

NSD-4884 Strategic Risk Assessment Interview Results

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> > May 2013

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About This Publication


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Strategic Risk Assessment Framework Background


- Strategic risk assessment framework originally developed at IDA in 2005
 - Co-sponsored by OSD(PA&E), OSD(AT&L), OSD(P), and JS J-8
 - Interviews conducted May-December 2005 with 27 senior DoD leaders (including VCJCS, Army CoS, USMC Commandant, VCNO, 6 COCOMs, DJS, DJ8, 5 USDs/PDUSDs, etc.)
- Current effort being conducted in support of DLA Strategic Materials Office
 - Objective is to build and implement an analytically rigorous riskbased process that can help set priorities for risk mitigation concerning strategic and critical non-fuel materials
 - Apply this process to the 2013 National Defense Stockpile Requirements Report to Congress
 - Strategic risk assessment is part of the Risk Assessment and Mitigation Framework for Strategic Materials (RAMF-SM)


2012 Strategic Materials Strategic Risk Assessment Participants

90-minute interviews conducted from April - July 2012

I	≻	Matthew Beebe	Deputy Director, Acquisition, Defense Logistics Agency
I	≻	Frank Carlucci	Former Secretary of Defense
I	۶	General George Casey (ret)	Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
I	۶	General Kevin Chilton (ret)	Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
I	۶	Dr. David Chu	Former Undersecretary of Defense (P&R)
I	۶	Admiral Vernon Clark (ret)	Former Chief of Naval Operations
I	۶	Michael Dominguez	Former Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (P&R)
I	۶	Alan Estevez	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Logistics and Materiel Readiness
I	۶	General Carlton Fulford (ret)	Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command
I	۶	General Alfred Gray (ret)	Former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
I	≻	General Michael Hayden (ret)	Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency
I	≻	General H.T. Johnson (ret)	Former Commander, U.S. Transportation Command
I	≻	Robert Manning	Deputy National Intelligence Officer, Economic Issues
I	۶	Deborah D. McWhinney	Chief Operating Officer, Citi Global Enterprise Payments
I	≻	Rear Admiral Rick Porterfield (ret)	Former Director, Naval Intelligence
I	≻	Philip Rodgers	Deputy Director, Acquisition Resources Analysis, OSD (AT&L)
I	≻	General Larry Welch (ret)	Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
I	≻	Dr. John P. White	Former Deputy Secretary of Defense
I			

Challenge Areas	Definitions		
Major Combat	Operations conducted against a state or non-state actor that possesses significant military capability. This area should account for risk related to the use of WMD during the course of major combat. <i>e.g., China, North Korea, Iran, Libya</i>		
Irregular Warfare	Stability operations, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, or counterterrorism operations involving significant participation of U.S. forces in combat or prospective combat. <i>e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia</i>		
Homeland Defense	Protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, population, and critical infrastructure against external threats. This area should delineate among risks from WMD, cyber attack, and all other forms of external attack (except those directly related to Major Combat). <i>e.g.</i> , <i>9/11, missile attack, WMD attack, cyber attack, other terrorist attack</i>		
Global Peacetime Operations	Operations conducted to influence partners and adversaries. This area should account for risks related to changes in allied or adversary military capabilities weapons proliferation, or political instability that are contrary to U.S. peacetime military objectives but do not result in U.S. combat operations. <i>e.g., presence, deterrence, building partnership capacity, counterproliferation, freedom of navigation, humanitarian and disaster response.</i>		





Majority Viewpoint #1


Most (67%) participants saw more strategic risk in Homeland Defense scenarios than any other category of military missions.

Key drivers of risk

- A significant successful cyber attack considered both relatively likely and relatively consequential.
- Nuclear and biological attack scenarios would have severe consequences not only in terms of civilian casualties, but also in enduring psychological and economic effects.

Possible implications to consider

- Homeland security capabilities may remain under-resourced relative to the degree of existing threat.
- Improvements in interagency and intergovernmental coordination remain a top priority, potentially including re-examination of current legal authorities (e.g., for cyber defense of civilian and commercial networks).



Majority Viewpoint #3

Most (67%) participants saw war with Iran as the riskiest of all major combat scenarios.

Key drivers of risk

- War with Iran considered significantly more likely than war with other states.
- Would be prompted by conflict over Iran's nuclear program or Iranian attempts to coerce its neighbors.
- Global retaliatory reach of Iran's proxies (e.g., Hezbollah).

Possible implications to consider

- Any changes to U.S. posture in the Middle East should avoid emboldening Iran.
- Opposing Iranian and Hezbollah activity and influence beyond the immediate region should remain a high priority.

Majority Viewpoint #4

All participants believed that strong global military presence and engagement is important to U.S. national interests.

Key drivers of risk

- Reducing forward presence and engagement would increase strategic risk in all mission areas by:
 - Eroding deterrence against regional aggression
 - Undermining confidence of allies and partners in the U.S. commitment to their security
 - Making it harder to maintain dialogue and cooperation with friends and potential rivals alike.

Possible implications to consider

• Even with sequestration or other budget cuts, priority should be given to sustaining forward presence and operational tempo.

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