

EDUCATION REFORM—A KEY TO SOUTH AFRICA'S FUTURE

By George F. Ward, Jr.

Although evidence of social progress in South Africa is often obscured by media focus on labor unrest and other problems, the country has taken significant strides toward greater equality since the advent of democratic government 20 years ago. Real GDP per capita has increased [40 percent](#), and the size of the black middle class has doubled. The number of people in the lower income groups as defined by the government has declined. Unemployment has, however, remained high. The broad unemployment rate, composed of those looking for jobs and those who have given up looking, is 36 percent (6.8 million people). Of the unemployed, 71 percent are young people in the 15–34 age range. Paradoxically, large numbers of jobs requiring highly skilled workers remain unfilled—829,800, [according to one estimate](#). The large numbers of both unemployed and unfilled positions create a drag on the economy. Two recent studies hold South Africa's failing educational system responsible in large part for this situation. Without significant education reform, the outlook for the country appears bleak. [more...](#)



Anele Ramphomana, front left, cries as he gives his mother, unseen, the thumbs up as he starts his school career with assembly, at the Themble Primary School, in the Kagiso Township, Krugersdorp, South Africa. (Source: AP Photo/Lungelo Mbulwana.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia.

CONTESTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN MADAGASCAR

By Alexander Noyes

On December 20, 2013, Madagascar [held](#) the second round of long-delayed presidential elections, aiming to put an end to a four-year political crisis precipitated by a military-backed coup d'état in 2009 that brought transitional President Andry Rajoelina to power. On January 3, 2014, Madagascar's electoral commission [announced](#) that former finance minister Hery Rajaonarimampianina, who was backed by Rajoelina, had won the poll with 53.5 percent of the vote. The results have yet to be confirmed by the electoral court, which must make a ruling on the election by January 19. Rajaonarimampianina's opponent, Jean Louis Robinson, who was a proxy candidate for exiled former president Marc Ravalomanana, ended up with 46.5 percent of the vote, although he has contested the poll results. Robinson's camp said the vote was rigged and demanded a recount, submitting nearly 300 complaints to the electoral court. While the international community has largely endorsed the vote, the potential for a drawn-out period of contestation remains high. [more...](#)



A voter right, casts his vote, at a polling station in Antananarivo, Friday, Dec. 20, 2013. (Source: AP Photo/Florence Treuil.)

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Both the South African office of [Goldman Sachs](#) and the South African Institute of Race Relations (IRR)¹ have recently produced studies that take stock of the past 20 years of South African history and look ahead to the next decade. Each study connects the high level of unemployment to the failure of the educational system to properly prepare workers. Goldman Sachs cites the fact that 51 percent of the labor supply has not completed the school-leaving qualification known as the “matric.” The IRR foresees that without education policy reform and greatly improved results, South Africa is at risk of transitioning into a “Dark Night” rather than a “New Dawn.”

Other studies support these conclusions. According to [The Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014](#) published by the World Economic Forum, factors related to education detract significantly from South Africa's ability to compete effectively on world markets. The report cites an inadequately educated work force as the most problematic factor for doing business in South Africa. It ranks the quality of the South African educational system at 146th out of 148 countries studied. Only Yemen and Libya fared worse. Perhaps even more ominous for the future, the report ranked the quality of math and science education in South Africa last among the 148 countries studied. Ghana, in contrast, was in 62nd place and Zimbabwe, South Africa's troubled neighbor, was in 63rd place.

These disappointing results are not due to lack of spending on education. South Africa reportedly spends [20 percent](#) of its government budget on education, or 6.4 percent of GDP. This proportion is considerably more than many other emerging market economies. For example, South Africa spends almost [five times as much](#) per pupil as Kenya, but Kenya's pupils achieve significantly better functional literacy rates, according to a report by the Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality.

Various factors are cited as responsible for the underperformance of the South African educational system. Lack of pupil commitment to learning is one, and the practice of promoting pupils from one grade to the next despite low levels of achievement (“condoning”) is another. The most frequently cited factors, however, relate to the [performance of teachers](#): there is a shortage of teachers; many teachers are underqualified; teachers often perform poorly in the classroom; and academic leadership is often deficient. One example of the problem: only 38 percent of South African grade 6 teachers were able to [correctly interpret](#) a simple graph.

The many recommendations for improving the quality of education include better teacher training, strengthened parent-teacher-student associations, better supervision of schools and enforcement of teacher standards by reintroducing government education inspectors, and reversal of the pattern of moving teacher training colleges away from rural areas. The last is aimed at taking advantage of the large numbers of bright, motivated, rural students, who might view a teaching position as a step upward, in contrast to urban students, who often see teaching as a low-status position.

Winning the support of the teachers union is perhaps the most significant hurdle on the way to education reform. The South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) is an affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which in turn is a constituent element of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). SADTU has already expressed its opposition to some proposed reforms, and the government is unlikely to take a confrontational stance toward the union in the run-up to this year's national elections. Assuming that the ANC emerges victorious from the upcoming elections, the post-election period will be the time for the government to grasp the nettle of reform. If it fails to do so, the likelihood of continued deterioration of South Africa's educational system, and of a "Dark Night" rather than a "New Dawn" for the country as a whole, will increase.

¹ Dr. Frans Cronje, "The Next Ten Years: A Time Traveller's Guide to the Future of South Africa," lecture and discussion at the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, December 4, 2013.

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A voter right, casts his vote, at a polling station in Antananarivo, Friday, Dec. 20, 2013. (Source: AP Photo/Florence Treuil.)

As highlighted in the October 31, 2013 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, the first round of presidential elections was held on October 25. Robinson and Rajaonarimampianina emerged as the two leading candidates, [garnering](#) 21.16 and 15.85 percent of the vote, respectively. Despite some irregularities, the results of the first round were deemed free and fair by international and regional observers. Since neither candidate secured more than required 50 percent of the vote, a second round was scheduled for December 20, when parliamentary elections were also scheduled to take place.

But in a troubling development for the prospects of an even electoral playing field in the second round, on November 22, Rajoelina's government [dismissed](#) 10 of 22 regional governors, replacing 8 of the 10 with senior military officers. As outlined in the August 1, 2013 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, Madagascar has a long history of unstable civil-military relations, with a highly factionalized and politically involved security sector. Mamy Rakotoarivelo, president of the National Assembly and ally of Ravalomanana's, expressed concerns about the change at the time, "We are worried by this decision which comes on the eve of the second round. . . We're worried that pressure, direct or indirect, will be put on voters." In the event, voting was largely peaceful, and despite this maneuver and other irregularities, international observers again [hailed](#) the vote as legitimate.

Rajaonarimampianina's ostensible win has raised hopes that Madagascar may finally move on from its long-running political crisis, recover economically, and regain international support. Before the coup, international aid accounted for up to 70 percent of the country's budget. Sahondra Rabenarivo, an attorney, [expressed some optimism](#) on *Voice of America* last week: "For the average people going to the polls was just to try to move forward, turn the page, get on with life and hopefully bring back what we need the most, which is unfortunately the international donors and investors and so on who went away during this crisis."

Unfortunately, given Madagascar's history of political violence and deeply entrenched political rivalries, the potential for unrest in the interim period and after the electoral court's final ruling remains high. For now, Robinson and the Ravalomanana camp have not directly called for demonstrations, although surrogates of Robinson seemed to imply that he would not denounce street protests. As Elyse Razaka, who worked on Robinson's campaign, told *Reuters*, "Robinson won't order people to take to the streets. But it is different if there is a spontaneous movement." The role and conduct of the divided military will be particularly critical during this period, especially if street demonstrations are staged. Another violent chapter of political struggle between the Rajoelina and Ravalomanana camps—now being waged through proxies—would be disastrous for Madagascar, dashing hopes for a prompt recovery and perpetuating the country's international isolation.

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BRAZIL: LOOKING TO EXPAND BEYOND LUSOPHONE AFRICA?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

As a member of the Lusophone bloc (those countries that had been colonized by Portugal and continue to use Portuguese as their official language), Brazil has historically been an [active partner](#) to many of its African counterparts. Thanks to their linguistic, cultural, and historical ties, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé and Príncipe have enjoyed significant [development assistance](#) and [political support](#) from the rising Latin American power, as well as numerous investments from private and state-owned Brazilian firms. Some non-Lusophone countries such as Nigeria and South Africa have also attracted limited Brazilian investment. The [recent opening](#) of a branch of the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, or BNDES) in Johannesburg, South Africa, suggests that Brazil may be looking to expand its investments, and perhaps its influence, further beyond Lusophone Africa. [more...](#)



Brazil's former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, left, talks with Brazil's Development and Foreign Trade Minister Fernando Pimentel during the "Investing in Africa" seminar at the Brazilian development bank BNDES headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (AP Photo/Felipe Dana.)

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WHITHER THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The interim president of the Central African Republic (CAR), Michel Djotodia, [tendered his resignation](#) on January 10, 2014, at a summit of regional leaders held in N'Djamena, Chad. It is rumored that Chadian President Idriss Déby and others in the region heavily pressured Djotodia to resign from office to avoid a full-blown civil war. President Déby went so far as to lend Djotodia and family his [plane](#) to travel to Benin, where it is assumed they will live in exile. Djotodia, who [intermittently waged rebellion](#) against former CAR president Francois Bozizé for almost a decade before finally toppling the regime in March 2013, previously lived in exile in Benin from 2007 to 2011. Although Djotodia had only been in power for 10 months, it may take years for the country to recover from the damage inflicted in that short time. The CAR's future is uncertain, but it is likely that Chadian President Déby will continue to play a significant role in it. [more...](#)



Michel Djotodia in January 2013. (Source: AP.)

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Brazil's former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, left, talks with Brazil's Development and Foreign Trade Minister Fernando Pimentel during the "Investing in Africa" seminar at the Brazilian development bank BNDES headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. (AP Photo/Felipe Dana.)

Background

Brazil has commercial and political motivations in Africa. Commercially, Brazil has been less focused than China on gaining control of Africa's natural resources, but like China, it is looking to expand and grow its own firms in the region and identify [new markets](#) for its own products. Although the oil and mining sectors continue to be major targets for Brazilian investment, a strong biofuel industry has grown in Brazil in recent years as a "green" alternative to petroleum imports. The question remains whether the recent news that Brazil's own oil reserves may have been [vastly overestimated](#) will shift its focus in Africa, where reserves *are* abundant and opportunities exist for companies such as Petrobras (Brazil's semi-public oil company).

Brazil also wants to assist with Africa's "[renaissance](#)," having itself created one of the fastest growing major economies in the world after decades of slow economic development. Brazil sees its own experience as having much in common with its African colonial counterparts, and Brazilian officials often emphasize their similar histories and future ambitions.

And like most players in the international arena, Brazil sees political support from the African voting bloc as a significant asset. Deep political penetration began with President Lula, who made [12 trips to Africa, visiting 21 countries](#) during his tenure from 2003 to 2010. [Thirty-seven Brazilian embassies](#) now exist across the continent, as compared with [17 in 2002](#), providing Brazil with a stronger diplomatic representation in Africa than even some traditional powers such as Great Britain.

