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By Sarah Constantine

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
Julius Maada Bio, presidential candidate for the main opposition Sierra Leone People's Party, waits to cast his ballots during the runoff presidential elections, outside a polling station in Freetown, Sierra Leone, Saturday March 31, 2018. (Source: AP Photo/Cooper Inveen)

Sarah Constantine is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A STORY OF TWO TRENDS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Recent leadership changes in southern Africa underscore two divergent trends in the region. Some countries seem to be moving toward democratic consolidation, while others are sliding toward authoritarian rule. Interestingly, the countries with the least competitive national elections appear to be the ones democratizing. [more...](#)



President Mokgweetsi Masisi of Botswana. (Source: By John Chibona—Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=56986725>.)

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IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

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2018 Elections: Politics as Usual?

The 2018 election cycle came down to a race between frontrunners from the incumbent APC and opposition SLPP. The parties are regionally and ethnically based, drawing support from the country's north and south, respectively, and have strong [historical legacies](#). With the exception of six years during Sierra Leone's civil war, the parties have alternated being in control of the government since 1961.

Both parties have forceful leaders who have sought to centralize their control in the run-up to the election cycle. The APC is led by current president Ernest Bai Koroma, who is stepping down after two five-year terms in office. Although he is leaving office, Koroma [unilaterally chose](#) his successor, Samura Kamara, who is heading the APC ticket. Civil society organizations [criticized](#) the lack of transparency in the APC's selection process.

Koroma's centralizing tendencies are also responsible for the creation of an opposition party. In 2015, Koroma fired his vice president, Sam Sumana, a decision that was declared [illegal](#) by a regional court. Sumana ran against the APC under the banner of the Coalition for Change and threw his [support](#) to the SLPP during the runoff.

The SLPP is led by [Julius Maada Bio](#), who previously came to power in a 1996 coup, before relinquishing control to an elected president. Bio was the SLPP frontrunner in the 2012 elections, in which he lost to Koroma. Although he faced criticism for this loss in the lead-up to the 2018 election cycle, he refused to relinquish leadership of the SLPP. This decision inspired [Kande Yumkella](#), a former UN official who had contested SLPP leadership, to declare an independent candidacy through the NGC.

Running on an issues-based platform, [Yumkella](#) generated a surprisingly active following. His entry into the race siphoned enough votes from the two leading parties so that neither was able to win outright in the first round. Although Yumkella did not advance to the second round, [observers](#) argued that his campaign showed that third parties could be politically viable. Notably, the NGC has not [thrown support](#) to either the APC or SLPP, allowing it to maintain its independence and build its brand for future elections.

It's the Economy...

The results of the run-off were closely [contested](#) and, at the request of Sierra Leone's chief justice, Bio was sworn in on the same day his victory was announced. As president, Bio will face increasing pressure to revive the country's

economy, which has slowed significantly since 2015 due to falling commodity prices, a problem that was exacerbated by the Ebola epidemic.

In the 2018 election cycle, all candidates spoke about the need for economic reform. This reflects Sierra Leoneans' frustration with the country's slow economic growth and widespread unemployment. The Ebola epidemic, which killed nearly [4,000](#) Sierra Leoneans between 2014 and 2015, brought the economy to a standstill. The country, which has come to rely on natural resource exports, including diamonds, gold, and iron ore, was simultaneously affected by [falling](#) commodities prices.

Hit by these dual crises, Sierra Leone's economy [contracted](#) 20.6 percent in 2015. Recovery has been slow. Although the [World Bank](#) expected growth to reach 5.4 percent in 2017, it warned that high inflation remained a concern. Poverty remains widespread. The [UN World Food Program](#) estimates half the population lives on less than \$2 per day.

Economic hardship has been compounded by widespread corruption and financial mismanagement. Sierra Leone's Auditor General reported that \$14 million of funding intended to fight the Ebola epidemic was [misappropriated](#). More recently, following an August 2017 [mudslide](#) in Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, that killed an estimated 1,000 people, displaced families reported they did not receive [housing assistance](#) promised by the government. On a daily basis, Sierra Leoneans [report](#) that petty corruption affects citizens' ability to access public services.

The international community has grown increasingly concerned by the government's financial mismanagement. In February 2018, the [IMF](#) delayed payment of part of a five-year credit facility due to Sierra Leone's "weak budget revenue outlook." The decision [reportedly](#) came after the IMF concluded the government was inappropriately spending on public works projects before the election.

Conclusion

Sierra Leone requires government leadership to overcome the economic setbacks of falling exports and widespread youth unemployment. It is doubtful the APC or SLPP will be willing to make the reforms necessary to manage these challenges. Despite this, the 2018 election cycle highlighted some positive trends. Election violence was relatively low, particularly when compared with violence during the [2007 elections](#). Third-party campaigns, while not able to reach the second round, drew increased attention to the economic issues most pressing to voters. The peaceful vote and emergence of issue-based campaigns suggest voters are increasingly looking to democratic processes to hold the government to account for current economic challenges.

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It Starts at the Top

Zambia held general elections in August 2016. In a contentious election, incumbent President Edgar Lungu, from the Patriotic Front, narrowly defeated Hakainde Hichelema, of the United Party for National Development (UNDP). President Lungu had been in office since January 2015, after he won a special election to replace President Michael Sata, who [died](#) suddenly in October 2014.

On April 1, 2018, Botswana swore in a new president, Mokgweetsi Masisi. Masisi, formerly the vice president, took over for Ian Khama, who [resigned](#) the day before. President Khama's second term of office formally expired on March 31. Masisi will serve as president until the next elections are held sometime in late 2019. Masisi and Khama are both members of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), in power since independence in 1966.



President Mokgweetsi Masisi of Botswana. (Source: By John Chibona—Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=56986725>.)

Democracy Receding in Zambia and Lesotho

Despite its history of free elections and peaceful transfers of power, there are worrying signs of democratic erosion in Zambia. Lungu's administration has been accused of clamping down on political dissent. First, Hichelema was [arrested](#) in April 2017 after a near miss between his motorcade and President Lungu's. He was accused of endangering the president. Treason charges were later tacked on. In what many interpreted as a gesture toward reconciliation, Hichelema was released in August 2017 after the charges were dropped. Second, Chishimba Kambwili, a former ruling party minister and outspoken critic of President Lungu, was [arrested](#) in mid-March on charges of profiting from criminal activity.

The opposition UNDP [initiated](#) impeachment proceedings on March 23, suggesting Zambia's political tumult will continue. The UNDP alleges that President Lungu is guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the constitution. The government called the move "[frivolous](#)." It is expected that the motion will not be considered until at least June. Because impeachment requires two-thirds support of the National Assembly, many [believe](#) impeachment is likely to fail but could cause legitimacy problems for Lungu by sowing disharmony within the ruling party.

While Zambia has experienced a peaceful transfer of power between its main parties, the quality of its contests has degraded over time. Zambia's August 2013 elections were marred by [violence](#), a departure from previous elections. For the 2015 special election and 2016 general elections, the major parties formed "[cadres](#)" to intimidate voters. The 2016 elections were the country's most violent, and the vast majority of constituencies were uncompetitive, with margins of victory in the 50-point range. [Coupled](#) with increasing politicization of ethnicity, Zambia, previously hailed as a democratic success story with instances of party turnover, appears headed down a dangerous path.

Like Zambia, Lesotho has also experienced alternations in power, but the country's politics have increasingly become violent and unpredictable. Lesotho has held three elections since 2012. The most recent snap elections in June 2017 unseated the incumbent prime minister. Tom Thabane was sworn in as prime minister on June 16. Thabane's former wife,

Lipolelo Thabane, was killed two days before his June inauguration. Lesotho's chief of the Army, Khoantle Motsomotso, was [shot](#) dead in September. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) [deployed](#) troops to Lesotho in December in an attempt to help stabilize the situation.

Democracy Continues in Botswana and South Africa

On the other hand, in Botswana, where power passed quietly from former President Khama to President Masisi, there are encouraging signs of continued democratic growth. Although Khama, son of founding president Seretse Khama, was [criticized](#) for his autocratic tendencies during his presidency, there was never any doubt that he would step down when his tenure concluded.

Because the BDP has won every election in Botswana since 1966, its democratic credentials are sometimes called into [question](#). The lack of alternation between parties has led some to conclude that Botswana's democracy is [minimalist](#) or untested. But a closer look at the quality of elections reveals a different picture. Botswana has held free and peaceful elections since 1966.

Botswana's elections do produce a level of accountability that is obscured by an exclusive focus on national-level trends. Elections have become significantly more competitive over time. In 1989, for example, the BDP won almost 65 percent of the vote. In 2014, the BDP registered its lowest vote total to date, receiving 46.5 percent of the total vote. Furthermore, almost half the legislative elections held in 2014 were won by a margin of victory of 10 points or less, and [turnover](#) of legislators has become commonplace. The 2019 elections promise to be the country's most competitive yet. President Masisi will have been in office for just 18 months, diminishing but not removing the electoral perks associated with incumbency. A united opposition could certainly unseat the BDP.

Like the BDP in Botswana, the African National Congress has dominated South African elections since the end of apartheid in 1994, usually receiving between 60 and 70 percent of the vote. In February, however, President Jacob Zuma, under pressure from his party, [resigned](#). Some [interpreted](#) this move as ushering in a new era of South African politics. General elections are next scheduled for 2019.

Conclusion

Counterintuitively, the countries with the least competitive national elections appear to be democratizing, while those with competitive national elections appear to be headed in the opposite direction. These events underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of transfers of political power, which are not always produced by elections, even in democracies. In addition, when analyzing elections, it is necessary to go beyond winners and losers. A closer look at violence and competition at all levels may reveal critical information about a country's future trajectory.

