

## UGANDA'S REFUGEE POLICY: A SUCCESS STORY UNDER STRAIN?

By Sarah Graveline

Uganda's refugee policy, recognized as among the most progressive in East Africa, is under strain from the ongoing, rapid flow of South Sudanese refugees across its borders. Since 2006, Ugandan law has guaranteed refugees' rights to work and farm small-holdings. This policy is drawn from Uganda's own long history of refugee reception, as well as global best practices. While Uganda's welcoming stance is rightly praised by regional and international partners, as many South Sudanese cross into Uganda daily, existing challenges within this framework have become apparent. [more...](#)



South Sudanese refugees who crossed the Kaya river into Uganda by foot are taken by bus to the Koboko transit camp from Busia, Uganda, Wednesday, March 29, 2017. More than 100,000 people have fled a single county in South Sudan in just three months as civil war continues amid warnings of genocide, and the surge of more than half a million South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July has created an African refugee crisis. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay.)

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## LESOTHO HEADED FOR EARLY ELECTIONS—AGAIN

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On March 7, 2017, Lesotho's King Letsie III, the country's ceremonial constitutional monarch, [dissolved](#) parliament after Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a vote of no confidence days earlier. Mosisili will remain in office but only in a caretaker position until early elections are held in June. Unstable coalition governments have become the norm in Lesotho; this will be the [third](#) time in five years that the country has held elections ahead of schedule. Mosisili was ousted by a new opposition alliance mainly comprising former Prime Minister Thomas Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC) party and a splinter faction of Mosisili's Democratic Congress (DC) party. The latest round of early elections reveals that despite regional mediation, Lesotho has been unable to move successfully beyond its recent bouts of political instability. [more...](#)



Lesotho's Prime Minister Pakalitha Bothuel Mosisili addresses the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, at U.N. headquarters, Friday, Sept. 23, 2016. Mosisili has since lost a vote of no confidence and will serve in a caretaker position until elections are held later this year. (Source: AP Photo/Craig Ruttle.)

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# UGANDA'S REFUGEE POLICY: A SUCCESS STORY UNDER STRAIN?

By Sarah Graveline

Uganda's refugee policy, recognized as among the most progressive in East Africa, is under strain from the ongoing, rapid flow of South Sudanese refugees across its borders. Since 2006, Ugandan law has guaranteed refugees' rights to work and farm small-holdings. This policy is drawn from Uganda's own long history of refugee reception, as well as global best practices. While Uganda's welcoming stance is rightly praised by regional and international partners, as many South Sudanese cross into Uganda daily, existing challenges within this framework have become apparent.



South Sudanese refugees who crossed the Kaya river into Uganda by foot are taken by bus to the Koboko transit camp from Busia, Uganda, Wednesday, March 29, 2017. More than 100,000 people have fled single county in South Sudan in just three months as civil war continues amid warnings of genocide, and the surge of more than half a million South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July has created an African refugee crisis. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay.)

## Finding Refuge: Uganda's Long History of Refugee Reception

Uganda has continuously hosted refugees since it gained independence in 1962, with arrivals coming primarily from Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire prior to 1997) and [settling](#) in northern Uganda. Between 1962 and 2006, Ugandan refugee policy was governed by the Control of Alien Refugees Act ([CARA](#)), as well as standards laid out in international statutes to which Uganda was a [signatory](#).

In practice, Uganda regulated the delivery of aid to refugees living in designated settlements, composed of small plots of land located in rural areas in northern Uganda. These settlements were created and controlled by the Ugandan government, which expected refugees to ultimately become self-sufficient by farming the settlements.

In the late 1990s, this strategy was formalized in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the "Self-Reliance Strategy" ([SRS](#)). SRS called for interventions to improve refugees' and local nationals' opportunities for self-empowerment, with the ultimate goal of reducing dependence on aid.

In theory, Uganda's embrace of SRS, along with the placement of refugees in settlements, represented an improvement over the usual practice of confining refugees to designated camps where economic activities are limited and reliance on aid is high. In practice, [critics](#) argued that SRS left refugees without adequate support. Many settlement areas lacked arable land and were vulnerable to armed groups. Despite these risks, refugees were [not allowed to leave](#) the settlement areas without obtaining a permit from the administrative head of the settlement. With permits difficult to obtain, many refugees became trapped in settlements without adequate food, shelter, or physical security.

## The 2006 Refugees Act: Progressive Policy, Challenged Implementation

In 2006, a long-awaited new law, [The Refugees Act](#), was passed in answer to many of the challenges in existing policy. The new act, along with the passage of the statutory instrument, [The Refugees Regulation 2010](#), expanded the rights of refugees in Uganda. By law, refugees can now work, receive an education, and travel throughout Uganda, although they must report their movement to the Commissioner for Refugees. In addition, refugees continue to be provided with rights to small-holdings in settlement areas, in line with past policy.

On paper, the 2006 Refugees Act, in conjunction with Uganda's *prima facie* [acceptance](#) of any asylum seeker crossing into Uganda from Sudan, the DRC, or Burundi, makes Uganda's refugee policy among the most generous worldwide. In practice, however, refugees in Uganda continue to be prevented from exercising their rights to travel and work. [Reports from](#) northern Uganda indicate that refugees must still receive permission to leave settlements and are prevented from integrating with local populations despite significant service gaps in the settlements.



## No Long-Term Solution

Also, refugees are challenged by their inability to solidify their status. Refugees are not allowed to [own land](#), and it is written into the [Ugandan Constitution](#) that no refugee, or anyone whose parent or grandparent was a registered refugee, can become a citizen.

Many refugees have lived in Uganda for decades, but without the ability to gain citizenship, they cannot be certain of their right to stay over the long term. In 2010, [Human Rights Watch](#) reported that 1,700 Rwandan refugees were forcibly returned by the Ugandan government. Today, refugees [report concern](#) that they have little recourse if support from the Uganda government falters.

## The South Sudan Dilemma

The continued crisis in South Sudan has brought tensions in Uganda's refugee policy to the fore. As [Africa Watch](#) has reported, since July 2016, over 1.6 million South Sudanese have fled widespread conflict. Over [800,000](#) of these refugees have crossed into Uganda, adding to the thousands of refugees who arrived following the outbreak of fighting in 2013 and 2014. In total, [UNHCR](#) has registered over 818,000 South Sudanese refugees in Uganda and estimates that over 2,000 continue to arrive daily.

The initial response to this large influx has been largely positive. Refugees have been quickly settled on small-holdings, avoiding many of the [humanitarian challenges](#) that typically accompany an emergency response effort. Local communities have been welcoming of refugees, with Ugandan residents [reporting](#) that they expect the incoming refugees to boost the local economy.

This positive response may, however, be slowly reversing. In interviews with aid workers in northern Uganda, [Refugees International](#) found that many believe community leaders have received inflated estimates of the economic benefit refugees will bring. If these high expectations go unmet, it could create hostility between Ugandan citizens and refugees, increasing the vulnerability of refugees in Uganda over time.

## Conclusion

Uganda's refugee policy, while remarkably generous compared with global norms, may yet prove to be inadequate for refugees who suffer long-term displacement. This challenge is becoming visible as the international community struggles to support South Sudanese refugees. A lack of [funding](#) for the UN has led to [ration cuts](#) for many refugees, despite the lack of other resources available in the settlements. These gaps in services, in conjunction with the potential failure to manage Ugandan communities' expectations for refugee integration, could increase refugees' future vulnerability.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# LESOTHO HEADED FOR EARLY ELECTIONS—AGAIN

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On March 7, 2017, Lesotho's King Letsie III, the country's ceremonial constitutional monarch, [dissolved](#) parliament after Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a vote of no confidence days earlier. Mosisili will remain in office but only in a caretaker position until early elections are held in June. Unstable coalition governments have become the norm in Lesotho; this will be the [third](#) time in five years that the country has held elections ahead of schedule. Mosisili was ousted by a new opposition alliance mainly comprising former Prime Minister Thomas Thabane's All Basotho Convention (ABC) party and a splinter faction of Mosisili's Democratic Congress (DC) party. The latest round of early elections reveals that despite regional mediation, Lesotho has been unable to move successfully beyond its recent bouts of political instability.



Lesotho's Prime Minister Pakalitha Bethuel Mosisili addresses the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, at U.N. headquarters, Friday, Sept. 23, 2016. Mosisili has since lost a vote of no confidence and will serve in a caretaker position until elections are held later this year. (Source: AP Photo/Craig Ruttle.)

## Background

Lesotho, a small, landlocked country of 2 million, is surrounded entirely by South Africa. South Africa has historically played an influential role in Lesotho's internal affairs. As highlighted in previous [editions](#) of *Africa Watch*, Lesotho has faced a number of political and security crises over the past several years, including a failed coup attempt in August 2014 and low-level violence between different branches of the security apparatus. This turmoil resulted in a series of regional interventions led by South Africa's Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

In addition to recommending an array of political and security reforms, the SADC mediation led to early elections in February 2015 (two years ahead of schedule). In the 2015 polls, Mosisili and his DC party eked out a victory over Thabane's ABC and formed a multiparty alliance with Mothetjoa Metsing of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Political violence and internal security sector clashes continued under Mosisili's government, including the killing of army commander Maaparankoe Mahao (who was thought to be loyal to Thabane) by a contingent of soldiers aligned with Mosisili. In the midst of the unrest, Thabane and a number of other opposition parties [fled](#) to South Africa, returning only recently.

## SADC's Reform Recommendations Go Largely Unheeded

In November 2016 a [faction](#) of Mosisili's party, led by DC's Deputy Leader Monyane Moleleki, abandoned Mosisili and [announced](#) its exit from the coalition government, giving as [reasons](#) for its departure economic stagnation, corruption, continued instability, and Mosisili's failures to implement SADC's reform recommendations. After an SADC Commission of Inquiry into the killing of Mahao wrapped up its work in July 2015, Mosisili and his government largely [refused](#) to carry out many of the specified reforms. Thabane, who led the effort for the vote of no confidence on March 1, [said](#): "The biggest failure by the outgoing prime minister was ignoring the SADC calls for reforms in the military, particularly its involvement on issues of civilian politics." Thabane also maintained that Lesotho continues to be beset by security [issues](#): "The reason we have not supported the call for an election is that of security problems that have not yet been resolved. For instance I divide my time between South Africa and Lesotho because of fears on my life."



## Conclusion

As foreseen in the November 17, 2016, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, Lesotho is headed for another snap election. Given that no party appears set to gain an overwhelming majority, the fresh poll seems likely to deliver yet another unstable coalition government. SADC has again been pulled back into the fray of Lesotho's politics—the regional body [held](#) a summit March 17–19 in Swaziland focused on the recent political drama in Lesotho, with participation from South African President Jacob Zuma and Ramaphosa. The summit called upon Ramaphosa, who continues to lead the SADC mediation effort, to consult widely with Lesotho's political stakeholders before the election in an effort to [build](#) “consensus and trust.”

To date, SADC efforts at regional mediation have proved insufficient in steering Lesotho toward a more stable trajectory. Outside entities interested in political stability in Lesotho should consider encouraging SADC to implement fully the wide-ranging institutional reforms that the body has already [recommended](#). Particular attention could be paid to reforming the security sector, regulating floor crossings (when parliamentarians defect to rival parties during their term), and strengthening rules on the formation and practice of coalition governments.

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## SPLITS IN BURUNDI'S MILITARY?

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

Burundi's ongoing political crisis, sparked by President Pierre Nkurunziza's unconstitutional third term victory in July 2015, is taking a [toll](#) on the country's military. The crisis has left up to [500](#) dead and caused over [400,000](#) refugees to flee the country. Before the crisis, Burundi's military had become a relatively well-regarded and [professional](#) force in the region, due in part to sustained international support. But the fallout from the low-intensity conflict, including a military coup attempt in May 2015, recent [killings](#) of high-level officers, and soldiers [implicated](#) in political assassination attempts, suggests that past gains in the military's professionalism may be eroding. [more...](#)



Protests in Burundi. (Source: Paul Nantulya "Stopping the Spiral in Burundi," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 28, 2016, <http://africacenter.org/spotlight/stopping-the-spiral-in-burundi/>.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## SOUTH AFRICA: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AT A CROSSROADS

By Sarah Graveline

South African President Jacob Zuma's decision to fire Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan on March 30, 2017, pitched the country into political turmoil. Gordhan was widely regarded a check on state corruption, and his ouster helped lead the Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Fitch credit agencies to [downgrade](#) South Africa's debt to junk status. South Africa's parliament has announced a no-confidence vote on Zuma's government. A date for the vote has not been set [pending](#) a Constitutional Court decision on whether the ballot may be secret. If Zuma survives the vote, which seems likely given that he has weathered [five](#) previous no-confidence votes since 2014, he will have eight months before the African National Congress's (ANC) National Conference to build support for his preferred successor as ANC President and likely [candidate](#) in upcoming 2019 elections. [more...](#)



Demonstrators protest against South African President Jacob Zuma in Pretoria, South Africa, on Tuesday, April 4, 2017. (Source: AP Photo.)

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# SPLITS IN BURUNDI'S MILITARY?

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

Burundi's ongoing political crisis, sparked by President Pierre Nkurunziza's unconstitutional third term victory in July 2015, is taking a [toll](#) on the country's military. The crisis has left up to [500](#) dead and caused over [400,000](#) refugees to flee the country. Before the crisis, Burundi's military had become a relatively well-regarded and [professional](#) force in the region, due in part to sustained international support. But the fallout from the low-intensity conflict, including a military coup attempt in May 2015, recent [killings](#) of high-level officers, and soldiers [implicated](#) in political assassination attempts, suggests that past gains in the military's professionalism may be eroding.



Protests in Burundi. (Source: Paul Nantulya "Stopping the Spiral in Burundi," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 28, 2016, <http://africacenter.org/spotlight/stopping-the-spiral-in-burundi/>.)

## Background

Burundi is a small, landlocked country of 11 million bordering Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda in east-central Africa. It has a long history of intense ethnic conflict and military coups. Since the end of the country's civil war in 2000 until recently, Burundi was [hailed](#) by academics and practitioners as a rare post-conflict and security-sector reform success story. Indeed, as highlighted in the March 16, 2017, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, military governance and [reform](#) were crucial components of the Arusha Agreement, the wide-ranging peace agreement that put an end to Burundi's civil war in 2000. Scholars have [attributed](#) Burundi's military reform achievements to long-term international support (led by the Netherlands), a focus on governance, local ownership, and high-level political engagement.

In addition to military reform, the Arusha Agreement and new 2005 constitution included a number of significant power-sharing arrangements that guaranteed the country's Tutsi minority a share in governing institutions. These mechanisms, along with the reconstituted military, helped to shift Burundi's political dynamic away from ethnic politics. As scholar Filip Reyntjens [argued](#) in 2015, "Burundi's main divide is now between parties rather than ethnic groups, and when violence occurs it is political rather than ethnic." Even after the 2015 crisis erupted, the military, despite the coup attempt, was largely [lauded](#) by outside observers for its [professionalism](#) and behavior during mass protests, which stood in contrast to the conduct of the heavily politicized police.

## Military Cohesion Fraying

More recent developments suggest that a troubling new dynamic is now taking hold within Burundi's military. After the May 2015 military coup attempt, a series of [killings](#) and retaliations within the military have taken place, and [dozens](#) of Burundian officers serving in peacekeeping roles overseas have defected, including a number of soldiers serving in Somalia under the banner of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Two recent reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) highlight these shifting dynamics within the military. The ICG [report](#) asserts that Burundi's political crisis and intra-military violence have created political and ethnic rifts in the heretofore cohesive armed forces. As the report [argues](#), "the army today is a microcosm of the country's crisis" and the "2015 crisis easily broke the key consensus on which the stability of the regime was based: between the army and civilian power, and within the army between the former rebels, most of whom come from the ruling party, and the old guard."

The ACSS report details similar developments and points to a new bill in parliament that seeks to rename and reorganize the armed forces. According to the [report](#), this shows that Nkurunziza and his political allies are actively seeking to roll back the Arusha Accords and reorganize the military to consolidate his power: "Military reorganization is evidently an effort to increase the regime's control over the army's apolitical posture." It goes on to [underscore](#) how rifts have begun

to evolve around ethnic lines: “After the failed 2015 coup, efforts to stamp out disloyalty in the ranks have been perceived to have particularly targeted Tutsi officers, eroding the level of trust” between Tutsi and Hutu elements of the armed forces.

## Conclusion

The undermining, and attempted restructuring, of Burundi’s largely apolitical military does not bode well for the prospects of a peaceful resolution to the country’s drawn-out crisis. Indeed, according to some [accounts](#), the professionalism of Burundi’s military was one of the key reasons why the country has not yet descended into a renewed civil war. Regional and international entities could consider increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on the Burundian government to reach a new settlement that includes recommitting the country to the Arusha Agreement, as urged by both the ICG and ACSS reports, and to military reform and integration efforts.

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



# SOUTH AFRICA: AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AT A CROSSROADS

By Sarah Graveline

South African President Jacob Zuma's decision to fire Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan on March 30, 2017, pitched the country into political turmoil. Gordhan was widely regarded a check on state corruption, and his ouster helped lead the Standard and Poor's (S&P) and Fitch credit agencies to [downgrade](#) South Africa's debt to junk status. South Africa's parliament has announced a no-confidence vote on Zuma's government. A date for the vote has not been set [pending](#) a Constitutional Court decision on whether the ballot may be secret. If Zuma survives the vote, which seems likely given that he has weathered [five](#) previous no-confidence votes since 2014, he will have eight months before the African National Congress's (ANC) National Conference to build support for his preferred successor as ANC President and likely [candidate](#) in upcoming 2019 elections.



Demonstrators protest against South African President Jacob Zuma in Pretoria, South Africa, on Tuesday, April 4, 2017. (Source: AP Photo.)

## Cabinet Shuffle Highlights Political Crisis

Jacob Zuma is widely unpopular. In a November 2016 nationally representative [poll](#), respondents gave his performance an average rating of only 4 on a scale of 1 to 10. More recently, a March survey of urban South Africans found [71 percent](#) disapproved of his performance. And on April 7, [tens of thousands](#) of South Africans responded to the decision to fire Gordhan by protesting in cities across the country.

Despite this show of opposition, Zuma remained [defiant](#), calling the protestors “racist” and pointing out [counter-protests](#) led by the ANC Youth League. Zuma's posture reflects his political strength. As [Africa Watch](#) previously reported, Zuma has built a cadre of loyalists within the ANC who have ensured his political survival despite his being implicated in numerous corruption scandals.

The ANC leadership's response to Gordhan's firing conformed to this pattern. Although ANC Deputy President [Cyril Ramaphosa](#) called Gordhan's firing “totally unacceptable,” ultimately, ANC leadership publicly accepted Zuma's decision. ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe even suggested that criticism of Zuma was [improper](#), saying, “their [Ramaphosa and Zuma's] public dissonance on the matter was a mistake that should not be committed again.”

