

RENEWABLE ENERGY—AFRICA’S NEXT “MOBILE” REVOLUTION?

By George F. Ward

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Wind turbines are being used to generate electricity near the small town of Darling, situated on the outskirts of Cape Town, South Africa. (Source: AP Photo/Schalk van Zuydam.)

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Jubilee Alliance Party profile picture and CORD poster from each party’s Facebook’s page.



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The Dimensions of the Power Challenge

According to the [International Renewable Energy Agency](#), in 2013, 160 gigawatts (GW) of power-generation capacity existed in the African continent as a whole. Of that total, 100 GW came from aging plants that from a technical point of view should be retired before 2030. Yet demand projections suggest that Africa will need 610 GW of installed power-generation capacity by that year. Building power-generation facilities is only one part of the challenge. Another major part is connecting power plants to consumers through transmission lines. Given the vast distances involved and the predominantly rural nature of Africa’s population, the transmission problem is sometimes harder to solve than the power-generation one.

Still another challenge is the widespread maintenance by governments of [electricity](#) rates that do not reflect the cost of production. Without the prospect of an adequate return, investors are understandably loath to enter many African markets. In addition, governments will need to facilitate permitting procedures for construction of power plants and transmission lines.

Every country in sub-Saharan Africa will need a comprehensive plan that addresses all these aspects of the power challenge. At present, many governments have set power-generation goals, but few have identified the resources or formulated the integrated plans that will be necessary to achieve them.

The Surge of Renewable Power Sources

Africa’s [sources](#) of renewable energy include solar energy, wind energy, hydropower, geothermal energy, and various sorts of biomass. Today, approximately half of all the energy consumed in Africa comes from biomass—the burning of firewood and charcoal, usually in inefficient cook stoves. Hydroelectric sources represent less than 1 percent of total energy consumed, and solar, wind, and geothermal comprise even less. Looking solely at [sources of electricity](#), hydropower rises to around 20 percent of the total; biomass almost disappears as a factor; and solar, wind, and geothermal still contribute only on the order of 1 percent each. Fossil fuels, mainly coal, account for the rest.

This picture is beginning to change because of falling prices for renewables generally and because of better public-private planning in a few countries. As [Linklaters](#), a consultancy, notes, “renewable energy technologies are trending towards cost-competitiveness with fossil fuels and there is evidence to support cost parity in certain cases. Economic development and the deployment of renewable technology in Africa are now synergistic because of this movement towards parity.”

In its analysis, Linklaters uses as a metric the Levelised Cost of Power (LCOE), which is a unit representing the per-kilowatt cost of building and operating a plant over its assumed life cycle and at an assumed utilization rate. The conclusion: “at least at the lower end of the range [of costs], onshore wind, solar photovoltaic, biomass, hydropower and geothermal are all cost-competitive with fossil fuels, based on today’s costs and taking into account any future cost decreases.” This supports the [projection](#) by the International Energy Agency (IEA) that renewable energy will meet two-thirds of the growth in demand for power in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020.

The South African Experience

Achieving sustained growth in renewable electric generating capacity will depend on the capacity of sub-Saharan African countries to combine effective government planning and market incentives. Currently, significant, program-driven growth in renewable energy is limited to a [few countries](#) such as South Africa and Kenya. South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Procurement Program ([REIPPPP](#)) is perhaps the best example of the sort of agile and innovative policy that is needed. The REIPPPP includes a market-based bidding process for independent power producers; agreements by the national power company, Eskom, to purchase the power; and framework support agreements by the government.

In five bidding cycles since November 2011, the REIPPPP has contracted for more than 6.3 GW of renewable energy from 102 projects, and wind projects comprise more than half the total capacity. The program projected that nearly 3 GW would be connected to South Africa’s grid by the end of 2016. Notably, each bidding cycle has seen a reduction in prices for solar and onshore wind energy: the average bid price for solar power [declined](#) from 3.44 South African Rand per megawatt in the first REIPPPP bid cycle to .85 Rand in the fourth cycle.

The Challenges Ahead

Despite Africa’s abundance of renewable energy sources, significant challenges remain. All the renewable resources—hydro, solar, wind, bioenergy, and geothermal—are either intermittent (solar and wind) or unevenly distributed (hydro, geothermal, and biomass). Large-scale hydropower is possible in only a few countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia. Geothermal sources have so far been exploited only in the Great Rift region in Kenya. Many renewable sources are located far from the urban areas that produce most of the demand for electricity, so costly transmission systems are required. And it is unlikely that the African electric grid will reach many remote rural areas in the next decade. Small-scale solar, wind, and hydro can provide interim solutions in those areas at the mini-grid and household levels.

Conclusion

Given the aforementioned challenges and Africa’s rapidly growing demand, it is likely that new production of renewable energy will play an increasingly important, but not exclusive, role in meeting sub-Saharan Africa’s power needs. Renewables will be an essential part of the African power solution, but not revolutionary in the way that mobile technology came to dominate African telecommunications. Especially when the sun does not shine and the wind does not blow, Africa will continue to need fossil fuel generating capacity. This capacity will [also need to grow](#), even if not as rapidly as renewable energy production, in the march toward meeting the continent’s electricity needs.

