

## THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: JUSTICE FOR WHOM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

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Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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By Alexander Noyes

On May 26, 2015, Madagascar's Parliament, in which the opposition holds a majority, voted to impeach President Hery Rajaonarimampianina (known as Hery) for not [delivering](#) on his election promises, meddling with and threatening to dissolve parliament, and mixing religion and politics by holding political speeches in churches, among [other](#) allegations. But on June 13, Madagascar's highest court [rejected](#) parliament's attempt to impeach President Hery, ruling that the impeachment had "no legal foundation." The impeachment attempt signals a rise in political tensions in Madagascar that threatens to derail recent progress toward stability. [more...](#)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta, center, sits amid his defense team members before the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, to appeal for the crimes against humanity case against him to be dropped for lack of evidence. The International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor dropped all crimes against humanity charges against him on December 5, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Peter Dejong, Pool, File.)



In this photo taken Wednesday, May, 27, 2015, Madagascar member of parliament, Malemit Liahosoa, seated on right, surrounded by fellow members, hands documents to the High Constitutional Court in Antananarivo, Madagascar, alleging that President Hery Rajaonarimampianina has repeatedly violated the constitution. (Source: AP Photo/Martin Vogel.)

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IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

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Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta, center, sits amid his defense team members before the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, to appeal for the crimes against humanity case against him to be dropped for lack of evidence. The International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor dropped all crimes against humanity charges against him on December 5, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Peter Dejong, Pool, File.)

## International Justice, Pre- and Post-Rome Statute

Before the ICC was established in 2002, no single body was responsible for trying cases related to war crimes, genocide, and other such mass atrocities. For the most heinous of offenses, ad hoc tribunals such as the [Nuremberg Trials](#), the [International Criminal Tribunal \(ICT\) for the former Yugoslavia](#), and the [ICT for Rwanda](#) were used, at significant expense. It is estimated that the ICT for Rwanda cost approximately [\\$17 million per indictee](#). In addition, the cases that were selected were argued to be arbitrary or capricious and based on the [preferences of donor countries](#).

The [Rome Statute](#) was drafted in July 1997 to address these concerns—especially the perceived politicization of cases. The statute affords the ICC jurisdiction “over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,” including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In 2002, after a critical mass of countries (120) had signed and adopted the Rome Statute, the ICC came into being. As of 2015, [123 countries](#) are party to the Rome Statute.

Over the past few years, the ICC has come under increased scrutiny and criticism by African leaders. The President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, has been especially critical. Kenyatta claims that the ICC is a continuation of a “[century of exploitation and domination](#)” by Western countries. Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, claims that African countries “[don't want it in this region at all](#).” Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of the African National Congress, the ruling party of South Africa, recently stated that the ICC is “[a tool in the hands of the powerful to destroy the weak](#).” Does the ICC unduly target Africa?

## The ICC and Africa

On their face, these allegations of selective justice might appear to have some merit. The ICC has initiated more cases in Africa than in all other regions combined. There are currently open [cases](#) under investigation for crimes allegedly committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, and Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, of the 18 individuals charged by the court and the eight cases either heard or pending on the docket, [all are based on crimes committed in Africa](#).

There are several reasons as to why Africa might be overrepresented by the ICC's docket. First, of the [123 countries that are party to the ICC](#), the largest contingent is from Africa (34). At the same time, around two-thirds of the [UN-member states not party to the ICC](#) (approximately 60) are outside Africa. In general, crimes committed within non-party states cannot be considered by the court. Second, the court is allowed to hear cases only under very specific conditions: (1) a party state is unable or unwilling to bring charges and a party state requests an investigation, or (2) the

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United Nations Security Council refers a case to the ICC. The majority of the cases that the ICC has considered or is planning to consider have been referred by countries themselves (Central African Republic, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali) or with the explicit support of the country of origin (Côte d'Ivoire). The UN Security Council has referred only [three](#) cases for alleged crimes committed in Africa—in Libya, Sudan, and Kenya. To date, the ICC has refused to hear only three cases that have been brought before it. The court's docket is therefore limited by its jurisdiction and the cases that are referred to it.

Third, the statute was drafted in [close consultation](#) with the majority of African countries and with the participation of more than [800 civil society organizations](#) based in Africa. Forty-three African countries are signatories to the treaty, and 34 states have also ratified the treaty and are party to its jurisdiction. Twenty-one countries in Africa had coalitions for the ICC that actively assisted in helping their countries implement the Rome Statute. If the ICC is predominantly focused on African perpetrators, perhaps it is because Africans themselves were so instrumental in the Court's creation.

The ICC was established as a means to end immunity for crimes committed that are of broad concern to the international community. It was hoped that a permanent international body would be a less political method of punishing the most egregious of offenses. Now, it appears the ICC has become a political tool, but not exactly in the way its critics allege. African political elites are using the ICC in a self-serving way as a wedge issue, portraying themselves as struggling against Western imperialism.

The example of Kenya is especially illustrative. With an ICC court case pending against him, referred by a commission created by his own government, Uhuru Kenyatta still decided to campaign for president in 2012. The man Kenyatta ultimately chose as his running mate, William Ruto, was also facing charges at the ICC. Some allege their political union was [forged out of mutual desire to evade prosecution](#) at the ICC. The ICC featured prominently in the 2013 Kenyan presidential election, with some reducing the contest to a referendum on the ICC's legitimacy. Kenyatta, who once publicly stated that he preferred an ICC investigation into the post-election violence as opposed to a local tribunal, made a significant about-face when it was politically expedient to do so, framing the ICC's prosecution as an imperial persecution against Africans. Upon his election as president, Kenyatta used his victory as a mandate of sorts to lobby the ICC to drop the charges against him, arguing that he was now a sitting president and should therefore enjoy immunity. He began lobbying other African leaders, some of whom had been accused of crimes against humanity in their own countries, and found sympathy and support. Ultimately, the charges against Kenyatta were withdrawn, but a cloud remains as the government was deemed [uncooperative](#) by the ICC, and several witnesses were reportedly [intimidated or disappeared](#) in the months leading up to the trial.

## Conclusion

It is not surprising that some African political leaders seek immunity to shield themselves from the consequences of offenses they have committed while in office. They are supported by political elites that benefit from non-democratic rule, and they have created a problem of perceived illegitimacy for the ICC in Africa. On the other hand, [African civil society groups](#) remain supportive of the ICC, perhaps because they see it as addressing existing gaps in justice. The bottom line seems to be that the ICC, created with input from a broad swath of African leaders and civil society members, is currently functioning as it was intended. But continued manipulation and interference by African political elites could work to undermine the Court's most essential function: to bring justice to those no other court is willing or able to try.

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On May 26, 2015, Madagascar's Parliament, in which the opposition holds a majority, voted to impeach President Hery Rajaonarimampianina (known as Hery) for not [delivering](#) on his election promises, meddling with and threatening to dissolve parliament, and mixing religion and politics by holding political speeches in churches, among [other](#) allegations. But on June 13, Madagascar's highest court [rejected](#) parliament's attempt to impeach President Hery, ruling that the impeachment had "no legal foundation." The impeachment attempt signals a rise in political tensions in Madagascar that threatens to derail recent progress toward stability.



In this photo taken Wednesday, May, 27, 2015, Madagascan member of parliament, Malement Liahosoa, seated on right, surrounded by fellow members, hands documents to the High Constitutional Court in Antananarivo, Madagascar, alleging that President Hery Rajaonarimampianina has repeatedly violated the constitution. (Source: AP Photo/Martin Vogel.)

## From Instability to Reconciliation and Back Again?

Madagascar has a long history of political instability, with frequent bouts of electoral violence and military intervention in politics. A long-standing feud between two former presidents—Marc Ravalomanana and Andry Rajoelina—has overshadowed Madagascar's politics since Rajoelina overthrew Ravalomanana in 2009 with backing from the military. After four years of international isolation, a peaceful election in 2013 brought Hery to power, and political and economic [improvements](#) soon followed. International cooperation quickly resumed and, as reported in the February 5 [edition](#) of Africa Watch, Hery presided over several impressive reconciliation initiatives.

Hery [freed](#) Ravalomanana from house arrest (where he had remained since his unannounced return from exile in South Africa in October 2014), pardoned a number of prisoners allied with Ravalomanana, and hosted dialogues with four former presidents (including Rajoelina and Ravalomanana) under the auspices of the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar (FFKM). A national [conference](#) on reconciliation held in early May by FFKM, however, had the opposite effect—actually helping to precipitate the impeachment vote—when FFKM called for the [dissolution](#) of all political institutions except for the presidency.

## Impeachment and Aftermath

The threat of a dissolved parliament seemingly brought the supporters of Rajoelina and Ravalomanana together, with the impeachment vote gaining 121 out of 151 votes in parliament. The political opposition is led by Rajoelina's Mapar party (Miaraka amin'ny Prézidà Andry Rajoelina), which has the most seats in parliament with [49](#). Ravalomanana's party, TIM (Tiako-i-Madagasikara), has the second most, with 20. The remaining parliamentary seats are held by non-aligned independents and single-person parties. Hery came to power on the back of support from Rajoelina but then distanced himself from Rajoelina's camp once in office, losing support from Mapar. Although a fledgling [alliance](#) between Hery and Ravalomanana appeared to be [gaining](#) ground before the impeachment vote, TIM's (Ravalomanana's party) vote for impeachment ostensibly has ended such cooperation. After the impeachment vote, Tinoko Roberto, of Rajoelina's Mapar party, [said](#) Hery had skills as an accountant, but "he doesn't know how to run a country."

The high court's rejection of the impeachment has spared Hery, at least temporarily. After the decision, the African Union [called](#) on political stakeholders to respect the ruling and to show "restraint," while France urged dialogue, [calling](#) on "all parties to undertake a frank and constructive dialogue and push for a climate of appeasement and stability in the greater interest of the Malagasy people." Hery warned against returning the country to crisis and also [called](#) for dialogue: "We must fight to ensure that the crisis will not return to our country. Each of us has learned from



what happened . . . I call on the Malagasy population, including opponents, to take account of the best interests of the nation, to join hands, to dialogue, to work together and enhance development.” Former Prime Minister Camille Vital, however, [said](#) that presidential elections, scheduled for 2018, should be held early: “An early presidential election is the solution the country needs regardless of the decision of the High Constitutional Court. It belongs to the National Assembly [parliament] to decide the next step.”

## Conclusion

It appears that the extended rivalry between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana will continue to play out in Madagascar, with Hery stuck in the crossfire. Despite signs of an alliance between Hery and Ravalomanana earlier in the year, Ravalomanana’s support for the impeachment vote reveals Hery’s acute political isolation as well as Ravalomanana’s political opportunism. The role and allegiance of the military remain uncertain. Both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana are believed to enjoy [continued](#) support from factions in the security sector. Recognizing the importance of the military to political life in the country, Gen. Dominique Rakotozafy, the defense minister, [asked](#) political leaders to respect the court’s judgment and “to refrain from any attempt to lead the security forces into actions contrary to their missions.”

Hery’s political life was saved by the court’s rejection of parliament’s impeachment vote, at least in the near term. But given the president’s lack of support in parliament and the continued influence and political maneuverings of Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, the brewing political crisis in Madagascar appears far from over. International and regional actors should continue to urge dialogue and restraint by all parties.

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## WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF NONCOMPETITIVE ELECTIONS IN SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Recent elections in Ethiopia and Burundi resulted in resounding yet controversial victories for each country's ruling party. Although conducted under significantly different circumstances, the outcome of neither election was ever in doubt. These elections underscore the fact that elections are held for a variety of reasons in semi-authoritarian countries, some of which have little to do with the selection of leaders. What functions, then, do noncompetitive elections serve? [more...](#)



Demonstrators opposed to a third term for President Nkurunziza dive to the ground as army soldiers shoot in the air to disperse the protest, in the rural area of Mugongomanga, east of the capital Bujumbura, in Burundi Wednesday, June 10, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Berthier Mugiraneza.)

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## RUSSIA AND AFRICA—MEASURED RE-ENGAGEMENT

By George F. Ward

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the end of a period of intense Russian engagement with the continent of Africa. [By the mid-1980s](#), the Soviet Union had signed hundreds of agreements with African countries. Moscow had offered training in the Soviet Union to around 25,000 African civilians at the university level, and thousands more had graduated from Soviet military and political schools. Soviet training programs on the continent had reached at least 200,000 Africans. The Soviet Union had concluded technical and economic assistance agreements with 37 African countries and trade agreements with 42. By the end of the 1990s, this dense network of relationships had deteriorated markedly. Newly democratic Russia closed embassies and cultural centers in Africa and terminated development projects. Trade atrophied. During the current decade, indications of increased Russian interest in Africa have appeared, and researchers are examining "[Russia's Return to Africa](#)." In assessing this reported trend, several questions need to be addressed. How extensive is Russian re-engagement? Why is Russia focusing anew on Africa? What does Russia bring to the table in its engagements with Africa? Where will re-engagement lead? [more...](#)



Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, right, speaks with Madagascar's ambassador in Russia Eloi Maxime Alphonse Dovo during a reception marking Africa Day in Moscow, Russia, Thursday, May 22, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin.)

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## Ethiopian Elections

On May 24, Ethiopian voters turned out in mass to cast their ballots for the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In power since 1991, the EPRDF, a coalition of four political parties, claimed a decisive victory, [winning all 547 seats in Parliament](#). The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia estimated turnout at [more than 90 percent of registered voters](#). Ethiopian elections typically generate significant turnout, with levels routinely reported [between 80 and 95 percent](#).

Despite healthy levels of voter participation, electoral competition has been severely limited in Ethiopian elections. In the 2005 election, the country's most competitive to date, the opposition coalesced around eight political parties. Although the opposition had won at most 12 seats previously, they looked poised to win at least [180 seats](#). Before the official results of the May 2005 were released, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced that the EPRDF had won a majority of seats and was forming a government. He also instituted a month long ban on demonstrations.

The opposition cried foul, alleging that massive voter fraud had taken place. Beginning in June, protests broke out in several major cities across the country. From June through November, security forces fired liberally upon protesters, [killing close to 200](#) in total. As many as 20,000 protesters were arrested on charges related to the protests. The subsequent election, held in May 2010, saw the opposition's gains reversed; they were awarded only two seats.

## Burundian Elections

Despite repeated calls from international and domestic actors to postpone elections, on June 29, Burundi held legislative and local government elections. The ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), claimed to have won [at least 77](#) out of 100 seats in the legislature. The ruling party also reported very high turnout in many rural areas, claiming that more than 98 percent of registered voters had participated in the election.

The election was held under significant protest and duress. Incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza has pressed ahead with his bid to secure a [controversial third term](#), plunging the country into chaos. His regime survived a [coup attempt](#) in May. Protests have taken place almost daily in the capital Bujumbura. [At least 70 have been killed](#) since the end of April, and [more than 144,000](#) have sought refuge in neighboring countries.

Seventeen political parties [boycotted the elections](#), stating that it was not possible to conduct free and fair elections under the circumstances. In a bold move, the African Union announced the day before the election that [it would not be sending an observation mission to Burundi](#) because it also believed the conditions for a free and



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fair election would not be met, given the “prevailing political and security environment.” As further evidence of the problematic conditions under which the elections were organized and held, [several key government](#) officials fled the country out of fear for their lives, and the [private media have been virtually shut out](#) and shut down. Although regional leaders and international leaders have been encouraging Burundians to engage in a constructive dialogue to resolve the political impasse and postpone the next round of elections, presidential elections are still currently scheduled to be held on July 15.

### Reasons for Noncompetitive Elections

Elections such as these are obviously not meant to provide a meaningful forum for citizens to express their preferences on policy or leadership. What purpose do such noncompetitive elections serve? Autocratic or nondemocratic elections may be held to allow for a [controlled distribution of power and resources](#) among a specific subset of the political elite. Elections can serve as a means of periodically rotating power among and between the political elite within the ruling party to forestall internal challenges to power. Elections, sanctioned and organized by the party in power, can also send a strong message to members of the political opposition regarding the strength of the party in power, deterring opposition to the regime. Under certain circumstances, semi-authoritarian elections can also provide a government with valuable information it needs to maintain power, such as its geographic distribution of support and the location of potential opposition strongholds.

