IDA | RESEARCH NOTES

Security In AFRICA

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About This Issue

Home to nearly a billion people, about 15 percent of the earth's population, Africa is second only to Asia as the world's most populous continent. Yet, few in the United States—even those tasked with considering issues of defense strategy—know a great deal about a region rich in human potential and natural resources, beset by daunting governance and health issues, and almost certainly of increased strategic importance in coming decades. This edition of *IDA Research Notes* presents analyses and observations offered by the growing number of IDA researchers focusing their attention on the continent's more than 50 nation-states and territories.

Ambassador George Ward, who leads IDA's Africa practice, begins the discussion with a look at how dated yet persistent misconceptions have restrained understanding of important political, economic, and sociological conditions on the continent. He points up the disservice accruing to strategic planning when significant changes go unnoticed.

IDA Asia scholar **Kongdan Oh Hassig** details the remarkable scale and scope of engagement and investment in Africa by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and analyzes the degree to which the Chinese efforts are intended to engender general goodwill or function as a quid pro quo.

John P. Cann explores a long-simmering conflict in northern Africa and the world's newest nation, born from the war. His multi-layer assessment of South Sudan describes the status quo post-independence and the circum-stances potentially influencing movement toward peace or continued fighting with the Sudan, from which the new state split.

IDA anthropologist **Janette Yarwood** shares findings of her research into the phenomenon of young men of Somali heritage leaving the United States and other Western countries in which they've spent their youth to fight as part of rebel groups in their parents' homeland. She examines efforts to counter such youth radicalization.

Andrew Hull and **David Markov**, well-regarded for their open-source IDA analyses of international weapons sales, offer a robust description of PRC arms sales throughout Africa. In doing so, they examine potential implications of the sales to security environments on the continent and to Chinese economic and military interests.

Africa's informal civil networks, argue **Caroline Ziemke-Dickens** and **Ashley L. Bybee**, are a potentially powerful yet under-utilized tool for addressing security dilemmas on the continent. They discuss benefits potentially accrued through an increasingly imaginative use of civil society, complementing nation-to-nation engagement, as a means of conflict resolution.

Finally, **Susan L. Clark-Sestak**, whose research on environmental issues has informed a significant number of US Department of Defense projects, offers an introduction to environmental issues likely of concern to military forces operating in Africa.

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TRENDS IN AFRICA PROVIDE REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

George F. Ward, Jr.

The Problem

Negative stereotypes of Africa mask the reality of a rich and diverse continent, making it difficult to notice changes regarding governance, economic growth, development, violence, and corruption.

My first impressions of Africa were shaped by a 19th-century world atlas that my father's family carried with them when they emigrated from England. Similar to the one below, the volume's map of Africa consisted of an outline of the continent, with some areas delineated normally but with large portions depicted only as white spaces. Africa was a great unknown. In the intervening years, the great white spaces in Africa have been replaced in the popular imagination not by facts, but by enduring stereotypes. Africa the unknown became Africa the caricature. Although kernels of truth often lie within stereotypes, their exaggerations and distortions form barriers to real understanding. The purpose of this article is to examine a few of the more widespread stereotypes of Africa and to test them against emerging realities.

What is the popular image of Africa? Here are a few assertions that are often heard:

- Africa is poor, and there is little hope that poverty will be alleviated.

- Africa is underdeveloped, and most projects aimed at development end in failure.

- Africa is badly governed, and democracy has made little progress.

- Africa is prone to corruption, with tribal and ethnic factors contributing to this problem.

- Africa is unstable and beset by violent conflict, and there is little hope of respite.

Africa remains poor, but incomes are rising and the middle class is growing rapidly.

Credit: Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies, Northwestern University

Remarkably, these images are often applied to Africa as if it were an undifferentiated whole (Radelet 2010, 11). It is as if the lack of democracy in North Korea or of economic development in Nepal formed the basis of blanket statements about Asia, ignoring countries like South Korea, Singapore, and China. In this sense, Africa is still the "great white space" of the 19th-century atlas. Let's take the time to examine each of the elements of the African stereotype.

Africa is Poor but Growing Stronger Economically

Without question, most Africans are poor, but are they poorer than those of other regions? Is there really no hope? In fact, Africa is not the poorest region of the world. A greater proportion of South Asians than sub-Saharan Africans live on less than two dollars per day according to The World Bank's website. During the first decade of the 21st century, African real per capita incomes resumed growth after two decades of decline. From 2000 to 2009, real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2011, 11). Steven Radelet, a noted researcher and adviser to African and Asian governments and currently chief economist at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has noted that growth in 17 "emerging" African economies was even faster. Unlike most industrialized nations, African economies have continued to

GNI Per Capita *

Sub-Saharan African (all income levels)

Credit: The World Bank

* GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.

grow through the difficult years of the world economic crisis since 2008. In October 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa would expand by 5.25 percent in 2011 and by 5.75 percent in 2012 (IMF 2011, 1). These projections are, of course, subject to exogenous influences, such as the possibility of slowing growth globally.

Traditionally, economic growth in Africa has depended upon income from extractive industries. This has changed. From 1996 to 2008, real per capita incomes grew about 3 percent annually in the 17 "emerging" economies and only about 2 percent in the 9 oil-exporting economies (Radelet 2010, 32). What caused this turnaround? One factor is the growth of the African middle class. A McKinsey & Company study reports that the numbers of African middle-class consumers has increased, so that Africa now has more middle-class households with incomes of $20,000 or above than India (Leke et al. 2010, 7). Second, foreign direct investment in Africa has grown rapidly—a six-fold increase from 2000 to 2009. Third, total trade in the fastest growing African economies has spiked, tripling since 1995. Fourth, productivity is rising in sub-Saharan Africa and exceeds 2 percent annually in the fastest growing economies (Radelet 2010, 37).

So it appears that the first stereotype is misleading. Africa remains poor, but incomes are rising and the middle class is growing rapidly.

Development—A Long Way to Go but Not Failing

The second stereotype concerns development in Africa and is tougher to evaluate for a couple of reasons. First, anecdotal evidence supporting the stereotype is not difficult to find. The rural landscape of Africa is littered with the remains of abandoned projects. Rusting farm machinery and dry bore holes abound. Second, the media sometimes seem to report failures in development more often than successes.

Another factor contributing to the sense that development efforts in Africa have failed has been the inability of official and private development agencies to quantify the impact of projects. For example, in the water and sanitation field, it is fairly simple to quantify inputs in terms of funds and other resources applied. It is not much more difficult to enumerate outputs (i.e., numbers of wells dug, latrines installed, and community instructional workshops held). Outcomes—the significant and lasting contributions that projects make to the welfare of intended beneficiaries—are more meaningful and more difficult to measure. Two difficulties in measuring outcomes stand out. First, agencies often begin projects without establishing a baseline. For example, project workers might fail to examine the burden of water-borne diseases on the community before the start of a water and sanitation project. As a result, quantifying outcomes at the end of the project might be impossible. Second, it is difficult to control for the influence of other factors. Was the decline

in deaths from water-borne diseases due to the completion of the community borehole or to the introduction of simple oral rehydration techniques?

In the absence of good data on development outcomes, we must look at surrogates. Three factors that influence development in a powerful way are

· Mortality among children under five,

· Primary school enrollment, and

· Agricultural production.

According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), one in eight African children dies before his/her fifth birthday.

In 2009, of the 31 countries in the world with over 100 deaths among children under five for every 1,000 live births, all but one (Afghanistan) were in Africa. Development, however, is about change, not static measurements. In 1990, the under-five mortality rate in sub-Saharan Africa was 180. By 2009, it had declined to 129. Especially considering the effects that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) pandemic have on African child mortality, this decline of between 1 and 2 percent annually is significant.

The positive changes in primary school enrollment and agricultural production in Africa are more striking. In the 17 "emerging" African countries identified by Radelet, net primary school enrollment was 65 percent in 1999 but has climbed to 80 percent today. There has even been progress among the "not-emerging" African

countries, where the rate has gone from 56 to 65 percent. In many African countries, agricultural production doubled from 1987 to 2007. Even the slowest growing tier of countries experienced 30 percent growth.

Although these data indicate that Africa has a long way to go and is lagging other world regions, the stereotype that development in Africa has failed is not supported by current realities.

Governance—Some Improvement but Uneven

Stereotypes regarding poor governance in Africa have often been fed by media accounts of the lavish lifestyles of entrenched African rulers. This image is misleading. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance provides probably the most complete overview of the situation. The Index includes 48 sub-Saharan countries. Comparing the scores registered by those countries in 2006 and 2010, we find that 24 improved, 10 remained the same, and 14 declined. This trend is positive, although less pronounced than in recent years.