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Background: History of Violent Elections

Kenya, a country of [46](#) million located in East Africa, has had an extended [history](#) of violence surrounding elections since its move to multiparty politics in the early 1990s. Kenya's most recent and intense electoral crisis took place after the December 2007 vote, when communal violence left up to [1,200](#) killed and 600,000 displaced. The violence was ended by a power-sharing agreement signed in early 2008 between former President Mwai Kibaki and Odinga, who became prime minister under the coalition government. The 2013 elections, which put an end to the power-sharing period, pitted Odinga against Kenyatta. At the time, Kenyatta faced charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his alleged involvement in the 2008 post-election violence (the charges were later dropped). Despite some outbreaks of violence surrounding the poll, Kenyatta prevailed in a tight, but much [less](#) violent, election than in 2007.

Political Landscape Before the 2017 Election

Once the Jubilee Alliance was in power, some [cracks](#) emerged within it, especially after the ICC dropped charges against Kenyatta in 2014 but continued their case against Deputy President William Ruto. When the charges against Ruto were [vacated](#) in April of last year, however, the Jubilee Alliance solidified and [strengthened a previously loose alliance](#), becoming a formal party in September 2016. Kenyatta and the Jubilee Alliance are running on a [platform](#) of economic growth, stability, and education. It will be difficult for Odinga and the opposition to unseat Kenyatta in August, given the ruling party's ostensible unity following the ICC saga. But the opposition's chances should not be discounted, especially if it is able to form a united opposition coalition, which appears to be in the works. Odinga and several other opposition figures, including Musalia Mudavadi, Kalonzo Musyoka, and Moses Wetang'ula, are in discussions about forming a cohesive umbrella coalition, to be called the [National Super Alliance](#) (NASA), to take on Kenyatta and Ruto. Big questions remain, however, about who would ultimately lead such a grouping, as Odinga, Mudavadi, Musyoka, and Wetang'ula are all currently [vying](#) for the top spot. The opposition's main [critiques](#) of the Kenyatta administration are that it is corrupt, has doled out government positions based on ethnicity, and lacked sound pro-economic growth policies.

Rising Tensions and Fresh Memories of Violence

Memories are still fresh from the 2007 poll and its ensuing violence. Just last month, Kenyatta [told](#) Kenyans: "I do not have to remind you what disunity looks like. We know all too well what happened the last time we failed to treat each other as one family." Increasing [tensions](#) between the ruling Jubilee Alliance and the opposition have stoked fears of a rerun of the 2007 violence in the 2017 elections. A [fistfight](#) broke out in parliament in December 2016 during debates over several election laws, which the opposition believes the ruling party will use to tilt the election in its favor. In June of that year, eight politicians from both Jubilee and CORD were arrested on hate speech allegations. And in May [five](#) people were killed in clashes between opposition demonstrators, who were protesting the makeup of the country's electoral commission,

and Kenyan security forces. The ruling party eventually capitulated on the issue of the electoral commission, agreeing to revamp its composition in August. But it appears the intense political maneuvering from both sides has come at a price. According to a recent opinion poll, up to 60 percent of the Kenyan population [cited](#) election violence as their biggest worry of 2017.

Conclusion


Given the [benefits](#) of incumbency, the ruling party's unity, and the expected backing from the large Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups (Kenyatta is a Kikuyu, Ruto a Kalenjin), the Jubilee Alliance appears to be in the driver's seat for the 2017 elections. As [argued](#) by political scientist Nic Cheeseman, a united opposition may stand a chance. But time is running out for the opposition to get its house in order before the election; the longer the opposition waits to do so, the more difficult it will become to form a strong and cohesive coalition. Regardless of how the next eight months play out, rising tensions and widespread fears of electoral violence suggest that the prospect of poll violence is real and that Kenya's regional and international partners should keep a close eye on Kenya as the vote nears.

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ECONOMIC GROWTH—A TALE OF TWO AFRICAS

By George F. Ward

Economic growth fell significantly and unexpectedly in sub-Saharan Africa in 2016. An early, authoritative forecast pegged real growth in regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2016 at a relatively robust [4.0 percent](#). By October 2016, the World Bank was forecasting only [1.6 percent](#) growth for the year. This dramatic decline in growth prospects was due mainly to low commodity prices and tight financial conditions. The trend was exacerbated by policy uncertainty, droughts, and political and security concerns. Within the context of the overall slowdown, a pattern of what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) calls “[multispeed growth](#)” has emerged. That is, one group of sub-Saharan African countries has continued to perform well, while another has suffered under severe economic strains. It is worth examining this “tale of two Africas” and assessing its implications. [more...](#)



Source: World Bank.

Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

Gross Domestic Product, 2005–2016, for sub-Saharan Africa, a portion thereof, and emerging economies excluding China. (Source: Figure 1.2, “Trends in GDP Growth,” in *Africa’s Pulse: An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future 14* (October 2016), World Bank Group, <http://tinyurl.com/gvxh8a5>).