Modern Ethiopian elections, although generally noncompetitive, have been an important method by which the regime has maintained its power. The 2005 elections provided the government with valuable information about those who opposed it and where they operated. After the significant breakthrough the opposition seemed to make in the 2005 elections, the government [responded](#) by threatening opposition members and their supporters, shutting down private media outlets, and enacting legislation to [curtail civil society activity](#). The combination of the EPRDF’s dominance in the 2010 and 2015 elections and the very high voter turnout (over 90 percent turnout in both) was intended to [discourage the opposition](#) from further challenging the regime’s hold on power.

In Burundi, the message is similar, but the immediate consequences are more dire. The country is teetering on the edge of civil war. The most recent elections lacked even the most basic veneer of legitimacy. A number of important stakeholders, including regional leaders and the African Union, exerted considerable pressure in an attempt to convince the government to postpone the elections. Not holding elections, however, would have been interpreted as a concession that the ruling party was apparently not willing to make. By holding the elections, and by drumming up substantial voter support, the ruling CNDD-FDD has attempted to demonstrate to the opposition its power, support, and popularity. Unfortunately, the opposition is now claiming that [force is the only recourse it has left](#), which does not bode well for a peaceful resolution.

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, right, speaks with Madagascar's ambassador in Russia Eloi Maxime Alphonse Dovo during a reception marking Africa Day in Moscow, Russia, Thursday, May 22, 2014. (Source: AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin.)

## Current Russia-Africa Relations—A Varied Picture

In looking at the facts and figures that describe Russia's engagement with Africa, two caveats are in order. First, significant proportions of Russia's international commercial relationships are carried out through [offshore entities](#) and therefore may not be counted as Russian in international trade statistics. Second, statistics related to Africa are [notoriously inaccurate](#). Keeping these factors in mind, it is worth looking at the reported statistics regarding Russian re-engagement in several areas.

- **Trade is growing, but is still modest.** In 2000, [Russia's overall trade with Africa](#) was reported to have been about \$1 billion. Over roughly a decade, trade expanded more than tenfold, reaching \$11 billion annually in 2012. These numbers were [dwarfed](#) by U.S. trade with Africa (\$93.2 billion in 2012) and Chinese trade (\$163.9 billion in just the first 10 months of 2012). Russia's bilateral trade relationship with Africa is the smallest of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The Russian-African trade relationship is relatively modest for straightforward reasons—Russia does not enjoy comparative advantage in the manufactured consumer and industrial goods that Africa needs, and Russia itself does not need the oil and gas exports that Africa offers.
- **Russian investment is significant.** According to a [study](#) by the African Development Bank (ADB) published in 2011, Russian investment flows to Africa peaked at \$20 billion in 2008. Even recognizing that annual investment numbers are volatile, Russian investments in Africa compare favorably to those of China. For example, *The Economist* reported that [Chinese direct investment](#) in Africa in 2012 amounted to only \$2.5 billion. Russian investments in Africa have been heavily focused in the mining and oil and gas sectors. According to the ADB study, these investments are motivated by the depletion of resource bases for key minerals in Russia itself. The ADB cites zinc, diamonds, gold, uranium, copper, nickel, manganese, bauxite, oil, and coal among the resources that are close to exhaustion in Russia. Russian investments, which have been heavily concentrated in northern, southern, and western Africa, are focused on production of these materials.
- **Arms sales—Strictly Business.** During the Cold War, the Soviet Union generously supplied its African clients with military hardware. Like other elements of the Russia-Africa relationship, arms sales fell precipitously

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during the 1990s. By 2003, Russia decided to [revive its military cooperation](#) with Africa. In fact, Russian exports of major weapons have [increased worldwide](#), from 22 percent of the total in the 2005–2009 period to 27 percent in the 2010–2014 period. Russia is now the world's second largest exporter of major weapons, after the United States. As a region, Africa accounted for 12 percent of Russian arms exports in the 2010–2014 period. The motivations for Russia's arms sales seem to be mainly commercial rather than political. Some Russian arms sales have gone to former Soviet client states, but other sales have been to countries with close ties to the West. Thus, Moscow has sold over \$100 million worth of jet fighter aircraft to both [Sudan](#) and [Uganda](#), states that are military rivals.

- **Soft power is still soft.** If investment through private and state-controlled companies is the leading edge of Russian engagement in Africa, Russian government efforts appear to be trailing. During the 1990s, Russia [closed](#) nine embassies, most of its trade missions, and 13 of 20 cultural centers in Africa. Most if not all of those embassies appear to [remain closed](#). Apart from a reported [\\$20 billion in debt relief](#), Russia has not provided significant development assistance to the countries of Africa. Even Russian Federation [participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions](#) in Africa has declined. In May 2007, 202 Russian personnel were serving in those UN missions. Eight years later, that number has been reduced to 60. The limited nature of official Russian representation in Africa and the lack of resources for assistance would appear to be a factor restricting Russia's ability to exert influence.

### Where Will Re-engagement Lead?

As the above review demonstrates, Russian re-engagement with Africa has been up to now relatively modest. This does not mean that the revival of relationships is without significance. Growing Russian investment in Africa's mining and energy sectors may produce needed raw materials for Russian industries while also providing a source of capital for African industry. In geopolitical terms, the rekindling of military relationships with former client states such as Angola and Sudan and the development of new relationships with countries like Uganda may help Russia counter perceived U.S. military dominance. Although trading relationships will probably remain modest for some time, they could increase in a meaningful way as Russian investments in the African mining sector mature. Finally, the revived commercial and financial relationships with African countries may become more important to Russia as counterweights to Western economic sanctions. For all of these reasons, we can expect Russia to continue to strive to expand its presence on the African continent.

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Ambassador George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## BORDER REGIONS, EXTREMISM, AND DEVELOPMENT

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

Border regions present unique challenges to governments because their distance from capitals can lead to their political isolation. This is especially the case in Africa, where there are a number of states with relatively weak governments that possess low operational capacities. Often, residents living in distant regions rarely, if ever, come into contact with government representatives. Unfortunately, the lack of official governance often translates into marginalization, creating openings that violent extremist organizations and rebel groups are able to fill. [more...](#)



In this Wednesday, June, 25, 2014, file photo, a Nigerian soldier, center, walks at the scene of an explosion suspected to be set by Boko Haram extremist in Abuja, Nigeria. An “alarming spike” in suicide bombings by girls and women abused by Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria has children in danger of being seen as potential threats, the U.N. children’s agency said Tuesday, May 26, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Olamikan Gbemiga, File.)

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## WHITHER TOGO’S OPPOSITION?

By Alexander Noyes

On April 25, 2015, President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo [won](#) a third term in office with 59 percent of the vote in contested but [peaceful](#) elections. He defeated Jean-Pierre Fabre of the National Alliance for Change (ANC), Togo’s main opposition party, who gained 35 percent. In the run-up to the election, Togo’s opposition was unable to rally behind a single candidate—four other opposition candidates decided to run, and other opposition parties [boycotted](#) the vote. Although Togo’s electoral system is [tilted](#) in favor of Gnassingbé and his Union for the Republic (UNIR) party, it appears the opposition’s disunity has stifled chances for democratization in the country. [more...](#)



An election official, rear, holds up a ballot paper as he and others count votes after polls closed during the Togo elections at a polling station in Lomé, Togo, Saturday, April 25, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Erick Kaglan.)

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# BORDER REGIONS, EXTREMISM, AND DEVELOPMENT

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

Border regions present unique challenges to governments because their distance from capitals can lead to their political isolation. This is especially the case in Africa, where there are a number of states with relatively weak governments that possess low operational capacities. Often, residents living in distant regions rarely, if ever, come into contact with government representatives. Unfortunately, the lack of official governance often translates into marginalization, creating openings that violent extremist organizations and rebel groups are able to fill.

## Border Regions and Insecurity

“Border regions in Africa keep me up at night,” is what one official in the African Union Border Program (AUBP) told the author in a recent interview. [According](#) to Professor Anthony Asiwaju, border regions, or borderlands, are areas along or across state lines inhabited by “the same people, culture, land, flora and fauna.” Border regions can be vibrant communities, but in many sub-Saharan African countries, rural areas are often [underserved](#) in terms of physical, financial, social, and economic infrastructure, and they may have minimal levels of [government representation](#) or political power. These conditions can result in marginalization of the population and make them vulnerable to extremism. Compounding this, the difficult terrain in some border regions makes them hard to police and contributes to the proliferation of small arms, light weapons, and other illicit activities.

Security threats linked to violent extremist organizations have emerged in border regions as various groups exploit these marginalized spaces. In the Cameroon-Chad-Niger-Nigeria border region—the [Boko Haram](#) stronghold—the response of governments has been to create the regional [Multinational Joint Task Force](#) (MNJTF), which comprises military units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Across the continent, the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda ([ADF-NALU](#)), an armed rebel group, operates along the Eastern Congo-Western Uganda borderland. Regional governments, along with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ([MONUSCO](#)), have conducted operations against the ADF-NALU.

## Exploiting Border Regions—Boko Haram and ADF-NALU

Despite their rhetorical commitment to rural development, the central governments of the countries facing these insurgencies have neglected their borderlands, and insurgent groups have taken advantage. The Boko Haram insurgency can be [directly linked](#) to chronic poor governance by Nigeria’s federal and state governments, the political marginalization of northeastern Nigeria, and the region’s accelerating impoverishment. Boko Haram has also [recruited](#) herdsmen and farmers from Chad and Niger who were displaced by drought and food shortages. [Reportedly](#), Boko Haram has paid hiring bonuses in the region. Boko Haram also made use of existing [cross border trade networks](#) in the north to [traffic](#) arms and weapons. People living in the border areas in which Boko Haram operates [share](#) ethnic ties (members of the Hausa, Mandara, Kanuri, Fulani, and Kotoko ethnic groups are found in Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria). They also engage in cross-border farming, fishing, cattle rearing, small-scale businesses, and trade. This translates into strong regional ties that transcend borders. There are also [historic border market areas](#) in the region. Thus, the inhabitants of the border regions are economically, socially, and politically [integrated](#). Boko Haram became a major regional security threat because of its increased selection of targets in neighboring countries.



In this Wednesday, June, 25, 2014, file photo, a Nigerian soldier, center, walks at the scene of an explosion suspected to be set by Boko Haram extremist in Abuja, Nigeria. An “alarming spike” in suicide bombings by girls and women abused by Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria has children in danger of being seen as potential threats, the U.N. children’s agency said Tuesday, May 26, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Olamikan Gbemiga, File.)



The [ADF](#) emerged in Uganda during mid-1990s. The group merged forces with rebels from a formerly active western Ugandan group known as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), guerrillas who had previously fought for the reinstatement of the “Rwenzururu Kingdom,” in addition to former Idi Amin fighters and other disgruntled soldiers from previous Ugandan regimes. These groups fled a Ugandan army offensive and established rear [bases](#) in the eastern DRC in the northwestern Rwenzori Mountain region, along the border with Uganda. In the Great Lakes region, ADF-NALU was able to [integrate](#) with the local community. They took part in coffee cultivation, engaged in agricultural smuggling to Uganda, and shopped in the local markets. The group reportedly [recruits](#) disenfranchised youth in an impoverished border region whose residents feel neglected by Kinshasa with gifts such as new bicycles and cash. The Ugandan government [claims](#) that the group has connections to al-Qaeda and the Somali militant group al-Shabaab. [According](#) to an IRIN report, “ADF-NALU are the product of about 20 years of cross-border living, operating as guerrillas and often blurring the lines between the criminal, the rebel, the citizen, the soldier and the state.” According to [Dr. Lindsay Scorgie-Porter](#), both western Uganda and eastern Congo have remained underdeveloped, conflict-ridden, and relatively ignored areas by their central governments. Communities on both sides of the border have high levels of unemployment, little access to education, and minimal levels of government representation.

### **Worsening Conditions and Countering Violent Extremism**

Initially, Boko Haram and ADF-NALU appeared to advocate or provide resources for some of the most marginalized areas of the country. As each group changed strategies and became more violent, they eventually turned on the communities that supported them. Communities in the Cameroon-Chad-Niger-Nigeria border area are the worst affected by Boko Haram’s stepped-up violence. Members of local communities suffer regular kidnappings, rapes, bombings, murders, and expulsions. Similarly, the ADF-NALU has increased its violence in the DRC’s North Kivu province; the group is accused of [killing](#) more than 400 civilians since 2014. The attacks have been brutal, [including](#) beheadings, mutilations, and rape. Women and young children have been killed as well. Ultimately, the most disenfranchised and historically marginalized communities in these areas become further victimized. Moreover, because of the increased violence, those affected flee their homes, and neighboring border regions already facing difficult conditions experience an influx of refugees. Refugee camps then become spaces of recruitment for extremist groups, thereby creating a vicious cycle.

Beyond programs that seek to curb Islamist networks or create dialogue with local communities, governments that seek to counter violent extremism need to include economic and social development for border regions in their strategies. Military operations and policing are likely to be unsuccessful unless the root causes of lack of development are addressed.

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# WHITHER TOGO'S OPPOSITION?

By Alexander Noyes

On April 25, 2015, President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo [won](#) a third term in office with 59 percent of the vote in contested but [peaceful](#) elections. He defeated Jean-Pierre Fabre of the National Alliance for Change (ANC), Togo's main opposition party, who gained 35 percent. In the run-up to the election, Togo's opposition was unable to rally behind a single candidate—four other opposition candidates decided to run, and other opposition parties [boycotted](#) the vote. Although Togo's electoral system is [tilted](#) in favor of Gnassingbé and his Union for the Republic (UNIR) party, it appears the opposition's disunity has stifled chances for democratization in the country.

## History of Divided Opposition

Together, Faure Gnassingbé and his father, Eyadéma Gnassingbé, have ruled Togo since 1967. After his father's death in 2005, Faure Gnassingbé was installed in office with backing from the military. He subsequently stepped down but later that year won a poll in which as many as [500](#) people died in election-related violence. Due to international and regional pressure, Gnassingbé signed a [power-sharing](#) agreement with the opposition in 2006, which at the time was led by the Union of Forces for Change (UFC). Although the UFC signed the Global Political Accord (APG), it [refused](#) to join the government of national unity after the position of prime minister was awarded toYawovi Agboyibo of a smaller opposition party, the Action Committee for Renewal (CAR).

According to interviews with political and civil society stakeholders conducted during a recent research trip to Togo, the UFC's refusal to join the unity government in 2006 highlighted the deep divides in the opposition during this period, which only widened in the aftermath of subsequent elections. Despite some [progress](#) on reforms after the UFC signed the APG, the opposition's lack of cohesion, along with lack of political will on the part of the ruling party, played a large role in preventing some of the key elements of the APG from being implemented. After peaceful legislative elections were held in 2007, in which the UFC made historic gains, winning [27](#) out of 81 seats of parliament, the presidential elections of 2010 created new rifts in the opposition.

## Opposition Splits Further

After UFC lost the 2010 elections, Gilchrist Olympio, its longtime leader, agreed to a coalition with Gnassingbé and the latter's party (the UFC was given [seven](#) ministerial positions). A large proportion of UFC members disagreed with this decision to join the government. In protest, Jean-Pierre Fabre, secretary general of the UFC at the time, formed a breakaway party, the ANC, further splintering an already divided opposition. In the run-up to the 2013 legislative elections, the opposition again failed to unify behind a single party, but did loosely coalesce into two broader coalitions of political parties and civil society organizations—the Let's Save Togo Collective (CST, Collectif Sauvons le Togo), headed by ANC, and the Rainbow Coalition (CAEC, Coalition Arc-en-Ciel), anchored by CAR. [Capitalizing](#) on the fractured opposition, Gnassingbé and UNIR consolidated their position in the polls, winning [62](#) out of 91 seats (the number of seats increased by 10 since the 2007 elections). Altering decades of opposition dynamics, the CST and the ANC emerged as the main opposition, winning 19 seats. The CAEC won six, while the remnants of the UFC were punished for joining the government, winning only three seats (down from 27 in 2007). Olympio [defended](#) his decision to reach accommodation with the ruling party as “the right choice” for the country.