## “State of Capture” and the Fight against Patronage Politics

The ANC's refusal to censure Zuma undermines its ability to oppose corruption within its ranks. The scale of this corruption became public in “State of Capture,” the November 2016 [publication](#) of South African Public Protector Thuli Madonsela. The report contained numerous allegations of financial impropriety in the relationship between Zuma and the Gupta brothers—a family with extensive business interests in South Africa.

Most notably, the report [alleged](#) that Zuma's December 2015 appointment of David van Rooyen as Finance Minister was recommended by the Gupta brothers with the understanding that van Rooyen would green-light investment in a nuclear plant that would benefit the Gupta's investment in uranium mining. Political pressure forced Zuma to [reverse](#) this decision and appoint Gordhan to replace van Rooyen as Finance Minister. With Gordhan now gone, [observers](#) worry that corrupt deals, including investment in the nuclear power plant, will continue.

It remains to be seen whether South Africa's political institutions can curb this brand of patronage politics. There have been some positive signs. The South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which formally support the ANC through a [Tripartite Alliance](#), have both [publicly called](#) for Zuma to step down.

In addition, South Africa's judiciary remains [independent](#). It has made a variety of decisions that challenged political impunity, including ruling that Zuma violated the constitution by refusing to pay back money owed for upgrades to his Nkandla property and by rejecting a politically motivated legal case against Gordhan.

### **The ANC's Struggle for Reform**

Ultimately, the fight against corruption will be effective only if it is embraced by the ANC. Although other political parties have begun to make [electoral gains](#) in urban areas, the ANC remains the dominant player in South African politics. It controls a majority in parliament and has won the popular vote in every election since 1994.

Through its own bylaws and [history](#), the ANC has internal checks and balances that require decision-making by consensus. Some party figures have opposed Zuma. It was Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas who acted as a whistleblower for "State of Capture" by [reporting](#) being offered a bribe to accept a cabinet position. Some leaders, such as former President Kgalema Motlanthe, have also [publicly criticized](#) Zuma.

Collectively, however, the ANC's response has been weak. In April 2016, ANC parliamentarians [voted against](#) impeaching Zuma, thus ensuring he retained the presidency. Public outrage is louder now than last year, and a secret ballot would provide plausible deniability to ANC MPs who vote against Zuma. Nevertheless, analysts believe it is [unlikely](#) that enough ANC parliamentarians will vote with the opposition to remove Zuma.

### **Conclusion**

If South Africa's parliament does not vote to impeach Zuma, he will likely survive to lobby for the nomination of his preferred successor at the ANC National Conference in December. Reports suggest that Zuma favors his [ex-wife](#), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Were she to win, her close ties to Zuma would be a concern for many South Africans, who are increasingly frustrated with a government that has proven unable to address the country's economic challenges and unwilling to end corruption.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



## ALGERIA'S AILING PRESIDENT TURNS 80: IS THERE A PLAN FOR SUCCESSION?

By Richard J. Pera

On March 2, 2017, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika turned 80 years old. The leader of the largest country on the African continent and the second most populous Arab nation, Bouteflika has been elected president four times since 1999, and his current term ends in 2019. His [health is in decline](#), and for several years he has rarely appeared in public. A recent political cartoon depicted the ailing Bouteflika with a thermometer in his mouth, above this caption: "Eighty years of life, 18 years in power, and four years of silence." Observers [question](#) who is really running the country, and point out that there is no apparent plan for presidential transition. What are Bouteflika's health issues, how is the country being run, and what are the prospects for transition? [more...](#)

Manuel Valls [@manuelvalls](#) Follow

Echanges économiques, humains et sécurités : la relation franco-algérienne est forte, historique et stratégique.



French Prime Minister Manuel Valls and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in Algeria. "Economic, human and security exchanges: the Franco-Algerian relationship is strong, historic and strategic," Google Translate. (Source: Manuel Valls Twitter account, April 10, 2016, <https://twitter.com/manuelvalls>.)

*Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.*

## KENYA ELECTIONS 2017: CAMPAIGNS ENTER THE FINAL STRETCH

By Sarah Graveline

With Kenya's August 8, 2017, elections just over 100 days away, both the ruling Jubilee party and opposition National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition have faced recent campaign setbacks. Jubilee was forced to reschedule its primary elections after canceling votes in 21 counties following [protests](#) over delays and missing election materials. NASA has risked losing momentum as coalition members grapple internally over which party's candidate should be at the top of the slate. These struggles point to the high-stakes nature of the election. With over 1,900 national and county positions on the ballot, the winning party will have a unique opportunity to shape Kenya's political future. [more...](#)



Kenya's Deputy President William Ruto addresses the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants, in the Trusteeship Council Chamber of the United Nations, Monday, September 19, 2016. Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta, of the Jubilee party, are standing for reelection this August. (Source: AP Photo/Richard Drew.)

*Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.*

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# ALGERIA'S AILING PRESIDENT TURNS 80: IS THERE A PLAN FOR SUCCESSION?

By Richard J. Pera

On March 2, 2017, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika turned 80 years old. The leader of the largest country on the African continent and the second most populous Arab nation, Bouteflika has been elected president four times since 1999, and his current term ends in 2019. His [health is in decline](#), and for several years he has rarely appeared in public. A recent political cartoon depicted the ailing Bouteflika with a thermometer in his mouth, above this caption: "Eighty years of life, 18 years in power, and four years of silence." Observers [question](#) who is really running the country, and point out that there is no apparent plan for presidential transition. What are Bouteflika's health issues, how is the country being run, and what are the prospects for transition?



French Prime Minister Manuel Valls and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in Algeria. "Economic, human and security exchanges: the Franco-Algerian relationship is strong, historic and strategic," Google Translate. (Source: Manuel Valls Twitter account, April 10, 2016, <https://twitter.com/manuelvalls>.)

## Over a Decade of Health Issues

President Bouteflika's health problems date back to 2005:

- In November 2005, during his second term in office, he underwent surgery at the Val-de-Grâce military hospital in Paris, reportedly to repair a [gastric ulcer](#). Bouteflika remained in France for a lengthy convalescence. In April 2006, he was [readmitted](#) to Val-de-Grâce. Secrecy surrounding the surgery and recovery fueled unsubstantiated rumors that the President had [stomach cancer](#).
- Former French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré met privately with the President at "al Mouradia"—the presidential palace in Algiers—in 2007. In his book *Ce que je ne pouvais pas dire* (*What I could not tell*), published in 2016, Debré [described](#) Bouteflika's condition: "He is tired in his armchair, very breathless, his voice weak . . . a small microphone glued to his mouth makes it easier to hear what he says. He has a lot of difficulty expressing himself . . . speech slurred . . . exhausted after less than an hour together."
- In early 2013, during his third term, Bouteflika [reportedly suffered](#) a transient ischemic attack (TIA)—a mini stroke. After treatment at Val-de-Grâce, he [convalesced in Paris](#) for nearly four months. Lack of official reporting on his illness and convalescence was grist for the rumor mill, which concluded that Bouteflika was seriously ill and would not pursue a fourth term. In November 2014, following reelection, Bouteflika was admitted to a clinic in [Grenoble, France](#), for reasons not revealed publicly. In early 2016, Bouteflika reportedly traveled to a clinic near [Geneva, Switzerland](#), for unidentified treatment.
- In April 2016, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls met privately with Bouteflika and later tweeted a photo of the two at al Mouradia. The photo (see article head) showed the trim, 53-year-old Frenchman juxtaposed with the 79-year-old Algerian leader, who was [described](#) as "sick . . . haggard looking . . . mouth half open." This photo shocked Algerians and led some to question Bouteflika's ability to govern.
- In February 2017, Bouteflika abruptly [canceled a meeting](#) with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, reportedly due to "acute bronchitis." This renewed the discussion about his health—and prompted the government to deny rumors of his death.



## Who is Running the Country and How?

Algeria has long been ruled by an interconnected group of military, political, and business elites known as “Le Pouvoir” (The Power)—a small group of leaders who benefit politically and financially from the current system. Some observers believe that because of Bouteflika’s illnesses, an inner circle of Le Pouvoir members is carrying out executive functions. The terms “soft coup” and “coup-proofing” are used to describe this inner circle and its actions. At the center is the president’s brother, 59-year-old Said Bouteflika, who controls access to the president. Having never held elected office, Said Bouteflika has been accused of running the country “[by proxy](#).” Also part of the inner circle is 77-year-old General Ahmad Salah, Army chief of staff since 2004.

Bouteflika’s inner circle has a vested interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime. In the last few years, they have consolidated power by [marginalizing](#) some opponents and [placating](#) others. Le Pouvoir has not opposed these actions publicly. Bouteflika’s presence, even enfeebled, reflects continuity and stability; his passing would create uncertainties. Consequently, several security, legal, and economic decisions have been taken to maintain the status quo:

- Security sector reforms—In September 2015, [Bouteflika fired](#) General Mohammad Mediene, the chief of Algeria’s powerful Department of Intelligence and Security (known as the DRS), who had led the service for 25 years. Other generals, including the chiefs of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and presidential security, were also sacked; one of these officers was jailed for suggesting Bouteflika resign. In February 2016, [Bouteflika dissolved](#) the DRS and resubordinated its functions inside the new Department of Surveillance and Security (the DSS). Unlike its predecessor, the DSS now reports directly to the president.
- Constitutional reforms—After his second term, Bouteflika orchestrated a constitutional amendment to rescind the law limiting the president to two terms. During Bouteflika’s third and fourth terms, the government has been sensitive to criticism that he has become “[president for life](#).” In February 2016, the regime reinstituted legal reforms to limit future presidents to two terms. Observers view these reforms as a “[cosmetic](#)” way to mollify critics.
- Economic pressures—Decreasing oil revenues since 2014 have forced the government to run [budget deficits and cut back on public sector subsidies](#). Budget cuts have resulted in widespread demonstrations, especially among Algerian youth ([70 percent](#) of Algerians are under 30, and youth unemployment is about [30 percent](#)). The government made a strategic decision to maintain subsidies in especially vulnerable sectors like housing and education. Though occasionally violent, protests have remained local and oriented on economic issues. The government has cracked down on [journalists](#), jailing television personalities. The regime has restricted social media, arresting people for [Facebook posts](#) that were critical of the state.

## Plan for Transition?

Members of the inner circle probably have been engaged in succession planning for some time. Whether Bouteflika’s successor comes from the inner circle—his brother, for example—or from political party or business leaders outside the regime, the next president will need to maintain the delicate balance between the government and nation’s elites. As scholars have [pointed out](#), however, the final word about Bouteflika’s successor is likely to rest with the Army: “[If countries across the . . . world have armies, in Algeria, the army has a state.](#)”

Ultimately, Algerian citizens will also get a vote on their country’s future—if they choose to exercise it. Up to this point, most Algerians have accepted a strong president and a “[tight, merciless security mechanism](#)” as the price for order and stability. They do not want to repeat the civil war of 1991–2002, a national trauma that cost over 150,000 lives. This

desire for order and stability may mean the people are willing to accept another leader chosen by the nation's elites. If true, this suggests there will be no repeat of the widespread demonstrations of 2011. Nonetheless, Bouteflika's passing could be a watershed moment for Algeria — a moment in which either Le Pouvoir will assert itself once again or one in which a [popular movement](#) will arise to oppose it and bring about an alternative future for Algeria.

---

*Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.*

---



# KENYA ELECTIONS 2017: CAMPAIGNS ENTER THE FINAL STRETCH

By Sarah Graveline

With Kenya's August 8, 2017, elections just over 100 days away, both the ruling Jubilee party and opposition National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition have faced recent campaign setbacks. Jubilee was forced to reschedule its primary elections after canceling votes in 21 counties following [protests](#) over delays and missing election materials. NASA has risked losing momentum as coalition members grapple internally over which party's candidate should be at the top of the slate. These struggles point to the high-stakes nature of the election. With over 1,900 national and county positions on the ballot, the winning party will have a unique opportunity to shape Kenya's political future.



Kenya's Deputy President William Ruto addresses the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants, in the Trusteeship Council Chamber of the United Nations, Monday, September 19, 2016. Ruto and President Uhuru Kenyatta, of the Jubilee party, are standing for reelection this August. (Source: AP Photo/Richard Drew.)

## Jubilee Primary Election Chaos

The Jubilee party is in a seemingly comfortable position ahead of August's polls. Led by Kenya's current president and deputy president, it benefits from the power of incumbency and draws support from Kenya's largest and third largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin.

As [Africa Watch](#) reported previously, the Jubilee Alliance was formed before the 2013 election as a marriage of convenience between Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya's first President, and William Ruto, a former cabinet member in Mwai Kibaki's administration. Both were charged by the International Criminal Court with instigating violence following the 2007 elections, in which more than 1,100 Kenyans died. The charges were later dropped in the midst of [allegations](#) of witness intimidation.

The Jubilee Alliance unified as a single political party in [September 2016](#), thus formalizing the alliance between President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto. The party's strength, along with the impact of [devolution](#) of power to county governments beginning in 2013, has raised the stakes for primary elections in Jubilee strongholds. Because primary winners are expected to prevail in the general election, and thus gain more control over county government funding, competition over primaries has intensified this election season.

As a result, more voters turned out for the April 22 primaries than expected, leading to [widespread protests](#) when Jubilee staff did not have voting materials ready. In response, Jubilee canceled the April 22 elections and scrambled to reschedule the primaries before May 1, a [cutoff date](#) imposed by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).

## NASA Infighting Delays Presidential Candidate Announcement

Compared with Jubilee, the NASA coalition is not nearly as organized. While it has long been [presumed](#) that Raila Odinga would be the coalition's nominee for president, infighting among the coalition's parties delayed NASA's formal decision. The coalition waited until April 27 to announce Odinga as its [nominee](#).

To counter Jubilee's incumbency advantage, NASA has sought to bring several opposition parties under one umbrella. On April 20, it announced that Chama cha Mashinani (CCM), under Bomet Governor Isaac Ruto, would [join](#) the coalition,

increasing NASA's key partnerships to five principal leaders and parties: Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement, or ODM), Kalonzo Musyoka (Wiper Democratic Movement), Musalia Mudavadi (Amani National Congress, or ANC), Moses Wetang'ula (Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, or Ford Kenya), and Ruto (CCM).

Even with this broad alliance, NASA faces an uphill battle to unseat Jubilee. By delaying the announcement of their nominees for president and deputy president, NASA was able to keep the coalition from falling apart, but it lost critical time to campaign. At the same time, [rumors](#) about possible defections from the coalition introduced doubt about its stability.

There are also concerns about Odinga's viability as a candidate. At 71, Odinga is a veteran opposition leader who has lost three national elections. In running a fourth campaign, he may follow in the path of his father, [Oginga Odinga](#), a career opposition leader who was a thorn in the side of both Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, but never attained the presidency. A February [poll](#) shows Odinga trailing Kenyatta by over 20 percent.

## The IECB and the Countdown to August

Both the Jubilee and NASA campaigns have taken place amid broader concerns about the credibility of the August election. The IECB, which is tasked with organizing the August vote, has been beset by both technical and political challenges.

Given past allegations of vote tampering, the IECB plans to use a biometric voter identification system and an electronic system to tally and transmit votes. The procurement of these systems is well [behind schedule](#), and [allegations](#) of irregularities raise the specter of the 2013 "[chicken gate](#)" scandal, in which IECB officials accepted bribes from a UK company for procurement of ballot paper. The IECB will face a significant challenge to staff and equip polling stations before August.

The IECB also faces political challenges stemming from the 2013 elections, which Odinga claimed were fixed for Jubilee by the IECB, although the Supreme Court [ruled](#) otherwise. As the 2017 campaign season opened, Odinga [maintained](#) the IECB would again be biased toward Jubilee, and he led [protests](#) against the IECB in May 2016.

Tensions eased somewhat when the IECB chairman and commissioners resigned in [October 2016](#) and were replaced with commissioners picked by both Odinga's coalition and Jubilee. In December 2016, however, Jubilee legislators pushed a controversial [amendment](#) through parliament to provide backup manual voter identification, a move the opposition claimed would make vote rigging easier.

Mistrust in the IECB's neutrality, in combination with ongoing [disputes](#) over the electronic voting system and the late appointment of IECB commissioners, suggests there will continue to be doubt over IECB's handling of the polls.

## Conclusion

Although there are reasons for concern before August's vote, Kenyans also have tools to ensure a credible, peaceful election. Even though the press may be [under pressure](#), Kenya boasts a free and raucous media that has aggressively reported on the campaign. Kenyan organizations like Ushahidi have developed novel techniques to monitor elections that have been used [worldwide](#).

Perhaps this is why Kenyans are feeling somewhat confident about the upcoming vote. Although a January [poll](#) showed 60 percent of Kenyans are concerned about the potential for elections violence, a recent [national poll](#) shows that 73 percent of Kenyans believe the August poll will be free and fair, and 89 percent say they will accept the results of the election, no matter the outcome. As these results suggest, even though there are reasons for concern, both Jubilee and NASA are preparing for a competitive vote in August.

---

*Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.*

---



## AFRICA AND NORTH KOREA: MONUMENTS AND MUNITIONS

By George F. Ward

The [latest report](#) by the Panel of Experts established under United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1874 documents the continued failure by a number of UN member states to abide by sanctions that have been imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). African countries feature prominently among the nations that have apparently violated the terms of the various Security Council resolutions related to North Korea. Most African states have failed to meet the reporting requirements of the sanctions regime. More seriously, several African countries have apparently been involved in prohibited trade with North Korea. African relations with North Korea are rooted deeply in post-colonial history, and it is likely that the pattern of incomplete African compliance with sanctions will persist. [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



In this photo taken Monday, Sept. 21, 2009, North Korean workers construct the 50-meter-high (328-foot-high) bronze statue dubbed the Monument of the African Renaissance in Dakar, Senegal. (Source: AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell.)

## ZAMBIA AT A TIPPING POINT?

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On April 11, 2017, Zambian authorities [arrested](#) the country's main opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND), during a night raid on his home. Stemming from a highway incident in which Hichilema's convey allegedly refused to give way to President Edgar Lungu's motorcade, Hichilema was [charged](#) with "breaking the highway code" and "using insulting language." Hichilema, along with five others, was also charged with the much more severe crime of treason. Although details remain scarce, the government is accusing Hichilema of attempting to overthrow the president. The arrest has raised tensions in Zambia, with authorities [threatening](#) to impose a state of emergency amid torchings of public buildings, allegedly by those protesting Hichilema's arrest. [more...](#)



In this January 2015 file photo Hakainde Hichilema, of the Zambia opposition United Party for National Development, addresses an election rally in Lusaka, Zambia. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi, File.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# AFRICA AND NORTH KOREA: MONUMENTS AND MUNITIONS

By George F. Ward

The [latest report](#) by the Panel of Experts established under United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1874 documents the continued failure by a number of UN member states to abide by sanctions that have been imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). African countries feature prominently among the nations that have apparently violated the terms of the various Security Council resolutions related to North Korea. Most African states have failed to meet the reporting requirements of the sanctions regime. More seriously, several African countries have apparently been involved in prohibited trade with North Korea. African relations with North Korea are rooted deeply in post-colonial history, and it is likely that the pattern of incomplete African compliance with sanctions will persist.

