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# Maintaining High Assurance in Asynchronous Messaging

Kevin E. Foltz and William R. Simpson

**Abstract**—Asynchronous messaging is the delivery of a message without waiting for the intended recipient to respond or acknowledge the message. This solution works for distributed systems communication, in which different systems may or may not be available at the same time. Asynchronous messaging solutions often use a message queue that holds messages to be picked up by the recipient. Although communication with the queue can be secured using lower layer protocols, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), this does not provide end-to-end security for the sender and receiver. The queuing system acts as a man-in-the-middle, negating authentication, integrity, and confidentiality guarantees. End-to-end security for asynchronous messaging must be provided by the asynchronous messaging layer itself. This paper discusses current asynchronous messaging models and proposes methods for providing end-to-end asynchronous messaging security in a high assurance environment.

**Index Terms**—Asynchronous Communication, Publish Subscribe, IT Security, Encryption, Key Management

## I. INTRODUCTION

Asynchronous messaging describes communication that take place between one or more applications or systems, in which the sender does not receive feedback from the receiver during transmission of a message. This is in contrast to synchronous communication, in which the sender of a message waits for acknowledgement or a response from the receiver before completing the transmission.

There is no assumption about which layers asynchronous and synchronous communication take place in or how these relate to each other. It is possible to implement synchronous communication using an asynchronous messaging service or using an asynchronous messaging service using synchronous communication channels. In practice, asynchronous messaging often uses an underlying synchronous channel.

A common asynchronous messaging design involves one system placing a message in a message queue and continuing its processing. At the completion of message transmission, the sender does not know when or whether the receiver received it. The message queuing system is responsible for delivering the message to the recipient. Some systems use two or more queues or intermediaries.

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### A. Some Advantages of Asynchronous Communication

Asynchronous messaging solves the problem of intermittent connectivity. If the receiving equipment fails or is unavailable, the message remains in a message queue and is delivered after the failure is corrected. This is especially useful for transmission of large data files, in which failures are more likely and retransmissions more costly.

An asynchronous messaging system with built-in intelligence may transform the content and/or format of the message automatically to conform to the receiving system's requirements or needed protocol but still successfully deliver the message to the recipient. This intelligence is used to provide a higher level of understanding of the content, which allows translation into other formats and protocols. Complicated transformations are better suited to asynchronous communication than synchronous communication because they may increase latency and cause connectivity problems or other underlying protocol failures for synchronous systems.

### B. Some Disadvantages of Asynchronous Communication

The disadvantages of asynchronous messaging include the additional component of a message broker or transfer agent to ensure the message is received. This may affect both performance and reliability. Another disadvantage is the response time, which may be inconvenient and not consistent with normal dialog communication.

## II. PRIOR WORK

A proliferation of standards for asynchronous messaging has caused interoperability problems, with each major vendor having its own implementations, interface, and management tools. Java EE systems are not interoperable, and Microsoft's MSMQ (Microsoft Message Queuing) does not support Java EE.

A few of the numerous standard protocols used for asynchronous communication are in the table below.

TABLE I MESSAGING PORTS

Port	TCP/UDP	Messaging Protocol and Description	Status
18	TCP and UDP	The <b>Message Send Protocol (MSP)</b> , more precisely referred to as Message Send Protocol 2, is an application layer protocol used to send a short message between nodes on a network. Defined in RFC 1312.	Official
99	TCP	<b>WIP message</b> is a work-in-progress message sent from a computer client to a computer server. It is used to update a server with the progress of an item during a manufacturing process. The only known use is in the automotive wiring manufacturing process, but the message structure is generic enough to be used in any manufacturing process.	Unofficial
110	TCP	<b>Post Office Protocol v3 (POP3)</b> is an email retrieval protocol.	Official