An election official, rear, holds up a ballot paper as he and others count votes after polls closed during the Togo elections at a polling station in Lomé, Togo, Saturday, April 25, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Erick Kaglan.)



## Reasons for Continuing Divides

Personal issues and historical rivalries within the opposition appear to have frustrated [attempts](#) to unite the CST and CAEC camps behind one candidate in the run-up to the 2015 elections. Fabre was able to cobble together a coalition of eight opposition groups to support his candidacy under the banner of the Combat for Political Change (CAP 2015) platform. He was unable to go beyond that and secure the support of all the major opposition parties because CAR [boycotted](#) the elections, four other opposition parties ran their own candidates, and three other parties aligned with Gnassingbé.

According to interviewees, some within the opposition questioned Fabre's genuine commitment to political reforms, such as term limits, saying that his desire to remain the main opposition leader often took precedence over delivering on political reforms. Others noted that his uncompromising stance often backfired in talks with the government and other opposition groups. His inflexible leadership style also appears to have led to disagreements within the CST coalition. The Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development (ADDI)—which won the second-most seats for the CST coalition in 2013—[reportedly](#) felt sidelined in the alliance and decided against backing Fabre, running its own presidential candidate in 2015.

## Conclusion: Opposition Unity Key to Democratization

Academic research on opposition unity in semi-authoritarian regimes suggests that the political experience of Togo may represent broader trends in Africa and beyond. In a 2006 [study](#) published in the *American Journal of Political Science*, political scientists Marc Morje Howard and Philip G. Roessler argue that, in competitive authoritarian regimes, the opposition's "decision to create a coalition or to jointly support a single candidate, despite significant regional, ethnic, or ideological differences and divisions, can have a tremendous effect on the electoral process and its results." Based on global data from 1990 to 2002, their main [finding](#) is that the "impact of such coalitions on political liberalization can be rapid and dramatic." The study by Howard and Roessler built on previous Africa-focused [research](#) by Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle that also found that "opposition cohesion" played an important role in democratic transitions on the continent in the early 1990s.

The recent case of electoral turnover in [Nigeria](#) in 2015 lends further support to the theory on opposition unity: it appears that a broad-based opposition coalition was key to opposition success in Nigeria. As [argued](#) by political scientist Nic Cheeseman, "the most obvious lesson from the Nigerian election is that opposition unity is critical if an established incumbent is to be defeated." In light of these broader findings, Togo's opposition parties might be well advised to strengthen cohesion among their leaders, especially as elections approach.

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## ZIMBABWE—POLITICIANS MANEUVER AS ECONOMIC WOES CONTINUE

By George F. Ward

With Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe halfway through his 92nd year, speculation about who will succeed him is increasing. Putative successors and faction leaders in the governing Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) are maneuvering to improve their political prospects. Meanwhile, Mugabe himself seems absorbed in his multilateral roles as chair of both the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has done little of late to enforce party discipline. The deceleration in economic growth that began in 2013 has continued, and food shortages may lie ahead. Are both political and economic instability in Zimbabwe's future? [more...](#)



Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, center, is welcomed at the airport on his arrival to Moscow, Russia, Friday, May 8, 2015. (Source: Host Photo agency/RIA Novosti Pool Photo via AP, File.)

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## PAYING THE PRICE FOR PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, elected to office in March 2015, campaigned extensively as an [anti-corruption candidate](#). He [vowed](#) to jail corrupt politicians and “make sure that Nigeria’s wealth belongs only to Nigerians.” What types of reforms will President Buhari pursue, and what types of roadblocks might he face in attempting to stamp out public corruption in Nigeria? [more...](#)



In this May 29, 2015, file photo, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari salutes his supporters during his Inauguration in Abuja, Nigeria. (Source: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba, File.)

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### About IDA

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## Worrying Contingencies

In an earlier paper [published](#) by the Council on Foreign Relations, the author identified three scenarios in which acute instability in Zimbabwe could emerge:

- Mugabe dies or becomes incapacitated before installing a chosen successor.
- Mugabe's control is challenged and undermined by growing factionalism.
- An economic crisis triggers demands for political change.

These scenarios are not mutually exclusive and all three remain possible.

## Mugabe—A “Visiting President”?

Robert Mugabe continues to say that he will run again in the 2018 elections, and he maintains an active schedule, often traveling among African capitals in his AU and SADC roles. His foreign travels are frequent enough that one commentator has said that Mugabe is [known inside Zimbabwe](#) as “a visiting president.” This point of view implies that Mugabe is paying less attention to his strategy of divide and rule that has in the past ensured party discipline and prevented the rise of rivals. Allegations of failing mental and physical capacities continue to appear. Simba Makoni, a former ZANU-PF minister who quit the party and ran against Mugabe in the 2008 elections, [claims](#) that the president cannot stay alert for more than 40 minutes at a time. Similar views have been attributed to unidentified [Western diplomats](#), who expressed surprise at the rapidity of Mugabe's decline in recent months.

## Intense Intra-Party Infighting

Mugabe may well die without having put in place a plan for a nonviolent succession. Emmerson Mnangagwa, the 69-year old party stalwart whom Mugabe installed as one of the country's two vice presidents following the ZANU-PF party congress in December 2014, seemed for a time to have positioned himself as successor. He is still seen as the most likely successor, but Higher Education Minister Jonathan Moyo, one of the “Young Turks” within the party and reportedly close to Grace Mugabe, the president's ambitious wife, recently trashed Mnangagwa's prospects in a [BBC television interview](#).

There are several other possible successors to Mugabe. The one most often mentioned is Joice Mujuru, whom Mugabe stripped of her positions as national and ZANU-PF vice president after the party congress in December 2014. Mujuru still enjoys a loyal following within the party. Another is Phelekezela Mphoko, the other vice president. Mphoko

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is a liberation struggle stalwart whom Mugabe plucked from obscurity and placed in the deputy role. Mphoko does not lead a coherent faction of the party and is a member of the minority Ndebele ethnic group, but he might be attractive as the candidate of groups hostile to Mnangagwa. Still another is the commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Force, General Constantine Chiwenga, who wields great power based on his control of the security apparatus. Chiwenga has been linked to the [plundering](#) of the Marange diamond fields by government officials and ZANU-PF insiders. Chiwenga's disadvantage is that he lacks an independent political power base and is seen as linked to Mnangagwa. Among the younger generation of ZANU-PF leaders, the aforementioned Jonathan Moyo, who is also from the Ndebele group, and Minister of Environment [Saviour Kasukuwere](#) have been mentioned as possible successors.

The wild card in the succession drama continues to be Grace Mugabe, who played a key role in last fall's defenestration of Joice Mujuru. After a period of reduced political activity, which some attributed to a serious illness, Grace Mugabe has recently been in the news again, portraying herself as "Amai," or "Mother." She styles herself as regularly holding school for Mnangagwa and Mphoko, the two national vice presidents, [saying](#), "In the few months they have been in power, I have lost count of the times that I have sat down with them one-on-one to talk about the development of Zimbabwe. This is the leadership we want, servant leaders who know that they are there to work for the people and that they should sit down with the mother to discuss issues." Even though her husband in April 2015 took pains to say that Grace had no "[ambitions](#)" as his successor, it appears that [younger leaders](#) in the party may be gathering around her.

### **Continued Economic Troubles and Possible Famine**

The growth of [Zimbabwe's economy](#) declined from 10.6 percent in 2012 to an estimated 3.1 percent in 2014. On a per capita basis, growth has almost disappeared. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's economy was based on strong commercial farming and manufacturing sectors. For a variety of reasons, including the takeover of lands owned by white commercial farmers, both those sectors have declined. According to the [African Development Bank](#), each of the two sectors constitutes only about 12 percent of Zimbabwe's GDP. Zimbabwe was formerly an exporter of food grains, but today, according to one observer, it faces a [shortfall](#) of more than 1 million tons of maize. Despite this looming gap in capacity to feed the Zimbabwean population, the government has reportedly failed to issue a letter of appeal to the United Nations for aid from the World Food Program. Unless the government acts swiftly to secure adequate supplies of grain, the sort of widespread hunger that Zimbabwe experienced a decade ago could recur.

### **Is There Cause for Hope?**

If there are bright spots in contemporary Zimbabwe, they are due to the resilience and resourcefulness of the people. Political repression continues unabated; the latest example was the broad daylight [abduction](#) on March 9, 2015, of Itai Dzamara, a human right activist, who has not been seen since. Nevertheless, civil society organizations continue to demand respect for human rights, as do voices in the free press. On the economic side, only 600,000 out of a population of 13 million have [formal employment](#), and 250,000 of those are civil servants. Two-thirds of working Zimbabweans are engaged in the growing informal economy, whether as street vendors or in a myriad other roles. In agriculture, the Western media have focused on the decline of commercial farming, but there is another aspect. [Ian Scoones](#) has uncovered examples of noteworthy resilience among entrepreneurial family farmers, who have been able to improve their families' lives through production of pigs and chickens and irrigated horticulture. [Scoones sees these farmers as the country's future](#): "Generating a new sense of hope, out of which a new politics might emerge, will have to come from the fields and farms of rural Zimbabwe . . ." That is an uncertain and fragile prospect, but at least it is one that transcends the frenzied maneuvering of the political class in Zimbabwe's extended succession drama.

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Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, elected to office in March 2015, campaigned extensively as an [anti-corruption candidate](#). He [vowed](#) to jail corrupt politicians and “make sure that Nigeria’s wealth belongs only to Nigerians.” What types of reforms will President Buhari pursue, and what types of roadblocks might he face in attempting to stamp out public corruption in Nigeria?

## Scope of the Problem

Public corruption, or the use of public resources for private gain, is certainly not a new problem in Nigeria, a country blessed with significant natural resources. Since it began exporting oil in the late 1950s, [allegations of corruption](#) and misappropriation of public resources have plagued successive Nigerian governments. The “[natural resource curse](#)”—the perhaps counterintuitive relationship between valuable natural resources (in this case oil and gas) and conflict, underdevelopment, and corruption—is partly to blame. When governments have access to revenue generated by natural resources, their need to rely on taxes to fund spending is reduced. In Nigeria, oil revenue comprises approximately [75 percent](#) of total government revenue. In this situation, where accountability mechanisms that make governments beholden to citizens are weakened, corruption can become endemic.

The country’s First Republic (1960 to 1966) fell as the result of a coup undertaken by military commanders on the grounds of grand corruption, and many former Nigerian politicians (including a few past presidents) have been tainted by accusations of corruption. Between 1979 and 1983, more than [\\$16 billion](#) in oil revenues went missing during the Shehu Shagari regime. Former military dictator Sani Abacha’s theft is often argued to be the [most egregious](#) in Nigerian history. It is estimated that during his five years in office, from 1993 to 1998, Abacha alone stole at least [\\$4.3 billion](#).

The theft believed to have taken place during the government of Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015) may end up rivaling that of the Abacha regime. Former Central Bank Governor and current Emir of Kano [Sanusi Lamido Sanusi](#) alleged in 2014 that close to [\\$20 billion](#) that was supposed to have been transmitted from the Nigerian National Petroleum Commission (NNPC) was missing from federal accounts. A forensic audit was conducted in 2014, but the results, confirming the loss of \$20 billion, were only released [shortly before Jonathan left office](#). Some more recent estimates place the amount stolen since 2008 from the petroleum sector alone at over [\\$84.52 billion](#).

## Electing a “New” Solution?

President Buhari’s March 2015 victory over incumbent Goodluck Jonathan sent a strong message to politicians in Nigeria, many of whom are among the [highest paid in the world](#), that change would occur. His persona as an austere and devout former soldier, along with his history of championing anti-corruption reforms, suggests he is likely to attempt to make good on many of his promises.

When President Buhari came to power previously as the result of a military coup in 1983, [rooting out corruption](#) was high on his agenda. His regime set up several tribunals to determine the extent of corruption and made public various corruption scandals that exposed the excesses of the previous civilian regime. He also launched a “[War on Indiscipline](#),” a key component of which was to eradicate public corruption. Unfortunately, other components included corporal punishment for infractions such as showing up to work late or not properly queuing at bus stops. Amid a stagnating economy and a litany of [human rights abuses](#), his leadership ended in 1985 when a military coup removed him from power. He has since described himself as a “[convert to democracy](#)” and has given assurances that his regime will respect human rights and the rule of law.



In this May 29, 2015, file photo, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari salutes his supporters during his Inauguration in Abuja, Nigeria. (Source: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba, File.)



Since his inauguration at the end of May, President Buhari has taken several steps that have signaled his government's willingness to go after corrupt officials. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an autonomous body [established under](#) former President Olusegun Obasanjo in the early 2000s to tackle corruption in the public sector, has recently made several high-profile arrests, including those of former Jigawa State Governor [Sule Lamido and his sons](#). It was reported in mid-July that the EFCC would [soon begin investigating](#) the assets and holdings of ministers and aides from the previous Jonathan government. The house of one of Jonathan's closest aides, former National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki, was [raided](#) on July 16. The government confiscated 12 vehicles, five of which were armored.

The President is also taking steps to address corruption at one of its main sources: the oil industry. Buhari, who served as [chairman of the NNPC](#) in the late 1970s and as a former petroleum minister in the 1980s, [dissolved](#) the governing board of the NNPC in late June. He also ordered the NNPC and all other revenue-generating agencies to begin [remitting their revenues](#) directly to the federal government. On July 20, he ordered [113 vessels](#) blacklisted and barred from transporting oil with immediate effect.

## Challenges Ahead

Although the Buhari regime has taken some encouraging first steps in combatting corruption, there are sure to be roadblocks ahead. If corruption is as pervasive and systematic as it is believed to be in Nigeria, there will likely come a point where the country's powerful political elites will feel threatened. Right now, Buhari is bolstered by public sentiment to see corrupt officials prosecuted; however, any overt politicization of corruption (i.e., targeting of his opponents) will only hasten resistance to his reforms.

Furthermore, while he is correctly both addressing the sources of corruption and investigating those believed to take part in corrupt acts in the past, these types of immediate actions will ultimately fail if the institutions and processes responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing corruption are not reformed as well. Public corruption of the kind Buhari is facing is akin to a [collective action problem](#) where a large number of actors either directly benefit or are at the very least complicit in corrupt acts, thus making meaningful reform difficult to enact. One weak link in the reform chain (e.g., judges willing to find defendants not guilty for the right price, members of the police force who can be incentivized to ignore particular crimes), and reforms will likely fail. Any approach to combatting corruption in Nigeria must address the multiple actors and institutions that have allowed this system to endure for decades. In addition to the public's buy-in, which by virtue of his recent electoral victory he presumably has, Buhari must secure the support of those employed by key institutions (e.g., the police, prosecutors, judges) to achieve success in taming corruption in Nigeria.

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
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## CRACKING DOWN ON DISSENT IN ANGOLA

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

A number of recent events in Angola signal that repression is widespread and may be increasing, with the government detaining [activists](#), [journalists](#), and [other](#) government [critics](#) in an effort to stamp out dissent. These actions may fuel tensions and exacerbate grievances. Deputy Assistant Secretary Steven Feldstein and others from the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor traveled to Angola in late July to address democracy and human rights issues. [more...](#)



This photo, taken May 11, 2014, shows Angolan journalist and human rights advocate Rafael Marques de Morais, during a visit to Johannesburg, South Africa. In March 2015, Marques was found guilty of libel and defamation after publishing a 2011 book that alleged that a group of generals and three companies were linked to human-rights abuses at diamond mines in Angola. (Source: AP Photo/Simon Allison.)

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## INSTABILITY RETURNS TO LESOTHO

By Alexander Noyes

On July 20, 2015, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Commission of Inquiry [arrived](#) in Lesotho to investigate recent incidents of political violence in the country. The former Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) commander, Maaparankoe Mahao, was [killed](#) by LDF soldiers in June, while Thabiso Tsosane, a businessman and ally of former Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, was [killed](#) in May. Fearing for their lives, several prominent opposition leaders [fled](#) to neighboring South Africa, including former prime minister and current leader of the opposition Thabane. These incidents suggest that despite free and fair elections and a change of government, SADC's previous attempts at resolving political instability in Lesotho have not been sufficient. [more...](#)



Lesotho's then Prime Minister Thomas Thabane casts his vote in Maseru, Lesotho, Saturday, Feb. 28, 2015. (Source: AP Photo.)