Recent Moves

Recently, it appears that Brazil is making additional forays into Africa. In [December 2013](#), the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) opened its first African branch (and third international branch) in Johannesburg, South Africa. Given Brazil's focus in Lusophone Africa, one may have expected it to locate itself in Luanda, Angola, or even Maputo, Mozambique. According to BNDES officials, the establishment of an African office is intended to broaden its relations with regional and local institutions, furthering its know-how concerning Africa's business environment, and providing support to Brazilian companies seeking business opportunities in Africa. Also noteworthy was the second [Brazil – Africa Leadership Forum](#), which took place in November in Johannesburg, South Africa, and addressed the desire by both Brazil and African countries to develop their economic relationships under the banner of South-South cooperation. Commitments from participants to promote collaboration on agricultural innovation and to identify promising sectors for investment suggest Brazil is looking to expand its activities in Africa.

Looking Ahead

It is not surprising that Brazil's Africa policy has historically revolved around the Lusophone countries—Angola, which has a fast growing economy, and Mozambique, which is eager to have the same—are both ripe for increased Brazilian investment and exports. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde are less so, given their size, although politically they are still valuable. Others such as South Africa and Nigeria have also been targets for Brazilian assistance. In addition, a multitude of other countries in Africa offer investment opportunities for Brazilian firms. Economic ties could eventually translate into strong and enduring political partnerships. Consolidating these South-South ties appears to be a major foreign policy objective of Brazil, which views itself as a leader in the effort to [shift the global balance of power](#) away from the traditional economies in North America, Western Europe, and Japan and toward the emerging economies of the developing world. It sees the 53 states in Africa with a combined population of approximately 1 billion as a significant bloc in a larger “Third World Alignment.”¹

¹ Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens, “The Fundamental Drivers of BRIC in Africa,” Standard Bank Report, 28 May 2009.

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Michel Djotodia, [unpopular to begin with](#), is the former head of the Seleka rebels, a group that initially supported his ascent to office by deposing former president Bozizé. The rebels, a majority of whom are Muslim, have engaged in looting and violence ever since, with the violence spiraling out of control until Djotodia's resignation last week.

The conflict in CAR has frequently been described as sectarian in nature, but it is not clear that the Seleka rebels had such an agenda. Although the Seleka fighters have been accused of [targeting Christians](#), their motivation for doing so is unclear. At no point have the rebels made religious demands or statements that would indicate that religion is being used as anything other than a convenient heuristic to describe what is taking place. In fact, the [country's religious leaders](#) have explicitly stated that at its core, this is not a religious conflict.

[It is estimated](#) that 15 percent of the population is Muslim, 25 percent Protestant, and 25 percent Catholic, with 35 percent holding some form of indigenous beliefs. The Christian population is [not a cohesive entity](#). Djotodia was the first Muslim president of CAR, but Bozizé, a Christian, enjoyed significant military support from neighbor to the north Chad, a majority Muslim country with a Muslim leader, Déby. The latter [intervened in 2012](#) when Seleka threatened to topple Bozizé's regime then, but [refused to send support again](#) in 2013.

It is also alleged that the [exiled Bozizé called upon some of his loyalists](#) to wage attacks against Djotodia's government. If this is the case, some of the violence might be political score-settling, not religious in nature. Nonetheless, the violence spread rapidly and led to the formation of "anti-balaka" groups meant to protect citizens from the aggressions of the Seleka rebels. Now there is concern that anti-balaka groups, some of which are majority Christian, may target Muslims in retribution. That could lead to the entrenchment of religious divisions that have been largely dormant for years.

It is also unclear who, if anyone, is leading the Seleka rebels. After he became the self-appointed president in March 2013, Djotodia began to distance himself from Seleka and officially [dissolved the group in September](#). That act had little impact on the group's activities. Djotodia's lack of influence was illustrated by continued violence in which more than 1,000 CAR citizens were killed and close to [1 million displaced](#). The rebel movement seems to be decentralized, with various groups taking advantage of the current power vacuum.

Now that Djotodia has been removed from the picture, there is hope that the country will stabilize and conditions will improve. A new transitional president, [Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet](#), has been appointed by the Constitutional Court, with



Michel Djotodia in January 2013. (Source: AP.)

the promise that another interim president will be appointed within 2 weeks. France is pressing for elections by the end of 2014. With large numbers of people displaced and a census that has not been updated since [2003](#), elections in the near term might exclude groups targeted by the violence, which might increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of future conflict.

There are also new allegations by a UN human rights mission [that Chadian forces/peacekeepers assisted Seleka rebels](#) in some of the massacres. If the reports are true, these acts might have been the result of military indiscipline. But Chad has long meddled in its neighbor's internal affairs. It played an instrumental role in the installation of Bozizé, the installation of Djotodia, and now the removal of Djotodia. Perhaps only [President Déby knows](#) the answer to what lies ahead for the CAR. Déby has ruled Chad since 1990, but there have been frequent challenges to his authority, one [as recently as 2013](#). His interests in CAR may be an attempt to prevent CAR's troubles from spilling over into his own country. He may also be positioning himself as a new trans-regional kingmaker in the mold of his old ally, Muammar Gaddafi. To this end, he is working to invigorate the [Community of Sahel-Saharan States](#), an organization that Gaddafi founded in the mid-1990s.

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CHINA-JAPAN TENSIONS PLAY OUT IN AFRICA

By George F. Ward, Jr.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, and Ethiopia from January 10 to 15, 2014, on a sub-Saharan African tour seen by [observers](#) as an effort to raise Japan's profile on the continent and compete with China. Although Abe was warmly received and delivered effective messages focused on economic cooperation and development, the relatively modest scale of his proposals pointed out the difficulties of competing in Africa with the Chinese juggernaut. In that context, the [hostile and intemperate reaction](#) of Chinese officials to the visit was somewhat surprising, but probably reflective of the general state of China-Japan relations. [more...](#)



Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, center, sits between Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, right, and Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission Erastus Mwencha, left, during Abe's visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 14, 2014. (AP Photo/Elias Asmare.)

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POLICE VETTING IN KENYA ILLUSTRATES BOTH PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES TO REFORM

By Alexander Noyes

On January 3, 2014, it was [announced](#) that three senior police officers in Kenya had failed a vetting process and were being involuntarily retired from the National Police Service. The ongoing vetting process, which began in December last year, is headed by the Kenya National Police Service Commission (NSPC) and is part of the country's police reform program that was launched in 2008—after police involvement in the country's 2007–2008 post-election violence—and later enshrined in the 2010 constitution. The vetting process has again sparked debate about Kenya's much-maligned police force, which has a long history of corruption and politicization and faces renewed [criticism](#) in the wake of its flawed response to the Westgate mall attack on September 21, 2013. While the sacking of high-ranking police officers by a new oversight body suggests that real progress is being made on police reform in Kenya, the vetting process also illustrates a number of enduring challenges to successful reforms. [more...](#)



President Uhuru Kenyatta, middle, with Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo, in police uniform at center, Nairobi, Wednesday, August 7, 2013. (AP Photo)

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Prime Minister Abe's Trip

As IDA pointed out in an earlier edition of [Africa Watch](#), Japan is at a disadvantage to China in Africa in several respects. Japanese two-way trade with Africa averaged \$22 billion annually in the years 2009–2011, less than one-fifth the comparable Chinese figure of \$125 billion. Investment and economic assistance data present similar pictures. Press accounts at the beginning of Abe's trip highlighted the [expected announcement](#) of more than \$14 billion in trade and assistance agreements during the tour. The total value of agreements announced during the trip, however, amounted to much less than this figure. The reported \$14 billion probably was simply a repeat of the total aid component of an overall \$32.8 billion trade and aid package announced last year at the [Fifth Tokyo International Conference on Economic Development](#).

In Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, Abe's first African stop, he and the approximately 50 business executives traveling with him met with leaders of West African countries in a mini-summit of the sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Abe's focus was on the troubled Sahel region, and he promised an \$83.4 million [humanitarian assistance package](#) to help stabilize the region, spur economic growth, and promote investment. He also announced \$7.7 million in aid to Côte d'Ivoire to strengthen the civilian security sector. In return, Abe garnered an endorsement by Ivoirian President Ouattara for Japanese permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, which is a primary Japanese foreign policy goal. [Ouattara said](#), "I hope Japan will be a permanent member in 2015, which is the 70th anniversary of the United Nations." Ouattara also called for increased African representation on the Council. [Mozambique](#) was Abe's second stop. There he promised Japanese cooperation in developing the country's newly discovered natural gas resources. Before moving on to Ethiopia, Abe also signed agreements in the areas of health care and infrastructure development.

In Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Abe [spoke](#) at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) on January 14. He announced a few specific commitments, including doubling to \$2 billion over five years a previous commitment of Yen-denominated loans and a grant of \$320 million to the AU for humanitarian and disaster assistance, focusing, among others, on the Central African Republic and South Sudan. A portion of his speech was devoted to an explanation of how the Japanese *kaizen* approach to organization and production, of which the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was an admirer, could—and should—be applied in Africa. Perhaps displaying a bit of insensitivity to the African context, Abe asserted, "*kaizen* is applicable to any country or culture as a type of managerial know-how."

China vs. Japan in Africa

Both in Africa and Asia, Prime Minister Abe's trip was seen as an episode in the increasingly sharp China-Japanese rivalry. It was widely noted that Abe's visit was preceded by a tour by the Chinese foreign minister the week before. The press reported that while Abe's visit was the first by a Japanese prime minister in eight years, China's president, Xi Jinping, had made Africa his [first destination](#) abroad.

Abe's trip was also bookended by Japanese and Chinese criticism of each other's approach to Africa. Responding to observations that Japanese investment lagged that of China, Abe's spokesperson, in a thinly veiled critique of the Chinese practice of building ostentatious facilities for African governments, [noted](#), "countries like Japan, Britain, and France cannot provide African leaders with beautiful houses or beautiful ministerial buildings." The Chinese foreign minister, referring to Japanese interest in a Security Council seat, characterized Japanese policy in Africa as based on purely political motives. A spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry [warned would-be competitors](#): "if there is any country out there that attempts to make use of Africa for rivalry, the country is making a wrong decision, which is doomed to fail."

The most scathing Chinese attack came in a press conference that the Chinese ambassador to the AU chose to hold the day after Abe wrapped up his visit. Displaying photographs of tortured and dead Chinese victims of Japanese aggression in World War II, the [ambassador accused](#) Prime Minister Abe of trying to undermine China's role in Africa. "Abe has become the biggest troublemaker in Asia," said the ambassador, "he has worked hard to portray China as a threat, aiming to sow discord... and so creating a convenient excuse for the resurrection of Japanese militarism."

Conclusions

What can we conclude on the basis of Prime Minister Abe's visit about the relative positions of Japan and China in Africa? First, it is clear that Japan needs more practice in engaging with the continent. Japanese rhetoric about industrial organization and management is probably not as appealing to Africans as the decades-long Chinese record of cultural and academic exchanges and business engagement. The presidential mansions, legislative chambers, and other monumental edifices built by the Chinese in cities around the continent are effective symbols of a deep relationship. Second, there is a clear resource mismatch. Abe spoke during his trip of millions of dollars in assistance and investment. Chinese visitors routinely sign deals with African governments that promise billions in infrastructure development. As a result of these deals, Chinese firms have achieved deep penetration into key sectors of African economies.