## North Korean Relations with African States

Oddly enough, the North Korean relationship with several African states can be said to be rooted in art. Since 1969, Pyongyang's [Mansudae Art Studio](#) has provided statues and monuments to at least 16 African countries. The works exported to Africa range from memorials of anti-colonial struggles to large statues of post-colonial leaders done in Socialist-Realist style. The studio, which was founded in 1959 during the rule of Kim Il-sung, has turned out tens of thousands of statues and monuments, mostly for the home audience. It [employs](#) 4,000 people, including 1,000 artists. From the beginning of its activities in Africa, Mansudae served as a political instrument. Until the turn of this century, its works were provided completely free of charge. More recently, perhaps because of the DPRK's dire economic circumstances, the North Korean state has received payment for Mansudae's efforts.

Providing monumental art was the thin edge of North Korea's wedge into Africa, but other channels of effort soon became active. The North Korean government launched educational and cultural exchanges aimed at spreading its philosophy of Juche (self-reliance) on the continent. Some [Juche](#) study groups reportedly still exist in Africa. Select African students were provided scholarships for study in North Korea.

North Korean policy also has had a distinctly [harder aspect](#). The Hermit Kingdom has long provided arms, military equipment, and military training to African countries. North Korean entities have constructed military facilities in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Madagascar, Namibia, and Uganda. Leadership protection training offered by North Korea has been particularly in demand. Over the years, Benin, the DRC, Egypt, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Libya, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have participated.

Perhaps the most sordid episode in North Korea's engagement with Africa played out in Zimbabwe. Soon after Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe, then the country's prime minister, visited North Korea and returned full of admiration for Kim Il Sung. Before long, a contingent of North Korean military advisers arrived in Zimbabwe. They trained 3,500 ex-liberation fighters. The result was the notorious Fifth Brigade, which was sent to Matebeleland to deal with "dissidents." In a campaign that became known as "Gukurahundi" (a Shona word for the spring rains that sweep



In this photo taken Monday, Sept. 21, 2009, North Korean workers construct the 50-meter-high (328-foot-high) bronze statue dubbed the Monument of the African Renaissance in Dakar, Senegal. (Source: AP Photo/Rebecca Blackwell.)



away dry season chaff), about 20,000 civilians, overwhelmingly from the Ndebele ethnic group that supported Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe's political opponent, were killed. [Documents released in recent years](#) implicate Robert Mugabe personally for orchestrating the killings. Ironically, [the statue of Joshua Nkomo](#) that stands in central Bulawayo was reportedly created by sculptors from Mansudae Art Studio.

## Africa and North Korea under UN Sanctions

Several African states are reported as not fully complying with UN sanctions related to North Korea. For example, the [report](#) of the UN panel of experts released in February 2016 stated that a North Korean entity either working with, or using the alias of, the Mansudae Overseas Project Group (MOPG), conducted military construction activities in Namibia at least through 2015. (MOPG is the overseas subsidiary of the Mansudae Art Studio.) These activities included the construction of what the experts characterized as a munitions plant and a number of military bases. The report did not include the assertion made by other sources that the financing of some of the military construction was provided by [soft loans from China](#), a permanent member of the UN Security Council that voted for sanctions on North Korea.

The response of the government of Namibia to the UN experts report was [confusing](#). The government told the panel of experts that it had not been aware of the connection between MOPG and KOMID, North Korea's primary overseas military contractor. At another point, the government stated that military construction by the North Koreans had been completed by 2005, before UN sanctions came into force. Documentary evidence in the UN report refuted that claim. Finally, Namibia's president, Hage Geingob, journeyed to New York to explain his country's actions to the UN. Without admitting that sanctions had been violated, the Namibian government stated that Mansudae's current projects had been terminated and that the company had been asked to leave Namibia.

The [2017 report](#) by the UN experts cited additional possible sanctions violations by the following African countries: Angola, the DRC, Eritrea, Egypt, Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, and Uganda. The experts noted that UN Security Council Resolution 2321, passed in 2016, prohibited states from procuring statues from the DPRK, whether directly or indirectly. Despite this ban, Mansudae continued to be active on the African continent.

## Policy Implications

According to an [August 2016 report](#) by the National Committee on North Korea, the DPRK then had diplomatic relations with 50 African states and maintained embassies in 12 of those countries. Those relationships provide a broad base of maneuver for North Korea in its efforts to circumvent sanctions and earn hard currency revenue. Having cultivated political, economic, cultural, and military relationships with African countries over many decades, North Korea can count on a sympathetic hearing in many parts of the continent. In response to these circumstances, the reports by the UN panel of experts are useful instruments. Note, however, that the reports themselves are not likely to be effective in changing African state behavior to the extent needed. Reaching that goal would require continued efforts by the United States and other interested countries to elevate sanctions compliance as a major issue in their relations with African states.

---

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# ZAMBIA AT A TIPPING POINT?

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On April 11, 2017, Zambian authorities [arrested](#) the country's main opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND), during a night raid on his home. Stemming from a highway incident in which Hichilema's convey allegedly refused to give way to President Edgar Lungu's motorcade, Hichilema was [charged](#) with "breaking the highway code" and "using insulting language." Hichilema, along with five others, was also charged with the much more severe crime of treason. Although details remain scarce, the government is accusing Hichilema of attempting to overthrow the president. The arrest has raised tensions in Zambia, with authorities [threatening](#) to impose a state of emergency amid torchings of public buildings, allegedly by those protesting Hichilema's arrest.



In this January 2015 file photo Hakainde Hichilema, of the Zambia opposition United Party for National Development, addresses an election rally in Lusaka, Zambia. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi, File.)

## Background

Zambia is a country of 16 million located in southern Africa. The country has a well-earned reputation for relative peace and democracy. Indeed, it is the only country in the region in which the governing party has [twice](#) been successfully unseated by the opposition party. Over the last several years, however, first under President Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF) party, who passed away in office in 2014, and currently under Lungu, also of PF, Zambia has been headed in a more authoritarian direction. Frequent [arrests](#) of opposition figures, a [crackdown](#) on the press and other [civil society](#) groups, and increasing levels of election-related [violence](#) in the run-up to August 2016 polls have all threatened to tarnish the country's democratic credentials.

Before the 2016 vote, the chairman of the Zambia's Electoral Commission [asserted](#) that pre-election violence was "unprecedented and has marred Zambia's historic record of peaceful elections." Although the August 2016 polls themselves were relatively peaceful, international election monitors [noted](#) an uneven playing field and a media bias toward the PF. After the elections, which Lungu won by a narrow margin over Hichilema, the UPND alleged that the results were fraudulent and refused to recognize Lungu as the president. In October 2016, Hichilema and his deputy were [arrested](#) for "unlawful assembly" and "seditious practices," but were later released on bail.

## Arrest and Fallout

These simmering tensions again came to a head with Hichilema's most recent arrest in April 2017. Up to 100 police [stormed](#) Hichilema's house in the middle of the night, allegedly breaking down doors, firing tear gas, and [abusing](#) his staff. As [argued](#) by scholar Nic Cheeseman, the nature of the arrest suggests that "the main aim of the operation was not an efficient and speedy arrest, but rather the humiliation and intimidation of an opponent." The specifics of the treason charge remain murky. Court documents [allege](#) that Hichilema, "on unknown dates but between 10 October 2016 and 8 April 2017 and whilst acting together with other persons unknown did endeavor to overthrow by unlawful means the government of Edgar Lungu." [Bail](#) is not available for treason charges, which in Zambia carry a maximum sentence of death and a minimum of 15 years in jail. Hichilema's lawyers [sought](#) to have the charges dropped, but the request was denied.

The Zambian opposition, along with domestic and outside observers, have decried the arrest and argued that the charges are politically motivated. Jack Mwiimbu, Hichilema's lawyer, [said](#) that Hichilema "has always known that the PF have always wanted to charge him with a non-bailable offence, so he is not shocked." After the arrest, Archbishop Telephore Mpundu, president of the Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops, [noted the ramifications of Hichilema's arrest](#): "Our country is now all, except in designation, a dictatorship; and if it is not yet, then we are not far from it." Depose



Muchena, Amnesty International's Regional Director for Southern Africa, [argued](#) that Hichilema and his co-accused, “are victims of longstanding persecution by the Zambian authorities stemming from their political activities and last year’s disputed election.”

## Conclusion

Amid a [depressed](#) economy, low commodity prices (Zambia’s economy is dominated by copper exports), and rising unemployment, Lungu appears willing to use increasingly authoritarian tactics to suppress challenges to his rule. Hichilema’s arrest and treason charge constitute the latest episode in a long line of worrying incidents under PF rule that threaten to tarnish Zambia’s democratic bona fides. To help steer Zambia back onto a democratic trajectory, international and regional partners should consider advising the Zambian government to drop the treason charge on Hichilema and enter into a political dialogue to end the impasse between Lungu and Hichilema. A pending [deal](#) with the International Monetary Fund worth over \$1 billion could provide helpful leverage. The Southern Africa Development Community, and South Africa in particular, could play an important role in such an effort. As [noted](#) by an advisor to Hichilema, “South Africa could fix this mess with a strongly worded statement. But the silence from South Africa is license for the president to continue.”

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## IN BURKINA FASO, AN EXTREMIST FULANI STRUGGLE SPROUTS

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

After years of relative peace and stability, Burkina Faso has recently been affected by the sort of Islamic extremism that has more commonly been associated with violence in neighboring Mali and Niger. Since early 2015, Burkina Faso has experienced numerous [attacks](#) in the form of targeted killings, assassination attempts, kidnappings, village incursions, and complex assaults on military targets. Initially, the perpetrators were radical jihadist groups based in Mali. Since 2016, however, a Burkina Faso–based organization called Ansarul Islam has become increasingly active, and its leader, Malam Ibrahim Dicko, has established himself as a threat to stability in the north of the country. He has characterized the group as being inspired by a long-standing struggle of the Fulani ethnic group to reconquer and rebuild the ancient Fulani Kingdom called [Djeelgodji](#). While Dicko is an advocate of [radical Islam](#), his appeal to ethnic pride creates a [narrative](#) much different than that of other violent extremist groups in the region. [more...](#)



Burkina Faso and neighboring countries. (Source: "Burkina Faso," The World Factbook, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html>.)

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## TUNISIA'S TOURIST INDUSTRY: BOUNCING BACK?

By Richard J. Pera

Two highly publicized terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State (IS) resulted in the deaths of 60 mostly European tourists in Tunisia in 2015. Tunisia's tourist industry, which [accounts for](#) 8 percent of gross domestic product and 300,000 jobs in a country of 11 million people, was hit hard. Tourism [decreased](#) by about 1.5 million visitors annually (about 36 percent in revenues) between 2014 and 2016. The fall in revenues [contributed to](#) a slowdown in economic growth from 2.3 percent in 2014 to 0.8 percent in 2015; sluggish growth continued in 2016, with a 1.3 percent increase. How were the 2015 attacks perceived, what actions has the government taken to boost tourism, and what are the prospects for 2017 and beyond? [more...](#)



A guard stands at the entrance of the Tunisian hotel where foreign tourists were massacred in 2015, as it reopened Tuesday May 2, 2017, in Sousse. The hotel has been renamed the hotel Kantaoui Bay. (Source: AP Photo/Sami Boukef.)

Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# IN BURKINA FASO, AN EXTREMIST FULANI STRUGGLE SPROUTS

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

After years of relative peace and stability, Burkina Faso has recently been affected by the sort of Islamic extremism that has more commonly been associated with violence in neighboring Mali and Niger. Since early 2015, Burkina Faso has experienced numerous [attacks](#) in the form of targeted killings, assassination attempts, kidnappings, village incursions, and complex assaults on military targets. Initially, the perpetrators were radical jihadist groups based in Mali. Since 2016, however, a Burkina Faso-based organization called Ansarul Islam has become increasingly active, and its leader, Malam Ibrahim Dicko, has established himself as a threat to stability in the north of the country. He has characterized the group as being inspired by a long-standing struggle of the Fulani ethnic group to reconquer and rebuild the ancient Fulani Kingdom called [Djeelgodji](#). While Dicko is an advocate of [radical Islam](#), his appeal to ethnic pride creates a [narrative](#) much different than that of other violent extremist groups in the region.



Burkina Faso and neighboring countries. (Source: "Burkina Faso," *The World Factbook*, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uv.html>.)

## A Significant Rise in Islamic Extremism in Burkina Faso

In April 2017, Burkina Faso's Minister for Security, Simon Compaoré, [observed](#) that about 20 terror attacks had killed 70 people in his country since April 2015. The highest profile of these was on January 15, 2016 when Takfiri terrorists (Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy) linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and [al-Mourabitoun](#) stormed the Splendid Hotel and nearby Cappuccino Café, took 176 hostages, injured 56, and ultimately left 28 people dead. The same group was responsible for the attack on the Radisson Hotel in Mali's capital in November 2015, which killed 27 people. AQIM said in a subsequent [statement](#) that the attack was "revenge against France and the disbelieving West," designed to "punish the Cross-worshippers for their crimes against our people in Central Africa, Mali and other lands of the Muslims."

Another high-profile attack occurred on December 12, 2016, when 12 army soldiers and gendarmes (part of the elite *Groupe Forces Anti-Terroriste*, or GFAT) were killed by militants in a raid on a military post in the Nassoumbou commune (in the northern Soum province.) The relatively new Ansarul Islam, led by Ibrahim Dicko, [claimed](#) responsibility for this attack, which solidified its status as a terrorist threat in northern Burkina Faso. The sophistication of the attack also raised questions regarding possible financial support from a larger organization such as Mali-based [Ansar Dine](#). Another attack on Burkinabe security forces took place on [February 27, 2017](#), with simultaneous raids on two police posts in Soum by approximately 12 Jihadists on motorbikes. Most recently, on March 14, Ansarul Islam took responsibility for an attack on a primary school in [Baraboule](#) in Soum.

## Who is Ibrahim Dicko?

[Ibrahim Dicko](#) is a radical Muslim preacher originally from the Muslim-majority Soum province. He gained prominence as an influential radio preacher who joined forces with like-minded preachers in [Mali](#), particularly those affiliated with Ansar Dine's [Katiba Macina](#). Amadou Kouffa, who leads the Fulani Macina Liberation Front and played a central role in the takeover of northern Mali in 2012, is [purported](#) to have radicalized Dicko. Dicko established an Islamic association called [Al-Irshad](#) and created his own Koranic school in 2012. He was [arrested](#) in September 2013 by the French army near Tessalit, Mali, with 20 of his students, along with a significant amount of cash. Malian authorities suspect he was in Mali to join

Ansar Dine. He was imprisoned in Bamako until 2015 when he returned to Soum in northern Burkina Faso and resumed leadership of Al-Irshad, which he subsequently renamed Ansarul Islam. He has been successful in recruiting [several hundred](#) fighters (who the Burkinabe government claims are supporters of the [former government](#) deposed in a coup in 2015). In December 2016, Dicko claimed [responsibility](#) for the attack on Nassoumbou against the Burkinabe army and gave himself the title of “[commander of the believers](#).”

## The Ancient Fulani-Peulh Kingdom: The Tie That Binds Burkina and Mali

Ansarul Islam operates in the northern Burkinabe province of Soum, which is directly adjacent to the Mopti region of central Mali. This region had been the historic “Fulani Islamic Emirate of Central Mali” and is also known as the “Macina Empire.” Several Fulani-led extremist groups operate in this region, including the Ansar Dine-affiliated groups Katiba Macina and Katiba Khalid Ibn Walid. Dicko has [stated](#) that his goal for Ansarul Islam is to advance the “Fulani Struggle” to rebuild the ancient Macina Empire, which was figuratively lost as a result of French colonization in the late 19th century.

The current Fulani struggle, which appeals to Fulani’s ethnic pride, also has a practical aspect. Fulani are semi-nomadic herders who have been affected by desertification and the resulting competition for scarce resources in the Sahel. As they move around the region in search of water and land for their cattle to graze, inter-communal conflicts have occurred with local farmers inhabiting the region. Dicko’s call to arms among the Fulani communities in the region may therefore be inspired as much by economic struggle as by ethnic and religious factors.

## Looking Ahead

The recent expansion of violent extremism in northern Burkina Faso is the result of several factors. First, the location of attacks on the Mali-Burkina border and the relationships between Ansarul Islam and Mali-based extremist groups suggest that groups operating in Mali may have inspired and in some cases helped radicalized Burkina-based groups. Second, Dicko has thus far been a seemingly effective leader, advocating for the return of the ancient Fulani-Peulh Kingdom to its original glory by taking up arms against those who threaten it. Third, the [Fulani Crisis](#), which is economic in nature but portrayed by extremists as a [religious and ethnic struggle](#), resonates with local communities. Underdevelopment of northern Burkina Faso by the government has strengthened this narrative.

To address underlying economic grievances, the Burkinabe government needs to deliver on its promise to develop the north and prevent a situation in which marginalized Fulani communities become sympathetic to extremist rhetoric. President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré has promised to improve the livelihoods of citizens living in the north through better integration, development, and socioeconomic inclusion of rural areas, but to date has [failed](#) to do so.

To address the growing security threat, the government has already taken some preliminary steps. The Army has deployed the GFAT to the northern part of the country to patrol the porous border with Mali. In addition, President Kaboré appointed [Colonel Major Oumarou Sadou](#) to be the Army Chief in December 2016 in part due to frustration with the former army chief, Pingrenoma Zagré, who was criticized for failing to address terrorism in the north. Oumarou Sadou is from Djibo, where Ansarul Islam is based. One of his first actions was to direct the elite GFAT unit to launch a [raid](#) on an Ansarul Islam base close to the Malian border on March 27, 2017. Eighteen jihadists were killed, although the army was unable to locate Dicko himself. The Burkinabe government has also entered into a military agreement with Mali and Niger to create the [Liptako-Gourma](#) regional task force to counter what has become an increasingly transnational threat. It remains to be seen if the task force can provide a military solution to this regional threat. If the Burkinabe government fails to effectively address the threat from regional and homegrown terrorist groups such as Ansarul Islam, there will be potential for public outcry and political protest.

---

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



# TUNISIA'S TOURIST INDUSTRY: BOUNCING BACK?

By Richard J. Pera

Two highly publicized terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic State (IS) resulted in the deaths of 60 mostly European tourists in Tunisia in 2015. Tunisia's tourist industry, which [accounts for](#) 8 percent of gross domestic product and 300,000 jobs in a country of 11 million people, was hit hard. Tourism [decreased](#) by about 1.5 million visitors annually (about 36 percent in revenues) between 2014 and 2016. The fall in revenues [contributed to](#) a slowdown in economic growth from 2.3 percent in 2014 to 0.8 percent in 2015; sluggish growth continued in 2016, with a 1.3 percent increase. How were the 2015 attacks perceived, what actions has the government taken to boost tourism, and what are the prospects for 2017 and beyond?