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ANGOLA: PRESIDENT LOURENÇO CONTINUES TO CLEAN HOUSE

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On March 26, 2018, José Filomeno dos Santos, the son of the former Angolan president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, was [charged](#) with fraud allegedly perpetrated during his time overseeing the country's \$5 billion [sovereign wealth fund](#). The fraud scheme was originally reported to amount to \$500 million, but on April 9, the government [asserted](#) that it actually amounted to \$1.5 billion. President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, who succeeded the elder dos Santos in September 2017, sacked José Filomeno dos Santos from his position in January 2018. Lourenço has taken some strong anti-corruption steps, but do his actions equate to a new dawn in Angola? [more...](#)



José Filomeno dos Santos. (Source: "Valter Filipe and José Filomeno dos Santos Indicted," *Maka Angola*, March 28, 2018, <https://www.makaangola.org/2018/03/valter-filipe-and-jose-filomeno-dos-santos-indicted/>.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

WESTERN SAHARA: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT SHOWS SIGNS OF ESCALATION

By Sarah Constantine

In early April, the Moroccan government [accused](#) the separatist Polisario Front of undertaking military construction in a United Nations (UN)-monitored buffer zone dividing Morocco from Western Sahara, a disputed territory. The accusation is one of several factors raising the potential for renewed conflict over the territory. The dispute over Western Sahara, which dates to 1975, has remained stalemated since 1991, when a UN peacekeeping force began monitoring a Moroccan-built wall bifurcating the contested territory. In recent years, Morocco has begun construction on a road to enhance its access to the territory, while also attempting to build diplomatic support for its de facto control of Western Sahara. In recent weeks, however, a major European court ruling and continued separatist activity have shown the limits of Morocco's strategy. [more...](#)



Western Sahara: the Polisario Front controls the area to the east of the berm, while Morocco controls the area to the west. (Source: By Knusser—Own work based primarily on the Digital Chart of the World, with this UN map and commercial atlases (Rand McNally, Google, Encarta, and National Geographic) used as references. CC BY-SA 2.5, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1621025>.)

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Background

Angola is a semi-authoritarian country in southern Africa. It has a [population](#) of 24 million and a GDP of \$95 billion. Oil dominates the economy, [accounting](#) for approximately one-third of GDP and 95 percent of exports. The country is sub-Saharan Africa's second largest [producer](#) of oil, surpassed only by Nigeria. The ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been in power since 1975. The MPLA fought a brutal decades-long civil war against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), currently the main opposition party. The conflict ended in 2002. Angola's post-war economy initially grew at a spectacular pace (topping out at 22.6 percent in 2007), but sharply [contracted](#) in 2014 due to a drop in the price of oil.

Lourenço was named as the MPLA candidate in the August 2017 elections after the elder dos Santos decided against seeking another term. Dos Santos stayed on as head of the MPLA, and Lourenço took office in September 2017 after the MPLA [won](#) 61 percent of the vote (150 out of 220 parliamentary seats). These results, which were contested in court by the opposition, marked a decline in support for the MPLA, which had [won](#) 72 percent of the vote in 2012 (191 seats) and 81 percent in 2008 (175 seats). For the first time, the MPLA [lost](#) its majority in the capital, Luanda, carrying only 48 percent.

Cleaning House

Since taking power, Lourenço has taken steps to crack down on corruption and has shown a striking willingness to take on the economically and politically powerful dos Santos family. As detailed in the January 18, 2018, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, Lourenço's quick actions on this front included replacing the board and editors of state-owned media; firing dos Santos's daughter, Isabel dos Santos (thought to be the wealthiest woman in Africa), from her position as head of Sonangol, the powerful state oil company; letting go of José Filomeno dos Santos; and dismissing a number of security chiefs appointed by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. In March 2018, the government [announced](#) that Isabel dos Santos was being investigated for misappropriation of funds during her tenure at Sonangol. She denies the [charges](#).

Later in March, the Lourenço government announced the charges against José Filomeno dos Santos, which [include](#) "fraud, misappropriation of funds, money laundering and associating with criminals." Valter Filipe da Silva, the former central bank governor, has also been charged. The allegations stem from a \$500 million transfer from the central bank to a bank in London that was frozen by authorities in the United Kingdom. The sum was [returned](#) to Angola earlier this month.

Two Competing Centers of Power

Because former president dos Santos has remained on as head of the MPLA and his family and allies continue to wield powerful positions in Angola's political economy, two centers of power have developed in Angola. Although dos Santos handpicked Lourenço as his successor, Lourenço's actions and targeting of dos Santos's family since taking office have [strained](#) the relationship between the two to the point that they allegedly are no longer on speaking terms. Dos Santos reportedly [warned](#) Lourenço against reforming "too quickly," advice Lourenço appeared to ignore. These tensions came to a head in March as the two leaders tussled over when dos Santos would step aside as head of the MPLA. The party [wants](#) dos Santos to step aside and be replaced by Lourenço as early as June, while dos Santos publicly stated that he should stay on until as late as April 2019.

Isabel dos Santos criticized news media coverage of the intra-party splits, saying it is "fake news" [meant](#) to "create confusion and division at the heart of the MPLA with the intention of destroying it." MPLA officials have attempted to downplay the rivalry as well. Joao Melo, the minister of social communications, [said](#), "Angola is capable of an exemplary transition—right to the end." Lourenço himself also dismissed the tensions, [saying](#), "such things don't happen on our side." Alex Vines, a scholar at Chatham House, [predicts](#) that the relationship between dos Santos and Lourenço will only deteriorate moving forward: "I think the politics will get more intense now . . . And the arrest of the former president's son is obviously not going to help that relationship."

Conclusion

The recent actions against José Filomeno dos Santos are the latest illustration of Lourenço's robust efforts to clean house, tackle corruption, and distance himself from his predecessor, who was in power for 38 years. While Lourenço's actions to date are encouraging, questions remain about whether he is a genuine reformer or is simply consolidating his control during a period of transition and slumping political support for his party. Indeed, as [noted](#) by scholars Justin Pearce, Didier Péclard, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, "The targeting of the Dos Santos circle shows a new president flexing his muscles . . . but hardly means that Lourenço and his supporters, all of whom benefited from Dos Santos' policies, are intent on revolutionizing Angola's institutions and political economy." Some Angolan critics are blunter. Journalist Rafael Marques [asserts](#): "Nothing has changed. Lourenço's economic team are still using the same old formula which has not done any good for those living in Angola."

On a potentially more positive note, MPLA party institutions appear to have grown stronger of late. Pearce, Péclard, and Soares de Oliveira suggest that this newfound institutional strength, which flagged under dos Santos, may [temper](#) any future efforts by Lourenço to start a personalized dynasty of his own: "The influential segments of the MPLA that promoted Lourenço's rise are unlikely to want him to become a new Dos Santos and will instead seek a more collective exercise of power formally centered on the party and informally centered on themselves."

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Western Sahara: the Polisario Front controls the area to the east of the berm, while Morocco controls the area to the west. (Source: By Kmusser—Own work based primarily on the Digital Chart of the World, with this UN map and commercial atlases (Rand McNally, Google, Encarta, and National Geographic) used as references., CC BY-SA 2.5, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1621025>.)

Western Sahara: From Colonial Control to Conflict

The Western Sahara conflict dates to the colonial era. The territory, home to the Sahrawi people, was colonized by Spain in 1884. In 1973, leftist separatists formed the Polisario Front to agitate for independence. Following a [UN call](#) for the decolonization of Western Sahara, Spain agreed to withdraw from the territory in 1975. Morocco co-opted this process by sending 350,000 of its citizens into Western Sahara to claim the territory, an event known as the [Green March](#).

When Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1975, it left the territory under Moroccan and Mauritanian control. In response, the Polisario Front launched a [guerrilla campaign](#) against Morocco and Mauritania. While Mauritania renounced its claim to the territory in 1979, Morocco strengthened its position by building a mined barrier, or berm, to limit movement across the border. Fighting continued until the UN brokered a [cease-fire](#) in 1991, with the goal of holding a future referendum on self-determination. This referendum has yet to be held. UN peacekeepers continue to monitor the berm dividing Polisario-controlled territory from Moroccan-controlled territory.

The forced separation has come at great cost for the Sahrawi people. An estimated [165,000](#) live in refugee camps in Algeria, unable to return home following the 1991 demarcation. Conditions have worsened recently as international support has been diverted to other crises. In 2017, a funding shortage forced the World Food Program to [limit rations](#) in the camps, even though most refugees have few sources of food beyond international aid. With support from Algeria, young refugees frustrated by life in the camps are [increasingly militant](#) in agitating for independence from Morocco.

Morocco Pushes Its Advantage to Claim De Facto Control

Despite the cease-fire, Morocco has undertaken steps to advance its control of the contested territory. In 2016, Morocco began [construction](#) of a road near the Mauritanian border and deployed soldiers with the construction crew. Morocco already benefits from exports of [phosphate](#) on the Moroccan side of the border. Road construction could further the reach of Morocco's trade. The Polisario front objected strongly, and Polisario and Moroccan forces engaged in a [standoff](#) along the border that was only resolved following an appeal from UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres in February 2017.

Tensions rose again in early April 2018, when Morocco claimed the Polisario Front was undertaking military construction in towns close to the UN-monitored buffer zone. On April 4, Morocco's [foreign minister](#) warned that Morocco would undertake military action if the UN did not stop the construction.

Morocco Turns to Diplomacy

The international community has been reluctant to overtly challenge Morocco's claims to Western Sahara in part because Morocco has developed strong international ties on critical issues. Morocco has [partnered](#) with the United States and Europe on counterterrorism and signed an agreement with the European Union (EU) on [migration](#). The EU is also Morocco's [largest](#) trading partner.

Recently, Morocco has sought to increase its diplomatic outreach in sub-Saharan Africa. In January 2017, Morocco [joined](#) the African Union (AU), reversing its long-standing refusal to join in protest of Western Sahara's membership in the AU. The decision demonstrated Morocco's increased emphasis on diplomacy to press its position on Western Sahara. Explaining the AU decision, Morocco's deputy foreign minister [said](#) that Morocco "will redouble its efforts so the small minority of countries, particularly African, which recognize [the Western Saharan government] change their positions."

Algeria, EU Relationship Complicated by Western Sahara

Morocco's turn toward greater diplomatic engagement does have limits. It is perennially challenged by Algerian [support](#) for the Polisario Front, a position stemming from Algeria's historical competition with Morocco. Algeria has bolstered the Polisario's hardline positions, including rejecting a 2007 Moroccan proposal to allow for Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The [proposal](#), which was the largest concession Morocco has ever offered, was supported by the United States, France, and Spain, but ultimately failed due to Algeria's and the Polisario Front's rejection.

Morocco has also faced challenges in its relationship with the EU. In February 2018, the [European Court of Justice](#) ruled that a fisheries agreement between the EU and Morocco could not be applied to fish caught in Western Sahara's territorial waters. While the fisheries agreement is relatively small, the decision represents a larger concern for Morocco's standing in Europe and its ability to profit from phosphate and other resources found within Western Saharan territory.

Conclusion

Western Sahara is frequently referred to as the forgotten conflict because so little has changed in the 27 years since the 1991 cease-fire. Although Western Sahara exports much of the world's [phosphate](#), a critical component in fertilizer, both Moroccan-controlled territory and Polisario-controlled territory remain underdeveloped. The international community is reluctant to allow Morocco to claim the territory outright, but there is also little appetite for a referendum that could spark further violence. The status quo will most likely continue, as will the suffering of the displaced Sahrawi population.