Port	TCP/UDP	Messaging Protocol and Description	Status
119	TCP	The <b>Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)</b> is an application protocol used for transporting Usenet news articles ( <i>netnews</i> ) between news servers and for reading and posting articles by end user client applications. Defined in RFC 3977.	Official
143	TCP	<b>Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)</b> is a protocol for e-mail retrieval and storage as an alternative to POP. IMAP, unlike POP, specifically allows multiple clients simultaneously connected to the same mailbox and through flags stored on the server; different clients accessing the same mailbox at the same or different times can detect state changes made by other clients. Defined in RFC 3501.	Official
161	UDP	<b>Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)</b> is an "Internet-standard protocol for managing devices on IP networks." Devices that typically support SNMP include routers, switches, servers, workstations, printers, modem racks, and more. Defined in RFC 3411-3418.	Official
162	TCP and UDP	<b>Simple Network Management Protocol Trap (SNMPTRAP)</b> . See port 161.	Official
218	TCP and UDP	<b>Message Posting Protocol (MPP)</b> is a network protocol used for posting messages from a computer to a mail service host.	Official
220	TCP and UDP	Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), version 3. See port 143.	Official
319	UDP	Event Messages for The <b>Precision Time Protocol (PTP)</b> is a protocol used to synchronize clocks throughout a computer network. On a local area network, it achieves clock accuracy in the sub-microsecond range, making it suitable for measurement and control systems. Defined in <b>IEEE 1588-2008</b> .	Official
320	UDP	Event Messages for The <b>Precision Time Protocol (PTP)</b> . See port 319.	Official
433	TCP and UDP	<b>Network News Speed Protocol (NNSP)</b> , part of Network News Transfer Protocol for bulk transfer. Defined in RFC 3977.	Official
587	TCP	<b>Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)</b> , as specified in RFC 6409.	Official
1801	TCP and UDP	<b>Microsoft Message Queuing or MSMQ</b> is a message queue implementation developed by Microsoft and deployed in its Windows Server operating systems since Windows NT 4 and Windows 95. The latest Windows 8 also includes this component. In addition to its mainstream server platform support, MSMQ has been incorporated into Microsoft Embedded platforms since 1999 and the release of Windows CE 3.0.	Official
1863	TCP	<b>MSNP (Microsoft Notification Protocol)</b> , used by the Microsoft Messenger service and a number of Instant Messaging clients.	Official
1935	TCP	Adobe Systems Macromedia Flash Real Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP) "plain" protocol.	Official
2195	TCP	Apple Push Notification service Link.	Unofficial
2196	TCP	Apple Push Notification—Feedback Link.	Unofficial
2948	TCP and UDP	<b>Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS)</b> is a standard way to send messages that include multimedia content to and from mobile phones. It extends the core SMS (Short Message Service) capability that allowed exchange of text messages only up to 160 characters in length. Multimedia Messaging Service 1.3 – Open Mobile Alliance.	Official
2949	TCP and UDP	WAP-push secure <b>Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS)</b> . See port 2948. Multimedia Messaging Service 1.3 – Open Mobile Alliance.	Official
4486	TCP and UDP	<b>Integrated Client Message Service (ICMS)</b> . Defined in RFC 6335.	Official
5010	TCP	<b>IBM WebSphere MQ Workflow</b> .	Official

#### A. Java Standard Messaging Protocol

Java Messaging System (JMS) is a message-oriented middleware API for communication between Java clients. It is part of the Java Platform Enterprise Edition. It supports point-to-point communication as well as publish-subscribe.

#### B. De-facto Standard Microsoft Message Queuing

Microsoft Message Queuing (MSMQ) allows applications running on separate servers/processes to communicate in a failsafe manner. A queue is a temporary storage location

from which messages can be sent and received reliably, as and when conditions permit. This enables communication across networks and between computers running Windows, which may not always be connected. By contrast, sockets and other network protocols require permanent direct connections.

MSMQ is responsible for reliably delivering messages between applications inside and outside the enterprise. MSMQ ensures reliable delivery by placing messages that fail to reach their intended destination in a queue and then resending them once the destination is reachable. It also supports security and priority-based messaging. Dead letter queues can be created for looking at messages that have timed out or failed for other reasons.

MSMQ also supports transactions. It permits multiple operations on multiple queues, with all of the operations wrapped in a single transaction, thus ensuring that either all or none of the operations will take effect. Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MSDTC) supports transactional access to MSMQ and other resources.

#### C. Open Source Messaging Protocols

In addition to Java and Microsoft, different open source solutions exist. RabbitMQ is an open source messaging solution that runs on multiple platforms and multiple languages. It implements Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), in which messages are queued on a central node before being sent to clients. It is easy to deploy, but having all traffic pass through a single central node can hinder scalability.

ZeroMQ is another cross-platform, cross-language messaging solution that can use different carrier protocols to send messages. It can support publish-subscribe, push-pull, and router-dealer communication patterns. It can be more difficult to set up, but it provides more control and granularity at the lower levels to tune performance.