## The 2015 Terrorist Attacks

Besides the capital, Tunis, much of Tunisia's tourist industry centers around beach resorts on the northeast Mediterranean coast. The March 2015 terrorist attack on the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, which killed 22 and wounded 50 mostly European visitors, was [depicted by some](#) as a "one off"—an anomaly in an otherwise peaceful vacationland. The June 2015 attack on the Imperial Marhaba seaside resort in Sousse, however, confirmed that European tourists were indeed the primary targets. Europeans are [described by IS](#) as "subjects that make up the crusader alliance fighting the state of the caliphate." Thirty of the 38 killed were Britons. European governments quickly restricted travel to Tunisia, resulting in a precipitous fall in tourism. Over 200 hotels [shuttered](#), and many related businesses cut back or closed, exacerbating Tunisia's [14 percent](#) unemployment rate.

Even worse for Tunisia, families of the deceased are suing the Marhaba tour operator in British courts. The British judge/coroner [ruled](#) that victims had been killed "unlawfully," [describing](#) the Tunisian police response as "at best shambolic and at worst cowardly." The investigation [revealed](#) that one hotel security guard fainted when confronting the attacker and another removed his shirt to conceal that he was a guard. The inquest also [found](#) that police units deliberately delayed arrival at the hotel, allowing the killer more time to attack vacationers.

The Tunisian government disputed the results, [claiming](#) "Tunisia is as safe as London." Some Tunisians interpret the British travel ban as a victory for terrorists and believe their country has been [treated unfairly](#), a "cruel and disproportionate economic penalty on a whole country for the crimes of a few extremists."

## Tunisia Resets Its Tourism Sector

Tunisia has implemented [meaningful changes](#) to prevent a repeat of the Marhaba massacre. Hotel enhancements now include metal detectors and monitored security cameras; under-car mirror inspections; and armed police in uniform and plain clothes working 24 hours each day. The government has also hired consultants to produce a security manual for tourist hotels and museums. Tunisia's Interior Minister, Hedi Majdoub, [explained the changes](#): "We have changed the strategy and decided the best way to combat terrorism is ... to be aggressive and proactive. ... There has been a whole plan for tourist security in towns and hotels."

Tunis has negotiated an ["open skies" agreement](#) with the European Union to expand flights to and from Europe and Tunisia. In an effort to diversify its customer base, it has also marketed Tunisia tourism in specific countries, including China, Russia, and Persian Gulf states. For example, to encourage tourism, Tunisia has [exempted](#) entry visas for Chinese citizens. In the case of Russia, Tunisia was a fortuitous beneficiary of changes in Russian policy. [Russia restricted](#) its citizens from visiting Egypt following the IS downing of a Russian charter aircraft in October 2015. Similarly, [Russia restricted](#) its citizens



A guard stands at the entrance of the Tunisian hotel where foreign tourists were massacred in 2015, as it reopened Tuesday May 2, 2017, in Sousse. The hotel has been renamed the hotel Kantaoui Bay. (Source: AP Photo/Sami Boukef.)

from visiting Turkey following that nation's attack on a Russian, Syria-deployed military aircraft in December 2015. Many Russians sought alternative destinations in 2016, and Tunisia experienced a [1,000 percent increase](#) in tourism from Russia. Tunisia has [adapted](#) to the influx of Russians by offering Cyrillic restaurant menus, offering Russian-language courses to hospitality workers, and opening a tourist bureau in Moscow. Russia lifted travel restrictions to Turkey in June 2016 and Egypt in February 2017, and it remains to be seen if Russians will continue to frequent Tunisia in the long term.

Tunisia is marketing [new or rebranded products](#) in specific subsectors to further diversify its tourist industry:

- Organic foods.
- Medical tourism—including cosmetic surgery and dental care.
- Well-being—including spas, thermal baths, and thalassotherapy.
- Sports—emphasizing golf.
- Culture—festivals, museums, and archeology.
- Enology—emphasizing Tunisian wines.
- Jewish tourism—revitalizing the [Jewish pilgrimage](#) to the “Ghriba” (on the island of Djerba), Africa's oldest synagogue. It is believed to have been founded in 586 BC by Jews fleeing the destruction of Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem. (Note: This event, which attracted 8,000 pilgrims in 2001, now attracts fewer than 2,000; attendance was affected by an al-Qaida suicide bombing near the site in 2002.)

The Tunisian Ministry of Tourism launched a “[Discover Tunisia](#)” campaign in 2017 that it plans to market digitally in nine languages. The campaign employs both traditional and social media, including bus shelter displays in Paris, Berlin, Milan, Brussels, and London, and “#TrueTunisia” on Twitter. Last year, the ministry recruited foreign bloggers, dubbed “[web influencers](#),” to become tourism ambassadors on social media as part of its “#RiseTunisia” campaign.

## Prospects for 2017 and Beyond

[Independent research](#) projects that Tunisia's tourism sector will grow by 3.8 percent in 2017 and 3.9 percent per annum through 2027. Figures for early 2017 are promising, with a [10 percent](#) rise in tourist entries in January compared with the same time in 2016. The Tunisian government [projects](#) the tourist sector will “grow by 30 percent compared to last year . . . [reaching] at least 6.5 million tourists”—up from 5.7 million in 2016. Several European countries, including France and Germany, have already lifted travel restrictions. The United States does not restrict travel to tourist areas in Tunisia. The Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark maintain restrictions. The United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has [extended](#) restrictions several times; the latest extension runs through May 16, 2017. A representative of the Tunisian National Tourist Office [noted the importance of FCO decisions](#): “Everybody is watching the UK . . . even a partial lifting of the ban—including key resorts like the island of Djerba, Hammamet and Port El Kantaoui [near Sousse] . . . would be a symbol of hope that might encourage governments around the world to do the same.”

It is likely the UK will lift restrictions, if not in May 2017, then not long afterward, especially given the passage of time since the judge/coroner's statements in the Sousse inquest were made public. Some British tourists seem ready to return; [1,500 Britons](#) ignored their government's advice and traveled to Tunisia in January 2017, attracted by low prices. If the FCO modifies its position, it will take time for British tourism to approach 2014's [425,000 visitor mark](#). Large travel companies like [Thomas Cook](#), which canceled all holiday bookings in 2017, would require time to ramp up again.

The key variable in the tourist equation, though, is not policy; it is security. Will Tunisia's security enhancements be adequate to deter an attack and make tourists feel safe enough to return? For this, only time will tell.

---

Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



## PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE IN KENYA'S 2017 ELECTIONS

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

Chaotic [primary](#) elections in Kenya in April 2017 left two dead and 63 arrested. Clashes plagued [both](#) the incumbent Jubilee party, led by current president Uhuru Kenyatta, and the opposition National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition, led by former prime minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party. The violence during the primaries has raised [fears](#) of both pre- and post-election violence surrounding Kenya's national elections scheduled for August 2017. What are the prospects for violence in the upcoming elections in Kenya? [more...](#)



From left, Kalonzo Mousyoka, Moses Wetangula, Raila Odinga, and Musalia Mudavadi attend a rally at Uhuru Park in Nairobi, Kenya, Thursday, April 27, 2017. The National Super Alliance, an alliance of Kenya's main opposition groups, announced in a rally attended by thousands of supporters that former Prime Minister Raila Odinga will run for the presidency with former Vice President Kalonzo Mousyoka as his running mate. (Source: AP Photo/Khalil Senosi.)

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## COMBATting THE SMALL ARMS TRADE IN AFRICA

By Sarah Graveline

The trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the African continent presents a major challenge to human security and conflict management. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that there are approximately [100 to 150 million](#) SALW in circulation in Africa, most controlled by nonstate actors. Although African states are party to a variety of regional and international agreements to prevent the spread of illicit SALW, enforcement of these agreements has been mixed. Illicit transfers remain a significant risk across the continent. [more...](#)



In this Wednesday, July 13, 2011 photo, young men herd cattle through the mud-caked streets of Pibor, South Sudan. Cattle raiding between some of the south's dozens of tribes, many of them cattle herders by culture and occupation, has plagued the region. (Source: AP Photo/Maggie Fick.)

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE IN KENYA'S 2017 ELECTIONS

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

Chaotic [primary](#) elections in Kenya in April 2017 left two dead and 63 arrested. Clashes plagued [both](#) the incumbent Jubilee party, led by current president Uhuru Kenyatta, and the opposition National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition, led by former prime minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party. The violence during the primaries has raised [fears](#) of both pre- and post-election violence surrounding Kenya's national elections scheduled for August 2017. What are the prospects for violence in the upcoming elections in Kenya?

## Background

Kenya is a lower-middle-income country located in East Africa with a population of [46 million](#). Although it has a reputation as a stable country in a largely unstable region, Kenya has a long [history](#) of violent elections. While Kenya's most recent 2013 elections were [largely](#) peaceful, the disputed December 2007 vote brought the country to the edge of civil war, with ethnically driven post-election violence leaving over [1,200](#) killed and 600,000 displaced. A political agreement and government of national unity ended the violence and led to a host of reforms, including a new constitution passed in 2010. In the 2013 elections, which ended the period of unity government, Kenyatta prevailed by a thin margin against Odinga. Citing voting discrepancies and the failure of a new electronic voting system, Odinga contested the results, but the Kenyan Supreme Court upheld the results and [ruled](#) in Kenyatta's favor.



From left, Kalonzo Mousyoka, Moses Wetangula, Raila Odinga, and Musalia Mudavadi attend a rally at Uhuru Park in Nairobi, Kenya, Thursday, April 27, 2017. The National Super Alliance, an alliance of Kenya's main opposition groups, announced in a rally attended by thousands of supporters that former Prime Minister Raila Odinga will run for the presidency with his former Vice President Kalonzo Mousyoka as his running mate. (Source: AP Photo/Khalil Senosi.)

## Primary Election Tensions

Developments ahead of Kenya's next national elections have raised [fears](#) that the relatively peaceful 2013 poll may have been an anomaly. Kenya's April 2017 primary elections were hotly contested. Devolution of power to the local level, stemming from the new 2010 constitution, has increased the importance of the country's primary elections. Indeed, as highlighted in the April 27 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, more than 1,900 national and county positions will be contested in the August elections. As noted, violence accompanied [both](#) the Jubilee and NASA April 2017 contests, leaving two dead and 63 arrested on a variety of charges. Jubilee was [forced](#) to reschedule its primaries when higher than expected voter turnout led to insufficient voting materials, while infighting within NASA, centered on who would lead the opposition alliance, also led to several delays. In addition, in Mombasa, on Kenya's coast, a politician was recently [charged](#) with inciting violence.

## Fears of Violence

The disorderly nature and violence in both major parties' primary contests have led many to worry about renewed violence in the August elections. A recent [poll](#) found that 60 percent of Kenyans' "single biggest worry for 2017 is election-related violence." On a recent fact-finding mission, the National Democratic Institute [reported](#) that "numerous stakeholders asserted to the delegation that the question is not whether there will be violence but how much and where." Sekou Toure Otondi, a researcher based at the University of Nairobi, [worries history could repeat itself](#): "If the [primary] violence isn't contained it could be a harbinger of things to come when Kenyans go to the polls in August."

## What Are the Risks?

While there is certainly cause for concern, and circumstances could change quickly, several factors may militate against the risk of widespread violence surrounding upcoming elections in Kenya: the closeness of the vote, the conduct of



the losing candidate—which will be affected by trust in the judiciary and other electoral institutions—and the role of the police (who [played](#) a leading role in the 2007–2008 violence).

Research on election violence in both [Africa](#) and [beyond](#) finds that very close elections are more likely to be violent. As [argued](#) by scholars Emilie Hafner-Burton, Susan Hyde, and Ryan Jablonski: “a leader who is confident of victory has little reason to use election violence.” That Kenyatta appears to be comfortably in the driver’s seat in Kenya suggests that the incumbent party may not need to engage in any “[strategic](#)” election violence to win the vote or remain in power. A March 2017 [poll](#) found that Kenyatta’s Jubilee party has 40 percent of the electorate, while Odinga’s NASA came in at 32 percent. The existence of what Hafner-Burton and her co-authors term “institutionalized constraints”—in Kenya these mainly consist of a largely revamped judiciary and relatively active [parliament](#)—may also help to reduce election violence in the August vote. [That is](#), “institutionalized constraints on an incumbent’s decision-making powers make violent election strategies hard to implement and risky.” Recent poll [findings](#) in Kenya are generally encouraging on this front, with 89 percent of Kenyans asserting that they will accept the election results and 72.8 percent of Kenyans having confidence in the country’s electoral commission.

## Conclusion

In light of these research findings, if current conditions hold, local-level violence in Kenya’s 2017 elections appears likely, but a conflagration on the scale of 2007–2008 may turn out to be less of a risk. Indeed, as [argued](#) by the scholar Ken Opalo, due to devolution, the local level may be the most hotly contested: “I am not too worried about the national elections. The real action will likely be at the county level. There will most certainly be violence. But again, that will be more a reflection of what is at stake, rather than some descent into complete chaos and state failure.”

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# COMBATting THE SMALL ARMS TRADE IN AFRICA

By Sarah Graveline

The trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the African continent presents a major challenge to human security and conflict management. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that there are approximately [100 to 150 million](#) SALW in circulation in Africa, most controlled by nonstate actors. Although African states are party to a variety of regional and international agreements to prevent the spread of illicit SALW, enforcement of these agreements has been mixed. Illicit transfers remain a significant risk across the continent.

## SALW Impact in Africa

The availability of SALW contributes to the spread of regional and local conflict in Africa. Weapons are transferred to nonstate actors from a variety of [sources](#), including leakage from state-controlled depots, the black market, unregulated local production, and external transfers from third states. While the transfer of SALW is rarely a direct cause of conflict, the presence of readily available weapons lowers the barrier of entry to violence and can worsen the impact of a conflict.

This dynamic has become apparent in pastoralist conflicts in both East and West Africa. In Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, traditional cattle rustling has grown more deadly as the widespread presence of SALW has created an [arms race](#) between cattle-herding communities. Raids are increasingly undertaken for [commercial](#) purposes in which cattle are sold rather than incorporated into raiders' own herds. The profit incentive, in combination with access to SALW, has led to tit-for-tat killings that are no longer easily addressed by traditional [dispute-resolution](#) mechanisms. Similarly, in Nigeria, conflict between pastoralists and farmers in the Middle Belt region is intensified by the circulation of an estimated [5,000 SALW](#).

Civil war and regional conflicts are also affected by SALW transfers. In his 2015 [report](#) on SALW, the UN Secretary-General argued that "the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition is a key enabler of conflict." Recently this dynamic has become evident in South Sudan where, despite government [use](#) of heavy arms and attack helicopters, widespread use of SALW presents a higher risk to civilians.

## Understanding SALW Regulation

African states are signatory to a variety of conventions to regulate SALW transfers. At the regional level, through the 2000 [Bamako Declaration](#), the African Union (AU) developed a "common position to control the circulation, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons." The Bamako Declaration, which guides AU policy on SALW regulation, directly informed the [2011](#) Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which calls on AU member states to work through the AU-Regions Standing Committee on SALW to coordinate policy at the regional level.

At the subregional level, agreements include the [2001](#) Southern African Development Commission (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials; the [2004](#) Nairobi Protocol on the Control, Prevention and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons; the [2006](#) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunitions and Other Related Materials; and the [2010](#) Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. These agreements set out regional policy to regulate SALW transfers or sales and establish guidelines for tracking state-owned SALW.

At the international level, African states are 37 of the 130 states [signatory](#) to the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty, a multilateral treaty "regulating the international trade in conventional arms." The treaty [requires](#) states that have signed and ratified it to



In this Wednesday, July 13, 2011 photo, young men herd cattle through the mud-caked streets of Pibor, South Sudan. Cattle raiding between some of the south's dozens of tribes, many of them cattle herders by culture and occupation, has plagued the region. (Source: AP Photo/Maggie Fick.)



develop controls for ammunition, to report exports to the UN, and to refrain from exporting SALW if there is an “overriding risk” the recipient will use the weapons to attack civilians.

## Does Regulation Work?

Although conventions to regulate SALW transfers are important in setting regional and international norms, their overall impact in Africa is questionable. Interlocking UN, regional, and subregional conventions mean most African states should have systems developed to track and monitor state-owned SALW, but [research](#) from the Small Arms Survey (an independent research program) on the implementation of these agreements finds many states have significant gaps in record keeping, tracing, stockpile management, and international transfer controls.

In addition, African governments have largely failed to enforce regulations that seek to curtail illicit transfers of privately held SALW. For example, although the Nairobi Protocol calls for signatory states to regulate small arms sales by requiring brokers to be licensed, six years after the Protocol entered into force, none of the [signatory states](#) had begun to fully enforce this requirement.

It is unclear if international enforcement efforts are any more effective. The UN currently mandates arms [embargoes](#) on transfers to the Central African Republic, the Darfur region of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia. Researchers have found, however, that these embargoes are regularly [violated](#). In some cases, their perceived effectiveness has more to do with market conditions than cooperation with the embargo. For example, in Somalia in [2012](#), declining SALW availability was due primarily to the closure of weapons markets in Yemen, traditionally a key supplier to Somalia, rather than purposeful compliance with the embargo.

## Conclusion

African governments and international actors have long been aware of the challenge posed by SALW transfers on the continent. Weapons that are durable, portable, and affordable are dangerous to civilians and government institutions alike. Regulatory measures undertaken to control the flow of state-owned SALW are an important step, but, to date, these conventions have not been fully enforced.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES: ESSENTIAL FOR A HIGHER EDUCATION AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CAPACITY

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

Universities are important vehicles for educating a country's rising workforce as well as creating and disseminating knowledge through research in a range of academic fields. Effective universities ensure that students are equipped with the skills they need to find fulfilling employment and contribute research relevant to a country's national development. African universities, however, have proven to be largely [ineffective](#) in both these functions. While some innovative concepts have been applied that have the potential to drastically alter the delivery of higher education in Africa, rapidly increasing enrollment will continue to pose a challenge to these public institutions unless resources are increased to support their research-based operations. [more...](#)



Student holds a placard as riot police officers watch during their protest against university tuition hikes outside the union building in Pretoria, South Africa, Friday, October 23, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Themba Hadebe.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## INDEFINITE CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCED IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On May 4, 2017, Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the RENAMO opposition party (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in Mozambique, [announced](#) an indefinite cease-fire with the government and ruling FRELIMO party (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), led by President Filipe Nyusi. The two parties have been engaged in a simmering conflict since 2013, during which Mozambique has been beset by violent clashes between RENAMO fighters loyal to Dhlakama and state security forces. While the announcement is certainly an encouraging sign, many of the specifics of the cease-fire arrangement remain murky, and questions remain about whether the agreement between the longtime opponents will hold. [more...](#)



Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, president of Mozambique, here speaks during the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, Wednesday, Sept. 21, 2016, at U.N. headquarters. (Source: AP Photo/Frank Franklin II.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES: ESSENTIAL FOR A HIGHER EDUCATION AND INDIGENOUS RESEARCH CAPACITY

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

Universities are important vehicles for educating a country's rising workforce as well as creating and disseminating knowledge through research in a range of academic fields. Effective universities ensure that students are equipped with the skills they need to find fulfilling employment and contribute research relevant to a country's national development. African universities, however, have proven to be largely [ineffective](#) in both these functions. While some innovative concepts have been applied that have the potential to drastically alter the delivery of higher education in Africa, rapidly increasing enrollment will continue to pose a challenge to these public institutions unless resources are increased to support their research-based operations.