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SOMALIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DELAYS AND INSECURITY CREATE CHALLENGES

By Sarah Graveline

After six months of delays, Somalia’s presidential election is scheduled to take place on February 8, 2017. Instead of a popular poll, the president will be elected by members of parliament, whose own election process was rife with irregularities. Allegations of widespread corruption and ongoing insecurity cast doubt on the Somali government’s capability, which may be further challenged by possible declines in international security assistance over the next four years. The new government will face an uphill battle to show citizens it can fight corruption and provide security. [more...](#)



Soldiers stand in the rubble of a destroyed building near the scene of a suicide car bomb attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, Monday, January 2, 2017. The country’s presidential election, a key step toward recovery, already has been delayed multiple times because of security and other concerns. (Source: AP Photo/Farah Abdi Warsameh.)

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
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Trends in Economic Growth and Inflation

In its [March 20, 2015](#), issue, *Africa Watch* examined the implications for Africa of falling oil and gas prices. That analysis noted that for some sub-Saharan African countries, oil made up more than 20 percent of import costs. Those countries would be likely to benefit from falling oil and gas prices. On the other hand, the decline in prices would have a negative impact on the largest African oil producers, decreasing both government revenues and GDP.

The projected scenario proved accurate, and its effects were amplified by the decrease in prices in a range of commodities beyond oil and gas. As the IMF has pointed out, the aggregate picture “[belies considerable heterogeneity](#).” It characterizes the situation as “A Tale of Two Africas.” The half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa with non-resource-intensive economies have continued to perform well. Examples from this group include Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal. Those countries are expected to continue to grow at more than 6 percent annually. In contrast, Africa’s commodity exporters are under severe economic strain. The sub-Saharan region’s three largest economies—Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola—have been hit hard, as have other resource-intensive countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Inflation rates have moved in inverse proportion to GDP changes—generally rising in the low-growth countries and remaining moderate in the fast growers. Thus, Angola’s inflation rate doubled to 38 percent. Nigeria’s went from 9 to 17 percent. Conversely, increases in inflation have been modest and within central banks’ target ranges in the oil-importing countries of East Africa.

Declining economic growth and increasing inflation have affected real per capita GDP, which is a particularly important metric on a continent still plagued by extreme poverty. The IMF [forecasted](#) in October 2016 that, overall, the region’s average per capita GDP would contract for the first time in 22 years. This projected mean average decline of .9 percent would be driven by slow GDP growth in the large, commodity-exporting countries. Using the median rather than the mean would reflect a 1.75 percent increase in per capita GDP in 2016. This mean-median contrast demonstrates Africa’s division between a small number of large, commodity exporters and a larger number of small, commodity-importing economies.

Looking Forward

The economic outlook for 2017 and beyond is moderately positive. The [October 2016](#) edition of *Africa’s Pulse*, published by the World Bank Group, forecasts growth of 2.9 percent in 2017 and 3.6 percent in 2018. As in the recent

past, the average growth rate hides considerable heterogeneity within the region. The larger economies and other commodity exporters are expected to grow more slowly than the rest of the region. In Nigeria, exchange rate policy adjustments (i.e., managed depreciation of the Naira) and a modest improvement in oil prices should boost oil revenues and thereby add incremental growth. South Africa is likely to remain hobbled by rising unemployment, high household indebtedness, and elevated inflation, but government policies may help improve investor sentiment. In other countries, the outlook is more favorable. Large infrastructure projects should boost growth in Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Gradually improving copper prices and the end to the El Niño–driven drought should help Zambia.

Political and Economic Risks Abound

Given the surprising downturn in growth that occurred during 2016, projections about African economies need to be viewed with caution. Both internal and external factors could intervene. According to the World Bank, the [balance of risks](#) going forward is “heavily tilted to the downside.”

Possible external challenges include:

- Earlier-than-anticipated monetary tightening in the United States or the Euro area that could limit capital flows to emerging and frontier markets.
- A sharper-than-expected economic downturn in China that could weigh on demand for commodities.
- Uncertainties surrounding Brexit.

Challenges internal to Africa also exist:

- Possible failure by African governments to continue attempts to contain the fiscal and current deficits that have been caused by low commodity prices. Governments may come under populist pressure to unwisely open spending spigots.
- Potential lack of success in increasing government revenues from non-resource sectors by strengthening the tax base and tax administration.
- The ever-present threat of militant insurgencies and terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

Even if the risks cited above are averted and sub-Saharan Africa returns to substantial growth in 2017–2018, it will do so at rates lower than before the downturn in commodity prices. Domestic financial resources will likely continue to be insufficient to satisfy the aspirations and demands of the ever-growing numbers of young Africans. This situation could lead to increased populist pressures on governments, especially those facing important near-term political decisions. These include Kenya, where general elections are scheduled in 2017, and South Africa, which will elect new leadership of the majority African National Congress at the end of the year.

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Somalia's Election Process

Somalia's Vision 2016 transition plan (dated [2013](#)) called for the 2016 presidential election to be conducted by popular vote. As [Africa Watch](#) reported, however, in September 2016, the government determined that Somalia would not be able to prepare for a "one person, one vote" poll. In lieu of a popular vote, parliament would elect the president as it had in 2012.

