

## KENYA'S MUSLIMS—IN THE EYE OF A STORM

By George F. Ward

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
Abubaker Shariff Ahmed shows a book proving that he had checked in with police in his office in Mombasa, Kenya. On April 1, 2014, he became the third leader of a controversial mosque to be killed under mysterious circumstances in Mombasa. (Source: AP Photo/Jason Straziuso, File.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

## HAVE AFRICAN UNION POLICIES HELPED REDUCE MILITARY COUPS?

By Alexander Noyes

Some observers have recently sharply [criticized](#) the African Union's (AU) response to the 2013 unconstitutional change of government in the Central African Republic (CAR) as dilatory and ineffective. But have the AU's emerging normative framework and responses to successful military coups d'état, such as those [seen](#) in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, actually helped to reduce the frequency of such events in Africa over the past decade? A new study by AU Commission researcher Issaka K. Souaré published in the latest issue of the *Journal of Modern African Studies* [makes](#) this claim, arguing that a decrease in successful military coups on the continent—beginning in 1990 and decreasing further since 2000—can mainly be attributed to the AU's normative framework on unconstitutional changes in government that has developed since 2000. Although the study focuses only on one subtype of unconstitutional change (military coups), it appears to confuse correlation with causation, and downplays a number of significant hurdles that clearly remain for the implementation of an adequate and timely AU response to military coups. Nonetheless, some useful implications for both the AU and the international community can be gleaned from the study. [more...](#)



African presidents and heads of government pose for a group photograph during the opening session of the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Thursday, Jan. 30, 2014. African leaders met to discuss outbreaks of violence in South Sudan and Central African Republic, as well as food security across the continent. (Source: AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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## Background

Historically, Kenya's Muslim community grew out of the coastal area around the city of Mombasa. [Arab traders](#) settled that area long before the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Over time, Muslims from the coast resettled in other areas of what would later become Kenya. In recent decades, there has been a sizable influx of Somali Muslims. One scholarly source states conservatively that [6 percent](#) of Kenya's 40 million people are Muslim, with half of Somali ethnicity. Other estimates of the Muslim proportion of the population exceed 10 percent.

The majority of Kenyan Muslims are well integrated in Kenyan society, and Muslims occupy many senior positions in government, the military, and business. A small minority of Kenyan Muslims have become radicalized. Those in that category fall into two groups, one centered on a group of mosques dominated by radical preachers in the Mombasa area, and the other within the Somali ethnic community, especially in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi.

## Youth Radicalization

A bridge between these two radical Muslim communities is the so-called [Muslim Youth Center](#) (MYC), which was founded in 2008 in Nairobi, and which soon established branches in other Kenyan cities, including Mombasa. One of the early leaders of the MYC was Shaykh About Rogo, a radical preacher who was a declared supporter of al-Shabaab. Rogo eventually became the imam of the [Musa Mosque](#) in Mombasa, a haven for disenfranchised, unemployed youths and a center for radical preachers. Members of the MYC began to travel back and forth across Kenya's poorly controlled border with Somalia, where some of them fought on the side of al-Shabaab. Islamic radical sentiment intensified with Kenya's entry into the conflict in Somalia in 2011.

Rogo was transformed into a martyr for the extremist cause when he was [murdered](#) on August 27, 2012, in Mombasa by unknown gunmen. His death, believed by his supporters to have been an extra-judicial killing engineered by Kenyan authorities, sparked violent protests. A year later, Rogo's successor at the Musa Mosque, [Ibrahim Omor](#), was murdered under similar circumstances. These murders did not impede the radicalization process of Muslim youths. The next leader of the Musa Mosque, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, better known as "Makaburi," proved to be just as extreme as his predecessors. In fact, the [UN Security Council](#) on August 23, 2012 subjected him to a travel ban, assets freeze, and a targeted arms embargo due to his recruitment of young Kenyan Muslims and mobilization of funding for al-Shabaab. Makaburi is quoted as applauding the Westgate mall attack: "It's our innocents for your innocents. It was justified. As per the Koran, as per the religion of Islam, Westgate was 100 percent justified." As this article was being prepared, Makaburi, like his predecessors, [was shot dead on the streets of Mombasa](#).



Abubaker Shariff Ahmed shows a book proving that he had checked in with police in his office in Mombasa, Kenya. On April 1, 2014, he became the third leader of a controversial mosque to be killed under mysterious circumstances in Mombasa. (Source: AP Photo/Jason Straziuso, File.)

## A Cycle of Violence

The response by Kenyan authorities to Islamic extremism in the wake of the Westgate Mall attack has been heavy handed and seemingly uncoordinated. In early February 2014, [police banned](#) a gathering of young Muslims at the Musa Mosque in Mombasa for a “regional Islamic conference.” When the participants nevertheless showed up at the mosque, they were permitted to enter. Once the proceedings were under way, police stormed the mosque, firing live ammunition and tear gas, and arresting 129 people. Many people were injured in the melee. By February 6, seven Muslims and one police officer had died. A senior police official in Mombasa, Henry Ondiek, [defended the actions](#): “The objective was to arrest. Our strategy is to let them in and surround them . . . it worked well.”

Predictably, the mosque raid led to retaliatory violence. On March 23, terrorists attacked the Joy in Christ church in Mombasa during a worship service, killing six congregants and injuring 21. In response, the Mombasa County Commissioner, Nelson Marwa, issued a [shoot-to-kill order](#): “These are not people to be arrested because they are armed, they must be finished with on the spot. Why take them to court . . . ?” Shortly afterward, the Kenyan interior minister, Joseph Ole Lenku, fanned tensions further by announcing on March 26 that 50,000 refugees and asylum seekers living in Kenyan towns would henceforth be obliged to move to refugee camps. The [interior minister warned](#), “Any refugee found flouting this directive will be dealt with in accordance with the law.”

The country’s two refugee camps, Dadaab and Kakuma, are already overcrowded, with populations of half a million and 100,000, respectively. Apart from the physical difficulty of moving thousands more into the camps, the minister’s order would seem to be at odds, as [Human Rights Watch](#) has pointed out, with a July 26, 2013, order of the Kenyan High Court that quashed a similar relocation plan announced in December 2012. In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the latest government order will be implemented.

## Breaking the Cycle

As the cycle of violence continues, with a [grenade attack](#) in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi killing six on March 31, what can the Kenyan government do to deal more effectively with terrorism while also retaining the allegiance of the non-radical majority of Kenya Muslims?

- First, tone down the rhetoric. Shoot-to-kill orders and threats of mass population movements will not be effective and will alienate moderate Muslims.
- Second, promote interagency cooperation. Lack of coordination between the various Kenyan security forces was in evidence during the response to the Westgate Mall attack and does not seem to have improved since.
- Third, fight corruption within the security forces. Using bribery, extremists continue to transit to and from Somalia with relative ease, often transporting weapons and explosives.
- Fourth, fund security organizations adequately. One [Associated Press](#) account alleged that the Anti-Terror Police Unit was allocated a total of only \$2,205 for its operations in the first quarter of 2014. That compares badly with the \$45,000 in salary and allowances for every Kenyan member of parliament during the same period and with the funds available to extremists operating inside Kenya.

Kenyan President Uruhu Kenyatta has [pledged](#) security reforms and investment in anti-terrorist capabilities. Following through will be a major test of his leadership.

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
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Some observers have recently sharply [criticized](#) the African Union's (AU) response to the 2013 unconstitutional change of government in the Central African Republic (CAR) as dilatory and ineffective. But have the AU's emerging normative framework and responses to successful military coups d'état, such as those [seen](#) in Mali and Guinea-Bissau in 2012, actually helped to reduce the frequency of such events in Africa over the past decade? A new study by AU Commission researcher Issaka K. Souaré published in the latest issue of the *Journal of Modern African Studies* [makes](#) this claim, arguing that a decrease in successful military coups on the continent—beginning in 1990 and decreasing further since 2000—can mainly be attributed to the AU's normative framework on unconstitutional changes in government that has developed since 2000. Although the study focuses only on one subtype of unconstitutional change (military coups), it appears to confuse correlation with causation, and downplays a number of significant hurdles that clearly remain for the implementation of an adequate and timely AU response to military coups. Nonetheless, some useful implications for both the AU and the international community can be gleaned from the study.

Souaré's study presents a database of military coups that occurred within AU (and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, or OAU) member states, which include the North Africa region, over the period of 1952–2012 (for a discussion of different types of coups see [here](#)). Based on this dataset, Souaré [finds](#) a “clear reduction in the occurrence of military coups since 1990, given that 63 (or 71.5 percent) of the 88 successful coups” took place before 1990, with a further reduction since 2000. In an effort to judge the effectiveness of the AU's coup policies, which began in 2000, he then compares the decade of 1990 to 2000, where 15 military coups occurred, with the subsequent period from 2000 to 2012, where 10 such events took place.

Although there was only a modest decrease in the number of military coups after 2000, Souaré argues that the evolution of norms regarding the treatment of coups is responsible for this reduction. The AU and the OAU instituted three main policies on unconstitutional changes in government since 2000, starting with the “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government” in [2000](#); the “Constitutive Act of the AU” in [2002](#); and the “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,” which was adopted in [2007](#) but did not become operational until 2012. [According](#) to Souaré, these policies together form a normative framework at the AU with a “zero tolerance” for military coups that requires suspensions and sanctions and bars coup-makers from participating in subsequent elections or holding office in a new government aimed at restoring constitutional order. Noting decreases in both the frequency and longevity of successful military coups in Africa from 2000 to 2012, Souaré [postulates](#) that the AU's normative policies have been the primary drivers of this reduction: “the policy seems to have had an impact on the dwindling rate of military coups, even if other national, regional and international actors have also supported this” trend.

While a variety of other factors, such as the end of the Cold War and the widespread adoption of multiparty elections in Africa in the 1990s, have also influenced the reduction in the number of military coups in Africa in the 2000s, the study offers interesting and optimistic findings regarding the ability of the AU and the regional economic communities to effect



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positive change. That said, the AU's lackluster response to several recent crisis situations sparked by unconstitutional changes in government, as in Mali in 2012 and CAR in 2013, suggests that much improvement is needed to ensure that the existing normative framework translates into an effective and timely response. Dr. Janette Yarwood and the author found similar problems in a recent [study](#) on the AU's Continental Early Warning System, where, despite much progress, issues of political will and weak capacity continued to hamper an effective conflict-prevention response. Indeed, Souaré [notes](#) an overreliance on international actors as one of the main challenges to the implementation of the AU's coup framework.

While significant challenges to an effective coup response strategy at the AU persist, the study discussed here suggests that the AU's normative framework on military coups has contributed to reducing the frequency and longevity of military coups in Africa since 2000. Unfortunately, the study does not discuss at length the exact avenues or mechanisms through which the AU's coup policies could have altered the behavior of actual or potential military coup-plotters, making it difficult to take Souaré's argument from correlation to causation. In addition, the study's focus on military coups means it fails to address the damaging impact of military influence or interventions in politics that fall short of coups, such as the military's involvement in political violence, or coups perpetrated by other political actors, such as rebel groups. Despite the study's shortcomings, most observers would agree that the further development of an AU norm against unconstitutional changes of government would be a good thing. To strengthen the AU's framework, international actors would be wise to consider redoubling support to the AU and helping the body build its enforcement and response capacities for when military coups do occur.

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## BOKO HARAM AND THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Political events in Nigeria, West Africa's regional hegemon and newly declared as the continent's [largest economy](#), always garner attention. The country's 2015 elections will likely be significant because they have the potential to destabilize an already fragile state of affairs. Along with issues related to the [intensifying competition](#) between political parties, including mass defections from the ruling party and controversy over who will run for president, the presence of the terrorist organization Boko Haram has added a pervasive sense of insecurity that will play a pivotal role in the campaign. As a result of escalating attacks by Boko Haram, there is currently a [state of emergency](#) in three of the country's 36 states. If current patterns hold, the elections could be a repeat of 2011's—[well managed but extremely violent](#). And that may be a best-case scenario. [more...](#)



The aftermath of a reported Boko Haram attack in Maiduguri, January 2014. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## TURKEY IN AFRICA: AN EMERGING INFLUENCER?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Several outside countries have demonstrated increased economic and political interest in the African continent in recent years, the most well-known being China, Brazil, India, and Russia. Another group that is increasing its involvement and influence consists of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. These countries may not be investing at the same level as China, but their activities are significant, in part because of their Muslim identities. Turkey seems to be taking a particularly strategic approach to the continent, not only for economic and trade benefits, but also to achieve a level of political influence. [more...](#)



Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, left, shakes hands with South African President Thabo Mbeki, right, following their meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, March 4, 2005. (Source: Obed Zilwa.)

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The aftermath of a reported Boko Haram attack in Maidiguri, January 2014. (Source: AP.)

## Boko Haram—An Evolving Threat

Since 2009, the terrorist group Boko Haram (loosely translated as “Western education is forbidden”) has waged war against the government of Nigeria and the traditional power structure in the country's northeast. Since May 2011, approximately [8,000 deaths](#) can be attributed to the conflict. Among the group's many grievances are the rampant corruption, mismanagement, and poor governance plaguing Nigerian politics. Historically, the northeast region—where Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s—has experienced poverty and underdevelopment born out of governmental neglect, making the region ripe for extremist sentiments.

Under its previous leader, Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram advocated for the implementation of *shari'a* law as a means of addressing corruption and insecurity. Yusuf endorsed [mostly peaceful means](#) of pursuing this goal, but after his death in 2009 at the hands of security forces, the group took up more violent means of achieving its aims. The group also seems to have become much more diffuse, encompassing as many as six different sects with different leaders and tactics.

The most high-profile of the sects is the one led by Abubakar Shekau, who recently released a series of videos covered in the Nigeria press. In one video, Shekau calls on Nigerians across the country to take up arms and defend Islam. He tells his followers, “[Just pick up your knife and break into homes and kill.](#)” According to [John Campbell](#), senior fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations and former ambassador to Nigeria, this may represent an intention to expand the group's activities, which until now had been more or less regionally confined to the North. Whether Boko Haram has the capacity to follow through remains to be seen.

Boko Haram's [targets have also evolved](#) over time. Whereas earlier actions attributed to Boko Haram focused on military and police targets, current attacks include soft targets such as schools, hospitals, and churches. In March, at least [43 students were brutally killed in Yobe state](#) in what was believed to be an attack by Boko Haram. In response, the government announced that it was shutting down all schools in the regions affected by the state of emergency.

## Instability as Election Season Begins

Both the government and the opposition are using the insurgency as a [campaign issue](#). In fact, some have speculated that the May 2013 declaration of a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states marked the unofficial launch of President Goodluck Jonathan's campaign. If the government is successful in defeating Boko Haram before the election, it would demonstrate President Jonathan's strength and capability.

Northern governors, on the other hand, are accusing the ruling government of [colluding with Boko Haram](#) and indirectly providing it with material support. They argue that if the insurgency were to continue throughout the campaign, it would marginalize the voting power of the North, long an opposition stronghold, because it would be impossible to conduct elections in regions or states under a state of emergency order.

The insurgency has also been used as a means to discredit members of the political opposition. Former Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi, who was [ousted in February](#) after publicly revealing that almost \$20 billion was missing from the government coffers, has been [accused of financing Boko Haram](#), a claim he vehemently disputes.

### **Boko Haram's Likely Approach to the Elections**

As part of its anti-Western ideology, Boko Haram is explicitly against holding elections, which they perceive as another Western imposition. During the 2011 election campaign, Boko Haram was [active in the North](#). The group was responsible for assassinations of political aspirants and party officials, in addition to several suicide attacks and bombings that targeted election rallies, polling centers, and the electoral commission in Maiduguri.

Thus far, Boko Haram has not made public mention of the 2015 elections or engaged in any attacks directly associated with them, but it seems highly likely that it will. Elections, in addition to contravening the group's interpretation of Islam, are high-profile events that could provide Boko Haram with opportunities to get its message out. The group's changing tactics and its expansion to new targets and regions are creating a particularly insecure election environment for the 2015 polls. This may prove to be a disastrous proposition in an already divisive contest.

### **Conclusion**

Because of Nigeria's history with election violence and the alleged frequent use of violence to intimidate voters, some opportunistic politicians may use the cover of Boko Haram to further their own political agenda, making widespread and intense violence an even likelier possibility. Furthermore, the politicization of Boko Haram's activities by both the government and opposition may serve to undermine any attempt at finding a genuine solution to this serious problem.

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Several outside countries have demonstrated increased economic and political interest in the African continent in recent years, the most well-known being China, Brazil, India, and Russia. Another group that is increasing its involvement and influence consists of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. These countries may not be investing at the same level as China, but their activities are significant, in part because of their Muslim identities. Turkey seems to be taking a particularly strategic approach to the continent, not only for economic and trade benefits, but also to achieve a level of political influence.

