports.⁴ Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of votes reported by the Electoral Commission when it declared the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, the winner of tight elections against his political rival, an ethnic Luo, Raila Odinga.

⁴ "Q&A: Kenya Peace Deal," *BBC News*, April 13, 2008.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm#map>

Exit polls contradicted the results, sending Kenya into a tailspin with Odinga supporters (drawn primarily from the Kalenjin minority ethnic group in the West, marshaled by William Ruto and Henry Kosgey) attacking Kibaki loyalists (the majority Kikuyus residing primarily in Central Kenya). In the run-up to the election, Kibaki allied with a young but astute politician, Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu and son of the first Kenyan president) with ties to the Mungiki (a Kikuyu cult and youth gang, renowned for its mass violence). As Kalenjin supporters of Odinga attacked Kikuyus, the Mungiki initiated a wave of brutal violence of their own, seeking to offset the push against the status quo. Although little is known about the Kalenjin gangs deployed for violence, the media has devoted a wealth of resources to reporting on the Mungiki.⁵ (See the discussion of Mungiki violence in Box 1.) According to estimates, between 800 and 1,500 people were killed and approximately 250,000 internally displaced because of the violence.⁶

A New Theory of Election-Related Violence

A noticeable fact is that violence occurring after the elections took place mainly as a reaction to electoral misfortunes.^{7,8} One interpretation of this is to consider election-related violence in

⁵ Erik Henningsen and Peris Jones, "Crisis and the Regeneration of the Self: the Mungiki Movement's Power of Mobilisation," *Norwegian Institute for Urbana and Regional Research*. <http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/21-40/panel-21/Henningsen-and-Jones-Full-paper.pdf>
And Scott Baldauf. "The six men accused of inciting Kenya's post-election violence," *Christian Science Monitor*. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/1215/The-six-men-accused-of-inciting-Kenya-s-post-election-violence/William-Ruto>

⁶ "Deal to end Kenyan crisis agreed," *BBC News*, April 12, 2008.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7344816.stm>; "Kenya opposition cancels protests," *BBC News*, 2008-01-07. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7174670.stm>.

⁷ Recorded pre-election violence occurred in the Rift Valley has the undertones of a longstanding territorial dispute ("Pre-Election Violence Hits Kenya," *BBC News*, 2007. See also: "160 Killed in Kenya Clashes," *Statesman*), but the overtones of pre-election deterrence ("Kenya: Army and Rebel Militia Commit War Crimes in Mt. Elgon," *Human Rights Watch*, 2008).

⁸ Two Kenyan presidents (Mzee Kenyatta and the current president, Kibaki) have been of Kikuyu ethnicity. Kenyans hold the view that the country's wealth is centered around the Kikuyu ethnic group. During the 2007 election violence, it was this group that was targeted most often when Odinga from the Luo ethnic group lost the election.

developing democracies as an extension of the political process within a theoretical framework that differentiates pre-election from post-election violence and describes the systematic forces behind each of them.⁹

Pre-election violence is a form of deterrence used to influence the targeted populations to abandon the voting franchise by not showing up at the polls. Motivation to commit pre-election violence grows as perceived support for the opposition grows. The goal is to use violence to reduce the turnout of opposition supporters, ultimately negating their political preferences and distorting the electoral results.

Post-election violence is not deterrence, since voting has already transpired and authorities have announced poll results. Instead, it is a form of coercion – specifically coercive punishment used by disaffected political actors to alter electoral outcomes in their favor.

Punishment in the form of violence seeks to make governing impossible. It forces “winners” who lack sufficient military strength to consider political compromises in order to reinstate stability.

Whereas levels of pre-election violence are based upon perceptions of comparative support and likely voter turnout, levels of post-election violence depend on how much political “losers” disagree with the announced outcome and the military power available to them to express this disagreement. The more a “loser” disagrees with an announced outcome and the more parity in power it has with the opposition, the greater the expected level of ensuing violence between them might be. This seems to be the trend with a majority of African countries, Kenya being one example.

There was pre-election political violence in Kenya preceding the 2007 presidential election, but it was insubstantial compared to the post-election violence afterward. In the context of the above framework, levels of pre-election violence were low because of the power parity between the two frontrunners, Kibaki and Odinga. While mobilizing their supporters was likely a chief concern of the each political elite, demobilizing supporters of the opposition apparently was not.

In contrast to this was the overwhelming magnitude of post-election violence. Odinga’s supporters were outraged over what they perceived as corrupt balloting while Kibaki’s supporters were unwilling to relinquish the gains they made through an alliance with the sitting president.¹⁰ No competing ethnic group possessed overwhelming force relative to others, so the parity in power resulted in outright conflict as each sought to target for retribution unarmed civilian supporters of the political opposition.

⁹ The definition of a developing democracy in this context is a democracy that has yet to consolidate the institutions necessary for peaceful transitions of political power.

¹⁰ Kenyatta’s strategic alignment with Kibaki dates back to the beginning of the 2007 campaign season, when he resigned his candidacy and gave Kibaki his official support. Deploying the Munguki, as Kenyatta is alleged to have done, most likely occurred as a means to protect and ensure his political investment.

Lessons Learned

- Competing political elites are willing to make use of strategic political violence in an effort to offset or sustain electoral achievement.
- Pre-election violence appears to follow a theoretical model, where narrow margins of support lead to lower levels of pre-election violence because little additional effort is needed to prevail. Each group needs to deter few, if any, opposition supporters from going to the polls.

The Kenyan Political Scene and Recent Polling

President Mwai Kibaki, has announced that he will not seek an additional term, which has opened an opportunity for his formal rival, Prime Minister Raila Odinga, along with others such as Uhuru Kenyatta (currently the Finance Minister) and William Ruto (who held multiple government posts but was twice convicted of corruption) to bid. Figure 2 shows a “poll of polls” illustration of likely political support for the candidates. Although polling done on August 15 and reported by radio station Capital FM show support for Odinga at 26 percent, Kenyatta at 23 percent, Ruto at 19 percent, and Musyoka at 16 percent, the results diverge from longer trends established over the years that ethnic groups vote uniformly.