Although plans for a popular presidential election were scrapped, in 2016 changes were introduced at the parliamentary election level to make the vote more inclusive. While in 2012, MPs were elected by a 135-member body of traditional elders, during the 2016 election cycle regional governments chose 54 members of parliament to sit in the newly created [upper house](#) of parliament. In addition, the election process for the 275-member lower house of parliament was adapted so that each member would be required to receive the majority of votes from a 51-delegate [electoral college](#). The electoral colleges were populated by 14,025 delegates selected by a 135-member body of traditional elders, with each MP being elected by a subgroup of 51 delegates drawn from the larger body of 14,025. These changes were adopted to expand the number of electors while maintaining clan and regional balance.

Corruption Undermines Parliamentary Campaigns

Although the parliamentary elections expanded the voter base from 2012, their legitimacy was challenged because of a number of alleged irregularities. Somalia's auditor general [reported](#) that many candidates secured their seats by bribing delegates, with payoffs allegedly as high as [\\$1.3 million](#).

Somalia's institutions appeared unable to challenge the corruption. The Indirect Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism (IEDRM) conducted an audit of the parliamentary elections, but canceled the results of only 11 out of 67 parliamentary races where [evidence of corruption](#) was found. This decision was itself [nullified](#) by the National Leadership Forum (NLF), the body of Somali senior leaders tasked with overseeing the election, and the parliamentarians accused of corruption were sworn into office.

The international community has criticized these irregularities. In December 2016, an array of international actors, including the United Nations, African Union, European Union, and the United States, issued a [statement](#) criticizing the NLF's decision to nullify the IEDRM results, as well as the failure to achieve gender quotas. With many candidates receiving [funding](#) from the Gulf States and Turkey, however, the AU and Western countries have little control over candidates' fundraising and have shown no inclination to respond by adjusting international assistance, given the potential for harm to vulnerable Somalis.

Insecurity Poses a Broader Challenge to Somali Government

While reports of corruption challenge the legitimacy of the Somali elections, insecurity poses a threat to the Somali government's ability to function. Al-Shabaab has directly threatened the electoral process, most recently bombing a [hotel](#) in Mogadishu where parliamentarians held meetings. This is part of al-Shabaab's larger [strategy](#) to exacerbate existing political grievances, particularly between clans, to weaken support for the government.

This strategy is effective because it shows that the Somali government is unable to ensure security for its citizens. Somalia remains reliant on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to provide security even though AMISOM's troop-contributing countries have stated their intention to [begin withdrawing](#) from Somalia in 2018. Without dramatic improvements in the performance and capabilities of the Somali National Army, an AMISOM withdrawal could significantly reduce the Somali government's ability to project territorial control.

Conclusion

The Somali government faces severe challenges in the near future. Even with AMISOM's deployment, insecurity continues and compounds the [risk of famine](#). In this environment, evidence of the scale of corruption in parliamentary campaigns, in conjunction with the six-month delay of presidential elections, casts doubt on the ability of the central government to rise above its internal divisions to address national issues. Failure to do so may have serious consequences for Somalia's vulnerable population.

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CAMEROON: ANGLOPHONE PROTESTS HIGHLIGHT HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES

By Sarah Graveline

In Cameroon's English-speaking regions, an escalating cycle of protest followed by government reaction is bringing the minority Anglophone population's longstanding grievances to a crisis point. Since lawyers and teachers began organizing protests in October 2016, the government has arrested hundreds of citizens and shut off internet services in Cameroon's Southwest and Northwest regions. While this reaction has drawn international criticism, neither Cameroon's government nor Anglophone protestors have taken steps to de-escalate the situation. This standoff has increasing economic and political costs for the country. [more...](#)



Protestors in Cameroon. (Source: "Cameroon: Excessive force that led to deaths of protesters must be urgently investigated," *Amnesty International*, December 9, 2016, <https://tinyurl.com/jx8ewqk>.)

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ECOWAS ACTS DECISIVELY IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRACY IN THE GAMBIA

By Alexander Noyes

On January 21, 2017, Yahya Jammeh, ruler of The Gambia for 22 years, yielded to regional diplomatic and military pressure and finally [stepped down](#) from power, heading into exile in Equatorial Guinea. After losing an election to opposition candidate Adama Barrow on December 1, 2016, Jammeh initially [conceded](#) defeat, but quickly thereafter reneged and vowed to remain in power. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led the effort to force Jammeh to respect the election outcome, organizing and deploying a force of [7,000](#) troops. In contrast to other regional bodies in Africa, which have uneven records of defending democracy, this intervention demonstrated ECOWAS's commitment to upholding democratic ideals in West Africa. [more...](#)



A woman poses in front of ECOWAS Senegalese troops near the state house in the Gambian capital Banjul, Sunday January 22, 2017, one day after Gambia's defeated leader Yahya Jammeh went into exile. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay.)

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Understanding the Roots of the Crisis

The current crisis reflects a longstanding divide between Cameroon's majority French-speaking population and its Anglophone minority, which comprises [20 percent](#) of the population. This divide resulted from colonial policies. Following Germany's defeat in WWI, Britain and France partitioned Germany's colonial territory, attaching southern and northern Cameroon to Britain's Eastern Province of Nigeria, while the rest of Cameroon came under French control. In 1961, as Britain withdrew from West Africa, southern Cameroon [voted](#) to rejoin Cameroon as part of a newly independent federated government.

