

## OIL IN TURKANA: RECIPE FOR DISASTER?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Although the discovery of oil in Kenya's remote Turkana County could be viewed as a sign of hope in a deeply impoverished region, a more realistic assessment is that the oil could further destabilize an already conflict-prone area. The presence of a lootable resource such as oil, a marginalized population, an existing insurgency, the prevalence of corruption, and an abundant flow of small arms and light weapons have all been key ingredients in generating instability in other situations around the globe. One need only look at Nigeria, Sudan, and Angola's Cabinda province to see how devastating oil-induced instability can be for an economy, environment, and good governance. Can the Kenyan government manage to avoid the pitfalls that have befallen many of its African neighbors? Does it have the political will and foresight to do so? [more...](#)



An armed Turkana man guards his camels at a water point in Oropayi, in northwestern Kenya. (AP Photo/Karel Prinsloo)

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## KENYA AND THE RULE OF LAW

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

More than a week after the siege at Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, left scores dead and hundreds injured, much is still not known about what exactly took place. The number of fatalities is unknown. The number of attackers is unknown. The types and numbers of weapons used, sequence of events, and the question of prior intelligence warning are all still very much in dispute. While Kenyans continue to grieve, various government departments have begun pointing fingers and attempting to shift the blame for the deadliest terrorist attack on Kenyan soil since the U.S. embassy bombing in 1998. In addition, it seems that some first responders may have participated in [looting](#) of the mall at some point last week either during or after the multiple-force security response to the siege. [more...](#)



Army personnel in front of the Westgate Mall, September 23, 2013. (Source: AP)

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### About IDA

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Although the discovery of oil in Kenya's remote Turkana County could be viewed as a sign of hope in a deeply impoverished region, a more realistic assessment is that the oil could further destabilize an already conflict-prone area. The presence of a lovable resource such as oil, a marginalized population, an existing insurgency, the prevalence of corruption, and an abundant flow of small arms and light weapons have all been key ingredients in generating instability in other situations around the globe. One need only look at Nigeria, Sudan, and Angola's Cabinda province to see how devastating oil-induced instability can be for an economy, environment, and good governance. Can the Kenyan government manage to avoid the pitfalls that have befallen many of its African neighbors? Does it have the political will and foresight to do so?



An armed Turkana man guards his camels at a water point in Oropoyi, in northwestern Kenya. (AP Photo/Karel Prinsloo)

In Kenya's Turkana County, the British oil company Tullow has [discovered](#) an estimated 250 million barrels of crude oil in the Ngamia and Twiga South localities. Additional fields continue to be discovered in [Lokichar](#), [Agete](#), and [most recently in Ekales](#), all with significant production potential. This region, however, has been rife with ethnic conflict, illicit trade, and general grievances stemming from its underdevelopment. Located in northwest Kenya in the vicinity of blurred borders with Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Sudan, Turkana has long been neglected by the Kenyan government, and the population is considered by most experts to be marginalized. Moreover, extremely difficult socioeconomic conditions characterize the region, including drought, famine, poor infrastructure, lack of communication facilities, impassable roads, and illiteracy. Nine out of 10 people in Turkana live in [poverty](#), and the majority of residents depend on nomadic pastoralism and fishing, the latter of which would undoubtedly be negatively affected if current prospecting in Lake Turkana yields commercially viable discoveries.

Production has not commenced, yet greed and corruption have already placed Turkana on the wrong trajectory. Amid speculation over the vast wealth to be gained, local officials have been [accused](#) of illegally acquiring title deeds, misappropriating community-owned land, and using intimidation and violence to displace communities in oil-producing neighborhoods. Similar accusations have been hurled at Tullow, with community leaders claiming it has bribed officials to secure control of the producing localities. Already, [youth protests](#) have blocked roads around oil installations, arguing Tullow has deliberately denied jobs to the local population by outsourcing basic services to foreign (i.e., less expensive) workers. Locals also claim Tullow has refused to publicize its Environment Impact Assessment, presumably in a format that they can read (i.e., in print versus on the Internet.)

In Turkana, the influx of an estimated [50,000 small arms and light weapons](#) from neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan have contributed to the escalation of violence between rival tribes. Today, these weapons fuel cattle rustling, highway banditry, and other types of organized crime—all of which are major sources of insecurity. Land disputes and resource scarcity have also contributed to frequent and protracted outbreaks of violence.

What needs to happen to avoid continued unrest, potentially leading to an oil-induced insurgency in Turkana? The Kenyan government should ensure that the appropriate level of oil revenues is reinvested in the region to avoid further perception of marginalization. It should practice greater transparency to preclude allegations of unequal distribution of oil revenues. Once production is under way, it should resist the urge to rely too heavily on oil revenues to sustain government operations at the expense of other economic sectors. The government should also work with Tullow to fashion an effective

corporate social responsibility program and to ensure that the company provides opportunities for the local population to benefit from the oil sector through direct and indirect jobs.

If there is political will, there is still ample time for the Kenyan government to develop legislation to effectively manage future oil revenues in a manner that benefits the whole country, encourages sustainable development through economic diversification, and ensures transparency throughout—ideally, with civil society oversight.

If it does not, competition for oil revenues may turn existing low-intensity yet persistent disputes into a larger regional conflict, with the possibility that currently opposing parties in these disputes may join forces and direct their grievances toward a common enemy—the Kenyan government.

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Barclays Bank and Millionaires Casino, both with locations at Westgate mall, have reported that approximately [3 million Kenyan shillings](#) (roughly \$35,000) are missing as a result of looting, allegedly by first responders. Recently released [footage](#) taken from within the mall reportedly implicates Kenyan security forces. Although these reports have provoked public [consternation](#), they do not come as a huge surprise. Similar allegations of looting were made against members of the General Services Unit (GSU) and fire brigade who responded to a fire at [Jomo Kenyatta International Airport](#) this past August. At least seven first responders have been charged with stealing cash and electronics from the airport as they helped to put out a fire that destroyed the arrivals terminal.

But the culture of impunity that may have contributed to looting at an active terrorist crime scene neither begins nor ends with Kenyan security or emergency services. It permeates all levels of government. The political class in Kenya is notorious for its attempts to circumvent the law, both domestically and internationally.

For instance, Kenyan parliamentarians, already some of the most highly paid in the world, have spent the past few months [maneuvering to amend the constitution](#), adopted in 2010, so that they would have sole authority to set their own salaries. Their attempts to remove themselves from the purview of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) led to popular protests and demonstrations in front of parliament early this summer. Parliamentarians objected to the SRC's reduction of their salary from approximately \$10,000 per month to \$6,400. The average Kenyan makes somewhere around [\\$800](#) per year. Unsurprisingly, members of the country's various [County Assemblies](#) are also lobbying the SRC for increases in their pay. These County Assembly positions have been in existence since the March 2013 election.

Another recent example of Kenyan politicians striving to place themselves above the law is the National Assembly's passage of a motion to withdraw the country from the [jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court](#) (ICC). Kenya has been a signatory of the treaty since 1999 and a member since 2005. The ICC is currently pursuing charges against the president and deputy president of Kenya for crimes against humanity related to the post-election violence of 2007–2008. The withdrawal would not take effect for at least a year and would not affect current ICC cases. The ICC is a court of last resort that only pursues cases that individual countries are unwilling or unable to try themselves.

When political elites repeatedly exhibit disregard for the rule of law, it provides a poor example for the rest of the country and fosters a sense of impunity that has the potential to undermine good governance. It also undermines the credibility of the government in the lawmaking and enforcement arenas.



Army personnel in front of the Westgate Mall, September 23, 2013. (Source: AP)


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## AFRICAN NUMBERS

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On October 7, 2013, the [World Bank announced](#) that most economies in sub-Saharan Africa are continuing to grow vigorously. GDP is projected to increase 4.9 percent in 2013, up from 4.2 percent in the previous year. Behind these numbers and other statistics relating to Africa lies a significant debate over data quality. The stakes are anything but trivial, largely because so many important decisions related to African growth and development are based on statistics that are believed to be of dubious quality. [more...](#)




Source: World Bank, *Africa's Pulse*, October 2013, Volume 8, 4, <http://tinyurl.com/jgno86a>

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## WOMEN JIHADIS: EMERGING TREND OR MEDIA FANTASY?

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Early news reports that Samantha Lewthwaite, a young white British woman, could have been involved in the attack by al-Shabaab on Nairobi's Westgate Mall were startling. Even more so, given her relatively ordinary, small-town UK upbringing, were rumors that she might have orchestrated the attack. Lewthwaite has drawn widespread attention not only for her rumored involvement at Westgate but also for being a fugitive from Kenyan authorities since 2011 for plotting to attack beach resorts in Mombasa. The media attention following the Westgate massacre has made Lewthwaite, also known as the "White Widow" (so named after her suicide-bomber husband died in the 2005 terrorist attacks in London) notorious. But is the focus on her warranted or is the mysterious White Widow the product of media sensationalism? [more...](#)



Undated image provided by Interpol shows Samantha Lewthwaite. Interpol has issued an arrest notice for Samantha Lewthwaite. The international police agency says the notice was issued at the request of Kenya, where she is wanted on charges of possessing explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony in December 2011. (AP Photo/Interpol, File.)

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
[Professor Morten Jerven](#) at Simon Fraser University sparked the current debate with an article published in African Arguments and reprinted in The Guardian in November 20, 2012. The newspaper article bore the provocative headline, “[Lies, damn Lies and GDP.](#)” Jerven elaborated on his themes in [Poor Numbers](#), a book published in February 2013. Shantayanan Devarajan, chief economist in the Africa division of the World Bank, made similar points in a January 2013 journal article entitled “[Africa’s Statistical Tragedy.](#)”

Both Jerven and Devarajan highlight the revision by Ghana’s statistical service in 2010 of its estimate of the country’s GDP. This revision resulted in an increase in estimated GDP of over 60 percent and caused Ghana’s overnight reclassification by the World Bank from a poor to a middle-income country. Likewise, Malawi revised its GDP estimates, with an increase of over 30 percent. Carlos Lopes, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), noted, as did Jerven, that Nigeria is planning to revise its GDP estimates. Lopes [estimated](#) that Nigerian GDP could swell from \$273 billion to \$382 billion, just behind that of South Africa.

At least three factors appear to have caused underestimation of African GDPs. Two are specific to the mechanics of GDP calculation, while the third is of a more general character. First, according to Devarajan, only half of Africa’s countries use an up-to-date version of the [UN System of National Accounts](#). Second, the choice of base year for the GDP statistics heavily influences the selection of data sources and proxies used in surveys. According to Jerven, seven countries used base years over 20 years old, and only six complied with best practice, which is 5 years old or younger. By using outdated base years, African data gatherers are likely to miss or underestimate the economic sectors that have been growing most rapidly, such as mobile telecommunications. Third, the quality and reliability of available data sets are often poor—surveys are often done infrequently, national capacities to manage data are often weak, and new data sets are sometimes withheld for political reasons.

Reactions by African statistics offices to these criticisms of data quality have ranged from acceptance to active hostility, with greater numbers apparently in the latter camp. According to [Magnus Taylor](#) of African Arguments, the statistical office of Cameroon supported Jerven’s work. On the other side, Pali Lehohla, South Africa’s Statistician General, is [alleged](#) to have prevented Professor Jerven from presenting his research at UNECA in September 2013. Dimitri Sanga, former Director of the African Center for Statistics at UNECA, rebutted Jerven’s work, calling it “sulphurous.” The Zambian Statistical Office called Jerven “a hired gun meant to discredit African national accountants.”

What is to be done? Jerven advocates greater transparency by governments about data weakness, increased resources for statistical offices, and repositioning of those offices as brokers rather than collectors of data. Devarajan suggests various



Source: World Bank, [Africa’s Pulse](#), October 2013, Volume 8, 4, <http://tinyurl.com/lqno66e>

organizational and funding fixes, but then says that the underlying cause of poor statistics is political. For example, if poverty estimates are gathered during an election year, governments often keep the results under wraps.