## Background

Following the wave of independence movements that spread across Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, numerous African universities enjoyed a [period of distinction](#) characterized by academic excellence, critical thinking, and important research contributions in the fields of social and economic development. [Research](#) on the subject of graduate education in sub-Saharan Africa shows that until the 1970s, faculty was highly educated, class sizes were small, schools were well funded through public and private means, and graduates typically found employment in the public sector. The research capacity of universities was equally as commendable, with high academic publication output and many new research initiatives. By the mid-1970s, however, the status of African universities began to wane as many countries faced economic crises and governments could not sustain the same level of support they had provided to public universities in previous years. Universities were also viewed as a source of political opposition as post-independence politics became more hostile.

In the 1980s, [international support](#) for education in Africa skyrocketed, but it focused heavily on primary education, thus contributing to the further neglect of higher education. By the 1990s, the high costs associated with developments in information technology (IT) and other sophisticated scientific fields precluded many African universities from participating in advanced scientific fields of research. Enrollment in African universities nevertheless climbed sharply, from fewer than [200,000 in 1970 to around 10 million](#) today, due in part to a massive [youth bulge](#), placing more pressure than ever on university faculty, infrastructure, and resources. As a result of these combined factors, the quality of teaching [deteriorated](#) significantly. Likewise, the quality of research has [declined](#) as fewer resources are available to support faculty research. Given the importance of higher education and applied research to advance Africa economically, socially, and technically, this deterioration of African universities represents a significant capacity gap for many nations.

## An African University Education Today

Most public African universities today suffer from the same condition: rapidly rising enrollment coupled with insufficient government funding. This affects the education received by students in several ways. First, the [poor treatment](#) of faculty (budget cuts, hiring freezes, low salaries, and low staff-to-student ratios) has driven many qualified faculty to seek positions abroad and has discouraged new graduates from pursuing careers in academia. Today, there is a distinct



Student holds a placard as riot police officers watch during their protest against university tuition hikes outside the union building in Pretoria, South Africa, Friday, October 23, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Themba Hadebe.)

[shortage](#) of faculty members with advanced degrees, particularly professors with PhDs. Scarce funding limits universities' capacity to implement graduate programs, thus contributing to this shortage of PhDs.

Second, [limited resources](#) prevent universities from having adequate facilities to deliver a university-level education to a growing number of students. This is especially evident in advanced scientific, engineering, and knowledge-based fields, where expensive equipment and sophisticated laboratories are required. Although concentrating resources in social science departments was once appropriate to prepare students for public sector jobs, [today](#) demand is greater in the private sector, where employers need "industry-ready" graduates with degrees in technical, knowledge-based fields. Unfortunately, most African universities today are [failing](#) to produce these types of graduates.

One solution proposed by some African governments to overcome this financial challenge is drastic tuition hikes, which have been met with resistance by students. In South Africa in 2015, for example, proposed tuition increases of between 10 percent and 12 percent sparked [massive student protests](#). Students [complained](#) their schools were underfunded and understaffed, despite increased government funding and their high tuition rates.

### **African Universities' Research Capacity**

Universities provide more than a higher education for students—they also [contribute](#) valuable research to governments and the private sector, which makes it possible for their countries to compete effectively in an increasingly sophisticated and globalized world. African universities today, however, have limited research capacity as evidenced by their [low output](#) of academic publications in peer-reviewed journals. (Only one African country, South Africa, is among the top 50 countries globally in terms of research output; fewer than 10 African countries are in the top 100.) This deficiency is primarily the result of tight budgets that provide [little administrative support](#) to faculty to cover the costs of their research. Often the most qualified researchers [leave their positions](#) in African universities to pursue better paying jobs abroad. A similar problem affects students. As one [source](#) asserts, "about ten per cent of every cohort of Sub-Saharan Africans with graduate degrees emigrates, leaving a comparatively low number of researchers in most African countries."

Yet Africa is arguably one of the most complex continents socially, economically, and politically, and in great need of applied research to address the multitude of challenges it faces. One [study](#) of qualitative data available for analysis of Africa-specific issues found a significant dearth of local, regional, and national level data, due in large part to the low capacity of African research institutions to collect it. The study recommends strengthening the indigenous capacity of these institutions to collect local data and suggests that doing so will enable them to advance fields of research pertinent to Africa's social, economic, developmental, and security challenges.

### **Online/Distance Learning—A New Approach to Higher Education**

In an increasingly internet-connected Africa, online learning has become a popular alternative for students who may not have the resources or access to a traditional university. Open Educational Resources (OER), and specifically Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), are examples of the types of educational resources available to anyone with internet access. The [World Bank](#) has sponsored projects to accelerate youth employment in Tanzania through MOOCs by training students in market-relevant IT skills. Similarly, the [African Virtual University](#) (AVU) is a pan-African effort to create an open and affordable distance-learning institution to serve the African continent. Such innovative approaches to the delivery of higher education may provide affordable education and marketable skills to Africans who do not have access to brick-and-mortar institutions.

### **Looking Ahead**

The challenges that have plagued African universities over the last several decades will continue to exist, and will be amplified as a massive youth bulge ensures the continuation of high enrollment rates. The importance of modernizing Africa's higher education system is widely recognized. Public-private partnerships may be one way to overcome the challenge of



limited government funding available to public universities. The [African Network of Scientific and Technological Institutions](#) and the [African Higher Education Summit](#) are just two examples of collaboration and dialogue among like-minded partners seeking to advance the goal of modernizing Africa's higher education system. In addition, African universities will need to consider reorienting their curricula to focus on programs that will be applicable in a knowledge-based global economy and produce appropriately skilled graduates for 21st century jobs. Online learning through MOOCs or virtual universities has the potential to be transformative in the delivery of such skills to students with limited means. It does not, however, address the gap in African universities' low research capacity and limited ability to undertake research in academic fields relevant to their national development.

---

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# INDEFINITE CEASE-FIRE ANNOUNCED IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On May 4, 2017, Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the RENAMO opposition party (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in Mozambique, [announced](#) an indefinite cease-fire with the government and ruling FRELIMO party (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), led by President Filipe Nyusi. The two parties have been engaged in a simmering conflict since 2013, during which Mozambique has been beset by violent clashes between RENAMO fighters loyal to Dhlakama and state security forces. While the announcement is certainly an encouraging sign, many of the specifics of the cease-fire arrangement remain murky, and questions remain about whether the agreement between the longtime opponents will hold.



Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, president of Mozambique, here speaks during the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, Wednesday, Sept. 21, 2016, at U.N. headquarters. (Source: AP Photo/Frank Franklin II.)

## Background

Mozambique is a [low-income](#) country located in southern Africa with a population of 28 million. The FRELIMO and RENAMO parties have a long history. The two parties fought a brutal 16-year civil war that left close to a [million](#) dead. The war ended in 1992 with the signing of the Rome peace accords. FRELIMO won elections in 1994 and has continued its ballot success since. After two decades of relative peace under FRELIMO's rule, a rise in political violence beginning in 2013 has [threatened](#) renewed conflict in Mozambique.

From 2013 to late 2016, a [series](#) of skirmishes took place between RENAMO fighters and the FRELIMO-led government. As [covered](#) in previous [editions](#) of *Africa Watch*, these incidents of political violence included attacks on police stations, military outposts, and key transport routes such as highways and railways. [Dozens](#) have been killed in the fighting, which has included [assassinations](#) of officials in both parties. Up to 15,000 people have been displaced. Dhlakama and his supporters cite a number of [grievances](#) against the FRELIMO government, including unequal sharing of state resources, unfair electoral laws, and a lack of sufficient integration of former RENAMO combatants into the military. Dhlakama's RENAMO fighters are made up of approximately 800 former guerillas who were not disarmed after the civil war.

## Elections, Ceasefires, and Political Deals

After RENAMO boycotted local elections in 2013, RENAMO and the FRELIMO government agreed on a [number](#) of political agreements and cease-fires before the 2014 national elections. These deals included a few key concessions by the government, such as a revamped electoral commission with more opposition members represented. In the 2014 elections, FRELIMO again prevailed, although by a less convincing margin than in past contests. FRELIMO's Nyusi [won](#) 57 percent of the vote, while RENAMO's Dhlakama took 36 percent (another opposition party leader, Daviz Simango of the MDM [Movimento Democrático de Moçambique], came in at 6 percent). FRELIMO captured 144 seats in parliament (down from 191), while RENAMO increased its share from 51 to 89 seats (MDM won 17). Despite their increased seats in parliament, Dhlakama and RENAMO disputed the results, [claiming](#) fraud and electoral irregularities. Violence continued, and a series of negotiations that came to include international representatives from South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania, the European Union (EU), and the Vatican [failed](#) to bring about a lasting agreement between RENAMO and the government.

## Indefinite Cease-fire

International negotiators departed Mozambique in December 2016 largely empty-handed, but domestic mediation efforts continued. In late December 2016, a weeklong cease-fire was [announced](#) after a phone call between Nyusi and Dhlakama. That arrangement was renewed twice, each time for 60 days. On May 4, 2017, Dhlakama [announced](#) the indefinite truce, saying that the deal marked the "beginning of the end of war" in Mozambique. While many details of



the cease-fire remain unclear, one of the major components is the removal of government forces from areas surrounding Dhlakama's base in Gorongosa (Dhlakama [asserts](#) there are more than 26 government bases in the region). The removal of troops has [reportedly](#) already begun, and Dhlakama maintains that he has a "verbal agreement" with Nyusi that this action will be completed by the end of June this year. Two centers, located in Maputo and Gorongosa, have been established to monitor the cease-fire. The centers are staffed by both RENAMO and government forces.

Dhlakama appears to have shifted his confrontational and violent strategy largely due to concerns from the business community, [acknowledging](#) "I have changed my strategy because I was listening to people, particularly some business people who were afraid." In his public comments Dhlakama signaled that the truce is aimed at bringing lost investment back to the country, [saying](#) "peace is becoming effective peace. The truce is more to reassure Mozambicans, business people, intellectuals and foreigners, that Mozambique now has another image, an image of peace, tranquility and of a country that has all the conditions for investment."

While Nyusi's calculus for agreeing to the cease-fire is less clearly discernible, FRELIMO's upcoming leadership conference in September—where the party will select its leader—appears to have played a role, as a peace deal would [bolster](#) his hand ahead of the conference. Other factors that likely helped push Nyusi to the bargaining table include Mozambique's [declining](#) economic fortunes and FRELIMO's diminishing political dominance.

## Conclusion

Given past violations of cease-fires between FRELIMO and RENAMO, it is uncertain whether the latest truce will hold in the long term. That said, the announcement of the indefinite cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities since January 2017 is an encouraging sign that both parties may finally be willing to negotiate in good faith. The prospects for long-term peace in Mozambique might be increased if regional and international entities supported the latest cease-fire and urged the parties to strive for a comprehensive agreement that addresses outstanding issues and that includes effective monitoring and enforcement arrangements.

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT OVER LAND IN KENYA

By George F. Ward

Considerable attention has been paid to conflicts in West Africa involving nomadic pastoralists. As recently as 2014, militants linked to the pastoralist Fulani ethnic grouping in Nigeria were the [fourth most deadly](#) terrorist group in the world. Although they have been less lethal than those in West Africa, conflicts involving pastoralists over land in Kenya have also long existed. Recently, these long-simmering conflicts have resulted in [significant violence](#). The most recent violence in Kenya has roots in a complex mixture of ethnic conflict, economic exigencies related to climate change, and national and local politics. The interplay of these elements is worth examining. [more...](#)



A Turkana herdsman in Lokubae, Turkana region, Kenya, during greener times in 2006. Photo courtesy of the author.

---

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## RWANDA ELECTIONS WILL LIKELY REINFORCE THE STATUS QUO

By Sarah Graveline

On August 4, 2017, Rwandan citizens will vote in national elections, where it is widely expected that current President Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, will win another term. In December 2015, Rwandans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a [referendum](#) to allow Kagame to stand for three more terms, meaning he could potentially remain in office until 2034. Under Kagame's leadership, Rwanda's economy and health outcomes have improved, but the country is no longer a "donor darling" due to mounting criticism over domestic repression and Rwanda's record of arming rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite donor concerns, however, few changes are expected in the 2017 elections. [more...](#)



In this Monday, April 7, 2014, file photo, Rwandan President Paul Kagame addresses the public and dignitaries at a ceremony to mark the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, at Amahoro stadium in Kigali, Rwanda. (Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.)

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT OVER LAND IN KENYA

By George F. Ward

Considerable attention has been paid to conflicts in West Africa involving nomadic pastoralists. As recently as 2014, militants linked to the pastoralist Fulani ethnic grouping in Nigeria were the [fourth most deadly](#) terrorist group in the world. Although they have been less lethal than those in West Africa, conflicts involving pastoralists over land in Kenya have also long existed. Recently, these long-simmering conflicts have resulted in [significant violence](#). The most recent violence in Kenya has roots in a complex mixture of ethnic conflict, economic exigencies related to climate change, and national and local politics. The interplay of these elements is worth examining.



A Turkana herdsman in Lokubae, Turkana region, Kenya, during greener times in 2006. Photo courtesy of the author.

## Herders and Farmers

Although the recent violence in Kenya has been described in the press as between Pokot and Samburu pastoralists and sedentary farmers in the Laikipia region, the reality is more complex. To begin, as Francis P. Conant pointed out in 1965, the Pokot people of west-central Kenya traditionally included [groups of both farmers and herders](#). In their traditional homelands, the Pokot worked out a variable means of describing and managing physical and social space that took into account the needs of farmers and pastoralists and facilitated coexistence. When violence took place in that context, it was usually between pastoralists of different ethnic groupings—for example, between the [Pokot and Samburu](#) or between the [Pokot and Turkana](#). The objective of these inter-ethnic clashes was more often cattle rustling rather than occupation of new grazing areas.

## Pressures of Change

Periodic episodes of drought have long been characteristic of life in northern Kenya. Writing in 1990, J. Terrence McCabe argued that periodic droughts served as a [useful means](#) of keeping livestock populations in check, preventing the overburdening of the land. While that may have been the case in the past, the changing climate of recent years has produced more frequent droughts. At the same time, the populations of the pastoralist groups and their livestock have grown. The result has been greater herding activity and thereby greater pressure on scarce water resources. At the same time, the pastoralists began to move out of their traditional lands in search of better grazing land and water.

## Herders versus Farmers

In early 2015, Kenyan news media began reporting incursions by Pokot herders and large numbers of animals into Baringo County, which lies south of the traditional Pokot territory in West Pokot county. According to the Kenya News Agency, the herders [displaced residents](#) from their farms and destroyed infrastructure facilities such as schools and water points. The Kenyan government responded with a [police operation](#) aimed at forcing the invading herders off the lands that they had occupied. That operation has not stopped the Pokot incursions, but has forced the herders to leave some of the land that they had occupied. In the process, many animals died, and [human food insecurity](#) increased. When 3,000 Pokot herders were [evicted](#) from Baringo county in early 2017, they lost 5,000 animals.

## Herders versus Large Landowners

More recently, a new chapter in Kenya's land conflicts began as herders occupied areas only around a three-hour drive from the capital of Nairobi. In February 2017, reports said that [10,000 herders](#) armed with automatic weapons and driving 135,000 cattle had occupied large private farms and ranches, nature conservancies, and traditional smallholdings in Laikipia county, one of Kenya's most important wildlife areas. The pastoralists reportedly killed wildlife both for sport and

The opinions expressed in these commentaries are those of the authors and should not be viewed as representing the official position of the Institute for Defense Analyses or its sponsors. Links to web sites are for informational purposes only and not an endorsement.

to reduce competition for scarce water and grazing. Elephants, giraffes, zebras, lions, and even family dogs perished. More tragically, the herders have [murdered](#) around 35 inhabitants of the area. They [killed](#) prominent British-Kenyan rancher Tristan Voorspuy and wounded Italian-born conservationist and author Kuki Gallman, whose memoir had been made into the feature film *I Dreamed of Africa*.

## Politics Aggravates the Conflict

Many of the large farms, ranches, and safari operations in Laikipia are run by the descendants of European settlers. Others are owned by wealthy and prominent indigenous Kenyans, including former President Mwai Kibaki's nephew, George Mwachira Mwai, who was [shot and injured](#) in July. Some of the owners of large farms see the incursions as politically instigated rather than as driven by need. For example, [Martin Evans](#), chairman of the Laikipia Farmers' Association, pointed out, "And when this thing happened, it wasn't a matter of drought. It was a normal rainy season when they came in . . . . They're using the cattle as a tool, a battering ram, to just take over private property."

According to observers, two political factors have helped aggravate the conflict. The first is related to the new constitution that Kenya adopted in 2010, after the post-election violence of 2007–2008. Under the [new constitution](#), authority and revenue were devolved from the federal government to 47 new county governments. The changes brought development to neglected parts of the country, but also created many new local government positions with relatively lucrative budgets and salaries. This has led to cutthroat political competition that may have encouraged violence. For example, in the case of Laikipia, one local politician, Mathew Lempurkel, was arrested for allegedly inciting the invaders who murdered Tristan Voorspuy. Lempurkel's public statements could be viewed in that light. He [told](#) a writer for *Foreign Policy*, "We have historical injustices which we feel should be addressed. There's nothing special the white ranchers are doing that we cannot do. If it's about conservation, we conserved those animals before they came to this country."

The other political factor is the approach of national elections in August 2017. Some observers believe that the national government has been [slow](#) to take aggressive action against the herders because it fears being perceived as supporting white landowners over indigenous populations. Indeed, President Uhuru Kenyatta did not deploy the army to Laikipia to support police efforts until months into the crisis—and after the murder of Tristan Voorspuy.

## Conclusion

The events in Laikipia have brought herder-pastoralist conflicts to the doorstep of the capital. The loss of game reserves and conservancies in Laikipia will probably result in a decrease in revenue from Kenya's tourism industry, a major pillar of a national economy that was already under strain because of concerns over terrorism. Perhaps that factor will incentivize the government to put in place programs aimed at offering nomadic pastoralist communities alternative economic opportunities in an era of persistent droughts. In any event, it will be important for the government to work to avoid the possibility that conflict over land might fuel electoral violence as the August 2017 polls approach.

---

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



# RWANDA ELECTIONS WILL LIKELY REINFORCE THE STATUS QUO

By Sarah Graveline

On August 4, 2017, Rwandan citizens will vote in national elections, where it is widely expected that current President Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, will win another term. In December 2015, Rwandans voted overwhelmingly in favor of a [referendum](#) to allow Kagame to stand for three more terms, meaning he could potentially remain in office until 2034. Under Kagame's leadership, Rwanda's economy and health outcomes have improved, but the country is no longer a "donor darling" due to mounting criticism over domestic repression and Rwanda's record of arming rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite donor concerns, however, few changes are expected in the 2017 elections.