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THE GULF CRISIS COMES TO SOMALIA

By Sarah Constantine

Tension between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) came to a head in early April when Somali forces [seized](#) \$9.6 million in cash from a UAE plane in Mogadishu. The incident signals a further escalation of the dispute between the two countries following the June 2017 decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to cut ties with Qatar. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have increasingly pressured Somalia to join their efforts to isolate Qatar, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has maintained its neutrality. The UAE has also independently pursued economic and military ties with Somaliland and Puntland, threatening the SFG's claims to the breakaway regions. The continued crisis adds further stress to Somalia's already-weak government at a time when security challenges remain severe. [more...](#)



Map of Somalia showing Somaliland and Puntland, quasi-independent regions located in the North. (Source: "Somalia," The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.)

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MOROCCO'S COMPLEX WATER SECURITY CHALLENGES

By Richard Pera

The [water crisis](#) in Cape Town, South Africa has called attention to the growing problem of water security in Africa. As surprising as it is that a city of 4 million people could run out of water, [experts point out](#) that other regions are also at risk. For example, the Maghreb (northwest Africa) has exceptionally [vulnerable](#) water resources, and despite years of policy planning, Morocco is projected to become one of the world's most [water-challenged countries by 2040](#). What is water security? What factors account for Morocco's situation, and what are the implications of a water crisis in Morocco? [more...](#)



NASA/Landsat photo of Al Massira Dam Reserve in 2013 (left) and 2017 (right), showing the declining surface area of the reservoir. Images can be viewed dynamically using <https://landlook.usgs.gov/viewer.html>.

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By Sarah Constantine

Tension between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) came to a head in early April when Somali forces [seized](#) \$9.6 million in cash from a UAE plane in Mogadishu. The incident signals a further escalation of the dispute between the two countries following the June 2017 decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to cut ties with Qatar. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have increasingly pressured Somalia to join their efforts to isolate Qatar, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has maintained its neutrality. The UAE has also independently pursued economic and military ties with Somaliland and Puntland, threatening the SFG's claims to the breakaway regions. The continued crisis adds further stress to Somalia's already-weak government at a time when security challenges remain severe.

Somalia Unwillingly Drawn into the Gulf Imbroglio

Somalia has historically maintained close ties to Arab countries. Somalia is a member of the Arab League, and its physical proximity to the Arabian peninsula has ensured a robust [economic exchange](#). In addition, Somalia has received significant humanitarian assistance and budgetary support from [Qatar](#), the [UAE](#), and [Saudi Arabia](#). Somalia has shown itself receptive to political demands, [granting](#) Saudi Arabia use of its airspace and territorial waters for strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen in 2015, and [cutting diplomatic ties](#) with Iran at Saudi Arabia's behest in 2016.

Somalia has also maintained strong ties to Turkey, which has historically provided significant humanitarian and financial [support](#) to Somalia, and the country maintains a [military base](#) in Mogadishu. Turkish President Recep Erdogan has [visited Somalia](#) three times since 2011, making a strong symbolic statement about Turkey's support for the Somali government.

Given the breadth of Somalia's ties to the region, the [June 2017](#) decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain to cut ties with Qatar presented the SFG with a dilemma. Despite Saudi and UAE appeals for all Horn of Africa countries to cut ties with Qatar, Somalia maintained an official position of [neutrality](#) in the dispute. The decision was seen as de facto support for Qatar and its ally Turkey, particularly as Somalia allowed Qatar to use its [air space](#) in the days following the outbreak of the crisis.

Disputes Strengthen Somalia's Federated States

As the ongoing dispute has caused the relationship between Somalia and the UAE to deteriorate, tensions have mounted over UAE investments in Somaliland, which claims independence from Somalia, and Puntland, a quasi-independent region under Somalia's federal government.

The UAE is seeking to expand its economic holdings and military access along the Gulf of Aden. In 2016, the Emirati company [DP World](#) signed a \$442 million deal to upgrade Somaliland's Berbera port, and in March 2018 [Ethiopia](#) signed a deal with DP World and the Somaliland government for a 19-percent stake in the port. Separately, the Somaliland government also granted the UAE a [25-year concession](#) to build a military base in Berbera. In Puntland, the Dubai-owned company P&O Ports signed a deal with the Puntland government in April 2017 to [develop a seaport](#) in Bosaso.



Map of Somalia showing Somaliland and Puntland, quasi-independent regions located in the North. (Source: "Somalia," The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.)

These investments have increased pressure on the fragile balance of power between the SFG and Somalia's federated states. The SFG claims that the states cannot sign deals without approval from the central government, and in [March 2018](#), Somalia's parliament passed a law banning DP World from investing in Somalia. The law is symbolic, because the SFG has no means to enforce it. In reality, the UAE investments will strengthen Somaliland and Puntland economically and politically, increasing their ability to resist SFG oversight. This creates a significant challenge for the SFG in its continual efforts to maintain the adherence of Somalia's six states to the central government.

Gulf Crisis Emphasizes SFG Weakness

The prospect of increased foreign intervention in Somaliland and Puntland is only one sign of the SFG's fragility. Somalia's relationships with Gulf countries have raised uncomfortable questions about corruption and infighting within the SFG. In the run-up to the 2016 election, Turkey, Sudan, the UAE, and Qatar [reportedly](#) poured millions of dollars into parliamentary and presidential campaigns to ensure the election of politicians friendly to their interests. Critics of Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed [claim](#) his insistence on neutrality in the Gulf crisis is due to his financial reliance on Qatar.

Infighting within the SFG reached a crisis point in April 2018, when a dispute between President Mohamed and the Speaker of Parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, nearly [devolved](#) into a fight between their respective armed guards. While Jawari ultimately [resigned](#) on April 9, the SFG's gridlock is a distraction from the immediate security challenges facing Somalia.

In fact, the worsening relationship with the UAE has drawn attention to the Somali National Army's (SNA) lack of professionalism. Following a UAE [announcement](#) that it would withdraw security assistance from Somalia, two [rival SNA units](#) engaged in a gunfight over control of an abandoned UAE training facility. UAE-provided weapons from the facility were later found [on sale](#) at a black market in Mogadishu.

Conclusion


The Gulf crisis has challenged Somalia by highlighting how unprepared the SFG is to take on the basic tasks of governing. While UAE investments in Somaliland and Puntland make negotiations over the status of Somalia's federated states increasingly difficult, the security situation within SFG-controlled areas seems to be deteriorating. On [October 14, 2017](#), Mogadishu experienced its most destructive terrorist attack to date when al Shabaab detonated two truck bombs, killing an estimated 500 people. The SFG's ability to build a responsive national government appears increasingly distant.

Sarah Constantine is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

MOROCCO'S COMPLEX WATER SECURITY CHALLENGES

By Richard Pera

The [water crisis](#) in Cape Town, South Africa has called attention to the growing problem of water security in Africa. As surprising as it is that a city of 4 million people could run out of water, [experts point out](#) that other regions are also at risk. For example, the Maghreb (northwest Africa) has exceptionally [vulnerable](#) water resources, and despite years of policy planning, Morocco is projected to become one of the world's most [water-challenged countries by 2040](#). What is water security? What factors account for Morocco's situation, and what are the implications of a water crisis in Morocco?



NASA/Landsat photo of Al Massira Dam Reserve in 2013 (left) and 2017 (right), showing the declining surface area of the reservoir. Images can be viewed dynamically using <https://landlook.usgs.gov/viewer.html>.

What is Water Security?

The United Nations [defines](#) water security as:

the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.

This definition establishes a correlation between water security and human security and links human well-being and economic development. Good governance, and accountability, and climate change all have major effects on water security.

Morocco's Water Challenges

Despite its arid climate, Morocco possesses surface water from rivers, lakes, and reservoirs and from aquifers beneath Earth's surface. Over time, however, these sources have [diminished](#). Since 1960, annual per capita water availability has decreased from 3,500 cubic meters (m³) per person to 750 m³. Hydrologists assess the "[population-water equation](#)" as follows: when supply falls below 1,000 m³ per person, the population faces "water scarcity;" and when it falls below 500 m³, it faces "absolute water scarcity." [By 2022](#), water availability in Morocco is projected to fall to below 500 m³ per person.

Several factors account for Morocco's current and future water problems:

- Climate Change. The UN has labeled Morocco "[very vulnerable](#)" to climate change. Average temperatures are projected to rise 1–1.5 degrees Celsius by 2050, and annual precipitation to drop 10–20 percent. The rain that does fall may accelerate early runoff of snowpack reserves in the Atlas Mountains, decreasing water renewal. Sea levels are expected to rise, threatening to pollute coastal aquifers. Dry spells and heat waves may intensify, and erratic weather patterns may result in both drought and deluge. The 2016 drought, the [worst in 30 years](#), reduced crop

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yields and GDP. Some are pointing to [dramatic images](#) of al Massira, Morocco's second largest reservoir, as evidence of climate change, drought, and unsustainable development. The reservoir has shrunk by 60 percent in the past three years and is at its lowest level in a decade (see illustration).

- Agriculture. [Agricultural production](#) accounts for 15 percent of GDP, 40 percent of employment, and 10 percent of exports. Many Moroccan crops are water-intensive, and [90 percent](#) of all water usage is for irrigation. For example, Morocco is the world's [seventh largest exporter](#) of watermelons, the farming of which requires large amounts of water. In addition, Morocco is the [world's largest producer](#) of "cannabis resin" (hashish), an illegal crop that requires particularly large quantities of [water](#).
- Mining. Mining [accounts for](#) 10 percent of GDP. Morocco (including the Western Sahara) [possesses](#) nearly 75 percent of the world's phosphorus reserves and is one of the top exporters of phosphate rock, essential to production of fertilizer. Moroccan phosphate exports are so important that [some say](#) that the world's food supply depends on Morocco. Unfortunately, phosphate mining is very [water-intensive](#). Making matters worse, groundwater quality can be [degraded](#) by phosphate mining.
- Tourism. Tourism accounts for [6.6 percent](#) of GDP. It, too, is water-intensive, especially the manicured golf courses that have been built on the Atlantic coast of the "Kingdom of Golf" to appeal to wealthy Western travelers.
- Population. [Demography](#) is a key factor in water security. Morocco's population in 2018 is 36 million, of which 60 percent live in urban areas. In 1995, the population was 27 million, of which 51 percent were urban dwellers. In 2050, the population is projected to be 46 million, of which 74 percent will be urban. The [World Bank projects](#) that urban areas will experience a sharp decline in water resource availability.