Carlos Lopes of UNECA has perhaps a more innovative prescription that could bypass some of the politics behind data collection. He notes that researchers from the London School of Economics have been successful in indirectly estimating growth in household consumption in Africa based on surveys of household wealth (i.e., the number of households with televisions, electricity access, mobile phones, and the like). He suggests that this sort of alternative methodology might be enhanced by accessing data transmitted through mobile telecommunications and the Internet.

Given the pace of economic change in Africa and the paucity of resources available for data collection by statistical offices, it is unlikely that traditional methods will solve Africa's data dilemma. Perhaps new approaches, including looking at new types of data as suggested by Lopes and finding ways of relating the new data streams to GDP, will provide a way out of the quandary or at least make available alternative estimates as comparators to those provided by governments.

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Although some [witnesses](#) to the Westgate massacre claim to have seen a Caucasian woman directing the attack, Lewthwaite's involvement has not been corroborated by law enforcement or other official sources. Al-Shabaab has explicitly denied the involvement of any women in the attack. Therefore, one must be wary of jumping to conclusions when hard evidence implicating Lewthwaite is missing.

There are other examples of white western women who converted to Islam and became jihadis. Rabiah Hutchison, the Australian "[grand dame of terror](#)," was purportedly married to one of Osama Bin Laden's closest confidantes. Colleen LaRose, the American "[JihadJane](#)," is currently in prison for providing material support to terrorists, among other terrorism-related crimes. The question is whether these examples are anomalies or are perhaps indicative of an emerging trend of women taking on more operational roles in terrorist activities.

Even before the Westgate massacre, Lewthwaite was portrayed in the media as an Islamic extremist sympathizer, with one radical Kenyan blog reportedly referring to her as their "white sister" who recruits and commands her own [all-female terror squad](#). Indeed, some [analysts](#) have observed that injunctions against female participation in violent jihad have begun to disappear from extremist websites. Yet an al-Shabaab [Twitter post](#) referring to the Westgate massacre contradicted this trend: "we do not employ sisters in such military operations."

Although reports of Lewthwaite's involvement in the Westgate Mall attack may have been largely a product of an overzealous media, they are a reminder that terrorism does not have a single face. Allowing women to take leadership roles in militant activities, however, would certainly be a departure from the norm and would represent a dramatic shift in al-Shabaab's modus operandi. Because neither Lewthwaite's physical presence at the Westgate Mall nor her taking an operational role in planning the attack can be confirmed, Lewthwaite's relative importance among regional terrorist figures remains tenuous.



Undated image provided by Interpol shows Samantha Lewthwaite. Interpol has issued an arrest notice for Samantha Lewthwaite. The international police agency says the notice was issued at the request of Kenya, where she is wanted on charges of possessing explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony in December 2011. (AP Photo/Interpol, File.)

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## THE M23 IN THE DRC—DYING OR THRIVING?

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Two different portraits of the 23 March Movement (M23) rebel group in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are currently being painted. In one, the rebels are on the ropes, having been pushed back and weakened by the UN's Force Intervention Brigade. In the other, the leaders of the rebel group are prospering as go-betweens and even principals in the illicit trade in Congolese gold. There are elements of truth in each portrait, and the interests of regional states and economic motives connect the two. [more...](#)



Congolese soldiers visit territory that was retaken the previous week from M23 rebels, near the Rwandan border north of Goma, Congo, Friday, September 6, 2013. (AP Photo/Joseph Kay.)

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## DEMOCRACY IN TROUBLE: ASSESSING THE STATE OF PRESS FREEDOMS IN EAST AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The past months have seen several high-profile cases in which governments in East Africa have resorted to various forms of press censorship and intimidation. In addition to the usual suspects [Ethiopia](#) and [Sudan](#), the governments of Tanzania and Uganda have clamped down on press freedoms, accusing journalists of sedition and libel. Is this indicative of a regional trend? If so, what does it mean for the state of democracy in the region? [more...](#)



Ugandan police arrest a journalist outside the Daily Monitor offices Wednesday, May 29, 2013. Journalists struggled with police as they protest outside the Daily Monitor newspaper head office, in downtown Kampala, Uganda, which Ugandan police have been occupying. (AP Photo/Rebecca Vassie.)

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
On March 28, 2013, the United Nations Security Council [approved](#) the creation of its first-ever “offensive” combat force intended to carry out operations to “neutralize and disarm” M23, as well as other rebel and foreign armed groups in the DRC. This “Force Intervention Brigade,” approximately 3,000-strong, was formed within the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).

As foreseen in an earlier edition of [IDA's Africa Watch](#), the intervention brigade has succeeded in securing the strategic city of Goma. After a week of fighting against the intervention brigade in the outskirts of Goma in August, M23 declared a [unilateral cease-fire](#) and returned to the on-again, off-again peace dialogue in Kampala, Uganda. In the meantime, the UN intervention brigade has gained strength, with a battalion from Malawi joining two from Tanzania and South Africa. In the coming months, the brigade will acquire both a surveillance drone and South African attack helicopters. With these reinforcements, the brigade intends to continue holding M23 at bay while [commencing operations](#) against other rebel forces in the Eastern DRC, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a largely Hutu force that seeks to destabilize Rwanda, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist organization directed against the government of Uganda.

Does this mean that M23 is finished as a military force? Almost certainly not, at least as long as Rwanda continues to provide it with material support in the DRC and political cover both regionally and in the [UN Security Council](#). Even with reinforcements, the intervention brigade will be stretched very thin: “I’m sure they’re expecting too much (of the brigade),” the UK Permanent Representative to the UN, [Mark Lyall Grant](#), recently said. If the brigade focuses too heavily on other rebel groups, the effort against M23 will become the responsibility of the DRC armed forces, the FARDC, which would likely not be up to the task.

The alternative portrait of an M23 profiting from illicit trade in gold was presented by the Enough Project in its [October 2013 report](#), “Striking Gold—How M23 and Its Allies are Infiltrating Congo’s Gold Trade.” Based on its investigations with gold traders, DRC civil and military authorities, and members of the DRC diaspora in neighboring states, the Enough Project asserts that M23 commander Sultani Makenga has taken over a gold-smuggling network built up over a period of years by his predecessor, Bosco Ntaganda, who is now in the custody of the International Criminal Court. According to the report, at least 12 tons of gold worth roughly \$500 million are smuggled out of the eastern DRC each year. The importance of gold as a source of revenue for armed groups like M23 has increased, in part because global-conflict minerals reforms have steadily reduced traffic in other minerals, such as tin, tungsten, and tantalum.

Interestingly, the Enough Project report identifies Burundi and Uganda, and not Rwanda, as the primary hubs for trade in illicit Congolese gold. The precious metals are reported to reach Kampala, Uganda, and Bujumbura, Burundi, via overland transport. Once the gold arrives in those cities, it is purchased by dealers, often representatives of companies based in the UAE, and exported, mainly to Dubai. This trading arrangement works because of the complicity of a large number of influential Congolese, Ugandan, Burundian, and Rwandan military officers, government officials, and businessmen.



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It appears that both portraits of M23 contain elements of truth. The rebel movement has suffered military setbacks, but it retains significant capabilities. The UN intervention brigade has contained M23, but probably would not be able to eliminate the movement entirely. A more serious threat to M23 would be withdrawal of Rwandan backing, either in favor of another surrogate or as part of an agreement with the DRC and other interested states. Such a move would not be without precedent. In 2009, Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC arrested [Laurent Nkunda](#), their erstwhile ally, as part of an arrangement with the DRC. Nkunda remains under house arrest in Rwanda. At least for now, however, Rwanda continues to back M23. The rebel movement is also a powerful commercial force, providing the muscle and protection needed for an active illicit trade in precious metals. As long as M23 remains at the nexus of these important political and economic interests, it will remain a force to be reckoned with in the eastern DRC.

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In June, the Committee to Protect Journalists accused governments in East Africa and the Horn of being “[among the worst culprits in stifling press freedoms.](#)” The governments of Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan have historically had antagonistic relationships with the media, but recently, some governments considered media friendly have also been accused of restricting press freedoms.

For example, in May, the [Media Council of Kenya](#) highlighted the difficult working environment for Kenyan journalists, which included threats against their lives and systematic harassment. And current trends in Uganda and Tanzania, which have often been touted as models for press freedom in the region, are troubling.

The Tanzanian government recently [banned](#) three newspapers, two of them temporarily (the Mwananchi newspaper, part of the Nation Media Group based in Nairobi, and Mtanzania, owned by New Habari Ltd) and one indefinitely (the MwanaHalisi newspaper). According to the government, the newspapers were guilty of [sedition](#) and other violations of the country’s media laws because they reported on classified information and questioned the government’s ability to combat terrorism. In response, private media outlets have announced that they [will not cover](#) any news event or publish statements or pictures from the ministries of information, culture, and sports. In addition to media repression, [violent attacks](#) on Tanzanian journalists, some deadly, have taken place. Over the past year, two journalists were assaulted, one [fatally](#), by [police forces](#). In September 2012 Daudi Mwangosi, a television journalist reporting on an opposition party demonstration, was shot by police forces at [close-range](#) with a tear gas canister. He died from his injuries.

In May, the Ugandan government raided and temporarily shut down the country’s only two privately owned newspapers. Both newspapers had published a letter written by the former Coordinator of Security Services claiming that President Yoweri Museveni was grooming his son to run for president in 2016. The government threatened to shut down both newspapers permanently if they continued to report the news “irresponsibly.” Journalists protesting against the government’s media crackdown were [shot with tear gas and roughed up by police forces](#) in late May.

Based on the rankings and scores released yearly by [Reporters without Borders](#), a French nongovernmental organization that has been monitoring the state of press freedom since 1985, the past decade has not been kind to journalists in East Africa. Since 2003, press freedoms have gradually decreased in all regional countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, all of which scored worse in 2013 than they did in 2003. [Freedom House scores](#), another measure of press freedoms over time, are largely stagnant across the region; by this measure, only Kenya demonstrated an increase in press freedom over the past decade.



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Although it is not clear what is driving this trend, it is cause for concern. Freedom of the press is one of the core components of democracy, alongside other civil liberties, free and fair elections, and limits on political power. Because the press is responsible for providing voters with the information they need to hold elected officials accountable, restrictions on press freedoms are common indicators that democracy is in trouble.

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
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## AFRICA RISING, BUT NOT ITS LEADERS?

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For the fourth time in five years and for the second year in a row, there is no winner of the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. Yet the Ibrahim Index of African Governance shows that on the whole, good governance is actually on the rise in Africa. This seemingly counterintuitive relationship raises the question: How is Africa achieving better governance scores if so few exceptional leaders exist? To date, only three African leaders have been awarded the prize: Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique (2007); Festus Mogae, former President of Botswana (2008); and Pedro Pires, former President of Cape Verde (2011.) [more...](#)



Mo Ibrahim speaks to the audience before presenting the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership to the former Cape Verde President Pedro de Verona Rodrigues Pires in Tunis, Tunisia, on Saturday Nov. 12, 2011. (Ons Abid IAP Images for the Mo Ibrahim Foundation)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## RENAMO RENEGES ON 1992 CIVIL WAR PEACE DEAL IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Alexander Noyes

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Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO, in Maputo, Mozambique. (AP Photo/Ferhat Momade)

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### About IDA

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The Ibrahim [prize](#) was the brainchild of Sudanese-born billionaire/entrepreneur Mo Ibrahim. In 2007, he instituted a financial incentive of \$5 million over 10 years, plus \$200,000 per year for life thereafter, to be awarded to African leaders who adhere to the constitutional limitations on their terms while demonstrating extraordinary leadership. The largest annually awarded prize in the world, the Ibrahim prize is designed to recognize those African leaders who developed their countries, lifted people out of poverty, paved the way for sustainable and equitable prosperity, and left office peacefully when their terms had expired. The prize is also intended to provide African leaders with sufficient financial security after leaving office to enable them to continue their service to society.

The theoretical assumption underlying the prize is that the fate of leaders once they are out of office is a key determinant of how they behave while they are in office. If leaders anticipate retribution and financial hardship after leaving office, they will be more inclined to enrich themselves with public resources while in office or refuse to cede power altogether. Mo Ibrahim [argues](#) that if leaders can rely on a financially secure future, they might be less self-serving while in office.

