

Planning Forces for Steady State Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency

Dr. John Shea

This article explores the parameters of rebalancing general purpose forces (GPF) for a “steady state” environment. Its horizon is nominally around 2014, and it assumes the war in Afghanistan will have diminished in intensity and no other major regional conflict will have risen.

Background

After the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD developed a program of five initiatives termed the Irregular Warfare (IW) Roadmap.¹ The initiatives and their focus are outlined in Figure 1.

Data underpinning the IDA research came from the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and Services. Their responses are referred to here as demands. The effort’s objectives were:

- Identify IW capabilities the COCOMs need to support their current plans.
- Identify which of those capabilities GPF could reasonably provide.
- Identify other changes to GPF (units or individuals) necessary to realize or enhance these capabilities.

Analytical Framework

Discussions of irregular warfare capabilities tend to be abstract because related definitions (e.g., foreign internal development (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and counter-terrorism (CT)) tend to cover broad and unspecified ranges of functional activity, all with special identifying characteristics. For example, a wide range of activity can constitute FID, in which U.S. forces help a friendly host nation deal with lawlessness, subversion or insurgency. Those same activities apply to COIN, but only if the problem is insurgency (not simply lawlessness or subversion) and whether or not helping the host nation is a primary U.S. concern. The table at Figure 2 lists activities either cited directly in data responses or that appeared plausible in context even if they were not among the responses.

Capabilities were organized into three broad categories, 1) the training, advising and equipping of foreign forces; 2) IW-intensive activities; and 3) the use of traditional units in IW environments. Responses to the data call, clustered under these categories, required some creativity to sort through the ambiguities and overlaps.




Figure 1. Five IW Roadmap Initiatives from the 2006 QDR.

¹Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Irregular Warfare, 26 April 2006.

Foreign Force Train, Equip, or Advise	IW-Intensive Activities	Traditional Units in IW
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Foreign Military Sales and Related Training ■ Exchange /Classroom Training ■ Military Training ■ Advise Host Nation Forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations ■ Intelligence: Human Intelligence/Counterintelligence ■ Psychological Operations ■ Electronic Warfare ■ Computer Net Ops ■ Planning and Command and Control Support ■ Law Enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Joint/Multi-National Exercises ■ Logistics Support ■ Intelligence or Communications Sharing ■ US Force Protection ■ Operations

Figure 2. Functional Areas of IW Specified in the Study's Data Request to COCOMs.

In the first group, demands for *military training* capabilities were generally for teams of around twelve special operations or general purpose forces personnel to train and advise *host nation forces*. Demands for advising host nation forces are difficult to distinguish from those related to *military training*. Another related item in the group is *foreign military sales and related training*. An example would be instructing host nation forces on use of a newly acquired tactical radio system. Here, a few U.S. military members or contractors might go to the recipient country to brief its military communications experts on how to use the capabilities. Those experts would in turn train their own forces.

In the second main group, different forms of interaction are identified, each distinct from the other. *Civil Affairs/ Civil Military Operations* covers engineering projects and medical aid visits. Here, analysts needed to decide which was the primary purpose—engineering and medical support or training host nation forces. If training dominated, the demand was listed under *military training*, whereas if engineering or medical support seemed to be primary, the case was considered *Civil Affairs/ Civil Military Operations*. The grouping includes Provincial Reconstruction Teams, although they receive training similar to that given to Military Transition Teams.

The third category, *Traditional Units*, covers a range of dissimilar, easier to differentiate, activity. Under this category, *military exercises*, for example, generally involve units of battalion size or larger going overseas for relatively brief periods of collective training. During that training, the forces interact with foreign forces, but

not necessarily to train them. The frequency of demands for these activities is summarized in Figure 3.

Summary

The analysis produced rough quantitative estimates of forces needed to perform irregular warfare functions, sensitive to varying assumptions. A similar study is under way to address demands for *Security Force Assistance*. With increasing standardization in the database, it may be possible in the future to collect this information directly from routine operational data without the need for a special data request.




Figure 3. Frequency of Functional Demands.