Government Water Policies

[United Nations](#), [World Bank](#), and [World Economic Forum](#) literature suggests that international institutions respect Morocco's efforts to deal with its water challenges. In fact, Morocco is an international leader in attempting to deal with water security issues, having hosted the UN Climate Change Convention (known as COP22) in Marrakech in 2016, which included a "[Water for Africa](#)" initiative. The government's "[Water Law 36-15](#)" of November 2015 recognizes Morocco's water challenges, improves governance, protects water resources by strengthening [water police](#) and levying fines, establishes an institutional framework for disaster protection, and encourages development of unconventional resources, including desalinization of seawater. Morocco devotes 9 percent of its budget to [climate change adaptation](#) and climate resilience, and this figure is expected to rise. Recognizing the formidable challenge of achieving the objectives of the "[National Water Plan](#)," in October 2017, the new Prime Minister, Saad El Othmani, [pushed back](#) the government's target year to achieve water security from 2030 to 2050.

Implications for the Future

Lack of water security endangers Morocco's ability to maintain its impressive pace of economic development. The challenge is especially great for water-intensive industries like mining, agriculture, and hydropower, whose outputs could be cut. Lack of water could hurt tourism as well: restrictions on swimming pools and golf courses likely would reduce the attractiveness of Morocco to tourists.

Endemic water scarcity could threaten societal stability. Residents of [Zagora](#), a rural town of 25,000 in east-central Morocco, had no running water for three months last summer. [In response](#), some protested, and eight were jailed for

insulting government officials. The government subsequently fixed the problem, but residents say the water is not potable, forcing women to walk longer distances, and to pay, for clean water. More protests could occur if more people lose access to clean water.

If water scarcity makes life too difficult, some Moroccans might choose to migrate—as hundreds of thousands of West Africans have already done—to Europe. Morocco is already a “[key migration transit country](#),” as every year thousands of West Africans seek to reach the [Spanish enclaves](#) of Ceuta and Melilla, which form the European Union’s only land border with Africa

The Moroccan government deserves credit for establishing a funded plan for water security. It remains to be seen if it will work and if it will work in time.

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IS THE DEATH OF AFONSO DHLAKAMA A THREAT TO PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Long-time Mozambican opposition leader Afonso Dhlakama [died](#) unexpectedly of kidney failure on May 3, 2018, at the age of 65. Dhlakama was the head of RENAMO [Mozambican National Resistance Movement in Portuguese], a former military group turned opposition political party. Although Mozambique's civil war officially ended in 1992, and multiparty elections were held in 1994 as part of the peace process, tensions between RENAMO and the government have lingered for more than 25 years. In 2013, the conflict was [reignited](#), and violence has broken out sporadically since. After several fits and starts, the government and RENAMO signed a truce in late 2016 meant to pave the way for further dialogue. By some reports, before his death Dhlakama and President Felipe Nyusi were [close](#) to an agreement. What are the implications of Dhlakama's death for lasting peace in Mozambique? [more...](#)



Interim RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade gestures during the state funeral of Mozambique's opposition leader, Afonso Dhlakama, in Beira, on Wednesday, May, 9, 2018. Dhlakama, who led a rebel group during the devastating civil war that ended in 1992, died on May 3. He was 65. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

AMID PROTESTS, FORMER PRESIDENT BANDA RETURNS TO MALAWI

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On April 27, 2018, thousands in Malawi [protested](#) against the government in several major cities, calling for an end to corruption as well as improved governance and services. The next day, Joyce Banda, president of Malawi from 2012 to 2014, [returned](#) to the country after a four-year absence. Banda, of the People's Party (PP), left Malawi after losing to current president Peter Mutharika of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2014 elections. Although she denies any wrongdoing, Banda faces a standing arrest warrant for her alleged role in a high-level corruption scandal during her time in office, referred to locally as "Cashgate." What does Banda's return mean for Malawi's political landscape ahead of elections scheduled for May next year? [more...](#)



Joyce Banda, former President of Malawi. (Source: Julian Martin, "An Interview with Joyce Banda, thepolitic.org, August 6, 2017, <http://thepolitic.org/an-interview-with-joyce-banda-former-president-of-malawi/>.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Civil War and Its Aftermath

The Mozambican civil war, which lasted from 1977 to 1992, is believed to have [caused](#) the deaths of around 1 million people. The rebel group RENAMO was [supported](#) by various outside groups, including white nationalist governments in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, as well as by Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi. The governing FRELIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique], its political origins rooted in Marxism, was initially aligned with the Soviet Union. FRELIMO later enjoyed support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

After the signing of the Rome General Peace Agreement in 1992, UN peacekeeping forces were deployed during a two-year transitional period. Elections were held in 1994, and FRELIMO head Joaquim Chissano won the presidency, defeating Dhlakama 53 percent to 34 percent. FRELIMO has won every parliamentary and presidential election held, but its support has waxed and waned over time. In recent years, RENAMO had enjoyed a [resurgence](#) in popularity due to allegations of corruption levied against the state and a widely shared belief that Mozambique's post-war development has disproportionately benefited the country's elites. In the 2014 elections, FRELIMO presidential candidate Nyusi received just 57 percent of the vote. This figure was as high as 75 percent when former president Armando Guebuza won re-election in 2009. RENAMO also received its largest share of parliamentary seats in 2014 (89 out of 250 seats).

Life of a Rebel Leader

Dhlakama was a controversial figure. After former leader Andre Matsangaissa was killed in 1979, Dhlakama took over control of the rebel group. Under his leadership, RENAMO was [known](#) for its brutal tactics and use of child soldiers. But he was also a charismatic figure loved by his supporters.

Upon the signing of the peace treaty in 1992, Dhlakama remained the head of RENAMO, which converted to a political party. He ran for president five times, losing to the FRELIMO candidate each time. In the lead-up to the 2014 elections, relations between RENAMO and the government disintegrated, resulting in sporadic fighting. In 2013, RENAMO announced it was abandoning the peace accords. After two assassination attempts in 2015, Dhlakama relocated to one of RENAMO's rural bases near the Gorongosa mountain in the north. Intermittent [clashes](#) between RENAMO's armed faction

and the military continued until a truce was announced in 2016; a [ceasefire](#) was formalized in 2017. President Nyusi, who defeated Dhlakama in the 2015 election, [met](#) with Dhlakama at his base in Gorongosa in August 2017. The two were believed to be close to an [agreement](#) before Dhlakama's death.

Death of a Former Rebel Leader

President Nyusi confirmed Dhlakama's death on national television in a statement to the country, calling Dhlakama's death a "bad time" for Mozambique. President Nyusi also expressed [regret](#) at not being able to help save Dhlakama. An official state funeral took place on May 9, 2018, with the president in attendance.

As the head of RENAMO, Dhlakama exerted significant personal control over his party. He would [reportedly](#) call party members on the floor of parliament with instructions on how to vote. Emblematic of his intense management of party affairs and tendency to remove challengers early, Dhlakama had no successor in the party.

After Dhlakama's death, RENAMO [announced](#) General Ossufo Momade, head of the military wing of the party, as interim party leader. Momade is a current member of parliament and was RENAMO secretary general from 2007 to 2012. As one of his first acts, Momade threatened a return to civil war if the government did not immediately accept and implement the agreement that Dhlakama and Nyusi had been negotiating. Drafts of the [agreement](#) included a decentralization provision, in which previously appointed governorships would be transferred, until elections are held, to RENAMO in provinces where RENAMO enjoys majority support, and a demobilization provision, in which RENAMO soldiers would be integrated into the Mozambican armed forces.

Conclusion

The takeover by the military wing of the party has some observers [concerned](#) about the threat of significant violence returning to Mozambique. But with Dhlakama gone and no clear successor to take control of the party in the long term, this could also pose an opportunity for the state to seize momentum and conclude the peace agreement.

A peace agreement could be mutually beneficial to both parties. President Nyusi is on [record](#) as wanting to continue peace talks. As the first president of Mozambique with no civil war credentials, his standing within FRELIMO has been [tenuous](#) at times as he [struggled](#) to wrest control of the party from former president Armando Guebuza. A peace agreement could increase his popularity and help cement his standing within the party before the next elections, scheduled for October 2019. RENAMO is in a position to secure significant concessions from the government if it can promise quick resolution and sign an agreement. Control over several gubernatorial positions (at least [three](#) out of Mozambique's 10 provinces enjoy majority RENAMO support) and senior leadership positions within the armed forces could also improve morale within RENAMO along with the party's electoral fortunes in 2019.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Joyce Banda, former President of Malawi. (Source: Julian Martin, "An Interview with Joyce Banda, thepolitic.org, August 6, 2017, <http://thepolitic.org/an-interview-with-joyce-banda-former-president-of-malawi/>.)

Background

Malawi is a [low-income](#) landlocked country of 18 million located in southern Africa. In 2016 it had a GDP of \$5 billion, with a growth rate of 4 percent. Bingu wa Mutharika, the brother of the current president, won elections in 2004 and 2009 but became increasingly autocratic in his second term. [Twenty](#) people died in anti-government demonstrations in 2011, leading donors to cut funding to the aid-dependent country. Banda, then serving as vice president, assumed the presidency in 2012 after Bingu wa Mutharika died in office. Peter Mutharika, then foreign minister, attempted to thwart Banda's succession to the presidency, but failed after the military [sided](#) with Banda and upheld the constitution. Peter Mutharika was [charged](#) with treason for these actions.

After a brief moment of domestic and international popularity, Banda, [tainted](#) by the multimillion-dollar Cashgate scandal, lost the 2014 poll after a tense election period [marked](#) by protests and allegations of fraud. Cashgate, the country's largest corruption scandal ever, consisted of a scheme to siphon government funds through fraudulent payments to the tune of an estimated \$250 million. Banda left Malawi after she lost the poll by a considerable margin to Peter Mutharika. The charges against Peter Mutharika were [dropped](#) when he won the presidency.

Protestors' Grievances

Civil society groups organized the recent protests, but were [joined](#) by opposition politicians, including Lazarus Chakwera, leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The demonstrations were sparked by allegations of government corruption, specifically a \$5.5 million disbursement to 86 different constituencies that a recent budget review revealed had not been properly approved by parliament. Protestors [petitioned](#) the presidency to reverse the payments and sack the minister of finance, Goodall Gondwe. Demonstrators also [decried](#) the lack of basic services, citing frequent electricity blackouts, as well as high unemployment. They also demanded that Malawi move to a simple majority electoral system.