Figure 2: Poll of Polls
(Methodology includes calculating a mean proportion across polls ranging from 2009 to 2011. See Appendix)

From the perspective of the theoretical framework, the poll results indicate a relatively high likelihood of pre-election deterrence on behalf of candidates like Kenyatta and Ruto. Not only do the candidates have an incentive to deter large numbers of Odinga

supporters from showing up at the polls, they have allegedly used violence for political ends in the past. Kenyatta and Ruto are among the six Kenyans standing trial before the ICC for their role in the violent aftermath following the 2007 elections.¹¹

In Africa, political elites often strike bargains. One example would be the apparent deal between Kibaki and Kenyatta before the 2007 election that led to Kenyatta renouncing his candidacy in favor of Kibaki. Ruto's alleged mobilization of the Kalenjin for post-election violence against Kibaki's supporters and his subsequent posting in the Kibaki government indicate that he used violence to improve his bargaining position and achieve a better deal than the absolute loss of the original election results handed to him.

All of this said, pre- and post-election violence can, however, combine to present political elites with costly and risky options. Violence can hurt a group's political reputation, bring condemnation from the international community, and does not always produce desired outcomes.¹² Rather than use violence to create a better pre-election position, reliable elites might negotiate with one another beforehand, avoiding violence altogether as Kenyatta and Ruto may have achieved when forming the new United Democratic Front (UDF) party.

¹¹ "Kenya post-election violence: ICC rejects appeal," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14721715>

¹² When Kenya failed to establish a local tribunal court which was intended to bring those who committed crimes in the 2007 elections, the ICC named the six Kenyan politicians who were involved in the post-election violence.




Figure 3: Notional Coalition Representation in Poll of Polls
 (Methodology includes taking the averaged average percentage across coalition members)

On August 3, 2011, Kenyatta, Ruto, Musyoka, and Wamalwa united with three other political elites to form the United Democratic Front (UDF) coalition party.¹³ Figure 3 shows the increased projected support for the UDP coalition party candidate, showing there is near parity in terms of public support between whomever UDF selects and Odinga. Such a change in the political picture implies a significant decrease in the likelihood of pre-electoral political violence. However, the transitory nature of coalition politics and the apparent strong case developed by ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo mean that stable cohesion among the UDF partners may not last.¹⁴

Dissolution of the UDF coalition would mean an increased likelihood for pre-election violence and could happen because of UDF infighting or because Ruto or Kenyatta receive six-month or longer sentences from the ICC. (Kenyan law forbids elected officials from serving if convicted of a serious crime and sentenced for six months or more.)¹⁵

The formation of the UDF demonstrates the ability of its members to negotiate and possibly avoid post-election violence. However, there might still be tensions between UDF and Odinga. Without an outright and unquestionable victory by Odinga or the UDF candidate, a runoff election will result. If violence erupts to affect the turnout for the second election or to alter the results from the final runoff, then the scale and magnitude of the violence will likely exceed that witnessed in 2008.

¹³ Patrick Mayoyo, "New Political Party Formed ahead of 2012," *Daily Nation*, August 3, 2011. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/New+political+party+formed+ahead+of+2012+/-/1064/1213204/-/oydtlw/-/index.html>.

¹⁴ Evelyn Kwamboka, "Hague: Ocampo Prepares Last Batch of Evidence," *The Standard, Kenya*. August 1, 2011.

¹⁵ "Uhuru, Ruto in 2012 Race even if ICC proceeds," *The Star*, August 24, 2011. <http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/37367-uhuru-ruto-vow-to-run-in-2012-even-if-icc-confirms-charges>

Kikuyus and the Kalenjin ethnic groups on both sides of the political divide reportedly have developed caches small arms and other light weapons.¹⁶ Although these are not heavy arms, it is noteworthy that much of the violence in 2008 involved sticks, gas canisters, bows and arrows, machetes and rocks.¹⁷ Access to firearms may heighten the level of violence should conflict erupt.¹⁸

Conclusion

Authorities must remain vigilant in the lead-up to the 2012 Kenyan presidential election. Although the formation of the UDF coalition significantly reduced the prospect for pre-election violence, this relative stability depends strongly on the coalition remaining intact. Internal forces such as ethnic strife and outside forces such as the ICC prosecution may undermine UDF cohesion.

The arming of groups since 2009 in preparation for the 2012 elections amplifies two risks: 1) It decreases confidence that opposing sides are seriously working on a negotiation agenda, and 2) It almost ensures that if conflict does erupt, the violence will be on a larger scale than that witnessed in 2007.

Appendix

Kenya Presidential Election 2012 Poll Sources	
Article Title	Source
Raila Crushes Rivals in Latest Opinion Poll	http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/08/15/raila-crushes-rivals-in-latest-opinion-poll/
Raila Ahead in Polls	http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Raila+ahead+in+polls/-/1056/1201594/-/I19ajhz/-/index.html
SPEC Barometer	http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/1145130/data/253118/-/ix0m8u/-/polls.ppt
Raila Short of Threshold Needed to Win Presidency Without a Runoff	http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000031880&cid=4&
Poll: Kenya Could Face Runoff	http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1106094/-/7oewdu/-/index.html
By-Elections and Beyond: Uhuru and Kalonzo Emerge as the Most Preferred Presidential Running Mates	http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/1017268/data/197989/-/md49auz/-/running.pdf
SPEC Barometer	http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/969980/data/180108/-/rdv846z/-/Synovate+23-07.ppt
Raila the Man to Beat in 2012: Poll	http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Raila%20the%20man%20to%20beat%20in%202012%20Poll%20%20/-/1064/994508/-/view/printVersion/-/iahw6uz/-/index.html
SPEC Barometer	http://www.nation.co.ke/blob/view/-/674224/data/108357/-/k1nq8v/-/Synovate+polls.ppt

¹⁶ "Kenyans Rearming for 2012 Poll," *BBC News*, October 7, 2009.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8293745.stm> Wednesday, 7 October 2009 12:05 UK.

¹⁷ "Bows And Arrows: Deadly Weapons of Rural Kenya's War," *Space War: Your World at War*, February 2, 2008.