In 1990, there were four democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2008, there were 23. The proportion of African leaders who gave up power without the assistance of coups, violence, or assassination had reached 80 percent by 2005. Data from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions indicate that in 1990, 36 of 46 countries had an executive who was either unelected or elected in a contest that had only one candidate. By 2006, only nine leaders were chosen that way.

To be sure, freedom's hold in Africa is tenuous. Freedom House, in its 2012 survey, rated 9 (18 percent) sub-Saharan countries as free, another 21 (43 percent) as partially free, and 19 (39 percent) as not free.

While the "emerging" African countries have approached parity with the world median in several sectors of governance, progress has not been uniform and other countries are lagging behind. For example, the Ibrahim Index disclosed significant declines in two of the components—safety and rule of law and participation and human rights—that comprise overall governance. The scores of 33 of 48 countries declined in the category of safety and rule of law. In the field of participation and human rights, 35 of 53 countries suffered declines.

Corruption Saps Africa's Vitality

It is probably in the arena of corruption that the African stereotype comes closest to describing reality. The World Bank (2010, 1) calls corruption "Africa's fundamental problem." Corruption cuts across and weakens efforts to achieve progress in other areas, including health and education. Some countries, including Liberia, Rwanda, and Tanzania, have made progress in combating corruption, while others have lagged behind or even regressed. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, of the 10 countries considered most corrupt in the world, 6 are in sub-Saharan Africa. A 2002 African Union study cited by the Council estimated that corruption costs the continent roughly $150 billion annually. Over half of East

Africans polled paid bribes to access public services that should have been freely available. Graft and corruption increase the cost of doing business in Africa and undoubtedly contribute to the failure of the benefits derived from extractive industries to trickle down to communities. The World Bank (2010, 2–21) also focuses on "quiet corruption," which it defines as "types of malpractice by frontline providers that do not involve monetary exchange." Because of poor controls at the producer and wholesaler levels, 43 percent of the analyzed fertilizers sold in West Africa in the 1990s lacked the expected nutrients. In Tanzania, a survey revealed that nearly four out of five children who died of malaria had sought medical attention from health facilities that were classified as "modern." This sort of malpractice or malfeasance manifests itself in myriad ways but must be conquered if governments want to reduce poverty and promote sustainable growth.

Violent Conflict Remains a Big Problem but Is Diminishing

The final stereotype—of a continent permanently wracked by conflict—is outdated. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which takes on the unenviable task of enumerating and cataloguing the world's conflicts, Africa's share of the global burden of violent conflict has declined. In 2000, 8 of the world's 18 major armed conflicts were being fought in Africa. During the following decade, the number of conflicts declined globally in an uneven fashion, but the reduction in African wars was more consistent. In 2009, only 4 of the world's 16 major

armed conflicts were being fought in Africa (SIPRI, 62). Without minimizing the terrible burden of conflict in Africa, especially its recent resurgence in North Africa, the Cote d'Ivoire, and the Great Lakes region, this trend is a positive, especially when compared to the toll taken on the continent by infectious disease. Compare, for example, the 14,000 direct-conflict deaths in Africa in 2007 (Geneva Declaration 2008, 16) with 1.3 million deaths annually from HIV and AIDS and between 600,000 and 900,000 deaths annually from malaria (both latter figures are for 2009).

In conclusion, we see that of the five stereotypes, four are untrue, out-dated, or misleading. The fifth—corruption—is regrettably still generally applicable to the continent, although not to every country. Whether true, partially true, or false, however, stereotypes are unhelpful because they conceal the richness of variation within the region and make us less apt to pick up early warnings of change. For these reasons and more, we need to focus on the real Africa that exists today on the ground, not the stereotypical Africa that may be in our minds.

Ambassador Ward is a research staff member at IDA. He served as US Ambassador to Namibia.

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CHINA'S SOFT POWER STRATEGY IN AFRICA

Kongdan Oh Hassig

The Problem

China is spearheading a remarkable diplomatic and economic push into Africa as worries mount that it pays little or no attention to human rights, democracy, labor standards, and environmental protection on the continent.

China-Africa bilateral trade increased from $12 million in 1950 to $114 billion in 2010. At the end of 2008, Chinese investment in Africa had reached $26 billion. China has funded more than 900 infrastructure projects and dispatched some 16,000 medical personnel to the continent. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have visited more than 15 African countries since 2006. The Chinese have hosted several ministerial meetings attended by many African heads of state. Yet, China's move into Africa has been bumpy. Africans are beginning to complain to government officials about the operation of Chinese companies, including poor pay and low safety standards. What is motivating China's strategy in Africa?

China's Engagement with the African Continent: Brief Summary

Contemporary China-African diplomacy began in the late 1950s with the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and several African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan). Premier Zhou Enlai conducted a 10-country tour of Africa from December 1963 to January 1964. During the Cold War, especially in the 1960s, Mao Zedong's China extended scholarships to African students to study Marxism in Beijing, even though China was still a poor country. Back home, many of these African students became members of the elite class of their country and remembered their visits to an economically poor but ideologically committed China. In 1971, China entered—as Taiwan exited—the United Nations (UN), which helped China increase its presence in Africa and secure allies for its global ambitions. In 1976, China completed building the famous TanZam railway linking Tanzania and Zambia and continued to grant scholarships to thousands of African students to study at Chinese universities.

An interesting turning point of China-Africa relations was the Tiananmen Democracy movement of 1989 in which the government brutally suppressed demonstrators. The crackdown came under orders from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and was tacitly approved by former CCP leader Deng

> **The Chinese seem willing to go anywhere to procure resources without worrying about a working environment that Westerners call "dirty, dangerous, and difficult."**

Xiaoping. The Party also persecuted former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and other top leaders who favored reconciliation with the demonstrators. The demotion and eventual house arrest of Zhao Ziyang, then the General Secretary of the CCP, and the Party's use of military power in the crack-down were strongly condemned by the United States and many other nations, especially in Europe. Many African states, on the contrary, refused to con-demn the CCP's actions, adopting China's own phrase of "non-inter-ference in other countries' domestic affairs." Thus, China found in Africa a region of compatible views as it strug-gled to protect its standing in the international community (Taylor 2006a, 2). In the 1990s, China's rap-idly progressing economic reforms and growth required that Chinese economic planners find new markets for Chinese goods and new sources of raw materials and energy. The African continent, with its under-cultivated consumer markets and vast mineral and timber wealth, offered both.

In 2000, China established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to promote long-term coop-eration. The first FOCAC ministerial conference, held in Beijing in October 2000, was attended by President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and Vice President Hu Jintao. Ministers from China and 44 other countries and representatives from 17 international and regional organizations attended the meeting. The second ministerial conference was held in Addis Ababa in December 2003. At the third min-isterial conference, held in Beijing in November 2006, President Hu Jintao announced China's grant of $5 bil-lion worth of concessionary loans to African countries. At the fourth min-isterial meeting in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2009, even more loans were announced, along with construction projects sponsored by China. The fifth ministerial meeting is scheduled in Beijing in 2012.

As of 2009, China was reportedly hosting 120,000 students from Africa, with several thousand more studying without scholarships in a kind of on-the-job training. Chinese foreign ministers, premiers, and presidents continue to make tours of various African coun-tries to demonstrate China's continuing interest in building solid political and economic relationships. When Western critics argue that China's recent interest in Africa is only to secure oil and raw materials, China reminds them of the early Chinese commitment to build the famous $455 million TanZam railway and China's subsequent track record of hosting students and making state vis-its to the continent. However, the genu-ine question remains: On balance, what is China getting from Africa and what benefits does China bring to Africa? Put another way, when it comes to the China-Africa partnership, who is working for whom? (Gowan 2009, 1–8)

China's Economic Interest in Africa

China's national strategy is focused on its economy. Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao made the following pledge at the Seventeenth Party Congress in Octo-ber 2007: "We will quadruple the per capita GDP [Gross Domestic Product] of 2000 by the year 2020 by optimiz-ing economic structure and improving economic returns while reducing con-sumption of resources and protecting the environment." To provide a "well-off" society to all citizens, the Party leadership will push economic growth

and social development. China's rate of economic growth during the past two decades proves that the country is firmly set on a path to overcome poverty and underdevelopment. China is an economic giant and is expanding its reach worldwide, including into Africa. In terms of national GDP, the country surpassed second-ranked Japan in 2010.