## Background

In 1998, Prime Minister Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz initiated an [“Opening Up to Africa Policy”](#) that entailed cultivating Turkey’s political, economic, and cultural ties with African countries. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a more concerted effort in Africa in 2005, which he designated the [“Year of Africa,”](#) when he made his first trip to [Sudan](#). At least partly as a result of this new commitment to the African continent, Ankara was rewarded with a [non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council](#) in 2008, thanks to a large number of African votes. In 2011, Erdoğan traveled to [Ethiopia and South Africa](#), and most recently he spent time in [Gabon, Niger, and Senegal](#). The purposes of these visits were to advance diplomatic relations and open doors for Turkish industry, which is why, in 2013, the prime minister was accompanied by a large group of Turkish businessmen. The Turks have also been especially active in Somalia, where they are focusing their economic assistance on much-needed [infrastructure development](#).

## Turkish Interests

As with other foreign investors, Turkey’s activities in Africa are multifaceted. Not only does it wish to establish an enduring presence on the continent alongside China, Brazil, and other major or emerging world powers, but it may also be motivated by a desire to (1) diversify its political alliances and (2) assert its influence in Africa, both of which could have an impact on its relations with European countries. To that end, Turkey has over the past 15 years almost tripled its diplomatic representation in Africa from [12 embassies](#) to [35, of which 30 are in Sub-Saharan Africa](#). In return, Turkey is inviting African countries to open embassies in Ankara.

Like other external actors, Turkey views Africa in terms of its own economic prospects. The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey, or TUSKON, has been playing an active facilitating role for Turkish businesses in Africa. It organized the [Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge summit](#) in 2008, which was attended by over [2,500 Turkish businessmen](#). During the summit, the TUSKON President [said](#), “Our intention is to create new venues of expansion for Turkish companies that are forced to deal with increased competition because of the contracting market.” This forum attracted over 200 Turkish [construction and auto firms](#) as well as [smaller companies](#) wanting to capitalize on Africa’s lack of an industrial base. Africa imports nearly [95 percent](#) of its manufactured products, which represents a great opportunity for small- and mid-sized firms wishing to exploit new markets. According to one Turkish chief executive, his company has a better reputation among African consumers than many Chinese companies, and its products are in high demand. For example, [Pancar Motor’s agricultural equipment](#) has been popular in Africa markets due to its durability and the longevity of the company itself. As a result of these efforts, Turkish trade with Africa has increased by an order of magnitude—from about [\\$2 billion](#) in 2002 to [\\$23 billion](#) by 2012. To facilitate this increased engagement, Turkish Airlines now flies to more than 30 cities in more than 20 African countries.



Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, left, shakes hands with South African President Thabo Mbeki, right, following their meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, March 4, 2005. (Source: Obed Zilwa.)

In terms of its military role, Turkey is an active contributor of personnel or financial resources to [six](#) of the existing eight UN missions in Africa. In 2009, the Turkish navy deployed a [dozen of its frigates](#) to patrol the waters off Somalia as part of the multinational anti-piracy force, even [leading](#) the combined joint task force for some time. Turkey does not have a particularly large defense industry, but it is [growing](#). [Numerous](#) reports indicate that it is “eyeing Africa” as a potential new market.

In terms of social and cultural penetration, Turkey has also made great strides. Ankara hosted the first [Turkey-Africa Media Forum](#) in 2012, inviting over 250 African journalists from 54 African countries. It stressed the importance of the media in keeping Turks and Africans alike apprised of events in each other’s countries. The Anatolia news agency, Turkey’s official news outlet, directly covers important events in all the major capitals of Africa. Another example of Turkey encouraging cross-national awareness and education was the establishment of [Ankara University’s African Studies Research and Application Center](#) in December 2008 to train researchers specializing in the African continent.

Although the goals of Turkey’s activities in Africa are primarily economic, it is noteworthy that several high-level Turkish delegations have visited countries with large Muslim populations, including Sudan in 2005, Kenya in 2009, and Tanzania in 2010. The extensive development efforts and [humanitarian assistance to Somalia](#) are seen by some as a means to appeal to conservative Muslim voters who want to foster deeper religious penetration. A number of “Gülen” schools, named for the religious and social movement led by Turkish Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen, have also contributed to this perception. As of 2010, there were [60 Gülen schools](#) in 30 African countries. In South Africa, five of these schools provide Gülen’s teachings to nearly [3,000 pupils](#). Given that Turkey was a vocal supporter of the Arab Spring, the potential geopolitical implications of a Muslim country exerting more influence throughout Africa is a development worthy of special attention.

## Messaging

In terms of messaging, Turkey seems to be taking a play from Brazil’s playbook: invoking “south-south” rhetoric, emphasizing its experience as a developing country that modernized politically and developed economically. Turkey eschews the Chinese and Indian models for economic development, implying they are unique and unrealistic for most African countries. Politically, Turkey, like China, claims it does not interfere in the internal affairs of its economic partners.

## Conclusion

As a result of these political and other gestures to African countries, the African Union declared in 2008 that Turkey was a strategic ally and granted it [observer status at the African Union](#). Turkey, which is also one of the non-African [members of the African Development Bank](#), wants to “enter into a free trade agreement with the East African Community. . . by 2019.” African countries appear receptive to Turkish advances, recognizing the direct benefit they could receive from the economic diversification, political alliances, development assistance, and security cooperation that Turkey offers.

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## KENYA—MASS ARRESTS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND UNDERMINE SECURITY REFORM PLEDGE

By Alexander Noyes

Since April 4, 2014, the Kenyan government, in an effort to thwart “terrorist activities,” has [deported](#) 82 and arrested over 3,000 mostly ethnic Somalis in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi. These actions have sparked concern from the [United Nations](#) and human rights organizations, which have [condemned](#) the conduct of the police and the government. As outlined in the April 3 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, this most recent crackdown on Kenya’s Somali community comes on the heels of a spate of recent [attacks](#) in Mombasa and Eastleigh. These incidents have heightened tensions between the country’s Muslim minority and the government. The mass arrests and reported abuse by security forces are counterproductive and undermine President Uhuru Kenyatta’s recent [pledge](#) to overhaul Kenya’s security agencies. It seems that after one year in power, Kenyatta’s administration may be more interested in security—or the perception of security—than in furthering the [genuine](#) institutional security reform processes that were undertaken by the previous unity government, in power from 2008 to 2013. [more...](#)



A detained Somali woman has her photograph taken before being fingerprinted and screened at the Kasarani sports stadium, which has been converted into a detention facility to hold those arrested during recent security crackdowns, near Nairobi in Kenya Wednesday, April 9, 2014. (AP Photo/Khalil Senosi)

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## A LITMUS TEST FOR GUINEA’S PRESIDENT

By George F. Ward

There have been two important recent developments in the lengthy investigation of possible corruption related to the issuance of iron ore mining licenses by the government of Guinea. In deciding what to do next, Guinea’s President Alpha Condé faces a series of important decisions. [more...](#)

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Simandou and Zogota mining areas in Guinea. (Source: CIA Factbook. Map adapted by IDA based on information from BSG Resources (<http://www.bsgresources.com/mining-and-metals/iron-ore/>.)

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
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# KENYA—MASS ARRESTS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND UNDERMINE SECURITY REFORM PLEDGE

By Alexander Noyes

Since April 4, 2014, the Kenyan government, in an effort to thwart “terrorist activities,” has [deported](#) 82 and arrested over 3,000 mostly ethnic Somalis in the Eastleigh section of Nairobi. These actions have sparked concern from the [United Nations](#) and human rights organizations, which have [condemned](#) the conduct of the police and the government. As outlined in the April 3 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, this most recent crackdown on Kenya’s Somali community comes on the heels of a spate of recent [attacks](#) in Mombasa and Eastleigh. These incidents have heightened tensions between the country’s Muslim minority and the government. The mass arrests and reported abuse by security forces are counterproductive and undermine President Uhuru Kenyatta’s recent [pledge](#) to overhaul Kenya’s security agencies. It seems that after one year in power, Kenyatta’s administration may be more interested in security—or the perception of security—than in furthering the [genuine](#) institutional security reform processes that were undertaken by the previous unity government, in power from 2008 to 2013.



A detained Somali woman has her photograph taken before being fingerprinted and screened at the Kasarani sports stadium, which has been converted into a detention facility to hold those arrested during recent security crackdowns, near Nairobi in Kenya Wednesday, April 9, 2014. (AP Photo/Khalil Senosi)

Those caught up in the security sweeps, named Operation Usalama Watch (“security” in Swahili), have been detained by the police at Kasarani stadium and various police stations. Detainees, who reportedly include women and children, are being separated by age and gender. In addition to the 82 deportations, a [reported](#) 447 people are being held for further interrogations, and 69 more have been charged with other offenses. While the [majority](#) of those detained are Somali, a number of Ugandans, South Sudanese, Ethiopians, and Eritreans are also being held. Members of the media and human rights groups were initially banned from Kasarani stadium but were granted limited access on April 9.

The sweeps, which the government [maintains](#) are to screen for those without legal documents or those living outside the “precincts of legally gazetted areas,” follow a March 26 directive from the government that all refugees and asylum-seekers living in urban areas [must](#) report to overcrowded refugee camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. The directive contravenes a High Court decision last July that such relocation orders are illegal. Kenyatta [asserted](#) that the operation would guard against further attacks launched by the al-Shabaab terrorist group, claiming, “We are not fighting any religion or community. Our fight is against criminals who kill innocent children, women and men going about their everyday activities, including praying.”

Various domestic and international human rights organizations have criticized the sweeps and mass arrests, including the [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees](#) (UNHCR) and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). The UNHCR has sought access to arrested refugees and [urged](#) the government to “uphold the rights of all those arrested and to treat them in a humane and non-discriminatory manner.” The KNCHR is investigating a host of alleged [abuses](#) reported during the security operations, including torture, sexual harassment, and theft, and warned the government of blowback effects: “Combating terrorism through official terror only serves to foment further resentment, increase radicalization and fertilizes the breeding ground of future terrorists.” On April 11, Human Rights Watch accused the Kenyan authorities of similar abuses, [including](#) “arbitrary arrests and detentions, extortion, and other abuses against Somalis.” The deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch, Leslie Lefkow, [says the Kenyan government has gone too far](#): “There seems to be a knee-jerk reaction to scapegoat the Somali community. . . Kenya has the right to respond to these acts of violence, but what we are now having are arbitrary arrests.”

Kenya's vulnerability to Islamist militant attacks should not be downplayed, as tragically illustrated by the Westgate mall massacre last September. That said, the government's heavy-handed counterterrorism response is troubling and counterproductive on a number of fronts. First, as warned by the KNCHR and highlighted in the April 3 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, such indiscriminate policies fuel a "cycle of violence" that risks further alienating and radicalizing Kenya's Somali and Muslim communities. Second, the crackdown undermines President Kenyatta's recent [pledge](#) to overhaul Kenya's security agencies. As the author has [argued](#) elsewhere, Kenya's previous power-sharing government was able to achieve real, if halting and incomplete, institutional security reform successes, including legislative and constitutional changes. The recent mass arrests and troubling allegations against security forces suggest that the Kenyatta administration is more interested in building up the capacity of the security agencies to fight terrorism—fostering the perception of security—than in consolidating any of Kenya's fragile institutional gains on security reform.

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# A LITMUS TEST FOR GUINEA'S PRESIDENT

By George F. Ward

There have been two important recent developments in the lengthy investigation of possible corruption related to the issuance of iron ore mining licenses by the government of Guinea. In deciding what to do next, Guinea's President Alpha Condé faces a series of important decisions.

## Latest Developments in a Long Saga

Some of the largest deposits of iron ore in the world lie in Guinea's Simandou Mountains. If exploited, these deposits could transform the economy of Guinea, one of the world's poorest countries. Unfortunately, the exploitation of the Simandou ore deposits—[known for more than 100 years](#)—has been repeatedly delayed. On March 28, 2014, a [high-level technical committee](#) of the Guinean government issued a report concluding that evidence provided “sufficient certitude” of “the existence of acts of corruption connected to the issuance of licenses” to BSG Resources, widely viewed as the [mining arm](#) of the business empire of Beny Steinmetz, one of Israel's richest citizens. The committee recommended withdrawal of the licenses. Shortly before the issuance of the committee's report, a French businessman who claimed to be operating under the instructions of Beny Steinmetz [pleaded guilty](#) to obstructing a U.S. federal investigation into corruption in the Simandou saga.



Simandou and Zogota mining areas in Guinea. (Source: CIA Factbook. Map adapted by IDA based on information from BSG Resources (<http://www.bsgresources.com/mining-and-metals/iron-ore/>.)

## Guinea's Sad Lot

Unlike other West African countries, including neighbors Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea has never been torn apart by civil war. It did, however, suffer decades of one-man rule, and a pervasive culture of corruption has flourished. In 2013, Guinea ranked [150th](#) out of 177 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. In large part due to corruption, Guinea's abundant mineral resources—[bauxite, diamonds, and gold in addition to iron ore](#)—have not yet benefited the country's people. Hundreds of overlapping mining permits, covering [110 percent of the country's territory](#), have been issued, but few projects have been realized. According to the World Bank, Guinea's per capita [gross national income](#) is less than \$1.25 per day. In addition, the state of the country's infrastructure and public services doubtless contributed to Guinea now being the epicenter of the outbreak of Ebola fever in the region.

## The Simandou Concession

The drama of the Simandou iron ore concessions has been widely reported over the past several years. [A most readable and thorough account](#) by Patrick Radden Keefe appeared in the July 8, 2013, edition of *The New Yorker*. Suffice it here to say that the accounts by Keefe and others chronicle a saga that included the alleged payment of incentives by representatives of BSG Resources to one of the four wives of the late ex-president and military strongman, Lansana Conté. In 2008, Conté stripped the mining company Rio Tinto of the licenses for Simandou Blocks 1 and 2 (see map) and awarded them late in the same year to BSG Resources, which paid nothing but promised it would construct infrastructure that would benefit the people of Guinea. Conté died in December 2008, and a military coup soon followed. In March 2010, BSG Resources was awarded a mining license for the Zogota area, located south of Simandou. The following month, BSG Resources, with no prior history of iron ore mining activity, [sold half its concessions](#) in Simandou and Zogota to the Brazilian mining company Vale for \$2.5 billion.

Later in 2010, Guinea held its first-ever multiparty presidential elections. Alpha Condé, who had lived in exile for years, campaigned on a platform of good governance and greater transparency. Once elected and in office, he established a technical committee to review mining licenses that had been issued. The [subsequent investigations](#) soon multiplied, and involved persons, companies, and agencies located in Guinea, other West African nations, Israel, France, the Guernsey Islands, England, and the United States. Allegations of millions of dollars in payments to Conté's fourth wife, Mamadie Touré, soon surfaced. In addition, there were reports of bribes, "incentives," and gifts in the form of diamond-encrusted model race cars, luxury automobiles, and the like.

The investigative trail ended with three meetings in March and April 2013 at the airport in Jacksonville, Florida, between the French businessman Frédéric Cilins, purporting to represent Beny Steinmetz, and Mamadie Touré, who had fled Guinea, established herself in the United States, and been confronted by the FBI. Cilins, holding himself out as representing Beny Steinmetz, offered payments to Ms. Touré amounting to millions of dollars. In return, she was to hand over documents in her possession that allegedly attested to the payments that had been made to Ms. Touré years earlier in Guinea for her assistance in obtaining the Simandou licenses. Ms. Touré was wearing an FBI wire. Mr. Cilins was [arrested and charged](#) with obstructing an investigation, witness tampering, and attempting to destroy evidence. After initially pleading not guilty, he later entered a plea of guilty to obstructing a federal investigation. He could still be charged with other offenses. It should be noted that Beny Steinmetz denies any wrongdoing in this case, and the [BSG Resources website](#) includes the company's history of its involvement in Guinea's iron ore sector.

### **The President's Litmus Test**

If he is to succeed in putting the iron ore riches of Simandou at the service of his country, President Condé should persevere in a difficult series of actions and decisions:

- First, ensure that the strategic committee, to which the technical committee submitted its findings, acts swiftly and objectively on the report. The strategic committee is a political body consisting of four ministers.
- Second, once the strategic committee forwards its recommendations to him, decide on a course of action regarding the existing licenses.
- Third, if the BSG Resources/Vale licenses are to be canceled, formulate a transparent plan for the re-awarding of licenses. This plan should include mechanisms for ensuring that royalties will be reported publicly and paid directly into government accounts, rather than into offshore arrangements.
- Fourth, decide on a plan for transporting the iron ore to a suitable port. Simandou lies 400 miles from the coast, and the closest suitable deep-water port may be in Liberia rather than in Guinea. Rio Tinto, which still possesses licenses for other areas in the Simandou Range, has a plan for building a [standard-gauge railroad](#) over mountains and rivers west across Guinea to a new port south of Conakry. This project would include three tunnels, 43 bridges, and 78 culverts along a route not currently serviced by roads. An alternative is the current BSG Resources/Vale plan to build a shorter railroad south to the Liberian border, linking to an existing rail link in that country. One potential problem with the latter design is that the Liberian link may not have [spare capacity](#) for years to come.
- Finally, provide some economic benefits to the citizens of Guinea in the near term. Because most of the royalties from new mining contracts will begin to flow only years from now, this may be the president's most difficult task. If he fails in it, he will strengthen the hand of those in Guinea who wish to bring back the old order, in which corruption was king. One possible approach to this issue would be to front-load license agreements with royalty payments and infrastructure projects that could be completed relatively quickly.