To win the prize, candidates must be former executive heads of state or government, have left office in the last three years, be democratically elected, have served their constitutionally mandated terms, and have demonstrated exceptional leadership. Over the last three years, only four democratically elected leaders in Africa have willingly left office. When the criterion of demonstrated exceptional leadership is added, the universe of contenders dwindles further. As a result, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's independent selection committee for the prize, composed of seven eminent figures, including three former presidents, two Nobel laureates, former ministers, and diplomats, determined there was no suitable African former senior leader deserving of the award in 2013 (or 2012, 2010, or 2009.)

Despite this apparent leadership deficit, Africa is indeed rising. Over the past decade, [six of the world's 10 fastest growing countries](#) were African. According to the [2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance](#), a comprehensive collection of quantitative data compiled to provide a holistic assessment of governance in Africa, there were improvements from 2000 to 2012 in three of the four categories measured—human development, sustainable economic opportunity, and political participation and human rights. Scores in the fourth category, safety and rule of law, actually declined. [Eighteen out of the 52 countries](#) analyzed saw their best ever performance in 2012.

So who or what is responsible for these improvements? Large investments by China and other foreign entities have undeniably contributed to the expansion of the African middle class and economic opportunity. Increased development assistance from abroad has to some extent driven the improved scores on human development.



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What role has national leadership played in the governance scores? The answer may lie in the safety and rule-of-law category of the Ibrahim Index. That category includes some of the most important indicators of leadership, such as transfer of power, accountability, transparency, and corruption. Data on these metrics paint a picture consistent with the shortage of potential Ibrahim prize contenders.

Perhaps a more important question is why the prize has not elicited more good behavior on the part of African leaders. The answer may be quite simple: greater wealth and riches than offered by the prize are easier to obtain through corruption and illegal activities. The Nigerian government, for example, has documented how President Sani Abacha [looted at least \\$2.2 billion](#) from state coffers when he ruled the country from 1993 to 1998.

Many argue that the failure to award the prize reflects poorly on African leaders, and some have lobbied for the Foundation to adjust its criteria to widen the pool of possible candidates. Allowing individuals showing [leadership in civil society](#) or [sitting heads of state](#) to qualify are two commonly suggested modifications to the current process. The opposing camp argues that deliberately not awarding the prize more effectively focuses the spotlight on the leadership deficit in Africa. The international community need not be totally disheartened, however. It should take comfort in knowing that there is no shortage of worthy African leaders in positions of importance to economic development and to other societal functions. They just don't usually rise to the top of political leadership in their countries.

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Afonso Dhlakama of RENAMO, in Maputo, Mozambique. (AP Photo/Ferhat Momade)

FRELIMO appears to have now unilaterally withdrawn from the 1992 peace deal, issuing a [statement](#): "This irresponsible attitude of the commander-in-chief of the defence and security forces puts an end to the Rome peace deal." Further blaming FRELIMO for the end of the accord, Mazanga [said](#), "The responsibility lies with the FRELIMO government because they didn't want to listen to RENAMO's grievances." Such grievances include incomplete integration of RENAMO veterans into the armed forces and unfair electoral laws.

This week's incidents are the most recent chapter in a continuing upsurge of political violence between RENAMO and the government, which has intermittently spurred [fears](#) of a return to civil war in Mozambique over the past year. As outlined in the July 3, 2013, [edition](#) of Africa Watch, RENAMO has repeatedly clashed with police and soldiers over the past 12 months. The feud has taken on international and regional economic implications, as evidenced by RENAMO threats in June this year to disrupt the Sena railway in Sofala, which led Rio Tinto to [suspend](#) mining exports from the northwest region.

How has RENAMO maintained an armed faction over the past two decades of peace? Although Mozambique's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for ex-combatants is often [cited](#) by scholars and international institutions as a successful post-conflict model, the current standoff and other violent incidents involving RENAMO veterans illustrate substantial shortcomings of the DDR process. Chief among them is the failure to demobilize RENAMO's approximately 300 so-called presidential guards. RENAMO has justified maintaining this force by citing a clause in the 1992 peace agreement allowing RENAMO to provide security to its "top leaders." The clause was only intended to apply in the transitional phase, however, and therefore should have become [inactive](#) after the 1994 elections.

Prior to the most recent escalation, former RENAMO soldiers were implicated in other periodic outbreaks of violence. In 2000, RENAMO men [killed](#) 10 people in Montepuez, with significant tensions recurring in the same region in 2003 elections. Although it almost certainly exaggerated, RENAMO recently [claimed](#) it could mobilize up to 5,000 troops and boasted of access to significant firepower hidden in arms caches after the war, including AK-47 rifles, rockets, and mortars. Armindo Milaco, an ex-fighter who trained under Dhlakama's direction in Gorongosa, [asserted](#) last year that RENAMO veterans can easily access the hidden weaponry: "As soon as the shooting starts, everyone knows where to grab them." These various incidents and ostensible access to arms indicate serious deficiencies in the DDR process in Mozambique.

While RENAMO'S ostensible withdrawal from the 1992 peace accord signals an escalation and possible shift in the conflict's dynamics, RENAMO has made bellicose threats in the past, and this week's events must be viewed in this broader context. In addition to RENAMO's waning political support—which, as previously [noted](#), suggests that the party's increasingly militant stance may simply be a ploy to remain relevant—several other factors militate against the risk of a return to widespread civil conflict. Among these are the advanced age and limited capacity of most of Dhlakama's men, a pronounced lack of regional support for RENAMO, a population with no thirst for a return to war, and high economic growth rates with increasing international investment in Mozambique.

At the time of this writing, this week's events and their attendant political implications are far from settled. Indeed, another retaliatory attack on a police station by Dhlakama's men was [reported](#) on October 22, and at the moment, it is unclear how different factions within RENAMO may ultimately behave with Dhlakama on the run. That said, RENAMO's hardline actions, along with threats to boycott upcoming local and national elections, could do irreparable damage to the party in political terms. If carried out, election boycotts could be particularly costly, as they would be likely to drive swaths of the party's eroding popular support base into the camp of a rising opposition party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM). On the other hand, FRELIMO could also face political fallout if the government mishandles the situation or is seen as using the episode as a pretext to gain political advantage ahead of the vote.

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## MADAGASCAR: THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On October 25, 2013, voting in Madagascar's oft-postponed presidential election finally took place. Although the official results are not yet in, given that there were more than 30 candidates participating and none seemed to garner a majority of support prior to the election, it is likely that a second round will be necessary. Legislative elections and a second round of the presidential election (if needed) are scheduled for December 20. While the October 25 vote was peaceful—except for a few isolated violent incidents—it is the period before and after the likely second round of elections that will pose the most serious threat to the future of the island. The two presumptive front-runners come from two very polarized political camps that in the past have demonstrated willingness to resort to violence to secure political office. *more...*



Supporters of presidential candidate Jean-Louis Robinson at a rally in late October. (Source: AP.)

Dr. Stephanie Burchard is a Research Staff Member on the Africa team at IDA.

## EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY—COMING APART OR COMING TOGETHER?

By George F. Ward, Jr.

The East African Community (EAC), the subregion's leading economic and political grouping, has already collapsed and disintegrated once. Although history is not likely to repeat itself in the near term, the organization is experiencing strains that could lead to a significant rupture within the Community. At the root of the current controversy are national interests and competing conceptions of the Community's future. Three members are pressing a drive toward greater economic and political integration in the near term, while the other two wish to move more slowly. *more...*



The East African Community currently comprises Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania (highlighted), and Uganda. (Source: The World Factbook, CIA,

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Supporters of presidential candidate Jean-Louis Robinson at a rally in late October. (Source: AP.)

Since the coup in 2009, Madagascar has suffered from severe economic and social hardship. In response to the coup, the international community suspended most aid and assistance in an attempt to encourage the country's transitional leadership to reinstate a constitutional government. The international business community also fled en masse. As a result of the withdrawal of funding, it is estimated that more than 90 percent of the Malagasy population now survives on [less than \\$2 per day](#). Madagascar is also facing long-forgotten dangers such as a [plague of locusts](#) and the threat of [bubonic plague](#).

Previous election dates were postponed due to various disagreements over candidacies and vote logistics. Madagascar's two main political rivals, Transitional President Andry Rajoelina and his deposed predecessor, Marc Ravalomanana, have been accused of holding peace hostage throughout this crisis because of their inability to find common ground and agree to allow elections to take place. Both men seem to feel that the Malagasy presidency is rightfully theirs—Ravalomanana because he was democratically elected in 2006 and Rajoelina because he enjoyed popular support after Ravalomanana's removal from office by the military in 2009. It took several years of negotiating just to secure the agreement of both men not to participate in a presidential election. Many were concerned that the enmity apparent between them would at best translate into election-related violence between rival supporters and party members or at worst plunge the country into a full-blown civil war.

In August, under [significant pressure](#) from the international community, Madagascar approved a slate of candidates for the presidency that was acceptable to the European Union and France, two key financial supporters. The list met the approval of the country's financial backers because it did not include Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, or Ravalomanana's wife, Laolo, who had previously submitted an application for candidacy. In total, more than 30 candidates were approved to run for president. Following this, the CENIT, Madagascar's transitional electoral commission, which is funded by the United Nations, organized the election in less than six weeks. The CENIT was able to [register almost 8 million voters](#) and set up 21,000 polling stations across the country. Although there were a few [bomb attacks](#)—presumably meant to disrupt election planning—in the capital city in September, the first round of voting took place on October 25 and, according to several reports, [all went smoothly](#).

As was expected by many commentators, early returns showed that the [two candidates backed by Ravalomanana and Rajoelina](#), Jean-Louis Robinson and Hery Martial Rakotoarimanana Rajaonarimampianina, were the two front-runners. Robinson, an ally of Ravalomanana, and Rajaonarimampianina, a purported ally of Rajoelina, were estimated to have received 30 percent and 15 percent of the vote, respectively. In the event that no candidate receives a majority of the vote (50 percent plus 1), a second round of voting is scheduled to take place concurrently with legislative elections on December 20. The CENIT has stated that official results from the first round will be released by November 8.

There is a very real concern that the eventual loser of the second round of voting will not accept the outcome. Compounding this fear, Robinson and Rajaonarimampianina, in the event they win the presidency, are rumored to be considering appointing Ravalomanana or Rajoelina, respectively, as prime minister. It is obvious that neither Rajoelina nor Ravalomanana (still living in exile in South Africa) has been wholly removed from Malagasy politics. The drawn-out negotiations allowed them time to devise creative maneuvers to remain politically relevant. Years of sanctions, while devastating for the vast majority of the Malagasy population, seemed to have little effect on the political appetites of either.

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The current membership of the [EAC](#) consists of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. South Sudan is an applicant for membership, and Somalia has interest in joining. Economic and commercial ties among East African entities stretch back to colonial times. A [Customs Union](#) joined the territories that became Kenya and Uganda in 1917. The East African Community was first formed in 1967, but it [collapsed in 1977](#) due to political differences. After decades of effort, the EAC was revived by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in 1999. Burundi and Rwanda joined subsequently. In its current configuration, the EAC claims to have established a Customs Union and a Common Market. Both these institutions exist on paper, but are largely aspirational in practice.

As IDA's Africa Watch [reported](#) on September 12, 2013, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have formed a bloc within the EAC, leaving Tanzania and Burundi isolated. In recent weeks, South Sudan has joined this tripartite activity. Strains within the organization are beginning to become evident.

Since June, the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have met at three "infrastructure summits." At the [most recent meeting](#) on October 28 in Kigali, Rwanda, the three leaders, joined for the first time by President Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan, agreed on a single customs territory. This accord is advertised as reducing the number of days a truck needs to travel from the port of Mombasa in Kenya to Kigali, from three weeks to eight days. (Although that is a big step forward, there is still room for improvement, as the road distance is only just over 900 miles.) At the summit, the leaders reported progress on their plans to build a new railroad and an oil pipeline to link their countries. Ugandan President Museveni denied that the absence of the leaders of Tanzania and Burundi from the meeting represented a rift in the EAC. The business of the summit, he said, concerned only matters relating to the "Northern Corridor," which is the term the countries apply to their ambitious infrastructure plans.