After initially criticizing the demonstrations, the government, through spokesperson Nicolas Dausi, [embraced](#) the protests: "As government we would like to commend Malawians for the peaceful demonstrations, that's a way to go and appreciate." Dausi also praised the police for their professionalism.

Banda's Return

Banda defiantly returned to Malawi on April 28 after an extended self-imposed exile, saying that she does not fear being arrested. Andekuche Chanthuya, Banda's spokesperson, said that Banda "is not afraid or intimidated" and that the

Anti-Corruption Bureau has said that she “is not linked to any cashgate, whether as a beneficiary or as a masterminder [sic].” The director general of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Reyneck Matemba, [denied](#) these claims: “We never said we have cleared the former president.” While Banda has not said so explicitly, the timing of her return has spurred [speculation](#) that she may run for president again in 2019. Banda has said that she will not comment on her political ambitions until she consults widely with her party, while her party has [said](#) that she returned to Malawi to help the party rebuild before the 2019 elections.

Conclusion

Banda has not yet been arrested, which suggests that she may have come to some sort of [arrangement](#) with President Peter Mutharika. If Banda decides to jump back into the political fray, this could unravel any such armistice and heighten political tensions in the run-up to elections in 2019. Greg Mills, of the Brenthurst Foundation, who also advised Banda’s Presidential Advisory Committee on the Economy, [asserts](#): “If she runs or signals her intention to do so, the gloves will come off.”

Given her Cashgate baggage and her long absence from the country, Banda appears to face an upward climb to become a competitive candidate, despite recent protests against the government. Henry Chingaipe, a political analyst, [noted the difficulties she faces](#): “her party is in tatters,” and her “decision to leave the country for so long eroded trust in her leadership.” Although Peter Mutharika has now praised the demonstrations, the persistent issues of corruption and a lack of effective service delivery are [not easily fixed](#). Protests may continue, with an attendant risk of low-level political violence.


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EBOLA RETURNS TO AFRICA

By Timothy D. Mitchell

On May 8, 2018, when two cases of [Ebola](#) virus disease were confirmed in the northwestern province of Bikoro, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) officially declared an outbreak of Ebola. By May 14, 39 cases had been confirmed, and [19 people](#) had been declared dead from the disease. Three of the confirmed cases were health-care workers. In a troubling development, according to a May 17 report an Ebola case was identified in [Mbandaka](#), a city of roughly 1 million people some 150 kilometers from Bikoro. [more...](#)

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Map showing location of initial Ebola outbreak in Bikoro province, as well as languages spoken by residents. (Source: Adapted from Translators without Borders, "Crisis Language Map: Democratic Republic of Congo – Ebola Outbreak," May 8, 2018, <https://tinyurl.com/ydbrqmn9>.)

TUNISIA'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND DECENTRALIZATION

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

On May 6, 2018, Tunisians voted in the country's first free municipal elections since the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his government in the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Independent candidates [won the most votes](#), with 32.9 percent, followed by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda with 29.7 percent and its secularist rival party, Nidaa Tounes, with 22.2 percent. Since the independent candidates are not aligned and have not announced any intention to form a coalition, Ennahda has claimed victory and has [vowed](#) to work with its secular partners as it has done before. The significance of this election was not this specific electoral outcome, however. Rather, it represents a practical application of the principles contained in the 2014 constitution and is an important milestone in Tunisia's young democracy. [more...](#)



A Tunisian policeman dressed in civilian clothing, right, accompanied by his daughter, casts his vote during municipal elections at a polling station for the police and military in Tunis, on Sunday, April 29, 2018. This is the first time in Tunisian history that the military and police participated in the voting for municipal elections, which were also the first to be held in the country since the 2011 revolution. (Source: AP Photo/Hassene Dridi.)

Dr. Ashley N. Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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History of Ebola

Named after the river in the DRC where the disease was first discovered in 1976, Ebola is a rare and deadly animal-borne disease found in Africa. Scientists are still unsure of Ebola's origins, but believe that it is carried by bats and transferred to primates and likely duikers (small antelopes) in the African forest. This latest Ebola outbreak is the ninth in the DRC since 1976, and the second in the past 10 months. It is also the second outbreak of Ebola on the continent since the March 2014 outbreak in West Africa, which lasted 21 months and took the lives of more than 11,000 people in six different countries. The fatality rate from Ebola is roughly 50 percent. Although many factors contribute to the likelihood of a victim's survival, evidence suggests that early and aggressive treatment is important.

How It Spreads from Person to Person


The Ebola virus is introduced into the human population through direct contact (via an open wound or mucous membranes) with blood or other fluids from animals, most likely fruit bats and primates found sick or dead in the forest. (Ebola is not spread from eating so-called bush meat, but rather from hunting, cleaning, and preparing game.) Depending on the strain of the virus, the incubation period in an infected person can range from 2 to 21 days before symptoms appear.

Ebola symptoms include severe fever, vomiting, and diarrhea. These symptoms are also associated with malaria and other more common tropical diseases, making the initial diagnosis difficult. In theory, it should be relatively easy to stop the spread of Ebola because it can only be spread through direct contact with the body fluids of a symptomatic victim, and once symptomatic, a victim is soon incapacitated and easily identified. Stopping the outbreak is straightforward: the sick need to be separated from the healthy, and those caring for the sick need to be properly equipped. As a result, with the exception of the 2014 outbreak in West Africa, all previous Ebola outbreaks have been contained.

How Ebola Spreads Outside of Remote Villages

What distinguished the [2014 outbreak](#) from previous outbreaks was that the disease was not contained in the remote village where it started. Several reasons are often cited to explain its spread, including poor infrastructure (lack of adequate medical facilities), lack of trust in national governments, and traditional West African burial practices that involved the washing and touching of victims. While these factors are valid, with the exception of the burial practices, they also applied to previous Ebola outbreaks in Africa. So what was different in West Africa in 2014? Ironically, the relatively good infrastructure where the outbreak occurred was a contributing factor. The 2014 outbreak took place in an isolated village in western Guinea (in the province of Gueckedou) that was relatively close to the borders of both Sierra Leone and Liberia and was connected to the capitals of those countries by relatively good roads.

In remote African villages, health care is often provided by either ill-prepared health-care workers or family members. Ebola is nicknamed the "[caretakers](#)" disease, because nurses, doctors, and family members acting in that role are the most



vulnerable to contracting the disease. In the 2014 outbreak, it became common for individuals who suspected they were infected to travel in search of better health care before becoming symptomatic. They did so because they recognized that health-care workers were reluctant to treat Ebola patients, they wished to avoid infecting family members, and they realized that quick and aggressive treatment increased the likelihood of survival. This pattern spread the disease into large urban areas and neighboring countries and, in one instance, to an Ebola victim who traveled to the United States.

Will Ebola Spread Outside of the DRC Now?

The question now is whether this new outbreak has the potential to spread outside the DRC. Criticized in 2014 for its slow initial response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, World Health Organization (WHO) officials have been quick to respond. The WHO has already released \$2.6 million from its reserve fund to deploy experts to the DRC and to provide supplies and equipment to assist in the response. Earlier this week WHO's [Director General](#) visited the DRC, where he met with President Kabila and the Minister of Health before flying to Bikoro to see firsthand the response on the ground. On May 15 it was announced that the DRC had approved the use of an [experimental Ebola vaccine](#), which could be used as early as the following week.

WHO officials have described the affected area as “[one of the most difficult terrains on earth](#),” a factor that would limit the likelihood that Ebola would move outside the local area; the previous eight Ebola outbreaks in the DRC occurred in similar terrain, and in each instance the disease did not spread outside the country.

This time, WHO officials seem to be hedging their bets. The WHO recently put [10 countries](#) on “high alert,” including Congo-Brazzaville and the Central African Republic. Both countries share an easily navigable river border with the Bikoro province of northwestern DRC. Neighboring countries, including [Uganda](#) and Kenya, have responded by establishing border checkpoints in an attempt to prevent symptomatic persons from transiting into their territory.

With the news that Ebola has been confirmed in Mbandaka, the current outbreak has moved into a new and more difficult phase. Ebola has again made its way into a large urban area, which makes containment more difficult, but not impossible. In 2014 when Ebola traveled from Liberia to Lagos, Nigeria, resulting in 19 confirmed Ebola cases, swift implementation of [public health measures](#) were sufficient to prevent a major outbreak.

A Glimpse into the Future

Despite the news that Ebola has again spread into a large urban area, due to the remoteness of the outbreak and the quick response by both WHO and the DRC's Ministry of Health, this most recent outbreak of Ebola seems likely to be contained. While the disease may continue to spread within DRC and possibly to a neighboring country, it still seems likely to resemble the previous isolated outbreaks of Ebola more than the regional outbreak that occurred in West Africa in 2014. It would be a mistake, however, to consider the 2014 outbreak an outlier. As African populations continue to increase and road infrastructures continue to improve, large outbreaks such as the 2014 could occur more frequently. To limit the severity of future outbreaks, international organizations and African countries should continue to improve disease prevention and identification, emergency preparedness, and pandemic response procedures.

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TUNISIA'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND DECENTRALIZATION

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

On May 6, 2018, Tunisians voted in the country's first free municipal elections since the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his government in the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Independent candidates [won the most votes](#), with 32.9 percent, followed by the moderate Islamist party Ennahda with 29.7 percent and its secularist rival party, Nidaa Tounes, with 22.2 percent. Since the independent candidates are not aligned and have not announced any intention to form a coalition, Ennahda has claimed victory and has [vowed](#) to work with its secular partners as it has done before. The significance of this election was not this specific electoral outcome, however. Rather, it represents a practical application of the principles contained in the 2014 constitution and is an important milestone in Tunisia's young democracy.



A Tunisian policeman dressed in civilian clothing, right, accompanied by his daughter, casts his vote during municipal elections at a polling station for the police and military in Tunis, on Sunday, April 29, 2018. This is the first time in Tunisian history that the military and police participated in the voting for municipal elections, which were also the first to be held in the country since the 2011 revolution. (Source: AP Photo/Hassene Dridi.)

A Recent History of Productive Alliances

Under Ben Ali's regime, religious parties were banned from participating in Tunisian politics. Following the 2011 revolution, religious parties quickly emerged, the most popular one being the Ennahda party. Ennahda won a plurality of the votes in the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, Tunisia's first free elections since independence in 1956. Ennahda quickly formed an alliance known as the Troika with two secular parties, Ettakatol and the Congress for the Republic (CPR). This coalition ruled until the assassinations of two secular politicians, allegedly by supporters of Ennahda, resulting in a [political crisis](#) in 2013. Ennahda withdrew peacefully from the coalition but first negotiated a new constitution that allowed for religion to assume a greater role than before while excluding references to Sharia law. It was passed on February 10, 2014. Later that year, the secularist party Nidaa Tounes won a plurality in Tunisia's first free parliamentary elections, with [38 percent](#) of the vote, followed closely by Ennahda.