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## GHANA, THE UNITED STATES, AND IRAN: BALANCING ALLIANCES WITH MUTUAL INTERESTS

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

The recent spotting of a U.S.-registered airplane at the Mehrabad airport in Tehran has generated a flurry of rumors of possible [sanctions violations](#). The subsequent discovery that the aircraft was operated by a Ghanaian company owned by the brother of that country's president highlights the delicate balancing act that African countries must perform when engaging with nations such as Iran and trying to maintain good relations with the United States. [more...](#)

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A plane takes off from Mehrabad airport in Tehran. (Source: AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian.)

## ELECTIONS AND THE AUTOCRATIC DRIFT IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The early 1990s saw a rapid proliferation of multiparty regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas before 1990 only a handful of African countries had held multiparty elections, by 1997 [nearly 75 percent of countries](#) in Africa had done so. Although the elections were of varying quality, this was a seismic shift in how political leaders accessed power in Africa. In the early 2000s, long-standing rulers and parties in countries such as Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya were removed from office through elections. It was a period of tremendous optimism. Even Nigeria, which had spent the vast majority of independence under military rule, made the transition to multiparty elections in 1999. Today, only Eritrea has resisted electoral transformation; every other African country routinely holds electoral contests. But has the widespread adoption of elections produced meaningful results, or are the changes merely cosmetic? [more...](#)



In this photo taken Sunday, April 13, 2014, people line up at a polling station to cast their votes in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. (Source: AP Photo/Yousouf Bah.)

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### About IDA

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## Background

The aircraft in question is held in a trust by the Bank of Utah, a small community bank headquartered in Ogden. The beneficiary of the trust is the Ghana-based mining firm [Engineers and Planners](#) (E&P), which is owned by Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama's younger brother, Ibrahim. E&P is not required to adhere to U.S.-imposed sanctions that limit trade between the United States and Iran. The Bank of Utah, however, is. According to the [FAA's](#) data, the bank is the owner of the aircraft, but as the beneficiary of the trust, E&P operates the plane. According to the State Department, U.S.-registered aircraft are [generally prohibited](#) from flying to Iran without [special licenses](#) from the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (and the Department of Commerce, if the aircraft or components are manufactured in the United States). Herein lies a gray area; U.S. Government lawyers must now [determine](#) whether the U.S. bank, as the trust holder, has violated any sanctions imposed on Iran.

## Implications for the U.S.-Ghana Relationship

This incident raises at least two questions. First, should [FAA regulations](#) permit a trust structure whereby a bank may hold title to an aircraft on behalf of a beneficiary whose identity is not part of the record? This potentially allows foreign companies or individuals to operate aircraft freely within the United States, and around the world, without disclosing their identity. In fact, the [Department of Transportation reported](#) in January that it is quite common for non-U.S. citizens to use trusts to own, operate, and maintain aircraft that are legally registered with the FAA. According to the Department's Office of Inspector General, approximately [5,600](#) of the registrations for aircraft owned under trusts for non-U.S. citizens lacked key information, such as the identity of beneficiaries.

Second, how should the United States respond to Iran's well-documented forays into Africa and other parts of the developing world? The Ghanaian business delegation's travel to Tehran is just one example of African receptivity to Iranian advances. The Ghanaian [vice president](#) and the [speaker of Parliament](#) also visited Tehran in August and October 2013, respectively. During those visits, a planned Joint Economic Cooperation Commission was discussed. Iran claims it is motivated by the desire to pursue [common interests](#), especially increased trade, but it is also seeking the political support of African nations.

In reference to this latest episode, [Iranian authorities](#) said the Ghanaian delegation, which included the president's brother, was in Iran to follow up on agreements reached between the two countries two years ago. An aide to President Mahama [denied](#) that the president's brother had been part of the delegation, while E&P's Executive Director added: "We wish to also state that the President of the Republic of Ghana, H. E. John Dramani Mahama, has never been transported by the said aircraft." This concerted effort to distance the president and his brother from the plane suggests an attempt to shield the Ghanaian government from any finding of wrongdoing or possibly any political backlash from the United States.



A plane takes off from Mehrabad airport in Tehran. (Source: AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian.)

## Looking Ahead

Ghana currently enjoys a very good relationship with the United States, as evidenced by President Obama's decision to stop in Accra during his first trip to Africa in 2009. While there is no apparent evidence of wrongdoing by Ghanaian government officials or their relatives, this case underscores the importance of diligence when dealing with countries that are the target of U.S., UN, EU, or other sanctions. Moreover, African countries must weigh the risks of engaging with Iran against the potential impact that doing so may have on other international relationships.

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In this photo taken Sunday, April 13, 2014, people line up at a polling station to cast their votes in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. (Source: AP Photo/Yousouf Bah.)

## Elections in Theory

In theory, elections are meant to provide citizens with ultimate authority over their governments by allowing them to decide who best represents their interests and whom they best trust to make decisions on their behalf. Before 1990, virtually all African countries were governed by some form of autocracy—military rule, single-party regimes, personal dictatorships, and the like. Regardless of form, what they all had in common was that citizens had little input into how or who ruled them, political power was centralized, and “[big man](#)” politics was the norm. Now, elections are the rule, not the exception.

Many believed the advent of multiparty elections signaled a new era of governance in Africa, one in which the citizen would reign supreme. Even though elections in and of themselves do not define democracy, they are an essential feature, one that is frequently used as a proxy measure for it.

Although there has been an increase in political rights in Africa—namely, in the realm of electoral participation—there has also been a simultaneous decrease in civil liberties in many countries as leaders have exerted influence and control in other ways. This behavior has become more pronounced over the past few years [as contraction of press freedoms](#) has been noted in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda. These declines reflect the [larger trend](#) of a global decline in freedom noted recently by Freedom House.

## Electing Autocracy?

There have been a few bright spots to be certain—for example, Senegal and Ghana, where elections seem to reflect popular will and produce leadership change—but the trend, especially recently, has been a reversion to autocracy through the ballot box. Multiparty elections in Zimbabwe have returned Robert Mugabe to office five times. He has [intimated](#) that he plans to run for a sixth time in 2018. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1986, has been elected president four times thus far and [will be running again in 2016](#).

Multiparty elections are meant to promote democracy, but presidents with autocratic tendencies are learning how to manipulate outcomes to their advantage and to consolidate power. In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, who had come to power in 1987 as the result of a coup, initiated a democratic transition in 1990 that led to the adoption of a new constitution in 1991. In 1992, the county held multiparty elections—the country’s first since 1978. Compaoré was re-elected president in 1998, 2005, and 2010. Presidential elections are now scheduled for 2015. Compaoré is barred from participating in 2015 elections by a provision in the 2000 constitution that he helped to enact, but it is no secret that he is now maneuvering to circumvent the constitution by calling a referendum on abolishing term limits. During [protests](#) held in the capital city,

the opposition demanded that Compaoré respect the constitution and step down, but this issue is far from decided. In mid-April, pro-government [protesters descended on Bobo-Dioulasso](#), the country's second largest city, demanding that the government hold the referendum and allow Compaoré to run.

A similar situation is playing out in [Burundi](#) as incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza seeks out a “legal” method of staying in power. Likewise, even though Rwandan president Paul Kagame is also prevented from seeking a third term and his term in office does not expire for another three years, [he hinted last week](#) that he may run in 2017.

### **Transitioning and Then What?**

Transitioning to elections, it seems, is the easy part. Developing and sustaining democracy is proving much more difficult. For every gain, there are multiple instances of political elites actively resisting democratic expansion. Note that even Africa's bright spots have faced significant challenges in maintaining their modest democratic gains. In Senegal, the same Abdoulaye Wade who came to power as a result of the 2000 elections, and whose victory heralded a triumph of democracy, attempted to reinterpret the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in 2012. He was ultimately defeated, but not without [sustained protest and loss of life](#).

In Africa, elections in which incumbent presidents participate [almost always lead to electoral victory for the ruling party](#). Opposition parties are significantly more likely to win in elections in which incumbent presidents do not participate. But if incumbents refuse to step aside, the likelihood of meaningful change, at least in terms of personnel, is minimal.

If elections aren't producing meaningful personnel changes, then what is their purpose? Some have argued that elections held by autocratic regimes [serve different functions](#) than those held by democratic regimes. Rather than providing citizens with a mechanism to hold governments accountable, autocratic elections allow political parties to engage in patronage politics and redistribution of state resources to political supporters on a regular and predictable basis. They also serve to legitimize governments to both domestic and international audiences. What they do not do, however, is lead automatically to democracy.

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## STATE-SPONSORED “VIGILANTISM” IN NIGERIA AND THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a vigilante group established in Borno state in June 2013 to help combat the terrorist group Boko Haram, is currently [participating in the search](#) for the more than 200 girls kidnapped in mid-April from a government secondary school in Chibok. It has been suggested that the Nigerian military mobilize [vigilante groups](#) such as the CJTF in support of its current efforts to defeat Boko Haram, [believed to be responsible](#) for the mass kidnapping. This proposition should be treated with caution because the history of self-policing in Nigeria has an uneven track record. [more...](#)



Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima visits the government secondary school in Chibok on April 21. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## EGYPT FAILING TO STOP ETHIOPIA’S DAM ON THE NILE

By George F. Ward

Three years after the commencement of work on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa’s largest hydropower project, located on the Blue Nile, the project is over [30 percent complete](#). When the dam is finished at the end of 2017, it will add 6,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity to the African grid. Egypt, which depends on the Nile for 95 percent of its water supply, fears that the GERD will seriously threaten the health and livelihoods of its people by reducing the amount of water available to them. Nevertheless, Egypt, which briefly in mid-2013 seemed to be threatening military action, has so far not succeeded in gaining much traction in its campaign to sidetrack or delay the ambitious project. For its part, Ethiopia is busy creating facts on the ground while rejecting Egypt’s arguments. [more...](#)



Construction at the site of the planned Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near Assosa in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, near Sudan, some 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (Source: AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the editor of Africa Watch. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

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Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima visits the government secondary school in Chibok on April 21. (Source: AP.)

## History of Vigilantism in Nigeria

Vigilante groups—also known as self-defense groups or informal policing groups—have frequently emerged in Nigeria as community-level initiatives meant to address chronic insecurity amid state failure to provide adequate and impartial policing services. During the 1980s and 1990s, in response to rising crime rates, there was a significant increase in the number of new vigilante groups, beginning in the southeast of the country, but rapidly spreading to other regions. Groups such as the [Bakassi Boys](#) in Abia, Imo, and Anambra states; the [Vigilante Group of Nigeria](#) in Kaduna; and [O’odua People’s Congress](#) in Lagos patrolled the streets at night in an effort to reduce crime in their local areas. These groups, which officially registered with the government as vigilante groups, were meant to augment existing security services. To this end, official vigilante groups had the ability to arrest suspects but not detain them; instead, they were required to immediately turn over suspects to local authorities. Because they often operated in parallel to the official government, many of these groups received [financial support from local and state](#) governments.

The Bakassi Boys were perhaps one of the best known of the vigilante groups. They formed in late 1990s in response to a series of violent robberies in the city of Aba, Abia state. Within a year, they had drastically reduced crime through their nightly patrols and by apprehending suspected criminals. The governor of nearby state Anambra invited the Bakassi Boys to establish operations in his state to assist in providing security. Initially, the Bakassi Boys were viewed as heroes and enjoyed [widespread popularity](#); however, after the group was accused of innumerable human rights abuses, including “[summary executions, torture, and unlawful detention](#),” and committed several high-profile public executions, including of opponents of the then governor of Anambra, the federal government banned the group’s activities in 2002. It continued [to operate underground](#), and today, there are still [sporadic reports](#) of Bakassi Boys activity in southeast Nigeria.

## The CJTF

The Civilian Joint Task Force is a more recent incarnation in the spirit of previous vigilante groups. Its name derives from the government’s Joint Task Force (JTF) currently deployed to Northern Nigeria to counter Boko Haram. The JTF is a mixed force that includes both military and police officers.

The CJTF has expressed a desire to [work with the Nigerian military](#) in its operations against Boko Haram. The CJTF reportedly counts at least 500 local males as members, all with varying [motivations](#) for joining, including revenge, the desire for peace, and employment. Governor of Borno Kashim Shettima, a member of the national opposition party, explicitly supports the CJTF, and the state government is reportedly paying members [approximately \\$113 per month](#) each

to continue their efforts. In fall 2013, Governor Shettima also sponsored the BOYES (Borno Youths Empowerment Scheme) program, which was established to train an additional 800 vigilante members.

Some have argued that the CJTF is [similar to vigilante groups from northeast in the 2000s](#), such as Ecomog, Sara-Suka, and YanKallare, all of which were assembled by local politicians and used for electioneering purposes. The CJTF reportedly burned down the home of the chairman of the ruling party in June 2013, accusing him of sponsoring Boko Haram activities. Boko Haram seems to take the CJTF seriously—it [declared war against CJTF](#) in a video statement released in mid-June.

## Pros and Cons

It is obvious that counterterrorism efforts in Nigeria will take a multipronged approach, as [recent remarks by National Security Adviser Mohammed Sambo Dasuki](#) indicate. Vigilante groups are uniquely poised to contribute to local security because these groups form in response to specific issues and conditions; are staffed by local volunteers who have knowledge of the community; and often have the trust of the local community, something Nigerian police forces, organized and controlled remotely by the federal government, do not always possess.

But there is the potential for abuse and manipulation of these types of groups. Thus, their inclusion in the state security apparatus must be undertaken cautiously. In the early 2000s, domestic groups such as [CLEEN](#) (formerly the Center for Law Enforcement Education) established programs to connect informal policing services with official state security forces to curtail human rights abuses and the overt manipulation of these groups by political actors. In 2006, the British government, also [concerned about the rise in vigilantism](#) began working with various groups to train and educate them regarding the law and their role in providing justice in Nigeria. These types of programs are essential in preventing vigilantism from taking on less than honorable methods and purposes while promoting security in insecure locales.

If a country can learn lessons from its past, it is not doomed to repeat its mistakes. The inclusion of local communities in security provision is commendable and, given the difficulty Nigeria has had in providing such an essential service to its populace, even necessary. Efforts to properly train the vigilante groups and oversee their activities are crucial to ensuring that additional sources of insecurity are not being added to an already combustible situation.

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By George F. Ward

Three years after the commencement of work on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Africa's largest hydropower project, located on the Blue Nile, the project is over [30 percent complete](#). When the dam is finished at the end of 2017, it will add 6,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity to the African grid. Egypt, which depends on the Nile for 95 percent of its water supply, fears that the GERD will seriously threaten the health and livelihoods of its people by reducing the amount of water available to them. Nevertheless, Egypt, which briefly in mid-2013 seemed to be threatening military action, has so far not succeeded in gaining much traction in its campaign to sidetrack or delay the ambitious project. For its part, Ethiopia is busy creating facts on the ground while rejecting Egypt's arguments.



Construction at the site of the planned Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near Assosa in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, near Sudan, some 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (Source: AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

## Compromise Remains Elusive

When IDA's *Africa Watch* [last looked](#) at the prospects for GERD in November 2013, it appeared unlikely that the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia would result in conflict and somewhat more likely that some sort of regional compromise might resolve the issue. Almost six months later, the military option seems to have faded further, but so have attempts at finding a compromise. In January 2014, a third round of negotiations involving Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan ended in failure when [Egypt withdrew](#), accusing Ethiopia of failing to guarantee Egypt's share of the Nile waters. In April, the Ethiopian foreign ministry rejected an Egyptian proposal for [joint control of the GERD](#), an arrangement that might have involved provision of Egyptian financing for the project.

## Egypt's Strategy

Having failed to negotiate a solution, Egypt is seeking international support in the dispute. Its strategy seems to be proceeding on three tracks. First, Egypt is seeking to cut off international financing for the GERD. According to a report based on [Arab-language media sources](#), the World Bank, the EU, and others have decided to refrain from financing the GERD. On April 9, 2014, the [EU's ambassador to Egypt](#) was reported saying that the EU is not funding the GERD. Although China has not provided financing for the dam, it has pledged to support construction of the [power transmission lines](#). Second, Egypt has [approached Italy through diplomatic channels](#) to ask that the Italian general contractor on the project be obliged to suspend construction until agreement can be reached on modifications to the project. This tactic has not yet been successful. Third, Egypt is exploring the possibility of taking the dispute to the United Nations, either through the Security Council or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Neither of these two options appears promising, as the ICJ normally requires parties in a dispute to agree to binding arbitration, and the Security Council usually sets a fairly high bar before exercising its mandate to consider matters related to international peace and security.