Tanzania's reactions to these tripartite (and quadripartite) activities are becoming sharper. The country reportedly asked the chairperson of the EAC Council of Ministers to provide in November 2013 a [report on the tripartite activities](#). More pointedly, [Bernard Membe](#), Tanzanian Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister, said, "It won't be easy to isolate Tanzania, though we know there are attempts to that effect." The Tanzanian Deputy Minister for East African Cooperation [was similarly negative](#): "The state of affairs in our region is not good. Our partners are taking decisions without informing us and this is contrary to the requirements of the community." Tanzania has also chosen not to attend a number of lower level EAC meetings, and it has imposed fees and regulations that are seen as [disadvantaging](#) citizens of other EAC countries living or working in Tanzania.



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Several factors may be contributing to the current tensions:

- Development of the Northern Corridor infrastructure project is seen by Kenya as essential, so building a coalition to support that is a first-order task. Hence the activity with Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan.
- The Kenyan leadership, under indictment by the International Criminal Court and feeling shunned by western leaders (President Obama has never visited), may chafe at Tanzania's positive profile as a development and democratic success story (and President Obama did visit there).
- Uganda, which also has designs on leadership within the EAC, is therefore also interested in diminishing Tanzania's role in the community. Uganda President Museveni is even rumored to covet the role of leader of an [East African political federation](#).
- Relations between Rwanda and Tanzania have been icy since the expulsion of Rwandan migrants from western Tanzania and remarks by the Tanzanian President to the effect that the Kigali government should negotiate with Hutu rebels in the Eastern DRC. Rwanda regards those rebels as genocidaires. Furthermore, Rwanda, as a landlocked country, has an interest in rapid progress on developing the regional transportation infrastructure and seaports. Tanzania feels no such pressure. At the elite level, there is considerable distrust and disagreement between Rwandan President Kagame and Tanzanian President Kikwete.
- Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community. Not wishing to complicate that relationship, Tanzania is reluctant to move fast on East African integration.

A test of whether the EAC will be able to continue moving ahead toward greater cooperation may come at the EAC Summit planned for later this year. At that meeting, a ministerial-level working group is scheduled to present a draft political federation model. The working group, chaired by Ugandan Internal Affairs Minister Aronda Nyakairima (former chief of the Ugandan armed forces), is striving to complete a draft document by the end of October. Success at the summit would give the EAC new impetus. Failure to reach agreement could intensify the centrifugal forces already at work within the organization.

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## ENDING ANGOLA'S AND PORTUGAL'S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: POLITICAL POSTURING OR REAL THREAT?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

In his annual state of the nation address to parliament on October 15, 2013, Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos announced that Angola's planned "strategic partnership" with Portugal, its former colonial ruler, was in jeopardy. This abrupt turn in their bilateral relationship is largely attributable to [investigations](#) by Portuguese prosecutors into the activities of several prominent Angolan businessmen and political officials. But given the deep political, economic, and cultural ties that bind the two countries, what does this really mean for the future of this relationship? [more...](#)



Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos (left) and former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates (right), at the Sao Bento palace in Lisbon. (AP Photo/Paulo Amorim).

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## ZANU–PF ELECTIONS HIGHLIGHT TENSE SUCCESSION BATTLE IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

While questions linger about the [fairness](#) of Zimbabwe's July 31, 2013, national elections, which ushered in another five years of rule under 89-year-old President Robert Mugabe, the long-running debate over who will eventually succeed Mugabe has [heated up](#) again during the lead-up to Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) provincial executive party elections. The intra-party elections got under way at the end of October amid [allegations](#) of vote rigging and intimidation, leading to delays and postponements of the polls. While Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa was previously seen as having the upper hand in the struggle to succeed Mugabe, recent developments suggest that Vice President Joice Mujuru has reasserted her authority within the party and may have the backing of Mugabe, a shift that has implications for the future trajectory of ZANU–PF and Zimbabwe. [more...](#)



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, center, and Vice President Joice Mujuru in Harare, Thursday, May 16, 2013. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi).

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Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos (left) and former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates (right), at the Sao Bento palace in Lisbon. (AP Photo/Paulo Amorim).

The bilateral relationship between Angola and Portugal became noticeably strained in September when Portuguese Foreign Minister Rui Machete apologized on Angolan radio for investigations into corruption allegations involving several members of Angola's political elite, including Vice President Manuel Vicente and Dos Santos' daughter, Isabelle. Machete received significant criticism from the Portuguese opposition, who claimed he had violated the independence of Portugal's judiciary by kowtowing to an increasingly powerful Angola. He subsequently [retracted](#) the apology, which had attracted outrage from Luanda, where Angolan government officials are already hypersensitive to any accusations involving corruption.

In his October 15 speech before parliament, Dos Santos [expressed misgivings about Angola's relationship with Portugal](#): "There have been some misunderstandings and given the current political environment in this relationship, the construction of a strategic partnership previously announced is not advisable." On October 23 Angolan Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti [expounded](#) on this sentiment, stating on Angolan television that the government no longer views cooperation with Portugal as a priority, instead listing South Africa, China, and Brazil as Angola's potential principal foreign partners.

This turn away from Portugal is indicative of Angola's heightened international stature and influence resulting from its rapid economic growth in recent years, where in addition to traditional investors such as the United States and United Kingdom, China, Brazil, and South Africa have made impressive inroads. Moreover, Angola is actively being courted by new investors and petroleum prospectors, most recently hosting a [French delegation](#) that included a number of business leaders from Air France, Airbus, BNP Paribas, and Total. This interest from the international private sector affords Angola significant leverage in the diplomatic arena—leverage it has used in its relations with Portugal.

Despite Angola's rebuff, Portugal is committed to preserving and even deepening its historically strong relationship with Angola, referring to it as a [priority](#) among Portugal's foreign relations. But whereas Angola once depended on Portugal for many of the goods and services typically provided by former colonial powers (e.g., imports, political assistance, security, etc.), now it is Portugal that needs to find new markets and expand its investments into existing ones. Portugal's [\\$212 billion economy](#) was the third after Greece and Ireland to be bailed out by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund during the Eurozone crisis in 2011. It grew at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually for the past decade and is expected to [contract by 1.8 percent this year](#) before returning to modest growth in 2014. On the other hand, Angola's rapid growth, [aided by Portugal's presence](#), offers copious opportunities for the [10,000 Portuguese firms](#) and [200,000 citizens](#) already resident in Angola to exploit new opportunities, thereby helping to ameliorate the dire situation at home.

And because Portugal is already deeply and permanently invested in Angola—its interests are ubiquitous and its citizens entrenched, especially in Luanda—the implications of terminating the strategic partnership may therefore be more political than economic. While alternative sources of investment are rising in prominence and visibility, the magnitude of Portuguese investment (which reached an all-time high in 2008 at around [\\$1 billion](#)) ensures that the economic relationship will endure, even if official channels suffer.

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While questions linger about the [fairness](#) of Zimbabwe's July 31, 2013, national elections, which ushered in another five years of rule under 89-year-old President Robert Mugabe, the long-running debate over who will eventually succeed Mugabe has [heated up](#) again during the lead-up to Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) provincial executive party elections. The intra-party elections got under way at the end of October amid [allegations](#) of vote rigging and intimidation, leading to delays and postponements of the polls. While Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa was previously seen as having the upper hand in the struggle to succeed Mugabe, recent developments suggest that Vice President Joice Mujuru has reasserted her authority within the party and may have the backing of Mugabe, a shift that has implications for the future trajectory of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe.



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, center, and Vice President Joice Mujuru in Harare, Thursday, May 16, 2013. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

The two major players in the intra-party battle are Mujuru, a relative moderate and widow of the late military leader Solomon Mujuru, and Mnangagwa, former Defense Minister and a hard-liner who has played a major role in several episodes of political violence in Zimbabwe, including being one of the main architects of the 2008 election violence. Mujuru's chances of succeeding Mugabe seemingly dimmed when her husband, who enjoyed support from a powerful circle of security officials referred to as the "securocrats," died in a suspicious fire in August 2011, after which many military leaders switched their allegiance to Mnangagwa, who stepped into the ensuing power vacuum. Mnangagwa's prospects looked even brighter as reports emerged in 2012 indicating that he had been chosen by Mugabe to eventually succeed him through a "gentleman's agreement" the two [made](#) in 2008. Under the supposed agreement, Mnangagwa received Mugabe's blessing in return for ensuring that Mugabe would secure a violent victory in the second round of the 2008 presidential elections.

Mnangagwa's stock within the party, however, has sunk as of late, as indicated by his move to the Justice Ministry in the new cabinet, which was [seen](#) as a demotion from the more powerful Defense Ministry. His troubles began last year when senior ZANU-PF members accused his faction of divisiveness and vote buying during the May 2012 local party elections and [disbanded](#) the local District Coordinating Committees (DCCs) after Mnangagwa supporters prevailed in many districts. Although he did not mention Mnangagwa by name, ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo [revealed](#) at the time that the disbanding of the DCCs was meant to cool the fierce succession debate within the party and lessen Mnangagwa's influence: "The District Coordinating Committees were being used by some ambitious people within the party who wanted to rise to the top. There was a lot of vote buying. It was divisive."

Similar allegations have been levied at Mnangagwa and his faction during the provincial executive party elections that began in late October and are currently underway. The outcome of these elections has major implications for the succession issue, as the winners will help select the top members of the party—the [presidium](#)—at an elective congress scheduled for 2014. Mugabe and senior party leaders have [canceled](#) or postponed polls in a number of provinces because of reports of intimidation and vote rigging. On November 3, Gumbo [restated](#) his thinly veiled displeasure with the Mnangagwa faction: "We only have one leader, President Mugabe, followed by vice president Mujuru and Simon Khaya Moyo, the party chairperson. As far as we are concerned, anyone outside that line-up is a rebel trying to create chaos."

Despite his age and failing health, Mugabe remains firmly in control of the party and of the succession issue. That said, the recent events discussed above suggest that Mujuru is regaining momentum in the succession struggle. While the battle is

far from over—Mugabe may well change his mind or die in office—for the moment, this development pushes ZANU-PF in a more moderate direction, a necessary shift if the party is to regain untainted popular (and even perhaps international) support once Mugabe leaves the political landscape. But the hard-line faction led by Mnangagwa should not be underestimated, particularly if Mugabe's health falters. In such a scenario, Mnangagwa would likely attempt to impose his will with support from the securocrats, by force if necessary.

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
Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## AFRICA'S EXPANDED ACCESS TO CREDIT MARKETS—OPPORTUNITY AND RISK

By George F. Ward

Public debt-to-GDP ratios in sub-Saharan Africa have fallen sharply since 2000, reaching a mean level of 40 percent. Driving the decline were improved fiscal balances, strong economic growth, some exchange rate appreciation, and debt relief. Especially in the context of continued strong economic growth, estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to amount to 6 percent in 2014, the improvement in national balance sheets has helped to open up new sources of financing for African development and infrastructure. Several African countries have been able to issue sovereign debt on surprisingly favorable terms. Twenty African countries have obtained sovereign credit ratings, thereby opening up still more financing possibilities. The massive increase in Chinese concessional loan commitments over the past decade is another source of capital for development of natural resources and construction of infrastructure. The question is whether debt, so often in the past a drag on African development, can become a tool for sustaining high rates of economic growth. *more...*



Ambassador George F. Ward is editor of IDA's Africa Watch. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

## THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: HOW LATE IS TOO LATE?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

While the international community has been focused on the conflicts in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo, an additional serious crisis has been festering in another African country. On November 1, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide called attention to the widespread atrocities being committed in the Central African Republic and warned that the spread of violence along religious lines could drive the country "to the brink." *more...*

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Seleka Rebels in Bria, Central African Republic. (Source: AP.)