Tunisia's recent municipal elections finally occurred after having been postponed four times. The delay caused significant [concern](#) among the population over the government's commitment to consolidating its democracy. The lag in municipal representation also undermined the government's ability to deliver the most basic public services, which had been disrupted as a result of the revolution and the subsequent political uncertainty. These municipal elections represent several "firsts" that qualify them as an important milestone for Tunisia's fledgling democracy and its stated desire to decentralize power, decision-making, and allocation of resources across the country.

Decentralization

Under the Ben Ali regime, decision-making was highly centralized in the capital Tunis. This manifested itself in political and economic disparities, with Tunisia's central government receiving the [vast majority of the national budget](#) while the municipalities received significantly less. The budget also had an unequal economic impact on the population, since the coastal areas near the capital received more resources at the expense of the interior region. [Article 14](#) of Tunisia's 2014 constitution sought to correct this imbalance by mandating a decentralization program to transfer authority to local governments, including budgets to meet the needs of their citizens. In 2017 a [law on local elections](#), which included "assurances for the participation of women, youth, and disabled individuals in the electoral lists," was adopted, but it was not until a few days before the municipal elections that Parliament adopted a [Local Government Code](#) that provided a legal framework for decentralization. The code also

defines [responsibilities](#) for Tunisia's municipalities, including the creation and management of public transportation, schools, and hospitals, with the long-term goal of financial independence. The municipal elections were therefore an encouraging sign that the principles enshrined in legislation are being applied in the Tunisian electoral system.

Inclusivity

Another defining feature of Tunisia's 2014 constitution is its level of inclusivity. According to some [analysts](#), it represents a breakthrough for women's rights, since it promotes representational parity for men and women in all elected assemblies by requiring an equal number of candidates of both genders be placed on party lists. Furthermore, it guarantees the representation of [youth](#) in local authority councils, an important consideration for a country whose [high unemployment](#) coupled with its [youth bulge](#) represents a significant threat to its stability. The latest municipal elections demonstrated that the election authorities are willing to enforce these new rules, evidenced by their [rejecting](#) several candidate lists for failing to respect the gender-parity principle.

In [2017](#), Tunisia's parliament approved an amendment to the electoral law of 2014 to allow military personnel and security forces the right to vote in municipal and regional (but not national) elections. Members of the Tunisian armed forces had not been permitted to vote since 1956; the same had been true for the police and state security since the 1980s. Although military turnout was only [12 percent](#), and there was some opposition to the participation of the army in elections out of fear of jeopardizing the neutrality of the armed forces, this represents a shift in the government's concept of its democracy.

Economic Woes

Pressure from Tunisia's foreign lenders to pursue unpopular austerity measures have contributed to a dire economic situation that has resulted in protests and violent riots. In January 2018 a [new budget](#) was implemented that applied the economic policies endorsed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western sponsors. It raised taxes on gasoline, phone cards, internet usage, hotel rooms, and produce in an attempt to lower the budget deficit. Tunisia adopted free-trade policies that disadvantaged Tunisian producers and allowed the value of Tunisia's currency to fall, further exacerbating grievances related to the high cost of living, despite assurances that the policy would jump-start Tunisian industry. Protests ensued and scores were [arrested](#). Given that Tunisia owed its lenders (the European Union and IMF) \$31 billion, political leaders claimed they had no choice but to implement the policies being recommended by those institutions.

Conclusion

The latest municipal elections represent a practical application of the constitution's central tenets of democratic rule and decentralized power, but Tunisia's democracy is still young and fragile. Many of the same [structural deficiencies](#) that led to the Jasmine Revolution in the first place are present in Tunisia today—in particular, inflation, corruption, and high unemployment.

It is therefore appropriate to be cautiously optimistic when considering Tunisia's democratic journey thus far. From 2011 to 2014, there were two peaceful transfers of power, adoption of a new constitution, installation of the country's first democratically elected president, and significant strides toward decentralization of political authority throughout the country. There is also a long history of [strategic decision-making](#) by Tunisia's previous leaders that has positioned the country for success, unlike many of its Arab neighbors. Most notably, civil society has been allowed to flourish in an environment that embraces a moderate level of religious influence in society and politics while limiting its role in the education system. The emancipation of women has given a voice to a portion of the population with progressive ideas and pursuits. These conditions and its recent history of relatively peaceful elections suggest Tunisia is on its way to consolidating its democratic gains. Tunisia's democracy seems relatively strong, but persistent economic hardship will test the ability of political parties to meet the high expectations of the population following the 2011 revolution.

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FARMER-HERDER VIOLENCE: A CONTINENT-WIDE CONCERN

By Sarah Constantine

Violent conflict between farmers and nomadic cattle herders is an increasing concern across sub-Saharan Africa. While the trend in rising violence began 30 years ago, recent events in Nigeria and Kenya have drawn attention to the urgency of the situation. In [2016](#), more people were reportedly killed by conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria than by the terrorist organization Boko Haram. In [2017](#), the Kenyan military was forced to deploy internally to the northern region of Laikipia to stop a series of violent pastoralist raids on landowners. [more...](#)



Osaka Sansui, a farmer living in the Ardor Siding community in central Nasarawa state, speaks at a USAID-conducted peace dialogue, one of dozens held in Nigeria to promote understanding and reduce bias between farmers and herders. (Source: USAID/The Search for Common Ground, July/August 2017, <https://tinyurl.com/ybkg7wdw>.)

Sarah Constantine is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE—A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

By George F. Ward

In Kigali, Rwanda, on March 21, 2018, representatives of 44 African countries signed an [agreement](#) establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The agreement sets out ambitious goals, including creation of “a single market for goods, services, and movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African Continent and in accordance with the Pan African Vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa’... .” With this agreement, the countries of Africa have taken a step in the direction of greater economic integration. To gauge the impact of the agreement, it is important to look in some detail into what happened—and did not happen—in Kigali and to assess the challenges to increased intra-African trade that remain. [more...](#)



Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, walks away after signing the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) Agreement during the 10th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) in Kigali, Rwanda, Wednesday, March 21, 2018. (Source: AP Photo.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Across Africa, the growth in violence can largely be attributed to three factors. First, environmental changes have forced many pastoralists to seek out new land for their cattle, bringing them more frequently into contact with neighbors. Second, the changing profile of pastoralists and availability of small arms have increased both the likelihood of young men engaging in violence and the lethality of the violence when they do. Finally, elites incentivize violence by using cattle as a store of wealth, thus increasing the size and destructiveness of herds and exercising greater influence over herder behavior.

Environmental Factors Force Farmers and Herders into Proximity

In both West and East Africa, desertification and environmental shocks have made it increasingly difficult for pastoralists to sustain herds of cattle along their traditional routes. In [West Africa](#), pastoralists who traditionally traversed the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad have been forced further south by the expansion of the Sahel and the retraction of [Lake Chad](#). Similarly, in East Africa, recent [drought](#) conditions encouraged pastoralist communities to move their cattle to surviving grasslands, including into wildlife conservatories in Laikipia, Kenya. Changing routes bring herders into contact with large settled populations, creating opportunities for violence, as both groups vie for scarce resources.

While environmental degradation may be encouraging more contact between nomadic and fixed populations, it does not fully explain episodes of conflict. A [2016 study](#) examining the relationship of environmental shock in Africa, such as drought, to the likelihood of violent conflict found that “environmental stressors were only partly predictive of conflict events.” Similarly, an [analysis](#) of 11 case studies of pastoralist conflict in Africa found that although environmental shock was a contributing factor in five cases, it never proved the most important cause and could not explain conflict intensity.

Guns and Changes to Pastoralism Increase Likelihood of Violence

The lethality of pastoralist conflict is better explained by the widespread availability of small arms and the changing profile of pastoralism. In East Africa, regional conflicts have created a growth industry for arms and ammunition, with weapons [transferred](#) from Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia and also [allegedly sold](#) by corrupt security officials. Similarly, in West Africa, the [UN](#) estimated there were approximately [8 million](#) small arms in circulation, with illicit transfers originating from regional conflicts and corrupt security officials, transfers from regional governments, and a small number of imports.

Alongside the proliferation of small arms, changes in the norms and profiles of herding communities have contributed to an uptick in violence. In East Africa, [researchers](#) have noted that within pastoralist communities traversing the borders between Uganda, South Sudan, and Kenya, customary rules governing cattle raids changed over the past 30 years. While raids were traditionally conducted with limited violence, and had compensation mechanisms for injured or killed raiders, since the 1980s, raids have become [more violent](#) as raiders began to steal cattle for profit rather than to replenish herds.

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In both [Kenya](#) and [Uganda](#), the influx in small arms has also created an arms race between communities in which violent retaliation is seen as necessary deterrence against further attacks.

In West Africa, recent upticks in violence may reflect communities' reaction to the [perception](#) that herders are increasingly composed of groups of armed men with criminal ties, more akin to a militia than a nomadic community. Although some West African herders are involved in [terrorism or crime](#), criminal elements likely represent only a fraction of the estimated [50 million](#) pastoralists across West Africa. In Nigeria, however, as all sides perceive heightened risk of aggression, small violations, such as property damage, can quickly degenerate into tit-for-tat [reprisals](#). In some Nigerian states, rural communities have formed [vigilante groups](#) to protect against armed herdsmen. Conversely, pastoralists argue they must be armed to protect themselves from these types of groups.

Elites Stand to Benefit from Spreading Conflict

One of the largest changes to the culture of pastoralism over the past 30 years has come from the commodification of cattle. Across the continent, elites use cattle as a [store of wealth](#), investing in vast herds and paying armed young men to oversee and protect them. While many investments are legitimate, cattle ownership has also proved valuable to [criminal](#) and [terrorist](#) networks as a way to launder money and recruit young men. Anecdotally, observers [report](#) that armed young herders who answer to urban-based elites, rather than local leaders, are more likely to ignore national land-use laws and may be more likely to escalate conflict situations.

In both East and West Africa, communities affected by conflict also believe politicians have used herders to incite violence for political ends. In Kenya, many [observers believed](#) Matthew Lempurkel, a Kenyan MP, encouraged the Laikipia standoff by directing the herders to take land to strengthen his chances at a local election. Similarly, in Nigeria, farming communities affected by violence [allege](#) that the Nigerian President, Mohammadu Buhari, is sympathetic to the herders because he is of the same ethnicity.