ActiveMQ is a compromise between the ease of use of Rabbit MQ and the performance of ZeroMQ. All three support multiple platforms and have client APIs for C++, Java, .Net, Python, and others. They also have documentation and active community support. There are many other implementations, including Sparrow, Starling, Kestrel, Beanstalkd, Amazon Simple Queue Service (SQS), Kafka, Eagle MQ, and IronMQ.

#### D. Emerging Standard Advanced Message Queuing Protocol

Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP) is an open standard application layer protocol for message-oriented middleware. It is an emerging technology addressing the standardization problem. Implementations are interoperable. It includes flexible routing and common message paradigms like publish/subscribe, point-to-point, request-response, and fan-out.

The defining features of AMQP are message orientation, queuing, routing (including point-to-point and publish-and-subscribe), reliability, and security. AMQP mandates the behavior of the messaging provider and client to the extent that implementations from different vendors are truly

interoperable, in the same way as SMTP, HTTP, FTP, and others have created interoperable systems.

### III. ASYNCHRONOUS MESSAGING SECURITY

Asynchronous messaging can provide authentication of the sender and receiver identities and the integrity and confidentiality of the message content if the holder of the queue is trusted. One key challenge in asynchronous messaging systems is that a third party is often involved in the transaction, which may or may not be trusted to speak for the sending or receiving entities or view or modify content in transit. As a result, security models often require a trusted third party, which restricts deployment options. In contrast, synchronous web traffic relies on routers and other infrastructure to deliver messages, but the use of TLS provides end-to-end security without the need to trust these intermediate nodes.

#### A. Security for Server Brokered Invocation

Server brokered invocation uses web server middleware to manage message queues. The sender and receiver both communicate directly through secure synchronous channels to the server to send and receive messages. This model is shown in Figure 1. Asynchronous message security must be from sender to receiver, not just from sender to server and server to receiver. The latter fails to provide end-to-end authentication, integrity, and confidentiality, which are required for a high assurance environment.




Fig. 1. Security Considerations for Server Brokered Invocation

#### B. Security for Publish Subscribe Systems

In a Publish Subscribe System (PSS) the queue server acts as an intermediary between sender and receiver to manage many-to-many instead of just many-to-one communications. Senders and receivers communicate with the PSS through a secure synchronous channel. The PSS collects messages and makes them available to entities based on subscriptions. This model is shown in Figure 2.




Fig. 2. Publish-Subscribe Push Model

In order for the parties involved in the transaction to provide accountability, integrity, and confidentiality, the service requester must authenticate itself to the receiver, encrypt the message so only the service provider can receive this message, and provide verifiable integrity checks on the full message content. The service provider must confirm that the message is from a known identity, decrypt the content with a valid key, and verify the integrity checks before that entity can take action on the message.

This is accomplished by invoking two cryptographic techniques. The first is the use of a digital signature by the sender. When the message signature is verified, the service provider knows the identity of the sender and that the content has not been altered by another entity after it was signed. The second is the encryption of the message using the public key of the service provider. This requires that the requester know the public key of the target. A response to the requester must similarly be signed and encrypted using the public key of the requester.

The use of asymmetric encryption is paired with more efficient symmetric encryption, where content is encrypted with a random symmetric key, which is itself encrypted using the receiver's public key. Additional security can be provided by message expiration deadlines within queues and central auditing of all messages sent and received.

The PSS is an active entity and registered in the Enterprise Service Directory. Active entities act on their own behalf and are not a proxy. To preserve the end-to-end accountability chain for messages, the original publisher signs the message. However, unlike server-brokered invocation, no single public key can be used for all potential receivers. One solution to address this is for the PSS to encrypt the content to the receivers. The sender's signature remains intact, preserving integrity, but end-to-end confidentiality is not guaranteed.

A PSS may use the web server broker as shown in Figure 3. The web server broker is used only for notification messages, so it does not require security like the main channel. The transmission of the actual message is still done through the secure synchronous channel. The storage queue must be encrypted using the PSS's public key. This is piecemeal confidentiality, because the sender encrypts to the PSS, and the PSS encrypts to the receiver. This relies on trust of the PSS.




Fig. 3. Publish-Subscribe Pull Model

### IV. PSS ROCK AND JEWEL

The following is an approach developed to maintain high security assurances with the use of an untrusted PSS. In this

formulation, the sender and receiver maintain end-to-end security because the PSS is unable to impersonate either endpoint or view or modify the content. The key concepts are the use of “rocks” and “jewels” to provide security guarantees. The “rocks” are encrypted content blocks, and the “jewels” are the decryption keys for these rocks, encrypted using public keys for the intended recipients.