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Bows_and_arrows_deadly_weapons_of_rural_Kenyas_war_999.html

¹⁸ Friends Committee on National Legislation, "Kenya: Temporary Cease-Fire or Lasting Peace?" *Policy Brief*, September 2009. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Kenya_Book_Web.pdf

Ethiopia's Hydroelectric Plans Masking Other Problems

Researcher: Claudio C. Biltoc

Executive Summary

Ethiopia's ambitious plans to generate and export electric power may lead to domestic and international discord stemming from domestic power shortfalls, ethnic conflicts, political friction, and the impact on water flow to neighboring countries including Kenya, Sudan, and Egypt. The controversial nature of the projects has limited external funding options, leaving the Ethiopian government with few choices. International financial institutions have begun to criticize Ethiopia's loose monetary policies as the government prints money to fund programs. Water-sharing issues with its neighbors and the environmental harm done to local populations may give rise to instability in Ethiopia and the region.

Introduction

In late May 2011, Ethiopia began exporting electricity to neighboring Djibouti. The export will generate approximately USD 10 million of income in the first year.¹ It is part of a plan by Ethiopia to become the regional electrical export leader. Future electricity export destinations cover most East African states, including Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. Although now only producing at a rate of slightly over 3,460 megawatts (MW), Ethiopia plans to more than double production capacity by 2015 and increase it almost tenfold by 2020.²

This increase is to be accomplished mainly by adding to the current hydroelectric infrastructure, which now produces over 85 percent of total electricity in Ethiopia.³ Distribution networks are also being improved, including a new high voltage line linking the Ethiopian and Kenyan power grids, a USD 900 million 2,000 MW project funded via by various entities including the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the French Agency for Development.⁴

Both residential and commercial customers in Ethiopia pay about USD 0.04 per kilowatt/hour for electricity, approximately half of the cost for electricity in Kenya.⁵ One factor driving up the cost of electricity in Ethiopia's neighboring countries is their use of

¹ William Davison, "Ethiopia Begins Electricity Exports to Neighboring Djibouti, Utility Says," *Bloomberg*, June 10, 2011. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-10/ethiopia-begins-electricity-exports-to-neighboring-djibouti-utility-says.html>

² Stephen Asiimwe, "East Africa: Ethiopia to Sell Power to Region," *East African Business Week*, July 31, 2011. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108011816.html> (accessed August 17, 2011).

³ Asiimwe, Stephen, "East Africa: Ethiopia to Sell Power to Region," *East African Business Week*, July 31, 2011. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108011816.html> (accessed August 17, 2011).

⁴ Open Source Center. (2011, August 11). World Bank to fund high voltage line linking up Ethiopian, Kenyan Power Grids. Retrieved August 29, 2011, from Open Source Center .

⁵ Mesfin, Mahlet. "Ethiopia: Fleeced – Power Co, Telecom Cry for Justice," *Addis Fortune*, August 30, 2011. <http://www.addisfortune.com/Fleeced-%20Power%20Co,%20Telecom%20Cry%20for%20Justice.htm> (accessed September 7, 2011)

oil-fired thermal plants for generating electricity. Kilowatt/hour prices have increased with the price of fuel. In Uganda, where thermal generation accounts for almost half of all electrical generation capacity, the cost of producing electricity has risen over 300 percent since 2006.⁶

Electrical Capacity Increasing

Comparing Ethiopia's electrical generation capacity of approximately 3,460 MW and its domestic consumption slightly under 3,130 MW provides a deceptive view of the country's energy situation. While the numbers show a surplus allowing for exports, reality is that electricity penetration within the country is very limited.⁷ Only approximately half of the towns in the country have access to electricity. Of the 83 million people in the country, only approximately 22 percent have electricity.⁸ The general population is not likely to take a favorable view of the exploitation of Ethiopian water resources for export.

Compounding the limited penetration of electricity in the country are losses in transmission and generation capacity due to theft of components. Ethiopian Electrical Power Cooperation (EEPCo) uses 138 power distribution stations, 136,000 km of electric lines and 30,000 towers to deliver power to customers. Theft of rails, copper, fiber optic cable, and steel components from transmission towers, coupled with the hijacking of electric power, is having a significant impact on electricity distribution. It also costs the company millions of dollars each year.⁹ Even large installations such as steel mills are reportedly involved in the theft of electricity.



Cable theft
Source: Addis Fortune

Between fall 2009 and summer 2010, Ethiopia brought online an additional 1,180 MW of generating capacity with the 300-MW Tekeze, 420-MW Gilgel Gibe II and 460-MW Beles hydroelectric facilities. Earlier this year, Ethiopia announced a future mega-dam project, dubbed the "Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam," capable of producing 5,250-MW of electricity on the Nile River.¹⁰ Total future accessible hydropower potential is

⁶ J. Barigaba, "East Africa: Region Foots Huge Energy Bill as Thermal Plants have a Field Day," *AllAfrica.com*, August 27, 2011. Retrieved September 7, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108292152.html>

⁷ "Ethiopia Electricity," *CIA Factbook*, July 12, 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html> (accessed August 17, 2011).

Institute, Global Energy Network. "Ethiopia Energy issues." Global Energy Network Institute.

⁸ Global Energy Network Institute. "Ethiopia Energy issues." Global Energy Network Institute. <http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/energy-issues/ethiopia/index.shtml> (accessed August 17, 2011).

⁹ Mesfin, Mahlet. "Ethiopia: Fleeced – Power Co, Telecom Cry for Justice". *Addis Fortune*. August 30, 2011. <http://www.addisfortune.com/Fleeced-%20Power%20Co,%20Telecom%20Cry%20for%20Justice.htm> (accessed September 7, 2011)

¹⁰ "Ethiopia: Gibe III Project 46% complete – Ministry," *Nazret.com Blog*, August 19, 2011, <http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2011/08/19/ethiopia-gibe-iii-project-46-complete-ministry>

estimated to be approximately 40,000 MW, based on the hydro-geography.¹¹ For comparison, Hoover Dam has a capacity of 2,080 MW, which is the average output for average hydroelectric generation facilities.¹² Larger plants usually produce between 6,000 MW and 10,000 MW, with the largest being Three Gorges Dam in Hubei China, with a capacity of 22,500 MW.¹³