In this Monday, April 7, 2014, file photo, Rwandan President Paul Kagame addresses the public and dignitaries at a ceremony to mark the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, at Amahoro stadium in Kigali, Rwanda. (Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.)

## The Rwandan Miracle

In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 [genocide](#), in which the Hutu Interahamwe militia and ordinary citizens killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi over a period of 100 days, few could have predicted the positive changes the country would undergo over the next two decades. The genocide ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Uganda-based rebel group led by Kagame, occupied the capital of Kigali and pushed Hutu perpetrators and civilians across the border into the DRC. After securing a military victory, the RPF consolidated political rule into a new government that developed policies for transitional justice, economic growth, and development. [Pasteur Bizimungu](#), one of the few Hutu RPF members, was appointed president, although he was ousted in 2000 and replaced by Kagame, who initially served as vice president.

The Rwandan government and international community pursued justice along several tracks. The United Nations (UN) appointed an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to "prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994." In addition, the Rwandan government pursued cases through the national courts. The government also established [gacaca courts](#) in which communities tried local cases with the goal of seeking truth and reconciliation. The emphasis on reconciliation means that many perpetrators have returned to their communities and live alongside survivors.

The Rwandan government also pursued aggressive policies to stimulate economic growth and improve national development. The government rolled out a national health care program that has been [credited](#) with lowering rates of maternal death and tropical disease. The government has also pursued policies to jump-start economic growth, developing [infrastructure](#) to help urban areas excel in the IT sector and strategies to move rural society away from subsistence farming. Although poverty rates have [fallen](#) since 1994, the government's rural programming has been [criticized](#) for putting small-scale farmers at risk by mandating centralized production targets.

## Despite Growth, Political Repression Raises Concerns

Over the past decade, Rwanda's reputation as a post-conflict success story has suffered as evidence of government repression surfaced. Speech is tightly controlled, and the state enforces adherence to behavior intended to improve national cohesiveness. Thousands of Rwandans have attended [re-education](#) camps, and the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" have been [banned](#). Human Rights Watch alleges that in urban areas street vendors and beggars, viewed as urban blight, are regularly arrested and held in "[transit centers](#)," under poor conditions. Critics of government policies have been [arrested](#) under the justification that they are promoting genocide ideology or sectarianism.

There are also allegations that the government has harassed students and carried out extrajudicial killings to silence critics. In his 2016 [book](#) *Bad News: Last Journalist in a Dictatorship*, Anjan Sundaram recounts his experience teaching a journalism course in Rwanda from 2010 to 2013 and alleges that his students were either co-opted into writing pro-government propaganda or pressured through intimidation, trumped-up legal charges, and extrajudicial violence to stop writing. He maintains a list of Rwandan journalists who have been killed under mysterious circumstances or forced to leave the country because of state pressure.

Political critics have also been targeted. [Amnesty International](#) alleges that between 2010 and 2012, at least 45 government critics have been extrajudicially detained, and some tortured. Rwandan critics abroad have also been targeted. In 2010 Kayumba Nyamwasa, a former army chief who had fled to South Africa after breaking with Kagame, was shot leaving his home. A South African [court](#) sentenced four Rwandans for the shooting, and the judge claimed the shooting was politically motivated. In [2014](#) Patrick Karegeya, a former intelligence chief turned critic, was killed in South Africa, allegedly by Rwandan agents.

Within Rwanda, opposition figures have been marginalized. [Victoire Ingabire](#), a Hutu politician who returned to Rwanda in 2010 to challenge Kagame for the presidency, was arrested and sentenced for threatening state security. Her supporters maintain the charges are political. More recently, nude photos of opposition politician [Diane Shima Rwigara](#) were distributed online days after Rwigara announced her intent to run against Kagame. The source and authenticity of the photos are unclear.

Kagame faces no real challenge to re-election. Besides Rwigara, [Phillipe Mpayimana](#), a former journalist, and [Frank Habineza](#), leader of the opposition Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, have also announced their intention to run. Their chances, however, are slim. In 2010 Kagame won re-election with 93 percent of the vote, and he will likely win in 2017 again by a large margin. An EU official [noted](#) that the EU would not send observers to monitor the polls because Kagame is likely to win, and concerns over vote rigging are low.

## Creating a “Buffer Zone” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The international community has long been concerned by [Rwanda's](#) support for a series of predominantly Tutsi militias in the DRC. Rwanda considers the eastern DRC to be within its sphere of influence because of its large Rwandan population, the threat posed by the [continued presence](#) of Hutu militants, and the financial benefits Rwanda receives from mineral [smuggling](#) across the border. Since 1994, Rwanda has sought to influence political outcomes in the DRC, initially [partnering](#) with a Congolese dissident group to ultimately overthrow longstanding dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and later offering support to armed proxies.

The humanitarian costs of this sponsorship have been high. The UN [alleges](#) that the Rwandan military killed tens of thousands of civilians in the DRC after the genocide. Rwandan-supplied militias have also been accused of committing [violations against civilians](#). Further, weapons provided by Rwanda circulate among armed groups, contributing to the [widespread proliferation](#) of small arms in the eastern DRC.

## Conclusion

The international community has proved hesitant to pressure Rwanda over domestic repression or its involvement in the DRC. Nevertheless, following a surge in violence by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 in 2012, the United States [withdrew](#) some military assistance, and the United Kingdom [canceled](#) several aid programs. Otherwise, most assistance continued. Rwanda's involvement in the DRC is now at an all-time low, perhaps due in part to this external pressure, but more likely due to the [scarcity](#) of willing Congolese partners following the defeat of M23. As Congolese militias regroup, the possibility of new Rwandan intervention should not be ruled out.

Preoccupied with violence in Burundi, the Central African Republic, and the DRC, the international community seems unlikely to attempt to upset Rwanda's status quo. In the fragile Great Lakes region, Rwanda's stability and growth remain an important asset. In the absence of forces for change, Rwanda will likely continue on its course of increased growth and decreased political freedom.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.


---



## WHAT WILL OIL AND GAS MEAN FOR SENEGAL?

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

In [2014](#), Edinburgh-based Cairn Energy announced it had discovered oil off the shores of Senegal. In [February 2017](#), the Australian company FAR Ltd announced that its data indicated that more than [1.5 billion barrels](#) of crude may exist off the coast of Senegal; Cairn suggested it could begin to reach markets by [2021](#). Meanwhile, the international oil companies BP and Kosmos Energy announced in [May 2017](#) that they had discovered large reserves of natural gas in the deep offshore waters of Mauritania and Senegal. Believing there to be up to [50 trillion cubic feet \(tcf\)](#) of gas off these shores, the partners plan to construct a near-shore liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility and expect to be extracting gas by [2021](#). Senegal's economy is already one of the [fastest growing](#) in sub-Saharan Africa, and its reputation as one of Africa's most politically stable countries is well-deserved. What impact will these newfound oil and gas discoveries have on Senegal? Can its economy withstand an influx of oil and gas revenues without succumbing to deleterious effects common in other oil and gas exporting nations? Can government officials minimize corruption and effectively manage these revenues to support Senegal's rapid development? [more...](#)



Senegal offshore oil exploration by Cairn Energy. (Source: Map adapted from "Building on Success: Cairn in Senegal," <http://tinyurl.com/ybj4ldxr>.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## KASAI CONFLICT HIGHLIGHTS NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

By Sarah Graveline

Accelerating violence in the previously peaceful Kasai region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has [killed](#) 500 and displaced 1.3 million people since January 2017. The current conflict in Kasai began in August 2016 when Congolese security forces killed Jean-Pierre Mpandi, a traditional leader ("tribal chief") agitating against the national government. In response, his supporters took up arms against local security forces. While the grievances underlying the conflict reflect historic frustration with the central government's treatment of the Kasai region, the violence has quickly spread along ethnic lines, creating a cycle of tit-for-tat killings and a proliferation of self-defense militias in the region. This violence is a concerning reflection of the DRC's overall fragility. [more...](#)



Riot police patrol on the streets following protests against President Joseph Kabila's hold on power, in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tuesday, December 20, 2016. (Source: AP Photo/John Bompengo.)

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.


IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# WHAT WILL OIL AND GAS MEAN FOR SENEGAL?

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

In [2014](#), Edinburgh-based Cairn Energy announced it had discovered oil off the shores of Senegal. In [February 2017](#), the Australian company FAR Ltd announced that its data indicated that more than [1.5 billion](#) barrels of crude may exist off the coast of Senegal; Cairn suggested it could begin to reach markets by [2021](#). Meanwhile, the international oil companies BP and Kosmos Energy announced in [May 2017](#) that they had discovered large reserves of natural gas in the deep offshore waters of Mauritania and Senegal. Believing there to be up to [50 trillion cubic feet \(tcf\)](#) of gas off these shores, the partners plan to construct a near-shore liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility and expect to be extracting gas by [2021](#). Senegal's economy is already one of the [fastest growing](#) in sub-Saharan Africa, and its reputation as one of Africa's most politically stable countries is well-deserved. What impact will these newfound oil and gas discoveries have on Senegal? Can its economy withstand an influx of oil and gas revenues without succumbing to deleterious effects common in other oil and gas exporting nations? Can government officials minimize corruption and effectively manage these revenues to support Senegal's rapid development?



Senegal offshore oil exploration by Cairn Energy. (Source: Map adapted from "Building on Success: Cairn in Senegal," <http://tinyurl.com/ybj4ldxr>.)

## Background

Offshore oil and gas exploration in Senegal started in the [1950s](#), but it wasn't until 2014 that Cairn acquired licenses in three offshore blocks held by FAR Ltd and PETROSEN (Senegal's national oil company) and drilled the region's first deep-water wells. The result was the discovery of two major basins (FAN-1 and SNE-1) containing enough oil to make extraction and production commercially viable. A recent [seismic survey](#) conducted by FAR indicates that more than 1.5 billion barrels of oil may exist in these basins; other reports suggest that a peak production rate of [140,000](#) barrels per day is realistic. Since Cairn's discovery, several other energy giants have sought licenses to explore Senegal's offshore waters, the most recent being the French company [Total](#), which signed two agreements with Senegal in May 2017, including one that permits Total to explore Senegal's "ultra-deep" waters.

Also in May, BP and Kosmos [announced](#) their discovery of a major gas reserve in the waters off the shores of Senegal and Mauritania. The Tortue field that straddles Senegal and Mauritania is thought to contain more than [15 tcf](#) of gas, and the Yakaar-1 field (formerly known as Teranga West, situated 95 km northwest of Dakar) contains a similar amount. This entire area is believed to contain up to [50 tcf](#) of gas. Between the Yakaar and Teranga fields, BP and Kosmos believe there are sufficient resources to support the creation of one and possibly two [LNG hubs](#) in the basin and expect their first gas in [2021](#).

## Senegal's Responsible Management of Its Strong Economy

Senegal's [economic performance](#) in 2016 was strong, with an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.6 percent over 2015, making Senegal's economy the second fastest growing in West Africa and the fourth fastest in sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture led growth in 2016 due in part to the government's efforts to promote production of groundnuts, rice, and flowers. Industry also contributed to growth, led by agricultural and fish processing, phosphate mining, fertilizer production, petroleum refining, zircon and gold mining, manufacturing of construction materials, and ship construction and repair. Services, which generate more than half of Senegal's total GDP, also expanded due to advances in transport and financial services.

The IMF predicts this trend will continue in [2017](#). Supporting growth in all sectors is crucial for a country that is about to add oil and gas sectors to its national economic portfolio. With a relatively small economy (GDP of [\\$14.87 billion](#) in 2016),

The opinions expressed in these commentaries are those of the authors and should not be viewed as representing the official position of the Institute for Defense Analyses or its sponsors. Links to web sites are for informational purposes only and not an endorsement.



Senegal's economic well-being could be susceptible to fluctuations in global oil and gas prices unless responsible fiscal management practices are implemented. The government's concerted effort to diversify its economy by growing all sectors is an important way to avoid overdependence on oil and gas revenue as well as to create a local market for these resources.

Senegal's responsible management of its public finances also includes its [precautionary reserve](#), which it inserted in its national budget in 2015 and continued in 2016, per the direction of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). In 2016, this [precautionary reserve](#) totaled approximately \$80 million, of which approximately \$20 million could be used to support the national operating budget (as long as the ministerial departments implemented the reforms in their respective economic sectors, particularly higher education, national education, health and social action) and approximately \$60 million could be used for investment projects whose profitability has been demonstrated by a feasibility study. This practice bodes well for a country that is likely to experience an influx of oil and gas revenues over the next few years.

## Other Encouraging Signs

Senegal has adopted other practical measures that suggest its intent to manage its public finances responsibly. In 2012, it joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Complying with this initiative ensures transparency and accountability of the governance of a country's natural resources.

In May 2017 the World Bank announced it would offer Senegal a [\\$29](#) million International Development Association (IDA) credit to help it negotiate complex oil and gas contracts. The World Bank Country Director for Senegal [explained why it sought the credit](#): "We wanted to make sure that the country, which has no real background to speak of in oil and gas, had access to the best possible technical assistance." This technical assistance will help Senegal to design and negotiate oil and gas development projects that attract private sector investors while supporting the public interest.

## Looking Ahead

Some Senegalese officials have forecast energy [self-sufficiency](#) and the capacity to become a net gas exporter as a result of recent resource discoveries. A more likely scenario is that recent oil and gas discoveries will contribute modestly to much-needed [domestic power generation](#) and support to Senegal's rapidly growing economy and middle class. This assumes, however, that the governments of Senegal and Mauritania collaborate in the construction of an LNG facility and associated infrastructure to transport gas onshore. Senegal will also need to remain committed to the principles of fiscal responsibility and support to all sectors of its economy that it has demonstrated in recent years.

---

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# KASAI CONFLICT HIGHLIGHTS NEW CHALLENGES FOR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

By Sarah Graveline

Accelerating violence in the previously peaceful Kasai region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has [killed](#) 500 and displaced 1.3 million people since January 2017. The current conflict in Kasai began in August 2016 when Congolese security forces killed Jean-Pierre Mpandi, a traditional leader ("tribal chief") agitating against the national government. In response, his supporters took up arms against local security forces. While the grievances underlying the conflict reflect historic frustration with the central government's treatment of the Kasai region, the violence has quickly spread along ethnic lines, creating a cycle of tit-for-tat killings and a proliferation of self-defense militias in the region. This violence is a concerning reflection of the DRC's overall fragility.



Riot police patrol on the streets following protests against President Joseph Kabila's hold on power, in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tuesday, December 20, 2016. (Source: AP Photo/John Bompengo.)

## Legacy of Government Neglect Inflames Current Conflict

The current violence in Kasai, a region located in southern DRC, has its basis in long-standing grievances between locals and the central government. Kasai residents attribute their region's socioeconomic neglect to Kasai's historic position as an opposition stronghold. Following independence from Belgium in 1960, South Kasai launched a [secession](#) attempt, which was violently put down by the central government in 1962. Although the region was largely peaceful both under Mobutu Sese Seko's rule and the post-1997 governments of Laurent and Joseph Kabila, it has remained politically marginalized and under-resourced.

Kasai residents have complained that the central government of the current Kabila administration takes punitive action against the region in response to its widespread [support](#) for the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), whose recently deceased leader Etienne Tshisekedi hailed from Kasai. Many saw the 2015 [decision](#) to split the region into five separate provinces as a tactic by the central government to weaken the region politically and economically. Further, residents expressed frustration with the central government's propensity to control the appointment of local government officials.

This issue came to a head when the central government [refused](#) to recognize locally chosen Jean-Pierre Mpandi as a traditional leader, preferring a candidate who was not perceived to be allied with the opposition. Mpandi began publicly agitating against the central government and was killed by security forces on August 12, 2016. In response, his supporters took up arms, calling themselves [Kamuina Nsapu](#), after the title for Mpandi's hereditary position.

## Violence Is Evident, But Culpability Difficult to Prove

Proliferating violence has made conflict-resolution efforts in Kasai more difficult. There are credible allegations of extrajudicial killings and widespread violence by both Kamuina Nsapu and Congolese security forces. In [March](#), the DRC government reported that Kamuina Nsapu militants had killed 30 police officers in an ambush, while the UN has documented [40](#) mass grave sites likely containing the remains of civilians and militants killed by Congolese forces. In addition, multiple [videos](#) allegedly showing Congolese forces killing unarmed civilians have circulated online.

Although the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has [called](#) for an investigation of the violence, the allegations have proven difficult to verify. In March, two UN experts were [killed](#) while conducting interviews, the first such incident targeting independent UN investigators in the DRC. The targeted murders have raised [questions](#) about the international community's ability to conduct independent investigations in the DRC. UN [discussions](#) with the DRC government over access are stalled,



presenting a significant challenge to efforts to establish culpability and bring justice. Although the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has promised to [impose](#) an investigation should the DRC government refuse to participate, a robust investigation could prove difficult to launch if the DRC government continues to oppose it.

### Conflict Entrenched Ethnically and Politically

As discussions about investigations continue, there are worrisome signs that the conflict is becoming more entrenched along ethnic and political lines. Although fighting began locally near Mpandi's home community in Kasai-Central, it has spread to Kasai and Kasai-Oriental. Observers report the Kamuina Nsapu militia has split into many autonomous groups pursuing different aims. This fracture has brought existing [ethnic-political conflict](#) to the fore as some Kamuina Nsapu militants, largely from the Luba and Lulua ethnic groups, have allegedly begun to attack Tchokwe and Pende civilians, who the militants claim are not native to the region. In response, Tchokwe and Pende communities have formed self-defense militias, which are themselves accused of attacks against civilians.

National political concerns have also continued to influence the conflict. As [Africa Watch](#) has reported, Kabila is currently in a standoff with the opposition over when and how to hold elections. A December 31, 2016, political agreement negotiated by the Catholic Church [broke down](#) in March, although voter registration continues. The opposition coalition has [accused](#) Kabila's government of purposefully exacerbating the situation in Kasai to prevent voter registration and, thereby, postpone elections. Elections have become a salient issue for Kamuina Nsapu as well. In [February](#), the group issued a statement calling for implementation of the December 31 agreement.

### Conclusion

In March, talks between the Minister of Interior and Mpandi's family members resulted in an agreement for the return of Mpandi's remains. Given the spreading violence and politicization of the conflict, however, steps like that are not likely to lead to resolution of the conflict. Likewise, robust outside intervention appears unlikely. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) peacekeeping mission is already stretched thin and faces personnel cutbacks. Thus, for now, formerly peaceful Kasai seems likely to remain one of the focal points of conflict in the DRC.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## TRANSFORMATION OF ALGERIA'S OIL-BASED ECONOMY IS UNLIKELY

By Richard J. Pera

In June 2014, buoyed by \$108 per barrel oil, and with hydrocarbons [accounting](#) for 95 percent of exports and 67 percent of tax revenues, the Algerian government could easily afford generous subsidies to its citizens and large infrastructure projects. Within a year, oil had fallen to \$61 a barrel, and nearly all measures of national economic performance plummeted. Today, oil is about \$48 a barrel, and the Algerian economy continues to struggle. How have falling oil prices affected Algeria, what economic policies were enacted to mitigate the effects of low oil prices, and—three years later—what is the likelihood the government will make fundamental, structural changes in pursuit of long-term economic growth? [more...](#)



A ship docks at Algiers port, Friday Nov.25, 2016. Tensions are mounting over Algeria's 2017 budget, which foresees tax hikes and salary freezes to offset a plunge in gas revenues. (Source: AP Photo/Anis Belghoul.)