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## Cracking Down on Dissent

Fourteen nonviolent, pro-democracy activists from the Angolan Revolutionary Movement (MRA) and journalist Domingos da Cruz are currently being [held](#) in various prisons around Luanda, Angola's capital city. Thirteen activists were arrested on June 20, 2015, at their weekly reading and discussion group, where the group was discussing methods of nonviolent protest. They had been reading "Tools to Destroy a Dictator" by da Cruz and Gene Sharp's [From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation](#). After the initial arrests, the activists were taken to their homes, which were [searched](#). Items such as personal computers, cameras, thumb drives, and books, including those of family members, were seized as evidence. Journalist da Cruz and another individual were arrested in the following days. The interior ministry made an official statement, [saying](#) that its Criminal Investigation Service (SIC) arrested "13 Angolan citizens who were caught red-handed as they prepared to carry out acts aimed at disrupting public order and security in the country." The government spokesman also said that these acts constituted a crime of rebellion.

The activists call for greater democracy, an end to corruption, and increased equality in Angola. For 36 years the country has been led by one of Africa's longest serving presidents, José Eduardo dos Santos, and his party, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Angola is Africa's [second biggest](#) oil producer, sub-Saharan Africa's third largest economy, and the world's fourth largest diamond producer. [Social indicators](#) have not kept pace with the strong economy. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Angola was ranked 149th out of 187 countries on the [Human Development Index](#), a widely used metric.

Paula Roque, senior analyst at International Crisis Group (ICG), argues that the arrest of these activists may [indicate](#) an increase in repression and state violence in Angola, especially in light of a number of other recent events in the country. In March 2015, prominent anti-corruption journalist and activist Rafael Marques de Morais [faced](#) arrest and trial on charges of defamation. He received a suspended six-month sentence for his 2011 book *Blood Diamonds: Torture and Corruption in Angola*, which alleges links between Angola's military rulers and the "blood diamonds" trade. That same month a human rights activist, Jose Marcos Mavungo, was [arrested](#) for planning a demonstration to denounce corruption, human-rights violations, and bad governance in the oil-rich Cabinda region. He was charged with the crime of rebellion, which carries a potential 15-year penalty.

In April 2015, Angolan police were accused of killing members of [The Light of the World](#) religious sect in a raid to capture its leader, José Kalupeteka. The government states 13 were killed, but human rights activists and opposition parties [say](#) more than a thousand were massacred in a military action aimed at crushing the group, which President dos Santos [cited](#) as a threat to "peace and national unity." The main opposition party, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), condemned the killings while the government accused UNITA of [stoking](#) the violence that took place in



This photo, taken May 11, 2014, shows Angolan journalist and human rights advocate Rafael Marques de Morais, during a visit to Johannesburg, South Africa. In March 2015, Marques was found guilty of libel and defamation after publishing a 2011 book that alleged that a group of generals and three companies were linked to human-rights abuses at diamond mines in Angola. (Source: AP Photo/Simon Allison.)

Huambo, an opposition party stronghold. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) [called](#) for a thorough, independent investigation of events. The government has meanwhile faced increasing criticism for the deadly clash.

In July 2015, Nelson Sul D'Angola, a Deutsche Welle correspondent in Angola, and others were [detained](#) after a visit to the Calomboloca prison, where the journalist interviewed several of the activists who had been imprisoned for a month. They were eventually released.

## Responding to the Crackdown

These events in Angola have led to a vocal and open response from civil society, which is rare in the country. On the [one-month](#) anniversary of the activists' arrests, local and internationally based Angolans released a [video](#) titled "Freedom Now" calling for the release of political prisoners. Activists planned a [simultaneous protest](#) in Luanda and Lisbon on July 29 under the slogan "No more arbitrary arrests and political persecution in Angola." Police [said](#) there was no authorized demonstration scheduled, while journalist Rafael Marques de Morais [reported](#) that at least 33 activists and four journalists were arrested. Most were released, but the whereabouts of nine remain unknown. Additionally, in a [rare show](#) of dissent, opposition legislators boycotted a vote on a bill aimed at increasing foreign investment in Angola's parliament.

In interviews conducted via telephone by the author, one activist said, "The government knows that we are not capable of violence. We are mostly artists, students, and intellectuals; none of our protests have been violent." Another activist asked, "How can 15 guys with no guns overthrow a government that has one of the most feared police and military on the continent, especially in a country where the president owns the army?" Angola has the [biggest](#) defense budget in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the largest, most experienced, and well-equipped militaries in Africa. Some have even suggested that the arrests are meant to divert attention away from the mounting criticism of the government for the April 2015 killings, for the new loan deals it has struck with China, and for China's increasing economic dominance in the country.

## Conclusion

In *[Repression, Political Threats, and Survival Under Autocracy](#)*, political scientist, Abel Escriba-Folch found that while some repression may be effective for leader survival, repression may also lead to further protest activity and unrest. [Some](#) scholars also [argue](#) that when nonviolent actions are violently repressed, protestors may turn to violent activities. The government's increasing detentions of activists, journalists, and other government critics may fuel tensions and exacerbate grievances, potentially leading to additional human rights abuses. The visit by the delegation from the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor is a valuable opportunity to urge the Angolan government to allow freedom of expression and assembly and improve its overall human rights record.

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Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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# INSTABILITY RETURNS TO LESOTHO

By Alexander Noyes

On July 20, 2015, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Commission of Inquiry [arrived](#) in Lesotho to investigate recent incidents of political violence in the country. The former Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) commander, Maaparankoe Mahao, was [killed](#) by LDF soldiers in June, while Thabiso Tsosane, a businessman and ally of former Prime Minister Thomas Thabane, was [killed](#) in May. Fearing for their lives, several prominent opposition leaders [fled](#) to neighboring South Africa, including former prime minister and current leader of the opposition Thabane. These incidents suggest that despite free and fair elections and a change of government, SADC's previous attempts at resolving political instability in Lesotho have not been sufficient.



Lesotho's then Prime Minister Thomas Thabane casts his vote in Maseru, Lesotho, Saturday, Feb. 28, 2015. (Source: AP Photo.)

## Previous Instability

As outlined in the March 12 [edition](#) of Africa Watch, the small southern African country of Lesotho has suffered from several bouts of political instability over the past year. In August 2014, an alleged coup attempt occurred when the head of the military, Tlali Kamoli, refused to step down and be replaced by Maaparankoe Mahao (now deceased), as ordered by then Prime Minister Thabane. Several violent [skirmishes](#) between the police and military followed. Outbreaks of political violence continued even after South Africa's Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, under the auspices of SADC, brokered a series of political agreements. The agreements called for early elections to be held in February 2015 (two years ahead of schedule) and [forced](#) a "leave of absence" on LDF chiefs Kamoli and Mahao, as well as Khothatso Tsooana, the former police commissioner.

Despite pre-electoral violence and fears of military intervention, the 2015 elections were peaceful and deemed free and fair by regional observers. Akin to the 2012 vote, none of the parties were able to secure a majority in the elections, with Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC) losing by one seat to current Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili's Democratic Congress (DC). After the election, Mosisili, who was also Lesotho's prime minister from 1998 through 2012, formed a coalition with Mothetjoa Metsing of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), who was deputy prime minister under Thabane but had fallen out with him over corruption charges. Although peaceful, the 2015 elections failed to resolve Lesotho's crisis and depoliticize the security forces. In fact, the change of government exacerbated tensions on the security front when Mosisili promptly reinstated Kamoli as head of the LDF.

## Military Influence

Although Lesotho's security sector has a long history of involvement in politics, the current internal fighting grew from residual political allegiances to Thabane (former prime minister), Metsing (current deputy prime minister, who also held this position under Thabane's administration), and Mosisili (current prime minister). The top military officers are [seen](#) as allied with Metsing and [Mosisili](#) (excluding the now deceased Mahao, who was appointed by Thabane), with the police seen as allied with Thabane. These divides have come into sharp relief in the latest round of violence and political assassinations, as Tsooana, the former police commissioner, [fled](#) to South Africa in June. After fleeing in May, Thabane, claiming that he was on a hit list, [spoke](#) on the military-police divide: "We do not want the army protecting us. We want the Lesotho Mountain Police to ensure our safety." He [added](#), "The security situation in Lesotho has collapsed."

Currently, Kamoli appears to have the upper hand in the rivalry between the two forces. [According](#) to Institute for Security Studies analyst Dimpho Motsamai, “Lesotho’s civil-military relations are now characterized by a resurgence of heavy military influence over its politics. There is a strong alliance between Metsing and Kamoli . . . . Under Kamoli, the LDF is the eighth party in the governing coalition” (after the elections, Mosisili and Metsing formed a seven-party coalition). The increasing involvement of the military in politics has drawn calls for thoroughgoing security sector reform in the country. After former LDF chief Mahao was killed, U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby gave a statement: “This latest—and most tragic—example of abuses within the Lesotho Defence Force highlights the urgent need for security sector reform.”

## Conclusion

The latest wave of political violence in Lesotho suggests that SADC’s previous attempts at mediation did not repair the persistent politicization and fissures in Lesotho’s security sector. SADC’s failure to act more forcefully on the security issue appears to have instead indirectly [rewarded](#) those most responsible for the 2014 coup, namely Kamoli and Metsing. The U.S. Ambassador to Lesotho, Matthew Harrington, referring to Kamoli, [said](#) as much in May: “the person held responsible [for the 2014 coup] has been rewarded.”

The SADC Commission of Inquiry into the recent killings, which is headed by Judge Mpaphi Phumaphe of Botswana and started its work on July 20, is a step in the right direction. It will hopefully bring some clarity and closure to recent events. That said, given SADC’s and Ramaphosa’s track record, the Commission could be a catalyst for further progress if it were to rigorously investigate all sides of the conflict and call for comprehensive security reforms, with an emphasis on depoliticizing the armed forces and the police. As is currently being [demanded](#) by the opposition, the removal of LDF chief Kamoli might be a good starting point for reform.

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## YOUTH AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA—BEYOND PROTESTS

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

August 12, 2015, marked another United Nations [International Youth Day](#). The theme for 2015 was “Youth and Civic Engagement.” In their recent book, *Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change*, Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly ([discussed](#) in the June 4, 2015, *Africa Watch*) argue that Africa has experienced an upsurge in civil protests over the last decade. Youth activists have been at the forefront of many of the protests, yet once the short-term goal has been accomplished (e.g., removing a head of state or preventing a power grab), youth groups and activists often withdraw from the political scene. Senegal’s Y’en a Marre collective has been an exception to this trend, having found a way to remain politically engaged beyond protests. [more...](#)



Y'en a Marre activists Thiart and Kiliféu with Le Balai Citoyen activists Sams K Le Jah and Smokey at a press conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 2014. (Source: Janette Yarwood.)

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA

By Alexander Noyes

Ahead of President Obama’s trip to Kenya and Ethiopia last month, a number of observers [called](#) for Obama to pressure the Kenyan government to recommit itself to security sector reform (SSR) to alleviate its acute security problems. Calls for strengthening security reform in Kenya, and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly, are not new, as SSR programs have proliferated across the continent over the past two decades. Despite the prominence of SSR programs in peacekeeping missions and post-conflict stabilization programs in Africa, SSR initiatives have for the most part shown limited success. Why? [more...](#)



Kenyan Police. (Source: Irene Ndungu, “Police Reforms in Kenya Crucial to Restore Public Confidence,” *Institute for Security Studies*, October 20, 2011 <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/police-reforms-in-kenya-crucial-to-restore-public-confidence>)

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Y'en a Marre activists Thiart and Kilifeu with Le Balai Citoyen activists Sams K Le Jah and Smokey at a press conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 2014. (Source: Janette Yarwood.)

## Youth and Political Participation

According to an Afrobarometer paper by Danielle Resnick and Daniela Casale, political participation [refers](#) to activities by citizens aimed at influencing the selection and decisions of government personnel. Examples include voting in elections and more informal modes of engagement, such as meeting with community members, contacting political representatives, and participating in protests. Other interpretations of political participation [call](#) for youth to be included in formal decision-making.

The now-famous Y'en a Marre protest movement emerged onto the Senegalese political scene in [early 2011](#). The founders—youth activists led by a collective of some of the country’s most well known rappers and journalists—first organized protests to denounce injustice and inequality in the country. The movement then gained mass popularity after then-[President Wade](#) attempted a power grab by changing the constitution and running for a third term in office. The population responded with protests led by Y'en a Marre and other citizens groups. Wade responded to the massive protests by withdrawing the proposed changes, yet he moved forward with his controversial bid for a third term. Y'en a Marre and other citizen coalitions then turned their energy toward defeating Wade at the ballot box.

More modest success was achieved by youth in Burkina Faso. The October 2014 citizen uprising led to the [resignation](#) of 27-year President Blaise Compaoré. The youth-led Le Balai Citoyen (Citizen’s Broom) and Collectif Anti-Referendum (Anti-referendum Collective) were at the head of the protests. Yet once Compaoré resigned, the military [stepped in](#) to fill the power vacuum. A transitional government was then set up, but the youths who had laid much of the groundwork for the protest movement were at a disadvantage as well-established institutions or politicians took control after Compaoré’s departure. The youth-led groups, however, have been able to exert some [influence](#) on the nature of the transition with the continued threat of mass mobilization.

As discussed in the [June 25, 2015](#), issue of *Africa Watch*, citizens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), [led](#) by the youth collectives [Filimbi](#) and [Lucha](#), went into the streets en masse in opposition to President Joseph Kabila’s attempt to pass a bill that would have allowed him to stay in office. In an interview with the author, an activist explained that Lucha, which means struggle or fight, is a group of young people based in Goma who want to see lasting political and economic change in their country. The activist further explained that Filimbi, which is based in Kinshasa, is a collective of



citizens movements. The DRC Senate ultimately amended the controversial bill. Since then, [opposition parties](#) have once again become the [focus](#) of election discussions.

## Y'en a Marre: Political Participation after the Protest

Y'en a Marre achieved its short-term objective in Senegal with the [victory of opposition party leader Macky Sall](#), who defeated Wade in the election. Y'en a Marre's ultimate objective has been to cultivate a Nouveau Type de Senegalais (NTS), or "[new type of Senegalese citizen](#)," one with a heightened sense of civic responsibility. The group remains active, and in an interview with the author, rapper-activist Fou Malade asserted, "Y'en a Marre will continue to act as watchdogs." The collective has launched programs to address issues relating specifically to Senegal, including their [Dox Ak Sa Gox](#) campaign (Democracy and Good Governance), which they see as a platform for monitoring democracy in the country. As part of this campaign, and in collaboration with civil society and various government officials, Y'en a Marre aims to increase citizen participation in policy debates, as well as inform communities around the country about the specific duties of their elected officials and how to hold them accountable.

The author was in Kaolack and Thiès, Senegal, in April and May 2015 for a series of these meetings. Local politicians spoke to community members and discussed various plans for development. Community members then had the opportunity to note their most pressing concerns and to engage in dialogue with the politicians. An elder in Thiès interviewed by the author said, "Y'en a Marre is helping to make sure that we see politicians after the elections, and that's important because we are the people that vote them into office."

The group also organizes a yearly [foire aux problèmes](#) (fair of problems) to bring to politicians' attention the daily problems experienced by the population—like disruptions of water supplies and power outages. Local politicians [are](#) often in attendance. In 2013, the collective also collaborated on a song in support of [Amnesty International's campaign against impunity](#) in the country. The human rights advocacy organization launched the campaign to put public pressure on President Sall to ensure criminal investigations are continued to secure justice for victims of violence and torture during the 12-year regime of former President Wade, especially in the period just before the 2012 presidential elections.

## Conclusion

Y'en a Marre's activities illustrate the variety of ways that youth can be active participants in political processes, ranging from focused protest to sustained engagement. The Y'en a Marre protest movement was successful for a number of reasons: clearly identifying its goals; collaborating with other civil society groups; and using an effective media campaign, which included direct messaging to the population, especially the youth, through popular culture. Given the [youth bulge in Africa](#)—nearly 70 percent of the population is under 30—Y'en a Marre's strategy of sustained engagement might deserve emulation elsewhere on the continent.