Whether real or perceived, the implication of elite political involvement in pastoralist conflicts may lead to spikes in violence during periods of political uncertainty. In both [Kenya](#) and [Nigeria](#), observers have related pastoralist violence to [elite manipulation](#) around elections.

Changing Nature of Conflict Challenges Both Local and Top-Down Solutions

As herders are increasingly perceived to answer to elites, solutions to violence have become more complicated. An observer in [Kenya](#) notes a generational difference in how conflicts are resolved: "Elders, who once negotiated grazing rights with their neighbors in times of drought, are now ignored by smartphone-wielding teenagers who get their orders from WhatsApp."

Similarly, government attempts to provide solutions have backfired. In Nigeria, recommendations to create "cattle colonies" or [ranches](#) for pastoralists to contain their herds have come under fire over concerns about property rights, with some farmers [arguing](#) the proposals represent an elite attempt to steal land. Meanwhile, some states have [outlawed grazing](#), leading [herders](#) to accuse the state governments of inciting violence against them.

To Reduce Violence, Political and Technical Solutions Needed

The interlocking environmental, cultural, and political drivers of pastoralist conflict suggest multifaceted responses are necessary. Although no organization has yet to successfully address the challenge, a number of efforts created through partnerships with local organizations, aid agencies, and regional governments appear promising. For example, the [World Bank](#) has created several initiatives designed to lessen the economic impact of climate shocks on pastoralists, while [USAID](#) has provided funding for community-level peace talks. Moving forward, the most successful efforts to reduce violence will likely involve partnerships to address the unique economic and political concerns driving pastoralists and settled communities into conflict.

Sarah Constantine is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE—A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

By George F. Ward

In Kigali, Rwanda, on March 21, 2018, representatives of 44 African countries signed an [agreement](#) establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The agreement sets out ambitious goals, including creation of “a single market for goods, services, and movement of persons in order to deepen the economic integration of the African Continent and in accordance with the Pan African Vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa’... ” With this agreement, the countries of Africa have taken a step in the direction of greater economic integration. To gauge the impact of the agreement, it is important to look in some detail into what happened—and did not happen—in Kigali and to assess the challenges to increased intra-African trade that remain.



Rwanda's President Paul Kagame, walks away after signing the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) Agreement during the 10th Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) in Kigali, Rwanda, Wednesday, March 21, 2018. (Source: AP Photo.)

What Happened in Kigali?

In addition to the agreement establishing the AfCFTA, [two other documents](#) were signed in Kigali. The first was the Kigali Declaration, which emphasizes the objective of African economic integration. It was signed by representatives of 47 countries, including a few, such as South Africa, that did not join in the AfCFTA. For some of those that did not sign, the Kigali Declaration provided an opportunity to be on record in support of continental free trade even though their national legal requirements precluded them from signing the AfCFTA agreement. The second additional document was a Protocol on Free Movement that was agreed to by 30 countries.

The AfCFTA agreement itself is incomplete in at least three respects. First, the current [text](#) is an umbrella framework that will be operational only after the addition of protocols and annexes. Of those additional documents, the Protocol on Trade in Goods is well advanced. Others will require significant negotiations. Second, the agreement will come into force only after it has been ratified by 22 of the signatory states. Third, Africa's two largest economies, Nigeria and South Africa, did not sign the AfCFTA agreement.

Of the two, Nigeria's failure to sign is the most troubling. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari had abruptly [canceled](#) his travel to Kigali. His cabinet had indicated that additional time was needed for domestic consultations even though it acknowledged that the agreement would create jobs and foster growth. The Nigerian labor union opposed the agreement, calling it a “[radioactive neoliberal policy initiative](#).” It is noteworthy that the Buhari government, which leans toward protectionist policies, recently also [decided not](#) to sign a free trade agreement between West Africa and the European Union. The failure of South Africa to sign is probably less consequential—Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies [told](#) the media that only technical, process reasons prevented his country's signature, adding, “South Africa is very much part of the process. We are not holding back. We don't have reservations or differences.”

What Happens Next?

If past is prologue, the AfCFTA ratification process is likely to be lengthy. As [reported](#) previously in Africa Watch, on June 10, 2015, three Regional Economic Commissions—the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area, which would cover about half the continent and over half of its GDP. Deadlines for completion of negotiations on tariffs and other issues related to the Tripartite Agreement have repeatedly been missed, and the ratification process

has lagged. South Africa [signed](#) the Tripartite Agreement only in July 2017, and Botswana [adhered](#) only in January 2018. Now, after almost three years of delay, it is unclear how the Tripartite Free Trade Area will be coordinated with the AfCFTA. There is little reason to believe that the ratification process for the AfCFTA will be less complicated and drawn out than that for the Tripartite Agreement.

What Would the AfCFTA Do—and Not Do?

There is no question that the AfCFTA projects a bold vision: a free-trade area covering an entire continent, 1.2 billion people, and \$2.6 trillion in GDP. Today, intra-African trade compares quite [unfavorably](#) with trade within other world regions. Only about 16 percent of the total trade of African countries is intra-African. That contrasts sharply with the figures for intra-regional trade in Asia, 51 percent, and in Europe, 70 percent. When fully agreed to and ratified the AfCFTA would provide the policy and regulatory framework for significant expansion of intra-African trade.

An improved framework for trade would be an important accomplishment, but at least two other roadblocks to increased intra-regional trade would remain: (1) the high costs of trading within Africa and (2) the relative lack of tradable products.

According to [researchers](#) at the International Growth Center, the high costs of getting goods to and from border or ports in Africa restricts the continent's potential gains from international trade. Poor roads and other factors increase the cost of transporting goods over long distances. The researchers report that in some areas of Africa, transport costs constitute higher trade barriers than tariffs or other restrictions. They cite statistics that the unit costs of road transport in Africa are 40–100 percent higher than in Southeast Asia. In landlocked African countries, the comparisons are even starker—300–400 percent higher than in other regions. The majority of roads in sub-Saharan Africa are poorly maintained, and around 53 percent remain unpaved. Long waiting times at ports and borders persist. Even though these non-tariff barriers to trade are gradually being reduced, importers require 50 percent more time to bring goods to market in Africa than in East Asia.

Even with an improved regulatory framework and better physical infrastructure, Africa would still suffer from a deficit of tradable products. Africa's rapidly growing middle class demands consumer goods, but many African economies continue to [depend](#) on exports of commodities, mainly fuels, metal ores, and other minerals. In fact, several countries depend on the export of just one or two commodities (e.g., oil and gas for Angola and copper for Zambia). African manufacturers have been under pressure for decades, largely because of the difficulty of competing with cheap consumer goods from China and elsewhere. Today, Africa is less industrialized than two decades ago. In 2014, only [9.8 percent of Africa's GDP](#) came from manufacturing, a quarter lower than in 1990. Until African manufacturers and farmers are able to produce efficiently for African markets, the prospects for significant growth in intra-regional trade are likely to remain limited.

Conclusion

That the AfCFTA agreement will not solve all of Africa's trade problems should not distract from the importance of achieving swift completion, ratification, and entry into force of that agreement. Rather, the governments and entrepreneurs in all the countries of Africa should push forward to expand trade on parallel tracks, building up a robust legal and regulatory framework for trade through AfCFTA while also reducing the inefficiencies and non-tariff barriers that currently pose such formidable obstacles.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

LIBYA: PARIS CONFERENCE SETS LOFTY GOALS, BUT MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL DRIVE OUTCOMES

By Richard J. Pera

On May 29, 2018, leaders of Libya's Eastern and Western rival factions met in Paris, and agreed to a [general framework](#) for national reconciliation, including unification of the country's institutions and elections in December. While the leaders' apparent willingness to compromise was positive, [observers pointed out](#) that a multitude of factors make concrete steps much more difficult to achieve. Ongoing military operations, especially by the Eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), which continues to gain territory and influence, likely will prove the greatest challenge to national reconciliation. What did rival Libyan leaders agree to and what challenges lie ahead? How do ongoing LNA military operations, led by General Khalifa Haftar, affect efforts to stabilize the country? [more...](#)



Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica regions of Libya. (Source: Juan Valdes, "Cyrenaica, Libya: Part I," *Changing Planet* (blog), *National Geographic*, March 15, 2012, <https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2012/03/15/cyrenaica-libya-part-i/>.)

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SMART CITIES: THE ANSWER TO AFRICA'S URBANIZATION PROBLEM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Africa's urban population is expanding at a rapid rate. Currently, about 40 percent of the continent lives in urban areas; by 2050, this figure is projected to increase to 60 percent. How are governments planning to accommodate these large population shifts? Current challenges, such as the continent's underdeveloped road networks, unreliable electricity provision, and short supply of affordable housing, will likely all be exacerbated by increased population pressures. One potential solution is the adoption of "smart city" initiatives, which several African countries have already begun to undertake. Are smart cities the answer to Africa's urbanizing population? [more...](#)



Plan for Vision City, Kigali, Rwanda. (Source: "Vision city is a premium residential development in Kigali city, with an exceptional neighborhood and fabulous properties," Twitter, May 9, 2018, <https://twitter.com/thevisioncity?lang=en>.)

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What Was Achieved in Paris and What Challenges Lie Ahead

French President Emmanuel Macron convened a one-day "[International Conference on Libya](#)" at the Elysée Palace on May 29. In addition to representatives from the United Nations (UN) and 20 countries, [participants included](#) leaders of Libya's rival factions: two from Western Libya's UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and two from Eastern Libya's LNA and House of Representatives.

Calling the agreement "[historic](#)" and a "[crucial step](#)" toward stabilizing the country, Macron said the conference forged a political roadmap that set a December 10 date for presidential and parliamentary elections. The legal underpinning of the elections, which is to be set by September 16, could entail a new constitution. The [leaders agreed](#) to provide "strong security arrangements" for the elections. [They also committed](#) to work on "phasing out parallel government and institutions" and unifying the central bank and armed forces. None of the leaders actually signed the agreement, however. [Macron explained](#) that trust was a foundational issue: "Each [leader] denied the existence of the institutions that the others represented and their legitimacy."

Several contentious issues must be addressed. Libya's existing constitution would need to be replaced, a requirement foreseen by the UN, whose experts have been working on a draft with GNA authorities. It is not clear if a [constitutional plebiscite](#) would need to be held before elections. Nor is it clear if presidential elections would be held in advance of parliamentary voting or if parliamentary voting would happen first. The International Crisis Group [warned](#), "setting a deadline for elections without due preparation and at least the parties' public commitment to respect the results is certain to raise tensions." [Security](#) is also a major issue: Islamic State suicide attackers bombed the electoral commission in Tripoli last month, killing 12 people. There is no impartial apparatus to ensure the integrity of the process, including safety at polling sites.