---

Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## ANGOLA: IMPLICATIONS OF DOS SANTOS'S DECISION TO STEP DOWN

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On February 3, 2017, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), followed through on his previous commitment to step down and [announced](#) that João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, the current minister of defense, would run in his place in Angola's elections set for August. Since dos Santos has been in power since 1979 and has previously [reneged](#) after saying he would leave power, his apparently sincere intention to step aside marks a significant moment in Angola's politics. What are the implications of dos Santos's departure from power for the August 2017 elections and the political direction of Angola? [more...](#)



Billboard showing MPLA candidate, João Lourenço, in the province of Huila, February 18, 2017. (Source: photo taken from MPLA campaign page, <http://tinyurl.com/y9djb38w>.)

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# TRANSFORMATION OF ALGERIA'S OIL-BASED ECONOMY IS UNLIKELY

By Richard J. Pera

In June 2014, buoyed by \$108 per barrel oil, and with hydrocarbons [accounting](#) for 95 percent of exports and 67 percent of tax revenues, the Algerian government could easily afford generous subsidies to its citizens and large infrastructure projects. Within a year, oil had fallen to \$61 a barrel, and nearly all measures of national economic performance plummeted. Today, oil is about \$48 a barrel, and the Algerian economy continues to struggle. How have falling oil prices affected Algeria, what economic policies were enacted to mitigate the effects of low oil prices, and—three years later—what is the likelihood the government will make fundamental, structural changes in pursuit of long-term economic growth?



A ship docks at Algiers port, Friday Nov.25, 2016. Tensions are mounting over Algeria's 2017 budget, which foresees tax hikes and salary freezes to offset a plunge in gas revenues. (Source: AP Photo/Anis Belghoul.)

## Effects of Falling Oil Prices

During late 2014, as prices began to fall, Algerian officials repeatedly expressed confidence that the country could withstand collapsing oil prices. By early 2015, however, such confidence had eroded. Between 2013 and early 2017, the nation's "[Oil Stabilization Fund](#)," created in 2000 to mitigate the effects of downward fluctuations in oil revenues, decreased from \$75 billion to under \$7 billion. The nation's [foreign exchange reserves](#), which stood at nearly \$200 billion in June 2014, dwindled to \$112 billion by March 2017. Algerian [public debt as a percentage of GDP](#) rose from nearly 8 percent in 2013 to about 18 percent in 2016. Likewise, the [budget deficit](#) rose from under 1 percent in 2013 to nearly 13 percent in 2016. From 2014 to 2015, Algeria's [gross domestic product \(GDP\) per capita](#) dropped 24 percent, from \$5,496 to \$4,154. Finally, in 2015, Algeria registered its first negative [foreign trade balance](#) since 1994.

## New Economic Policies

In response to worsening economic conditions, Algeria enacted budget deficits and increased borrowing. In 2016, Algeria raised \$5.2 billion via the "[National Bond for Economic Growth](#)," with financing coming from its domestic debt market. Previously reluctant to borrow on international markets, the government obtained a \$1 billion loan from the [African Development Bank](#).

Despite falling revenues, Algeria, which has the [largest defense budget in Africa](#), opted not to cut military spending.

In May 2016, the Algerian government adopted a three-year economic strategy called the "[New Growth Model](#)." The plan, which envisages that the price of oil will increase about 10 percent each year through 2019, sets the following goals:

- Increase the annual growth of the non-oil economy by 6.5 percent per year between 2020 and 2030.
- Double the contribution of manufacturing to 10 percent of GDP by 2030.
- Modernize the agricultural sector.
- Cut the growth of domestic energy consumption from 6 percent in 2015 to 3 percent by 2030.
- Diversify exports.
- Grow the economy at 7 percent a year.

To accomplish these goals, the plan outlined several “[strategic axes](#),” including stimulating creation of new businesses, encouraging private investment, diversifying industry, reorganizing land management, ensuring the security and diversity of energy supply, and improving economic governance.

The World Bank [endorsed](#) the plan, and analysts [agreed](#), noting that the “objectives set Algeria on the right path.” Analysts also [pointed out](#) that implementing the changes implied restructuring the socialist model adopted after independence from France in 1962.

### Likelihood of Fundamental, Structural Changes

Success of the New Growth Model depends on the political will of the government to make fundamental, structural changes in the following areas:

- *Limiting State Subsidies.* The government has been unable (or unwilling) to deal adequately with the key issue of [state subsidies](#), which total about \$45 billion and comprise 25 percent of the budget. Algerians, both rich and poor, enjoy substantial subsidies on food, consumer goods, and energy. For example, in June 2017, because of subsidies, gasoline in Algeria registered as the fourth cheapest out of 170 countries [surveyed](#). In addition, Algerian citizens (and even foreign residents) enjoy free health care and education. Although the government [increased](#) the value added tax (VAT) and tariffs on gasoline and electricity in 2016, economists continue to [view](#) subsidies as regressive and unsustainable in the long term.
- *Encouraging the Private Sector and Foreign Investment.* The government has stated its intent to increase the private sector's share of the economy by encouraging economic development and foreign investment. So far, Algeria has not demonstrated a willingness to solve the underlying problems that make Algeria one of the least desirable states for business (131 out of 139 countries, according to the [Forbes](#) 2017 list). The International Monetary Fund listed the following [structural impediments](#): difficult access to finance, weak governance and corruption controls, high barriers to entry, a rigid labor market, jobs-skills mismatches, and insufficient legal transparency. Further, the government has done little to encourage foreign investment. Algerian law generally [limits foreign ownership](#) in Algerian companies, and Algerian bureaucracy is notoriously cumbersome. For example, [some American companies](#) have waited months for simple responses to queries about exporting products to Algeria. Expansions of the tourism and renewable energy industries seem years if not decades away.
- *Countering Corruption.* Not mentioned in the nation's economic plans is the need to control [corruption](#). According to [one measure](#), the country is so corrupt that one-half of all economic transactions occur in the “informal sector.” [Further](#): “The prevalence of corruption is the real economic ailment. With their sense of entitlement, the political elite has long skimmed off the nation's wealth, typically through over-invoicing on imports and exports.” For example, the nation's largest development project—construction of the 756-mile-long East-West Highway from Tunisia to Morocco—reportedly was [plagued by corruption](#). The project began in 2007 and was scheduled for completion in 2011 at a cost of \$6 billion. Instead, due to “rampant graft,” the highway was completed at the end of 2016 at an estimated cost of \$15 billion, making it—mile for mile—[the most expensive road in the world](#).

### Conclusion

Benchmarks in the New Growth Model likely seem unrealistic. Regarding a 10 percent annual increase in the price of oil, the World Bank [points out](#) that, while price increases are possible, [certain factors](#) could work against this projection. Similarly, achieving a goal of 7 percent annual growth in GDP in 2017 and beyond is also unlikely; the [last time](#) the Algerian economy grew at about 7 percent was 2003.

Algeria's plan pays lip service to fundamental, structural changes necessary for growth. There is little evidence the government is willing to cut subsidies meaningfully—doing so would likely prompt large-scale demonstrations that could



threaten the regime, especially with [presidential transition](#) (President Bouteflika is 80 and ailing) looming on the horizon. Even the 2 percent increase in the VAT in early 2017 caused the [most disruptive violence](#) the country has seen since 2011. Limiting corruption would mean cutting the wealth of elites, making it similarly unlikely.

It appears that Algeria will cling to its long-standing model of socialist-inspired centralism to ensure survival of “[Le Pouvoir](#)” (French for “The Power”)—the interconnected group of military, political, and business oligarchs who run the country. More budget deficits and additional borrowing on the international market may work in the near term, but with youth unemployment already at [30 percent](#) and millions of young people expected to enter the labor market in the next few years, Algeria’s failure to strengthen its economic outlook could be a significant long-term risk.

---

Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# ANGOLA: IMPLICATIONS OF DOS SANTOS'S DECISION TO STEP DOWN

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On February 3, 2017, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), followed through on his previous commitment to step down and [announced](#) that João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, the current minister of defense, would run in his place in Angola's elections set for August. Since dos Santos has been in power since 1979 and has previously [reneged](#) after saying he would leave power, his apparently sincere intention to step aside marks a significant moment in Angola's politics. What are the implications of dos Santos's departure from power for the August 2017 elections and the political direction of Angola?



Billboard showing MPLA candidate, João Lourenço, in the province of Huila, February 18, 2017. (Source: photo taken from MPLA campaign page, <http://tinyurl.com/y9djb38w>.)

## Background

Angola is a semi-authoritarian country located in southern Africa with a [population](#) of 25 million and a Gross Domestic Product of \$102 billion. Angola is Africa's second largest [producer](#) of oil. The MPLA fought a decades-long civil war against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (now the main opposition party) that came to an end in 2002. The post-war oil-dominated economy, which initially generated tremendous but uneven growth, has contracted significantly as of late due to low oil prices (as highlighted in the August 20, 2015, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*).

Angola watchers have long debated who would eventually succeed dos Santos as head of state. Until last year, the main candidates appeared to be Vice President Manuel Vicente, the former head of Sonangol, the state oil company, and dos Santos's [son](#), Jose Filomeno de Sousa dos Santos, who leads the country's \$5 billion [sovereign wealth fund](#). But with a bribery charge hanging over his head, [Vicente's](#) political stock fell in 2016, and the old guard of the MPLA [reportedly](#) nixed any plans for a dynastic succession (dos Santos's daughter, Isabel dos Santos, is head of Sonangol and is [cited](#) as Africa's richest woman). These developments opened the door for Lourenço to become the heir apparent; he was [elected](#) as vice president of the MPLA at a party congress held in August 2016.

## Repression and Pre-Election Protests

Dos Santos has ruled Angola with the backing of a strong and loyal military and security apparatus, which he has used to crack down on [dissent](#) in Angola. In 2015, 17 opposition activists were arrested and [sentenced](#) to prison for merely participating in a book club on nonviolent movements. In April 2017, seven other activists who [held](#) an unauthorized protest calling for transparency in the upcoming 2017 elections were arrested and handed 45-day sentences for "rebellion and association with criminals."

But in a sign that the MPLA may be becoming more tolerant of dissent, earlier this month 4,000 Angolans rallied in Luanda during an authorized protest organized by UNITA calling for free and fair elections. Isaias Samakuva, the leader of UNITA, [explained the reason for the protest](#): "This protest is to denounce the vicious system of fraud perpetuated in recruiting the same companies that participated in manipulating elections of 2008 and 2012." The MPLA [won](#) the 2012 elections with 71.9 percent of the vote (in 2010, the country moved away from a presidential race; under the current system, the lead candidate of the party that wins the parliamentary election becomes president). The European Union is set to [monitor](#) the 2017 poll.



## Prospects for 2017 Elections

Given the MPLA's dominance in previous elections and the opposition's [lack](#) of unity, the MPLA and Lourenço are likely to prevail in August's elections. While opinion polls are scarce in Angola, the MPLA is believed to remain [popular](#), in part because it is seen as the party that ended the civil war. Lourenço, who has a [military](#) background and extensive international connections, has avoided being tainted by Angola's many corruption scandals. [According](#) to Darias Jonker, Africa Director at Eurasia Group, Lourenço "has proven himself as competent technocrat without major scandals in his past and he's probably the best selection the party could have made." Lourenço is campaigning on a platform of combatting corruption, increasing foreign investment, and strengthening the economy. Last month, he [told](#) the Washington Post: "We are going to make every effort to have a transparent administration. We are going to combat corruption, and we are going to underscore the fact that we want the private investors to be a major part of our future economy."

Despite Lourenço's rhetorical shift and anti-corruption focus, his deep party and military ties make him likely to play by the MPLA rules, safeguard the status quo, and not contest the powerful roles of dos Santos's family in the political economy of Angola. This is especially so because despite stepping aside from the presidency, dos Santos is [expected](#) to continue as the leader of the party. As UNITA's parliamentary head, Adalberto da Costa Jr., [put it](#), since the leadership of the MPLA remains largely unchanged, "therefore its essence has not changed."

## Conclusion

After decades of dominating the political scene, dos Santos's impending departure is an important moment in the country's political trajectory and should not be underplayed. Indeed, Alex Vines, a scholar at Chatham House, [calls](#) it "a watershed moment in Angola's modern history." That said, dos Santos will continue to lead the MPLA and maintain significant residual economic power through his family. Therefore, while some marginal policy shifts should be expected in Angola under Lourenço, large-scale political change remains unlikely.

---


Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

## CONTINUED AFRICAN MIGRATION: WHAT WILL EUROPE DO?

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

Now in its third year, Europe's migrant crisis is far from over. If experts' predictions are correct, Africa will continue to be a major source of Europe's migrants unless measures are taken to (1) control the flow from Africa and (2) deny illegal entry into Europe. Italy and Germany have been among those European nations most affected by the migrant crisis—Italy due to its location as one of the first points of entry into Europe for migrant vessels crossing the Mediterranean and Germany due to Chancellor Angela Merkel's "[Open Door](#)" policy that permitted the entry of [1 million](#) migrants and refugees into Germany in 2015. As a result, these two countries have also been among the most vocal on the issue and have clear intentions to pursue some combination of the aforementioned solutions. [more...](#)




The installation "Mare Nostrum" by Swedish artist Runo Lagomarsino, at the Triennale Palace of Arts, in Milan, Italy, Thursday, April 27, 2017. The exhibit speaks of the epochal transformations that are marking contemporary history, particularly the problem of migration and the crisis of refugees. The exhibition will run until August 20, 2017. (Source: AP Photo/Luca Bruno.)

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## KENYA: MAIZE FLOUR SHORTAGE BECOMES CAMPAIGN FODDER

By Sarah Graveline

Across Kenya, a persistent shortage of maize flour, a staple food, is generating widespread public anger ahead of the August 2017 national elections. The government announced plans last month to subsidize maize prices and increase imports, but shoppers across the country [report](#) maize flour continues to be overpriced and in scarce supply. Kenyan commentators have accused the government of manipulating the price of maize for political gain; opposition candidates have seized on the shortage as a campaign issue. Kenya's history of maize scandals suggests, however, that little will come of these rumors. Although the shortage demonstrates the government's failure to plan for a predictable crisis, it will likely have only a marginal impact on elections. Without electoral pressure, Kenyan leaders are unlikely to undertake the reforms necessary to develop transparent, long-term policies to address future food insecurity challenges. [more...](#)



Wholesale price of maize in Kenya, March 2015–March 2017. (Source: Global Information and Early Warning System, "Country Briefs: Kenya," Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, April 25, 2017, <http://tinyurl.com/y7qq72j8>.)

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.



# CONTINUED AFRICAN MIGRATION: WHAT WILL EUROPE DO?

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

Now in its third year, Europe's migrant crisis is far from over. If experts' predictions are correct, Africa will continue to be a major source of Europe's migrants unless measures are taken to (1) control the flow from Africa and (2) deny illegal entry into Europe. Italy and Germany have been among those European nations most affected by the migrant crisis—Italy due to its location as one of the first points of entry into Europe for migrant vessels crossing the Mediterranean and Germany due to Chancellor Angela Merkel's "[Open Door](#)" policy that permitted the entry of [1 million](#) migrants and refugees into Germany in 2015. As a result, these two countries have also been among the most vocal on the issue and have clear intentions to pursue some combination of the aforementioned solutions.



The installation "Mare Nostrum" by Swedish artist Runo Lagomarsino, at the Triennale Palace of Arts, in Milan, Italy, Thursday, April 27, 2017. The exhibit speaks of the epochal transformations that are marking contemporary history, particularly the problem of migration and the crisis of refugees. The exhibition will run until August 20, 2017. (Source: AP Photo/Luca Bruno.)

## An Increase Predicted

The flow of migrants from Africa into Europe shows no signs of abating. In the first six months of 2017, more than [65,000 migrants](#) arrived in Italy, an increase of 18 percent from the same time last year. Over the same period, at least 1,735 people have died trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean, underscoring the danger associated with this journey. Despite the risk, numerous experts predict an increase in these numbers. Germany's Minister for Development recently forecast that up to [400,000](#) migrants in total would enter Italy this year, while the President of the European Parliament has expressed concern over the possibility that up to [30 million](#) could enter Europe in the coming years. A leaked German intelligence report warned that up to [6.6 million](#) people are waiting in the countries around the Mediterranean to cross into Europe. In addition, analysis by Austrian military intelligence predicts that rising unemployment in Africa could lead to as many as [15 million](#) economic migrants entering Europe from Africa in the next three years.

## Push and Pull Factors

This increase has occurred for [several reasons](#), among them Africa's massive youth bulge seeking employment in Europe, the continued threat posed by conflict and violent extremism, and the growing ability of more Africans to afford the cost of the trip. Some [observers](#) also note that "pull factors" in Europe and "push factors" in Africa encourage migration. For example, a growing number of humanitarian NGOs in the Mediterranean are conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations coordinated by the Italian Navy. This practice, while necessary to save the lives of thousands of migrants, has come under criticism by some European stakeholders, most notably the EU's border management agency, Frontex. It has [reported](#) that NGO vessels inadvertently support smugglers by providing a reliable way to transport migrants ashore and increasing their chance of success—a message which is then relayed to friends and family, encouraging them to make the dangerous journey. The reliable presence of NGO vessels, referred to by some as a "[ferry service](#)" for migrants, is even factored into smuggler's business models. A senior Libyan coast guard official went so far as to accuse NGOs of [colluding](#) with traffickers by paying them in exchange for the migrants, and in doing so, fueling their criminal enterprise.

The implied solution is to cease these proactive SAR operations, although doing so would undoubtedly result in a humanitarian [catastrophe](#)—at least in the short term.

## EU Actions

The EU has pursued numerous initiatives to stem the flow of migrants from Africa, most of which have focused on enhancing the capacity of the Libyan government to manage the migratory flow through popular coastal embarkation

points such as Sabha and Kufra. In February 2017, for example, the EU agreed to provide Libya's UN-backed government with [\\$215 million](#) to do the following:

- Increase training and equipment for the Libyan coast guard.
- Step up efforts to block smuggling routes.
- Improve conditions for migrants at Libyan reception centers.
- Increase EU involvement with countries near Libya to slow the influx.
- Support local communities on migration routes and in coastal areas to improve their socioeconomic situation.