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# CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA

By Alexander Noyes

Ahead of President Obama's trip to Kenya and Ethiopia last month, a number of observers [called](#) for Obama to pressure the Kenyan government to recommit itself to security sector reform (SSR) to alleviate its acute security problems. Calls for strengthening security reform in Kenya, and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly, are not new, as SSR programs have proliferated across the continent over the past two decades. Despite the prominence of SSR programs in peacekeeping missions and post-conflict stabilization programs in Africa, SSR initiatives have for the most part shown limited success. Why?



Kenyan Police. (Source: Irene Ndungu, "Police Reforms in Kenya Crucial to Restore Public Confidence," Institute for Security Studies, October 20, 2011 <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/police-reforms-in-kenya-crucial-to-restore-public-confidence>)

## Security Sector Reform in Africa

The SSR concept—which aims to professionalize and democratize state security sectors—began gaining momentum in the mid 1990s in international development circles as a crucial component to peace and stability in post-conflict settings. The concept has since been [endorsed](#) and promoted by scholars, the United Nations, and the African Union, among a wide assortment of other stakeholders. After decades of military intervention in politics in Africa and following the "third wave" of democracy in the early 1990s, a number of SSR programs were initiated in Africa.

Such programs have ranged from those with deep international involvement, as seen in post-civil-war cases in Burundi and Sierra Leone, to more domestically driven efforts, as in South Africa. Indeed, scholars have [described](#) Africa as "ground zero for SSR." Political scientist Mark Sedra [argues](#) that Africa "provides an ideal mix of test cases for the [SSR] concept, including post-authoritarian transition states like Nigeria, post-conflict states like Sierra Leone, conflict states like the Democratic Republic of Congo, collapsed states like Somalia, fragile states like Guinea Bissau and more advanced democratizing states like South Africa."

In spite of the large number of security reform programs on the continent, the record of SSR in Africa can be described as mixed at best. In fact, as argued by SSR expert Nicole Ball, "while there has been growing appreciation for the importance of SSR, there have been few clear successes in implementation." Somalia, Guinea Bissau, and the DRC are seen as prime [examples](#) of SSR failures.

What accounts for such failures? International SSR programs in Africa have faced criticism for being overly technical, poorly attuned to political realities, and lacking a sufficient degree of local [ownership](#). Political scientist Alice Hills [maintains](#), "SSR is too normative, prescriptive and ethnocentric to be easily transplanted" to developing contexts such as those in Africa. While the overall record of SSR in Africa is mixed, a few cases stand out as notable, if uncertain, successes, including military reform in South Africa and Burundi and, although incomplete, police reform in Kenya.

## Rare, If Fragile, Successes?

South Africa's successful SSR experience after apartheid can be [attributed](#) to its unique circumstances and relatively developed political and security institutions, as well as a high degree of domestic political ownership. Burundi,

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as a post-civil-war country with a history of military coups and ethnic conflict, however, stands out as a surprising, if fragile, [success](#) (especially before the current renewed conflict surrounding President Pierre Nkurunziza's unconstitutional third-term bid, which included a failed military coup attempt in May 2015). SSR was a major element of Burundi's Arusha Agreement, which ended the country's civil war in 2000. According to Ball, Burundi's SSR achievements in reforming and integrating the country's military are due to a sustained (eight year) international commitment led by the Netherlands that made priorities of political engagement at all levels, local ownership, flexibility, and extensive dialogue designed to build trust. As highlighted in the June 4, 2015, [edition](#) of Africa Watch, whether such successes will hold through the current conflict is an open question.

Despite renewed calls for SSR in Kenya, the country's police reform efforts since the 2008 coalition government have also been more [successful](#) than is commonly thought, at least at an institutional level. Although corruption, allegations of extrajudicial killings, and recent efforts to roll back institutional progress continue, various independent oversight bodies were created after the passage of the 2010 constitution, and the police performed in a more professional and [measured](#) manner in the 2013 elections (compared with their disastrous involvement in the 2008 post-election violence). In previous work, the author [attributed](#) this institutional progress to international and domestic pressure, a strong SSR element in the 2008 power-sharing agreement, and a relatively low degree of political influence within the police. With the passage of the 2010 constitution, Kenyans also took major ownership of the police reform process, although international funding and support remain crucial. Again, only time will tell if such institutional gains in Kenya will hold and translate into genuine changed behavior.

## Conclusion

Given the limited success of SSR programs in Africa over the past two decades, the cases of South Africa, Burundi, and Kenya offer unique and valuable lessons for international actors involved in SSR in Africa and beyond. International stakeholders should consider incorporating these lessons into SSR programming, with a particular focus on sustained, flexible engagement; attention to domestic political dynamics; and local ownership of the process.

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
## SOVEREIGN DEBT—A THREAT TO THE AFRICAN GROWTH STORY?

By George F. Ward

During the past several years, sub-Saharan African countries have increasingly turned to the international sovereign debt market for their capital needs. Recently, some of the countries that issued sovereign debt have run into fiscal problems. The cost of borrowing in international markets has risen sharply. One potential new entrant to the sovereign debt market canceled its plans. These developments have sparked renewed debate over the sustainability of Africa's debt burden and the effectiveness of sovereign debt in promoting economic development. [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Sub-Saharan Africa Sovereign Bond Issuance



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database

Graph adapted from Paul Adams, "Africa Debt Rising," Counterpoints (Africa Research Institute, January 2015), <http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ARI-Counterpoint-SovereignBond-download.pdf>.

## JULIUS MALEMA'S ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS PARTY TURNS 2

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), one of South Africa's newest political parties, recently had its two-year anniversary. The EFF's first anniversary was marked by surprise and optimism as the party earned 1 million votes during the 2014 elections. How has the party fared in its second year? Will the EFF continue its momentum and increase the party's share of the votes during the 2016 local elections? [more...](#)



South African Economic Freedom Fighters leader Julius Malema, center, after he and supporters disrupted the official opening session of Parliament in Cape Town, South Africa, Thursday, Feb. 12, 2015. Security guards removed the opposition lawmakers who interrupted an annual address by President Jacob Zuma and demanded that he answer questions about a spending scandal. (Source: AP Photo/Nic Bothma, Pool.)

Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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During the past several years, sub-Saharan African countries have increasingly turned to the international sovereign debt market for their capital needs. Recently, some of the countries that issued sovereign debt have run into fiscal problems. The cost of borrowing in international markets has risen sharply. One potential new entrant to the sovereign debt market canceled its plans. These developments have sparked renewed debate over the sustainability of Africa's debt burden and the effectiveness of sovereign debt in promoting economic development.

## The African Rush to Sovereign Debt

The stock of sub-Saharan African government bonds on the international market (sovereign debt) grew from less than \$1 billion in 2008 to more than \$18 billion by 2014. The IMF reported in May 2013 that 11 sub-Saharan African countries had accessed international sovereign bond markets in the previous decade. Since that report, an additional six sub-Saharan African countries have issued international sovereign debt.


The international bond market has been attractive to African countries for several reasons. It provides an alternative to concessional lending by donor countries, which often comes with strings attached, and to domestic bond markets, which are in almost all cases small. Even though all African sovereign bond issues have been rated at less than investment grade, interest rates have been surprisingly low. In 2014, for example, a bond issue by Cote d'Ivoire was set at a level not much greater than the sovereign debt of the United Kingdom. These favorable terms have been available because Western investors have turned to so-called frontier markets to obtain more attractive yields and because they have been willing to accept relatively small surcharges to compensate for the increased risk.

## Bumps in the Road

Despite some of the advantages of sovereign debt, its recent history in Africa has not been entirely positive. The experiences of a number of countries have highlighted the risks associated with sovereign debt:

- To attract international investors, sovereign debt is issued in foreign currencies, either in dollars or euros. This means that the debt is subject to *currency risks* if the currency of issuance strengthens relative to the currency of the issuing country. In 2014, the currencies of countries such as Ghana and Angola declined sharply in value, largely due to the decline in prices for natural resources, especially oil. The additional Ghanaian cedis and Angolan kwanzas needed to service debt denominated in dollars and euros represented a significant new economic burden for both countries. In part because of this burden, Ghana was obliged to turn to the IMF for assistance. According to Judith E. Tyson of the Overseas Development Institute, if comparable exchange rate losses were to be repeated across the region, the total impact would amount to a value over time equivalent to 1.13 percent of sub-Saharan African GDP.
- *Interest rate risks* have also emerged on the African debt market. Record-low borrowing costs in 2014 facilitated sovereign bond sales by several African countries, including Ethiopia, which paid 6.63 percent for its debut offering of \$1 billion in December 2014. Beginning in 2015, investors appear to be taking a more jaundiced view of the African scene. On July 23, 2015, Zambia paid 9.38 percent for the sale of \$1.25 billion in debt. That was the highest yield ever paid for an African issuer on the Eurobond market and almost 4 percent higher than Zambia's first Eurobond in 2012.

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- In part due to past debt relief programs, *the overall level of African government debt* has remained [relatively stable](#) at around 30 percent of GDP. Upward revisions to the GDPs of countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria due to updated statistics have helped to lower debt-to-GDP ratios. Nevertheless, the IMF has warned African countries not to go overboard in contracting new debt. The IMF's advice has not always been heeded, and debt in four countries—Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, and Seychelles—has reached a [moderate level of risk](#) on the IMF's scale of debt sustainability.
- A final type of risk relates to the [differences between sovereign debt and concessional debt](#). In the case of the latter, negotiations over debt issuance typically take place over a lengthy period of time during which issues such as the term of the debt, its sustainability, and its developmental impact are explored in detail. In contrast, sovereign international debt is often contracted rapidly. The borrower's intentions regarding the use of the debt principal are generally not binding. The term of the debt is generally 5 to 10 years, in contrast to the 30-year terms often employed in concessional lending. The looser arrangements associated with sovereign debt have led some countries to use the funds obtained for purposes that have little or no development impact. In [Ghana and Mozambique](#), for example, funds were used to increase the salaries of public sector employees.

### **Time to Check the Fire Alarm, But Perhaps Not to Ring It**

After reviewing a study from the [Overseas Development Institute](#), Amadou Sy of the Brookings Institution [concluded](#), "it is not yet time to sound the alarm on these risks. Rather, it is time to check the fire alarm and make sure that African governments can properly and rapidly identify, measure, and manage the risks from their increased external indebtedness." Other views have been more negative. One African country—Uganda—in 2014 declared that it would not issue sovereign debt after all. Its central bank governor warned of the dangers of debt and [said](#) that African countries would "never again get debt relief." [A Policy Research Working Paper](#) published by the World Bank Group in June 2015 concluded that in contrast to foreign direct investment, sovereign borrowing does not have a positive effect on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.

The bottom line is that African governments should heed cautionary notes such as the ones above. Even at a time of increasing interest rates, sovereign debt may be appropriate to address some problems. For example, borrowing to finance high-impact infrastructure projects that are likely to produce significant rewards at low risk might be justified. On the other end of the scale, governments should probably avoid issuing sovereign debt for purposes that promise low returns, such as financing current expenditures, increasing government salaries, or purchasing military hardware.

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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# JULIUS MALEMA'S ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS PARTY TURNS 2

By Dr. Janette Yarwood

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), one of South Africa's newest political parties, recently had its two-year anniversary. The EFF's first anniversary was marked by surprise and optimism as the party earned 1 million votes during the 2014 elections. How has the party fared in its second year? Will the EFF continue its momentum and increase the party's share of the votes during the 2016 local elections?

## Rise of the Economic Freedom Fighters

The EFF arose in the wake of the Marikana massacre (2012), when police shot and killed 34 striking black miners who were demanding higher wages, and it emerged onto the South African political scene in July 2013 after its leader, Julius Malema, was expelled from the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in 2012. The [EFF declaration and founding manifesto](#) explains that the party draws inspiration from Marxist and Leninist schools of thought, as well as the work of Frantz Fanon. The EFF describes itself as a radical, leftist, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist movement with an internationalist outlook anchored by popular grassroots formations and struggles.

The EFF quickly gained momentum with its populist [message](#) of redistribution of wealth and land and advocating the nationalization of South Africa's mines, banks, and other sectors of the economy. The party also aims to address corruption, unemployment, and broad inequality. This philosophy resonated among many in a society that remains [deeply unequal](#). South Africa's [GINI coefficient](#) in 2011 was .65, the highest listed by the World Bank. (The Gini coefficient is a ratio between zero and one. The higher, or closer to one, a country's Gini coefficient is, the greater the level of inequality in that country.)

Malema and the EFF appeal to this disaffected sector of the population in a way that no other party does. EFF supporters wear Hugo Chavez-inspired red berets, and its parliamentary representatives wear red working men's overalls and domestic worker dresses, which they say symbolize solidarity with the working people the party represents and signal their intention to work hard in parliament to represent their constituency. The party has also attracted frustrated youths, who are often in attendance at protests wearing the signature red beret.

Nine months after its founding, the EFF won 6 percent, over a million votes, in the 2014 general election, becoming, with 25 seats, the third largest political party in the national assembly. It is now the [official opposition](#) in Limpopo and North West province. The 2014 election results [showed](#) that the ANC won the election with 62 percent of the vote and the Democratic Alliance (DA) consolidated its position as the official opposition with 22 percent of the vote, a 5 percent increase from 2009.

## Year Two in Review

Political analysts in South Africa have varying views on the EFF's impact during its first two years, with most concluding that the political landscape continues to be dominated by the ANC. Theo Venter of the University of the North West [argues](#) that the EFF has succeeded in making Parliament relevant again. The EFF certainly does have people watching what is going on in Parliament, but it may be more for the spectacle than a true engagement in politics. EFF members regularly disrupt Parliament and twice have been [removed](#) from Parliament by police for confronting South African President Jacob Zuma with questions about an investigation into a \$23 million state-funded security upgrade to his home.



South African Economic Freedom Fighters leader Julius Malema, center, after he and supporters disrupted the official opening session of Parliament in Cape Town, South Africa, Thursday, Feb. 12, 2015. Security guards removed the opposition lawmakers who interrupted an annual address by President Jacob Zuma and demanded that he answer questions about a spending scandal. (Source: AP Photo/Nic Bothma, Pool.)

At the same time, the EFF [continues to be marked by infighting](#). Shortly after the 2014 election, Malema was accused of removing those critical of him after key leaders were dismissed. EFF spokesperson Mbuyiseni Ndlozi [denied the charges](#): “the restructuring was purely organizational and aimed at improving the overall functioning of the fledgling party’s structures across the board.” Then, in March 2015, the chairperson of the EFF in Gauteng, Zorro Boshielo, and deputy secretary of the province, Kim Heller, both [resigned](#). [Expulsions](#) soon followed, with former party MPs Mpho Ramakatsa, Andile Mngxitama, and Khanyisile Litchfield-Tshabalala dismissed in April 2015 following their claims of misconduct and corruption against the party’s leadership. In May 2015, seven senior members in Mpumalanga severed ties with the political party, [citing](#) financial mismanagement, exploitation of women, nonexistence of internal democratic processes, corruption, and thuggery as reasons for leaving. Mpumelelo Masina, who was the EFF Mpumalanga spokesperson at the time, [summarized the party’s problems](#): “The party has become a danger to the political fabric and economic stability of South Africa. The organization has turned into a *stokvel* led by corrupt individuals.” (A *stokvel* is an informal savings pool or syndicate, usually among Black people, in which funds are contributed in rotation, allowing participants lump sums for various needs.) Finally, some claim that Malema and the EFF are [opportunistic](#) and capitalize on grassroots activism already underway. The party has been accused of parachuting into communities for service delivery protests rather than actually engaging in the struggles of the working class and poor.

### Conclusion: Prospects for 2016

The EFF has had a rocky first two years. The party continues to [center](#) on Malema. Despite criticism of the party’s confrontational methods during parliamentary sessions, Malema remains optimistic. At the two-year anniversary celebration, Malema [said](#) the party would contest all wards countrywide during the 2016 municipal elections. EFF spokesperson Mbuyiseni Ndlozi [said](#) the party immediately went to work to build structures in all provinces, regions, and subregions after the 2014 election. The party is also [deploying](#) party members around the country to increase membership. So far, [doubts](#) persist over the effectiveness of these efforts. Unless the party strengthens its base, its prospects will continue to rest on sustaining Malema’s national popularity.