Relentless economic and industrial development requires many resources. Africa, among other regions, has them, and China needs them. Oil best exemplifies this relationship. Since 2007, China has been the world's second largest consumer of oil behind the United States. China has been a net importer of oil since 1993. Oil use for transportation in 2010 was 3.4 million barrels per day (showing an annual increase of about 7 percent since 2004). As of 2010, China was consuming about 8 million barrels of oil a day. Three major state-owned enterprises (China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, and China Offshore Oil Corporation) are working to secure ever more oil resources. It is projected that China will need 12 million barrels per day by the year 2020. (Zhang 2010, 1–3)

The Chinese seem willing to go anywhere to procure resources, without worrying about the "three Ds," a Western expression for a working environment that is "dirty, dangerous, and difficult." Chinese corporations, most of them still owned by the state, have few scruples about dealing with shady governments. Thus, China's "oil safari" has traveled to such corruptly led countries as Angola, Sudan, and Gabon (Taylor 2006b, 944–945). In the Chinese political dictionary, "There are no rogue states" (Taylor 2006b, 946).

Moral judgment and political values are not critical factors when it comes to Chinese business interests.

The length to which China is willing to go to secure trade opportunities is extraordinary. For example, China immediately offered Angola $3 billion dollars in oil-backed credits to rebuild the country's infrastructure after its long and brutal civil war. Angola is the second largest oil producer (after Nigeria) in sub-Saharan Africa, and 30 percent of Angolan oil is now being shipped to China. Similarly, China has invested heavily in Sudan, and the China National Petroleum Corporation has a 40 percent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Company that dominates Sudan's oilfields. In 2009, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports. (Jiang 2006, 6–7)

In the eyes of the economic and political elite class of many African countries, China is a desirable partner. China's "non-interference in other countries' domestic politics" (one of the five principles of external relations stipulated by the Chinese constitution) is very convenient for African political leaders who want a free hand to rule their countries. China tries to impress African countries with the idea that both China and Africa have suffered at the hands of Western imperialists and that China is not imperialistic. Chinese workers and businessmen are willing to work and settle in Africa to make the kind of profits and seek the kind of potential profits that cannot be made in developed countries. China offers loans on favorable terms to cash-poor African countries for long-term procurement projects. China's top leaders have been supportive of African states by making frequent state visits, giving the impression to Africans that rather than living in a two-dimensional Africa-West world,

they live in a triangular China-Africa-West world.

China has poured billions of dollars into railways, bridges, roads, dams, and hospitals in Africa. China's health-care units, regularly dispatched to Africa, especially since the early 2000s, have impressed African leaders. As early as 1963, a Chinese medical team was dispatched to Algeria and soon word spread about good Chinese medical care. According to the Chinese Ministry of Health, nearly 20,000 Chinese medical personnel have worked in 47 African countries since 1963, treating 200 million patients. (Shinn 2006, 14–16) Chinese traditional medicine is also widely popular in Africa today because many African tribal communities have relied on traditional healers and herbal medicine. All in all, many Africans admire China.

Africans Express Concerns about Chinese Companies

China has argued that its engagement in Africa is mutually beneficial for China and the continent because it provides two-way commercial trade, infrastructure investment, and aid grants. At least in the short term, it would certainly appear that China's trade and investment in Africa are good for the continent. China's investment in African infrastructure would seem especially welcome in a continent where so much of the infrastructure is substandard.

However, the long-term effects of China's engagement in Africa are worrisome to some Africans. At least three concerns have been voiced (Taylor 2006b, 951–954). First, they are wary of becoming heavily dependent on Chinese economic development, especially in the oil and commodities industries. Second, they are concerned

about China's ambivalence regarding norms for human rights and democracy. Third, they see a lack of environmental concern in Chinese-funded development projects.

For example, in April 2006 a car bomb exploded outside an oil refinery in Nigeria, a week after Chinese President Hu Jintao signed oil deals with the Nigerian government. A group calling itself the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta claimed responsibility for the blast, which it said was a warning to foreign companies working in Nigeria, specifically, Chinese companies: "We wish to warn the Chinese government and its oil companies to steer well clear of the Niger Delta." The group claims that the Nigerian government is not spending its billions in oil revenues for the benefit of its people. (CNN World 2006)

In Gabon, environmental activists have pressed corrupt local officials to stop allowing the exploitation of Gabon's park areas by the Chinese company Sinopec. When a Gabonese national government delegation visited one of the parks, it determined that Sinopec was guilty of environmental exploitation for prospecting for oil, dynamiting, and carving roads in the park without first receiving approval from the environmental impact statement that it submitted to the government (Taylor 2007).

In Zambia, 13 Zambian miners at the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine were injured in October 2010 when they were shot by two Chinese supervisors during a wage protest. Zambian prosecutors charged the supervisors with attempted murder but later dropped the case for undetermined reasons. The mine had been temporarily shut down the previous year for unsafe working conditions, and a Zambian provincial minister charged that

the mine workers were being employed under disadvantageous circumstances since they were classified as part-time laborers even though some of them had been with the company for up to nine years. (Chen 2010)

A Washington-based economist with personal experience in Africa has shared the following observation on China's image in Africa: "Only corrupt nations will accept China with open arms. In more successful African economies—for example, Ghana—members of the social and economic elite have demonstrated deep concern toward Chinese business practice and ethics."

Concluding Remarks: Is China a Soft Power in Africa?

China has wielded its power more dramatically since President Hu Jintao mentioned at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 that it needed to increase its soft power. The expression's creator, Joe Nye, recently defined this concept to a group of Beijing University students as "the ability to use attraction and persuasion to get what you want without force or payment." However, calling China a soft power in Africa, misses important nuances. Not all Africans are impressed with China. African Countries are beginning to complain about Chinese companies' poor pay and low safety standards. The exercise of soft power is not always easy, as Americans well know. If Americans want to keep Africa open to Western influence, they need to pay closer attention to China's role in the continent.

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Sudan on a Precipice

John P. Cann

The Problem

The secession of South Sudan in July 2011 was meant to end 22 years of hostilities between Juba and Khartoum. However, as the governments of Khartoum and Juba persist in taking provocative actions, fears linger that sporadic violence could escalate into a full-blown war.

After more than six years, Darfur remains lawless. Armed men loot the livestock of vulnerable people, hijack humanitarian vehicles and relief supplies, impose war taxes, and extort protection money.

In 2007, IDA assisted the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) with a study of the problems facing Sudan and their implications for the country and its neighbors. Most critical at the time were preservation of the fragile Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the North and South, the ongoing crisis in Darfur, and northern Sudan's potential as a sanctuary for international terrorists.

In July 2011, South Sudan gained independence. The viability of the fragile new state rests on peaceful relations with its northern neighbor, Sudan. However, skirmishes have erupted along the North-South border, and the two sides are at loggerheads over oil and accusations that each side is arming groups to destabilize the other. Almost all of the two countries' oil lies underground in the South and is pumped North via a pipeline. In late January 2012, the South accused the North of stealing its oil and shut down production of crude. The North maintains that it was merely taking its due in unpaid oil transit fees.

Today, the North and South are still in conflict, and there are fears it could escalate into a renewed civil war. Darfur remains in crisis, and terrorists are still drawn to Sudan. The outcome of these problems will affect not only the two immediate parties, but regional neighbors and international partners as well. All of these entities have a vital interest in the stability and resources of the two countries.

Border Problems

The United States was the driving force behind the independence of South Sudan, as only it had the diplomatic heft to force the major actors together. Unfortunately in this process, some issues (e.g., the failure of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to develop a coherent peacekeeping plan) fell through the cracks and allowed the North to make mischief. UN missions were established in Darfur, the South, and Abyei, but none were established in the Nuba Mountains, where forces in Khartoum—

the capital of Sudan—proceeded to attack civilians. These attacks led to a series of low-key proxy wars along the 1,200-mile disputed border and to state-on-state economic warfare. Tribal loyalty in the South also intensified into a number of open tribal conflicts in which about 26,000 head of cattle were stolen and about the same number of people were displaced. Among

Libya

Northern

Red Sea

Port Suda

Dongola

Nile

Atbara

Northern Darfur

Khartoum
Khartoum

Kassala
Kasala

Eritrea

El Gezira
Wad Madani

El Geneina

Northern Kordofan

Gadaref
Al Qadarif

Al Fashir

Sannar

El Obeid
Kosti Sennar

Western Darfur
Zalingei

White Nile

Nyala

Southern Darfur

Ad Damazin

El Muglad
Kadugli

Southern Kordofan

Blue Nile

Upper Nile

Malakal

Northern Bahr El Ghazal
Bentiu
Unity

Aweil

Ethiopia

Wilayat Warab

Warrab
Wau

Akobo

Western Bahr El Ghazal

Jonglei

Rumbek
Lakes

Bor

Western Equatoria

Bahr El Jabal Juba
Eastern Equatoria

Yambio

Credit: United Nations Mine Action Office Sudan

Uganda

Kenya

these migrant pastoralists, life is articulated through cattle ownership, as it is the primary store of wealth. The thefts left vast sections of the population destitute.