Since 1961, Cameroon's Anglophone and Francophone regions have disagreed over the role of the central government. Although Anglophone politicians pushed for semi-autonomous governance under the federated system, Cameroon's ruling party successfully moved the country toward increasingly [centralized rule](#) under French-majority control. In May 1972, Cameroon became a unitary government, which further weakened Cameroon's Anglophone region by removing its semiautonomous status.

The 1972 [constitution](#) protects Cameroon's bilingual and [bi-jural](#) status; its Southwest and Northwest regions adhere to English common law, while other regions follow French civil law. Despite constitutional guarantees, however, English speakers have long argued that the central government discriminates against them. Since the [1990s](#), Anglophone political parties have pushed for a return to federated government or outright independence.

Current Protests: Old Grievances, New Tactics

The current crisis began in October 2016, when [lawyers and teachers](#) went on strike to protest the placement of French-speaking lawyers in common law courts and French-speaking teachers in Anglophone schools. By December, protests had spread from Bamenda, the largest Anglophone city in the Northwest region, to Buea, capital of the Southwest region. As commenters have [noted](#), because political cooperation between the regions is historically rare, the connected protests put increased pressure on the central government.

The current protests are also taking place in a time of increased government repression. An [anti-terrorism law](#), created in December 2014 in response to the threat from Boko Haram, has been used to stop political parties from meeting and to jail Anglophone activists.

On [January 17, 2017](#), three activists who organized the protests were arrested under this law and are currently being tried in a military tribunal, where they face the death penalty. While civil society groups have [protested](#) the activists' arrest, in a speech, [President Paul Biya](#) maintained the prosecution is "necessary."

More intrusively, on January 16, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications issued a [statement](#) notifying social media users that their posts risked criminal prosecution. Some protesters reported receiving [threatening text messages](#) from the government. The following day, at the direction of the central government, internet providers [shut off](#) service in Anglophone regions. Currently, the internet remains blocked, despite criticism from the [UN](#) and [civil society organizations](#).

Standoff Has Larger Economic and Political Concerns

The continued standoff between protesters and the government carries economic and political costs. The internet ban is disrupting business and communication. Civil servants have not been [paid](#), banks' online systems are not working, and ATMs are reportedly closed. The organization [Internet sans frontières](#), estimated that the first 15 days of the internet shutdown cost the country \$723,000 in lost revenue.

The protests also pose a political risk to President Biya, who will likely run for a [fifth term](#) in 2018. The government's reaction to protests has drawn further attention to Anglophone grievances. Activists using the Twitter hashtag [#BringBackOurInternet](#) have generated global interest in the crisis by linking it to larger issues of internet freedom. While international attention is unlikely to translate to an electoral threat to Biya, who has been in power since 1984, backlash against continued government repression may help strengthen the opposition.

Conclusion

Although Anglophone political dissent is not new, the scale of the current protests, coupled with the severity of the government response, has created a situation that is proving difficult to resolve. Central government efforts to repress dissent have so far failed, helping fuel domestic protest and generating international censure.

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ECOWAS ACTS DECISIVELY IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRACY IN THE GAMBIA

By Alexander Noyes

On January 21, 2017, Yahya Jammeh, ruler of The Gambia for 22 years, yielded to regional diplomatic and military pressure and finally [stepped down](#) from power, heading into exile in Equatorial Guinea. After losing an election to opposition candidate Adama Barrow on December 1, 2016, Jammeh initially [conceded](#) defeat, but quickly thereafter reneged and vowed to remain in power. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led the effort to force Jammeh to respect the election outcome, organizing and deploying a force of [7,000](#) troops. In contrast to other regional bodies in Africa, which have uneven records of defending democracy, this intervention demonstrated ECOWAS's commitment to upholding democratic ideals in West Africa.



A woman poses in front of ECOWAS Senegalese troops near to the state house in the Gambian capital Banjul, Sunday January 22, 2017, one day after Gambia's defeated leader Yahya Jammeh went into exile. (Source: AP Photo/Jerome Delay.)

Background

Located in West Africa, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa. It has a population of around 2 million and is entirely surrounded by Senegal. As highlighted in the December 8, 2016, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, Jammeh came to power via a military coup in 1994. His 22 years in power, which pushed the country in an authoritarian direction, were marked by successive coup attempts, restrictions on democratic expression, and human rights violations. In 2011, Jammeh declared that he would rule for “a [billion](#) years,” and in 2015 he announced that the country would become an Islamic republic. In 2016, Jammeh [promised](#) to pull out of the International Criminal Court. Jammeh's increasingly impulsive and authoritarian rule left The Gambia isolated.

Leadership Crisis

In The Gambia's 2016 elections, a united coalition of opposition parties, led by Barrow, surprised many by [capturing](#) 45 percent of the vote, with Jammeh taking only 36 percent. After reneging on his agreement to concede defeat, Jammeh [declared](#) a state of emergency and unilaterally extended his rule for another three months, but faced concerted domestic, regional, and international pressure to hand over the reins of power. ECOWAS quickly launched a high-level mediation effort aimed at convincing Jammeh to step down. The effort was [supported](#) by a wide array of international actors, including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. Compounding this outside pressure, many of Jammeh's top domestic allies began to abandon him—half of his government resigned, including his [vice-president](#) since 1997, Isatou Njie-Saidy.