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Dr. Janette Yarwood is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## ELECTIONS IN UGANDA: A ONE-MAN SHOW?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Uganda is scheduled to hold presidential and legislative elections in February 2016. Informal [campaigning](#) has already begun in the country. Although some think this could prove Uganda's [most competitive](#) presidential election to date, longtime President Yoweri Museveni is unlikely to face electoral defeat. [Recent polling](#) places support for Museveni at slightly higher than 50 percent, but disturbingly, it also suggests that the majority of Ugandans (61 percent) do not believe Museveni would peacefully accept defeat. [more...](#)

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


Republic of Uganda President Yoweri Museveni listens during an interview, Tuesday, May 5, 2015, at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Museveni, who turns 71 in September, is one of Africa's longest serving leaders. (Source: AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews.)

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The worldwide decline in the price of oil that began in 2014 hit the Angolan economy hard. Although oil is not the country's only resource—Angola also [exports](#) diamonds, coffee, timber, and other minerals—oil has [accounted for](#) 90 percent of all exports and as much as 80 percent of tax revenues. The fall in the price of oil left a [gap](#) as large as 7 percent of GDP in the Angolan government's budget and forced reductions in key programs aimed at alleviating the widespread poverty that persists in the country. As part of his efforts to close the financial gap, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos turned to China, which is Angola's [largest trading partner](#) and has reportedly lent Angola as much as \$20 billion. The Angolan President visited Beijing in June 2015 and was received by Chinese President Xi Jinping and other senior officials. Chinese government [communications](#) on the visit were long on expressions of friendship and cooperation, but short on specifics with respect to Angola's current financial needs. This response may highlight China's dilemma—how to help an African client state at a time when China's focus is on its own economy. [more...](#)



Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, left, is greeted by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang before their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Tuesday, June 9, 2015. (Source: Wang Zhao/Pool Photo via AP)

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### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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## Museveni's Elections

On July 31, Yoweri Museveni formally announced his intention to seek the ruling National Resistance Movement's (NRM) [nomination](#) for the 2016 presidential election. Museveni, who came to power through a military coup in 1986, has been elected president four times thus far. If he wins the 2016 election, it would extend his mandate through 2021.

When he initially came to power, Museveni was highly critical of the old guard of African politicians. As he famously [declared](#) in his 1986 book *What Is Africa's Problem?* "the problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but the leaders who want to overstay in power." Since then, however, he has had a significant change of heart.

Museveni was elected president in the country's first elections held in 1996. During the 2001 election campaign, Museveni promised that his second term [would be his last](#). Term limits, which were adopted as part of the 1995 constitution, were then repealed in 2005 to allow Museveni to remain in power. Those in favor of repealing term limits argued that the people of Uganda should be free to choose their president; if voters disapproved of Museveni, the argument went, they could vote him out of power. He won re-election in 2006 and 2011.

## The Competition

Museveni's main competitors are faces familiar to Ugandan politics: Kizza Besigye and Amama Mbabazi. Opposition candidate Besigye, former personal physician to Museveni, has run for president (and lost) in the country's last three elections. Besigye is seeking the nomination of the country's main opposition party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), but is facing internal competition from within the party. Mbabazi, prime minister from 2011 to 2014 and former secretary general of the NRM, [announced](#) in July that he would be running for president as an independent candidate. Mbabazi had initially planned on seeking the ruling party's nomination but claims that the NRM is actively blocking him from running against Museveni in the party's primary. Besigye and Mbabazi [were arrested](#) in July and accused of organizing illegal campaign rallies. They were both released the same day without charge.

## Electoral Quality

The quality of Ugandan elections has frequently been called into question. Allegations of [intimidation](#), [vote buying](#), and [fraud](#) have accompanied all the country's previous elections. Electoral reform is currently being [debated](#) by the Ugandan Parliament, but many fear that no substantive reforms will be undertaken ahead of the 2016 election. Some members of civil society are [threatening to file a lawsuit](#) to force parliamentarians to pass reforms before the election takes place, including establishment of an independent electoral-management body. Besigye's party, the FDC, has threatened a [boycott](#) unless meaningful reform takes place.

The past few years have seen a shrinking of the political space with new, overly harsh rules put in place to limit political dissent. Political discussions involving [more than three people](#) require an official permit from the police. Civil



Republic of Uganda President Yoweri Museveni listens during an interview, Tuesday, May 5, 2015, at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Museveni, who turns 71 in September, is one of Africa's longest serving leaders. (Source: AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews.)



society has also been under fire—parliament is debating a [new bill](#) to curtail nongovernmental organizations' activities before the 2016 elections.

In July, the government approved a one-time [supplementary travel payment](#) to the country's parliamentarians of approximately \$40,000 each. Although the government denies it, these payments are allegedly to assist candidates in traversing the countryside during the upcoming campaign. The travel payments are part of an overall 58 percent increase in the government budget from the previous year. The 2011 electoral cycle experienced a similar burst of spending.

## Conclusion

In the past three elections in which he has participated (2001, 2006, 2011), Besigye has polled 28 percent, 38 percent, and 26 percent, respectively. According to a [poll of Ugandans](#) conducted in mid-July, 55 percent supported Museveni, 17 percent supported Besigye, and 13 percent supported Mbabazi. Unless opposition to Museveni is able to coalesce around a single candidate, even a relatively free and fair election could return Museveni to office easily. Having been firmly in power for close to 30 years now, Museveni is generally viewed favorably by many as the man who has brought [peace and security](#) to Uganda, which had experienced a series of brutal dictators and coups after independence and a civil war from 1980 until 1986. Museveni enjoys wide support in rural areas and among older voters. Given the country's history of electoral conduct and parliament's inability or unwillingness to enact electoral reform, however, a fair election is far from likely.

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
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Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, left, is greeted by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang before their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Tuesday, June 9, 2015. (Source: Wang Zhao/Pool Photo via AP.)

## China and Angola—The Development of a Strategic Partnership

Today's close relations between China and Angola were not necessarily foreordained. During Angola's liberation struggle and civil war, which ended only in 2002, dos Santos's party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), received more consistent support from the Soviet Union, and later Russia, and Cuba than from China. At least initially, China [hedged its bets](#), providing help to other factions as well as to the MPLA.

With the end of the civil war, the MPLA government in Angola sought assistance in rebuilding the shattered infrastructure of a country devastated by decades of conflict. The Chinese government [stepped forward](#), providing both the financial resources and the manpower needed to rebuild infrastructure. In 2008 alone, the Angolan embassy in Beijing issued more than 40,000 visas to Chinese headed for the southern African country. By 2011, some claimed there were more than 100,000 Chinese workers in Angola. From 2002 through 2010, China's Export-Import Bank loaned \$4.5 billion to Angola for reconstruction projects that included roads, bridges, and government buildings.

The result of this intensive economic engagement was the declaration on November 20, 2011, of a "[strategic partnership](#)" between Angola and China. This move came during a visit by China's then-vice president, Xi Jinping, to Luanda. The partnership was based on mutual interests: Angola became one of China's principal sources of petroleum; China's state oil company, Sinopec, gained [access](#) to Angolan oil fields; trade between the two countries increased; and Angola received additional financial resources from China on a loan-for-oil basis.

## Criticism of the Partnership—"The Boss Does Not Talk"

Even as the MPLA government has sought to deepen the partnership with China, more negative views of the relationship have developed. Many Angolans have been impressed by the hardworking nature of the Chinese who have come to reside in their country, but they have not appreciated the competition that many of the newcomers have offered in real-estate development, retail, services, and a variety of other fields. The Chinese [commercial presence](#) is large—50 state companies and 400 private companies operate in Angola. These companies are supposed to use 30 percent Angolan labor, but [industry sources](#) say that rule appears to be rarely observed. The quality and utility of the large-scale infrastructure projects built by the Chinese have also been criticized in the press. Poverty remains widespread, and some of the Chinese projects have tended to deteriorate over time. Angolans [speak](#) of "disposable roads, Styrofoam bridges, façade works."



The political opposition, led by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has also criticized the MPLA government's relationship with China. In late July, legislators from UNITA and other opposition groups boycotted a vote in the Angolan parliament on a bill put forward by the government to increase foreign investment by creating special economic zones, free-trade zones, and other incentives. This boycott was actually a surrogate for opposition displeasure over the government's lack of transparency regarding the agreements that President dos Santos arrived at during his June 2015 visit to China. As UNITA lawmaker Raul Danda [pointed out](#): "How much did your president get from China? Nobody knows. How will he pay for it? Nobody knows. . . . We asked our president to explain what he did in China, but the boss does not talk."

### **What Did Dos Santos Want from Beijing, and What Did He Get?**

During the visit by dos Santos to China, the official Angolan news agency [reported](#) that the president had asked the Chinese government for a two-year moratorium on repayment of its debt and for a new credit line or expansion of existing ones. The [statement](#) issued by the Chinese government after the meeting between dos Santos and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang did not mention either a moratorium or any specific financial support. The same was true of Chinese press coverage of the visit. These facts perhaps motivated a statement, published on June 23, 2015, by the [Angolan Finance Ministry](#), that the "terms of loans" provided by China had been "improved," but that no payments moratorium had ever been requested.

If the public record seems to indicate that traditional debt relief does not figure prominently in China's plans for its future relationship with Angola, there are other indications of what is important. According to [press reports](#), a bilateral memorandum of understanding that would permit the entry of Chinese banks into the Angolan market is under negotiation. Such an agreement would appear to promote the Chinese goal of achieving reserve currency status for its currency. Another report, attributed by the [Voice of America](#) to different sources, suggests that an agreement signed during the dos Santos visit provided for the "delivery" of 500,000 hectares (almost 1.25 million acres) of land, with water rights, to the Chinese government as collateral for a loan. With the price of oil falling, the Chinese government may prefer the security of land tenure over access to a commodity that is not in short supply.

### **Conclusion**

China's reaction to Angola's economic problems poses a dilemma for President dos Santos. If he agrees to even deeper penetration of the Angolan economy by Chinese interests, he will face increased criticism by his political opponents. If he resists the Chinese advances, he could lose an important financial lifeline. Given China's paramount role as a buyer of Angola's most precious resource, it is likely that dos Santos will choose the former option and take the political heat, at least in the short term.

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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
## WHY ELECTION VIOLENCE IN AFRICA MATTERS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On average, 50 percent of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa experience some form of violence. The severity ranges from harassment and intimidation to targeted assassinations to, in rare instances, significant numbers of [fatalities](#). What do we know about the nature of electoral violence in Africa, and, more specifically, who and what are affected? [more...](#)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new [book](#), *Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2015), is out now.

Elections in Africa  
2004–2015 (August)



\*Through August 25, 2015. (Source: Data compiled by Stephanie Burchard.)

## TANZANIA: TENSIONS HIGH IN ZANZIBAR AHEAD OF OCTOBER VOTE

By Alexander Noyes

On October 25, 2015, Tanzania will hold elections that are set to be the country's most [competitive](#) yet, with a unified opposition coalition ostensibly posing a real threat to the ruling party's decades-long grip on power. While mainland Tanzania has [escaped](#) much of the civil conflict of its neighbors, Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous island region in the northeast of the country, has suffered several bouts of electoral violence since the 1990s. Although Zanzibar has made significant progress on political [reconciliation](#) over the past five years, political tensions are again on the rise ahead of the October vote. [more...](#)



Ali Mohammed Shein, President of Zanzibar, taking the oath of office administered by the Chief Justice of Zanzibar, at the Amaan Stadium, Zanzibar, Tanzania, November 3, 2010. (Source: AP Photo/Ali Sultan.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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## Electoral Violence Patterns and Trends in Africa

In a [book](#) released this month, I systematically examine the nature of electoral violence and its causes and consequences in sub-Saharan Africa. Based on an analysis of the more than 300 elections held in 47 African countries from 1990 through August 2015, 56 percent (171) can be characterized as “violent,” with reports of harassment by security forces, intimidation by political operatives, and more extreme forms of violence taking place either before or after the election.


While most electoral violence does not escalate beyond harassment and intimidation, in a subset of these violent elections, roughly 40 percent of elections (or 20 percent of all elections held in Africa) experienced serious incidents such as politically motivated assassinations, widespread violence, or both. In a few cases (Angola 1992, Burundi 2015, Congo-Brazzaville 1993, Cote d’Ivoire 2010, Nigeria 2011, Zimbabwe 2008), prolonged civil conflict broke out. For reference, it is estimated that [globally](#), approximately 20 percent of elections experience some form of violence, with violence occurring most frequently in South Asia and Africa.

Some violence is strategic, or planned, while some is incidental, or spontaneous. I estimate the breakdown of violence by type to be about 40 percent strategic and 60 percent incidental. These numbers are imprecise—the planners and perpetrators of violence often attempt to make planned violence appear spontaneous to evade detection by law enforcement officials, media outlets, and international election observers and monitors.

Pre-election violence is generally less intense but occurs more frequently. More than 95 percent of electoral violence occurs either before or on Election Day. Post-election violence has only taken place in a handful of cases and almost never without pre-election violence preceding it. Unfortunately, outbreaks of post-election violence tend to be extreme, such as the [2007–2008 Kenyan post-election violence](#), where nearly 1,500 died over the course of two months, and the [2011 Nigerian case](#), where at least 800 died in the days following the general election.

As Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor [argue](#), ruling parties are often the primary agents of violence. The party in power is often not the only actor responsible for electoral violence, however. Opposition parties and civil protesters have also been known to engage in violent tactics. Specifically, politicians of all partisan persuasions have engaged in violence in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, and [Zimbabwe](#).

In the 1990s, the first decade of the continent’s large-scale return to multiparty elections after decades of dictatorship and autocracy, 60 percent of elections were violent. From 2000 to 2009, 57 percent of elections were violent. From 2010 through the present, 50 percent of elections have been violent. Thus, there appears to have been a modest decrease in electoral violence since the 1990s, but it is worrisome that roughly 50 percent of elections still involve violence. Furthermore, in 2015 alone, five of the nine (56 percent) elections conducted in sub-Saharan Africa to date have been violent. Elections



\*Through August 25, 2015. (Source: Data compiled by Stephanie Burchard.)

are scheduled in Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania, South Sudan, and Sao Tome and Principe for the latter half of 2015. The patterns of the past 25 years of elections held in Africa suggest that at least half of these upcoming elections will experience some form of violence.

### **Why Does Electoral Violence Occur and Why Does It Matter?**

Research has identified several political factors correlated with electoral violence: certain [electoral systems](#) associated with a winner-take-all mentality; [co-opted electoral management bodies](#); [electoral fraud](#); and weak adherence to the [rule of law](#). Many of these factors are found in newly democratizing countries, and many newly democratizing countries are found on the African continent.

So why does electoral violence matter? What does it affect? First, there is the normative argument that violence of any type is counterproductive and should be acted against when possible. Related to this argument is the idea that although electoral violence may happen, in many cases it does not have to. Much electoral violence could be prevented either through improved electoral management or enhanced trust in political institutions.

Finally, and most instrumentally, electoral violence is [inimical to democratic consolidation](#). Individual voters, the building blocks of democracy, are adversely affected by electoral violence. Electoral violence results in lower levels of democratic satisfaction at the individual level, and those who fear electoral violence exhibit lower levels of trust in relevant political actors and electoral institutions. These attitudinal effects can translate into regime vulnerability as violence undermines a government's legitimacy. Electoral violence may result in short-term victories for some, but in the long term, democracy is the loser.

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Ali Mohammed Shein, President of Zanzibar, taking the oath of office administered by the Chief Justice of Zanzibar, at the Amaan Stadium, Zanzibar, Tanzania, November 3, 2010. (Source: AP Photo/Ali Sultan.)