Along the new border, a number of areas are home to militias and other groups allied with the South. These groups have found themselves caught on the wrong side of the realigned border, particularly as they view Khartoum as their enemy. Sudan used indiscriminate and disproportionate force over the summer of 2011 to bombard the militias and civilians in the three border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, with devastating results. Tension continues along the border.

North-South trade is now at a virtual standstill, and although South Sudan oil exports—its only significant source of revenue—continued to flow for six months following independence, there were no agreed terms to its transit and export through Port Sudan. At independence, South Sudan took about three-quarters of the 500,000 barrels per day of oil produced by Sudan; however, the South has no facilities to export crude. The two sides disagree over how much the South should pay the North for the use of its pipeline and port. Despite the South shutting down crude production, foregoing 98 percent of its revenue, economic activity appears unmoved. South Sudan, however, is a fragile country, and the oil decision could ultimately have a disastrous impact. Salaries of the army and state soak up 40 percent of state spending, and there will be the added burden of needing to purchase food aid for about a third of the country's 8.3 million people. Half a million South Sudanese may also be expelled

from Sudan, and their need for care will further burden government coffers. The January 2012 shutdown, which was popular initially, is expected to lose its luster soon, as it presages the austerity that will come when the $1.5 billion in foreign reserves are expected to be exhausted.

By March 2012, under the mediation of the African Union, Sudan and South Sudan signed a framework agreement in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, addressing this oil issue, border demarcation, and citizens' rights. Following this accord, leaders of the two countries agreed to meet on April 3rd in Juba, the South Sudanese capital, to hold a much-anticipated summit in an attempt to find solutions to these outstanding issues and establish positive relations.

For General Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president who has been in power for 23 years, this meeting comes none too soon, as he now faces a revolt in his own military for his threat to invade the South because of the oil dispute. More than 700 officers signed a letter protesting the threat. There is also popular unrest in the northern cities of Sudan over rising food prices. This unrest will be aggravated during the coming months by the massive budget deficit and the need to layoff government workers and cut subsidies. Hence, like the South, Sudan has a compelling need to come to agreement over the transit fees to forestall severe trouble for Bashir.

Fault Line

To understand the fragility of the Sudanese peace accords, it is necessary to review a bit of history. The fault

line running across Sudan around the twelfth parallel divides the Muslim North from the non-Muslim South, Arab from African, and has been a continued cause of conflict. At independence in 1956, northerners gained control of the central government in Khartoum, and this has been a point of friction since then. The basis for this modern divide was laid in the British preparation for independence, as colonial officials were replaced largely by northerners. Out of a total of about 800 senior posts in the civil service, only 6 were given to southerners. This lack of representation and the new presence of northern administrators, teachers, and traders in the South, frequently abrasive in their dealings with the local people, soon rekindled long-standing resentments and has set the tone of North-South relations to this day.

When the army took control of the country in a 1958 coup, General Ibrahim Abboud began to promote Islam and the use of Arabic in the South, saying that this would encourage national unity. He considered Christianity an alien religion and imposed restrictions on missionary activity. He also expressed contempt for African religions, denigrated indigenous languages and customs, and ordered the construction of Muslim religious schools and mosque throughout the South. He then changed the day of rest from Sunday to Friday. Southern protests were met with increasing repression, and this prompted a number of southern politicians to flee into exile and to found the Sudan African Nationalist Union movement, whose goal was independence for the South. In 1963, armed groups of dissidents began a sustained insurgency that lasted 10 years and claimed half a million lives. When Abboud was replaced in 1964, the same policies of repression remained.

A military coup in 1969 brought to power the Revolutionary Command Council, which was determined to sweep aside religious-based political groups. By 1983, it had abandoned any effort to accommodate southern interests, declared an "Islamic revolution" in which Sudan would become an Islamic republic governed by strict Islamic law, and terminated the constitutional arrangements with the South. These actions resulted in civil war. Southern troops fled across the eastern border with Ethiopia, where they formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM called for a united, secular, and socialist Sudan, free of Islamist rule. Following the droughts of 1983 and 1984, in which an estimated 250,000 people died, Sudan's economy collapsed.

The 1986 elections brought power to northern politicians fully committed to continuing an Islamic state. Consequently, the SPLM refused to accept a cease-fire or to participate in the election and asked for a constitutional convention. In turn, Khartoum armed Arab militias and encouraged them to attack the South. Atrocities became common. Villages were burned, livestock was stolen, wells were poisoned, and people were abducted into slavery. The war culminated in a severe famine in 1988. As international aid entered the country, food denial was used as a weapon by both sides. By 1989, the tide of war turned against the government. As Khartoum began to negotiate with the SPLM, the concession on the suspension of Islamic law

was too much for Islamic militants, and a group calling itself the National Islamic Front overthrew the government in June 1989. This coup sunk the peace negotiations. General Omar al-Bashir, after suspending the constitution, dissolving parliament, banning trade unions, closing newspapers, and purging the officer corps, declared that Khartoum would never again be a secular capital. Bashir's coup marked the beginning of an Islamic dictatorship that dealt ruthlessly with Muslim and non-Muslim opponents. One institution after another was purged of dissent.

In reaction to the US-led recovery of Kuwait in 1991, Sudan became a hive of pan-Islamic activity, and a throng of militant groups and personalities established themselves there. Abu Nidal, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (Carlos the Jackal), and Osama bin Laden were among the most notorious, and Sudan soon became infamous as a rogue state that supported terrorist causes.

All About Oil

Bashir's jihad in the South was meanwhile prosecuted with ever greater zeal and ruthlessness, and slaughter occurred on a massive scale. Villages and relief centers were bombed indiscriminately. Military units and militias massacred civilians and plundered their cattle and property. Thousands of women and children were captured and forced into slavery. The refugees from this genocide faced starvation and were completely dependent on relief supplies reaching them through the fighting. Bashir's vision of regional jihad alarmed neighboring

governments, which began to support the southern rebellion.

Though reduced to a wasteland, the South still held the ultimate prize of oil. To protect it from the rebels, Khartoum initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing to establish a cordon sanitaire around the fields. Based on the relative quiet in this enclave, a new consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, was established as an umbrella for foreign investment and attracted state-owned oil companies from China and Malaysia. Within two years, a 1,540-kilometer pipeline had been built from the Nile oil fields to a new marine terminal for supertankers near Port Sudan. By 2001, Sudan was producing 240,000 barrels per day, and oil revenues comprised 40 percent of government revenue. Bashir, with new funds at his disposal, virtually doubled defense spending between 1998 and 2000. His new helicopter gunships and armored combat vehicles were used to clear the southern population for additional areas of oil exploration.

There were several peace initiatives, but Bashir made essentially no concessions to the rebels. His Islamist agenda continued. His record of supporting international terrorism, his savage conduct of the war in the South, and his repression of all opposition made his government one of the most reviled in the world. In 2001, the US House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act, which enumerated a series of sanctions to be implemented if Khartoum failed to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war or continued to obstruct humanitarian relief. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bashir became anxious to shed sup-

port of terrorism and became open to negotiations to end the war. Consequently, the administration of President Bush acted as an intermediary, culminating in a January 2011 referendum that allowed South Sudan to secede.

Darfur

Just when one war was coming under control, another reignited in the western region of Darfur and would rival Rwanda in magnitude of disaster. Its origin was the intensification of the traditional conflict over land between the nomadic Arab pastoralists and the settled African agriculturalists of the region, as well as the political and economic marginalization of Sudan's periphery regions by Khartoum's riverine elite.