ECOWAS Intervention

Fearing for his life, Barrow [fled](#) to Senegal in mid-January, where he was sworn into office at the Gambian embassy on January 19. Amid news of a looming regional military intervention, up to 45,000 refugees also flowed across the border to Senegal. Although the military appeared to back Jammeh for much of December and January, on the eve of the ECOWAS intervention, The Gambia's army chief General Ousman Badjie pledged his [allegiance](#) to the freshly inaugurated Barrow: “We are going to welcome them [the ECOWAS force] with flowers and make them a cup of tea.” The ECOWAS force was [composed](#) of troops mostly from Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, and Ghana. The Nigerian Air Force contributed 200 troops as well as aviation assets, including combat aircraft. When ECOWAS troops eventually entered The Gambia on January 19, they faced no resistance from the Gambian military.

The ECOWAS contingent stopped short of marching on the capital, Banjul, to allow for a final, and ultimately successful, mediation attempt. Under the terms of the [deal](#), Jammeh agreed to step down but would be afforded all the rights of a former president—including immunity from prosecution unless two-thirds of the national assembly votes to override—and would be allowed to keep some of his wealth, including a fleet of luxury cars. After the deal, reports [emerged](#) that Jammeh may have emptied the state coffers before he departed, taking up to \$11 million with him to Equatorial Guinea.

Conclusion

On January 26, as Barrow returned to The Gambia and was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd of thousands, he [announced](#): “The rule of fear has been banished from The Gambia for good.” While Barrow’s incoming government faces enormous [challenges](#) in reviving the economy and transitioning the country toward a functioning democracy, The Gambia’s transfer of power—and ECOWAS’s strong push to respect the election results—holds [promise](#) for the deepening of democracy in the region.

ECOWAS has a history of interventions in the name of democracy in the region, starting with the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Indeed, in 1999, ECOWAS went so far as to proclaim its right to intervene in the region with the adoption of the [Protocol](#) on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. These norms, and the demonstrated willingness to back them up with actions as in The Gambia, stand in contrast to other African regional bodies, which have been less willing to defend electoral successes by opposition parties, as exemplified by the Southern African Development Community’s [handling](#) of Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections.

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THE EU'S EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA: COMBINING THE REFUGEE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

On November 12, 2015, the European Commission, European Union (EU) member states, and other European donors launched the [EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#)—a new model for addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement in Africa. The EU has historically been an important donor in Africa, providing much development assistance to the continent. With a migration crisis now placing extraordinary pressures on European governments, the EU is more eager than ever to implement programs in Africa that will reduce the flow of migrants to Europe. To do this, the EU has adopted a two-layered approach, placing equal emphasis on (1) building the capacity of North African law enforcement and border security institutions to more effectively manage migration into Europe and (2) addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement, and irregular migration in Africa. The second area of focus is exemplified by the EU's Emergency Trust Fund (known simply as EUTF) for Africa, which in part views the migration crisis in Europe as a development issue in Africa. [more...](#)



The UN Refugee Agency truck fills a water tank at Kalobeyei Settlement. UNHCR through its water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) partner, Norwegian Refugee Council, trucks water to over 16,000 people at Kalobeyei settlement. (Source: UNHCR/S. Otieno, <http://www.unhcr.org/ke/2045-optimism-and-hope-as-refugees-relocate-to-kalobeyei-settlement.html>.)

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

BOTSWANA—CHALLENGES TO A SUCCESS STORY

By George F. Ward

Botswana, a landlocked and sparsely populated Southern African country, emerged decades ago as a somewhat surprising success story on the continent. Rich deposits of diamonds were discovered shortly after Botswana's independence in 1966, and the country's government used the resulting wealth well. Botswana transformed itself from a poor, agricultural society into an [upper middle income](#) economy. More recently, Botswana's economy has stalled, and increased [unemployment](#), especially among youth, has produced strains within a traditionally peaceful society. Although the proximate cause of Botswana's economic troubles is the worldwide decline in resource prices, the difficulties may be more deeply rooted. [more...](#)



The 1109-Carat "Lesedi La Rona," the largest gem-quality rough cut diamond discovered in over 100 years, was unearthed in Botswana in 2015 and was estimated to sell in London on June 29 for over £49.4 million (\$70 million or €52.4 million), but failed to meet the reserve. The decline in diamond production is working against the government's strategy of turning Botswana into a global center of diamond cutting and polishing. (Source: AP Photo/Matt Dunham.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Background: A New Financial Vehicle for Assistance

The EUTF, an innovative mechanism at the EU's disposal, is used in the field of development cooperation to pool [large resources](#) from different donors to enable a swift and flexible response to a complex emergency situation. The [premise](#) underpinning the EUTF is that Africans are migrating to Europe to escape poverty and conflict, seek protection from persecution or serious harm, or build better lives. The EUTF therefore supports programs for vulnerable populations that focus on development, the expectation being that their security and livelihoods in their home countries will improve as a result, so that they can remain in place rather than make the often dangerous journey to Europe in search of greater opportunities. Those programs include economic initiatives to promote employment opportunities, resilience programs that provide basic services to vulnerable populations such as refugees and displaced people, migration management programs that focus on border security and counter-trafficking, and governance programs that focus on conflict prevention by enforcing the rule of law. EUTF resources will be applied in a wide range of countries that encompasses the major African migration routes to Europe: the Sahel and Lake Chad area, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. As of January 31, 2017, a total of [106 projects](#) worth approximately \$1.6 billion have been approved.