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
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<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2013/afr/eng/sreo0513.pdf>

An interesting mix of [eleven sub-Saharan African countries](#) have accessed international sovereign bond markets in the last decade: Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. In addition, Ethiopia has issued so-called "[diaspora bonds](#)." Most of these countries have traditionally well-managed economies or are resource rich. A few, notably Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal, were participants in the World Bank's and IMF's Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which enabled them to put their economic houses in order and facilitated their access to international bond markets.

The market does not demand a sub-Saharan–Africa-specific premium. In fact, sub-Saharan African international sovereign bonds are [priced favorably](#), trading at yields below those of benchmarks as calculated by the IMF. This pricing reflects the relatively strong growth prospects for African economies. It also demonstrates the relatively high demand for African bonds in comparison to the limited supply. Bloomberg reported in May 2013 that average interest rates had declined 88 basis points in the 12 preceding months to reach 4.35 percent.

Twenty sub-Saharan African countries, including eight that have accessed the international bond markets, currently boast [sovereign credit ratings](#) issued by Moody's, Fitch, or Standard and Poors. Improved credit ratings are one important factor driving the record sale of debt in 2013 by sub-Saharan African nations. Even excluding South Africa, these sales amount to [\\$7 billion](#), which is more than the previous five years combined.

According to a RAND study, between 2001 and 2011, 49 African countries received pledges of [\\$175 billion in assistance](#) from China. The vast bulk of this assistance was in the form of loans made at concessional rates by the [China Development Bank](#) and

similar government entities. The loans provided by the banks typically carry [3 percent interest](#), with repayments scheduled over 15 years plus an additional five-year grace period. Often, the loans are tied to purchases of Chinese goods and services for use in African projects. In the case of loans for natural resources development, repayment is often in the form of raw materials delivered to China. Note that actual Chinese assistance delivered, as compared to pledged, is considerably less than the eye-catching number cited above. According to RAND, cumulative Chinese assistance delivered increased from \$52 million in 2001 to \$18.4 billion in 2011, an annual increase of \$1.84 billion.

What does the availability of resources through borrowing, whether on the international bond market or from China, mean for Africa? First, it is an opportunity to close the gap in financing economic and social infrastructure. According to the African Development Bank, Africa's [infrastructure development needs](#) amount to around \$90 billion annually. Only \$60 billion of this total can be funded from the countries' own resources and multilateral development banks. At current rates, resources gained through international bond markets and Chinese assistance can close around one-third of that gap. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and bilateral assistance programs can make up much of the remaining gap. It is not unreasonable to assume that African successes in bond markets might also stimulate FDI. Second, the success of the relatively few African nations that have issued sovereign bonds or achieved credit ratings, or both, will be an incentive for other nations. If current GDP growth rates can be maintained and if macroeconomic discipline continues to be strong, wider African access to international bond markets can be expected.

[According to the IMF](#), there are some significant risks in borrowing:

- Increased public spending financed by bonds could be poorly selected or executed and could therefore not render value for money.
- Issuing debt with "bullet" or "balloon" repayment provisions exposes countries to changes in international macroeconomic conditions, such as rising interest rates, when debt needs to be refinanced.
- A shift to foreign financing could place upward pressure on African currency values, thereby harming export competitiveness.

The debt service load could also become more burdensome should African growth rates decline. These risks are significant. If they can be avoided or managed, growing access to international debt markets will stimulate economic growth and provide better living conditions for millions of Africans.

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While the international community has been focused on the conflicts in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo, an additional serious crisis has been festering in another African country. On November 1, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide called attention to the [widespread atrocities](#) being committed in the Central African Republic and warned that the spread of violence along religious lines could drive the country “to the brink.”



Seleka Rebels in Bria, Central African Republic. (Source: AP.)

Since its independence from France in 1960, the sparsely populated Central African Republic (CAR) has experienced numerous coups, regime changes, power grabs, assassination attempts, French military interventions, rebellions, sectarian conflicts, and one brief [fling with empire](#) in the late 1970s, when former president Jean-Bedel Bokassa proclaimed himself emperor for life and the country was renamed the Central African Empire. And despite possessing sizable mineral deposits including diamonds and gold, CAR remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Its estimated 5 million citizens now face a collapse of the state.

The country’s most recent troubles can be traced to the 2003 military-backed coup that brought Francois Bozizé to power. After 10 years as president, during which time he quashed several rebellions, Bozizé was ousted in March 2013 by a coalition of rebels, known collectively as Seleka, from the northern part of the country. Michael Djotodia, the head of Seleka and the CAR’s current transitional president, had been involved in various rebellions against the state beginning with the CAR Bush War in 2004.

Since Seleka took control of the CAR in March, there have been allegations of extensive looting, frequent rapes, and [indiscriminant killing](#) by the rebels and individuals loosely associated with the group. It is estimated that as much as [10 percent of the population](#) has fled and is currently displaced. In a move meant to disassociate himself from the rebel group and its activities, [Djotodia officially dissolved Seleka](#) in September. Despite this, the group’s activities have not abated.

Although at least four of the country’s past presidents came to power through a coup, the most recent takeover may be more destabilizing than previous ones because the integrity of the state seems to be at issue. Although the Seleka movement was not explicitly a religious rebellion at the onset, it has begun to take on sectarian overtones. Djotodia is the first Muslim leader of the majority Christian country, and the Seleka rebels are approximately 80 to 90 percent Muslim. There are now reports that Muslim and Christian communities are fighting each other; what began as a power grab by rebels from the north could devolve into targeted killings based on religion.

[Support for Seleka is growing](#). Over the past six months, its numbers have increased from the 5,000 members it had before it ousted Bozizé to almost 20,000, demonstrating the group’s surging appeal. The CAR’s geography contributes to its instability: the country is landlocked and situated in a dangerous and unstable neighborhood near Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even when the central government was strongest, the CAR has been unable to extend its rule much beyond the capital city of Bangui, and now there is the possibility that the more remote parts of the country could be used as safe havens by other rebel groups. It is suspected that members of the Lord’s Resistance Army and its leader Joseph Kony are currently somewhere in the CAR. It is also possible that opportunistic leaders, either from within the CAR or from a neighboring country, could exploit religious divisions or fan the flames of hatred. For example, there are conflicting reports about Bozizé’s whereabouts, but many believe [he is plotting his return from exile](#). It is not a stretch to imagine that he might attempt to use religion to mobilize support.

In October, the United Nations Security Council passed a [resolution](#) endorsing the decision of the African Union to deploy an international support mission in the CAR. Given the speed with which the situation in the CAR is deteriorating, action on that plan cannot come too soon.

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## ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND—PAVING THE WAY FOR THE DOS SANTOS FAMILY DYNASTY?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

On [November 11, 2013](#), the managers of Angola's \$5 billion Sovereign Wealth Fund, known as the *Fundo Soberano de Angola* (FSDEA), announced that the government had appointed the international consulting company Deloitte to audit the fund's books. The FSDEA has been the subject of considerable international criticism, with the most vocal critics doubting the independence of its management, which is currently run by the President of Angola's son, José Filomeno dos Santos. [Additional concerns](#) are the fund's lack of a legal framework or investment strategy, the requirement that its managers are accountable [only to President José Eduardo Dos Santos](#) (as opposed to Parliament, which is constitutionally responsible for such oversight), and potential [conflicts](#) of interests among its board members. This announcement therefore is either a demonstration of the government's genuine desire to prove its critics wrong or an attempt to quiet the critics, thus buying time for the fund's managers—namely the Dos Santos family—to use the FSDEA for their personal gain. [more...](#)



José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, Chairman of the Board of Directors, FSDEA. (Source: Fundo Soberano de Angola corporate brochure, [http://www.fundosoberano.ao/English\\_Brochure.Pdf](http://www.fundosoberano.ao/English_Brochure.Pdf).)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## RADICAL LAND REFORM UNLIKELY IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Alexander Noyes

Julius Malema, leader of the new Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party and former president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), has revived the debate around South Africa's struggles with land reform. At the launch of the EFF in Marikana last month, Malema fired a warning shot at white landowners by [asserting](#), "You are in possession of stolen property." Just last year, Malema appeared politically sidelined by a corruption court case and his expulsion from the ANYCL. The postponement of his case until after the 2014 general elections and [speculation](#) that he could very well secure a seat in parliament next year have pushed Malema and the issue of unequal land distribution back into the political spotlight. But despite setbacks and recent [changes](#) to South Africa's land-reform efforts, the African National Congress (ANC) is unlikely to embark on a radical, Zimbabwe-like land-reform program such as the one proposed by Malema, which, along with the nationalization of mines and banks, [champions](#) the "expropriation of South Africa's land without compensation. . . ." [more...](#)



Julius Malema waves to supporters outside the court in Polokwane, South Africa, Friday, November 30, 2012. (AP Photo.)

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The FSDEA was launched in October 2012 in response to calls from the International Monetary Fund for Angola to create a more [“medium-term approach”](#) to its spending. The fund is intended to invest in infrastructure, hospitality projects, domestic agriculture, sanitation, power generation, and other non-oil sectors of the Angolan economy that are projected to exhibit strong growth in the coming years. The Angolan government claims these investments will eventually benefit its citizens by creating new opportunities.

That the establishment of the fund went largely unmentioned in the local press, but was a major story in the foreign media, leads to speculation that President Dos Santos was less interested in appealing to Angolans than impressing an international audience. Moreover, some [believe](#) that by appointing his son (who holds no official position in government) to head the fund, President Dos Santos intends to exert personal control over it. The Constitutional Court's decision in February of this year to uphold the legality of the fund amid claims that the President did not have authority to create it and needed the national assembly's approval to do so raised further concerns about the legitimacy of the FSDEA. The recent purchase of a \$350 million luxury office complex in London's exclusive Mayfair neighborhood by the FSDEA has added more fuel to this fire.

The FSDEA's management issued a [statement](#) to counter these claims:

The nomination of independent auditors represents an important landmark in the development of the fund and it reinforces its responsibility in face of state and civil society. Through the construction of solid foundations, FSDEA shall fully play its role in the socioeconomic development of the country.

According to the [statement](#), Deloitte expects to review the 2013 accounts of the fund during the first half of 2014. According to the FSDEA's bylaws, the results of this audit must be made public through dissemination in the local press. Parliament will also evaluate the performance of the fund on an annual basis, with the first review set for September 2014. As one of the largest auditing and financial advisory firms in the world, Deloitte is positioned to help FSDEA achieve a level



José Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, Chairman of the Board of Directors, FSDEA.

(Source: Fundo Soberano de Angola corporate brochure, [http://www.fundosoberano.ao/English\\_Brochure.Pdf](http://www.fundosoberano.ao/English_Brochure.Pdf).)

of transparency appropriate for sovereign wealth funds. In addition to auditing the fund, Deloitte said it will also help management to [develop strategies](#) for Angola's economic diversification. Although this is an important step for a country consistently ranked among the most corrupt by Transparency International, the Dos Santos family in fact remains heavily invested in many of the enterprises and sectors that the FSDEA is targeting, presenting a conflict of interest.

Because of [recent indications](#) that the President and his ruling party are beginning to consider succession plans, one must also question whether the establishment of the FSDEA and the appointment of José Filomeno dos Santos to lead it was a calculated move by the President to boost his son's patronage base in preparation for his ascendancy to the presidency. Certainly, the announcement of Deloitte to audit the fund is noteworthy. As Angola continues to grow its economy and become a major African and international economic player, one hopes this most recent move is a reflection of its genuine intent to ensure transparency and accountability to its citizens, and not an insincere gesture to its critics while the President forges a family dynasty.

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Julius Malema waves to supporters outside the court in Polokwane, South Africa, Friday, November 30, 2012. (AP Photo.)

South Africa has a long and contentious history regarding land. Under apartheid, white settlers appropriated 87 percent of the land, leaving a mere 13 percent for the black African majority. During this process, more than 3.5 million black Africans were forcibly [relocated](#). After the transition to nonracial democracy in 1994, the ANC announced a gradualist land-reform program. It followed a willing-seller/willing-buyer model that respected the right to private property and ensured market-rate compensation to landowners.