## Ethiopia Moves Forward

Ethiopia has responded effectively to Egypt's tactics, but in ways that carry some economic and political risk. First, Ethiopia has succeeded in winning the [support of Sudan](#), a country that, by the terms of existing treaties dating to 1929 and 1959, shares the rights to the bulk of the waters of the Nile with Egypt. Sudan has sided with Ethiopia on issues related to the structural safety of the dam. In return, however, Sudan may expect to be allowed to take additional downstream water for farm irrigation. If so, this would weaken Ethiopian arguments that the dam will not ultimately reduce the amount of water available to Egypt. Second, Ethiopia has made the decision to [pay for the dam itself](#) if no other sources of financing are available. Since the dam will cost over \$4 billion, roughly equivalent to 12 percent of Ethiopia's GDP, this is quite an



undertaking. So far, Ethiopia has been successful in meeting its financial obligations, having paid around \$1.5 billion. The risk here is that the government, which is requiring banks to lend it 27 percent of their loan books at concessional rates, is crowding out private credit needs. The IMF forecasts that public infrastructure projects such as the GERD have [reduced Ethiopian economic growth](#) by around 1 percent annually.

### Expert Opinions Differ

The division between Egypt and Ethiopia over the GERD is paralleled by dissent among experts. Both countries have publicly asserted that the May 2013 report of the International Panel of Experts supports their position. [A leaked copy](#) of that report, however, suggests that the panel's experts neither fully endorsed nor completely condemned the project. Rather, the panel cited the need for more information on certain aspects and asked for further studies. Analysts at [International Rivers](#), an NGO that often opposes large-scale hydroelectric projects, have been critical of the GERD. On the other hand, [Dr. Ana Cascão](#), a researcher at the Stockholm International Water Institute and an expert on the hydro politics of the Nile basin, largely supports the Ethiopian position.

### Conclusion

Considering the facts as they stand, it appears more and more likely that the GERD will be built, perhaps with some delay, and that Egypt will need to find a way to live with it. Under the historical treaty regime, Egypt has enjoyed rights to abundant water. A sizable portion of that resource has been used inefficiently in water-intensive types of agriculture. Egypt will bolster its case and its bargaining power to the extent that it is able to improve the efficiency with which it uses its increasingly scarce water resources. In addition, to salvage as much as possible from the current situation, Egypt may need to focus now on achieving agreement with Ethiopia on guidelines for filling the dam, to avoid creating shortages downstream, and on limiting use of the waters of the Blue Nile for irrigation.

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the editor of Africa Watch. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

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## CHINA: STEPPING IT UP IN AFRICA

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang wraps up his [four-country tour of Africa this week](#), many observers have noted China's major shift in its Africa policy from one focused largely on economics to one that also encompasses a broader set of political and security goals. It appears that the impetus for this change has been China's realization that its projects and citizens in Africa are vulnerable to the instability that pervades the continent. [more...](#)



Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, left, is welcomed by Ethiopian Premier Hailemariam Desalegn at the Ethiopian Presidential Palace, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Sunday May 4, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE'S MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY

By Alexander Noyes

Morgan Tsvangirai, former prime minister and leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), was ["suspended"](#) from the party on April 26, 2014, for violent and "fascist" tendencies. The attempted leadership ouster was orchestrated by former finance minister and secretary general of MDC-T, Tendai Biti, who heads a rival faction within the party that has been calling for leadership renewal since the party lost to President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in national elections held in July 2013. Tsvangirai immediately denounced his suspension as "illegal," and on April 29, he [announced](#) that Biti had been "expelled" from the party. Regardless of who wins the leadership struggle, the party leadership must unite and reconcile to have any chance of competing for power in 2018 elections. [more...](#)



Morgan Tsvangirai, the main opposition leader in Zimbabwe, addresses people who gathered during Workers Day Celebrations at Gwanzura stadium in Harare. Thursday, May, 1, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## Background

China's history in Africa dates back to Premier Zhou Enlai's long tour from December 1963 to February 1964. But since 2000, the number of its engagements, particularly in economic and development forums, is unprecedented. During this period, however, China has often been criticized for its actions in Africa, which have been [characterized](#) as self-interested, crowding out traditional partners, hollowing out Africa's manufacturing capacity, disrespecting human rights, and disregarding local communities. At the same time, other partners, including the United States, have spent considerable time cultivating favorable partnerships with local communities and investing in local development. It now appears that China is beginning to embrace this philosophy, or at least implement an approach that goes beyond simple economic goals.

## Recent Developments

In his first year, President Xi Jinping pledged [\\$30 billion](#) in loans to African countries, of which approximately [half](#) has been disbursed to date. At first glance, this appears to be simply a continuation of China's old Africa policy. What has changed, however, is the [focus on agricultural and manufacturing industries](#), instead of on the extractive industries. China also appears to be investing more heavily in localized social programs. Examples include funding a new [Multi-Purpose Youth Center](#) in Gaborone, Botswana; furnishing a [classroom block](#) for a primary school in Uganda; and donating [equipment for agriculture](#) practices in Cape Verde. China has also stepped up its environmental-protection actions. At the African Union, Premier Li [committed \\$10 million](#) in free aid for wildlife preservation and to "promote joint research in protecting biological diversity, preventing and controlling desertification and promoting modern agriculture."


## Why Now?

There are numerous plausible explanations for this change. China might simply be responding to the [international outcry](#) following allegations of corruption, labor abuse, and criminal cover-ups. Or this may be a concerted effort to debunk criticisms that China is simply exploiting Africa for its mineral and energy wealth. China may have determined there are reputational risks involved with engaging in countries that most Western governments generally avoid, such as Sudan. It is also possible that the more than [1 million](#) Chinese nationals now residing in Africa are applying more pressure on Beijing to assume a larger role in ensuring their physical security. These may all be contributing factors, but it is more likely that China, hardly the altruistic actor that the aforementioned explanations might imply, is looking to safeguard its growing economic interests throughout Africa.

Since the 1950s, Chinese foreign policy has revolved around the central tenet of [non-intervention](#). It was a noteworthy development, therefore, when one of President Xi Jinping's first actions in office was to deploy 170 *combat* troops from the People's Liberation Army to the UN peacekeeping force in Mali. This was the [first time](#) China deployed combat troops, as opposed to medics or engineers, in support of an African peacekeeping force. Likewise, China is providing increasing levels of support for [anti-piracy operations](#) in the Gulf of Aden, which some [experts](#) believe reflects its acknowledgment of the



Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, left, is welcomed by Ethiopian Premier Hailemariam Desalegn at the Ethiopian Presidential Palace, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sunday May 4, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

The background of the page is a light-colored, semi-transparent map of the African continent. A compass rose is visible in the lower-left corner, and the map shows various geographical features and country names, though they are faint. The overall aesthetic is clean and professional, with a focus on the continent of Africa.

need for heightened security in waters that transport Chinese goods, citizens, and vessels. That this has taken the form of naval exercises with the United States is an important development, given the very few opportunities that currently exist for the United States to cooperate militarily with China. Finally, Zhong Jianhua, China's special representative on African affairs, has taken an active role in peace talks in South Sudan. This is undoubtedly motivated in part by the need to protect China's investments in South Sudan's oil industry, but it nonetheless represents a “[new chapter](#)” in Beijing's foreign policy—one of engaging in Africa's security.

## Looking Ahead

It seems likely that China's change of heart with respect to directly engaging in Africa's political and security affairs is motivated by its need to protect what now totals [\\$25 billion](#) in investments throughout the continent. Nonetheless, this is a welcome change, one that may even create more opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation on the continent, such as a counter-piracy exercise with the Chinese Navy.

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Morgan Tsvangirai, former prime minister and leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), was "[suspended](#)" from the party on April 26, 2014, for violent and "fascist" tendencies. The attempted leadership ouster was orchestrated by former finance minister and secretary general of MDC-T, Tendai Biti, who heads a rival faction within the party that has been calling for leadership renewal since the party lost to President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in national elections held in July 2013. Tsvangirai immediately denounced his suspension as "illegal," and on April 29, he [announced](#) that Biti had been "expelled" from the party. Regardless of who wins the leadership struggle, the party leadership must unite and reconcile to have any chance of competing for power in 2018 elections.



Morgan Tsvangirai, the main opposition leader in Zimbabwe, addresses people who gathered during Workers Day Celebrations at Gwanzura stadium in Harare, Thursday, May, 1, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

Tsvangirai has led the MDC party since its founding in 1999. In 2005, the party split into two factions, the MDC-T, led by Tsvangirai, and another smaller grouping, MDC-N, currently led by Welshman Ncube. After Tsvangirai's strong showing in the first round of the 2008 polls, in which he outpolled Mugabe, ZANU-PF violently cracked down on the opposition. This violence led to Tsvangirai's refusal to stand in the second round and, subsequently, to an uneasy power-sharing government between ZANU-PF and MDC, which was in effect from 2009 to 2013. Since the MDC-T's loss in the July 2013 elections, Tsvangirai's leadership has been questioned and [challenged](#) indirectly a number of times. In announcing the suspension of Tsvangirai and six others, Biti's faction [alleged](#) that under Tsvangirai's leadership the opposition party had taken on the worst traits of ZANU-PF and been "transformed into a fiefdom of the leader." Biti himself [charged](#), "The MDC as we know it has abandoned its original founding values and principles. . . The party has been hijacked by a dangerous fascist clique bent on destroying the same and totally working against the working people of Zimbabwe."

In a quick [response](#), Tsvangirai decried Biti's actions as "illegal, unconstitutional, illegitimate and bogus." Douglas Mwonozora, MDC-T party spokesman and an ally of Tsvangirai's, [added](#), "The MDC leadership cannot be changed by a bunch of desperate power-hungry officials, a minority that cannot win a leadership contest at party congress." Tsvangirai [asserted](#) that Biti and eight other "rebels" had been expelled from the party and "recalled" as members of parliament, arguing that they were "opportunists" and were being manipulated by ZANU-PF. Although a party congress has [reportedly](#) been called for October—both factions appear deadlocked and see themselves as [legally](#) in control of the party—it appears the current leadership crisis is likely to be settled in the courts.

Because the legal system in Zimbabwe, akin to the security sector, is frequently [cited](#) as an ally of Mugabe's and ZANU-PF's, this scenario could provide ZANU-PF with an opportunity to manipulate the outcome in its favor and further foster divisions in the opposition. MDC's internecine struggle is a clear boon to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. As noted in the February 12, 2014, [edition](#) of Africa Watch, due to a variety of factors, namely Mugabe's faltering health and his party's own combative succession struggle, elections in 2018 may provide the opposition with an opportunity to finally beat ZANU-PF at the polls. Given these high stakes, the potential damage from the current leadership crisis could be grave, and efforts to resolve the impasse should be pursued with urgency.

Tsvangirai's position within the party has been weakened by Biti's move, but Biti is unlikely to be able to compete nationally against ZANU-PF without the backing of Tsvangirai and his waning but still considerable popular support base. Regardless of which faction ultimately prevails, the party—and Tsvangirai and Biti in particular—must unite, reconcile,

and get back to the difficult tasks of party-building if the opposition is to have a real chance of success in the next elections. While any lasting solution will have to be brokered locally, international actors could help defuse the situation by urging the two camps within the MDC to come together to pursue a broad-based coalition comprising other opposition parties and civil society actors as well. International assistance would also be valuable for rebuilding grassroots structures that many [argue](#) were neglected during MDC's stint in government.

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## ERITREA—TIME FOR CHANGE?

By George F. Ward

The country of Eritrea in the Horn of Africa has been isolated internationally for over a decade. This status has been due to Eritrea's unresolved conflict with Ethiopia, its role in the destabilization of Somalia, and its poor record of respecting human rights. In recent months, several authoritative observers have suggested that the time may be ripe for new efforts to engage in a dialogue with Eritrea and to resolve its conflict with Ethiopia. Given the policies and actions of the government in Asmara and the deep wounds left by armed conflicts in the region, there is no doubt that such an effort would face significant obstacles. Nevertheless, it is worth assessing the prospects for moving beyond the long-standing impasse. [more...](#)



Eritrea and surrounding countries. (Source: CIA Factbook, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Ethiopia\\_Transportation.jpg/image.jpg](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Ethiopia_Transportation.jpg/image.jpg))

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## SATA STALLS NEW ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTION

By Alexander Noyes

In 2011, then-presidential candidate and populist Michael Sata campaigned vigorously on the need for a new, people-driven Zambian constitution, [promising](#) to deliver a new document in a mere 90 days. After three contentious years in power, President Sata reversed his position in January 2014, [asserting](#) that the draft constitution should not be released to the public or put to a referendum until after the document has been vetted by his cabinet. Sata's reversal and hard-line handling of the constitution-making process is another indication of his administration's strong-arm tendencies, which domestic and international actors have increasingly [decried](#) since his 2011 election. [more...](#)



Zambian president Michael Sata gestures after taking the oath of office on September 23, 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay, File.)

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## A Falling-Out between Rebel Allies

Little more than 15 years ago, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea enjoyed excellent relations based on the alliance of the insurgent groups that seized power in both countries. This relationship [began to cool in 1997](#) when trade differences emerged. The following year, tensions on the border between the two countries erupted into a conflict that lasted for two years and left approximately 100,000 dead or wounded on both sides. Algeria brokered a ceasefire in 2000 and established the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) to arbitrate the exact demarcation line. This effort reached an impasse when Ethiopia refused to delineate the border without bilateral talks with Eritrea, and the latter refused to talk before final agreement on the border.

The dispute between the two countries has had a variety of consequences. The border between them quickly became heavily militarized. Vastly outnumbered by Ethiopia in population, and therefore in potential army conscripts, Eritrea instituted a system of indefinite military service. This system has spawned waves of emigration from Eritrea to Ethiopia, the Gulf States, Israel, and Europe. Ethiopia, having lost its access to the sea through ports in Eritrea, has been forced to develop new trade routes through Djibouti and, to a lesser extent, Sudan. The conflict has had significant regional consequences, with the two countries taking opposite sides in the conflict in Somalia. Eritrea's support for al-Shabaab earned it both United Nations sanctions and designation by the United States as a "state sponsor of terrorism." A useful timeline of significant events in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict may be found in a recent briefing by [Chatham House](#).

## Severe Economic Consequences for Eritrea

In economic terms, the bilateral conflict has been inconvenient, largely in terms of increased shipping costs, for Ethiopia, but disastrous for Eritrea. Eritrea, both because of international sanctions and the autarkic policies of its own government, has been cut off from the global economic system. In Africa-wide studies, Eritrea is often listed as "no data." Even estimates of population are imprecise, ranging from 3.5 to 6 million. The IMF's economic projections for [Eritrea](#) and [Ethiopia](#) in 2014 and 2015 illustrate the contrast (see Table 1). Ethiopia has become one of Africa's fastest growing economies; Eritrea is one of the slowest.



Eritrea and surrounding countries. (Source: CIA Factbook, [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Ethiopia\\_Transportation.jpg/image.jpg](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Ethiopia_Transportation.jpg/image.jpg).)

**Table 1. IMF Economic Projections for Eritrea and Ethiopia**

Year	Projected Growth (percent)			
	Real GDP		Consumer Prices	
	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Ethiopia
2014	2.3	7.5	12.3	6.2
2015	1.9	7.5	12.3	7.8

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## A Call for Change

In the midst of this situation, Ambassador (ret.) Herman J. (Hank) Cohen, a widely respected authority on Africa, suggested in December 2013 that it is time to “[bring Eritrea in from the cold](#).” Cohen argued that because Eritrea seems to have abandoned its support of al-Shabaab, the UN sanctions imposed on the basis of that support should be lifted. Two of Ambassador Cohen’s senior colleagues, [Princeton Lyman](#), a former ambassador and presidential special envoy, and [David Shinn](#), a former ambassador to Ethiopia, have supported Cohen’s argument. Both Lyman and Shinn have also pointed out, on the basis of their experience, how difficult it can be to deal with the regime in Asmara. Another keen observer of the African scene, Tony Carroll of Manchester Trade, has contributed to the dialogue by noting [eight potential business benefits](#) that would accrue from the resumption of economic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The initial [response](#) in January 2014 by the Ethiopian foreign ministry to Cohen’s suggestion was not promising. A posting on the ministry’s website argued that a change in the relationship with Eritrea could “only come after a visible change of attitude in Eritrea, with implementation of a fundamental shift in attitude, an end to all aggressive policies . . . .” Since the ministry’s statement, rumors of indirect contacts between the two countries have circulated, but these have been [denied by both sides](#). Yet rumors persist, sustained in part by the fact that Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn went on the record in December 2012, shortly after he assumed office, in support of bilateral contacts. At the time, he said to the [al-Jazeera network](#): “If you ask me, ‘Do you want to go to Asmara and sit down and negotiate with Isaias Afewerki?’ Then I will say, ‘yes.’”