In February 2003, a rebel group (the Darfur Liberation Army, later the Sudan Liberation Army) emerged, launched an insurgency, and demanded a share in the central government. A second group, the Justice and Equality Movement, also joined the fight. Khartoum reacted with a savage campaign of ethnic cleansing intended to destroy the local population and make way for the Arab settlers. In addition to deliberate and indiscriminate government air and ground attacks, Khartoum licensed Arab militias, known as janjaweed, to kill, loot, and rape at will. By February 2004, these actions had left a million refugees with no means of survival. When UN agencies attempted to intervene, Khartoum blocked access to the area. The US government declared the Khartoum actions genocide, and world pressure forced Bashir to stop

aggravating the disaster. The violence dropped, but the situation festered and Darfur remained lawless. In March 2009, Khartoum expelled and suspended the operations of 13 international and at least 3 domestic aid organizations operating in Darfur and across Sudan. Following this development, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Looking to the Future

When South Sudan seceded, it was clear that it would possess the lion's share of the Sudanese oil wealth. Despite the South's dismal infrastructure, its vast oil reserves gave hope that it could develop into a regional economic highlight. A developing South Sudan would be a boon to the region. The country would link its growing market with those in the strengthening East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi) and beyond, enhancing the infrastructure of pipelines, railways, roads, and fiber-optic communication networks.

The problem with this dream has always been one of how to get the oil safely and reliably to market, as the only immediate partner in this venture is the old foe, the North. Khartoum has spent its time before and after independence sowing unrest and instability in South Sudan and continues to subvert the fledgling land-locked democracy today through political and economic means. Indeed, both countries have been implicated in conducting proxy wars inside the other.

Despite the much-publicized meeting on April 3rd to solve the oil transit and refining issue and the export of agricultural and other products, its outcome does not represent a long-term solution. Khartoum has proven over time that it does not negotiate in good faith. Whatever the arrangement between the South and the North, it will be only a band-aid. South Sudan understands this and will use the breathing room to diminish the economic power of Khartoum in their lopsided bilateral relations, lay the groundwork through some serious strategic planning to cement its prospects for prosperity and, secure its position in the region.

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Source:
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A NEW THREAT:
RADICALIZED SOMALI-AMERICAN YOUTH
Janette Yarwood

The Problem

The past several years have seen heightened concerns about Somali-American youth from across the diaspora being recruited by the foreign group al-Shabaab. The recruits pose an especially dangerous threat to US national security because they hold American passports and thus enjoy more freedom of travel and civil liberties than non-citizens.

A number of Somali-American youth have engaged in terrorist attacks abroad, as revealed through Department of Justice documents. Since 2007 at least 20 American young men, all but one of Somali descent, secretly left their homes across the United States to join training camps in Somalia operated by al-Shabaab, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) (US House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security 2011). Many of them ultimately fought with al-Shabaab against Ethiopian forces, African Union troops, and the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

On October 29, 2008, 27-year-old Shirwa Ahmed of Minneapolis took part in one of five simultaneous suicide attacks on targets in northern Somalia. Ahmed drove an explosive-laden truck into an office of the Puntland Intelligence Service in Bossasso, Puntland. Other targets included a second Puntland Intelligence Service office in Bossasso, the Presidential Palace, the United Nations (UN) Development Program office, and the Ethiopian Trade Mission in Hargeisa. In 2009, a Somali-American from Seattle was one of two suicide bombers who drove vehicles with UN logos into the African Union force headquarters in Mogadishu, killing at least 21 peacekeepers (Escobedo 2009). In 2010, there were also reports that a Somali-American died on the streets of Mogadishu following a battle with pro-government forces.

The situation was repeated in many Somali communities in the West, as youth left their homes in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Three suspects accused of having ties to al-Shabaab are currently in an Australian prison awaiting sentencing for allegedly planning an attack on an Australian military base (*ABC News* 2011). While much attention has been paid to Somali diaspora youth radicalization in Western countries, al-Shabaab has stepped up its campaign in East Africa. In March 2012, at least 6 people were killed and more than 60 were injured in

> **The only way to understand what is driving youth disaffection and isolation from both the Somali community and the broader American society is to engage with the youth themselves.**

an attack at a busy bus station in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. Four men suspected of belonging to al-Shabaab were detained in Yemen near a site of an explosion that killed two. In addition, members of al-Shabaab attacked an Ethiopian base in Somalia in March 2012. There were dozens of casualties. Because of continued instability in Somalia, there is a large diaspora population, and at least one million Somali's reside outside of Somalia. This diaspora is concentrated throughout Africa, the Gulf States, Western Europe, and North America. Has al-Shabaab attempted to recruit from other Somali diaspora communities across sub-Saharan Africa?

A handful of Somalis from the United States have taken high-visibility propaganda and operational roles in al-Shabaab. They are being deployed strategically to raise the terrorist organization's profile and recruit others, especially from English speaking countries, said Anders Falk, a former Assistant US attorney who prosecuted suspected al-Shabaab supporters in Minnesota.

Since the first reports of Somali-American involvement in Somalia, there has been concern that this violent extremism would lead to attacks

Credit: Film Director Fathia Abie

in the United States. This threat became more tangible with the arrest in Oregon of Somali-American teenager Mohamed Osman Mohamud, who attempted to detonate a bomb at a holiday tree lighting ceremony in Portland in November 2010. Although the suspect had been in contact with a terrorist recruiter from the Middle East, he did not appear to be connected with Somali extremist organizations.

These high-profile cases make clear that some sectors of the Somali-American youth population have become radicalized. The important question is, Why have these youth left their homes in the United States (or other Western countries) to join a civil war their parents struggled to escape?

From Somalia to America

Somalia has been plagued by clan-based war since 1978, but the situation deteriorated on a massive scale after rebels ousted President Siyad Barre's regime in 1991. This ouster resulted in factional fighting, and no central government has controlled the country since then despite several attempts to establish a unified central government. The TFG was formed in 2004. In 2006, a coalition known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) formed rival administration to the TGF and took power in southern Somalia, including major cities and Mogadishu. In late 2006 and early 2007, the TGF joined with Ethiopian forces in an effort to regain control of most of the southern region. The ICU separated into smaller groups after it was removed from power in 2006. One group, Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as al-Shabaab (The Youth), represented a militant youth movement within the ICU. Since 2006, al-Shabaab has continued its violent insurgency in southern

and central Somalia. The group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in southern and central Somalia by recruiting, at times forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerrilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the TFG and its allies, African Union peacekeepers, and non-governmental aid organizations. On February 29, 2008, the US government designated al-Shabaab an FTO.

Following the outbreak of the civil war, many of Somalia's residents left the country as refugees in search of asylum. The Somali-American population is distributed in small clusters throughout the United States, with the heaviest concentrations in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Columbus, Seattle, and San Diego. According to the latest report from the US Census Bureau's American Community Survey, almost one in three people in the United States with Somali ancestry now live in Minnesota. Many Somalis in Minnesota live in low-income housing in impoverished communities, especially the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, also known as "Little Mogadishu," which is east of downtown Minneapolis. Most, but not all, of the young men recruited to fight for al-Shabaab lived in or around the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, which is geographically isolated from the rest of the city and crime-ridden with drugs, gangs, and drive-by shootings. It is believed that the initial wave of recruits in 2007 was motivated by the Ethiopian army's intervention in Somalia, which many viewed as an invasion. However, recruitment continues, and al-Shabaab and Somalia have returned to the international spotlight as governments across the region and the West attempt to intervene in Somali

conflicts. Will this lead to a new wave of radicalization among Somali diaspora youth?

Combating Youth Radicalization

The US government has responded to these challenges with strategies to identify and disrupt such attacks. In 2010, the White House included combating homegrown extremism in the national security strategy and endorsed empowering local communities as one element of an approach to countering this type of radicalization. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed a community outreach engagement effort to build trust and open a dialogue with specific communities. According to testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, the primary purpose of the FBI's Community Outreach Program is to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI by fostering relationships with various communities so that community members are more likely to report a crime, return a phone call, or respond positively to being approached by an FBI Special Agent.

During a recent trip to Minneapolis, I had the opportunity to engage with various members of the Somali-American community. A man in his 50s reacted to the youth who went back to Somalia by commenting, "It was unbelievable; we were shocked. How could someone go back to a country we fled, to go and do harm." This sentiment was repeated by several people with whom I spoke in Minneapolis. Amina, a shopkeeper at a local Somali market, explained, "Parents used to tell their children not to be too American because we were afraid of the drugs

and gangs. We just didn't know; we don't know what to do now." Abdi, a 20-year-old college student told me, "Young people have no business going over there to fight. The way to help Somalia is to make something of yourself." Finally, Omar, a recent college graduate told me, "A lot of Somali guys my age are in jail." These comments and preliminary research in Minneapolis signal that law enforcement officials should not rely solely on outreach to community elders, who are often disconnected from younger generations. While it is important to develop trusting relationships with Somali-American communities, parents and religious leaders often have no idea about the issues confronting youth. Ultimately, engaging with the youth themselves is the only way to understand what is driving their disaffection and isolation from the Somali community and the broader American society.