Prime Minister Abe's trip was not for naught. He succeeded in delivering the message that Japan does not intend to cede sub-Saharan Africa to China as a sphere of influence. He demonstrated a significant level of commitment to helping African countries meet their security and human development challenges. He achieved at least some support for a permanent Japanese seat on the United Nations Security Council. These are modest achievements. The question for the future is whether the Japanese government will increase its focus on Africa and thereby play a larger role on the continent.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward, Jr. is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Namibia.

POLICE VETTING IN KENYA ILLUSTRATES BOTH PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES TO REFORM

By Alexander Noyes

On January 3, 2014, it was [announced](#) that three senior police officers in Kenya had failed a vetting process and were being involuntarily retired from the National Police Service. The ongoing vetting process, which began in December last year, is headed by the Kenya National Police Service Commission (NSPC) and is part of the country's police reform program that was launched in 2008—after police involvement in the country's 2007–2008 post-election violence—and later enshrined in the 2010 constitution. The vetting process has again sparked debate about Kenya's much-maligned police force, which has a long history of corruption and politicization and faces renewed [criticism](#) in the wake of its flawed response to the Westgate mall attack on September 21, 2013. While the sacking of high-ranking police officers by a new oversight body suggests that real progress is being made on police reform in Kenya, the vetting process also illustrates a number of enduring challenges to successful reforms.



President Uhuru Kenyatta, middle, with Inspector General of Police David Kimaiyo, in police uniform at center, Nairobi, Wednesday, August 7, 2013. (AP Photo)

The NSPC vetting team, headed by NSPC Chairman Johnston Kavuludi, is charged with investigating the upper echelons of the police and ensuring that leading officers meet specified standards and qualifications, including adequate training and credentials, professional conduct, respect for human rights, and financial probity. On the goals of the vetting, Kavuludi recently [said](#), “The main objective of vetting is to reclaim public confidence in the Police Service to enable the officers who have been cleared during the vetting process [to return] with pride, confidence and renewed vigor.” Seven senior officers were vetted during the initial phase. Twenty-five lower ranked officials are being vetted during the second phase, which began on January 7, with another 200 facing questioning in the third round.

The three police officers who lost their jobs, Francis Okonya, Jonathan Koskei, and Peter Eregai, all Senior Deputy Commissioners, reportedly failed to satisfy the vetting requirements on a number of counts. Eregai and Okonya were [unable](#) to satisfactorily answer questions regarding their finances and land holdings, suggesting corruption, while Koskei faced accusations of abuse, such as the firing of subordinates without investigation. Other details of [widespread](#) corruption within the force have emerged during the second round of vetting, particularly within the Traffic Department. During questioning officers faced allegations of being bought off by cartels; further, although it is against the law, officers are believed to own informal public transport vehicles (“matatus”).

Some within the force have fiercely [pushed](#) back against the vetting, with a number of officers choosing early retirement to avoid scrutiny. Fortunately, Kavuludi and the new Inspector General of the police, David Kimaiyo, [warned](#) that officers will still be prosecuted if it turns out they opted for early retirement to hide past transgressions. But other police officers [warned](#) the vetting panel that officials may go so far as committing suicide if they are dropped from the force, given their long commitment to the police.

Although at times slow and incomplete, much progress has been made on reforming Kenya's police over the past six years, with a number of institutional reforms realized during the tenure of Kenya's coalition government, which completed its term in 2013. Despite these institutional advances, tangible shifts in police behavior have been more difficult to achieve, as highlighted by police conduct during the Westgate attack and recent [reports](#) of major human rights abuses. That said, the current vetting process should be viewed as another step in the right direction on the long road to achieving a reformed police force. At the same time, the vetting has revealed a number of enduring

challenges to reforms, namely deep-rooted police corruption and pushback from some within the force. Civil society and international actors involved in security sector reform in Kenya would be wise to [continue](#) applying pressure on Uhuru Kenyatta's new government to empower the fledgling police oversight bodies and make sure the vetting process does not fall victim to political manipulation.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

THE PERSONALIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: STYLE OVER SUBSTANCE

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Two of the continent's most significant countries have upcoming elections of importance. In South Africa, elections will be held in April 2014, and in Nigeria, elections are scheduled for April 2015. Although the latter are more than a year away, political parties, political aspirants, and even [former presidents](#) are already wrangling to influence Nigeria's next election. Recent events in both countries reveal one striking similarity: the absence of distinctions based on policies, issues, or ideologies tends to produce weak political parties and to exaggerate the importance of individual politicians. In this climate, political accountability is difficult to achieve. [more...](#)



Voters from Lagos Island, Nigeria, in 1998. To date, thousands have died as a result of election-related violence in Nigeria. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ELECTIONS IN BISSAU: HOPE FOR THE BEST, BUT EXPECT THE WORST

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Presidential and legislative elections have been scheduled for March 16, 2014, in Guinea-Bissau, Africa's first so-called [narco-state](#). Voting in Guinea-Bissau rarely occurs without some major disruption, as political assassinations and military coups have come to characterize the political system in the country. No elected president has ever completed a term in office, and all but one have been ousted by the military. In recent years, cocaine transiting the country en route to Europe has raised the stakes even higher, creating lucrative opportunities for those with access to the state's resources. With no end to this illicit trade in sight, it is possible that the upcoming elections will be marred by irregularities and probable that the elected president will govern at the behest of the military. A more positive result would be a first for Guinea-Bissau. [more...](#)



Guinea Bissau troops sit in front of the electoral commission offices as they guard ballot boxes in Bissau, Guinea Bissau. (AP Photo/Shaikh van Zuydam.)

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About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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A brief attempt at an [opposition alliance](#) in South Africa ahead of April's elections fell apart almost as quickly as it was announced. The Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa's largest opposition party, which received approximately 17 percent of the vote in 2009, announced a merger with Agang SA on January 28, 2014. Agang SA was formed in February 2013 by Mamphele Ramphela, an anti-apartheid activist and former partner of the late Black Consciousness leader, Steve Biko. Ramphela was announced as the DA's presidential candidate. Almost immediately there were accusations by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) that the merger was merely [window dressing](#) and that the DA, whose supporters typically tend to not be black, was seeking to "rent a leader" and "rent a black." Lending credence to this charge, there was little substantial discussion of policy associated with the merger. Just five days later, after an uproar within Agang SA, in which members complained they were not consulted about the merger, the DA announced that Mamphele had reneged on their agreement to [stand for election](#) and the merger would not go forward. This episode compounds the DA's existing difficulties, including its lack of success in articulating its policies. More than 50 percent of young adults in South Africa think the DA, if elected, would [reinstate apartheid](#).

In Nigeria, the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) has been slowly hemorrhaging members. The PDP has won every electoral contest since the return to civilian multiparty rule in 1999, but a leadership crisis is threatening to tear the party apart from within. Despite the absence of an official announcement, it is widely believed that the current president, Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, will seek re-election in 2015. In 2010, Jonathan, who was vice president at the time, assumed the presidency on an interim basis after the death of President Umaru Yar'Adua, a Muslim. Because of the strong and overlapping social cleavages in Nigeria (mostly Muslim Hausa-Fulani north and a mostly Christian Igbo and Yoruba south), PDP leadership had made a gentleman's agreement that the presidency would alternate between the south and the north. Jonathan's insistence on running in 2011 angered many Muslim northerners who felt their "turn" in the Presidency had been unfairly cut short because Yar'Adua had only served for three years. Ensuing violence led to the deaths of at least 800 in post-election riots. There are significant concerns that [another Jonathan campaign](#) will lead to more death and division.

In November 2013, an [opposition faction](#) within the PDP broke ranks with the party and joined the newly formed All Progressives Congress (APC). The APC insists that [more senators and governors](#) will defect to it from the PDP in March, and at this point, it is unclear who will run for president under the APC banner. There is speculation that [Muhammadu Bahari](#), a northerner who has run unsuccessfully against three previous PDP candidates, is on the short list.

In what was seen as a PDP attempt to bring the defectors back into the fold, the national chairman of the PDP, [Bamanga Tukur](#), resigned in January. So far, there has been no indication of reconciliation. In another development, former vice president

[Atiku Abubakar resigned](#) from the party in early February. Abubakar is a serial party-switcher, having previously quit the PDP in 2006 after a dispute with former president Olusegun Obasanjo and rejoined after Obasanjo's retirement in 2007. The PDP has again reached out to Abubakar and urged [him to return](#).

The ongoing defections may cause Jonathan to reconsider his candidacy. Alternatively, they may provide PDP members, whose main interest is retaining political power, with reasons to oppose Jonathan in the party's primary later this year.

These developments illustrate the fluidity of political party attachments, especially at the elite level. Party switching is nothing new in Nigeria. Political aspirants routinely [party hop](#) prior to elections in an attempt to secure office.

The situation is slightly different in South Africa, where the ANC has dominated every post-apartheid election. The opposition's miscalculation in prematurely announcing an alliance projected an image of disorganization and lack of professionalism. This stumble will help the ANC retain its dominant majority in the next election.

What can we conclude about the state of democracy in these countries? First, weak parties are associated with personalization of political power. Individuals reign supreme over issues and policies. In Nigeria, this may also lead to electoral violence. There has been a steady increase in [fatalities](#) associated with Nigerian elections since 1999. Second, in both cases the representational ties and accountability mechanisms believed to be produced by democratic elections are undermined by voters having no real choice among alternative policies advocated by the different political parties. Voters are left to base their choices on the popularity of a candidate, patronage, gratitude for liberation, or the fundamental desire for peace.

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Guinea Bissau troops sit in front of the electoral commission offices as they guard ballot boxes in Bissau, Guinea Bissau. (AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

Interim Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros recently confirmed that general elections will be held on March 16, marking the end of transitional rule. The elections were originally scheduled for April 2012, but a military coup forced their postponement. November 24, 2013, was designated as the make-up date, but logistical problems and funding shortfalls prevented the elections from occurring. The gap in funding appears to have been rectified by donations from [East Timor and Nigeria](#), with about [half of the \\$30 million](#) needed for electoral support received to date. (East Timor, like Guinea-Bissau a former Portuguese colony, has historically had a strong relationship with the country, and former East Timorese President Jose Ramos-Horta is the UN's special representative to Guinea-Bissau.) Progress in the registration process is also encouraging, with approximately 400,000 of the targeted 800,000 voters now registered. Guinea-Bissauan authorities have even begun the biometric voter registration process of its [35,000 nationals in The Gambia](#). All told, many observers, [including the African Union](#), are optimistic that the country will be prepared to hold elections in March.

Elections, however, do not always equate to democratic development, especially in Guinea-Bissau. The dominance of the military in all aspects of government has resulted in a system in which senior military officers effectively rule the country through civilian surrogates. For example, following the April 2012 coup military leaders, [claiming they had no political ambitions](#), appointed [Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo](#) to lead the Transitional National Council.