## Prospects for the Future

Given the record of the past, it is difficult to be optimistic about the future of the Ethiopia-Eritrea relationship. Both governments are deeply entrenched in their positions, so moving beyond the impasse would involve some political costs, at least in the short term. On the other hand, both countries may have interests that would be served by some degree of normalization of relations. As an emerging regional power, Ethiopia has an interest in stability. A fall into chaos by Eritrea, however satisfying to the Ethiopian hierarchy on some level, might not serve that interest. If the political cost were not too high, clearing away the border dispute and regaining access to Eritrean ports might have some value. Eritrea’s dire economic situation is probably the main motivator for that country. An end to Eritrea’s economic isolation would provide access to markets in Ethiopia and elsewhere and might be a factor in attracting investments to improve the country’s decrepit infrastructure.

Although there may be a role for the United States in resolving the impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea, that role may be limited because Eritrea sees the United States as largely to blame for the sanctions regime. The [Chatham House briefing](#) suggests roles for others, including the European Union, Turkey, Qatar, and South Africa, in bringing the parties together. Given the difficulties of the task, success will probably require a coordinated effort.

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In 2011, then-presidential candidate and populist Michael Sata campaigned vigorously on the need for a new, people-driven Zambian constitution, [promising](#) to deliver a new document in a mere 90 days. After three contentious years in power, President Sata reversed his position in January 2014, [asserting](#) that the draft constitution should not be released to the public or put to a referendum until after the document has been vetted by his cabinet. Sata's reversal and hard-line handling of the constitution-making process is another indication of his administration's strong-arm tendencies, which domestic and international actors have increasingly [decried](#) since his 2011 election.



Zambian president Michael Sata gestures after taking the oath of office on September 23, 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay, File.)

The Technical Committee tasked with writing a new constitution, which was [appointed](#) by Sata and chaired by former Chief Justice Annel Silungwe, finished the public consultation process and draft document in late October 2013. Seemingly unhappy that a number of the draft provisions devolved power away from the executive—[namely](#), a clause requiring presidential candidates to win an absolute majority of votes (50 percent plus 1) and a provision allowing the constitutional court to consider cases against the executive—Sata has been delaying and stonewalling its release since then.

Although the Technical Committee was charged with delivering the draft to the president and the public [concurrently](#), in January 2014 Sata declared that the draft document would not be released to the public, [arguing](#) vaguely, “it’s clear that the well-intended process has been hijacked to embarrass, humiliate and politically undermine the will and interest of the majority of Zambians.” His office further [contended](#), “the country already has a functional constitution and the state will not be pushed into fast and reckless conclusions by individuals with dubious agendas.” At the end of March, Sata reportedly [dismissed](#) the Technical Committee.

Sata's about-face on the constitution has prompted firm push-back from a broad coalition of opposition and civil society groups, including members of [parliament](#), churches, and youth organizations. Over the past two months, a number of demonstrations have been launched to protest the president's actions, with Sata responding in a heavy-handed manner. In mid-March, over 40 youth protesters were [detained](#) for demonstrating in favor of the release of the draft, and on March 30, a Catholic bishop [alleged](#) that he received a threatening call from Sata, warning him to stay out of the tense debate surrounding the constitution. As noted in the August 14, 2013, [edition](#) of Africa Watch, this forceful response reflects a broader trend under Sata's rule—leaders of the two main opposition parties have been [arrested](#) several times over the past two years, media freedoms have been curtailed, and Sata has used violence surrounding local elections to crack down on those opposed to his rule.

Sata's mishandling of the constitution-making process and his administration's hard-line tactics and tendencies may be [backfiring](#) politically. The recent heated debate about the constitution has galvanized opposition parties and civil society groups to come [together](#) under one banner to demand the release of the draft and challenge Sata's undemocratic actions. This coalition—reportedly [comprising](#) over 300 groups and organizations, including 16 opposition parties—has become progressively emboldened and active, [announcing](#) the formation of new organizational structures in March and just last month [requesting](#) a meeting with Sata to discuss how to move forward on the constitution. Regardless of how the current impasse over the constitution plays out, this umbrella group could become a real threat to Sata and his Patriotic Front party in 2016 elections, especially if the alliance is able to remain relatively cohesive and unified.

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Alexander Noyes is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## POACHING: FROM CONSERVATION CONCERN TO SECURITY THREAT

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

The ivory trade was once regulated for wildlife conservation; now its regulation is necessary to prevent the funding of terrorist and rebel groups, organized criminal syndicates, and corrupt [government officials](#). Today, conflict, crime, and corruption fuel the ivory trade to such an extent that Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), said that the trade generates [\\$8–\\$10 billion](#) annually, ranking it alongside the trafficking of human beings, arms, and drugs in terms of illicit profits. [more...](#)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



Kenyan officials display some of more than 1,600 pieces of illegal ivory found hidden inside bags of sesame seeds in freight traveling from Uganda, in Kenya's major port city of Mombasa. (AP Photo)

## RESPONDING TO TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: FANNING THE FLAMES?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Boko Haram, a loose amalgamation of several groups of Islamist terrorists, has operated in northeastern Nigeria for over a decade. Most recently, Boko Haram has escalated its offensive activities, as evidenced by attacks in Chibok, Abuja, Kaduna, and Jos. The Nigerian government's response to the threat posed by Boko Haram has been inconsistent, contradictory, ineffective, and, in some cases, inflammatory. While the group most certainly has the potential [to affect the outcome of the 2015 elections](#), Boko Haram's most significant effect may be to cast a spotlight on the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian government. [more...](#)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses



Nigeria President, Goodluck Jonathan, is pictured on a billboard, in Abuja, Nigeria, May 6, 2014. (AP Photo/ Sunday Alamba)

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# POACHING: FROM CONSERVATION CONCERN TO SECURITY THREAT

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

The ivory trade was once regulated for wildlife conservation; now its regulation is necessary to prevent the funding of terrorist and rebel groups, organized criminal syndicates, and corrupt [government officials](#). Today, conflict, crime, and corruption fuel the ivory trade to such an extent that Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), said that the trade generates [\\$8–\\$10 billion](#) annually, ranking it alongside the trafficking of human beings, arms, and drugs in terms of illicit profits.

## The Culprits

Ivory is a well-documented source of income for several of Africa's most notorious [insurgent and terrorist groups](#), such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Lord's Resistance Army, and Darfur's Janjaweed. Government officials are also [alleged](#) to be involved in some cases. Even some [U.S.-trained African armies](#), such as those of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and newly independent South Sudan, have been implicated in poaching and trafficking ivory. [Poorly paid government soldiers](#) exploit their access to [military-grade weapons and equipment](#), such as AK-47s, grenade launchers, night vision goggles, and helicopters, to slaughter elephants en masse. Although they are sometimes well armed, park rangers cannot compete with the military's superior equipment.

## The Consumer

Experts estimate that approximately [70 percent](#) of illegal African ivory is trafficked to China, where a burgeoning middle class can increasingly afford coveted ivory products. The demand is so high that one tusk, with a bush value in the DRC of perhaps \$100, will retail for as much as [\\$3,000 in China](#). This great profit is an incentive for all those involved—the local shooter, the agent who sells the ivory, the organized crime group that traffics it abroad, and the dealer who sells it in Beijing.

China's expanding footprint and increasing economic relationships in Africa have, unfortunately, facilitated some of this activity. Chinese mining and timber operations in places such as the DRC have necessitated the [construction of roads](#), facilitating poachers' access to previously remote areas. Likewise, criminal syndicates are taking advantage of the increased legal trade between Africa and Asia to conceal illegal ivory (among other protected wildlife products) in legitimate cargo.

## What Can Be Done?

Stemming the flow of any illicit trade is difficult. An approach that focuses on reducing supply by targeting traffickers and dealers may render the trade even more lucrative for the most effective criminals who are able to evade law enforcement. [Research](#) has already shown that the value of ivory has increased greatly in the last decade due to natural market forces associated with supply and demand. Reducing demand, another approach, is currently being tested in China, where the nongovernmental organization "Save the Elephants" is working with influential celebrities such as basketball player [Yao Ming](#) to highlight the cruelty of the illegal ivory trade and discourage youths from purchasing ivory trinkets.

An approach that targets poachers in Africa while reducing demand in China could be the most effective, yet most difficult. To investigate cases and prosecute criminals, judicial institutions must be strengthened. Some novel approaches,



Kenyan officials display some of more than 1,600 pieces of illegal ivory found hidden inside bags of sesame seeds in freight traveling from Uganda, in Kenya's major port city of Mombasa. (AP Photo)

such as that of South Africa, which placed anti-poaching under the military's purview instead of law enforcement's, seem to be working well and demonstrate genuine political will on behalf of the government. Namibia's creation of [community-based nature conservatories](#), which has imparted a deeper understanding of the negative consequences of poaching on local communities, has also been an effective approach. Advances in [technology](#), such as testing the amount of carbon-14 found in ivory to determine whether it was harvested before or after the 1989 trade ban, are also helping to identify illegally traded ivory and provide evidence that authorities may use to prosecute perpetrators.

## Conclusion

There is broad consensus among experts that African poaching rates are higher than ever and show no signs of abating. It is [estimated](#), for example, that between 35,000 and 50,000 elephants may have been killed in 2013. At this rate, poaching can no longer be considered just an ecological atrocity, but, with profits going to criminal and terrorist enterprises, also a major threat to security in Africa.

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# RESPONDING TO TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: FANNING THE FLAMES?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Boko Haram, a loose amalgamation of several groups of Islamist terrorists, has operated in northeastern Nigeria for over a decade. Most recently, Boko Haram has escalated its offensive activities, as evidenced by attacks in Chibok, Abuja, Kaduna, and Jos. The Nigerian government's response to the threat posed by Boko Haram has been inconsistent, contradictory, ineffective, and, in some cases, inflammatory. While the group most certainly has the potential [to affect the outcome of the 2015 elections](#), Boko Haram's most significant effect may be to cast a spotlight on the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian government.



Nigeria President, Goodluck Jonathan, is pictured on a billboard, in Abuja, Nigeria, May 6, 2014. (AP Photo/ Sunday Alamba)

## Nigerian Taliban

Initially referred to as the [Nigerian Taliban](#), the group formed after the country transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999. Led then by Mohammed Yusef, it demanded the overthrow of the Nigerian state, a stricter imposition of sharia law (some variant of which had already been adopted by 12 Northern states), and the cessation of Western-style (read non-Quranic) education. Boko Haram's primary targets were security forces and moderate Islamic clerics who were critical of the group's fundamentalist message. Then-president Umaru Yar'Adua, himself a Northern Muslim, [appealed to the country's Muslim population](#) to help the state fight against extremism.

## Escalation of Attacks

In July 2009, Yusuf was [killed in police custody](#). Although the Nigerian government claimed victory against Boko Haram at the time—the group did briefly cease operations—in January 2010 members regrouped and emerged stronger than ever. It is primarily a Northern phenomenon and its operational strengths certainly lie in the North, but it has from time to time engaged in attacks in central Nigeria. Most recently, the group took responsibility for a series of [bombings](#) in the federal capital Abuja in April.

Boko Haram has a long record of violent attacks in Nigeria that predate the recent kidnappings in Chibok of close to 300 schoolgirls. Before the 2011 election, Boko Haram was, as catalogued by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), responsible for a [host of activities, including](#) the deaths of security forces in Yobe, Borno, and Bauchi; a prison attack that led to the release of hundreds of Boko Haram members; the politically salient deaths of the Borno State speaker of the assembly, an opposition party vice chairman, and several other local aspirants; the deaths of prominent clerics; attacks on mosques and churches; and multiple explosions in Jos in December 2010 that killed more than 30 people. After the 2011 election, the group continued its activities, killing 25 in a beer garden in Maiduguri; 23 in a bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja; and at least 63 in a car bombing in Yobe. On Christmas Eve 2011, Boko Haram coordinated an attack on churches in five cities across the country. In early 2012, the group was believed to be responsible for the deaths of at least 185 in a large-scale bombing attack of police stations in Kano. Boko Haram has expanded its targets to markets, newspaper offices, and schools. The situation had become so dire that in May 2013, the government declared a state of emergency in three states—Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. This state of emergency has now been extended twice by the legislature.

In April 2014, almost 300 female students were kidnapped in Chibok from a public boarding school. Their plight has captured international attention. Since their abduction, additional scores have been killed in blasts in Abuja, Kano, and Jos.

## Government Response

Unfortunately, the government's response to Boko Haram thus far has been inconsistent, contradictory, and ineffective. The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan until recently seems to have taken an "ignore publicly, engage militarily" approach to combatting Boko Haram, to little effect. In 2011, there were calls for talks to be held and perhaps amnesty offered to some members, but Jonathan chose to take a hard-line approach, [refusing to engage with the group](#), even though the government had previously adopted an [amnesty program for insurgents in the Niger Delta](#) in 2009.

In some cases, the government has given in to the group's demands without explicitly acknowledging doing so. For example, after a series of Boko Haram attacks on schools, the [government responded by closing 85 schools in Borno state](#) in March 2014, which affected 120,000 students. An oppressive state of emergency exists in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe that threatens to become indefinite, with no end in sight to the insurgency. As part of the emergency procedures put in place, [cell phone service was disrupted](#) in much of the region in 2013 and an overnight curfew established.

The northern region was already ripe for extremism before the state of emergency due to its comparative underdevelopment and seeming government neglect. Now, with fewer services and less freedom, it is hard to see how the situation can improve. In addition, there are rumors that the federal government has designs on a [complete takeover](#) of one or more of the Northern state governments, although Goodluck Jonathan has publicly [denied](#) this to be the case.

The Chibok case only magnifies the government's miscues in dealing with Boko Haram. It took [more than 2 weeks](#) for the government to respond to the situation. The day after the abduction, the military stated that it had recovered all the girls and then was forced to retract its statement when this proved to be false. The president's wife, Patience Jonathan, dismissed protesters, suggesting [the kidnapping was a hoax](#) to discredit her husband. Goodluck Jonathan planned and subsequently [canceled a trip to Chibok](#) in mid-May, saying that visiting the city would not help bring the missing girls back. There are rumors that his security could not be guaranteed in the area. His office has vacillated on whether or not it would negotiate for the girls' release.

Making matters worse, Boko Haram has been hitting the same targets multiple times (Abuja, Chibok) in quick succession, demonstrating the government's inability to provide security even after an attack. Amid this deteriorating security situation, internal problems within the military are beginning to manifest themselves. Last week in Borno, [soldiers mutinied](#), reportedly frustrated with the government's ineffective response to Boko Haram.

While the situation may seem intractable, there are a few approaches that President Jonathan has not yet taken that might help the government gain traction in the fight against Boko Haram. First, the federal government [has not coordinated its efforts](#) with those of key Northern politicians such as the governors of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The government has also not, at least publicly, engaged in a dialog with members of Boko Haram, which [some civil society groups are insisting](#) is the only way to stop the carnage. Finally, the president has thus far been silent on whether he intends to participate in the 2015 elections. Saying nothing has only fanned the current flames of conflict and insecurity in the North. Perhaps it is time for him to make a statement on this critical issue.

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
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## MALI—2012 ALL OVER AGAIN?

By George F. Ward

Renewed fighting broke out between the Malian army and Tuareg rebels on May 17, 2014, during a visit by Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara to the separatist stronghold of Kidal in northern Mali. Days later, on May 21 and 22, an attempt by the Malian army to take control of Kidal was repulsed by a coalition of Tuareg separatist groups. After initially claiming that the Malian army had lost 20 killed and 30 wounded, Malian Defense Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga, who has since resigned, [admitted on state television](#) that there had been 50 deaths and 40 wounded. The scale of the fighting is reminiscent of that in January 2012, when an alliance of Tuareg rebels and Islamic extremist fighters [defeated the Malian army](#) in the country's North, leading to the fall of the government in a military coup. Despite the similarities to 2012, there are also a number of factors that provide hope a larger conflict may be averted. [more...](#)



Mali population centers under rebel control, shown in red. (Source: CIA Factbook and Stratfor, "Mali's Tuareg Rebels Threaten Regional Security Efforts," May 23, 2014.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at IDA. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

## MALAWI: TENSIONS AS PARTIAL RECOUNT DELAYS ELECTION RESULTS

By Alexander Noyes

On May 20, 2014, Malawi held presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. The presidential poll, the fifth since the transition to multiparty politics in 1993, was [expected](#) to be close. It was contested by incumbent President Joyce Banda of the People's Party and 11 other candidates, including Peter Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), brother of the late president Bingu wa Mutharika. Despite efforts to [improve](#) Malawi's electoral process in the run-up to the vote, a number of irregularities and delays marred the poll, leading to a tense week of violent [protests](#), [allegations](#) of vote rigging, a failed attempt by Banda to [annul](#) the vote, and conflicting court orders. [more...](#)



Background from left to right, Chief Justice Richard Banda, his wife, Malawi President Joyce Banda, and younger sister Anjimile Mtila-Oponyo join a voting queue to cast their votes in the eastern district of Zomba, Malawi, Tuesday, May 20, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Raphael Tenthani.)