To date, the land-reform program has been painstakingly slow and largely unsuccessful, with little overall land redistributed over the past two decades. Speaking in 2012, Rural Development and Land Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti [said](#) that the government has achieved only a quarter of its goal of redistributing 30 percent of agricultural land by 2014. In an effort to accelerate redistribution, the government announced earlier this year that it would be [shifting](#) away from this model toward a "just and equitable" compensation principle, which would not require a willing seller and would not guarantee market-based compensation.

Despite these changes and rising political pressures to deliver, South Africa is unlikely to embrace radical, Zimbabwe-style land expropriation, mainly due to several structural factors. First, South Africa's environment is overwhelmingly arid and inhospitable to agriculture, with a mere 9.87 percent of land [deemed](#) arable. This constrains the role of agriculture in the overall economy and places considerable limitations on the transformational potential of land reform. Second, over the last century South Africa's population grew from about 5 million in 1904 to [over](#) 48 million in 2013. Such population growth, when combined with the small amount of arable land, means there simply is not enough land to be redistributed to more than a small proportion of the population. Furthermore, rapid urbanization has accompanied this population growth, with over 60 percent of the population [classified](#) as urban in 2010. This increasingly urbanized population puts considerable pressure on the government to ensure adequate urban food supplies at low prices, which in turn places additional constraints on large-scale land redistribution efforts, because such policies could hurt production.

Thus, the limited transformational potential of land reform, combined with the institutional strength of the country's political system and its commitment to the global economic system, make the prospect of South Africa following in the footsteps of Zimbabwe unlikely. That said, the repeated calls by populists such as Malema for more drastic land redistribution—as well as the ANC's [maneuverings](#) to appear as if it is acting on the land question—signal that the issue remains politically salient, particularly in the run-up to the election season.

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## WATERS OF THE NILE—DISPUTE SIMMERS BUT ARMED CONFLICT UNLIKELY

By George F. Ward

With Egypt in turmoil during the past two and one-half years, Ethiopia has been building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which would capture [74 billion cubic meters](#) of the waters of the Blue Nile behind a hydroelectric dam capable of generating 6,000 megawatts of electric power. Egypt, which is almost totally dependent on the waters of the Nile for its human consumption and agricultural needs, has alternately expressed alarm, threatened the use of military force, and indicated a willingness to negotiate on Nile waters issues. The use of force by Egypt against the dam now seems unlikely. [more...](#)



Construction work takes place Friday, June 28, 2013, at the site of the planned Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near Assosa in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, near Sudan, some 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (AP Photo/Elias Asmare)

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and the editor of IDA's Africa Watch. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

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## JUSTICE FOR THE VICTIMS OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA: DELAYED OR DENIED?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Almost immediately after the indictments for crimes related to the Kenyan 2007–2008 post-election violence were first announced in December 2010, efforts to frustrate the International Criminal Court's (ICC) ability to prosecute the defendants began. Since the election of two of the indictees as president and deputy president of Kenya in March 2013, these attempts have become more frequent. The focus has remained largely on the plight of the perpetrators, and as a result, the plight of the victims of the violence is too often overlooked. [more...](#)



Internally Displaced Person Camp hidden off the highway in Nakuru, Kenya. (Source: Author.)

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Meles Zenawi, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, chose an opportune moment to begin construction of the GERD: April 2011, a time of great unrest in Egypt, just two months after the overthrow of former President Hosni Mubarak. As Africa analyst Harry Verhoeven [points out](#), maintaining direct control of the Nile's waters has been a fundamental principle of the modern Egyptian state since the early 19th century. International agreements on the Nile in 1929 and 1959 established that principle in international law, and the construction of the High Dam at Aswan in the 1950s solidified it on the ground. Egypt was able to maintain control of the Nile's waters in part because of the relative weakness of the upstream states, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. Egypt's "hydro-hegemony" deteriorated in recent years due to several factors, including Mubarak's lack of interest in sub-Saharan Africa during the latter portion of his rule, the increased economic development of the sub-Saharan riparian states, and the emergence of China as a source of financing for large-scale infrastructure projects.

Egyptian authorities and media outlets have on several occasions threatened the use of force to protect the country's water security. In June 2013, former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi [stated](#), "As president of the republic, I confirm to you that all options are open. If Egypt is the Nile's gift, then the Nile is a gift to Egypt. . . . If it diminishes by one drop, then our blood is the alternative." Around the same time, Egyptian politicians advocated in a television broadcast the employment of airstrikes and special operations forces against the dam-building project. These threats had little or no effect on Ethiopian behavior, and work on the project continued.

The World Bank and other multilateral lending institutions have not been willing to participate in the financing of the GERD. In their absence, the [\\$4.8 billion project](#) is being financed by the Ethiopian government through the sale of debt. The bonds are being sold domestically and [marketed](#) by Ethiopian diplomatic and consular posts to the diaspora. Although China has extended financing for other hydropower projects in Ethiopia, it has not been reported as funding the construction of the GERD, which is being built by an [Italian company](#). China has provided \$1 billion in financing for the [transmission lines](#) needed to connect GERD to the grid, however.

While financing might become a question later in the 6–7 year project cycle, so far there are sufficient funds to support the continuation of construction. In September 2013, the [Ethiopian government](#) announced that it had completed 30 percent of the engineering and technical preparations at the dam site and was ready to begin building the dam itself. The flow of the Blue Nile at the dam site has been diverted into a newly excavated channel to allow construction to go forward.

Even amid the periodic bellicose rumblings from both sides, the two countries have been involved in dialogue, which recently has become more substantial. In May 2012, a tripartite body formed at the [suggestion of the Ethiopian government](#),



Construction work takes place Friday, June 28, 2013, at the site of the planned Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam near Assosa in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia, near Sudan, some 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (AP Photo/Elias Asmare)

composed of two specialists each from Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan and four specialists from other nations, held its first meeting. This committee produced its findings, which have not been publicly released, in June 2013. According to [Bloomberg](#), which apparently received a copy of the committee's report, the experts indicated that Ethiopia's analysis of the dam's downstream impact during filling and operation was "very basic, and not yet at a level of detail, sophistication, and reliability that would benefit a development of this magnitude, importance, and with such regional impact."

In the run-up to a meeting of Egyptian, Ethiopian, and Sudanese water ministers in Khartoum on November 4, both sides used the unreleased report to buttress their positions. Ethiopia maintained that the GERD could be constructed and filled without significant impact on the operation of the Aswan High Dam or effect on Egypt's water supply. The Egyptian side did not accept these conclusions and stressed the risks to its water supply. At the ministerial meeting, the [three countries agreed](#) to form a committee to implement the recommendations contained in the report, but they could not agree on the composition of the committee. A second ministerial session will take place in Khartoum on December 8.

At the level of national leadership, there have been hints that the way out of this dispute may be through regional cooperation. At a news conference on October 7, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn [announced](#) that his country would welcome Egyptian and Sudanese participation in the construction of the dam and that he considered the dam to be jointly owned by the three countries. Egyptian official sources indicated a willingness to dispatch engineers to assist in the construction, to participate in the management and operation of the dam, to establish a permanent mission at the dam site, and to act as an intermediary in the effort to find assistance and financing for the GERD. Sudan, which is pursuing its own hydroelectric and irrigation projects, has tended to support Ethiopia, breaking its historical links to Egypt on Nile waters issues. As the December 8 ministerial meeting approaches, the elements for a regional compromise that would replace Egyptian "hydro-hegemony" may be beginning to surface.

That two powerful African nations have thus far avoided conflict on an issue central to their national interests is itself noteworthy. An agreement that both allows construction of the GERD to go forward and protects essential Egyptian interests in use of the waters of the Nile would be both historic and a positive indicator that the often predicted African "water wars" are not inevitable.

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# JUSTICE FOR THE VICTIMS OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA: DELAYED OR DENIED?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Almost immediately after the indictments for crimes related to the Kenyan 2007–2008 post-election violence were first announced in December 2010, efforts to frustrate the International Criminal Court's (ICC) ability to prosecute the defendants began. Since the election of two of the indictees as president and deputy president of Kenya in March 2013, these attempts have become more frequent. The focus has remained largely on the plight of the perpetrators, and as a result, the plight of the victims of the violence is too often overlooked.



Internally Displaced Person Camp hidden off the highway in Nakuru, Kenya. (Source: Author.)

The latest round of attempts to frustrate the prosecution took place as the ICC trial of Deputy President William Ruto began and that of President Uhuru Kenyatta was postponed—for a third time—until January 2014. Over the past few months, the Kenyan parliament has threatened to withdraw Kenya from ICC jurisdiction, Kenya has petitioned the UN Security Council to step in and postpone the trials, and several African countries have used the African Union as a forum to discuss a mass exodus of African countries from the Rome Statute that established the ICC.

In addition to the numerous [diplomatic maneuvers](#), [multilateral threats](#), and even allegations of [bribery](#) and witness tampering, all meant to prevent the trials at the ICC from proceeding, the African rhetoric surrounding the ICC has changed dramatically since the court came into being in 2002. What was once heralded as a new way of preventing mass atrocities and bringing perpetrators of the worst types of crimes against humanity to justice is now being labeled a [racist](#), anti-African institution used as a tool to promote Western biases. With this narrative being [endorsed](#) by many of Africa's political class, some of whom are suspected of transgressions themselves, the ICC is now being portrayed as unpopular and unjust.

Even though sentiment against the court may be found at elite levels, there is evidence to suggest that Kenyan citizens approve of the ICC trials. According to a recent poll, slightly more than 50 percent of Kenyans [supported](#) the continuation of the trials. Of those who support the ICC process, the most frequent reason given is the need for justice for the victims.

While Kenya's political elite has been maneuvering to remove the prosecution of Kenyatta and Ruto from the Court's docket, the experiences of the victims of post-election violence—those whom the ICC was designed to protect—are too often overlooked. Estimates are that 600,000 or more were displaced in the clashes that took place in January 2008. As of September 21, 2013, approximately 65,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were still living in informal settlements or IDP camps in the Rift Valley.

In September, IDA conducted surveys and interviews with victims of the 2007–2008 post-election violence who were residing in IDP camps in the Rift Valley. Of those asked what needed to take place for them to move forward with their lives, some said that they just wanted land and a chance to start over, some said that they wanted the compensation (monetary or otherwise) that the government had promised them, and some said that they were in favor of the ICC trials. But importantly, none of the respondents felt that justice had yet been done in their cases. Regardless of ethnicity, gender, age and experience, the desire for justice was the constant.

The political maneuvers of the alleged perpetrators of the post-election violence and the ICC obscure the real victims of that violence, the Kenyans who lost their lives, their families and friends, and their homes in the 2007/8 post-election violence. Durable peace will only come once those victims feel that justice has been served.

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## PETRO-PIRATES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Recent news [reports](#) indicate that the Gulf of Guinea has replaced Somalia as the world's most piracy-prone region. The objectives and modus operandi of the pirates in the two regions are, however, significantly different. While Somali pirates usually hijack ships and kidnap their crews for ransom, West African pirates tend to steal petroleum products for quick sale on the lucrative black market. The reported rise in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea must therefore be considered in the context of increased regional oil production and shipping traffic, whereas Somali piracy reflects opportunistic behavior in the absence of governance and law enforcement. [more...](#)



Gulf of Guinea  
(Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_of\\_Guinea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_of_Guinea))

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## DESPITE PROTESTS, DOS SANTOS AND MPLA FIRMLY IN CONTROL IN ANGOLA

By Alexander Noyes

On November 23, 2013, several opposition groups launched [protests](#) in Luanda and other cities in Angola over the deaths of two war veteran activists who were [allegedly](#) tortured and killed by the State Intelligence and Security Service (SINSE) of Angola in 2012. The demonstrations were staged by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and other opposition groups, including the Broad Convergence for Angola's Salvation-Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE) party. The ensuing government response, in which security forces used tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds, resulted in the arrest of over 300 protesters and the death of a 28-year old CASA-CE youth wing member, who was [reportedly](#) shot and killed in the early hours before the demonstrations. Despite recent protests and increasing discontent, President José Eduardo dos Santos and the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) exercise a strong grip on the political space in Angola through a political-security alliance, as evidenced by the state's swift response last week. [more...](#)



Gen. Fernando Miala  
(Source: <http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/16/miala.jpg/>)

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### About IDA

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Gulf of Guinea  
(Source:[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_of\\_Guinea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_of_Guinea).)