Although the president is the face of the nation, he is obliged to provide the appearance of civilian rule while hewing to the wishes of the country's military masters.¹ He must also contend with tribal politics that, while not particularly divisive in Guinea-Bissauan society, do play out at the highest political levels. Civil-military relations are especially affected by ethnicity, since one ethnic group, the Balanta, is disproportionately represented in the military. Given that political parties are loosely associated with different ethnic groups, the president must at times work across institutional, political, and ethnic lines. Yet if the president fails to protect the interests of the generals—such as in safeguarding their role in facilitating [cocaine trafficking](#) through Guinea-Bissau—he runs the risk of being ousted and replaced by someone who will². Similarly, if a front-runner in a presidential election is not allied with, or at least willing to concede some influence to, the military leadership, recent history has shown that the entire election may be compromised.³

An optimistic assessment is that the March elections will proceed without major disruption. Even if that proves to be the case, future political instability is likely. No president in the history of the country has completed his term in office (three have been deposed, one assassinated and one died of natural causes). A change in that pattern seems unlikely at a time when competition for the spoils of the drug trade has raised the stakes higher than ever.

- ¹ This assertion is based on the author's dissertation research, which found that the military's unique role in Guinea-Bissau is due to its role in the country's struggle for independence from Portugal. The Bissauan military was one of a handful of African militaries that fought (and won) independence from its colonial master. Since that time, the military has been viewed by citizens as the most prestigious and capable institution in the country. In the years that followed, the generals adopted an entitlement mentality, reminding citizens that they sacrificed life and limb for the country's independence and were therefore entitled to their fair share of resources. They even coined the phrase "En esc e lute" meaning "It was us who fought." This entitlement mentality explains why the military constantly intervenes in politics, or why its members are the first to be paid when donor funding is received.
- ² Most analysts agree that the rivalry and ultimately assassinations of former President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira and General Batista Tagme Na Waie were due in some part to competition for control of the drug trade. This example, plus the military's record of interfering in politics, lends credence to this assertion.
- ³ This occurred most recently in the 2012 elections when the frontrunner, Carlos Gomes Júnior, was arrested following a military coup in the days leading up to the election. Gomes had a tense relationship with the military and had indicated during his campaign his plans to reform the armed forces, which would have significantly reduced their numbers and influence.

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THE AFRICAN GROWTH STORY CONTINUES—BUT WHAT IF...

By George F. Ward, Jr.

The World Bank's latest report on [Global Economic Prospects](#) projects that economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa will modestly accelerate over the next few years. The World Bank foresees an increase from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 5.3 percent in 2014 and 5.5 percent in 2016. Excluding South Africa, the African growth picture looks even stronger, with GDP growth averaging 6 percent in 2013. The International Monetary Fund is even more sanguine about Africa's prospects, foreseeing [6 percent growth](#) for sub-Saharan Africa in 2014. The pattern of moderately strong economic growth that has persisted in sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the millennium has been based on high resource prices, substantial external investment, and strong growth in consumption by an emerging African middle class. Although Africa's economic growth is likely to continue, a number of potential developments could slow, if not reverse, Africa's secular expansion trend. It is worth considering these potential developments, which could affect political and social, as well as economic, stability, if only to avoid the assumption that past patterns will persist indefinitely. [more...](#)



Union leader Joseph Mathunjwa, center, sings and dances with mine workers outside Lonmin's platinum mine in Marikana near Rustenburg, South Africa, Thursday, Jan. 23, 2014. (AP Photo/Themba Hadebe.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward, Jr. is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Namibia.

ZIMBABWE OPPOSITION FACES LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE

By Alexander Noyes

President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is not the only party experiencing a leadership [struggle](#) in Zimbabwe. After suffering a decisive defeat in the July 31, 2013, national elections, Zimbabwe's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change faction led by former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), has faced several internal challenges to Tsvangirai's leadership, which he has held since the party's founding in 1999. The most recent plea for Tsvangirai to step down emerged in the last week of January 2014, when a letter authored by the party's deputy treasurer and former energy minister, Elton Mangoma, became [public](#). The letter [called](#) for "leadership renewal" within the party, asking Tsvangirai to voluntarily step down for the good of the party. The Tsvangirai camp subsequently dug in its heels, suggesting that an internal challenge to Tsvangirai's leadership will be drawn out and, if mishandled, would likely be costly to the party. [more...](#)



Former Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai delivers an address in Harare, Friday, Jan. 24, 2014. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

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Union leader Joseph Mathunjwa, center, sings and dances with mine workers outside Lonmin's platinum mine in Marikana near Rustenburg, South Africa, Thursday, Jan. 23, 2014. (AP Photo/Themba Hadebe.)

In the past, Africa's relative lack of integration with the global economic system has shielded the continent from economic downturns. This was true, for example, during the worldwide recession that began in 2008. As pointed out previously in *Africa Watch*, Africa's ties to global financial networks have grown recently. One example has been [increased access](#) by African countries to international credit markets.

When the U.S. Sneezes, Africa Catches Cold

In recent years, Western government monetary policies have kept interest rates low. In response, investors have sought higher returns outside the developed world, including in Africa, which has benefited from increased foreign direct investment (FDI) and availability of credit. The commencement by the Federal Reserve of the "tapering" of asset purchases has led to an increase in U.S. interest rates, creating the prospect that Western investors might retreat from emerging markets to take advantage of better returns at home. The result has been a decline, perhaps exaggerated, in the value of emerging market currencies, including the South Africa rand ([down 19 percent in 2013](#)) and the Ghanaian cedi ([down 23 percent in 2013](#)).

The effective devaluation of African currencies and resulting higher import prices triggered both increased inflation and government measures that may prove unwise. Inflation in Ghana, recently one of the world's best performing economies and a new oil exporter, reached [13.5 percent](#) in December 2013. Similarly, inflation is growing in South Africa, increasing pressure on firms, which face worker demands for higher wages, higher input costs, and an inability to raise prices. Central banks in both countries have raised interest rates and, in the case of Ghana, imposed [foreign exchange controls](#).

Implications for Stability

The World Bank lists stricter global financing conditions as one of the major threats to Africa's continued growth scenario. Other observers are [debating](#) whether the current situation could develop into the kind of generalized emerging market crisis that occurred in 1997, which resulted in significant social unrest in Southeast Asia. So far, the consensus is that a full-blown crisis can be avoided.

Even if this proves to be the case, the effects in Africa of higher interest rates could be outside. South Africa is already experiencing unrest in the mining sector that has significantly reduced production of platinum-group metals. The [three largest platinum producers](#) have been hit by strikes orchestrated by a new and more militant union, which is demanding the doubling of wages for entry-level workers. One expert reckoned the costs of these strikes as around [\\$36 million per day](#). Although South Africa has usually been successful in bringing labor unrest to peaceful conclusions, that has not always been the case. In 2012, police shot and [killed 34](#) striking miners. A repeat of this sort of violence could have a significant impact on the campaign for the elections announced for May 2014.

The larger threat to African stability is that the stifling of growth in key countries such as South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya could have knock-on effects across the continent. Experts at Maplecroft, a UK-based risk consultancy, have called attention to the deteriorating operating environment for investors caused by exposure to external cross-border shocks, and they say that 30 percent of African economies are [more at risk](#) now than in 2012. Separately, the United Nations has [expressed concern](#) that decreased FDI could limit growth in sectors such as telecommunications, financial services, transport, and construction, which are Africa's best hopes for reducing dependence on extractive industries and providing jobs for the steady stream of new entrants to the labor market.

Finally, the negative implications for Africa of the end of monetary easing in the West may be compounded by reductions in the foreign assistance budgets of developed nations. According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the reduction of aid budgets will hit Africa's fragile states the hardest. Half of those states are expected to see a [drop in aid](#) by 2015.

In the end, African resilience may prevail. There is, however, reason for concern that the combination of monetary tightening in the West, social tensions in Africa, and reduced foreign assistance might combine to produce a pause in the virtuous cycle that has brought impressive economic progress to the continent for more than a decade.

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Former Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai delivers an address in Harare, Friday, Jan. 24, 2014. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

The letter has further deepened rifts within the MDC-T, which was part of the power-sharing government that was in office from 2009 to 2013 in Zimbabwe. The party is [reportedly](#) divided between two major factions, those in Tsvangirai's camp and those supporting former finance minister and secretary general of MDC-T, Tendai Biti. While Biti has not publicly declared his intentions to challenge Tsvangirai, the *Mail and Guardian* [reported](#) that Biti, Mangoma, and the party vice president, Thokozani Khuphe, met with Tsvangirai after the letter went public and asked him to resign. An MDC official [asserted](#), "Mangoma's letter has widened cracks in the party. . . There are many people who respect him [Mangoma] for being honest with Tsvangirai. But the letter has also angered a lot of people. . ."

Tsvangirai has staunchly refused to step aside, and MDC-T has, for the time being at least, rejected Mangoma's request that an early party congress be held to decide the issue of leadership. After a party meeting, MDC-T spokesperson Douglas Mwonzora [declared](#), "As things stand, the congress will be held in 2016, but in the MDC we subject everything to the views of the majority, including Mangoma's views, which were examined during a standing committee meeting. His proposals were rejected, but should the national council vary its resolution, we will have an early congress." The national council is the highest decision-making body of the party and, along with the president, can call for an early congress.

Although refusing to stand down, Tsvangirai has also defended Mangoma's right to speak openly. Some within Tsvangirai's camp, namely youth groups, [demonstrated](#) against Mangoma during recent party meetings and would not disperse until Tsvangirai demanded that they do so. Mwonzora stated that Mangoma would not be punished for his actions. That said, it seems some retaliatory action has been levied at Mangoma, because he is no longer in sole control of the party's finances. A number of other party officials, including Tsvangirai, are now [reportedly](#) required to sign off on the party's accounts.

Because of Mugabe's advanced age, ailing health, and ZANU-PF's own contentious and unresolved succession struggle, Zimbabwe's 2018 presidential elections may present MDC-T with its best opportunity to date for capturing state power. An internal struggle over leadership within the party therefore takes on particularly high stakes; if it is

mishandled, the fallout is likely to be costly. A drawn-out struggle to unseat Tsvangirai could significantly weaken the opposition's chances at the ballot—exactly what Mugabe and ZANU-PF are hoping for. Whatever the final outcome, if the opposition in Zimbabwe is to remain viable, it would be wise for MDC-T to settle the leadership issue as discreetly and as quickly as possible and then begin rebuilding the necessary structures and support to compete at the polls.

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IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

For the past several months, the [United Nations](#), [France](#), and other [international groups](#) have been warning that the Central African Republic (CAR) is facing widespread communal violence, religious in nature, that could take on genocidal proportions. It is unclear, however, from where the enmity originates. Although the country has been notoriously unstable since independence from France in 1960, communal violence of this specific nature and severity is unprecedented. Furthermore, the politicization of any form of identity is only a comparatively recent phenomenon, believed to have begun in the 1980s as a result of the political machinations of former president André Kolingba. Because there is little or no history of religious conflict in CAR, it is important to understand the context of the situation that is unfolding, to help ensure that remedies undertaken by the international community do not end up doing more harm than good. [more...](#)




Catherine Samba-Panza stands in front of the Central African Republic flag as she is selected as interim president. (Source: AP Photo/Herve Sereffo.)

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URBANIZATION + CONSTRUCTION + ILLICIT TRADE = MORE MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH REAL ESTATE?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Africa's [rapid urbanization](#) is drawing millions of people to its largest cities, necessitating massive new residential and commercial construction projects. Given the growth of transnational crime across the continent, the real estate sector offers an ideal vehicle for organized crime groups, terrorist organizations, and corrupt public officials to disguise the illegal origins of their gains and to integrate that money into the formal economy. [more...](#)



Source: <http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/soac10/soac-pr1-en.pdf>.