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### About IDA

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
## Renewed Fighting and a Cease-fire

As in 2012, a coalition of Tuareg separatist groups came together militarily in Kidal. The [three principal Tuareg groups](#) are the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUC), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA). Following their success there, the Tuaregs went on to take [control of most of the main towns](#) in northern Mali with the exception of Gao and Timbuktu. Unlike in 2012, the Tuareg groups have not, at least publicly, allied themselves with Islamic extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), or Ansar Dine. Lack of evidence of direct Islamist involvement in the action at Kidal did not, however, stop protesters in Bamako from [denouncing the alleged participation](#) of AQIM, MUJAO, and other Islamist groups in the fighting. Thanks to the efforts of Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the current chairperson of the African Union, and UN Special Representative Albert Koenders, [a cease-fire was signed](#) on May 23. This agreement has held since then.

## The Roles of External Players

Neither of the two external military forces present in Mali intervened in support of the Malian army's move against Kidal. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which maintains a presence in Kidal, limited itself to providing medical treatment and sanctuary to Malian soldiers involved in the conflict. On May 20, UN representative Koenders provided an [even-handed assessment](#) of the situation to the UN Security Council. The priority, said Koenders, was "to pull Kidal back from the brink of renewed confrontation. It is absolutely imperative that all actions are taken to avoid further violence." While France sent 100 reinforcements to join its contingent in Mali, it also distanced itself from the Malian government's decision to move against Kidal. Gerard Araud, French Ambassador to the UN, said in a [tweet](#) that the Malian government informed "neither MINUSMA nor the French Serval [designation for the French force in Mali]. It is a Malian affair."

The Malian army's latest defeat illustrates the challenge that Mali's international partners face in helping to upgrade that force's capabilities. Conventional wisdom in Bamako ascribed the army's defeat in 2012 to the lack of adequate weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Since then, the army has added [4,000 additional soldiers](#). The governments of France and the United States and the European Union have all contributed to the effort to train and equip the Malian force. Despite these efforts, Tuareg forces were able to capture a number of Malian army armored vehicles, artillery, and



Mali population centers under rebel control, shown in red. (Source: CIA Factbook and Stratfor, "Mali's Tuareg Rebels Threaten Regional Security Efforts," May 23, 2014.)

tactical vehicles during the recent fighting at Kidal. Photographs show Tuareg fighters with captured armored personnel carriers, a howitzer, and French-supplied tactical vehicles bearing the insignia of one of the four combined arms groups that have been [trained by the European Union](#).

## The Islamist Factor

A great deal has been written about the connections or lack thereof between Tuareg groups and Islamic extremists. Before the conflict of 2012, various groups claiming to speak for the Tuareg disavowed any linkage between their community and groups such as AQIM. For example, in a statement on October 20, 2011, the [Conference on Tamasheq Unity](#) said, "It is important to note that so far no sincere, and credible evidence has established a reliable link between the Tuareg community and the terrorist group of AQIM. Everything is different between these two entities." That sort of position became less tenable when the Tuaregs and Islamists joined in a military alliance, albeit transitory, in early 2012.

A second school of thought recognizes the existence of mutually supporting relationships between the Islamists and the Tuareg, but characterizes most of the Islamist groups as alien to heterodox, Sufi Mali. In this view, the [AQIM strategy for Mali](#) is to maintain access to the North of the country as a base from which to infiltrate Algeria and other North African states.

A third view goes further, asserting that since 2007, AQIM has skillfully pursued a strategy of embedding itself in the culture and economy of northern Mali. According to [Morten Bøås](#), a researcher with wide field experience, "AQIM should not just be viewed as a predatory, external force in northern Mali, but also as an actor that has managed to integrate into local communities over time." Bøås and others sharing this view note that the income from trafficking, kidnapping, and allied activities has become a significant factor in the economy of impoverished northern Mali. Kidal, which is only a day's journey from Algeria across the desert, has become an important node for smuggling cigarettes and trafficking of persons to European and Mediterranean countries. All in all, this view seems to be the most useful in understanding the current situation.

## A Difficult Path Ahead

In 2012, the Malian army's military defeat produced an unstable situation in which a single triggering event—an army mutiny—morphed into a military coup and a near disaster that was averted only by outside intervention. In the current situation, the cease-fire agreement and the presence of MINUSMA and French forces may help avert another crisis of the Malian state. Nevertheless, the situation is fraught with difficulties:

- France would like to draw down its force in Mali, but the continued existence of a significant Islamic extremist threat in northern Mali limits its ability to do so.
- The UN's MINUSMA remains understrength and incapable of providing security across its assigned area. There is little prospect that it will be able to assume the missions currently covered by the French forces.
- The Malian army, staffed and led primarily by Southerners, is not effective in the North, and will not become so in the near future.
- Tuareg grievances, which are primarily economic and social, will continue to fester unless they are more effectively addressed by the government in Bamako. Conversely, a successful reconciliation effort combined with substantial economic assistance to the North could be successful in winning over at least a portion of the fractious Tuareg population while also limiting the appeal of Islamic extremist groups such as AQIM. In March, the Malian parliament established a [Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission](#) with a three-year term. This commission is a promising development, but only a first step.

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Background from left to right, Chief Justice Richard Banda, his wife, Malawi President Joyce Banda, and younger sister Anjimile Mtila-Oponyo join a voting queue to cast their votes in the eastern district of Zomba, Malawi, Tuesday, May 20, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Raphael Tenthani.)

With 30 percent of the votes counted, on Friday, May 23, the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) released preliminary results showing Banda with only 23 percent of the votes cast, coming in second behind the DPP's candidate, Peter Mutharika, who garnered 42 percent. Peter Mutharika served as foreign minister under the administration of his brother, Bingu wa Mutharika, and attempted to thwart Banda's succession to the presidency in 2012 after his brother died in office. Peter Mutharika is currently on trial for [treason](#) for these actions. A parallel vote tabulation by a local observer mission, the Malawi Electoral Support Network, reported even less promising numbers for Banda. Extrapolating from the official results, the group [projected](#) that Peter Mutharika would receive an estimated 32.7 to 39.3 percent of the vote, Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party between 25.1 to 31.7 percent, with Banda coming in third with a mere 18.2 to 21.8 percent.

In a sharp departure from the usual script of opposition parties claiming the incumbents rigged the vote, Banda, the sitting president, cited fraud and a variety of [alleged](#) irregularities, including multiple voting, tampered ballots, and computer hacking of the electronic system used to transmit results to the MEC. Another candidate, Atupele Muluzi of the United Democratic Front and son of former Malawian president Bakili Muluzi, [voiced](#) similar allegations. Although Banda did not mention Mutharika by name, he [responded](#) to the allegations: "People have spoken through a fair and credible election... there is no way the DPP can rig elections. I have heard nowhere in the world where an opposition rigs an election."

Citing these "rampant irregularities," on Saturday, May 24, Banda surprised the nation by attempting to [annul](#) the poll and reschedule fresh elections within 90 days, [announcing](#): "I am nullifying the elections, using the powers invested in me by the Malawi constitution... I want to give Malawians an opportunity to choose a candidate of their choice in a free and fair manner. When elections are to be held again, I will be stepping aside." This attempt at nullification was quickly reversed later that same day by the High Court, which [ruled](#) she did not have the constitutional authority to annul the vote. Although Mutharika initially succeeded in winning an [injunction](#) against a full recount of the vote by the MEC, on May 26 the High Court ruled in favor of a partial manual recount in 42 polling stations where the most egregious anomalies are alleged to have taken place. The BBC [reported](#) that in one constituency, 38,000 voters were registered, yet 184,000 actual votes were reported.

What caused Banda—a darling of international donors until she recently became [tainted](#) by a multimillion dollar corruption scandal known as "cashgate"—to attempt to annul an election that did not go in her favor? Although some have [cited](#) Banda's decision not to run in the new election she attempted to call as evidence that this was not a typical power grab, her motives were unlikely to be wholly beneficent. As alluded to by Kim Yi [Dionne](#) and argued by Simon [Allison](#), it is possible that Banda, realizing her political career was over, attempted to save herself from likely prosecution for

cashgate under a Peter Mutharika administration by annulling the vote and then negotiating a deal with one of the other leading candidates.

The court ruling for a partial recount could reportedly [delay](#) the release of the election results by up to two months, an interregnum that has the potential to further exacerbate tensions. If Mutharika does not prevail in the final tally, protests by his supporters are almost certain. In the current high-stakes atmosphere, such protests could easily turn violent. Despite high tensions and the potential for post-election violence, two positive developments can be salvaged from the current situation: the independence and nonpartisan stance of the military and the courts. The military has [vowed](#) not to intervene, and, as highlighted by Stephanie Burchard in the March 13, 2014, [edition](#) of Africa Watch, Malawi's judiciary has demonstrated increasing autonomy since 2009, a trend that has fortunately continued through the current crisis thus far.

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## RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA – CULTURALLY ROOTED

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Religiously motivated insurgencies in Mali and Nigeria and Islamic terrorist attacks in the Horn of Africa have captured the world's attention. In an era when terrorism and religious extremism seem to dominate international security and geopolitics, much of the reporting on religion in sub-Saharan Africa focuses on radical Islamic groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia. Conflicts in the Central African Republic and Sudan have also been characterized as religious in nature, although a [deeper examination](#) suggests these conflicts have roots in ethnicity and competition for natural resources. Significantly less attention is paid to the prevalence of religious tolerance, which is far more common in Africa than religious extremism. If the nature of religion in sub-Saharan Africa were understood better by the continent's international partners, they might find ways to employ it as a tool to promote unity and harmony in a region typified by conflict and discord. [more...](#)



Relatives of people killed in the 2002 Joola ferry disaster attend an interfaith prayer ceremony at a Joola cemetery containing 140 unmarked graves, in Mbao, outside Dakar, Senegal. (Source: AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## WHEN THE STATE FAILS TO PROVIDE: INNOVATION IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Governments are expected to provide their citizenries with basic public goods such as security, infrastructure, and some level of social development assistance. The particular demands of a populace, however, vary based on context and need. In some sub-Saharan African countries, the governments have failed to provide necessary public goods and services. Government failure of this nature is exemplified by the dearth of [navigable roads and inadequate electricity provision](#); the deteriorating security situations in countries such as [Nigeria](#), [Central African Republic](#), and [South Sudan](#); and the abysmal performance of public education even in better governed states such as [South Africa](#). These failures, despite the burdens placed on citizens, have created the opportunity for nongovernmental entities to address governance shortfalls, resulting in some innovative approaches to security and development. [more...](#)



Customers make money transfers at an M-Pesa counter in Nairobi, Kenya, as others wait outside. (Source: AP Photo/Sayyid Abdul Azim.)

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Relatives of people killed in the 2002 Joola ferry disaster attend an interfaith prayer ceremony at a Joola cemetery containing 140 unmarked graves, in Mbao, outside Dakar, Senegal. (Source: AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell.)

## Background

Understanding the role of religion in African societies is complicated by the fact that many Africans practice syncretism, or the [combination of multiple belief systems](#). Although studies typically divide African populations into three religious groups—Christian, Muslim, and indigenous beliefs—the reality is that many Africans embrace aspects of two or more religions. Many [experts](#) cite this mixing of religions to explain the prevalence of religious tolerance among Africans. They also view the polytheistic nature of most indigenous religions as conducive to an inclusive approach to other faiths. For example, such religious tolerance has come to distinguish Senegal and Sierra Leone from those African countries affected by religious conflict.

## Senegal

The West African country of Senegal is not only free of significant religiously motivated conflict, but it is also widely touted as one of the more stable democracies in Africa. What then, sets Senegal apart from other African countries that are beleaguered by religious militancy? As one of the region's predominantly Muslim countries, Senegal is known for Sufism, a form of tolerant Islam. Some [experts](#) attribute Senegal's relative political stability and the absence of religious militancy to the positive influence of Sufism in all aspects of religious, economic, and social life. This is in stark contrast to Nigeria, which since 2009 has experienced an upsurge in [religious violence](#) at the hands of Boko Haram. Likewise in Northern Mali, the 2012 insurgency, initially begun by Tuareg separatists, ultimately took on a religious flavor once Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA/MUJAO) became involved. In contrast, religion in Senegal [has facilitated a system of social cohesion](#) that transcends ethnic and regional divisions. Sufi institutions have proven to be effective conduits for mediating state-society relations.

## Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, religion was not a factor in its civil war, which was motivated by corruption and competition for access to the country's alluvial diamonds. In fact, Sierra Leone, where a significant number of citizens identify themselves as "[ChrisMus](#)," or practitioners of both Islam and Christianity, is well known for its religious tolerance. Although there are deep divisions in Sierra Leonean society, these are drawn largely along [ethnic and regional](#) lines rather than religious ones. That the current president, Ernest Bai Koroma, a Christian, was elected by a population in which Christians comprise only [10 percent](#) is a testament to Sierra Leone's religious tolerance.

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## Beyond Senegal and Sierra Leone

While Senegal and Sierra Leone stand out as examples of religious tolerance, the pervasiveness of this attitude throughout sub-Saharan Africa is striking. [Pew survey data from 2010](#) show that sub-Saharan Africa is among the most religious regions of the world. In many countries, roughly nine out of 10 people say religion is very important in their lives. Moreover, the data demonstrate that the majority of respondents in over half the countries surveyed trust people with different religious values different from their own. Majorities in all countries in the Pew survey also believe that the freedom to practice one's religion is important. In most countries, majorities say that it would be acceptable for one's political leader to practice a different religion. These data suggest that religious tolerance is widespread in sub-Saharan Africa.

## Conclusion

Insurgencies, violence, and human rights violations conducted in the name of religion do not accurately characterize religion in Africa. Even conflicts that have been frequently portrayed as religiously motivated, such as those in Central African Republic and Sudan, have roots in other causes. Large numbers of Africans tolerate, and even embrace, the beliefs and practices of other religions. This feature of African society should be studied further to determine whether, and how, religious tolerance could be leveraged to help address more sensitive cultural issues and divisions.

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Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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# WHEN THE STATE FAILS TO PROVIDE: INNOVATION IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Governments are expected to provide their citizenries with basic public goods such as security, infrastructure, and some level of social development assistance. The particular demands of a populace, however, vary based on context and need. In some sub-Saharan African countries, the governments have failed to provide necessary public goods and services. Government failure of this nature is exemplified by the dearth of [navigable roads and inadequate electricity provision](#); the deteriorating security situations in countries such as [Nigeria](#), [Central African Republic](#), and [South Sudan](#); and the abysmal performance of public education even in better governed states such as [South Africa](#). These failures, despite the burdens placed on citizens, have created the opportunity for nongovernmental entities to address governance shortfalls, resulting in some innovative approaches to security and development.



Customers make money transfers at an M-Pesa counter in Nairobi, Kenya, as others wait outside. (Source: AP Photo/Sayid Abdul Azim.)

## Security and Information

After the post-election violence in Kenya broke out in late December 2007 and spread across the country, [bloggers and technologists](#) came together to create software that would allow individuals throughout the country to report firsthand on instances of violence. These reports were then aggregated onto a physical map. [Ushahidi](#), as the software came to be known, crowdsourced local information collected from cell phones and Internet technology to disseminate information in a timely fashion.

Part of the impetus for the creation of the software was the lack of information being reported by the government and traditional media sources on the nature and extent of the violence. Ushahidi, Swahili for “testimony,” created a more comprehensive and more accurate picture of the nature of violence as it was occurring, allowing for a quicker and more targeted response. Use of the platform has spread to other countries and regions. For example, individuals in [Haiti](#) were able to use the same technology to provide the location of survivors of the 2010 earthquake to search-and-rescue teams. Countries such as Liberia and Nigeria have also adapted the technology for their own elections, allowing individuals a mechanism for reporting election-related offenses.

In countries such as [Nigeria](#), the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, local communities have begun to provide for their own security as a response to crime and the perception of partiality by existing security services. These community groups, referred to as self-policing units, self-defense forces, or vigilante groups, are a direct result of government failure to provide the most essential of services: security. In the short term, they may improve security situations, as was the case of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria. Nevertheless, because they are a reflection of fundamental government failures and generally operate in an environment in which the government is not present, they can end up exacerbating already problematic and tense situations.