The new dam construction is not without critics or controversy. Gibe III – currently under construction with a planned capacity of 1,870 MW – has proven very controversial, with the United Nations recently calling for suspension of construction. The World Heritage Committee has stated that the dam construction endangers Lake Turkana in Kenya, an important downstream water resource for populations in both Ethiopia and Kenya.¹⁴ Additionally, an April 2010 study by the African Development Bank concluded that the dam will “result in a significant drop in the Lake’s water level” and other major detrimental effects.¹⁵ Ethiopia is dismissive of the criticism and insists that the completed environmental impact studies show no negative effect to Lake Turkana. The project is currently 50-percent finished but the planned completion date of 2013 is in jeopardy. Although part of the initial financing is from Chinese sources, financing for completion is not fully in place.¹⁶

Ethiopian Economy Fueled by Printing Money

In 2010 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi won reelection to a fourth consecutive five-year term. His victory in an election marred by multiple complaints of harassment and intimidation was based on his claim to a record of double-digit economic growth.¹⁷ This façade of economic prosperity may be crumbling. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) press release stated that the high rate of inflation – 30 percent annually in April 2011 – was partly caused by rising commodity prices but mainly due to excessive monetary expansion. The report also noted a stifled private sector in need of growth, the need to lift price controls, and disruptions caused by transfer of resources from private banks to the Ethiopian Development Bank (EDB).¹⁸ Basically, it seems that

¹¹ Sonal Patel, "Ethiopia's new Hydro Plant Boosts Region's Generating Capacity," *Power Magazine*. March 1, 2010, accessed August 17, 2011, http://www.powermag.com/renewables/hydro/Ethiopias-New-Hydro-Plant-Boosts-Regions-Generating-Capacity_2528.html

¹² "Hoover Dam FAQ," U.S. Department of Interior, accessed September 14, 2011, <http://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/faqs/powerfaq.html> ()

¹³ "Three Gorges Hydroelectric Power Plant, Hubei, China " *Power.technology.com*, accessed September 14, 2011, <http://www.power-technology.com/projects/gorges/>

¹⁴ Argaw Ashine, "UN Calls for Suspension of Giant Hydroelectric Dam," *Daily Nation On the Web*, July 28, 2011, accessed August 17, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201107290070.html>

¹⁵ World Heritage Committee, "Convention Concerning The Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage," UNESCO, May 27, 2011, accessed Aug 17, 2011, <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2011/whc11-35com-7B.Adde.pdf>

¹⁶ "Ethiopian officials reject UN calls to suspend controversial dam project," *Sudan Tribune*, accessed Aug 31, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Ethiopian-officials-reject-UN,39806>

¹⁷ J. McLure, "Ethiopian Party Accused of Intimidation Before Election," *The New York Times*, May 23, 2010, accessed at, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/world/africa/24ethiopia.html?ref=meleszenawi>

¹⁸ "IMF Staff Mission on the 2011 Article IV Consultation with Ethiopia," International Monetary Fund, accessed September 2, 2011, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11207.htm>

As upstream countries develop new uses for Nile Basin water resources, Egypt is becoming concerned for its water security. So far, this concern has been expressed only rhetorically. Given Egypt's dependence on the waters of the Nile, more drastic action in the future cannot be ruled out.

Impact/ Conclusion

Ethiopia may only be attempting to position itself ahead of Africa electricity demand, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates will rise by 150,000 MW by 2013.²² However, doing so while creating significant internal and international opposition may bring about instability and conflict. In addition to the economic and environmental issues described above, these plans might increase drought vulnerability and increase international tensions.

²² Sonal Patel, "Ethiopia's New Hydro Plant Boosts Region's Generating Capacity," *Power Magazine*, March 1, 2010, accessed August 17, 2011, http://www.powermag.com/renewables/hydro/Ethiopias-New-Hydro-Plant-Boosts-Regions-Generating-Capacity_2528.html

Uranium Mining: Risks Abound, but Expansion Continues

Researcher: Andrea Pongo

Summary

Uranium mining in Africa is a capital-intensive activity that carries with it serious risks of social, environmental, and economic harm. However, international mining companies driven by global demand for nuclear power generation and host governments motivated by tax revenue and profit sharing will continue to push uranium extraction on the Continent.

Recent incidents demonstrate the need for uranium mine operators to work closely with host governments to enforce security, safety, and health policies. The theft in August 2011 of radioactive materials from a new facility in Namibia, recent labor disputes, and kidnappings of foreign workers are examples of risks faced. As with any large-scale industrial project, investors need to be sensitive to local conditions in order to avoid labor actions or other hazards that threaten project feasibility or even the possibility of violence against personnel and property.

Uranium in Africa

Traditional exporters of uranium in Africa include Niger and Namibia. Namibia alone accounts for 8 percent of world uranium output. Nigerien uranium production is comparable at 7.8 percent. South Africa produces 583 tons/year – or 1 percent of world output – mostly as a by-product of existing gold mining operations. A new entrant to the African producer market is Malawi, which produced 670 tons of uranium in 2010 at the Kayelekera Uranium Mine, operated by Paladin Energy (Australia).¹ A uranium processing plant is planned in Zambia.²




Figure 4: Location of Trekkopje Mine in Namibia

Source: http://www.marenicaenergy.com.au/projects/namibia_marenica.html

Exploration and study are underway in other African countries including: Areva projects in the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Africa, Australian-led projects in Botswana, and other efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.^{3,4}

¹ "World Uranium Mining." World Nuclear Association, accessed, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html>

² Oliver J. Schatz, "A Brief Review of Uranium Mining in Africa," *Mining.com*, September 2008. p. 34.

³ Oliver J. Schatz, "A Brief Review of Uranium Mining in Africa," *Mining.com*, September 2008. p. 34.

Risks to Host Countries

Theft

The security of uranium ore and yellowcake from local plants is one of the challenges of uranium mining in a high-risk environment. The theft of radioactive yellowcake from the Areva (France) Trekkopje mine in Namibia on 26 August 2011 was similar to a theft from the Rio Tinto (Australia) Rössing mine in 2009.^{5,6,7} In both cases, no material was shipped out of the country because local law enforcement arrested the suspects within days of the theft after well-staged 'sting' operations.