## Italy's Vision

Although the May G7 Summit in Sicily was overshadowed by a terrorist attack in Manchester, UK, and speculation about the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, Italy had intended to use the occasion and location to draw attention to the migrant crisis. In an unusual move, the leaders of Tunisia, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya were invited to join the leaders of the world's seven most economically-advanced countries to underscore Italy's concern over the migration issue. The Italian delegation's African [agenda](#) included a proposal that recognized the inevitability of migration and rather than seeking to fully eliminate it, argued that it could be controlled by "reducing the dire political, economic and environmental factors that 'push' migrants out of their countries." The [plan](#) included a large food security component, measures to ensure the safe passage of migrants and refugees, compacts or partnerships that would create jobs and education opportunities in the hardest hit African countries, and ways to confer legal status on migrants. Unfortunately for Africa, none of these initiatives were agreed upon or even included in the [final communique](#). They do, however, shed some light on the Italian government's desired way forward on the migrant issue.

## The "Merkel Plan"

Since Merkel announced her "[Open Door](#)" policy to migrants and refugees in 2015, Germany has been consumed with the chaotic, and at times violent, aftermath. In dealing with this situation, Merkel's policy emphasis has been on economic development in Africa as a means to generate jobs and provide opportunities for those who would otherwise seek employment in Europe. As part of this policy, earlier this month the German Federal Ministry of Finance hosted several African leaders in Berlin in a [conference](#) titled "G-20 Africa Partnership—Investing in a Common Future" to discuss Germany's evolving engagement with Africa. Merkel also plans to take advantage of Germany's hosting the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017 to highlight the German approach to Africa, dubbed the "[Merkel Plan](#)." This plan focuses on economic development by investing up to [\\$335 million](#) to help African nations expand their use of renewable energy, improve energy efficiency, and develop their financial and banking sectors. Germany has already negotiated agreements with Tunisia, Ivory Coast, and Ghana, who "stand out by virtue of their reform-oriented policies." Another facet of the Merkel Plan is increased military aid to help African countries fight violent extremism. Merkel also recently [pledged](#) her support for a UN-mandated West African security force to fight terrorism in the Sahel.

## Conclusion

Poverty and violence in Africa, combined with perceived economic opportunity in, and likely safe passage to, Europe will continue to draw African migrants there. Germany's commitment to economic development in Africa and Italy's willingness to embrace some migration while cultivating partnerships that create jobs and education opportunities in the hardest hit African countries are potential ways to stem the tide of migration..

---

Dr. Ashley Neese Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



# KENYA: MAIZE FLOUR SHORTAGE BECOMES CAMPAIGN FODDER

By Sarah Graveline

Across Kenya, a persistent shortage of maize flour, a staple food, is generating widespread public anger ahead of the August 2017 national elections. The government announced plans last month to subsidize maize prices and increase imports, but shoppers across the country [report](#) maize flour continues to be overpriced and in scarce supply. Kenyan commentators have accused the government of manipulating the price of maize for political gain; opposition candidates have seized on the shortage as a campaign issue. Kenya's history of maize scandals suggests, however, that little will come of these rumors. Although the shortage demonstrates the government's failure to plan for a predictable crisis, it will likely have only a marginal impact on elections. Without electoral pressure, Kenyan leaders are unlikely to undertake the reforms necessary to develop transparent, long-term policies to address future food insecurity challenges.

## Failed Rains, Pests Impact Maize Supply


The current maize shortage is largely due to poor domestic production caused, in part, by lower than expected rainfall and pest infestations. The United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) [reported](#) that rainfall in maize-producing areas was 25 to 50 percent below average this season and that crops were affected by pest infestation in the fall. As a result, the FAO found that Kenyan maize production "was 70 percent below the average of the past five years, with a near-total failure reported in coastal areas." The FAO reported that domestic crop failure would require imports to increase "25 percent more than the previous year and 37 percent higher than the last five-year average."

The impact of domestic crop failure on food insecurity was predicted in advance of the crisis. In [January 2017](#), the Kenya Food Security Steering Group, comprising Kenyan government agencies and international organizations, assessed that a regional drought meant that large parts of the country faced "atypical high food assistance needs," while urban areas across the country were experiencing a 10 percent increase in food prices.

## Critics and Opposition Question Government Intervention

On [February 10](#), the Kenyan government declared the drought a national emergency and pledged \$105 million toward relief. The government also announced that it would allow maize imports "in a very transparent manner," a reversal from earlier [statements](#) that maize would not be imported. As maize prices continued to rise, the Kenyan government announced on [May 16](#) that it would intervene by subsidizing maize prices by up to \$58 million and importing 450,000 metric tons of maize.

Following the May 16 announcement, [Kenyan commentators](#) accused the government of manipulating the maize market for political gain. Critics, who pointed out that Mexican-produced maize had become available within days of the government's statement, [argued](#) that the impossibly fast delivery was proof the government had hoarded grain for political benefit. Government officials responded that the maize was imported by private millers, rather than the government, and came from [South Africa](#).



Wholesale price of maize in Kenya, March 2015–March 2017. (Source: Global Information and Early Warning System, "Country Briefs: Kenya," Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, April 25, 2017, <http://tinyurl.com/y7qq72j8>.)

Despite the clarification, opposition candidates continue to levy allegations of price fixing on the campaign trail. On [June 15](#), presidential candidate Raila Odinga referenced the rumors and accused the government of purposefully raising and then lowering maize prices as a campaign technique. Two days later [Odinga](#) posed for photos in front of empty shelves in a grocery store before delivering a speech blaming Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta for failing to address food shortages.

## Few Repercussions for Past Maize Scandals

Allegations of maize price fixing make for good campaign material, given Kenya's history of failing to fully investigate or punish officials accused of similar improprieties in the past. Kenya's first large graft scandal revolved around maize. In 1965 [Paul Ngei](#), the Minister for Cooperatives and Marketing, was found guilty of manipulating the Maize Marketing Board to earn a profit on smuggled maize exports, at a time when Kenya was forced to pay for maize imports to supplement the country's food supply. While Ngei was initially suspended, he was quickly [reinstated](#) and went on to have a long political career, serving as a cabinet minister under both Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi and as a member of Parliament until 1990.

More recently, in 2009, [William Ruto](#), the current deputy president, was accused of illegally selling maize when he was agriculture minister. A parliamentary investigation ultimately sputtered when the deputy speaker of Parliament ruled that documents supporting a related case against First Lady Lucy Kibaki were forged, although the documents presented to justify the allegations against Ruto were found to be genuine. While Ruto was investigated over a [separate](#) corruption case, the allegations over maize sales were never fully examined.

The current rumors over price manipulation are based on far less evidence than either of these cases. The failure to resolve past graft scandals, however, informs Kenyans' perceptions of the likely veracity of current rumors. One [critic](#) commented on the recurring nature of the problem: "Is it just by coincidence that the Deputy President is caught up in the subsidized maize scandal yet again?"

## Conclusion

While the current maize flour shortage has generated public anger and rumors of government malfeasance, it is unclear whether this will translate into votes for the opposition in August. Kenyatta has stated the race should be a [referendum](#) on his government's record, but rising food prices may make some Kenyans more likely to [vote along ethnic lines](#) to elect candidates deemed most likely to distribute financial benefits to their communities.

With polls continuing to show Kenyatta maintaining a slight [advantage](#), and the government working to put maize on shelves, anger over the shortage may not be a salient issue by August. This suggests that political elites will likely find there is little electoral pressure to investigate allegations of graft or to develop long-term plans to address chronic food insecurity.

---

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---



## AFRICAN DEBT: HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?

By George F. Ward

Government indebtedness has been an issue for African countries for decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, African countries borrowed heavily. By 1990, continent-wide indebtedness had grown to [\\$270 billion](#), a level then widely viewed as unsustainable. Beginning in 1996, 30 sub-Saharan African countries were able to cancel \$100 billion in debt through the [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative](#) (HIPC), a joint program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The HIPC helped to reduce debt to sustainable levels. After years in which debt levels remained relatively low, questions about debt sustainability have recently again begun to arise. Given the importance of access to capital for development, it is worth examining whether these concerns are well founded. What is the current African debt situation? How much debt is too much? [more...](#)



Mozambique's debt-to-GDP ratio, 2007–2016. (Source: "Mozambique Government Debt to GDP," tradingeconomics.com, <http://tinyurl.com/ycwntzcy>.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

## MUTINIES IN IVORY COAST REVEAL DEEP MILITARY DIVIDES

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On May 12, 2017, a group of 8,400 soldiers in Ivory Coast [mutinied](#) over delayed bonus payments, leaving two people dead and nine injured. The mutiny began in the country's second-largest city, Bouake, where soldiers took to the streets and erected barricades, cutting off access to the city. The revolt [spread](#) to other areas of the country, including Abidjan—Ivory Coast's commercial hub and largest city—where soldiers took control of the ministry of defense and military headquarters. After a deal was struck with President Alassane Ouattara's government on May 16, the soldiers returned to the barracks. A similar [mutiny](#) took place in January of this year. Do these recent mutinies threaten stability in one of the world's [fastest](#) growing economies? [more...](#)



French President Emmanuel Macron, left, welcomes Ivory Coast's President Alassane Ouattara in Paris, France, Sunday, June 11, 2017. Ouattara worries that recent mutinies and resulting political instability threaten the country's economic trajectory and reputation with investors. (Source: AP Photo/Francois Mori.)

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

### About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.


IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

# AFRICAN DEBT: HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?

By George F. Ward

Government indebtedness has been an issue for African countries for decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, African countries borrowed heavily. By 1990, continent-wide indebtedness had grown to [\\$270 billion](#), a level then widely viewed as unsustainable. Beginning in 1996, 30 sub-Saharan African countries were able to cancel \$100 billion in debt through the [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative](#) (HIPC), a joint program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The HIPC helped to reduce debt to sustainable levels.

After years in which debt levels remained relatively low, questions about debt sustainability have recently again begun to arise. Given the importance of access to capital for development, it is worth examining whether these concerns are well founded. What is the current African debt situation? How much debt is too much?



Mozambique's debt-to-GDP ratio, 2007–2016. (Source: "Mozambique Government Debt to GDP," tradingeconomics.com, <http://tinyurl.com/ycwntzcy>.)

## Patterns of African Borrowing

The African debt that accumulated to crisis levels in past decades was held mainly by Western governments and banks and by international financial institutions. In recent years, those sources of capital have been joined by two additional ones—Chinese loans and the international sovereign debt market.

Although the level of Chinese lending to Africa has sometimes been exaggerated, there is no question that it has been substantial. According to the [China-Africa Research Initiative](#) at Johns Hopkins University, the Chinese government, banks, and contractors extended \$94.4 billion worth of loans to African governments and state-owned enterprises from 2000 to 2015. Although reliable numbers are not available, Chinese lending has probably increased since that time.

As noted by Africa Watch in [August 2015](#), the international bond market has recently become attractive to African nations for several reasons, which include low interest rates. In 2014, the interest rate on a dollar-denominated bond issued by Côte d'Ivoire was set at a level comparable to that paid by Great Britain. Such favorable terms were available in large part because Western investors were hungry for greater yields than were to be found in traditional markets. Sovereign bonds have another advantage: unlike concessional loans by donor countries, they do not come with strings related to good governance attached. According to one [source](#), African sovereign bonds issued from 2006 through September 2014 amounted to \$25.8 billion.

## Is There a Debt Problem?

Even though borrowing from China and issuance of sovereign debt on the international market has bent the curve of African government indebtedness upward, the question remains whether another African debt crisis is in prospect. [Data](#) compiled by Trading Economics confirm that debt levels throughout Africa are generally rising. In most of the 51 African countries listed, however, the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios has been gradual. Only seven African countries have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than the [rich country average](#) of 80 percent. According to the Trading Economics data, the median African debt-to-GDP ratio is 37.6 percent, which is Rwanda's quite moderate ratio.

Despite the prevalence of moderate indebtedness, at least two problems are connected to government debt in Africa. The first is the risk of default. Other African countries are in arrears to the IMF and other international financial institutions, but



Mozambique is the only African country to have recently defaulted on its sovereign debt. It missed a sovereign debt payment of [\\$119 million](#) due on March 21, 2017, to Credit Suisse Group AG. That was the second missed payment by Mozambique in the same number of months.

Mozambique's current debt-to-GDP ratio is around [130 percent](#). Its debt problem is the result of profligate borrowing based on the hope that future natural gas revenues would be able to cover debt repayments. A recent audit by Kroll, Inc., concluded that more than [\\$1 billion](#) of the funds raised for the benefit of state-owned companies could not be accounted for. As [Africa Watch](#) has previously reported, depressed natural gas prices worldwide make Mozambique's future ability to cover its arrears problematic.

Although other African countries have avoided Mozambique's dire straits, the levels of government debt service obligations elsewhere are cause for alarm. This is the second problem linked to government debt. As Akinwumi Adesina, the president of the African Development Bank, [pointed out](#) last year, "An indebted Africa cannot be a rising Africa." Of the 20 countries with the highest ratios of foreign debt payments to government revenues, eight are in Africa. Angola leads the way, devoting 44 percent of its government revenues to debt service. Thus, although Mozambique is the only country in default, others are at risk of falling into that status. Even if they do not, their debt service costs are crowding out needed investments in infrastructure and economic development.

### What Can Be Done?

As noted above, although only a few African countries have immediate debt concerns, many more need to bolster their abilities to service their rising levels of sovereign debt. Time is limited, because many of the recent African sovereign debt obligations will begin to mature within [5 to 6 years](#). It is likely, although not certain, that refinancing those obligations will entail paying higher rates of interest.

In the meantime, African governments should work to enlarge their "fiscal space." The latter is a "fundamentals-based measure of the risk of sovereign debt default" devised by [Moody's Analytics](#). Fiscal space is the difference between a nation's sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio and the limit beyond which the nation will default unless policymakers take unprecedented steps. In modern economies, governments are able to cope with debt problems through fiscal policies, by raising taxes and curbing expenditures. In many African countries, however, fiscal space is limited. Modern taxation systems such as income or value-added taxes are either absent or poorly administered. Local capital markets are weak or nonexistent. Subsidies of basic commodities often represent a large proportion of government expenditures and cannot be reduced without political pain and the risk of social instability. Nevertheless, despite these obstacles, the extent to which African governments use the time available to modernize their fiscal systems and develop local capital markets will likely be the crucial determinant of success or failure in managing the continent's debt.

---

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---

# MUTINIES IN IVORY COAST REVEAL DEEP MILITARY DIVIDES

By Dr. Alexander Noyes

On May 12, 2017, a group of 8,400 soldiers in Ivory Coast [mutinied](#) over delayed bonus payments, leaving two people dead and nine injured. The mutiny began in the country's second-largest city, Bouake, where soldiers took to the streets and erected barricades, cutting off access to the city. The revolt [spread](#) to other areas of the country, including Abidjan—Ivory Coast's commercial hub and largest city—where soldiers took control of the ministry of defense and military headquarters. After a deal was struck with President Alassane Ouattara's government on May 16, the soldiers returned to the barracks. A similar [mutiny](#) took place in January of this year. Do these recent mutinies threaten stability in one of the world's [fastest](#) growing economies?



French President Emmanuel Macron, left, welcomes Ivory Coast's President Alassane Ouattara in Paris, France, Sunday, June 11, 2017. Ouattara worries that recent mutinies and resulting political instability threaten the country's economic trajectory and reputation with investors. (Source: AP Photo/Francois Mori.)

## Background

Ivory Coast is a lower-middle-income country located in West Africa with a [population](#) of 22 million and a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$31 billion. It is the leading [exporter](#) of cocoa in the world. Although the country has been plagued by coups and civil wars—most recently in 2010–2011 when an electoral [conflict](#) left 3,000 dead and displaced 500,000—since 2011 the country has rebounded, enjoying relative political stability and rapid economic growth. In 2016, Ivory Coast was the second [fastest](#) growing economy in the world, with a GDP growth rate of 8.5 percent. Yet the Ivorian security sector has been unable to move beyond rivalries and divides forged during years of civil conflict, as evidenced by a number of large-scale mutinies launched by soldiers over the past several years.

## Series of Mutinies

In contrast to coups, mutinying soldiers do [not](#) aim to unseat the head of government. Mutinies are usually launched by the rank and file. They have occurred quite frequently in Ivory Coast. According to one [count](#), mutinies have taken place in 1990, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2008, and 2014. The group that mutinied in January 2017 was composed of former rebels who fought with Ouattara in 2011 and were subsequently integrated into the military. The mutineers seized control of three major cities, attacking police stations and a state-owned broadcasting network. Businesses and schools were forced to close. Disturbances were also recorded in a number of other cities throughout the country. The mutineers [demanded](#) back pay for time spent fighting for Ouattara, bonuses, and better living quarters.

Ouattara capitulated to the soldiers' demands, striking a deal that sent the soldiers back to the barracks. Under the deal, the soldiers would be paid in two installments—the first for 5 million CFA francs each (approximately \$8,000), with a second payment of 7 million CFA to be paid at a later date. Ouattara also [fired](#) his security chiefs (the heads of the army, gendarmes, and police). But the government delayed in making the second payments, leading the group to launch a further mutiny in May. Sergeant Seydou Kone, the mutineers' spokesperson, issued their demand: "We want our 7 million and that's it." Following another round of negotiations, the government agreed to [pay](#) the mutineers their remaining 7 million CFA, but in two installments (the first for 5 million, the second for 2 million).

## Factionalized Military a Threat to Economic Growth?

This history of mutinies underscores the deep divides, legacies of the country's civil wars, that remain in Ivory Coast's security services. Currently, a variety of factions within the military are allied to different political and military patrons.



[According](#) to the scholars Jeremy Allouche and Oswald Padonou, one faction is aligned with Ouattara, while another supports former rebel leader Guillaume Soro (who is currently president of the National Assembly). A further grouping remains allied to former president Laurent Gbagbo. Other former regional rebel commanders also continue to hold sway. Since the group of recent mutineers helped put him in power in 2011, Ouattara remains somewhat beholden to them, as evidenced by his acquiescence to their demands. As the scholar Mike McGovern [argues](#), Ouattara “was going to be walking this tightrope where those who brought him to power by force were always going to be in a position of calling their own shots.”

Ouattara is concerned that the recent mutinies and resulting political instability will hurt the country's economic trajectory and reputation with investors. After the January revolt, Ouattara [warned](#), “I want to say that this way of making demands is not appropriate. . . . In fact, it tarnished the image of our country after all our economic development efforts.” According to some observers, the mutinies have already done just that. Mark Bohlund, a Bloomberg economist, [said](#) to “expect more apprehension about Ivory Coast” from foreign investors.

## Conclusion

While last month's deal to end the latest mutiny is welcome, recent academic research suggests that Ivory Coast is likely to remain susceptible to further such episodes, which could raise the risk of renewed conflict. Indeed, Maggie Dwyer, a scholar who has conducted research on mutinies in West Africa, [found](#) that mutinies tend to beget further mutinies, even when a deal is struck: “Additional mutinies regularly occur, even after a deal is reached, when other units in the military see it as a successful way to improve their conditions.” Dwyer also finds that mutinies are rarely just about pay, but often indicate deep military divides. She [argues](#), “Rather than simple pay revolts, mutinies should be viewed as representing deep distrust between the ranks, which usually has historic roots.” To consolidate Ivory Coast's recent political and economic gains and avoid a slide back toward instability, Ouattara and the Ivorian government should consider genuine security sector reforms that tackle the underlying factors dividing the country's military.

---

Dr. Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

---