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
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IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

For the past several months, the [United Nations](#), [France](#), and other [international groups](#) have been warning that the Central African Republic (CAR) is facing widespread communal violence, religious in nature, that could take on genocidal proportions. It is unclear, however, from where the enmity originates. Although the country has been notoriously unstable since independence from France in 1960, communal violence of this specific nature and severity is unprecedented. Furthermore, the politicization of any form of identity is only a comparatively recent phenomenon, believed to have begun in the 1980s as a result of the political machinations of former president André Kolingba.¹ Because there is little or no history of religious conflict in CAR, it is important to understand the context of the situation that is unfolding, to help ensure that remedies undertaken by the international community do not end up doing more harm than good.



Catherine Samba-Panza stands in front of the Central African Republic flag as she is selected as interim president. (Source: AP Photo/Herve Serefi.)

In March 2013, then-president Francois Bozizé was ousted by Séléka rebels, a loose coalition of groups from the north of the country. Michel Djotodia, their self-appointed leader, took over as transitional president of CAR. Amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation in which hundreds of thousands were displaced and thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) murdered, Djotodia was [forced to resign](#) by regional leaders at a summit in N'Djamena, Chad, in January 2014. [Catherine Samba-Panza](#), formerly interim mayor of the capital Bangui, was selected as new transitional president on January 20, 2014.

Djotodia was the first Muslim leader of the mostly Christian CAR. [Muslims comprise](#) approximately 15 percent of the population, Protestants comprise about 25 percent, Roman Catholics comprise about 25 percent, and the remaining roughly 35 percent hold some form of indigenous belief. The Séléka rebels are believed to be mostly Muslims from the north, although there have been several reports that some of the rebels are [Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries](#).

During Djotodia's brief rule, Séléka rebels engaged in looting, rape, and murder of civilians. As a means of protection, various community-based groups formed to prevent aggression against civilians. This is not the first time that [local protection militias](#) have been formed in the CAR to address the lack of security provided by the central government. These current groups, known as anti-balaka, are believed to be mostly Christian, but their origins and leadership are largely [unknown](#). Some have speculated that former president [Bozizé controls more than half the anti-balaka forces](#). These forces have recently been accused of attacking Muslims and former Séléka rebels, seeking revenge for the many atrocities committed during Séléka's brief rule. Some of the anti-balaka militias have been particularly [brazen](#) in their attacks; in one instance, they kicked a suspected ex-Séléka rebel to death in front of a several journalists directly after a press conference held by Samba-Panza.

Because of the way the fault lines have formed over the past year or so, with Muslims and Christians seemingly on opposite sides of an escalating conflict, [many](#) have depicted this conflict as sectarian in nature. But there is no significant history of sectarian conflict and no deep-seated religious enmity between Christians and Muslims in CAR. Central African [political](#) and [religious leaders](#) have repeatedly asserted that it is insecurity and the fight for power that is driving the conflict, not religious divisions. Furthermore, the trend over the past 30 years has been to politicize ethnicity in CAR, not religion. Former president André Kolingba (1981–93) was the first to explicitly reward his ethnic group, the Yakoma from southern CAR, with patronage and support.² His successor, Ange-Félix Patassé (1993–2003), who came to power as the

¹ Andres Mehler, "The Shaky Foundations, Adverse Circumstances, and Limited Achievements of Democratic

² Mehler, "The Shaky Foundations."

result of a coup, in turn dismissed Yakoma and rewarded his supporters from the Northwest, mostly Sara-Kaba, with government positions and patronage. Patassé was the first president to come from the North. Bozizé, who deposed Patassé, also came from the North and continued some of the same patronage-based practices as his predecessor, including the preferential treatment of members of his ethnic group, the Gbaya. Kolingba, Patassé, and Bozizé were all Christian.

In 2012, the [U.S. State Department](#) analyzed the nature of social conflict in CAR and concluded that while some repression of Muslims was taking place, it was not organized or sustained at a mass level. The violence currently taking place is new, unprecedented, and spreading. According to a local report from [Berbérati](#), located in southwest CAR, there was never a problem between Christians and Muslims, who make up approximately one-third of the city's population, until the past few months. Now, Muslims are fleeing CAR's third largest city in droves.

Further complicating the matter, sizable deposits of country's [gem-quality](#) diamonds are located in the northeast of the country. Gold and iron deposits are also found all throughout the east of the country. Because the CAR's mineral deposits are dispersed, much of the mining sector has been dominated by artisanal miners. And because of the state's inability to enforce laws, diamond smuggling is a lucrative operation undertaken by a number of domestic and foreign actors.

Although a handful of incidents between Muslims and Christians have occurred over the past decade, significantly more conflict has resulted from the interference of CAR's neighbors to the north, most notably Chad. Throughout the 2000s, and especially after Bozizé came to power in 2003, the Central African government was routinely unable to secure the northern part of the country. It faced repeated challenges from rebels supporting former president Patassé and incursions by Chadians, Libyans, Congolese, and Sudanese rebels and bandits. The frequent interference of CAR's neighbors has caused the ethnic cleavage between the Yakoma and an amorphous "North" to take on an added dimension, with northerners in general being described as foreigners. This pattern of government weakness, ethnic favoritism, domestic neglect, and foreign intervention may have created a perfect storm for a conflict that is being depicted as religious but in reality encompasses many more factors.

Why is it hazardous to [mischaracterize](#) this conflict? To address the worsening situation, the CAR needs security, development, and governance. [Misunderstanding](#) the true drivers of conflict will lead to inappropriate and inadequate attempts to resolve it. For example, if the focus is on religious mediation and nothing is done to address the underlying causes, there will be no durable resolution. Mislabeling conflicts can also exacerbate and inflame tensions, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Events in [Berbérati](#) may reflect this dynamic.

Finally, describing the conflict as sectarian, or based on ideological divisions between non-state actors, obscures who benefits from a chaotic and ungoverned CAR. Potential beneficiaries include: previously marginalized political actors who can insert themselves into the conflict as peacemakers, rebel groups who can use chaos to continue to operate in the North with impunity, and illegal miners who profit from the lack of government control over natural resources.


Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

URBANIZATION + CONSTRUCTION + ILLICIT TRADE = MORE MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH REAL ESTATE?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Africa's [rapid urbanization](#) is drawing millions of people to its largest cities, necessitating massive new residential and commercial construction projects. Given the growth of transnational crime across the continent, the real estate sector offers an ideal vehicle for organized crime groups, terrorist organizations, and corrupt public officials to disguise the illegal origins of their gains and to integrate that money into the formal economy.

AFRICAN URBAN POPULATION TREND 1950-2050



* Projections

Source: <http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/soac10/soac-pr1-en.pdf>.

Why is the real estate sector ideal for money laundering?

The nexus between criminal activity and money laundering through real estate has been often associated with construction booms in the developed world, such as [Miami in the 1980s](#) or [Japan in the late 1980s](#). In Africa, the complex confluence of migration, urbanization, growing foreign direct investment, and increasing remittance inflows from diaspora communities abroad have facilitated [construction booms](#) in cities such as Lagos, Nigeria; Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Luanda, Angola. For many, this trend symbolizes economic development and an enhanced status on the international stage. For criminals, this environment offers an ideal mechanism through which they can launder their gains.

The act of [purchasing property](#) can lend itself to money laundering. In many West African countries, for example, the wide variation in property prices makes purchasing conducive to the laundering process. That is, prices vary drastically by location or by the identities of the buyer and seller (e.g., family members or individuals of the same ethnic group will often be offered lower prices). The absence of published average market prices for property means that under- or over-valuation does not draw attention. Moreover, purchasing property with cash does not raise suspicion in cash-based economies and leaves no audit trail.

The absence of a legal or regulatory framework or any public institutions to oversee the real estate sector allows money laundering to thrive in many African markets. The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) has assessed that certain West African countries, most notably [Nigeria and Senegal](#), have attempted to establish control mechanisms to regulate the real estate sector, but most countries have not yet established sound anti-money-laundering laws or guidelines for real estate agents. The effectiveness of the controls that have been instituted is disappointing. Nigeria's Money Laundering Prohibition Act provides that any cash transactions beyond the threshold of Naira 500,000 (about \$3,000) should be reported. Yet since the law came into effect in 1993, there have not been any reported cases of cash transactions.

The real estate profession itself is often inadequately regulated in African countries. Whereas many developed countries require that real estate agents be professionally trained, be registered, and adhere to basic ethics rules, [real estate agents in many African countries](#) are untrained, unregistered, and willing to turn a blind eye to nefarious activity. For example, they may oversee the sale of property to third parties, front men, or fictitious individuals, thus protecting the actual owner who is using the transaction to launder criminal proceeds.

How can they do it?

The real estate sector can be used to facilitate money laundering in a number of ways. According to GIABA, undervaluation of property is one common technique. A deliberately low price is negotiated in a contract to allow buyers to obtain a loan for the property, supplementing this official price with cash, which may be from criminal sources, to complete the sale. When the property is resold at the fair market price, the seller effectively converts illegal income into seemingly legitimate profits. Alternatively, criminals may obtain loans to legally fund mortgages on properties and then pay off the mortgages before term with dirty money. In this way, illicit funds are injected into the formal financial system.

Shell companies are another vehicle commonly used by criminals to deposit illegal gains. To give the appearance of a profitable business, money launderers typically purchase property and run operations that may or may not be legitimate. In the case of legitimate businesses, because the criminally run operation has enough disposable income to undercut its competitors, it eventually crowds them out of the market.

Because data on money laundering are difficult to obtain, analysts must often rely on anecdotal evidence or anomalous trends that may be associated with criminal transactions. A frequently cited piece of evidence is that the rise in real estate purchases in several major West African cities in recent years does not seem to be correlated to similar ratios of [banking mortgages](#), leading many to believe that these purchases are the result of money laundering.

Conclusion

The amount of money illegally in the economy has social consequences for African citizens. In [Kenya](#), for example, there are reports that the inflow of Somali pirate funds has contributed to the rapid increase in urban property prices, which has made it difficult for middle-income families to afford homes. In the mid-2000s, South Africa experienced a sharp rise in housing prices, which the President of the Financial Action Task Force [attributed](#) to money laundering. The [UN estimates](#) that the population of some African cities will grow by up to 85 percent in the next 15 years. If governments continue to fail to regulate the real estate sector or to enforce anti-money-laundering laws, the effect of illegal money on the real estate market will persist and likely grow.

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENSE—TIME FOR DECISIONS?

By George F. Ward

A wide-ranging official review of South Africa's defense needs that was commissioned in mid-2011 for completion by October 2012 has been languishing for over a year. The delay has not been due to shortcomings in the study. On the contrary, the members of the Defense Review committee are credited with producing a [workable plan](#) that could guide the South African military for the next 20 years. The failure to act on the review's recommendation—or even to present the review formally to Parliament—has had more to do with its potential costs and [resistance](#) from within state-controlled defense industries. It was therefore a surprise when South African President Jacob Zuma announced in a [speech](#) on February 21, 2014, that cabinet approval of a plan for support of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) was imminent and that action would be taken before the elections scheduled for May 7. The question now is why did Zuma grasp the defense nettle in the sensitive pre-electoral period? [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward, Jr. is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Namibia.