These particular thefts were likely crimes of opportunity, but they demonstrate the routes by which yellowcake could potentially be illicitly acquired. The Trekkopje mine had not yet started commercial operations when the August theft occurred.⁸ The incidents emphasize that security precautions must be strengthened and enforced at all stages of production and storage and that measures are the responsibility of the plant operators. The fact that one of the 2009 conspirators was a member of the Namibian Defense Force points out how issues of local corruption affect plant security planning.⁹

Economic Collapse

An important but underrated risk to local populations is economic collapse if large-scale mining operations shut down suddenly and without careful planning for mitigation.¹⁰ Infrastructure built especially to service mining operations such as power plants, roads, or rail lines would deteriorate when their primary customer leaves. Governments do not have the resources to operate and maintain the infrastructure without income from taxes and royalties generated by the mining companies.

Besides losing the jobs directly related to the mines, thousands more jobs can be lost among their suppliers. Companies providing parts, chemicals, or services to the mines would likely close their operations without their primary customer.

To the extent that those operations benefit to the host country, it is important that the host government helps to create conditions that enable the continued profitable operation of large-scale mines. For example, the new government of Niger is attempting to improve security in the north so that kidnappings by militant groups are curtailed.

⁴ "Uranium in Africa," World Nuclear Association. Information updated July 2011, accessed, <http://www.World-nuclear.org/info/inf112.html>

⁵ 'Yellowcake' is the term used for material resulting from the milling and chemical processing of uranium ore. It contains about 80 percent uranium oxide and is used to make fuel rods for nuclear reactors.

⁶ Three men – a Rössing Uranium employee, a contractor, and a Namibian soldier – were arrested in 2009 in possession of 170 kg (375 lbs) of uranium oxide.

⁷ Adam Hartman, "Namibia: Police Seize Stolen Uranium," *The Namibian*. 8 September 2009.

⁸ "4 Charged in Theft of Radioactive Uranium," AP Financial News. 29 August 2011

⁹ Adam Hartman, "Namibia: Police Seize Stolen Uranium," *The Namibian*. 8 September 2009.

¹⁰ Because uranium mining feasibility is dependent on sustained prices for uranium above a certain threshold, investments can quickly become unprofitable when prices fall. Long-term supply contracts protect producers against price volatility, but they depend on new reactor capacity coming online. See: "Red Book - Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand," IAEA. July 2010. p. 17.

Taxes and royalties, as well as systems for addressing grievances, should be transparent because arbitrary changes to contract terms could make investors relocate to other countries in Africa where uranium mining is becoming feasible.

Health Concerns

Uranium mining in Africa carries the inherent risk that local communities could be harmed by poorly monitored mining operations. Government capacity to administer a public health and safety program can be low. Uranium mining, especially open-pit mining, puts nearby communities at risk through solid or gaseous low-level radioactive contamination. The most serious health risk is lung cancer from exposure to heavy metals contained in uranium mill tailings.¹¹

During the last decade, the Nigerien town of Akokan, located about 5 miles from the Areva-led Akouta uranium mine, was contaminated with radioactive material when waste rock from the mine was used for road construction. Personnel from NGOs measured radiation levels 100 times normal and reported their findings.¹² Environmental groups, such as *Commission de Recherche et d'Information Indépendantes sur la Radioactivité* (CRIIRAD) of France, have published reports about water contaminated with heavy metals and sulfate pumped from open-pit coal mines supplying coal to fire power plants for uranium mines.¹³ In 2009, Areva partnered with NGOs including *Médecins du Monde* to establish health monitoring stations around Areva's uranium mining sites.¹⁴

Risks to International Investors

Safety and Security

When companies undertake uranium mining projects in Africa, they face challenges characteristic of high-risk regions of the world. Most recently, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped French and African personnel from uranium facilities in Niger.¹⁵ Three hostages, one French and two African, were released in February 2011 after five months in captivity and four French hostages remain in AQIM custody as of September 2011.¹⁶ The kidnapping franchise was taken over from other militant groups, such as the Nigerien militant group *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice* (MNJ),

¹¹ Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, accessed, <http://www.ieer.org/fctsheets/uranium.html>

¹² Richard Hamilton, "Niger Probes Uranium Health Scare," BBC News, May 30, 2006, accessed, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/5030290.stm>

¹³ "Environmental Impacts of Coal Mining for Electricity to Supply to Uranium Mines (Niger)," Wise Uranium Project: Issues at Operating Mines and Mills – Africa, accessed, <http://www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html>

¹⁴ "Areva and NGOs Conclude Agreement on Health Monitoring Around Uranium Mine Sites," Wise Uranium Project: Issues at Operating Mines and Mills – Africa, accessed, <http://www.wise-uranium.org/umopafr.html>

See also "Areva in Niger: FAQ," Areva, accessed at <http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-592/a-lasting-partnership-with-niger.html#Q7>

¹⁵ "France Confirms al-Qaeda Kidnap at Niger Uranium Mine," BBC News, September 22, 2010.

¹⁶ "Niger President Says Areva Uranium Mines Safe," *Inet Bridge – Business and Economic News*, July 7, 2011.

which targeted foreign economic interests in Niger during its campaign against the government during the 2000s.

In 2007, MNJ kidnapped a Chinese nuclear engineer working for China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corps (CNEC) for 10 days and kidnapped four French employees of Areva in 2008 for three days.¹⁷ The majority ethnic Tuareg MNJ demanded that foreign mining companies pull out of Niger because of their support of the Niger government.

Labor Issues

When workers at mine facilities go on strike, losses can climb to millions of dollars. For uranium mining, repeated labor actions can affect project feasibility. In July 2011, workers at the Rio Tinto Rössing mine in Namibia went on strike to demand N\$30,000 (4,250 USD) performance bonuses after learning that managers and supervisors had received incentive packages. When the 3-day strike ended after a court order, the Rössing COO reported losses of about 3.2 million USD.¹⁸

Potential Benefits to Host Countries

Revenues from uranium mining operations accrue to the host government in many ways, most of them tied to the world price of uranium. Host governments receive revenues from exploration rights, mining royalties, employment taxes, customs duties, and taxes on dividends.¹⁹ Under normal conditions, the most lucrative tax for government coffers is corporate income tax.²⁰ However, during times of financial stress – i.e., when the world price of uranium falls, undermining mining operations' profits – this source of revenue drops off.