The lack of governance in Somalia, both onshore and offshore, is illustrated by the ability of Somali pirates to [anchor hijacked vessels along the shoreline](#) and hold crews captive, in plain sight, for as long as three years. Local authorities, whether government officials or traditional leaders, tacitly permit these activities and may receive up to 86 percent of pirates' bounties, according to the [Brookings Institution](#).

Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, on the other hand, must contend with some law enforcement (however weak) in sovereign waters and on coastal lands. For this reason, to evade detection, their operations are typically performed much more quickly and closer to shore, where national navies normally do not patrol. The presence of law enforcement also reinforces the pirates' preference for thefts, which can be performed in days, as opposed to kidnappings, which may take months, providing time for security forces to detect and apprehend perpetrators.

The [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime](#) (UNODC) has reported very few Somali-style kidnappings in the Gulf of Guinea in recent years. Rather, 2013 saw the first increase in large-scale oil thefts. In these incidents, large tankers are hijacked and pirates transfer their petroleum cargos to smaller vessels. The petroleum products are refined in clandestine facilities and sold on the [black market](#). The [International Maritime Bureau](#) (IMB) estimates the value of goods stolen in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 at between [\\$33 million and \\$100 million](#). Another notable development has been the expansion of piracy beyond Nigerian waters, where oil theft has been common for many years, to Togo, Benin, and farther up the coast. This expansion may be attributable to the 2011 amnesty declared for militants in the Niger Delta. Having lost their connection to a political cause, the militants may now feel free to operate beyond Nigeria's borders in search of new criminal opportunities.

There is another difference between piracy activities in the two regions. More than in Somalia, the problem in the Gulf of Guinea is one of organized crime. Although West African organized crime is not technically sophisticated, the entrenched criminal networks in the region are quite effective because they are highly networked. Almost all the known pirates in the Gulf have been identified as [Nigerian](#) (though non-Nigerian pirates certainly exist), whose global diaspora provides them with access to intelligence, facilities, people, arms, and other resources to facilitate transnational illicit trade.

According to the IMB, [966 sailors in West Africa were attacked last year compared with 851 in Somalia](#). Although this would appear to place West Africa above Somalia as a piracy hot spot, one must be wary of these data. Underreporting (or not reporting) acts of piracy is common and frustrates efforts to measure the actual scope of the problem. Victims might choose not to make reports for a variety of [reasons](#), including fear of further victimization by police, who likely have little ability to find and prosecute perpetrators, or because the victims' cargo was itself illicit.

## Implications

The political/economic/social context in the Gulf of Guinea, which is quite different from that in Somalia, is driven by a number of factors. For example, there is a continuing increase in oil production in the Gulf of Guinea as newfound resource discoveries are exploited (such as in Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). The history of the Niger Delta demonstrates the challenges that face a region when vast natural resources are exploited for the benefit of a political elite, to the detriment of the local population. In addition, a great deal of anger has been directed at the international oil companies (IOCs) that extract the Delta's natural resources but fail to provide opportunities for local citizens or reinvest those profits in the local economy. Depending on how the IOCs manage their social investment programs in the future, one might expect to see increased local support for pirates.

Also from the local perspective, the impact on international insurance rates may prove to be disastrous for some West African economies that rely on trade through their ports. The international insurer Lloyd's of London recently increased premiums for shipping companies operating in Benin, which it re-categorized as "risky." [As a result](#), there was reportedly a 70 percent decrease in maritime traffic through the port of Cotonou, which translated into a 28 percent loss in government revenue.

From a broader perspective, regional powers and the international community all have a common interest in combatting piracy in West Africa. Piracy threatens the heart of Africa's oil industry, which is the single [most important economic sector](#) in the region. Piracy also threatens international oil supplies -- more than [30 percent of the oil imported to the United States and 40 percent](#) of the oil imported to Europe pass through the Gulf of Guinea.

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
Gen. Fernando Miala  
(Source: <http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/16/miala.jpg/>)

Dos Santos wields informal power over military and security officials through extensive patronage networks funded by the state oil company, Sonangol, and by granting the leaders access to political power through positions in the state bureaucracy. Angola's military is one of the [largest](#) in sub-Saharan Africa, with over 105,000 troops, supplemented by 10,000 paramilitaries and 10,000 Rapid Reaction Police. Dos Santos, in power for over three decades, presides over a resilient network that is used to co-opt potential opponents and placate military and business leaders. These shadow institutions are funded through Sonangol, which has been [accused](#) of endemic corruption and an acute lack of transparency. The security sector also has [benefited](#) from extensive involvement in Angola's diamond mining operations.

Despite the existence of rival factions and ambitious personalities within the security sector, Dos Santos has maintained control thus far through a strategy of "[divide and rule](#)." When individuals in the security sector appear to be accruing too much influence, Dos Santos acts to sideline them. For example, General Fernando Miala, the former head of external intelligence, was [sacked](#) in 2006 and sentenced for an alleged coup attempt. Dos Santos has kept Miala close, however, pardoning him in 2009 and bringing him back into government. Just this month, in the uproar sparked by a leaked document tying the deaths of the two protestors in 2012 to the SINSE, dos Santos [dismissed](#) the chief of SINSE, Sebastião Martins, and announced that four SINSE officials were under investigation for the killings. Although security chiefs certainly have considerable political influence, akin to the situation in Zimbabwe, it appears dos Santos and the MPLA are firmly in control of the civil-security relationship.

This does not mean that the status quo will persist indefinitely. A shift in popular support for the MPLA could increase the possibility of political instability. Various opposition groups have staged numerous protests during the last few years, particularly in the lead-up to the August 2012 national elections, where the MPLA [prevailed](#) with over 70 percent of the vote. As highlighted by the graph, which outlines incidents of political violence in Angola from the year after the end of the civil war to 2012 using [data](#) from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, there has been a slight increase in levels of political violence over the past two years. Recent events suggest that this upward trend may continue through 2013.

## Incidents of Political Violence, 1997-2012



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)

The security sector seems unlikely to challenge dos Santos under current political conditions, but a change in the MPLA's political hegemony or a succession crisis within the party could shift incentives within the political-security alliance. Although public support for opposition groups may be increasing and low-level violence and political demonstrations will continue, it is likely that as long as the political-security nexus remains intact, dos Santos and the MPLA will remain firmly in control in Angola.

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## FRANCE'S LATEST AFRICAN RESCUE MISSION—THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

By George F. Ward

With the Central African Republic (CAR) engulfed in internecine violence, France has again come to the aid of a beleaguered African country. After the United Nations Security Council passed an [authorizing resolution](#) on December 5, 2013, France moved swiftly, sending 1,600 troops to the CAR. At around the same time, December 6–7, delegations from 53 African nations were meeting with French President Francois Hollande in Paris at a summit on peace and security. The summit represented an effort by Hollande to make progress on a broad African security agenda, but most especially to lay out a path toward more effective African efforts to provide for regional security. Simultaneous operational deployments of French forces in both Mali and the CAR were probably not what Hollande had in mind when he proclaimed [an end to \*francafrique\*](#) last year. [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is a Research Staff Member of IDA and editor of IDA's Africa Watch. He is a former U.S. Ambassador to Namibia.

## THE FALLOUT FROM MALAWI'S "CASHGATE" CORRUPTION SCANDAL

By Alexander Noyes

On October 10, 2013, President Joyce Banda of Malawi [dissolved](#) her entire cabinet in response to a multimillion-dollar corruption scandal known by local journalists as "cashgate." While emphasizing that the majority of funds went missing under her predecessor, Bingu wa Mutharika, Banda said that that up to 30 percent of Malawi's budget may have been looted by state officials over the past decade. It is [estimated](#) that \$50 million has gone missing since Banda came to power a year and a half ago, with another \$500 million lost to corruption under the late Mutharika's eight years of rule. Although Banda has moved quickly to investigate and respond to the scandal—actions included sacking the former justice and finance ministers and making dozens of arrests—the fallout from cashgate is likely to have costly international and domestic implications for Banda and Malawi. Indeed, in the aftermath of the scandal, donors [froze](#) foreign aid to Banda's government, which accounts for roughly 40 percent of Malawi's government budget. [more...](#)

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French President Francois Hollande reviews the troops during a stopover from South Africa in Bangui, Central African Republic, Tuesday, December 10, 2013. (AP Photo/Jerome Delay)



Malawi President Joyce Hilda Mtila Banda addresses the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters. (AP Photo/Frank Franklin II)

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French President Francois Hollande reviews the troops during a stopover from South Africa in Bangui, Central African Republic, Tuesday, December 10, 2013. (AP Photo/Jerome Delay)

As pointed out last month in IDA's [Africa Watch](#), violence by the former Seleka rebels has continued unabated since they toppled the Bozizé government in March 2013. This violence took on religious overtones, with the majority Christian population being targeted by the mainly Muslim former rebel group. The atrocities committed by the Seleka group sparked a backlash by Christian self-defense militias, the "antibalaka." At least [400,000 people](#), nearly a tenth of the population, are estimated to have fled their homes due to the violence. The African-led International Support Mission in the CAR, referred to as [MISCA](#), is a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force deployed by the Economic Community of Central African States, with authorization by the African Union and the United Nations Security Council. This force has not managed to end the violence.

Although the French deployment, despite casualties, is already helping to restore a semblance of order in the troubled CAR, this latest mission illustrates the difficulties that President Hollande and his government face in changing the nature of France's relationship with its former African colonies. In a landmark speech in Dakar, Senegal, on October 12, 2012, Hollande [stated](#), "The age of what was once called *francafrique* is over," as he projected the vision of a new age of true partnership in trade, investment, development, and cultural ties between France and Africa. Since then, he has been obliged to delay the downsizing of the French force in Mali, defend French uranium mining installations in Niger against Islamic extremists, and, now, deploy more forces to the CAR. Unless and until African governments and their regional organizations can more effectively provide for the common defense on the continent, interventions such as these will remain necessary.

The [final declaration](#) of the Paris summit stressed the importance of improving the ability of African states to provide for regional security and applauded the increased participation by African states in security operations on the continent. The summit participants pledged support for efforts by the African Union to create an African Standby Force (ASF) and an African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC). On December 7, 2013, reiterating this support, French President Francois Hollande [stressed](#) at a press conference that, "Africa should be able to get together and react swiftly to crises. Therefore, a rapid reaction force should take place in the coming months." Hollande announced that France would be training 20,000 African soldiers over the next five years.

The AICRC concept, [discussed earlier](#) in IDA's Africa Watch, was agreed upon by the African Union largely because of the long delays, which have involved political and resource difficulties, in creating an ASF. Had an ASF been available for service in Mali, France's need to intervene there in January 2013 might have been obviated or its forces reduced in size. The AICRC concept, which would result in one rapidly deployable combat brigade, is smaller and more feasible, but its realization is by no

means assured. The major African proponent of the AICRC has come to be South African President Jacob Zuma, a leader who also suffered a setback in the CAR when [Seleka rebels inflicted heavy casualties](#) on a South African National Defense Force contingent in the capital of Bangui in March. Zuma convened a so-called summit meeting on the AICRC concept in November. Only three heads of government appeared at the meeting in addition to Zuma. Six other African countries were represented at a lower level. The gathering did little more than hear a report on the AICRC prepared by a group of defense chiefs of staff and agree on another meeting in January 2014.

The problem in creating more credible African regional security capabilities—and thereby reducing the need for interventions such as those by France—is not lack of good intentions. These have been abundantly expressed for years. But adequate resources are lacking. Infantry forces are available, but the capabilities needed to deploy and support a force—airlift and motor transport, communications, intelligence, and the like—are missing.