Emphasis on Local Ownership

One of the principles underpinning the EUTF is ensuring local ownership. Programs funded by the EUTF are therefore contingent upon the African partner nation's active participation in their design and implementation. In Kenya, for example, the EUTF is providing financial support to the [Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Program](#) (KISEDPP), which operates under the leadership of the Kenyan government and officials from Turkana County. The program targets residents of a new refugee settlement near the Kalobeyei Township in Kenya's western Turkana County, on the border with South Sudan. A humanitarian crisis in South Sudan has driven record numbers of refugees into Turkana County, prompting Kenyan authorities to open the new refugee camp to accommodate the overflow from Kakuma, which currently hosts about [163,192](#) displaced people and is expecting more with the impending [famine](#) in South Sudan.

The provision of free food and basic services had been considered appropriate until such time as refugees could return to their homelands, but an entire generation of East Africans has been born in Kenyan refugee camps, and the prospects for their return home look grim. The Kenyan government, which has hosted refugees from East Africa in Kakuma since 1991, is testing a new approach to the issue. The [KISED](#) program therefore seeks to

re-orient the refugee assistance program to contribute to improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the refugees and host communities, better prepare the host community to take advantage of emerging economic opportunities in upcoming extraction and potential irrigation-fed agriculture, and reduce over-dependence on humanitarian aid and support the refugees to achieve durable solutions.

In addition to EUTF funding, the Kenyan government has allocated [15 million euros](#) to implement KISED.

Exclusionary Undertones and Unintended Consequences?

As the EU provides financial support to African countries through the EUTF, the EU is attempting to ensure that the funds have a purpose other than simply paying Africans to remain in Africa because their presence in Europe is undesirable. Likewise, the EU does not want to aid governments that have paid lip service to protecting refugee populations while simultaneously repressing them. The European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), a left-wing political group in the European Parliament, has suggested this to be the case in Sudan, where the EUTF has provided [100 million euros](#), on top of 878.8 million euros for the wider Horn of Africa, as part of a [special measure](#) to support the people of the Republic of Sudan. The GUE/NGL's [report suggests](#) the Sudanese authorities are using the refugee crisis in Sudan to secure EU funding, while the EU takes advantage of the Sudanese government's proclaimed intentions to enforce anti-migration policies in the region, all while numerous claims of gross human rights abuses committed by Sudanese security forces against civilians and refugee populations have been voiced by [Human Rights Watch](#).

Numerous [nongovernmental organizations](#) (NGOs) operating in Libya expressed similar concerns, believing that the EU's recently announced plan to bolster the capacity of the Libyan Coast Guard will have the unintended consequence of returning captured migrants to squalid, unhealthy, and dangerous Libyan detention centers. As the NGO Doctors Without Borders recently [tweeted](#), "hypothetically, blocking people in Libya would prevent them from drowning. In reality, it would condemn them to slow death." Others question the reliability of Libya's Government of National Accord, which is backed by the UN but controls only a small portion of the country's coastline.

A final concern about this program is rooted in the claim by some [development researchers](#) that rising incomes in developing countries will encourage emigration from those countries. That is, the wealthier portion of the population is more likely to move than the poorer. If this hypothesis is true, then the EUTF may be inadvertently promoting more migration rather than reducing it.

Conclusion

The EUTF is a novel approach to the refugee issue that promotes self-reliance in African countries through better economic opportunities, enhanced service delivery, and longer term solutions for refugees. However, to ensure these programs are as effective as possible, the EU needs to manage carefully the partnerships with African countries, discouraging investments in countries with poor records on human rights or an inability to provide vulnerable populations with safe places to reside.

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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The 1109-Carat "Lesedi La Rona," the largest gem-quality rough cut diamond discovered in over 100 years, was unearthed in Botswana in 2015 and was estimated to sell in London on June 29 for over £49.4 million (\$70 million or €62.4 million), but failed to meet the reserve. The decline in diamond production is working against the government's strategy of turning Botswana into a global center of diamond cutting and polishing. (Source: AP Photo/Matt Dunham.)

Botswana Has Led the Way

Botswana has been widely heralded as an example of good governance in sub-Saharan Africa and, indeed, in the developing world. It ranks second in the [Ibrahim Index of African Governance](#). Botswana scores better than any other sub-Saharan African country on Transparency International's [Corruption Perceptions Index](#), ranking 35th out of 176 worldwide. Botswana is relatively business friendly, coming in third in sub-Saharan Africa in the World Bank's [Ease of Doing Business](#) ranking. It is [one of only six sub-Saharan African states](#) that have achieved a place in the World Bank's upper middle income group (Gross National Income per capita of between \$4,036 and \$12,475). Both Standard and Poor's and Moody's credit rating agencies assign [investment-grade ratings](#) to Botswana's debt.