Although the Paris agreement did not seriously address security issues or call for a cease-fire, it did reiterate support for an [Egypt-led effort](#) to unify Libya's fragmented military—the only security track in the peace process. [Some question](#) how this process can be fair, given Cairo's alliance with Haftar, the 75-year-old LNA chief and former military leader under Qaddafi.



Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica regions of Libya. (Source: Juan Valdes, "Cyrenaica, Libya: Part I," *Changing Planet* (blog), National Geographic, March 15, 2012, <https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2012/03/15/cyrenaica-libya-part-i/>.)

LNA Strength and Military Operations

Current and potential military operations by Haftar's LNA will almost certainly affect negotiations to stabilize Libya. While other leaders exercise political authority, Haftar's impressive military capabilities enable him to dictate the situation on the ground. Haftar's LNA draws strength from a web of tribal alliances that have established regular military units, supported by armed militias, [totaling 75,000 fighters](#). The LNA boasts impressive ground and aviation equipment, and it has employed [air power](#) especially well. Haftar has also fostered highly beneficial alliances with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia. From its airbase east of Benghazi, the [UAE air force](#) has flown strike missions in support of the LNA, and [Egyptian aircraft](#) have flown similar missions—both in violation of the [UN arms embargo](#). As *Africa Watch* has [reported](#), Russia has provided Haftar with MIG-23s. Today, the LNA claims to control 90 percent of Libya, though this may be exaggerated. What is certain is that the LNA controls nearly all of Cyrenaica (Eastern Libya) and parts of Fezzan (Southwestern Libya). It does not control Tripolitania (Western Libya).

After the LNA secured Eastern Libya's "Oil Crescent" earlier this year, the main oil terminals of Ras Lanuf and as-Sidra were [attacked by a local militia](#) in early June. The LNA quickly retook the terminals, which constitute the majority of Libya's oil wealth. The fighting caused [heavy infrastructure losses](#) and could cut oil output for an extended period. "Libya's economy [relies](#) heavily on oil," and "[this new surge of violence](#) around the oil crescent casts a shadow on the . . . scenario established . . . at the end of May in Paris."

Haftar's mid-May renewal of the LNA's year-long assault on Islamist groups in Derna—the last major bastion of opposition to the LNA in Eastern Libya—[overshadowed](#) the conference in Paris. The assault may have been intended to signal to rivals and international actors that events on the ground, controlled by him, will drive diplomacy. Aircraft from [Egypt and the UAE](#) supported the assault, and [French intelligence](#) reportedly provided a [Beechcraft 350](#) surveillance aircraft. The LNA [claimed](#) to have captured 75 percent of the city.

The LNA has also established a presence in Sabha (in Fezzan), where the LNA has opposed GNA allies. Haftar may believe that controlling Sabha is key to controlling the South and its oil fields. As [one observer put it](#): "These two issues are going to be important cards to hold in any future negotiations." With UAE financial support, Haftar has reportedly arranged for [two Darfuri \(Sudanese\) rebel groups](#) to intervene in Libya's South, including Sabha. Haftar's use of foreign militias to control Libyan territory may make it even more difficult to unify Libya's armed forces.

A spokesman for Haftar [stated](#) on June 10 that the LNA was about to "liberate" Derna from terrorism, and Tripoli and Misrata would be next. An LNA advance into Tripolitania likely would nullify political efforts to unify the country. A battle for Misrata, which supports the Tripoli-based GNA with military manpower, likely would cost many lives.

Conclusion

Although the Paris conference was a political windfall for President Macron, some observers were concerned that it had [supplanted or even subverted](#) the 2015 [Libyan Political Agreement](#) (LPA), which the UN [called](#) "the only viable framework to end the . . . crisis." The conference's most important potential achievement—December elections—raises more questions than it answers.

While Haftar lacks the imprimatur of the international community, his stable of alliances, both internally and reaching across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, will carry his LNA far, though probably not all the way to Tripoli—an outcome that would almost certainly be rejected by the United Nations. Internally, [Haftar's stock is rising](#) because Libyans want stability: areas under his control have seen less fighting, and oil is flowing. He has delivered an appreciable level of governance, though critics, especially the GNA, [accuse him](#) of being autocratic. Haftar's endgame is not known, but one thing seems certain: because of his military strength, Haftar will drive the outcome of any political settlement. It remains to be seen if he is able to transform military success into achievement at the negotiating table.

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SMART CITIES: THE ANSWER TO AFRICA'S URBANIZATION PROBLEM?

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

Africa's urban population is expanding at a rapid rate. Currently, about 40 percent of the continent lives in urban areas; by 2050, this figure is projected to increase to 60 percent. How are governments planning to accommodate these large population shifts? Current challenges, such as the continent's underdeveloped road networks, unreliable electricity provision, and short supply of affordable housing, will likely all be exacerbated by increased population pressures. One potential solution is the adoption of "smart city" initiatives, which several African countries have already begun to undertake. Are smart cities the answer to Africa's urbanizing population?



Plan for Vision City, Kigali, Rwanda. (Source: "Vision city is a premium residential development in Kigali city, with an exceptional neighborhood and fabulous properties," Twitter, May 9, 2018, <https://twitter.com/thevisioncity?lang=en>.)

Population Pressure and Smart Cities

Global population [projections](#) over the next 30 years have Africa overtaking Asia as the world's fastest urbanizing region. Such dramatic population growth in African cities promises to add strain to the continent's already stressed infrastructure. [Roads](#) and [public transportation](#) are frequently found lacking. Traffic [congestion](#) is an ongoing problem. [Housing shortages](#) are also extremely common, resulting in a proliferation of informal settlements, or slums, as they are more colloquially known. How will African cities respond to population pressures?

Urban and peri-urban planned "smart city" developments, that is, the incorporation of information and communication technology (ICT) and clean energy to improve efficiency of land use and services, have been announced in recent years in several countries, including [Ghana](#), [Kenya](#), [Nigeria](#), [Rwanda](#), [South Africa](#), and [Zambia](#). Many of these cities are designed to be all-inclusive live, work, play concepts that incorporate extensive ICT infrastructure in their design and management.

Smart cities are designed with "[data-led management and planning processes](#)." Clean energy and efficient living are key attributes associated with smart cities. Smart cities may provide free Wi-Fi, solar-powered street lamps and roads, remote-sensing traffic control, smart meters for electricity that track usage in real time, and smart [parking](#) structures with automatic lifts. Because of the lack of [legacy](#) infrastructure in many African countries, it will not be necessary to remove existing traffic lights, roads, utility grids, and the like, rendering overall expenses comparatively less expensive than in other regions.

Rwanda Leads the Way

Rwanda is helping to spearhead many of the most recent smart-city initiatives. In May 2017, at the [Transform Africa Summit](#), the Rwandan government announced the [Smart Cities Blueprint](#), a 10-point agenda for incorporating technology into urban development. Rwanda also authored the "[Smart Africa Alliance](#)," a pact that has now been signed by 20 additional countries to ensure that technology is a part of national development planning. The Rwandan government has been an early adopter of e-government services. [Irembo](#), the government's online service, allows citizens to [access](#) 50 different services from 10 different government agencies. The service facilitates the collection of taxes and fees to help offset the costs of government investments in ICT and infrastructure.

[Vision City](#), located just outside of the Rwandan capital, Kigali, is a planned community of 22,000 homes. Wi-Fi will be available free of charge, street lamps will be solar-powered, and residential electricity will be installed with motion-

sensors. The government of Rwanda is also planning the Kigali Innovation City, a [\\$1.9 billion initiative](#), likened to Silicon Valley, that is envisioned to offer industrial, retail, leisure, health care, and housing facilities.

In Nigeria, [Eko Atlantic City](#) is a private-public partnership that, when completed, will house around 250,000 in Lagos, the country's commercial capital. Private investors are funding the development, and both the state and federal government are considered "strategic partners." Close to four square miles of land bordering the Atlantic Ocean are being [reclaimed](#) through [dredging](#) and the erection of a sea wall. A mix of industry, retail, and luxury housing is envisioned for the space. Fiber-optic cables will ensure easy internet access, and the development is securing its own power and water supplies. Completion is not anticipated for at least another five years.

In South Africa [Waterfall City](#), located midway between Johannesburg and Pretoria, began construction in [2012](#). Close to 35 percent of the planned housing (18,500 units) and commercial developments have already been constructed. Home prices will be at the mid and luxury ranges, with some more affordable high-density housing. The development should be completed by 2025. Attacq, one of the developers, announced a smart-city competition in September 2017. The contest calls for the submission of proposals for [innovations](#) focused on geolocation, transportation, and security technologies, among others, that could be adopted for use specifically in Waterfall City.

Criticisms

Vision City has been criticized for being too [heavily reliant](#) on foreign investment and foreign developers. It has also been criticized for its cost—the price of the average housing unit is estimated at [\\$160,000](#). The average Rwandan makes a little over [\\$2000 per year](#). In 2017, the developer reduced costs by [30 percent](#) in an effort to increase sales. In Nigeria's Eko City, the unit costs are even higher. Homes are estimated to be priced close to [\\$1 million](#). Without adequate planning, an increase in the supply of luxury homes will not address Nigeria's (or Rwanda's) larger housing issues.

An additional concern is the tendency for governments to overpromise and under-deliver. John Mahama, the former president of Ghana, announced the creation of Hope City in 2013. Costing an estimated [\\$10 billion](#), Hope City was another planned mixed-use community that would house 300,000 and employ at least 50,000 in the ICT fields. Very little progress, however, has been made since 2013. Konza Technological City in Kenya may be suffering a similar fate. Although plans were formally approved in 2013, only a [half-constructed building](#) has thus far been erected. The government of Kenya recently allocated new funds to the project, but it is not expected to be completed until 2030.

Conclusion

Smart cities are exciting and attractive options for countries facing mounting population pressures. But it remains to be seen if these types of cities will meet the needs of Africa's expanding populations. Smart-city projects in Africa have so far focused on elite housing and business needs. Several planned developments have not reached fruition. In addition, all the above planned cities are [public-private partnerships](#). Public-private partnerships are a means of reducing costs for governments, but to maximize profit, developers tend to focus on higher end residents. Unless governments demand the inclusion of affordable-housing options, African smart cities will not address the core problems of informal housing and slum dwelling.

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