The problem of youth disaffection and radicalization requires in-depth social science research based on interviews, focus groups, and first-hand engagement with Somali-American youth and others members of the Somali community. This research could provide insights on the current conditions affecting Somali diaspora communities, including information related to identity formation, youth concerns, disconnects, or conflicts with elders. Targeted counter-radicalization programs could be developed in partnership with local community leaders based on such insights.

Somalia continues to present fertile ground for the cultivation of extremists, and the risks to American society will only grow if increasing numbers of Somali-Americans are among those being radicalized.

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CHINESE ARMS SALES TO AFRICA
Andrew Hull and David Markov

The Problem

China is selling arms and military equipment to Africa using enticements like favorable financing and below-market prices. If Africans succumb to the marketing push, the conflicts between African nations could become more destructive, and military forces from the United States and partner nations in Africa could face more hostile conditions in future conflicts or peace-keeping operations.

The Chinese are now aggressively selling defense and security equipment to African nations. Indeed, a Chinese exhibitor at Airshow China in November 2010 told us that state-sponsored Chinese arms trading companies have three primary marketing targets. One of these is Africa. Selling weapons to African countries is one of many levers the Chinese are using to garner business from African countries rich in mineral and energy resources.

In support of China's arms marketing push in Africa, the Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, accompanied by a team of senior generals, visited Namibia, Angola, and Tanzania in May 2010. The purpose of that trip was to promote Chinese military hardware and "exchange views on issues of mutual approval" (Gelfand 2010).

China had the largest contingent of foreign exhibitors at Africa Aerospace and Defence (ADD) 2010 in South Africa, a show that bills itself as the largest defense exhibition in Africa. For the first time, the Chinese had a national pavilion at an ADD show. Representatives from the following 10 Chinese arms import-export corporations filled the 1,200 square-meter national pavilion: (1) China National Electronics Import-Export Corp (CEIEC), (2) China Electronics Technology Corp (CETC) International, (3) China Aviation Industrial Base Corp, (4) China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corp (CATIC), (5) China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), (6) North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO), (7) China Overseas Space Development & Investment Corporation, (8) China Xinxing Import-Export Corp, (9) China Shipbuilding & Offshore International, and (10) Poly Technologies Inc. By contrast, Chinese companies had only a few stalls at ADD 2008.

A decade ago, Chinese defense goods were characterized by shoddy workmanship. That is no longer true.

China also had a large presence at the 10th International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) 2011 held in the United Arab Emirates in February 2011. The IDEX trade show is considered one of the preeminent shows for marketing to African countries, with numerous delegations attending from that continent. Chinese exhibitors increased floor space in their national pavilion by about 53 percent compared to IDEX 2009. A total of 26 Chinese companies exhibited at IDEX 2011, a virtually unprecedented number, based on our experience in attending international arms shows over the past 19 years. The Chinese contingent included more than just large state-sponsored arms trading companies. Smaller companies (e.g., Armor China Company), many of which we had never seen exhibit outside China, also had booths.

The Eurosatory 2010 international arms exhibition in France offered still one more sign of the importance that the Chinese attach to the African Market. At Eurosatory 2010 (another show that attracts large numbers of African military delegations), Poly Technologies Inc. distributed two catalogs. One was devoted to military supplies (e.g., uniforms, boots and packs), and the other

featured police supplies (e.g., protective clothing and anti-riot gear). Both catalogs pictured ethnically African models wearing Chinese equipment. In our experience, this was the first time Chinese companies depicted models who were not ethnically Chinese.

Chinese exporters are offering a wide range of weapons and ancillary military equipment. Chinese exhibitors at ADD 2010 and IDEX 2011 distributed brochures featuring (1) small arms, (2) armored vehicles (such as the WMZ551 armored fighting vehicle and VN1 family of 8×8 armored vehicles),


Illustrations in Chinese Arms Catalogs of Ethnic Africans wearing Chinese Military (left) and Police Equipment (right) ("Military Supplies" and "Police Supplies" from Poly Technologies, Inc. 2010)

(3) tactical air defense weapons (including QW-2 and QW-18 man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS)), cruise missiles (such as the C-704, C-705, and C-802AKG anti-ship cruise missiles), (4) naval ships, (5) very short-range tactical ballistic missiles (such as the B11M, BP-12A, and SY400), (6) fighter aircraft (such as FC-1 and JF-17 tactical fighters), (7) precision-guided artillery and mortars, and (8) command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. NORINCO's marketing emphasis at ADD 2010, for example, included the (1) Red Arrow-8 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), (2) MBT-2000 main battle tank, (3) VN2A wheeled armored personnel carrier, and (4) LD2000 air defense system. At the same show, CPMIEC emphasized equipment such as A-100 long-range artillery rockets, several kinds of anti-ship cruise missiles, and the HQ-9/FD-2000/FT-2000 surface-to-air missile system.

Models of C-705 and C-704 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles on Display at ADD 2010

A model of the QW-18 Man-Portable Air Defense Missile on Display at ADD 2010

Models of the B611M and BP12A/SY400 Short-Range Tactical Ballistic Missiles on Display at ADD 2010

NORINCO and Poly Technologies are also targeting the African police and paramilitary internal security force markets. Products being displayed and advertised included riot protective gear for individuals, non-lethal weapons and launchers, riot batons, personal restraining devices, and internal security vehicles.

The Chinese approach to selling weapons to African states is based primarily on three factors: non-interference, price structure, and financing options. The official Chinese policy of non-interference, applied to potential arms buyers, means that China will sell weapons and security equipment to a state without regard to its internal political situation or the repressiveness of the regime. Another Chinese strategy for marketing arms to Africa uses price to undercut international competitors, particularly the Russians and Ukrainians. Indeed, some African countries are turning away from their traditionally favored Russian and Ukrainian suppliers in favor of Chinese firms. In some cases, the Chinese are willingly substituting "friendship pricing" to reduce their already low prices to rock bottom. According to a presentation at the National Press Club by a former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, the relatively low cost of Chinese small arms and ammunition has made China the "provider of choice" in Africa for the generic version of the AK-47 assault rifle (Shinn 2009).

Besides pricing weapons low, the Chinese offer attractive financing options, such as soft loans and convenient payment options. They will accept barter goods (e.g., copper from Zambia) in payment for weapons. Unsubstantiated rumors in Internet articles also suggest that a few African countries have secured military products from China in exchange for mining concessions. These rumors perhaps spring from instances such as NORINCO forming a joint venture with the Zimbabwe Defense Industries in 2006 to explore for chromate in Zimbabwe's Great Dyke (Brautigam 2010). A South African source from its defense industries also claimed that Zimbabwe might finance the purchase of Chinese FC-1 fighters with zinc and aluminum mining concessions (Dempsey 2010).

Chinese efforts to sell military hardware in Africa are helped by the improved quality and reliability of Chinese weapons. A decade ago, Chinese

defense goods were characterized by shoddy workmanship, but that is no longer true. Our recent conversations with users of Chinese weapons indicate that today's products are of significantly better quality than past ones. According to people with whom we have spoken, some products, such as Chinese aircraft and ships, are of equivalent quality to Western products. A debate about the quality of NORINCO-built small arms versus Western brands on an Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) blog site elicited somewhat similar opinions from two different posters. One opined that overall NORINCO workmanship was not up to Western standards but that the company no longer has the problems it once did with materials. A second participant in that discussion went somewhat further and said pistols from NORINCO are "durable but cheap firearms" that "perform equally as good" as more expensive Western equivalents (Dino 2011). Based on so few anecdotal sources, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions about the comparative quality of Chinese versus Western-made weapons. Nevertheless, such data do lend credence to the general notion that the workmanship of Chinese weapons has improved over the last decade. What is still open to debate is how much improvement.

The siren-song of Chinese arms exporters may not have fallen on deaf ears. As one writer observed:

The combination of low costs and few overt political strings may prove an increasingly attractive combination to African countries, particularly if the technological and qualitative improvements in its military equipment continue and the *benefits of a close relationship with an emerging great power become increasingly apparent.* ("China Looking to Boost Arms Sales to African Nations" 2010)

China's spotty record of supplying data to the United Nations (UN) Arms Registry makes it difficult to say definitively how many or what types of weapons China has supplied to Africa states (see table on page 29). Nevertheless, it is clear that Chinese marketing efforts have achieved success in Africa. For example, an article in *Defense News*, citing annual reports by the US Department of Defense (DoD) on Chinese military modernization, states that African countries accounted for 11 percent of total Chinese arms export sales from 2005 to 2009 (Minnick 2010). That same article goes on to quote figures from David Shinn, former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and African specialist at George Washington University. These figures show that China transferred 390 artillery pieces, 440 armored personnel carriers and armored cars, 20 supersonic combat aircraft, and 70 other military aircraft (mostly transports) to sub-Saharan African states from 2001 to 2008 (Minnick 2010).