South African president Jacob Zuma, left, arrives at Parliament for the yearly South African State of the Nation address in the city of Cape Town, South Africa, Thursday, Feb. 13, 2014. (AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam, Pool.)

A VIABLE “THIRD WAY” POLITICAL PARTY IN MOZAMBIQUE?

By Alexander Noyes

On February 8, 2014, the MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique), a rising opposition party in Mozambique, [won](#) a re-run municipal election in Gurue, located in the central province of Zambezia. Local municipal elections were held across the country on November 20, 2013, but the Constitutional Council ordered a re-run in Gurue because of irregularities. The November municipal elections took place despite boycotts and threats of disruption by RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). RENAMO, the traditional opposition party led by Afonso Dhlakama, fought a decades-long civil war with the current ruling party, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique). Current President Armando Guebuza heads FRELIMO. Although FRELIMO prevailed in 49 out of 53 municipalities, the MDM, in addition to the recent win in Gurue, was able to [capture](#) three of the country's four largest cities in November and performed well in the capital of Maputo, where it polled above 40 percent. These results indicate a shifting political landscape in Mozambique ahead of the upcoming national elections in October 2014. [more...](#)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



Daviz Simango, from his Facebook page. Source: <https://www.facebook.com/Daviz.Simango>

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A Candid Assessment

The Defense Review was undertaken by a blue-ribbon panel chaired by Roelf Meyer, a former minister of defense renowned for the constructive role that he played during the transition to democracy. The review, which began with a thorough analysis of South Africa's national interests and defense priorities, took an unblinking look at the current status of the country's defense establishment, [concluding](#), "the persistent disconnect between the defense mandate, South Africa's growing defense commitments and the resource allocation has eroded defense capabilities to the point where the Defense Force is unable to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people, and is hard pressed even to maintain its current modest level of commitments." The committee posed a simple, binary choice: either provide greater budget resources for defense or scale down the country's ambition and commitments. Even with immediate action, the committee forecasted that it would take a decade to reverse the decline and build a credible defense capability.

The shortcomings of the SANDF have been amply [catalogued](#):

- The army is three battalions short of what it needs to fulfill current commitments, and its equipment is largely obsolete.
- The air force cannot afford the fuel to retain pilot proficiency in its Swedish-built Gripen fighter aircraft, and it relies on World War II-era DC-3s for transport and maritime surveillance. (At the same time, one element of the air force managed 203 flights in chartered Gulfstream aircraft over a three-year period for a former defense minister.)
- The navy spends little time at sea and many of its ships are nonoperational.
- Investment in defense is now only around 1.2 percent of GDP, well short of the 2 percent recommended by the International Monetary Fund.



South African president Jacob Zuma, left, arrives at Parliament for the yearly South African State of the Nation address in the city of Cape Town, South Africa, Thursday, Feb. 13, 2014. (AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam, Pool.)

Increasing Regional Security Challenges

In quieter times, the decay in South Africa's defense capabilities might have attracted less attention. These are not ordinary times in terms of security on the African continent, however, and recent developments have pointed out the need for South African forces in meeting regional contingencies, as well as the shortcomings of those forces.

Last March, thousands of armed rebels attacked a force of 200 South African soldiers engaged in training and security duties in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR). The SANDF force acquitted itself ably and [inflicted heavy casualties](#) on the opposing force. At the same time, the South Africans had 13 killed and 27 wounded, and the contingent was withdrawn from the CAR. The number of SANDF casualties shocked the nation and sparked a debate about the adequacy of defense resources, with observers noting that the force in the CAR was dependent on chartered airlift for support.

Other developments have also highlighted gaps in Africa's security architecture. When Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a former South African foreign minister, won a [hotly contested election](#) for the office of chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission in July 2012, she found herself at the helm of an organization short on resources and struggling to achieve the ambitious goals it had set for itself in several areas, including peace and security.

One of the key shortfalls in the AU's capabilities is the lack of a quick-reaction force able to respond to military contingencies on the continent. In over eight years of effort, the organization made little progress in putting together an [African Standby Force](#). Seeking to support his compatriot at the AU, South African President Zuma has become a principal proponent of the AU's scaled-down version of a rapid reaction force, the ponderously named African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). In November 2013, Zuma convened a summit of African leaders to promote the ACIRC. In the event, attendance at the [summit](#) was sparse, and action on the ACIRC was punted to a working group that has thus far not produced a result.

One reason for the lack of progress on the ACIRC is the shortage of capable African ground forces. Despite its current difficulties, the SANDF offers some of the best capabilities on the continent, which would be needed by any African quick-reaction force. An example of what a quick-reaction force could contribute is the defeat of the M23 rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by the forces of the DRC, supported by the UN's new [Force Intervention Brigade](#) (FIB). The South African contingent in the FIB, which included an infantry battalion and attack helicopters, played a key role in the engagement.

Conclusion

As Jacob Zuma assesses his African security options with these developments in mind, he may well have concluded that this is the time for action. The political opposition, already weakened by its failure to conclude an electoral alliance, will not protest measures taken to strengthen the country's defenses. Resource decisions will come with a cost, but most of the bills can probably be deferred. For now, Zuma may content himself with relatively modest defense budget increases, while providing rhetorical reassurance and moral support to a defense force that is struggling against a severe mismatch of commitments and capabilities.

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Daviz Simango, from his Facebook page.

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/Daviz.Simango>

Emerging from a split within RENAMO's leadership in 2008, the MDM was formed by Daviz Simango, a civil engineer by training. After being dropped from the RENAMO ticket, Simango ran in local 2008 elections as an independent candidate and was reelected as mayor of Beira, the country's second largest city after Maputo. In the wake of his reelection, he formed the MDM in March 2009. The barely six-month-old MDM party won eight parliamentary seats in the subsequent 2009 national election. The party would have likely garnered much more support if it had not been [barred](#) from running in 9 of 13 constituencies, allegedly due to inadequate paperwork. Capitalizing on RENAMO's slumping support and boycotting of by-elections in 2011, the MDM increased its popularity, [winning](#) by-elections in Quelimane, the fourth largest city in the country. The MDM targets its message toward urban youths and has strong support among that segment of the population, which is not burdened by memories of the country's civil war. The party [focuses](#) on issues of accountability of elected officials, distribution of wealth, and improving public services.

While RENAMO is still the second largest political party represented in parliament, its support has dropped since the 1990s. Dhlakama's decisions to decamp to a former guerilla base in Gorongosa, launch attacks against FRELIMO, [threaten](#) a return to civil war, and boycott elections have hurt the party over the last several years. In 1994, RENAMO [won](#) 112 out of 250 seats in parliament, and Dhlakama won 33 percent of the presidential vote. By 2009, however, RENAMO gained only 51 seats, and Dhlakama polled a mere 16 percent in the presidential vote. It [appears](#) Dhlakama may finally be changing tactics, as he recently began a new round of negotiations with the government and stated RENAMO's intentions to participate in the 2014 elections.

The recent municipal election results in Mozambique illustrate how RENAMO's uncompromising actions and election boycotts have proved to be costly to the party in political terms and a boon to the rising MDM party, a prospect that was highlighted in the October 25 [edition](#) of Africa Watch. Although Dhlakama asserts that RENAMO will return to the political process and participate in the 2014 national elections, it appears that much damage to RENAMO has already been done, with the MDM filling the opposition vacuum and establishing itself as an alternative to the FRELIMO-RENAMO political dichotomy that has dominated Mozambican politics since the end of the war in 1992. While FRELIMO's grip on power is unlikely to be broken in the 2014 elections, and RENAMO's reentry into the political space may split the opposition vote in

some areas, the MDM's impressive levels of urban support and strong showing in the municipal elections suggest that it is a viable "third way" political force that can compete nationally.

Because Guebuza is unlikely to run for a third term in office—such a maneuver would require a change to the constitution—FRELIMO's choice of presidential candidate may further improve MDM's chances at the polls, particularly if a relatively unproven candidate is chosen to [succeed Guebuza](#).

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ELECTRONIC WASTE: OPPORTUNITY TO BRIDGE THE DIGITAL DIVIDE OR ECO-DISASTER?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Waste from electrical and electronic equipment, sometimes called “e-waste,” has emerged as a serious environmental threat in West Africa. In many developing countries, citizens often cannot afford the latest equipment, and inexpensive, second-hand devices are in demand. As a result, a mutually beneficial relationship has formed between e-waste exporters in industrialized nations and African merchants who purchase this waste. The environmental impacts and the possible risks to personal information contained on these devices, however, create concerns. [more...](#)

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Burning site manned by children, Agbogbloshie scrap yard, Ghana. (Source: Yaw Amoyaw-Osei et al., Ghana e-Waste Country Assessment, SBC e-Waste Africa Project, March 2011, <http://www.weee-forum.org/documents/2011-ghana-e-waste-country-assessment>.)

MALAWI ELECTION WATCH MAY 2014: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On May 20, 2014, Malawians are set to cast their ballots in the country's fifth multiparty election held since the transition to multiparty rule in 1993. The presidential election is likely to be highly contentious. Incumbent Joyce Banda is increasingly unpopular because of corruption scandals and seems vulnerable to challenge. Two of the [11 approved candidates](#) are related to former presidents (both of whom have been accused of corruption during their tenures in office), and one of these two came dangerously close to subverting the constitution in a failed effort to assume the presidency in 2012. On its face, the election has several elements that could lead to either pre- or post-election violence—it is a close contest, there are staunch political rivalries, and a history of deadly protest exists. But the strength of civil society and the autonomy of the judiciary are two major reasons to be optimistic that this election will prove peaceful and the results universally respected. [more...](#)



Protesters claimed electoral fraud after a delay in the announcement of the results of the 2004 elections. (Source: AP.)

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How it Works

Industrialized countries are the main sources of electrical and electronic equipment waste, which includes cell phones, televisions, and computers, among other devices. The United States produced nearly [9.4 million tons](#) of such cast-offs in 2012, the largest amount of any country. Since recycling is expensive and the United States has laws governing the disposal of such equipment, many recyclers opt to ship the waste to countries willing to accept it. Most of these countries are located in [South Asia and West Africa](#). Ghana and Nigeria have emerged as West Africa’s primary e-waste importers, primarily because neither is a signatory to the [Bamako Convention](#), which prohibits the importation of hazardous waste. In these countries, where there is a large market for inexpensive, second-hand electronics, local merchants purchase consignments, filter out the functional items, and dispose of the rest. Experts estimate that only 25 percent of imports are functioning products.



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Environmental Implications

But there is money to be made from the trash. Locals, often children, scavenge digital dumping grounds for the valuable components contained in e-waste. Copper wiring is most frequently scavenged for [resale on the local market](#). To access the metal, foam packaging is used as kindling to melt cables’ outer casings, exposing the copper wiring. As the casings melt, toxic smoke is released from the cables, foam, and components. Once the copper is recovered, the remaining material is often burned in the open air or left to accumulate. This method is used to extract other metals as well, such as cadmium, a valuable metal that can be extracted from computers. A single computer, however, also contains about [two kilograms of lead and inorganic chemicals](#) that can be harmful if released into the environment or ingested.

Agbogbloshie, Ghana, the world’s [largest](#) digital dumping site, is known for [inappropriate dismantling of e-waste](#). Here, children are sent into landfills in search of metals or other valuable materials. Reports indicate they can extract about [\\$2 worth of copper](#) per day from computers, telephones, and televisions that have been discarded, but often not without being exposed to toxic fumes and sustaining other injuries.