## History of Electoral Conflict Leads to Government of National Unity

Zanzibar, made up primarily of the islands of Unguja and Pemba, has a long history of election-related violence and political polarization between the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the Civic United Front (CUF), the main opposition party on the islands. Since the move to multiparty democracy, the 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections all suffered from violence and allegations of fraud by the opposition. After a number of failed [attempts](#) at power-sharing, the leaders of CCM and CUF in the lead-up to the 2010 elections agreed to form a government of national unity (GNU). The idea was put to a referendum, in which the GNU gained the support of 66 percent of voters. A very close but peaceful vote in the 2010 elections resulted in CCM's Ali Mohamed Shein winning the presidency and CUF's Seif Shariff Hamad, the second-place finisher, taking the position of first vice president. The 19-member cabinet was allocated on a proportional basis, with [nine](#) members from CUF.

Despite several high-level rifts, lingering resentment from hardliners in both parties, and a number of incidents of political violence at the hands of the Islamist group [UAMSHO](#), the early years of the GNU were viewed as a [success](#). The GNU was hailed for bringing about Zanzibar's first peaceful multiparty election and for significantly lessening the long-running political tensions in Zanzibar. Both CCM and CUF praised progress made under the deal. President Shein [attributed](#) newfound unity and stability on the islands to the GNU. Second Vice President Seif Ali Iddi, also of CCM, echoed these sentiments, [asserting](#), "We worked collectively in the government regardless of our political differences. We enjoyed peace and stability in the islands. . . ." First vice president Hamad also [maintained](#), "the top leadership is working very, very closely together. The President, myself, the Second Vice President, we always consult."

## Renewed Tensions Ahead of Vote

Such consensus has been steadily eroding of late, however, with recent disagreements escalating tensions before the October election. As outlined in the October 30, 2014, edition of *Africa Watch*, Tanzania's contentious [constitutional review](#) process threatened the GNU in May 2014, as CUF favored increased autonomy for Zanzibar while CCM was adamant about retaining the status quo. The rift between the two parties reached a head when some senior CCM members [called](#) for a new referendum on the GNU to see if people were still in favor of the arrangement. Although a constitutional referendum was eventually [postponed](#), debates over the future of the constitution have remained politically salient as acrimony continues between CCM and CUF over preparations for the October elections.

In May 2015, Hamad held a press conference [alleging](#) that CCM was planning to rig the elections. In June, CUF staged a [walkout](#) from Zanzibar's House of Representatives over alleged flaws in the voter registration process, including intimidation by security forces. Hamad was subsequently [barred](#) from attending a session in the House. In July, amid rising incidents of political violence at the hands of security forces and party-affiliated militias, opposition parties [refused](#) to sign an election code of

ethics drawn up by the Zanzibar electoral commission. In a letter to the police chief and the head of the electoral commission, CUF [cited](#) seven incidents of intimidation and violence aimed at opposition supporters in the run-up to the vote. During a campaign event for his reelection, Shein rejected allegations of plans to rig the election, [asserting](#), "It is very sad that already some candidates are saying that the elections will be manipulated, how? Elections are always transparent, with both party agents and police present. Why do you start complaining of rigging elections now? This is political immaturity."

## Conclusion

Despite a peaceful election in 2010 and initial progress on political reconciliation under the GNU, political tensions have returned to Zanzibar, a development that bodes ill for prospects of a peaceful election period. The October elections will present the GNU framework with its toughest test yet. Unlike the unity governments formed in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008, which were transitional in nature, Zanzibar's form of power-sharing is more permanent and difficult to alter, as the GNU mechanism is enshrined in the constitution and was popularly legitimized by the 2010 referendum. That said, while officials from both [CCM](#) and [CUF](#) have expressed their wishes to remain in the GNU framework moving forward, it remains to be seen whether the mechanism will be able to survive a hotly contested election, particularly if there is significant violence.

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
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## SOUTH AFRICA ON THE EDGE— POLITICAL PARALYSIS AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION

By George F. Ward

South Africa made headlines when the government led by President Jacob Zuma in June 2015 ignored an order by a South African court and failed to exercise an International Criminal Court warrant for the arrest of visiting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. As John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations has [pointed out](#), the South African government's inaction highlighted a increasing threat to the rule of law in that country. In fact, the al-Bashir episode is only the latest addition to a growing list of indications of the fraying of South Africa's political fabric that is occurring as economic fundamentals deteriorate. [more...](#)



South African President Jacob Zuma shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Friday, September 4, 2015. (Source: Lintao Zhang/Poo Photo via AP.)

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In this photo taken late Saturday, July 11, 2015, Tanzania's public works minister John Pombe Magufuli speaks at an internal party poll to decide the ruling party's presidential candidate, in Dodoma, Tanzania. Tanzania's ruling party, which has been in power for five decades, has chosen public works minister John Pombe Magufuli as its presidential candidate, making him the favorite to replace current president Jakaya Kikwete in the upcoming October election. (Source: AP Photo/Khalif Said.)

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South African President Jacob Zuma shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Friday, September 4, 2015. (Source: Lintao Zhang/Poo Photo via AP.)

## President Zuma's Do-Nothing Record

As Africa Watch pointed out in [June 2014](#), President Zuma's first priority after his victory in the May 2014 national elections was to shore up his own political position. Challenges such as economic stagnation and urgent national defense needs were given short shrift. Economic growth in 2014, which in June of that year was projected to come in at 2 percent, ended up at just [1.5 percent](#). In 2015, economic growth has fallen still further, and GDP actually [decreased](#) in the second calendar quarter.

Instead of focusing on the nation's economic needs, President Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) have been busy dealing with allegations of mismanagement and corruption. Faced with a government report that criticized the lavish spending (\$21.7 million) on "security" upgrades to Zuma's private homestead at Nkandla that included a swimming pool, amphitheater, and a visitors' center, the government produced its own report that justified the spending in what has been described as "[comic detail](#)." The swimming pool, for example, was characterized as an essential source of water for fighting fires.

The Nkandla episode joins a long list of [other scandals](#) that have dogged Zuma and the ANC for years. One [commentator](#) sees the problem as rooted in more than President Zuma's evident personal flaws. In a system that has been dominated for over 20 years by one party, it is inevitable that unqualified political appointees would find their way into executive positions in essential organizations such as South African Airways and the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The ANC's tendency to flout rules is also evident in the conduct of its representatives in parliament. Instances of [ridicule and attempted intimidation](#) of the opposition are allegedly not uncommon.

## Economic Challenges

The South African economy faces multiple challenges. In [2014](#), the key mining sector contracted, and the important manufacturing sector flatlined. Both sectors have suffered from the power cuts that have been a consequence of the government's past failure to act expeditiously to increase electrical generation capacity. The once-vibrant [gold mining](#) sector is beset by falling profits and, in some cases, actual losses. South Africa's gold mines are old, and production costs are increasing. Falling gold prices coupled with higher costs for wages and electricity are taking their toll. A similar situation exists in the [platinum sector](#), where the leading producers are cutting employment and seeking to raise additional capital to improve efficiency.

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## What Will the Future Hold?

South Africa, which still boasts sub-Saharan Africa's most advanced economy, [if no longer the largest](#), should by no means be counted out. According to two recent studies, recovery and a return to a stronger economic growth path is possible, but only if South Africa makes the right political and economic choices.

In August 2015, Jakkie Cilliers, the executive director of the Pretoria-based Institute for Strategic Studies, revised previous work in his paper [South African Futures 2035](#). Cilliers takes the point of view that South Africa is "generally a divided, unhappy, and increasingly corrupt country with its growth potential hampered by contradictory and ever-changing government policy." He opines that the government's failure to act on key infrastructure and economic issues, chief among them energy supply, has reduced growth prospects for the next several years. The sort of muddle-through scenario that Cilliers earlier dubbed "Bafana Bafana" (after the national soccer team) has been replaced by "Bafana Bafana Redux," which foresees reduced growth through 2035 because of the impact of the electricity crisis, poor policy planning, and the challenges of implementing economic policies. To reach even the reduced targets that Cilliers deems possible, the South African government and private sector will need to work together to generate growth and, above all, jobs.

In a [detailed study](#) released in September 2015, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) proposed in more specific terms what will be needed to reignite economic growth and reduce South Africa's stubbornly high 25-percent unemployment rate. MGI advanced five "bold priorities" for inclusive growth. These steps, if implemented, would represent a decisive move away from an economy fueled by coal and dependent on the mining of gold and platinum:

1. **Advanced manufacturing**, focused on adding value in sectors such as automotive, industrial machinery, and chemicals;
2. **Infrastructure productivity**, aimed at closing gaps in electricity, water, and sanitation by making spending 40 percent more effective;
3. **Natural gas**, to diversify the power supply in relatively rapid fashion and exploit local shale gas resources (if the latter are proven);
4. **Service exports**, with a focus on the African region; and
5. **Raw and processed agricultural exports**, to meet increasing demand throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

The MGI study asserts that these steps, if implemented, could raise annual GDP growth by 1.1 percent and create 3.4 million jobs by 2030.

## Conclusion

As the two studies cited above indicate, South Africa continues to offer great potential both politically and economically. To realize that potential, however, the country will need both wise public policies and more effective implementation. President Zuma and his ANC government have provided little evidence that they have either the capacity or the inclination to provide either. Instead, Zuma seems to be doubling down on his past behavior. Having flouted international norms by failing to detain Sudanese President al-Bashir in June, Zuma [met with the Sudanese leader](#) on September 3 in Beijing to discuss further strengthening relations through increased cooperation. He accepted al-Bashir's invitation to visit Sudan. So much, Zuma seems to be saying, for the views of both international institutions and his domestic political critics.

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In this photo taken late Saturday, July 11, 2015, Tanzania's public works minister John Pombe Magufuli speaks at an internal party poll to decide the ruling party's presidential candidate, in Dodoma, Tanzania. Tanzania's ruling party, which has been in power for five decades, has chosen public works minister John Pombe Magufuli as its presidential candidate, making him the favorite to replace current president Jakaya Kikwete in the upcoming October election. (Source: AP Photo/Khalif Said.)

## Constitutional Design and Conflict in Africa

The relationship between constitutional design and conflict in divided societies has long been a question of interest to scholars and practitioners. Two camps have emerged in the broader political science literature – those supporting strategies of “accommodation,” such as decentralized federalism or power-sharing, and those in favor of “integration” approaches, which are more centralized and aimed at forming a unifying nationality across ethnic groups. In an [edited volume](#) published in June 2015 titled *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa:*

*Preventing Civil War through Institutional Design*, political scientist Alan J. Kuperman argues that constitutions in Africa are overwhelmingly integrative and highly centralized in design. He asserts that nearly 80 percent of all constitutions on the continent are either integrative or hyper-integrative, as measured in 2011, but that they are “imperfectly institutionalized from the standpoint of good governance and resilience to shocks.”

Kuperman and his contributor Eli Poupo attribute this trend toward integrationist design in Africa to the centralizing tendency of states as well as a legacy of highly centralized colonial systems and authoritarian regimes after independence. Poupo [notes](#), “States are by nature integrative; they only implement accommodative design elements reluctantly and under pressure from a mobilized opposition.”

## Successes and Failures of Constitutional Design

Based on findings from seven case studies in Africa (Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Zimbabwe), Kuperman argues that either model of constitutional design, if properly implemented and institutionalized, can help insulate countries against internal and external shocks and manage conflict effectively. Indeed, he [maintains](#), “the two most successful constitutional designs in our case studies—Ghana and Burundi-2005 [after Burundi implemented a new constitution in 2005]—lie on opposite ends of the integration-accommodation spectrum.” According to Kuperman, Ghana represents a successful centralized integrative design that is complemented by relatively strong liberal institutions. On the other hand, Burundi, [despite](#) current violence, exemplifies a successful accommodative approach featuring a variety of power-sharing mechanisms that ensure the Tutsi minority of guaranteed representation in governing institutions no matter the outcome of elections.

Given Burundi's [current violence](#) surrounding the president's unconstitutional third term, some might find it counterintuitive that Kuperman considers Burundi a success. But considering the country's history of mass ethnic violence,

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Burundi has achieved a lot of progress in mostly overcoming ethnic politics. As [argued](#) by Filip Reyntjens in the volume, “Burundi’s main divide is now between parties rather than ethnic groups, and when violence occurs it is political rather than ethnic.” Despite how fractured and contentious the political landscape is, the country, thus far at least, has managed to avoid escalation to war.

Kuperman also holds up Kenya’s decentralized post-2010 constitutional framework as an example illustrating the potential of accommodation-based approaches. He cites the cases of civil war and genocide in Burundi in 1993 and renewed conflict in Sudan after the 2005 peace agreement between the North and the South, however, to [argue](#) that the accommodation strategy also “entails risks of backfiring gravely if not institutionalized appropriately.” To further illustrate such dangers, he cites the cases of Angola (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Liberia (1997), where, he [says](#), “failed attempts at partial accommodation contributed to more than a million deaths.”

Given these risks, the preponderance of highly centralized and integrative constitutions in Africa, and the limits of external influence, Kuperman urges international actors to scale back current preferences for fundamental reform and instead follow the incremental model of Ghana. He [argues](#) that international actors should seriously consider promoting “liberal reforms of Africa’s existing, integrative constitutional designs—rather than their radical replacement with accommodative designs. . . attempting the latter would likely result in incomplete or inequitable accommodation, which our case studies demonstrate can have disastrous consequences.”

## Conclusion

The volume’s findings are mainly based on seven case studies in Africa. Further research is therefore needed on other cases in Africa and beyond to test the study’s proposed causal relationships and explore the offered policy recommendations. Moreover, the database presented in the volume also reveals other relationships that allow for alternative interpretations and, by extension, policy implications. For instance, while only a handful of countries in Africa are listed as having “accommodative” or “hyper-accommodative” systems, a closer look reveals that such cases are some of the most democratic and peaceful in Africa, including Botswana, South Africa, Cape Verde, and Mauritius.

This finding suggests that African, regional, and international actors may be wise to adopt a more flexible, tailored approach to promoting constitutional reform in Africa, as opposed to simply writing off accommodative strategies (while remaining acutely aware of the dire consequences of improper implementation). Political scientist Nic Cheeseman advocates a similar approach in his recent [book](#) on democratization in Africa. On the tradeoff between political inclusion and competition, he [writes](#), “there is no ideal constitutional template that can be deployed across the continent. . . because different countries may require different degrees of inclusion in order to achieve political stability.” He goes on to [say](#): “Judging whether a given political system can bear the strains associated with higher levels of competition requires an intimate knowledge of a country’s demography, geography, and political history of a given polity.” Any upcoming efforts at constitutional reform in Tanzania will need to strike a careful balance between inclusion and competition while remaining attuned to the realities of what design can be realistically institutionalized.

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## ZIMBABWE: FORMER VP MUJURU JOINS FRAY

By Alexander Noyes

On September 8, 2015, former Vice President Joice Mujuru—who was sacked from her position by President Robert Mugabe in December 2014—[released](#) a political manifesto. The [document](#), “Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development (BUILD),” reads as a strong rebuke to Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. It calls for rapprochement with Western countries and revision of some of Zimbabwe’s most controversial policies, including land reform. The BUILD manifesto announces Mujuru’s return to the political stage with a splash. But does she stand a chance at unseating 91-year-old Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980? [more...](#)



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President, Joice Mujuru. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

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## SECURING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Providing security is an essential feature of election management, especially in newly democratizing countries and post-conflict environments. In those situations—where trust in institutions and political actors is lacking and electoral processes are relatively new and unfamiliar—the need for impartial and professional security is great. The police and the military are frequently expected to provide security during elections, but problems have been associated with the involvement of each, especially in Africa. There appears to be a need for more and better training of security forces before elections are held. [more...](#)



Police provide security during local municipality elections in Cape Town, South Africa, May 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

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## Background

As [highlighted](#) previously by *Africa Watch*, ZANU-PF has faced increasing factionalism over the past several years. A long-running struggle between two political camps, one headed by current Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the other by Mujuru, came to a head at the party’s congress held in December 2014. Shortly afterward, Mugabe [sacked](#) Mujuru and dozens of her closest supporters. Mugabe then installed Mnangagwa as vice president and purged [hundreds](#) other party officials seen as aligned with Mujuru. While Mujuru retreated to her farm and kept a low profile after the congress, several senior officials in her camp openly [criticized](#) Mugabe and ZANU-PF, a rarity in Zimbabwe. In April, several former senior ZANU-PF officials and allies of Mujuru’s, led by Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo, [announced](#) a new opposition party called “People First,” which Mujuru was expected to eventually lead. In June, Mujuru broke her silence and apologized for her past complicity in Zimbabwe’s [failures](#): “We collectively failed in our basic mandate to the nation. For my role in the failure I am truly sorry and I apologize to my fellow Zimbabweans.”