The initial transactions open the door to post-sale opportunities such as supplying spare parts and ammunition, performing maintenance and installing upgrades, and training African personnel. More importantly, military sales offer the opportunity for access. The Chinese provide training to Africans, thereby building personal relationships with up-and-coming African military officers. In 2007, for instance, Rwanda sent 20 officers for training in China following a sale of large-caliber Chinese artillery to

Rwanda. The supplier-customer relationship also provides an excuse for limited Chinese military presence in Africa. In March 2003, *China Military News* (cited by thezimbabwean.co.uk) reported that the Chinese were building a multi-million-dollar base at Chitamba Farm in Mazowe Valley of Zimbabwe (a long-time Chinese arms customer) as an intelligence training academy ("China Building Spy Centre in Zimbabwe?" 2011).

In conclusion, increasing Chinese arms marketing efforts in Africa have several implications:

· Using cost and pricing advantages, China has the potential to grow its arms sales significantly in Africa, copying the model that led to similar success in other industrial sectors such as toys, textiles, and electronics.

· Sales provide the Chinese access to people and resources in Africa.

· Some of the weapons being offered (e.g., MANPADS and short-range tactical ballistic missiles) could seriously destabilize the military balance in Africa, make conflicts between African states more destructive, and increase the risk to military forces of the United States and partner nations operating in Africa or in adjacent littoral areas.

· The Chinese policy of non-interference offers pariah African regimes access to arms and internal security equipment, which could prolong their hold on power—even in the face of condemnation from the international community.

· Finally, the lack of stringent and comprehensive controls of arms stocks by African end-users means that some Chinese weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors.

United Nations Arms Registry of Weapon Transfers by China to African Countries from 1992 to 2009 (data as of March 2011)

Recipient	Delivery Date	Weapon Type
Chad	2007	10 AFV
Congo	2006	4 AFV
	2009	9 armored vehicles
Gabon	2004	4 122mm LRM
	2004	5 106mm recoilless rifle
	2004	4 HM2 105mm howitzer
	2004	10 130mm guns
	2004	16 107mm MRL
	2006	6 AFV
Ghana	2007	4 helicopters
	2009	48 armored vehicles
Kenya	2007	32 AFV
Namibia	2006	6 warplanes
	2009	21 armored vehicles
Niger	2006	6 artillery
Nigeria	2009	15 aircraft
Rwanda	2007	6 artillery
	2008	20 AFV
Sudan	1992	18 artillery
Tanzania	2006	2 AFV
	2007	2 AFV
	2009	2 aircraft
Zimbabwe	2006	6 warplanes

NOTE: This is a compilation of the United Nations Arms Registry data that cover officially acknowledged weapons transfers. The Arms Registry began reporting in 1992 and is issued on an annual basis. In some cases, details of the weapons are provided. In other cases, details are lacking, and a generic description is provided. ("UN Register of Conventional Arms" 2011)

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OUTSOURCING IMAGINATION:
THE POTENTIAL OF INFORMAL ENGAGEMENT NETWORKS IN AFRICA

Caroline Ziemke-Dickens and Ashley L. Bybee

The Problem

State-on-state conflict has declined dramatically in Africa in recent years, leading to a significant advancement in state security and stability. Yet, Africans across the continent have not seen similarly dramatic improvements to their sense of human security—freedom from want and freedom from fear. Internal conflicts (ethnic and religious disputes, political power struggles, insurgency, civil war, and resource management issues) continue to spread human suffering and undermine political stability and economic development.

Africans remain wary of US expressions of increased strategic focus on Africa, despite official US outreach efforts and engagement with African partners.

Drug and arms trafficking are an expanding force for instability in Africa. Religious extremism from both indigenous (the Lord's Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, or the "Nigerian Taliban") and external (al-Qaeda and associated groups) sources has the potential to become a more dangerous and destructive force in the region. Africa's rapid economic growth and uneven distribution of the benefits thereof give rise to social and economic grievances. Rapid urbanization and associated crime, urban poverty, and increases in internally displaced and refugee populations—partially as a result of desertification and other effects of climate change—also constitute potential sources of violent instability in the future. Cities like Lagos and Nairobi are growing faster than the local governments' capacity to provide basic services, and the number of unemployed and underemployed youth is constantly growing, giving rise to massive slums that could become breeding grounds for instability.

Foreign assistance efforts in post-independence Africa have focused on reforming the political sector to reduce corruption and cultivate a cadre of democratic African leaders. Civil society, particularly the traditional, indigenous governance structures that pre-date modern African states and the colonial institutions from which they were forged, has not received similar attention. Political loyalty in Africa often exists on two not-always-integrated levels: traditional social and governance structures focused on ethnic groups or clans and the post-independence African state structures. Those traditional structures represent deep historical and cultural currents that rarely conform neatly to modern political boundaries and economic structures. Indigenous authorities—religious leaders, chiefs, elders—are important stakeholders in the effort to resolve conflict, counter religious extremism,

and provide "roots" for youth and displaced populations.

In the effort to preserve "state security," African governments have too often suppressed the space in which civil society and traditional governance operate. Autocratic regimes often see civil society and traditional leaders as potentially dangerous sources of opposition or even power competitors. While the situation is improving, particularly in southern Africa and some other notable cases, harassment of journalists is common and threats to the independent press are growing. Reporters Without Borders ranks the majority of African states in 2011 as having "noticeable problems," "difficult situations," or "very serious situations" regarding freedom and safety of the press. The growing influence of China, the prevalence of anti-sedition and criminal defamation laws (which are used to prevent criticism of governments and officials), and counterterrorism/security statutes have had a deleterious effect on the independent media and analysis in Africa. An independent press capable of holding governments accountable and forcing a healthy degree of transparency, along with a vibrant debate in civil society more generally, is vital to democratic reform and economic development in Africa. Developing robust civil society institutions is a vital step toward enabling Africans to find and take ownership of the solutions to their problems and challenges, with or without the emergence of uncorrupt, transparent governance.

Africans remain wary of US expressions of increased strategic focus on Africa, despite official US outreach efforts and engagement with African partners. This stems in large part from the perception that recent US actions—particularly the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM)—are part of a larger trend in US policy toward militarizing foreign policy and pursuing its own security concerns (especially countering terrorism, securing alternatives to Middle East oil, and containing the spread of China's influence) at the expense of African democratic reform. Such concerns reflect the legacies of imperialism and Cold War international relations. Africans fear being used as pawns in a political power play between the United States and China and, in the process, losing their non-aligned status—a cherished source of post-independence regional pride.

Outsourcing Imagination: Intellectual Engagement Networks

The Report of the 9/11 Commission identified four requirements for successfully countering surprise attacks that might be applied more broadly to anticipating and hedging against a wide range of unpleasant strategic surprises (9/11 Commission Report 2004, 346):

1. Think about how attacks might be launched,

2. Identify telltale indicators and warning signs connected to the most dangerous possibilities,

3. Collect intelligence on those indicators, and

4. Adopt defenses to deflect the most dangerous possibilities.

The Commission broke down the failures leading up to the 2001 terror attacks into four broad categories—failure of imagination, policy failures, failed capabilities, and failed management—and identified a need to find ways to institutionalize imagination. At first blush, the phrase "institutionalizing imagination" sounds like an oxymoron. As the 9/11 report points out, "Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies" (p. 344). It is, however, an asset in abundant supply in the private, academic, and civil society sectors. And thanks to modern information and communication tools, it is an asset available to be mined to beneficial effect. So, instead of searching for ways to formalize and "institutionalize" imagination, perhaps we should be looking to outsource it.

Nowhere is the need to outsource imagination more urgent than in Africa. The United States and other members of the international community have responded to Africa's security threats by raising the level of professionalism in African militaries, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and bureaucracies. Such traditional security-sector reform is essential and important for state security, but there is also a growing need to develop a vibrant and diversified civil society capacity to address human security issues in a way that reflects the realities on the ground, especially the inherently transnational nature of the challenges and the appropriate responses. In many African nations, however, a fundamental lack of trust between governments and civil society undermines the ability to bring the civil talent base to bear in analyzing and forging effective, whole-of-society approaches for improving

human security in Africa. US strategic communication, influence, and engagement efforts that focus on the government sector and "connected" civil society elites (high-profile academics, major non-governmental organizations (NGOs), state-approved/-sponsored media) may not benefit from the full range of expertise, insight, and commitment of smaller, less-connected individuals and groups in the private and civil society sectors.