Sensitive Personal and Corporate Data Are Compromised

Transnational organized crime groups are also taking advantage of e-waste’s contents. Hard drives frequently contain personal data from their original owners. [Criminals comb through these hard drives](#) to access this data, which they then use in computer scams or, if sufficient information exists, for identity theft. One [investigative report](#) revealed that a recycled hard drive purchased in Ghana and originally owned by a large U.S. defense contractor contained details about sensitive contracts with the Defense Intelligence Agency, NASA, and the Department of Homeland Security.

Conclusion

By 2017, the volume of e-waste produced globally is expected to [grow by a third](#). The current major destinations for this waste, West Africa and South Asia, are expected to receive much of this increase. Some noteworthy programs, such as the [Solving the E-Waste Problem \(StEP\) Initiative](#), are working toward innovative e-waste management solutions. But additional international cooperation will be required to ensure that West Africa, already beleaguered by other environmental, health, and security challenges, does not continue to be the destination for much of the world's hazardous waste resulting from the disposal of electrical and electronic equipment.

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MALAWI ELECTION WATCH MAY 2014: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On May 20, 2014, Malawians are set to cast their ballots in the country's fifth multiparty election held since the transition to multiparty rule in 1993. The presidential election is likely to be highly contentious. Incumbent Joyce Banda is increasingly unpopular because of corruption scandals and seems vulnerable to challenge. Two of the [11 approved candidates](#) are related to former presidents (both of whom have been accused of corruption during their tenures in office), and one of these two came dangerously close to subverting the constitution in a failed effort to assume the presidency in 2012. On its face, the election has several elements that could lead to either pre- or post-election violence—it is a close contest, there are staunch political rivalries, and a history of deadly protest exists. But the strength of civil society and the autonomy of the judiciary are two major reasons to be optimistic that this election will prove peaceful and the results universally respected.



Protesters claimed electoral fraud after a delay in the announcement of the results of the 2004 elections. (Source: AP.)

Since Malawi's transition to multiparty elections in 1993, the country has held four presidential elections. The first, held in 1994, saw the autocratic Hastings Banda defeated by Bakili Muluzi. Muluzi was re-elected in 1999, and his hand-picked successor, Bingu wa Mutharika, won the 2004 elections and was re-elected in 2009.

Of these four elections, three (1994, 1999, and 2004) were relatively close contests, with margins of victory of 14 points or less. Only the 2009 election was lopsided. The incumbent, Mutharika, who was [very popular](#) at the time due in part to the country's robust economic growth, won the election with 66 percent of the vote. After his re-election, however, he became erratic and combative. On multiple occasions during his second term, Mutharika was accused of corruption, nepotism, and repression. In 2011, more than [20 died protesting](#) his regime.

Joyce Banda, the vice president, came to power after Mutharika died in office on April 5, 2012, but not before a brief constitutional crisis took place. Banda had previously had a falling out with President Mutharika over the party's succession plan. It is believed that Mutharika was trying to push his brother Peter into office ahead of Vice President Banda. Mutharika attempted to force Banda to resign her post, but she refused and remained in office. After Bingu wa Mutharika's death, Peter reportedly attempted to [circumvent](#) the constitutional provision that directed the vice president to assume office in the event of the death or incapacitation of the president.

The upcoming elections promise to be at least as competitive as previous ones. This will be the first election in which Banda, the incumbent, actually campaigns for the presidency. It is difficult to estimate her chances of election, but two serious corruption scandals, "[Cashgate](#)" and "[Jetgate](#)," have marred her brief tenure in office. These scandals involve the misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars of state funds that allegedly took [place largely during her time in office](#) but also during that of Mutharika. In addition, political foe Peter Mutharika will be contesting the presidency in a field of candidates that also includes Atupele Muluzi, the son of former president Muluzi.

The election has several elements that could lead to electoral violence. Yet for two reasons, it may yet prove relatively calm and peaceful. First, the election looks to be well managed. Despite the competitiveness of past elections in Malawi, only the 2004 election experienced significant violence or unrest. At that time, the electoral commission

delayed announcing the results, leading many to believe that the ruling party was attempting to steal the elections. It is estimated that [four people died](#) as a result of the protests. After the 2004 elections, several reforms were undertaken to improve the management and transparency of the electoral process. As a result, the conduct of the [2009 elections](#) was much improved. Further, [the Malawi Election Information Centre](#), an initiative meant to combine the efforts of citizens, civil society, and the electoral commission, is being launched before the 2014 election. The initiative is meant to monitor the electoral process and respond quickly to any allegations of impropriety. If the initiative works as envisioned, it will reduce the opportunities for fraud and violence to take place.

Second, the court system has demonstrated its autonomy and strength on multiple occasions, including preventing previous president Muluzi from [seeking a third term](#) as president in 2009, ruling against Bingu wa Mutharika in his attempts to oust Banda from the vice presidency, and reportedly [interpreting the succession statute](#) in favor of the vice president against some powerful interests. That civil society and political institutions in Malawi are able to demonstrate impartiality and to provide checks on the behavior of political actors bodes well for the conduct and quality of the upcoming elections.

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

WHO WILL SUCCEED ANGOLA'S DOS SANTOS?

By Alexander Noyes

On March 1, 2014, a [report](#) quoting a former official asserted that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was planning to hand power to Vice President Manuel Vicente. This report reignited speculation about the successor to Angola's president, who has been in office for over 30 years. In November 2013 dos Santos [announced](#), "From now on things will change," adding that he was considering stepping down, but he provided no details. Although Vicente, the former head of Sonangol, the state oil company, is viewed as the most likely successor, dos Santos's son, Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, is also [considered](#) a contender to take over. Because both candidates have [failed](#) to gain broad support from the MPLA's "old guard," however, a handful of other party stalwarts are also viewed as possible successors. Recently, the president's alleged ailing health, his prolonged absences overseas, and the growing popular discontent with his regime have pushed the succession issue to center stage in Angola. [more...](#)



Angolan Vice President Manuel Domingos Vicente addresses the 68th United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 2013, at U.N. headquarters. (AP Photo/Andrew Burton/Pool)

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ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMY—HEADING FOR NEW TROUBLE

By George F. Ward, Jr.

In the previous decade, Zimbabwe's hyperinflation, which reached an annual rate of [79.6 sextillion percent](#) in November 2008, received a great deal of attention. Once hyperinflation was halted by replacing the Zimbabwe dollar as legal tender with the U.S. dollar and South African rand, Zimbabwe's economy fell out of the international news. Even though the important agricultural sector had been set back by the invasion and occupation of the properties of white commercial farmers by indigenous Zimbabweans, high global prices in the mining sector and other factors buoyed Zimbabwe's economy from 2009 to 2011. Beginning in 2012, the country's economy began to slow. If current trends continue, Zimbabwe's ability to feed its growing population and meet its financial obligations will again become problematic, and a new wave of emigration and even internal unrest could ensue. [more...](#)



Chinese buyers assess some of the tobacco being auctioned on the first day of the tobacco selling season. Zimbabwe thrived on tobacco and other farm exports until the government-instigated seizures, often violent, of white-owned commercial farms starting in 2000. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Namibia. From 2005-2011, he was senior vice president for international programs of World Vision, a global humanitarian organization.

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The prospect of Vicente taking the reins from dos Santos has garnered increased attention over the past several years, even while Vicente was still at Sonangol. Vicente's [appointment](#) as Minister for Economic Coordination in January 2012 and his subsequent [nomination](#) for vice president during the campaign for the August 2012 national elections heightened expectations. In his 12 years at Sonangol, Vicente earned a favorable reputation in international business circles as a competent technocrat, but Sonangol was also accused of endemic corruption during his tenure. An International Monetary Fund report [found](#) that from 2007 to 2010, \$32 billion was unaccounted for in Angola's coffers; a portion of this sum was believed to be linked to Sonangol. Vicente's business background, lack of military experience, and quick ascent to the top of the party have rankled some within the MPLA, particularly those in the old guard, such as former Vice President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, who believe the presidency should remain with a group of "freedom fighters" [composed](#) of senior party officials and former generals.

Although the president's eldest son, Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, has [denied](#) any presidential aspirations, rumors of a dynastic succession have been circling since he was elevated in the political pecking order last year and selected to head Angola's \$5 billion [sovereign wealth fund](#). Jose Filomeno, formerly a director at Banco Kwanza Invest in Luanda, was educated in the United Kingdom and until recently has kept a relatively low [profile](#). Being 35 years old and with no military background, however, he suffers from many of the same perceived shortcomings as Vicente, particularly regarding his lack of freedom-fighter credentials. Some within the MPLA also [balked](#) at his appointment to run the sovereign wealth fund, which was seen as a display of nepotism.

While both Vicente and Jose Filomeno are much younger and more business savvy than dos Santos, it appears the president's reluctance to lessen his firm grip on power has prevented him from throwing his weight decisively behind a successor. Indeed, the prospect that the two candidates would be unable to secure broad support from the ruling party is likely to be a primary reason that dos Santos chose them as possible successors in the first place—their lack of an independent power base has allowed dos Santos to remain unchallenged.

Despite recent reports that Vicente will win the contest, given dos Santos's demonstrated skill in maintaining power by balancing factions, it seems unlikely that the MPLA's succession issue is settled. In the recent past, dos Santos has sacked and [blamed](#) his number two when it was politically expedient to do so, and he could use a similar tactic again. Unless dos Santos dies in office before a successor is chosen, it appears that regardless of who ultimately succeeds him, the status quo will not be fundamentally altered by a change in party leadership. The MPLA will remain dominant, and dos Santos's handpicked successor will likely manage the economy in a similar fashion and safeguard the regime's interests.



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Declining Economic Growth

In a [2013 study](#), Craig J. Robertson of Winston-Salem State University asked, "Why is one of the world's least-free economies growing so fast?" Robertson noted that Zimbabwe's average annual growth rate of 7.3 percent between 2009 and 2011 placed it among sub-Saharan Africa's "Lion King" economies. Unlike the latter, however, Zimbabwe had not done a great deal to facilitate the creation of new businesses or otherwise liberalize its economy. Richardson identified three significant factors, aside from the dollarization of the economy, that contributed to short-term economic growth, but will not foster longer term well-being:

- Increased government expenditures augmented by International Monetary Fund grants and Chinese credits, all of which amounted to two-thirds of Zimbabwe's nominal GDP growth from 2009 to 2011.
- Foreign assistance provided by Western governments directly to the economy through non-governmental organizations, which increased at an unsustainable rate and accounted for almost 9 percent of total GDP.
- Price increases on the global market for Zimbabwe's mineral commodities.

The [African Development Bank](#) attributed the deceleration of growth beginning in 2012 to political and economic uncertainties, a large debt overhang, and deteriorating infrastructure. In addition, gold and platinum prices, which are key to Zimbabwe's economy, began to fall in 2013. Public expenditures continue to grow rapidly, and they are increasingly spent on salaries—the government wage bill amounts to [47 percent](#) of all government expenditures. External debt, now at [\\$7 billion](#), carries a high risk premium and has become an albatross on the economy. GDP growth in 2012 was [4.4 percent](#) and declined in 2013 to [3.4 percent](#). The finance minister is touting [6.4 percent growth](#) for this year, but a wide variety of other observers foresee a much lower rate. The IMF is forecasting 3.6 percent, and others put figures as low as [2.5 percent](#).