Host governments often negotiate ownership stakes in foreign-led uranium mines. In Niger, the new Imouraren mine will be 66.65 percent owned by Areva and 33.35 percent owned by the Niger government. Additionally, the government of Niger takes ownership of a percent of the uranium mined by its existing joint ventures (JVs) with Areva and can sell the ore on world markets. In this way, the Niger government took advantage of high world prices in 2007 and 2008. However, the Rössing mine in Namibia sells its uranium directly to world markets and can achieve more revenue overall when prices are high, compared to Niger's long-term sales contracts with Areva.²¹

¹⁷ "Chinese Worker Abducted in Niger," BBC News, July 7, 2007, accessed, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6280700.stm>

¹⁸ Denver Kisting, "Another Rössing Strike Looms," *The Namibian*. July 20, 2011.

¹⁹ "Radioactive Revenues: Financial Flows between Uranium Mining Companies and African Governments," Somo-Wise, March 2011. P. 8.

²⁰ The corporate tax paid by uranium companies in Namibia totals about 37.5 percent of profits. PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Turning up the Heat: Namibian Tax Information 2010/2011," cited in "Radioactive Revenues: Financial Flows between Uranium Mining Companies and African Governments," Somo-Wise, March 2011, p. 42

²¹ "Radioactive Revenues: Financial Flows between Uranium Mining Companies and African Governments," Somo-Wise, March 2011, p. 17

Conclusions

- **Uranium Exploration and Mining Will Continue.** Given the growing demand for power generation worldwide, it is likely that uranium will continue to be sought on world markets. Although the current economic downturn has led to a drop, future demand for uranium by growing Asian economies could lead to sustained demand, making investments feasible. A growing number of countries in Africa with uranium endowments are making contracts available to a wider array of foreign investors, including Chinese and Russian interests.²² It is unlikely that the trends of new exploration and extraction will turn around, despite the risks.
- **Illicit Smuggling Still a Concern.** Unless uranium mine operators and host governments work carefully to coordinate security measures, the potential exists for illicit smuggling of yellowcake from African sources. Although yellowcake by itself and in small quantities is worth little money, if sufficient quantities could be arranged for shipment, there are potential customers for the trade. International monitoring agencies have an inconsistent record of monitoring or preventing illicit flows of radioactive materials. Primarily, the responsibility for security will fall to the international mine operators.
- **Environmental Degradation is a Risk to the Host.** Heavy metal contamination from open-pit mines is a serious risk. Because it is unlikely that all host governments will quickly develop the administrative capacity to monitor and remedy environmental concerns, it is important that support for environmental protection capacity be provided by multiple sources. International organizations and the NGO community have traditionally provided guidance on best practices and have conducted studies of health risks from mining operations.

²² "World Uranium Mining," World Nuclear Association, accessed, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html>

See also: Oliver J. Schatz, "A Brief Review of Uranium Mining in Africa," *Mining.com*, September 2008. p. 34.

ALERTS

Cameroon: Leadership Profile of Edith Kabbang (“Kah”) Walla

Researcher: Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens

Edith Kabbang Walla, widely known as Kah Walla, is a Cameroonian politician, business owner, and civil society entrepreneur from Douala in the Littoral Province. She declared her candidacy for the presidency of Cameroon in 2011 after a short four-year political career during which she has worked to break down cultural resistance to women in politics. Since her selection as the Cameroon People’s Party (CCP) candidate on April 30, the government of Paul Biya has conducted a campaign of intimidation against Walla.

In May 2011, she was abducted from her hotel in Yaoundé on National Day (Cameroon’s Independence Day) by police who searched her bags, confiscated her phone, and held her captive for several hours. She was released later that day at her home in Douala. Earlier in February 2011, riot police used night sticks and water cannons to break up a peaceful demonstration for electoral reform led by Walla and other civil society activists.¹ Intimidation of female political candidates and anti-government activists is common in Cameroon.

Edith Kabbang Walla first became politically active in 2007 when she joined Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front (SDF) and backed the presidential candidacy of John Fru Ndi when he challenged the then-25-year incumbent Paul Biya. Kabbang Walla later split from the SDF, resigning in 2010 after allegations of embezzlement were made against her. Political opponents accused her of “unilateral and opaque management of funds for the 2007 elections,” and “making comments in the media against the interests of the party,” – both charges that she denies.

The main obstacle Edith Kabbang Walla faces in Cameroon politics is the patriarchal culture that sees the role of women limited to the domestic sphere. For example, women in Cameroon still need consent from their husbands to register to vote. Martin Fon Yembe, a Cameroonian political commentator, wrote recently: “Given a level playing field, Kah Walla will single-handedly defeat the other candidates [...] but, alas, there is blackmail, slander, corruption, and all those vices which are already playing against her and any other female candidates in Cameroon.”

Walla founded *Strategies!*, a woman-owned, women-run management consulting firm with annual revenues of USD 500,000. She is also a civil society activist. In 2008, she launched a program to organize women market traders in Douala to advocate collectively for improved conditions, a more transparent tax system, and a level playing

¹ Alyse Nelson, “Kah Walla, Presidential Candidate, Abducted and then released,” Vital Voice, accessed September 8, 2011, <http://www.vitalvoices.org/node/1736>
See also: Kah Walla, “R’esistance jusqu’au but,” Kah Walla’s Diary, Accessed September 8, 2011, <http://www.cameroonvoice.com/news/news.rcv?id=3131>

field for women in the marketplace. Walla is campaigning for the presidency on a platform of transparency, reform, and economic and social development under the slogan “The Time Is Now.”² The underlying cause of her campaign, however, is to encourage Cameroonians – especially women – to become politically active, run for office, and register to vote. She is attempting to build a national constituency for her reform and democratization movement that cuts across the regional, linguistic, and ethnic stovepipes that characterize Cameroonian politics and civil society and have enabled the concentration of power in the presidency since independence.