One example of such multilateral engagement is the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR), a consortium of researchers from 14 countries across the Asia-Pacific Region. CATR was established in 2005 "for the purpose of providing systematic ways for promoting and enhancing the capabilities of member institutions and countries in the Asia-Pacific region to counter terrorism, drawing on the unique perspectives of each member." It brings together representatives of counterterrorism centers, strategic analysis institutes, secular and religious universities, and academics and journalists from across the region to produce collaborative research products and discuss issues of mutual interest related to terrorism and other transnational threats. CATR's mission is to foster trust through sustained engagement with researchers in the region and encourage them to broaden their thinking about transnational threats, develop habits of analytical cooperation and coordination, and develop innovative approaches to responding to a broad range of non-traditional, transnational threats. (Ziemke and Droogan 2010, 4–5)

CATR's success in providing a venue for truly collaborative research

and analyses stems, in part, from its organizational culture. IDA has functioned as the facilitator for CATR, whose funding comes primarily from the US government. CATR member institutions, however, contribute materially to the organization's success by providing financial support for meetings and workshops as well as the expertise, of their researchers and experts, giving them "ownership" of the organization and its research products. IDA and its government sponsors see CATR as a "strategic listening" effort and, as such, take care to keep the US footprint small and ensure that all member institutions have equal opportunity to shape the group's research agenda. CATR's symposia and publications provide its members a chance to influence national and international policy approaches and provide policy makers in the United States, the Asia-Pacific region, and beyond a window into the underlying rationale of communities across the region as they struggle, individually and collectively, to respond to the emergence and evolution of a constantly shifting threat environment.

The establishment of sustained, informal engagement networks can go a long way toward building trust between African civil societies and the United States. It also has a great deal to offer

Front Row: (from left) Ousmane Sene, Kongdan Oh Hassig, Takyiwwa Manuh, Yaw Badu, Caroline Ziemke-Dickens, Mene Bodipo, Kakra Taylor-Hayford, Bernard Ngo-Nguty.

Second Row: (from left) Kwaku Sakyi Addo, Emmanuel Kuyole, Janette Yarwood, Manuel Araujo, Karen Buckley, Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, Adama Gaye, Herman Chinery-Hesse, Koryoe Anim-Wright, Stephane Ngwanza, Adamu Ahmed.

Photo Credit: The Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA)

in terms of improving the understanding of and imaginative international responses to emerging transnational threats and challenges by tapping into local expertise that may be unable or unwilling to participate in more formal, official engagements. Such engagement, carried out by NGOs and civil societies, serves a dual purpose by providing deeper insight into how local communities define and understand threats to both human and state security and by creating research and analytical synergies.

There is a need for a sustained dialog with African civil societies on a range of issues of mutual interest. The creation of informal networks as a sustained, neutral venue for frank, informal discussions without the overlay of US or other Western policy perspectives is a novel and appropriate way for the United States to engage African civil society. In the long run, such sustained engagement—"strategic listening" aimed first at understanding African perspectives and second at finding mutually beneficial mechanisms for cooperation with ordinary Africans—can cast security cooperation with the United States in a new light, break down suspicions of the US/AFRICOM agenda, and provide US policy makers and Combatant Commands valuable situational awareness.

These are just a few of the many ways that informal networks can contribute to building a true sense of partnership and common interest between the United States and Africa. Such efforts can make valuable contributions to raising international awareness of shared interests and emerging threats and creating regional buy-in and political will for national and international responses within African civil society. The networks also help provide an understanding of the historical and cultural currents that shape instability and violence in the region and that are crucial in forging effective solutions, building trust between government and non-government stakeholders, identifying and assessing vulnerabilities of states and civil society, and enabling the emergence of a workable, compatible shared vision as the foundation for collective action within Africa and between Africans and policy makers in the United States.

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DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Susan L. Clark-Sestak

The Problem

Environmental considerations, such as water and air pollution, can affect military training and deployment areas, posing a challenge to the safety of US troops and to mission execution.

Over the years, Department of Defense (DoD) officials have increasingly come to appreciate that giving due thought to environmental considerations is not so much about hugging trees and protecting tortoises as it is supporting the war-fighter and the mission. First, it is vital to consider the impact that the environment can have on the safety and health of our troops. For example, while environmental factors will rarely, if ever, be the deciding factor in selecting the location for an operating base, at least being aware of environmental conditions in the area when making this selection can help protect the deploying troops from environmental hazards that can affect their safety and health. Second, the environment can impact our ability to train our forces and execute the mission. For instance, if restrictions are placed on the use of training areas because these areas are also a critical habitat for endangered species, the military's training schedule can be adversely affected.

With this in mind, the US-South African Defense Committee's Environmental Security Working Group (ESWG) has convened teams of subject matter experts (SMEs) from the United States and South Africa to develop a series of guidebooks on various defense-related environmental topics that can be used by militaries throughout the world. This article describes two guidebooks to which IDA contributed.

One guidebook, *Environmental Considerations during Military Operations*, addresses the entire life cycle of military operations (i.e., mission planning, pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment) and how environmental factors can affect the safety and well-being of deployed forces and the execution of the mission.

The messages contained in the *Environmental Considerations* guidebook were well-received within US interagency circles and by the international community. The Department of State expressed its interest in using this information for some of its instructional activities in Africa. It leads the Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which provides training and assistance in peacekeeping to countries in Africa. At ACOTA's request, the ESWG incorporated the key

> **The environment can affect our ability to train our forces and execute the mission.**

themes of the guidebook into a series of three briefings (for commanders, environmental officers, and all deploying troops) and corresponding Programs of Instruction for use by ACOTA. ACOTA has since made this material available for brigade-level training at its peacekeeping training centers in Africa.

Internationally, Swedish and Finnish environmental experts in their respective defense establishments immediately recognized the importance of the *Environmental Considerations* guidebook and its applicability for use in Europe as well. As a result, US SMEs worked with representatives from these two countries to create a modified version of this guidebook. This version has since been briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) School, parts of the European Commission, and the Defense Network (an unofficial group of defense environmental leaders from European Union (EU) nations). The Swedish Armed Forces are now leading an effort to use this guidebook as the foundation for environmental practices and policies to be used in EU peacekeeping operations. The work has also been integrated into NATO Science for Peace and Stability initiatives, with the goal of providing guidelines for future NATO operations.

US-South Africa team, which created the Outreach for Mission Sustainability guidebook, on a visit to Luke Air Force Base (AFB) in August 2009. **Front:** Joe Knott, Annelle Human. **Back:** Etienne van Blerk, Clare Mendelsohn, Tommie Arpin, Eric Mali, Susan Clark-Sestak. Missing from photograph: Jan Larkin. **Photo Credit:** Kevin O'Berry of Luke AFB.

Another recent guidebook, *Outreach for Mission Sustainability*, created by SMEs from the United States and South Africa, examines how encroachment can negatively affect military training and readiness by restricting the timing, duration, intensity, and so forth of this training. Examples of such encroachment include commercial development, light pollution, competition for radio frequency, and requirements to protect endangered species or habitats. The guidebook explains the value of the military in developing outreach programs to reduce the impact of these pressures. This outreach—working with the local community and other government agencies at the federal, regional, and local level—has proven its value in helping to ensure mission sustainability at military bases. In writing this guidebook, the team drew on US and South African experiences at military bases and made site visits to the Yuma Training Range Complex, Luke AFB, Davis-Monthan AFB, and Camp Navajo National Guard Base.

The *Outreach* guidebook lays out a process for creating an outreach program and explains how such a program can be used to address mission sustainability challenges such as urban encroachment, noise pollution, endangered species protection, and alternative energy use. The ultimate objective of such an effort is to develop compatible civilian and military land use plans.

Already, the US DoD and the South Africa Defense Forces are making extensive use of the *Outreach* guidebook. It is one of the key reference documents for a course that DoD is developing for personnel charged with outreach responsibilities. South Africa has widely distributed this guidebook to its military personnel. It will also form the basis for a US-South African jointly sponsored workshop that will bring together a full range of government personnel, members of the local community and representatives from non-governmental organizations, and representatives from several other Southern African nations.

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