### A. Claims for Targeted Content (PSS)

After authentication through TLS v1.2 or later versions and authorization based on SAML claims, the sender accesses PSS services. The PSS will offer either *publish* or *retrieve* based on the values in the SAML content claim. If there are no SAML content claims, the subscriber will only receive basic services based on identity.

Publishing of content for a targeted list, as used by software publishers, is based upon registered delivery. The targeted list requires the following steps:

0. Publisher does a bi-lateral authentication and establishes a TLS 1.2 session with SAML authorizations for session establishment with the PSS. The PSS identifies him as a publisher. He may also be a subscriber, or he may be modifying a previous publish or he may be retrieving messages, so the PSS ascertains the reason for his session.
1. Content to be published will be digitally signed by the publisher.
2. The publisher will generate an AES-256 encryption key and encrypt the content.
3. Encrypted Content is placed in a queue based on an access claim and list name. The publisher will keep such lists. The PSS will assist in developing claims.
4. Access is based on a list of targets and claims. A target may be an individual subscriber or a group queue. The publisher may establish a new queue based on claims and the list for retrieval. This new queue requires an identity and a claims establishment for retrieval (see 3 above). Additional content may be published as needed.
5. Expiration time of targeted content is determined by the publisher or the messaging system.
6. The PSS will provide PKI certificates for each of the targets for the content (if the publisher needs them and they are already registered in the PSS). The publisher should check all certificates on the list for currency and revocation. If invalid certificates are discovered, the list should be pruned.
7. The publisher will prepare encrypted key sets (jewels) by wrapping the AES encryption key in each target’s public key.
8. The publisher will publish the encrypted material (rocks) and the encrypted key sets (jewels) for the targets. The PSS will link these to the encrypted material and the target(s).
9. The PSS will provide notification, if desired, to the subscriber list. The PSS will assist with message selection and target details, or the publisher may script his own.
10. The publisher closes the session.

Note: the target must be on the list and have authorization to view content. The steps are shown in Figure 4.

### B. Retrieving Content for Known Claimants

Retrieval of targeted content may be achieved without the targeted identities contacting the publisher. The following steps are followed:




Fig. 4. Publishing of Targeted Content

0. Subscriber does a full bi-lateral authentication using TLS 1.2 with SAML authorizations for session establishment with the PSS. The claims identify him as a subscriber. He may also be a publisher, so the PSS ascertains the reason for his session.
1. The PSS offers subscriber content available for the claims in queues for which the claimant has an encrypted key available, and the subscriber chooses and retrieves the encrypted content (rock).
2. The PSS provides the encrypted key package (jewel).
3. The PSS notifies the publisher. When expiration time occurs, the server deletes the packages and notifies the publisher which packages were not delivered. The publisher may republish to that list if desired.
4. The subscriber decrypts the content encryption key (jewel) with his private key and accesses the content (rock) decryption key.
5. The subscriber decrypts the content.
6. The subscriber verifies and validates signature.
7. The subscriber closes the session or retrieves additional content.

Note: the target must be on the list and have a content claim. The steps are shown in Figure 5.

### C. Retrieving Content for Unknown Claimants

Unknown claimants cannot retrieve the content until registering with the content provider. The steps in that process are described below:

0. The subscriber does a full bi-lateral authentication TLS 1.2 with SAML authorizations for session establishment with the PSS. The authentication identifies him as a subscriber. He may also be a publisher, so the PSS ascertains the reason for his session.
1. The PSS checks the content claims available and the subscriber chooses and retrieves the content for which full packages exist.
2. For the unknown list, the encrypted key package is not available. The PSS replies “the publisher has no record of your membership. I need to contact the publisher. I will send you a notice if the publisher agrees.”



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14. ABSTRACT Asynchronous messaging is the delivery of a message without waiting for the intended recipient to respond or acknowledge the message. This solution works for distributed systems communication, in which different systems may or may not be available at the same time. Asynchronous messaging solutions often use a message queue that holds messages to be picked up by the recipient. Although communication with the queue can be secured using lower layer protocols, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), this does not provide end-to-end security for the sender and receiver. The queuing system acts as a man-in-the-middle, negating authentication, integrity, and confidentiality guarantees. End-to-end security for asynchronous messaging must be provided by the asynchronous messaging layer itself. This paper discusses current asynchronous messaging models and proposes methods for providing end-to-end asynchronous messaging security in a high assurance environment.					
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