Training and equipping efforts by the United States, France, and other Western countries can help fill some of these gaps, but more needs to be done by African governments themselves. One avenue that could be explored is burdensharing, whereby individual countries would develop specialized capabilities that could be shared with other members of a coalition. African governments need also to make better use of their scarce procurement resources, buying the arms and equipment most needed in regional security operations rather than those that contribute more to national prestige than to useful force capabilities.

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Malawi President Joyce Hilda Mtila Banda addresses the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters. (AP Photo/Frank Franklin II)

The full extent of the scandal was revealed in the wake of the shooting of Paul Mphwiyo, budget director in the finance ministry, on September 13. He was shot three times but survived after receiving treatment in South Africa. It is [alleged](#) that Mphwiyo, who has a reputation as an anti-corruption leader, was about to unveil high-level government fraud and that the assassination attempt was an effort to silence him. The shooting was [connected](#) to the arrest of an official in the environment ministry a week earlier, during which \$300,000 was found in the trunk of his car. It appears many of the missing funds were funneled through a loophole in the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), the government's system of paying civil servants.

In the ensuing police raids and investigations, a number of top officials and businessmen were implicated in the graft schemes, including former finance minister Ken Lipenga and former justice minister Ralph Kasambara, who was arrested on November 8 for [links](#) to the Mphwiyo shooting. Banda [stated](#) that a total of 68 people have been arrested and 33 accounts have been frozen in connection to the scandal. According to Banda, the IFMIS loophole has been fixed and the software upgraded. Caving to donor pressure, Banda has also [hired](#) an audit team to help investigate various departments and agencies and unravel the extent of the scandal. The findings of the audit team are due in January 2014.

Despite [warnings](#) from the new finance minister, Maxwell Mkwazalamba, that a cutoff of donor support would create budget shortfalls and further weaken the fragile economy, international donors suspended aid after the revelations of cashgate. Major foreign donors, including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Norway, as well the Common Approach to Budgetary Support (CABS), a framework that includes a number of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, have all [frozen](#) support. The UK's Department for International Development [proceeded similarly, reasoning](#), "It is clearly not possible to provide direct support to Malawi's government at this time. No UK funds will be paid until we are fully satisfied that taxpayers' money is safe." This is significant because although international donors have only recently reengaged with Malawi, Banda had become somewhat of a darling among donors since becoming president. As the United States does not provide direct budgetary support to Malawi, the U.S. government has [not](#) suspended aid.



The domestic implications of cashgate could be even more costly for Banda and her party, the People's Party. Despite Banda's actions and vows to fight corruption, she has faced a variety of criticisms, namely that large-scale corruption has occurred on her watch, but also that she has used the scandal as an opportunity to crack down on [critics](#) through the purge of her cabinet. She was welcomed back from a recent foreign trip with [protests](#) in the capital, Lilongwe, and just this [week](#) a number of civil society groups launched an effort to protest corruption and Banda's handling of the scandal. While the implications of cashgate for national elections scheduled for May 2014 remain unclear, Banda is aware that her political fate is directly linked to how she handles the scandal, [asserting](#): "If I do not win the elections because I was fighting corruption, I am very comfortable with that."

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
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## COUNTERING AL-SHABAAB'S ROLE IN THE CHARCOAL TRADE: TIME FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE?

By Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee

Al-Shabaab, the Islamic terrorist group currently based in rural parts of southern Somalia, receives funding from many sources, including [other terrorist groups](#); [state sponsors](#) (reported to include Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Iran, Qatar, and Eritrea, although these governments officially deny the claim); the [Somali diaporra](#); [charities](#); and illegal activities such as kidnapping, [piracy, and extortion](#) of local businesses. But it is the charcoal trade that has become its most important source of income, generating approximately [\\$25 million a year](#), according to the United Nations (UN). In February 2012, the UN made a concerted effort to cut off this source of terrorist financing by passing [Security Council Resolution 2036](#), which imposed a ban on the direct or indirect importation of charcoal from Somalia. Several months later President Obama followed suit, ordering [sanctions against](#) anyone involved in the export or import of Somali charcoal. The capture by Kenyan forces of the strategic port city of Kismayo, which had been controlled by al-Shabaab, was also intended to cripple the terrorist group's ability to export charcoal abroad. Yet al-Shabaab's finances [do not appear](#) to have suffered a major setback as a result. [more...](#)



Thousands of sacks of dark charcoal sit atop one another in Somalia's southern port city of Kismayo. (AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## APRIL 2014: A LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEXT ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

In April 2014, South Africa will celebrate its 20th year of post-apartheid democracy and will hold its fourth democratic national election. Although this poll is still several months away, recent developments call for reflection on the status and meaning of elections in South Africa. First, the country's November voter registration efforts resulted in the addition of [2.5 million new voters to the rolls](#). The much anticipated participation in the registration process of the "born frees," those born after the end of apartheid, was, however, much lower than anticipated. The second development of note was the passing of Nelson Mandela, who ushered in a new era of freedom and reconciliation in a deeply divided country and was viewed as the face of the African National Congress (ANC). Finally, a recent poll of [ANC members](#) indicated that support for the country's current president, Jacob Zuma, is waning. Each factor has the potential to affect the outcome of April elections. Taken together, they may translate into an erosion of electoral support for the monolithic ANC. [more...](#)



Voters line up to cast their ballots in South Africa's first post-apartheid election in 1994. (Source: AP.)

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IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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## The UN Charcoal Ban

Charcoal is a commonly used cooking fuel in Africa and the developing world in general. One very lucrative market is in the Middle East, where there is great [demand](#) for meats grilled using charcoal from acacia forests between the Shabelle and Juba rivers in southern Somalia. The distinctive aroma and long-burning qualities of the dense wood have made acacia trees a highly valued commodity for Somalis. For many years, al-Shabaab has taken advantage of this profitable trade to fund its operations and pay its members, participating in the trade through either the direct ownership and sale of charcoal or taxes levied on producers and transporters.

Despite a UN ban on Somali charcoal, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states [continue to import Somali charcoal](#) in violation of those sanctions due to high demand for acacia charcoal. Prices in the Middle East are [three to four](#) times greater than on the local market, enticing many Somalis to participate in the trade. Moreover, there are numerous "[spoilors](#)" who have an interest in keeping the trade alive. Members of parliament, clan-based paramilitaries, Somali warlords, international peacekeepers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) all benefit from this lucrative trade. As a result, the UN estimates that Somalia's charcoal exports have actually [risen 140 percent](#) since the ban.

## Losing Kismayo

The southern port city of Kismayo, under al-Shabaab's control from 2008 to 2012, was a strategic base of operations for the terrorist group's charcoal-exporting activities. Between it and two smaller ports up the coast, al-Shabaab was collecting an estimated [\\$35–\\$50 million](#) annually in custom tolls and taxes on businesses. When a combined military offensive led by the KDF and AMISOM took control of Kismayo in October 2012, many thought this would cripple al-Shabaab's ability to raise revenues through charcoal exports and associated illegal activities.

It did not, however, and the UN [states](#) that al-Shabaab continues to profit from charcoal exports in two ways. First, it controls rural central and southern portions of Somalia and sets up checkpoints where it taxes truckloads of charcoal headed to Kismayo. The UN estimates that one checkpoint south of Kismayo generated [\\$675,000 to \\$1.5 million per month](#). Second, al-Shabaab remains in control of Barawe, a much smaller port north of Kismayo from which charcoal is exported.

Thus, the charcoal trade's infrastructure remains intact and the enterprise has actually grown. [According to the UN](#), the revenue that al-Shabaab currently raises from its Kismayo shareholding, its Barawe exports, and the taxation of ground transportation likely exceeds the \$25 million it was estimated to be receiving when it had sole control over the port city.

## Humanitarian Concerns

In addition to terrorism, the charcoal trade raises humanitarian concerns. The destruction of southern Somalia's acacia forests for the purpose of charcoal production contributes to conditions that cause drought and famine, such as the drought in 2011 that left approximately [13 million people in need of humanitarian assistance](#). Whereas Somalia was once 15 percent forested, [some experts state](#) that al-Shabaab has reduced that by two-thirds. This denuding of the savannah has made portions of southern Somalia [unsuitable for human habitation](#) by increasing soil erosion, depriving livestock of foliage for grazing and shade in the region's intense heat, and killing tree root systems needed to retain moisture in the soil.

## A Way Ahead?

Enforcing the existing sanctions is one approach to dealing with al-Shabaab, but this would require genuine political will from all stakeholders. Relying on the KDF for enforcement would not appear wise as it has purportedly [collaborated with the anti-government Ras Kamboni militia](#), led by a former al-Shabaab ally, leading to increased violations. The UN could alternatively apply pressure on the charcoal-importing Gulf States to enforce the ban. Strong links between al-Shabaab charcoal traders and businessmen in these countries, however, all of whom have an interest in seeing the trade thrive, would make this difficult in the absence of a serious crackdown on local businesses by the Gulf States

Given the apparent 140 percent increase in Somali charcoal exports despite the sanctions, policymakers might also consider adopting a different approach. It is worth considering whether measures taken to counter the illicit sale of other natural resources might be relevant to the charcoal trade. For example, a certification scheme similar to the Kimberley Process for diamonds might be applied. In any event, a strategy to defeat Al-Shabaab must recognize the limited effectiveness of economic sanctions and consider other means to suppress the financial support provided by the charcoal trade.

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Since South Africa's transition from racial oligarchic rule to full democratic political participation in 1994, one party has dominated the electoral landscape. The ANC, the party of liberation from apartheid rule, has won between 60 percent and 70 percent of the vote in each of its past four contests. The president is indirectly elected to serve for a maximum of two five-year terms. He or she is chosen by Parliament from the ranks of its elected members. Nelson Mandela was selected president in 1994. After Mandela voluntarily resigned from the presidency in 1999, Thabo Mbeki was selected. He served until September 2008 when he was [forced to resign](#) following a leadership dispute with his political rival, Jacob Zuma. Kgalema Motlanthe served as a caretaker president from 2008 until the next election in April 2009. In that election, the ANC received 11.6 million votes (65.9 percent of the total vote). The remaining votes and seats went to a fractured opposition that included 25 different political parties. The ANC selected Zuma as president.

In previous contests, the ANC has won at least 63 percent of the vote. In most elections it has secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament, giving it the power to amend the constitution without the consent or approval of any other political party. The party's electoral strength has been a function of its liberation struggle credentials. Despite the many challenges that South Africa has experienced (corruption, mismanagement, HIV/AIDS denialism, unemployment, and crime), voters have remained faithful to the ANC because it was seen as having delivered democracy to South Africa.

But in 2014, individual attachment to and reverence of the ANC may not be as strong as in previous contests. The father of the ANC has passed away, and a new crop of voters who did not experience the previous regime—the born frees—will now be able to participate in elections. If recent polling is any indication, President Zuma's popularity is in decline. Also, the political opposition may be maturing. The Democratic Alliance, South Africa's second largest party, has been [making some inroads](#) in local governments in Western Cape and Gauteng Provinces. In December, five other political parties, who together received 14 percent of the vote in 2009, announced a new electoral coalition called the [Collective for Democracy](#).



Voters line up to cast their ballots in South Africa's first post-apartheid election in 1994. (Source: AP.)

All these factors may translate into declining electoral fortunes for the ANC. Whereas previously the ANC could rely on its “glorious past” as the party of South African liberation to garner electoral support, in 2014 it may need to actively earn the support of the electorate through [issue-based campaigning](#), something that has been largely lacking in post-apartheid politics.

But the opposition is not completely united. And the born frees at this point seem agnostic about elections. Only 22.6 percent of those 18 to 19 years old are currently registered to vote. The country will engage in another voter registration exercise in [February](#) in an attempt to entice young voters to participate. By some estimates this generation, also referred to as the [Mandela generation](#), comprises up to 40 percent of the population. What they do—or don’t do—will have a significant impact on the nature and outcome of future elections. It remains to be seen whether they will be a force in 2014.

Past elections can be characterized as referendums on democracy. If a new generation of voters demands it, the next election can be about the many pressing issues facing a demographically young South Africa, such as corruption, unemployment, and inadequate delivery of public services.

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