² “Kah Wallah 2011,” Candidate website, accessed September 8, 2011, <http://www.kahwalla.com/il-est-l%e2%80%99heure-time-is-now/>

South Africa: Leadership Profile of Confrontational Youth Leader Julius Malema

Researcher: Dr. Janette Yarwood

Julius Sello Malema, the 30-year-old president of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League, is one of the most popular yet controversial political leaders in South Africa. Malema was first elected president of the Youth League – a position once held by Nelson Mandela – in 2008 and re-elected in 2011.¹ He rose to public prominence two months after assuming the top post when he strongly backed Jacob Zuma’s bid to become president of South Africa in the wake of Thabo Mbeki’s loss of the ANC leadership the year before.²



Malema is regularly featured in the pages of South African and more frequently Southern African newspapers for his controversial positions that include:

- A call for new land appropriation policies and the nationalization of South Africa’s mines. Malema supports a Zimbabwe-styled seizure of land and farms in South Africa. He also argues that state control of mines and other key industries may be the best way to redistribute resources and reduce the country’s high levels of poverty.³ This position is not shared by the South African government nor the National Union of Mineworkers.^{4,5}
- Support for President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe. Malema visited Zimbabwe In April 2010 and offered ANC Youth League support to the autocratic leader.
- Singing the anti-apartheid song “Shoot the Boer.” At a March 2010 university campus rally Malema sang the lyrics “Shoot the Boer” from the anti-apartheid song *Ayasab’ amagwala* (The Cowards are Scared).⁶ *Boer*, the Afrikaans word for farmer, is a derogatory word for white person. His singing was defined as hate speech by the South African Human Rights Commission and ruled

¹ “Malema Elected as New ANCYL Leader,” Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg, South Africa), 7 April 2008, September 12, 2011, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-04-07-malema-elected-as-new-ancyl-leader>.

² Mark Paterson, “Should South Africa be Scared of Julius Malema?” The First Post, August 9, 2011, <http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/82795,people,news,should-south-africa-be-scared-of-julius-malema#ixzz1Xl6zS5Y4>

³ “Malema planting seed of civil war: ANC,” The Zimbabwe Mail, August 30, 2011, accessed, <http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/8918-%26%23039%3Bmalema-planting-%E2%80%98seed-of-civil-war%E2%80%993A-anc.html>

⁴ Natasha Marrian, “Malema: ‘Nationalization Will Become ANC Policy,’” Mail & Guardian, 19 February 2010, accessed, <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-02-19-malema-nationalisation-will-become-anc-policy>

⁵ “Shabangu, League at Odds over SA Mines,” BusinessReport, 3 February 2010, accessed, http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?from=rss_Business%20Report&fArticleId=5336644.

⁶ Carien du Plessis, “Malema sings the Mokaba anti-boer tune,” IOL News, 10 March 2010, accessed, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/malema-sings-the-mokaba-anti-boer-tune-1.475838>

“unconstitutional and unlawful” by the Southern Gauteng High Court.⁷ After the ruling, crowds outside the downtown Johannesburg courtroom sang the song in defiance of the judge. Some protestors held up signs with the slogan “South Africa for blacks only.”⁸

- Calling for regime change in Botswana, arguing that the government there is too close to America. The impetus is to back African governments and parties that are opposed to Western influence.

Malema, once described by the premier of South Africa’s northern Limpopo province as the “future leader” of South Africa, has increasingly angered members of his own party and is currently facing disciplinary action for his comments on Botswana by the ANC Disciplinary Committee.⁹ This is his second time facing the Disciplinary Committee – the first was when he expressed support for Mugabe – and he could be suspended or expelled from the ANC.¹⁰

In protests against the disciplinary hearings, thousands of Malema supporters burned pictures of the president, chanted “Zuma must go,” and threw bricks at police.¹¹ The incident clearly indicates the distance that has grown between Malema and President Zuma. Given that Malema has alienated both white and black South Africans, Zuma’s chances of winning a second presidential term could be improved if Malema is expelled from the party. Although political commentators in South Africa seem to think that Malema lacks the political clout to dramatically affect the next presidential elections, the fact that he is able to mobilize large numbers of young people should make the ANC cautious.

⁷ “Malema Charged over ‘Kill the Boer’,” News24, March 10, 2010, accessed, <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Malema-charged-over-kill-the-boer-20100310>.

⁸ “ANC Youth Riot over Malema DC,” Sowetan Live, August 30, 2011, accessed, <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2011/08/30/anc-youth-riot-over-malema-dc---pictures#18>

⁹ “Malema a future leader.” <http://news.iafrica.com/sa/2271620.htm>

¹⁰ “Julius Malema supporters clash with South African police.” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14709570>

¹¹ “Cabinet slams spate of violent protests.” <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/cabinet-slams-spate-of-violent-protests-1.1133668>

Uncertainly and Unrest before November Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Researchers: Dr. Eliza Johannes and Ms. Ivana Djak

The Democratic Republic of Congo is set to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on November 28, 2011. Eleven candidates, including incumbent Joseph Kabila, have registered to run for the presidency in the election, which the country's justice minister Luzolo Bambi Lessa assures will "take place in absolute democracy and transparency," despite recent incidents of violence at party headquarters and the subsequent police ban on protests.^{1,2}

On September 11, 2011 Kabila filed for re-election as an independent candidate, with the support of the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), and the Social Movement for Renewal (SMR).³ On September 12, 2011 he reorganized his cabinet, making appointments that might help him gain advantages in the provinces of his opponents.

- The former secretary-general of the PPRD, Louis Koyagialo, was appointed vice-prime minister of post/telecommunications. Koyagialo is of candidate Mobutu's ethnic group and is from a pro-Bemba region.⁴
- Jean-Pierre Daruezi, the new minister of economy, is from the Oriental province, where people have often felt marginalized.
- New minister of rural development Charles Aluela Mengulwa is from the South Kivu province.
- Justin Kalumba Mwana Ngongo is the new minister of external trade.⁵

There has been controversy surrounding some of Kabila's actions in pre-election months.