## Economic Infrastructure

Some African governments also have failed to ensure the provision of infrastructure and institutions that are essential for development. For example, many Kenyans do not have access to formal banks or the necessary minimum capital to open and sustain an account. In response, Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecommunications firm, in 2007 unveiled [M-Pesa](#), a mobile banking service that allows individuals to transfer funds using their cellular phone accounts at authorized retail outlets. M-Pesa fills a gap in infrastructure and essential services by piggybacking on the existing networks of authorized shops for its cell service (approximately 40,000 agents in 2013), providing a viable alternative for those who cannot access banking services. Within the first few months of its launch, M-Pesa had over 1 million registered accounts; by March 2013 [Safaricom reported](#) that 17 million Kenyans used its service.

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In Ethiopia, local communities frequently come together to form [iddirs](#), or funeral societies in which individuals contribute monthly to a fund that is used to pay for funeral costs to families upon the death of a loved one. Over the past few decades, some iddirs have evolved to take on additional functions such as the provision of loans or funds for health care. These groups did not initially form to provide government services; they were a means for local communities to pool risks. But because the government has been unable to provide basic financial services, these groups have taken advantage of their community networks and emerged as an alternative source of assistance.

## Conclusion

When governments are unable or unwilling to provide essential services to their citizens, individuals, local communities, and business may step in to fill the void. In some cases, the solutions formulated by nongovernmental actors are innovative and adaptable. Because these solutions come from local sources to address local problems, they have the additional advantage of being more sensitive to local concerns and needs. Unfortunately, because they also reflect government failure or weakness, they can be subverted by maleficent actors and further contribute to state failure.

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## SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE ELECTIONS—BUSINESS AS USUAL?

By George F. Ward

At first glance, the results of South Africa's May 7, 2014, election were not dramatic. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) lost ground, but not more than had been forecast. The opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) gained votes, but is still a long way from posing a direct threat to the ANC's overall majority. The upstart Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party demonstrated its ability to attract votes from its youthful base, but it remains to be seen whether it can play an effective role in parliament. Beneath the surface, however, the election results may contain important indications of changes in the South African body politic. So far, it is not clear that the ANC government has a vision for adjusting to these changes, and it seems to be content to conduct business as usual in the face of significant challenges. [more...](#)



South African president Jacob Zuma speaks at his second inaugural in Pretoria, South Africa, Saturday, May 24, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Siphwe Sibeko, Pool.)

Ambassador George F. Ward is editor of IDA's Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

## TURNING A NEW LEAF IN MADAGASCAR?

By Alexander Noyes

On April 12, 2014, Madagascar's newly elected president, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, [named](#) Kolo Roger as his prime minister, defying former transitional President Andry Rajoelina, who [preferred](#) the appointment of another candidate, one he considered more aligned with his political camp. Rajaonarimampianina was formerly the minister of finance under Rajoelina, and with his backing he came to power after [winning](#) 53.5 percent in the second round of presidential elections held on December 20, 2013. The long-delayed elections ended a four-year political crisis brought about by a military-backed coup d'état in 2009 that installed Rajoelina in office. The runner-up, Jean Louis Robinson, who was a proxy candidate for exiled former president Marc Ravalomanana, captured 46.5 percent of the vote. Rajaonarimampianina's choice of an independent candidate for prime minister suggests that he is distancing himself from Rajoelina, a promising sign for the country's recovery. [more...](#)



Then-presidential candidate Hery Rajaonarimampianina, left, acknowledges the crowd with his wife Lalao, right, at his rally in the city of Antananarivo, Madagascar, Wednesday, Oct. 23, 2013. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam)

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### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

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South African president Jacob Zuma speaks at his second inaugural in Pretoria, South Africa, Saturday, May 24, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Siphiwe Sibeko, Pool.)

## Analyzing the Election Results

As shown in the table, the changes in the share of the vote for National Assembly seats garnered by the three strongest parties in the 2014 elections showed significant but not earthshaking changes from the 2009 polling. The ANC's share of votes cast declined about 5.7 percent. The DA's share of the vote and seats increased by one-third, and the new EFF will have 25 seats in the National Assembly. Note that most of the net gain by the DA and EFF came at the expense of smaller parties that lost support from 2009 to 2014.

**South African National Assembly Election Results**  
Seats won (percentage of vote)

Party	2009	2014
ANC	264 (65.9%)	249 (62.15%)
DA	67 (16.70%)	89 (22.23%)
EFF	0 (0.00%)	25 (6.35%)

Sources: <http://electionresources.org/za/provinces.php?election=2009>

<http://www.elections.org.za/resultsnpe2014/default.aspx>

Looking more deeply into the election results, [Collette Shulz-Herzenberg and Jonathan Faull](#), two South African political analysts, have teased out some potentially larger implications. Focusing on trends in [electoral participation and party support](#) in South Africa's democratic elections beginning in 1994, Shulz-Herzenberg noted that a steady decline in voter turnout has continued. Using more recent census figures than those used by the Independent Electoral Commission, she highlights the fact that 8 million of 33 million potential voters failed to register. Voters as a percentage of the voting age population fell from 86 percent in 1994 to 57 percent this year. Thus, the ANC has failed to keep its share of voters within an overall scenario of declining electoral participation.

Jonathan Faull's [analysis](#) supported the point made by Shulz-Herzenberg. He looked also in detail at voting at the provincial level, [concluding](#) that the 2014 results "disguise significant challenges and disquiet within the ANC and its support base." He highlighted the importance to the ANC of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), a key province in which the ANC was able to increase its share of the vote. The rate of increase in support for the ANC in KZN dropped from 2009 to 2014, however, and is likely to decrease further in the future when native son Jacob Zuma is no longer President. Without its strength in KZN, the ANC's national result would have been considerably weaker. Faull also pointed out that the ANC is more adept at delivering votes in rural areas than in cities. As South Africa becomes ever more urban, this is a potential disadvantage for the ruling party.

## The New Cabinet—Business as Usual

There are no indications that President Zuma interpreted the election results as anything other than an affirmation of the ANC and his leadership. His brief [inaugural speech](#) on May 24, 2014, touted the completion of South Africa's "first phase of transformation." The address was calibrated to provide something for each of the disparate constituencies represented within the ANC, but contained no new concrete initiatives. Zuma failed to mention the labor unrest that is limiting the growth of the South African economy, and he stressed the role of state-owned enterprises as the "engines of development."

Zuma moved quickly to organize his second-term government, announcing the new cabinet just a day after the inaugural speech. Like the speech, the new cabinet has a bit of something for everyone in the party. The cabinet has good [gender balance](#), with 20 men and 15 women as full ministers. As expected, Cyril Ramaphosa, a trade unionist turned billionaire businessman and deputy president of the ANC, was named deputy national president. Pravin Gordhan, the powerful finance minister who was viewed by some as insufficiently sympathetic to lobbying by black empowerment interests, was moved to the Cooperative Governance portfolio. The new finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, who had been Gordhan's deputy, may lack the political clout needed to lead Zuma's diverse economic team but may be more pliant politically. Two other key economic posts, Trade and Industry and Economic Development, will be in the hands of left-leaning party stalwarts.

## Challenges Left Unaddressed

The net effect of Zuma's moves so far has been to shore up his personal power as he begins his second and final presidential term. What Zuma has not done is provide indications of how he will deal with South Africa's most persistent problem: lackluster economic growth. With the operations of the world's three largest producers of platinum, a key South African export, disrupted by strikes since the beginning of 2014, it is unlikely that the country will achieve even the 2.7 percent growth that the government had projected for 2014. In fact, on June 8, 2014, Nhlanhla Nene told the [Financial Times](#) that the country would avoid recession, but would reach only "growth of around 2 percent." With economic decision-making dispersed among several ministries led by personalities with widely differing views, the outlook for jump-starting the South African economy does not appear bright.

Another problem area, the parlous state of the South African Defense Force (SADF), has also not been addressed so far. In February 2014, President Zuma announced his approval of a plan for the [support of the SADF](#), and promised action before the May elections. In the event, Zuma took no action, not even the modest steps that IDA's *Africa Watch* thought were [possible](#). The reappointment of Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula as minister of defense, while promising continuity, does not inspire optimism. As demands on the SADF for regional peace operations, border security, maritime patrol, and anti-poaching operations increase, the stresses on the force will become ever more serious.

## The Future Is—Almost—Now

The ANC faces another test at the polls in the 2016 local government elections. Jonathan Faull, whose electoral analysis is cited above, [believes](#) that the dynamics of the 2016 elections may favor the DA, because that party does relatively better in urban areas, where governance issues are felt most acutely.

In addition, the contest to succeed Zuma as leader of the ANC will begin well in advance of the December 2017 party conference. At this stage, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the current African Union chairperson and a former wife of Zuma, appear to be [two of the leading candidates](#). Whether they remain the front-runners or others emerge, it is inevitable that members of the ANC's inner circle will begin taking sides. As this process unfolds, it is likely that President Zuma's power will begin to wane. Thus, if Zuma wishes to make an impact during his second term, he will need to begin the effort soon. His performance thus far has not been auspicious.

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On April 12, 2014, Madagascar's newly elected president, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, [named](#) Kolo Roger as his prime minister, defying former transitional President Andry Rajoelina, who [preferred](#) the appointment of another candidate, one he considered more aligned with his political camp. Rajaonarimampianina was formerly the minister of finance under Rajoelina, and with his backing he came to power after [winning](#) 53.5 percent in the second round of presidential elections held on December 20, 2013. The long-delayed elections ended a four-year political crisis brought about by a military-backed coup d'état in 2009 that installed Rajoelina in office. The runner-up, Jean Louis Robinson, who was a proxy candidate for exiled former president Marc Ravalomanana, captured 46.5 percent of the vote. Rajaonarimampianina's choice of an independent candidate for prime minister suggests that he is distancing himself from Rajoelina, a promising sign for the country's recovery.



Then-presidential candidate Hery Rajaonarimampianina, left, acknowledges the crowd with his wife Lalao, right, at his rally in the city of Antananarivo, Madagascar, Wednesday, Oct. 23, 2013. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam)

Robinson initially [contested](#) the results as fraudulent, but the presidential elections were deemed [credible](#) by international observers, and Rajaonarimampianina was sworn into office in January. He immediately [launched](#) a campaign to win back international support, asking to fully rejoin the international community and pushing international financial institutions to reinstate support cut off in the wake of the 2009 coup. Before the coup, donor assistance constituted nearly [70 percent](#) of the country's budget. Rajaonarimampianina's efforts have quickly paid dividends. On May 28, 2014, the United States—following the lead of the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—[resumed](#) regular relations and financial assistance to Madagascar. The United States also invited Rajaonarimampianina to the U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit planned for August.

In a further indication of his autonomy, Rajaonarimampianina has publicly asserted his independence and pledged to undertake a variety of much-needed reforms. Speaking at South African President Jacob Zuma's inauguration in May, Rajaonarimampianina [argued](#), “The new government, the new president, bring a new framework of authority. . . I have to set up the rule of law and justice and [vow] to fight corruption. This is important to set up a new democracy.” Rajaonarimampianina has already begun to carry out a few of his reform pledges, most impressively in the security sector.

As outlined in the August 1, 2013, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, Madagascar has an extended and violent history of military intervention in politics, with a highly factionalized security sector divided by residual allegiances to a number of past presidents. Although much more needs to be done to achieve civilian control of the military and professionalize the security forces, Rajaonarimampianina has already taken a notable step in the right direction by [disbanding](#) two irregular police formations that were loyal to Rajoelina and reportedly acting as his private militias. On the other hand, citing concerns that the military might [disapprove](#), he has proven reluctant to promote political reconciliation by offering amnesty to former president in exile Marc Ravalomanana and allowing him to return to Madagascar without onerous conditions.

Rajaonarimampianina surely is not a panacea for Madagascar's long-entrenched political rivalries, violent elections, economic struggles, and deeply [troubled](#) civil-military relations. That said, his recent pledges—and more important, his actions—suggest that contrary to expectations, he is not directly under the thumb of Rajoelina. This development hopefully heralds a shift away from the damaging Ravalomanana-Rajoelina divide that has dominated Madagascar's political landscape over the last five years. As [argued](#) by the International Crisis Group, however, more than cosmetic changes will be needed to institutionalize reforms and turn a new leaf in Madagascar.

Resolving the complex dilemmas of Ravalomanana's eventual return from exile and depoliticizing the country's divided security sector remain two of the most pressing political issues that Rajaonarimampianina must tackle. Given his

ostensible reluctance to act on the former, international and regional partners, namely the Southern African Development Community, would be wise to push the new president to move quickly regarding Ravalomanana's return. While there are no guarantees that Ravalomanana would remain outside the political sphere if he returned, a failure to expeditiously resolve the issue could renew old tensions by angering the Ravalomanana camp and his supporters, who, as evidenced by the 46.5 percent of the vote won by his proxy candidate, clearly remain significant.

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
Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND: THE NEW EMIR OF KANO AND THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On June 8, 2014, Kano State Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso announced the appointment of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi as emir of Kano. Sanusi succeeded his great-uncle Ado Bayero, who had held the position since 1963. Although largely ceremonial in function, the emir of Kano holds significant influence as the position is second only to the sultan of Sokoto in terms of spiritual leadership of Muslims in Nigeria. Governor Kwankwaso's decision to select Sanusi over others, including Bayero's son, [on the short list](#) of candidates given to him by other traditional Muslim leaders elicited immediate criticism, culminating in riots and the brief occupation of the emir's palace by police forces. Why was Emir Sanusi such a controversial selection, and what does Kwankwaso have to gain through the appointment of a man who once referred to him in print as a "[rural aristocrat](#)"? A look to the 2015 elections may provide some insight. [more...](#)



New Emir of Kano Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## WHEN THE DUST SETTLES IN GUINEA-BISSAU, WHO WILL REMAIN STANDING?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

After two years of transitional rule following a military coup in April 2012, voters in Guinea-Bissau recently chose Jose Mario Vaz, a former finance minister, to be the country's president. Despite initially rejecting the results, Nuno Gomes Nabiam, the primary opposition candidate, ultimately conceded the race to Vaz and vowed to respect the legitimacy of the new government. The elections were broadly considered to be [free, fair](#), and an encouraging sign for Guinea-Bissau's democratic development, but history shows that political instability in Guinea-Bissau often follows major shifts in political power. The post-election period is typically when elite-level power struggles play out between newly elected government officials and senior members of the country's most powerful institution—the military. Although there has been no obvious indication yet that this contest is occurring, it likely will. [more...](#)



A Guinea-Bissau soldier casts his ballot in the presidential runoff election at a polling station in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, Sunday, May 18, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Youssef Bah)

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
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New Emir of Kano Sanusi Lamido Sanusi. (Source: AP.)

On Friday, June 6, 2014, [Ado Bayero](#), emir of Kano for more than 50 years, died in his palace at the age of 83. Bayero was a well-respected figure who embraced Western education and modernity for Muslims in the North. A vocal critic of Boko Haram, he had survived an [assassination attempt](#) by the group in January 2013. Many speculated that his son or another member of his immediate family would be next in line, so some were surprised when his brother's grandson, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, was announced as successor.

[Riots](#) broke out almost immediately, and there are reports of several fatalities as protesters met with police forces outside the palace. There are [conflicting reports](#) as to who exactly was behind the protests, with some claiming the ruling party was responsible and others maintaining that supporters of the former emir's son were responsible. Further complicating the situation, it was [alleged](#) that the police, upon orders from the presidency, had descended on the emir's palace and refused to leave. Some believed that they had orders to [arrest](#) Sanusi.

Sanusi is a [well-respected](#) yet polarizing figure who has proven himself a thorn in the side of government for years. A banker by trade, the bespectacled and often bow-tied Sanusi served as the central bank governor from 2009 until February 2014. Appointed by former President Umaru Yar'Adua in 2009 to a 5-year term, Sanusi was suspended by President Goodluck Jonathan in February 2014—a few months shy of completing his tenure set to expire in June—for "[recklessness](#)." His suspension came shortly after he alleged that more than [\\$20 billion was missing](#) from state coffers and suggested that some of the money may have been [siphoned off](#) into private accounts. (The government is still investigating the missing funds.) Following Sanusi's suspension, the federal government then attempted to discredit him. He was accused of [financing Boko Haram](#) and had his passport seized. Sanusi in turn sued the federal government for wrongful termination. The case is still pending, and there are signs that he may be rethinking [his lawsuit](#), perhaps in a move to ease tensions with the government.

Sanusi has long been an outspoken critic of the Nigerian government. At a university [convocation](#) in 2010 he stated that lawmaker salaries were consuming too much (25 percent) of the federal budget. He was summoned to the Senate where he defended his remarks and refused to apologize. He has also been critical of the state government. In 2001, he wrote a scathing paper on then-governor of Kano Rabiu Kwankwaso, accusing him of relying on the rural elite and ignoring the needs of the people of Kano.