## BUILD Manifesto

After her apology, Mujuru again largely remained out of the public eye until the release of her two-page manifesto last week. Contrasting sharply with ZANU-PF’s platform, the document called for a market-driven economy, respect for the rule of law and property rights, a free press, and a revision of the controversial land-reform program and [indigenization](#) policy (which requires foreign- and white-owned businesses to sell a 51-percent stake to black nationals). The manifesto also [eschewed violence](#), called for reengagement with the international community, and addressed the contentious topic of reforming the country’s security sector, which plays an influential role in keeping ZANU-PF in power: “We say no to violence... We shall ensure that our foreign policy will be guided by rapprochement across the board... The security establishment shall be apolitical, well-resourced and we shall promote meritocracy and professionalism in the sector.”

## Opposition Coalition?

Following release of the BUILD document, [local papers](#) have reported on a potential alliance between Mujuru and various opposition groups. Zimbabwe’s [opposition](#) parties have also suffered from acute factionalism since their loss in the 2013 elections. The most intriguing potential coalition partner for Mujuru would be Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party led by former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T). Tsvangirai’s [reaction](#) to the BUILD platform suggests he is open to the idea: “Our side of the struggle is getting many new players every day... They deserve our support for their new sense of patriotism and the realization that together we are bigger, better, and more formidable.” MDC-T spokesperson, Obert Gutu, [added](#), “We would like to make it known that as a party, we are happy that



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President, Joice Mujuru. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

some former liberation stalwarts have seen the light and are now speaking the language of democracy.” Alliances have also been [discussed](#) with former Finance Minister Tendai Biti’s MDC-offshoot, MDC Renewal, and Dumiso [Dabengwa’s](#) African People’s Congress (ZAPU).

## Conclusion

The release of the BUILD document signals Mujuru’s intention to return to national politics and challenge Mugabe in elections scheduled for 2018. A variety of factors suggest that her reentry into the fray could be a major political development in Zimbabwe. The first is Mugabe’s old age. This week, Mugabe apparently unwittingly repeated a [speech](#) he had given just weeks before, prompting MDC-T to question his “mental faculties” and call for his resignation. But if Mugabe dies in office or hands the reins to Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa before elections, ZANU-PF’s political fortunes might actually sink lower than if Mugabe (who would be 94 years old) ran, given Mnangagwa’s [lack](#) of broad political support and Mujuru’s perceived grassroots popularity among ZANU-PF supporters. Before she was sacked in 2014, Mujuru reportedly commanded support from nine out of 10 provinces in party elections. The country’s economic decline since 2013 also does not bode well for the incumbent party.

Finally, academic [research](#) shows that some opposition coalitions can greatly improve the chances of electoral turnover in semi-authoritarian regimes, a point recently illustrated by the case of [Nigeria](#). Given Mujuru’s national liberation credentials and Tsvangirai’s dwindling but still broad support base, a cohesive opposition alliance between the two would sharply increase the chances of a ZANU-PF defeat in 2018, especially if Mugabe were not a candidate. That said, there are a number of challenges to such a pact, namely deciding who would lead and who would play second fiddle, as both Mujuru and Tsvangirai see themselves in the leading role. Moreover, ZANU-PF will not go down without a fight—a Mujuru-Tsvangirai coalition would likely face harassment and violence at the hands of the state security apparatus, as seen in 2008 and previous election cycles in Zimbabwe.

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## Security Forces during Elections: Necessary but Problematic

Effective election management must address a multitude of security concerns, especially in newly democratizing countries, which seem to be [particularly prone](#) to election violence. Threat assessments and crisis response planning, candidate protection, ballot and polling station security, and crowd management are but a few of the many functions that security forces are expected to perform before, during, and after elections. In a best-case scenario, just the perception of an unprotected or insecure process could deter voters from participating; in a worst-case scenario, it could trigger widespread violence.

Due to constitutional limits on military deployments for domestic purposes, police forces are most often responsible for providing election security. Even when constitutional limits do not apply, potential voters and opposition supporters, especially in countries with a history of military involvement in political processes, are likely to interpret the involvement of military forces as a form of intimidation. For example, during the 2000 Ghanaian election, the ruling party conducted [military exercises](#) meant to intimidate opposition candidates and voters. In Zimbabwean elections, military personnel have been known to [man polling booths](#) to ensure the re-election of the ruling party.

On some occasions, however, there is little choice but to include the military in election management. Military forces may be directly called on to provide election security in countries emerging from serious conflict, such as post-apartheid [South Africa in 1994](#). In Nigeria, which has been fighting an insurgency in the northeast of the country, the armed forces provided security for the 2015 elections, although not without [controversy](#). Given Nigeria's history of military coups, some were [concerned](#) that the military was being called on to provide election security.

Finally, international peacekeeping forces have been known to provide election security for countries holding elections after the cessation of civil war, as was the case of [Liberia in 2005](#).

Because of the limited resources and capabilities of national police forces in many countries, [joint operations](#) between police and members of the armed forces are frequently temporarily authorized to assist in preparations for elections and to respond to emergency situations. Sierra Leone, Guinea, and South Africa generally rely on both police and national defense forces for election security.

Despite the obvious need for countries to provide security during elections, state security forces have also been a source of violence in several African elections, including those held in [Ethiopia 2005](#), [Togo 2005](#), [Kenya 2007](#), [Zimbabwe 2008](#), and more recently before the [Guinean election in 2015](#).

## Potential Best Practices

The need for security during elections and the opportunity for it to be abused by parties in power present a serious challenge to effective election administration for many African countries. According to [a 2010 report](#) prepared in consultation with the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] Electoral Assistance Unit, despite the inherent requirement



Police provide security during local municipality elections in Cape Town, South Africa, May 2011. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

of neutrality on the part of security actors, many countries in West Africa find it difficult to provide impartial security during elections. The report's authors find that this happens because neither citizens nor security forces themselves understand exactly what security forces are expected or allowed to do during elections.

USAID, in its electoral security [best practices framework](#), recommends that there be (1) clear guidelines for security forces providing election security and (2) consequences for those who act outside their prescribed roles. Citizens and security forces alike must believe that anyone who violates election laws will be punished.

Ghana's election management provides examples of best practices in action. Ghana draws its election security staff from a [combination](#) of the national police, prison officials, immigration and customs officials, and the national fire service. It also readies several thousand military troops that it keeps on standby for emergency purposes only (an estimated [4,000](#) before the 2008 election).

[Ghana's approach](#) underscores inclusiveness, forward-planning, transparency, and communication:

- It forms an Elections Security Taskforce using a multiplicity of actors and agencies.
- It identifies electoral hot spots and sends a "light peacekeeping force" to those areas as a precautionary measure.
- It ensures public awareness of the role of security forces during election through periodic press conferences and country-wide workshops.

Although every context is different in terms of key actors and specific security challenges, these fundamental tenets may go a long way toward keeping the peace during elections.

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## KENYAN GOVERNMENT STRUGGLES WITH RESPONSE TO EXTREMIST THREAT

By George F. Ward

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A Kenya Defence Forces tank moves toward the Garissa University College, in Garissa, Kenya, Thursday, April 2, 2015. (Source: AP Photo.)

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Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, waves at media after his meeting with his French counterpart, Francois Hollande, at the Elysee Palace, in Paris, Tuesday, June 16, 2015. He is opposed in the upcoming presidential elections by several factions within Côte d'Ivoire. (Source: AP Photo/Jacques Brinon.)

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### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

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IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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## “The Error of Fighting Terror with Terror”

That is the provocative title of the [KNCHR's report](#), which is couched in direct language. The report, which is still marked as preliminary, documents 120 cases of egregious human rights violations, including 25 extra-judicial killings and 81 enforced disappearances. The vast majority of these alleged abuses occurred since December 2013, with a significant upward spike since the attacks on the Garissa University College in April 2015.

The KNCHR's findings include the following:

. . . these violations are widespread, systematic, and well-coordinated and include but are not limited to arbitrary arrests, extortion, illegal detention, torture, killings, and disappearances. KNCHR has heard multiple narratives of suspects being rounded up and detained for periods ranging from a few hours to many days in extremely overcrowded and inhumane and degrading conditions. Many have been tortured while in detention, sustaining physical injuries and psychological harm as a result. The torture methods include beatings, waterboarding, electric shocks, genital mutilation, exposure to extreme cold or heat, hanging on trees, mock executions, and exposure to stinging by ants in the wild, denial of sleep and food.

The KNCHR concluded its report with a series of recommendations for actions by individuals and entities in the Kenyan government and security forces, beginning with President Uruhu Kenyatta, who was urged to “acknowledge and condemn the abuses by security agencies and call upon them to ensure respect for the rule of law and human rights in the fight against terrorism. [President Kenyatta] should issue an official apology to the survivors and families of victims of the abuses.”

## So Far, Little Public Attention

The KNCHR report emerged little more than a week before the second anniversary of the terrorist attack on Nairobi's Westgate mall in September 2013 and thus might have been expected to receive significant attention. In fact, it has received little notice. There has been only [modest coverage](#) of the report in the Kenyan press. The [Facebook page](#) of the KNCHR announced the release of the report, but that posting received no comment and only two “likes” from Kenyan citizens. President Kenyatta's [Twitter account](#) carried no mention of the report as of September 21, 2015.



Kenyan public sensitivity to the internal terrorist threat tends, perhaps understandably, to rise sharply whenever a high-profile incident occurs and then to fall off rapidly. When concerns about internal security are high, Kenyans tend to view the deployment of the KDF in Somalia as detracting from the government's ability to protect citizens at home. At other times, the KDF deployment abroad is viewed more positively, often through a patriotic lens. For example, a [survey](#) undertaken by Ipsos Public Affairs, a leading public opinion survey firm in Kenya, found that the proportion of respondents that advocated withdrawing Kenyan troops from Somalia to defend the Kenyan border increased about 10 percent around the time of the Garissa University College tragedy, from 44 percent in the days before the April 2 attack to 48 percent after April 2. At that time, a large majority of respondents advocated bringing the troops home. In contrast, an Ipsos survey conducted only three months later and released in September revealed that [57 percent](#) of Kenyans supported the continued deployment of the KDF in Somalia.

### **Government Remains Focused on a Military Solution**

Given the [existing climate of public opinion](#), in which the cost of living and public corruption are more active concerns than terrorism, President Kenyatta and his government may well believe that they have considerable freedom of action with regard to the internal al-Shabaab threat. In recent weeks, the KDF launched an operation aimed at ousting al-Shabaab fighters from sanctuaries in the [Boni Forest](#), which lies along the border with Somalia. Before the military offensive, the government issued an order to inhabitants of the area to leave. According to [one report](#), 3,000 people followed the order but, despite assurances by the government, have received little or no assistance in their new locations.

### **Conclusion**

There is little doubt that enhanced security in Kenya's cities and towns and aggressive operations against al-Shabaab are two elements necessary to defeat the terrorist threat. That said, unless those activities are accompanied by a program of reconciliation with Kenya's significant Somali minority, the need for which has previously been highlighted in [Africa Watch](#), it is likely that new recruits will continue to be available to fill gaps in al-Shabaab's ranks. A constructive response by the government of President Uruhu Kenyatta to the KNCHR report could be a step in the right direction.

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As [previous issues](#) of *Africa Watch* have noted, violence before, during, and following elections is a significant concern in sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, much attention has been focused on events unfolding in Burkina Faso, but Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea are scheduled to hold elections in October 2015 amid mounting political tensions as well.

## Introduction

Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea are scheduled to hold elections in October 2015 amid mounting political tensions. Both countries have experienced conflicts related to voter-registration processes being perceived as unfair or biased and to rivalries between political parties and contestants.

## Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire is scheduled to hold presidential elections on October 25. The tensions that have arisen there are cause for concern given the 2010–2011 post-election civil conflict in which 3,000 people died when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down. In [August 2015](#), the opposition Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) said it would boycott the election because political and security conditions were not conducive for a peaceful, transparent, and credible poll. The FPI is threatening to obstruct the election and hold street protests, claiming that the Electoral Commission (CEI) lacks independence, that there was a flawed registration process, and that the electoral register requires updating. In addition, two new opposition coalitions have emerged to contest President Alassane Ouattara's ruling Rally of Republicans (RDR).


In May, disgruntled elements from the FPI and Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) [joined](#) forces with other influential politicians to form the National Coalition for Change (CNC). Another FPI faction headed by Pascal Affi N'Guessan formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces (AFD). Both alliances assert that election preparations favor Ouattara. They [claim](#) that millions of people will be prevented from voting because they were unable to register. They have also [claimed](#) that the national electoral commission is biased toward the government.

On September 15, the CNC [accused](#) the government of detaining 16 of its supporters for participating in demonstrations opposing President Ouattara's candidacy in the upcoming presidential vote. The arrests could raise tensions ahead of next month's election, [said](#) coalition spokesman Cesar Etou. In recent weeks, the CNC also [urged](#) its supporters to take to the streets in protest to push for talks with the government on the presidential poll. Demonstrations have already [led](#) to clashes in several parts of the country. The ruling RDR spokesman Joel N'guessan [said](#), "the opposition's single strategy is to cause mayhem in order to prevent the holding of the forthcoming elections."

## Guinea

Guinea only returned to [civilian rule](#) in 2010 following a 2008 coup after long-time President Lansana Conte died. The country held its first election in 2010—voting in Alpha Conde as a president in what international observers deemed a valid ballot. In 2013, [about 100 people died](#) and more were injured during electoral unrest.

Tension is building around the presidential poll scheduled for October 11 and the local elections planned for early next year. The latter polls were originally scheduled for 2014 but were [canceled by the government](#) because of the Ebola epidemic. The opposition—principally Cellou Dalein Diallo's Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) and Sidya Touré's Union of



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Republican Forces—has [suggested](#) that President Alpha Conde will use the delay to manipulate the election. They [claim](#) that Guinea's local authorities are completely under the president's control and that he wants them to stay in power to help rig the presidential vote. The opposition has [held](#) several protests since April over the election calendar. These turned violent, leaving several dead and dozens injured. The [trigger](#) for the opposition's massive protests came at the end of March when the independent electoral commission (CENI) announced that local elections would be held in early 2016.

The main problem, [according](#) to Aboubacar Sylla, spokesman of the opposition alliance and chairman of the opposition party Union of the Forces for Change (UFC), is that Guinea's institutions are all under the thumb of the president: "He has systematically placed people close to himself at the top of important institutions. Parliament simply waves through all the president's drafts for new legislation, just like the post delivering letters."

The controversy goes well [beyond](#) the electoral calendar. The opposition has also challenged the electoral registry, the map of constituencies, the composition and functioning of the electoral commission, the conditions for diaspora voting, neutrality of prefects and governors, and the constitutional court. Coupled with this, [according](#) to Vincent Foucher, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, the results of the 2013 legislative elections indicate that voting often splits on ethnic lines. Diallo's UFDG is primarily supported by the Fulani; the Malinké ethnic group mostly support President Condé's Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG) Rainbow.

## Conclusion

A 2012 International Peace Institute [report](#) notes that election-related violence can be triggered by electoral shortcomings such as severely flawed voter lists, the misuse of incumbency, a lack of transparency, or actual or perceived bias of election officials. While these technical shortcomings are not the fundamental cause of violence, they can act as triggers that ignite violence when tied to deeper rooted social, economic, or political tensions. In Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, the international community should work with the government, the opposition, and international partners to build a minimum of consensus on electoral arrangements to reduce the risk of violence before, during, or after the voting. Pre-electoral conflict can be addressed by transparent registration, codes of conduct for political parties, and voter/civic education programs for voters and candidates. Election monitoring can enhance the credibility and legitimacy of elections, including the media's ability to report on all aspects of campaigning and election-related activities and events. Finally, a dispute mechanism must be in place for addressing grievances.

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