- Constitutional amendments that were pushed through by Kabila and approved by the upper house in February 2011^{6,7} allow for only one round of presidential

¹ "DR Congo pledges democratic, transparent elections," AFP, September 13, 2011, accessed, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALEqM5g7d6liqAIJLUW5PQq8hCWJ6ygCg?docId=CNG.7570364a92ced6f6208e89c44448c7fe.341>

² "Congo bans political protests after shootout," Reuters, September 8, 2011, accessed, <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJQE7870DK20110908?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>

³ "DR Congo President Files for His Candidacy for General Election," CRI, September 12, 2011, accessed <http://english.cri.cn/6966/2011/09/12/2743s657813.htm>

⁴ J. Kambale, "Kabila reshuffles cabinet ahead of November election," Africa Review, September 13, 2011, accessed, <http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1235550/-/h6r8chz/-/>

⁵ J. Kambale, "DR Congo: Kabila shuffles cabinet ahead of election," Daily Monitor, September 14, 2011, accessed, <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/-/688340/1235694/-/11i1116/-/>

⁶ Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments," Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2011)

polling. They have been described by the opposition as a blatant attempt to keep Kabila in power.⁸

While Kabila argued the modifications were made to avoid the risk of confrontation during a second round, opponents were enraged enough to make an unsuccessful coup and assassination attempt in late February 2011.^{9,10}

Violence has since ensued, most recently manifesting itself in the attack on the headquarters of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party by men including members of Kabila's PPRD.¹¹

The state of the opposition:

- Etienne Tshisekedi, founder in 1982 of the first party to oppose former President Mobutu and current UDPS chairman, filed for his first official bid for the presidency, having boycotted the 2006 election.¹² A vocal challenger to Kabila's corruption, Tshisekedi is meeting foreign government officials in Belgium, France, and the U.S., throughout September 2011 to voice concerns over potential election fraud.¹³
- The Congo Liberation Movement (CLM), whose 2006 runner-up presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba is currently on trial before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and not running, holds 20 percent of the National Assembly and is one of the main opposition forces.^{14,15} On September 12, 2011 major disunity in the CLM was visible after Adam Bombole – a CLM member, former customs agent, and millionaire playboy, and whom sources claim has been hand-picked by Bemba – announced his candidacy.¹⁶ The CLM suspended Bombole

⁷ "DRC: Senate Approves Presidential Poll Reform," STRATFOR, January 13, 2011, accessed,

<http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20110113-drc-senate-approves-presidential-poll-reform>

⁸ "DR Congo opposition anger over electoral changes," BBC News, January 10, 2011, accessed,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12152913>

⁹ "DR Congo opposition anger over electoral changes," BBC News, January 10, 2011, accessed,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12152913>

¹⁰ "30 Arrested Following Alleged Coup Plot," STRATFOR, February 28, 2011, accessed,

<http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20110228-drc-30-arrested-following-alleged-coup-plot>

¹¹ F. Wild, "Congo TV Station Burned in Pre-Election Political Violence," Businessweek, September 6, 2011,

accessed, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-06/congo-tv-station-burned-in-pre-election-political-violence.html>

¹² "Fears of Violence in Congo Elections," Associated Press, August 15, 2011, accessed,

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-08-14-congo-elections_n.htm

¹³ Alex Engwete, "DRC Election 2011 Watch," September 12, 2011, accessed

<http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2011/09/drc-elections-2011-watch-1-limited.html>

¹⁴ Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments,"

Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2011).

¹⁵ "War crimes suspect Bemba won't run in DR Congo poll," AFP, September 8, 2011, accessed,

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gRkCt21dO3pcR6khAxWa8Mg0cz8w?docId=CN.G.18b3c38ec581fd4a251c00a28ba59122.2a1>

¹⁶ Alex Engwete, "DRC Election 2011 Watch," (September 12, 2011, accessed,

<http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2011/09/drc-elections-2011-watch-1-limited.html>

from the party and requested the National Independent Electoral Commission withdraw his candidacy.¹⁷

- Vital Kamerhe, former speaker of the National Assembly and former minister of information, ran President Kabila's campaign in 2006. He quit his role in parliament in December 2010 to start campaigning as the candidate for the *Union pour la Nation Congolaise* (UNC) – a party he established.¹⁸
- Oscar Kashala, a doctor, pharmaceutical industry businessman, and U.S. resident who teaches at universities in the DRC and the United States, is running as the Union for the Rebuilding of Congo (UREC) candidate on a heavy anti-corruption and anti-exploitation platform.¹⁹
- Deputy Prime Minister of Social Needs Francois Joseph Nzanga Mobutu, son of former president Mobutu Sese Seko, is the chairman and presidential candidate of the Union of Mobutist Democrats (UDEMO). The union consists of parties and non-governmental associations advocating national unity and the restoration of peace. He placed fourth in the 2006 presidential campaign, supporting Kabila in the second round.²⁰
- Because the CLM appears divided and the two front-runners Kashala and Kamerhe are from the same region and therefore likely to split the vote, the opposition has not emerged with one strong candidate, as party leaders had hoped at the beginning of the year.²¹

Violence relating to the elections could erupt for several reasons:

- In the case of a Kabila win – which is likely, given the absence of a viable alternative – the opposition could use charges of voter registration fraud, including registration of children and the deceased, and criticism of the constitutional changes made earlier in the year to incite protest and violence.²²
- In the case of a close vote or contested results, the unstable situation in eastern DRC could erupt because militias could incite violence among refugee populations and carry out more operations like the recent prison breaks.^{23,24}

¹⁷ "Adam Bambole Excluded from the MLC," *L'Observateur*, September 13, 2011, accessed, <https://www.opensource.gov/>

¹⁸ "Fears of Violence in Congo Elections," AP, August 15, 2011, accessed, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-08-14-congo-elections_n.htm

¹⁹ "Union for the Rebuilding of Congo," May 16, 2011, accessed, <http://www.urecongo.org/home.php>

²⁰ Alex Engwete, "DRC Election 2011 Watch," September 12, 2011, accessed, <http://alexengwete.blogspot.com/2011/09/drc-elections-2011-watch-1-limited.html>

²¹ "DRC's opposition bids for a single presidential candidate," *Africa Review*, February 7, 2011, accessed, <http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1103084/-/hrq391z/-/>

²² "Fears of Violence in Congo Elections," AP, August 15, 2011, accessed, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-08-14-congo-elections_n.htm

²³ Ted Dagne, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments," Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC:2011)

²⁴ "Congo prison escape after attack by gunmen," BBC News, September 7, 2011, accessed, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10628245>

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