## Why Kano?

Kano, the largest state in Nigeria, has an estimated 5.1 million registered voters, giving it the largest voter population in Northern Nigeria and the second largest in the nation after Lagos State. It also has a history of close and contentious elections between various elite factions. Kwankwaso previously served as governor from 1999 until 2003, when he was defeated by challenger Ibrahim Shekarau. At the time, Kwankwaso was a member of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), and Shekarau was a member of the opposition All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP). Shekarau was re-elected in 2007. In the 2011 election, Kwankwaso narrowly defeated Shekarau's candidate by a margin of less than 3 percent.

In 2013, Kwankwaso defected from the PDP to the All Progressive's Congress (APC), the new opposition party formed from the remnants of several other parties, including the ANPP. In response, Shekarau defected from the APC to join the PDP. There is no love lost between the parties and candidates—Governor Kwankwaso has gone so far as to [accuse President Jonathan](#) of wanting to kill him. It appears that Kwankwaso's selection of Sanusi may have been influenced by the mutual enmity the two share for the ruling PDP. It also seems that Kwankwaso's decision was in direct opposition to the candidate preferred by the PDP, which allegedly sent [premature congratulations](#) to former Emir Bayero's son.

Due to Kano State's sheer size and number of voters, events there will have an impact on the 2015 elections. It is believed that Kwankwaso is one of the front-runners to represent the APC as its presidential candidate in the 2015 election. Given the state's history of voting against the PDP candidate for president, it is unlikely that the majority of voters would vote for President Jonathan or whomever the PDP ultimately decides to nominate, but the magnitude of the vote available (more than 5 million registered voters and a history of high turnout) means the PDP cannot afford to ignore the state. It is true that the PDP may not need to win a plurality in Kano, but [every vote there helps the PDP's national cause](#) in terms of the aggregate vote. This also may explain why [Ibrahim Shekarau's](#) name was submitted to the Senate on June 4 in consideration of a ministerial position in Jonathan's cabinet. It is believed that Shekarau still holds sway among some voters in Kano.

Moving beyond electoral concerns, if Sanusi can rise above the politics surrounding his appointment, there is much good that he can do to assist the people of Kano in his position as emir. Sanusi is viewed as a progressive reformer not afraid to speak his mind. Many hope that as emir, Sanusi will [support Islamic education reform and promote development](#) in the region. And much like his predecessor, Sanusi has come out strongly against extremism. In 2012, he donated [100 million naira](#) (approximately \$600,000) to victims of Boko Haram. He is well positioned to provide spiritual guidance and direction to the country's estimated 70 to 80 million Muslims and act as a bulwark against the increasing [activity of extremists](#) in the Northeast of the country.

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# WHEN THE DUST SETTLES IN GUINEA-BISSAU, WHO WILL REMAIN STANDING?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

After two years of transitional rule following a military coup in April 2012, voters in Guinea-Bissau recently chose Jose Mario Vaz, a former finance minister, to be the country's president. Despite initially rejecting the results, Nuno Gomes Nabiam, the primary opposition candidate, ultimately conceded the race to Vaz and vowed to respect the legitimacy of the new government. The elections were broadly considered to be [free](#), [fair](#), and an encouraging sign for Guinea-Bissau's democratic development, but history shows that political instability in Guinea-Bissau often follows major shifts in political power. The post-election period is typically when elite-level power struggles play out between newly elected government officials and senior members of the country's most powerful institution—the military. Although there has been no obvious indication yet that this contest is occurring, it likely will.



A Guinea-Bissau soldier casts his ballot in the presidential runoff election at a polling station in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, Sunday, May 18, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Youssouf Bah)

## Background

The country's last attempt at national elections in April 2012 ended when the military seized power following the first round of voting in which Carlos Gomes Junior appeared poised to win the runoff. The ensuing two-year transitional period has been characterized by major [international isolation](#) and the withdrawal of much financial and technical support to Guinea-Bissau. Thus, this vote was widely anticipated by international partners and citizens alike as an end to the damaging international isolation that has affected the country for two years.

## The Election and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

Jose Mario Vaz represents the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC, which has historically been the largest political party in the National People's Assembly. He is [57 years old](#), married with three children, a graduate of Portugal's Higher Institute in Economics, former mayor of Bissau, and former finance minister in the previous (overthrown) government. Nuno Gomes Nabiam ran as an [independent candidate](#) but enjoys the support of the [military](#), which is composed predominantly of Balanta—Nabiam's ethnic group. Nabiam is the former [chair of the civil aviation agency](#). With voter turnout at nearly [90 percent](#), Vaz won [41 percent](#) of the vote in the first round, and Nabiam received [25 percent](#). In the runoff, with voter turnout at [78 percent](#), Vaz won the election with 61.9 percent of the vote to Nabiam's 38.1 percent. International observers confirmed the electoral process was free, fair, and the results [legitimate](#). Citing fraud, Nabiam initially [rejected](#) the results, but in the spirit of peace and stability, he quickly conceded to Vaz.

Following the successful election, the United Nations Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the [UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau](#) (UNIOGBIS) for six months, or until November 30, 2014. Its initial mandate was to provide security during the transition period, but the [Security Council](#) determined that its continued support to Guinea-Bissau would be necessary to coordinate the work of UN agencies, funds, and programs that will facilitate the return of constitutional order in Bissau. In another show of international support to the new government, on June 2 the Secretary-General of Interpol made an [unprecedented visit](#) to Bissau.

## Commitment to Reconciliation

In a [previous issue](#) of *Africa Watch*, IDA forewarned readers that political instability in Guinea-Bissau would likely occur if the military's preferred candidate, Nabiam, lost the presidential race. The military is an inordinately powerful institution in Guinea-Bissau, dating back to its role in achieving independence from Portugal in 1973. Since then, the military has become infamous for its meddling in national politics, effectively ruling the country through its surrogates. If a non-Balanta president fails to protect the interests of the generals—such as in safeguarding their role in facilitating [cocaine trafficking](#) or reducing the military's influence through security sector reforms—he or she runs the risk of being ousted and replaced by someone who will.

It was therefore an [encouraging sign](#) when Army Chief António Indjai publicly saluted president-elect Vaz. Likewise, it bodes well that Vaz [claims](#) he is committed to an “ongoing dialogue” with the army. It is also noteworthy that the incoming Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira and Alberto Nambeia, the leader of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS), the main opposition party, have agreed to work together for reconciliation. The two leaders are even reviving a bill to [accord amnesty](#) to the 2012 coup leaders. This idea was previously broached by the transitional government but ultimately rejected in the National Assembly as [detractors believed](#) it would perpetuate widespread impunity. If they ultimately succeed in passing the bill, it will either be a reflection of the price lawmakers are willing to pay for political stability or the result of the coercion by the coup leaders.

## Looking Ahead

We will soon see if these modestly encouraging signs reflect genuine political will by civilian leadership to stop the pattern of instability that has characterized Guinea-Bissau for years or if structural challenges, namely the imbalance of power between the military and civilian leaders, will continue to impede democratic progress. The latest election was free and fair by all accounts, as most elections in Guinea-Bissau have been, producing a president who is broadly accepted to be legitimate. But when changes in political power shake out and settle down, will Vaz honor his duty to serve his country or will he succumb to the demands of the military brass?

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
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## AFRICA ONLINE—FOR GOOD AND ILL

By George F. Ward

The African information and communications technology (ICT) revolution that began little more than a decade ago with the introduction of cell phones is accelerating as smartphones proliferate. One authoritative [forecast](#) predicts that there will be over 635 million mobile subscriptions in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of this year and 930 million by the end of 2019. In part due to the unavailability of fixed broadband connections, Africans use smartphones instead of laptop or desktop computers for communications and web-based activities. Mobile data traffic is projected to grow 20 times from 2013 to 2019, while mobile voice traffic will only double. This rapid expansion of mobile data has implications for many sectors of African societies and economies. Both law enforcement agencies and their opponents are seeking to turn technology to their advantage while limiting access to it by their adversaries. [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of IDA's Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.



Chief Francis Kariuki reads a tweet on his mobile phone at his office in the village of Lanet Umoja, near Nakuru, in the Rift Valley of Kenya. Kariuki's latest attempt to improve village life is by using the micro-blogging site Twitter to send and receive information about crime and other local matters. (Source: AP Photo/Khalil Senosi.)

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Residents of Mbare are seen outside President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF offices in Mbare Harare. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

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### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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## The Continuing African ICT Revolution

With sub-Saharan Africa's population at approximately 1.1 billion and over 600 million mobile subscriptions, the vast majority of Africans now have access to basic telecommunications either directly or through family members and communities. Far more Africans have access to mobile services than to electricity or clean water. The imaginative use of basic cellphone technology through applications such as [M-Pesa](#), a mobile money transfer system, and [medAfrica](#), a medical services platform, has already provided significant benefits to African societies and economies.

The next stage in Africa's ICT revolution is the proliferation of mobile broadband. According to the [International Telecommunications Union](#), mobile broadband penetration in Africa will climb to 20 percent by the end of 2014 from just 2 percent in 2010. The growth rate of broadband subscriptions in Africa is twice as high as the global average. This rapid growth, of course, is taking off from a narrow base. Broadband penetration in Africa compares well with that in other regions of the developing world, but is still far below the level of 84 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the developed world. One of the key drivers of mobile broadband growth is the availability of [low-cost smartphones and tablets](#). Devices that cost less than \$100 are widely available, and ones priced below \$50 are expected to follow in the near-term future.

## The Mobile Economy

The mobile ICT ecosystem has grown to become a major component of sub-Saharan African economies. Starting from a base of zero, the mobile ecosystem currently represents an estimated [7.1 percent](#) of the sub-Saharan African GDP. The sector employs 3.3 million workers and pays \$21 billion in taxes. Mobile operators invested over \$44 billion in their systems between 2006 and 2013. The number of [mobile-enabled product launches](#) in sub-Saharan Africa (typically, apps, web portals, video, music) grew from fewer than five annually before 2005 to around 120 in 2012. The cumulative number of mobile-enabled products launched is over 400. Financial services and health-related applications are particular focal areas for these applications. "M2M," or machine-to-machine, applications are also growing. An [M2M service](#) in South Africa that monitors railroad track conditions has eliminated train derailments in areas in which it is used.

Although the mobile revolution doubtless will continue, it does face challenges that could slow it down:

- Possible changes in government policy—With few exceptions, such as [Ethiopia](#), African governments have

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generally fostered an open environment for the spread of ICTs. To the extent that governments feel threatened by openness and free expression of opinion, these policies could change.

- Limitations on bandwidth—The growth rate of broadband in sub-Saharan Africa challenges the capacity of mobile providers to build out and constantly upgrade their networks.
- Unaffordability of services—Although prices for mobile services have fallen substantially, they are still a challenge for the poor, who comprise [almost half](#) the African population.
- Lack of rural coverage—Although Africa is undergoing rapid urbanization, the majority of the population continues to live in rural areas. Mobile penetration rates are lower in rural areas, and growth there will be more expensive to achieve for several reasons, including low road density and lack of electrical power.

## Tools for Police and Terrorists

Mobile technologies are being exploited by both law enforcement authorities and terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya, which is emerging as East Africa's ICT hub, is a good example. In May 2014, the trade press [reported](#) that Safaricom, a leading Kenyan mobile provider, had been awarded a government contract worth \$172 million to provide a mobile communications system that will link all law enforcement agencies in the country. The system will reportedly be based on a 4G network and closed-circuit television cameras with facial-recognition capabilities. The system will be installed first in Nairobi and Mombasa, both of which have seen multiple attacks by the Islamist terrorist group al-Shabaab. ICT is also being exploited at a more basic and perhaps more sustainable level. For example, a village chief in Kenya [utilizes a Twitter account](#) for tasks as diverse as mobilizing the populace to scare away robbers and locating lost farm animals. In Nigeria, authorities have on occasion [interrupted mobile communications service](#) in the country's Northeast to limit the capacity of Boko Haram terrorists and their supporters to communicate.

Criminals and terrorists also understand the power of ICTs, and they have utilized mobile communications both offensively and defensively. The al-Shabaab terrorists who attacked Nairobi's [Westgate Mall](#) in September 2013 communicated among themselves and to the group's leadership by cellphone. Their attack was publicized by al-Shabaab via Twitter. The terrorists who attacked the Kenyan coastal resort of Mpeketoni on June 16, 2014, were initially reported to have [destroyed communication equipment](#) to hinder the police response. Authorities later denied that had been the case. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has been reported as conducting "[unrelenting](#)" attacks on mobile phone networks. One [academic study](#) has found that "the availability of cellphone coverage significantly and substantially increases the probability of violent conflict" in Africa.

Terrorist groups, including al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, have used social media to publicize their causes and their exploits. But a study published by the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence [concluded tentatively](#) that the "target audience for the majority of terrorist groups in Africa is predominantly Western Anglophones as opposed to groups indigenous to Africa." The same study also found no substantial evidence of offensive cyber attacks perpetrated by African terrorist groups. This conclusion is consonant with Akamai's [State of the Internet report](#), which pegs attacks originating in Africa at only 0.4 percent of the global total.

## Conclusion

The rapid expansion of the African mobile ICT universe will continue to deliver benefits to the peoples of that continent. For example, as broadband coverage increases, it will become possible for many thousands of Africans to participate in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) and thereby to learn through some of the world's leading universities. At the same time, mobile communications can be exploited by governments intent on repression and by criminal and terrorist groups. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of Africa depends on maintaining open access to the Internet and thereby to the world.

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Residents of Mbare are seen outside President Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF offices in Mbare Harare. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

The succession issue is expected to be resolved at the ZANU-PF party congress in December, where Mugabe is likely to step aside or anoint his successor. As highlighted in the November 7, 2013, edition of [Africa Watch](#), the two main candidates to replace Mugabe are Vice President Joice Mujuru and Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa, a former Defense Minister who is reported to enjoy the support of the security chiefs, has been implicated in several episodes of political violence. Mujuru is the widow of Solomon Mujuru, a former high-ranking military chief and ZANU-PF official. She garners more grass-roots political support than Mnangagwa and is considered a moderate.

After [winning](#) nine out of 10 provinces in provincial executive party elections held last fall, Mujuru was considered to be in the driver's seat on the succession issue because the winner of the party elections will nominate and elect members of the powerful [presidium](#) at the 2014 congress. But just as Mujuru was thought to be consolidating control of the party, Mugabe—who has adeptly played the two factions off each other in the past—reasserted his authority. Mugabe [said](#) in April that neither contender was guaranteed to replace him and that it was “terrible even to have your name mentioned as leader of a faction. It is shameful.” [He added](#): “But why should it [succession] be discussed when it’s not due? Is it due? I’m still there.”

Mugabe's pronouncements did little to stop the infighting and positioning between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions, with tensions rising to new heights over the past month and drawing in the state-owned media. In early June, Mujuru's camp [charged](#) Media and Broadcasting Services Minister Jonathan Moyo, who is aligned with Mnangagwa, with using the state-owned media for factional politics. The Mujuru faction alleged that Moyo sought to sabotage her leading position by appointing editors who were critical of the government and linked to the opposition to state-owned newspapers; these newspapers then published a number of negative stories about the government, including [allegations](#) of high-level corruption by ministers in Mujuru's faction. After hearing details of these allegations, Mugabe unleashed a [tirade](#) against Moyo on June 6, calling him a “devil incarnate” set on destroying the party from within. “When you have our minister of information wanting to pit people one against another, you don't do things like that,” Mugabe [said](#).

It appears that Kudzayi's arrest and the media crackdown are further fallout from this most recent battle in the succession struggle between Mujuru and Mnangagwa. Despite Mugabe's verbal attack, he has not sacked Moyo, indicating that Mugabe intends to keep both factions guessing regarding which candidate he favors. That said, because Mujuru had Mugabe's ear during the Moyo episode, it appears at this point that she continues to have the upper hand. As [argued](#) recently by Adrienne LeBas, if Mujuru wins the succession battle she would be likely to push the party in a more moderate, reformist direction, possibly leading to international acceptance. On the other hand, a Mnangagwa win—given his close personal ties to Mugabe

and the security sector and his implication in past political violence—would mean a continuation of the status quo and further entrenchment of the military in politics.

The entry of a third, compromise candidate is also a possibility, albeit a slim one. Current Defense Minister Sydney Sekeramayi's name has been [floated](#) as such a candidate in several recent reports. Leaving the door open to another contender, Mugabe [argued](#) in April, "It is said Mai Mujuru and Minister Mnangagwa are aspiring for the presidency. . . It's not only these two who can succeed me." Mugabe is keeping his cards close, and as demonstrated above, as long as he is still alive, he remains in firm control of the succession issue.

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