Indigenization Policies Are Part of the Problem

The [Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act](#) was passed in 2007. It obligates the government to endeavor to ensure that "at least fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans." The Act has been implemented unevenly and episodically since it entered into force. Well before passage of the act, white commercial farmers had been targeted. Land transfers, both officially sanctioned and unofficial, resulted in the dispossession of the farmers, whose efficient operations had made Zimbabwe an agricultural exporter. By



Chinese buyers assess some of the tobacco being auctioned on the first day of the tobacco selling season. Zimbabwe thrived on tobacco and other farm exports until the government-instigated seizures, often violent, of white-owned commercial farms starting in 2000. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

2008–2009, the humanitarian organization with which the author was associated provided food through U.S. Government grants to around 10 percent of the Zimbabwean population.

Other targets for indigenization were less vulnerable. The mining companies that are crucial to Zimbabwe's economy were simply too large to be taken over. For example, Zimplats, a platinum concern owned by South African interests, [agreed in principle to sell](#) 51 percent of its shares to any Zimbabwean entity. At a cost of roughly \$1 billion, no Zimbabwean entity could afford the purchase. Zimplats operates today as it has in the past.

Lack of success with larger corporate entities has apparently caused the Zimbabwean government to launch a new phase of indigenization, this time aimed at [smaller businesses](#) such as retail shops, hairdressers, farms, advertising agencies, real estate agencies, employment agencies, and restaurants. This policy, first publicized in November 2013, was to go into effect on January 1, 2014. It is being seen as just another means of rewarding supporters of President Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Unity Party – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which delivered another election victory last July.

The extent of implementation of this latest policy is unclear. It is [reported](#) that the majority of the non-indigenous proprietors of businesses in the targeted categories are Chinese or Nigerian. Although the latter probably have little recourse, the former have a much more powerful potential protector—the Chinese government, to which Zimbabwe is heavily indebted. China has not yet commented on the new policy.

Conclusion

The negatives are building for Zimbabwe's economy: unchecked government growth, growing indebtedness, falling mineral prices, reckless "land reform," and the wrecking ball of badly applied indigenization. In combination, these have devastated agriculture, created a hostile climate for foreign investment, and now threaten the vibrant small- and micro-enterprise sector. With hunger increasing again, the [World Food Program](#) is feeding about 10 percent of Zimbabwe's 13 million inhabitants. When Zimbabwe reached its last economic trough, during the peak of hyperinflation, up to 3 million of its inhabitants departed for countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia. A new wave of migration, which seems likely if the economy continues to contract, would be a threat to stability in neighboring countries that are striving to cope with their own economic challenges.

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Former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza taking the presidential oath in parliament in the capital, Bujumbura, Aug. 26, 2005. (AP Photo/Riccardo Gangale)

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SHALE GAS: THE SOLUTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ENERGY CRISIS?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

South Africa's energy demand is expected to [double, and potentially triple, by 2050](#). Currently, the country relies on coal to provide [90 percent](#) of its energy requirements. Shale gas, coupled with renewable energy sources, could help South Africa meet this heightened demand. By developing its own shale gas reserves, South Africa can enhance its energy security, reducing its dependence on [Mozambique](#) for gas imports. The environmental implications of extracting shale gas using the controversial process of hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") is a concern among the affected communities, however. It is important that the government of South Africa proceed in an environmentally responsible manner, addressing concerns of local citizens while demonstrating political will to manage resource revenues fairly and equitably. [more...](#)



Outline of Karoo Basin and Prospective Shale Gas Area of South Africa. Source: Figure X-1 in V. Kuuskraa, S. Stevens, T. Van Laeuwen, and K. Moodie, *World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States* (Arlington, VA: ARI, 2011). The report was prepared for the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy.

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During its civil war, from 1993 to 2005, rebel groups from Burundi's Hutu and Tutsi populations battled for control of the country. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 people were killed during the war. As part of the peace process, a new constitution was passed by referendum in 2005, and voters went to the polls later that year to elect a national assembly. Former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza was then selected by members of parliament to serve as president. He was re-elected in a general election in 2010 with almost 92 percent of the vote. The majority of the opposition, however, boycotted that election, claiming that fraud and intimidation were rampant.

Because of the country's long history of ethnic antagonism and conflict between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations, the new constitution [explicitly forced a power-sharing arrangement](#) between Hutus and Tutsis to prevent ethnic domination by either group. In the National Assembly, Hutus must hold 60 percent of assembly seats and Tutsis the remaining 40 percent. Seats in the senate are to be evenly divided between Hutus and Tutsis. Legislation must be passed by a two-thirds majority. The vice presidency is held by two individuals, one Hutu and one Tutsi, and the president "is elected, by universal suffrage, for a period of five years, which can be repeated once." The exact language of the statute, Article 96 of the Constitution, is important. The constitutional amendments proposed by the current government would have reduced the requirements to pass legislation to a simple majority, replaced the dual vice-presidency with a single prime minister, and removed presidential term limits. Taken together, they would undermine the spirit of reconciliation. According to the current provisions of the constitution, amendments require an 80 percent majority to pass. Although Nkurunziza's party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy, dominates the current parliament, the package of amendments sent to parliament was narrowly defeated in March by one vote.

Shortly after Parliament rejected the government's constitutional amendments, the government announced that Nkurunziza would run for president in 2015. Because Nkurunziza was selected by parliament in 2005 as part of the [Arusha Accords](#), hence indirectly elected, he is arguing that he is not yet subject to the term limits prescribed in the constitution. The opposition, however, argues that this interpretation contravenes the intent of the Accords, which explicitly state, "no one may serve more than two presidential terms." According to the Interior Minister, the Constitutional Court will be tasked with deciding Nkurunziza's eligibility.

It is possible that the international response to Nkurunziza's attempts to secure a third term and his ultimate success or failure will influence the behaviors of other regional presidents who are facing similar circumstances. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda are scheduled to hold elections in 2016 and 2017, respectively. In both, the president will have reached his constitutional maximum term limit. Elections in Uganda are scheduled for 2016. The incumbent president, Yoweri Museveni, appears to be planning to run again, having overseen the removal of term limits in 2005, one year before being elected to his third term as president.



Former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza taking the presidential oath in parliament in the capital, Bujumbura, Aug. 26, 2005. (AP Photo/Riccardo Gangale)

Since coming to power in Burundi in 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza's regime has been associated with politically motivated detentions, imprisonments, and scores of killings. Former president Domitien Ndayizeye and six others were [arrested in 2006](#) and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. Two of the alleged coup plotters were found guilty; five, including Ndayizeye, [were acquitted](#). In 2011, it was reported that an intelligence operation to eliminate opposition supporters called [Safisha](#) ("to clean" in Swahili) was being carried out on orders of the ruling party. In 2012, Human Rights Watch was [prevented from holding a press conference](#) in the capital city that would have detailed the increase in politically motivated killings in 2011.

More recently, former vice president Frederic Bamvuginyumvira, a member of the opposition and one of the believed frontrunners in the 2015 election, was arrested in 2013 and charged with [adultery and corruption](#). Several other members of the opposition have been [beaten up and subjected to extortion](#). At the beginning of March, 69 members of the opposition Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) who were "jogging" in the city center instead of protesting (protesting requires hard-to-get city approval) were arrested and charged with armed revolt. Within two weeks, 21 had been [convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment](#). Shortly thereafter, the city government banned all group sports, including jogging, from taking place anywhere but in city-sanctioned parks or sporting grounds.


Although the ruling party appears willing to resort to extra-judicial means to secure its power, the government still defers to the constitution, perhaps because it is more than an institutional framework: it is also a peace agreement. Undermining it could therefore do more than entrench a power-hungry president; it could spark a civil war.

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The Volume of Shale Gas in the Karoo Region

The Karoo Basin extends across nearly two-thirds of the country. In 2013, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated that it contained approximately [390 trillion cubic feet](#) of technically recoverable shale gas resources, down from its initial estimate of [485 trillion cubic feet](#) in 2011. The Petroleum Agency South Africa (PASA), however, believes a more realistic estimate is [40 trillion cubic feet](#). South Africa's Department of Mineral Resources [reports](#) that due to the limited amount of available data, it is impossible to quantify the resource accurately, other than to say that it is potentially very large. According to one executive of a large international oil company, only a gas field of [50 trillion cubic feet would be commercially viable](#), although other projects have built their shale [businesses](#) on reserves much smaller than that. It is primarily fracking that makes these projects commercially viable, unlike more costly methods of gas extraction.

Current State of Play

After some preliminary shale gas exploration activities by Royal Dutch [Shell in 2009](#) and subsequent protests in local communities, South Africa's cabinet established a moratorium on shale gas exploration in 2011 to allow time for a government study of the impacts of fracking. In 2012, South Africa lifted the moratorium, following the recommendations of a [report](#) by the Department of Mineral Resources. In late 2013, South Africa's cabinet imposed new regulations to [govern shale gas exploration](#). According to the Mineral, Petroleum and Resources Development Act, international oil companies will conduct exploration essentially on behalf of the government. Any reserves they discover will remain the property of the state, though international oil companies will [receive preference](#) in the allocation of future fracking rights for any reserves found. [Royal Dutch Shell](#) is already awaiting an exploratory fracking license in the Karoo, and it is expected to invest more than 1 billion rand (\$93 million), creating several hundred jobs. In addition, [Bundu Oil & Gas, Falcon Oil & Gas, and most recently an Australian company, Challenger Energy](#), have also applied for licenses.

Pros and Cons

There is good cause for much of the excitement surrounding shale gas prospects. According to a [report](#) by Econometrix, South Africa's largest macroeconomic think tank, developing even a small portion of the estimated shale resources in Karoo could add \$19.56 billion annually to the country's GDP and create 700,000 jobs for 25 years. In addition to reducing reliance on imports, shale gas could provide South Africans with a potentially less expensive, more reliable source of energy to meet their growing demand, preventing blackouts, such as those that have been occurring in recent weeks.

The [grievances](#) expressed thus far are legitimate, however. Fracking pumps large quantities of water, mixed with sand and chemicals, into the ground with sufficient pressure to create artificial fractures, thereby allowing the gas to be extracted. Of particular concern is how fracking companies will obtain and transport water in the semi-arid region of Karoo. How the used water will be disposed of and the potential for [contamination of local water supplies](#) and air pollution are also major concerns. Although fracking has not yet begun, farmers are already [frustrated](#) by the lack of information from Shell regarding the chemicals it will be injecting into the ground, fearing they could affect their crops, livestock, and ultimately their livelihoods.

Looking Ahead

Preliminary exploratory fracking in the Karoo is imminent, but it will be at least two years before we know if the reserves are sufficient to make large-scale fracking commercially viable, allowing time for the government to engage with local stakeholders to address their grievances. An environmental impact assessment will follow, offering another opportunity for the government to ensure any environmental concerns are allayed. According to one estimate, it could take up to [10 years](#) for commercial fracking to produce significant results, providing even more time for the government to address environmental concerns and to construct a legal framework that ensures shale gas revenues are managed responsibly and fairly.

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