Botswana's wealth has also translated into [improved social and economic development](#). Life expectancy increased from [51 years in 1960 to 64 years in 2014](#). Child mortality fell precipitously. Thousands of kilometers of paved roads were built. Per capita income growth averaged 7.0 percent between 1966 and 1999. The proportion of poor people fell from one-half to one-third of the population in only nine years, from 1985 to 1994.

A Pause in the Growth Trend

Botswana's pattern of growth paused in 2015, when its economy of \$14 billion GDP [contracted by 0.3 percent](#). Growth picked up to perhaps 3 percent in 2016, but remained well below the decade's average of 5 percent. Most of the decline was attributable to difficulties in the mining sector. Amid a worldwide decline in the diamond industry, Russia overtook Botswana as the [world's largest producer](#). Diamond sales represent one-third of Botswana's GDP. A number of diamond mines in Botswana have closed, as have some of the companies in the country's relatively new diamond-processing industry. The damage was not confined to the diamond sector—copper and nickel mining also declined significantly. Botswana's tourism industry, which contributes 12 percent of GDP, was affected by low global economic growth and fears of the Ebola virus.

Concern about Recovery

If the recent downturn in Botswana proves temporary, there would be little reason for concern. There are a number of disquieting signs, however, that Botswana may be facing a prolonged period of low growth. These indications include the following:

- Diamonds are [running out](#), and could be gone within 15–20 years.
- The decline in diamond production is working against the government's strategy of turning Botswana into a global center of diamond cutting and polishing. The hoped-for employment growth in this relatively new sector is not taking place.

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- Botswana's substantial coal deposits are likely to remain undeveloped. The country possesses significant low-grade coal deposits, reportedly amounting to [212 billion tons](#). In other times, this resource might have made an important contribution to economic growth. Currently, prospects for development of coal mining are limited by the general shift away from carbon-intensive fuels, slow growth in Chinese demand for coal, and the absence of heavy-duty rail infrastructure needed for export.
- Government revenues are heavily dependent on the sharing arrangement within the [Southern African Customs Union](#) (SACU), the world's oldest customs union, which includes South Africa and the smaller economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. Historically, SACU proceeds have contributed about one-third of government revenue, as much as the diamond sector. The traditional SACU revenue-sharing arrangement, which has favored the smaller economies, has come under criticism by South Africa, which faces its own economic challenges. The future of the de facto subsidy of the smaller economies is in doubt.
- Job creation is lagging. From 2013 to 2015, 40,000 new entrants came into Botswana's labor force, but according to government statistics, only [2,707 jobs](#) were created. The government launched an [Economic Stimulus Program](#) to address the jobs problem, but the program has been criticized for its poor implementation.
- Finally, although progress in poverty reduction has been made in Botswana, a high level of income inequality continues to exist. The higher a country's Gini index, the greater the degree of income inequality. Botswana's latest reported Gini index was [60.5](#), the sixth highest of countries ranked worldwide.

Conclusion

Botswana's current situation is a cautionary tale of the difficulties inherent in the economic development process. Even though it has made good use of its natural resources and has generally followed wise policies, there seems to be no easy way out of the current predicament. Fortunately, Botswana still has considerable time before its diamond resources are exhausted. In that interim, it would be wise for Botswana to make a renewed push toward market-based industrialization, emphasizing sectors that would provide substantial numbers of jobs and a cushion against future downturns in resource prices.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

THE LIPTAKO–GOURMA AUTHORITY’S JOINT TASK FORCE: THE SOLUTION TO RISING INSECURITY IN MALI, NIGER, AND BURKINA FASO?

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

On January 24, 2017, in Niamey, Niger, the Presidents of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso agreed to establish a [regional joint task force](#) to combat rising insecurity in the area where those countries share borders. This decision follows a significant uptick in violence perpetrated by jihadi militants against the countries’ security forces, particularly in western Niger near its border with Mali. The Joint Task Force, which is modeled after the recently repurposed [Multinational Joint Task Force](#) (MNJTF) established by Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin specifically to counter Boko Haram, suggests a growing interest in the use of regional forces where partners share mutual security interests. [more...](#)



Niger's president reads a statement announcing the formation of new joint task force to fight insecurity in the Liptako-Gourma area. (Source: <http://www.presidence.ni/article/discours-de-son-excellence-monsieur-issoufou-mahamadou-president-de-la-republique-du-niger/esthshaeDSN4vXg.LNUWAFFc.dpbs.>)

Dr. Ashley Bybee is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN MALI ENTERS ITS FIFTH YEAR

By Richard J. Pera

As the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali ([MINUSMA](#)) prepares to enter its fifth year in April 2017, challenges abound: peacekeepers have sustained heavy losses and implementation of peace accords remains elusive. Still, improvements in training, tactics, and materiel, as well as new relationships with former rebels, appear to be showing positive results. With new leadership in place, where does MINUSMA stand after four years? [more...](#)



German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen, center spoke with German soldiers at Camp Castor near Gao, Mali Tuesday April 5, 2016. Von der Leyen stayed in Mali for a three-day visit and met soldiers of the German army stationed there as part of the Mission ASIFU-MINUSMA. (Source: Michael Kappeler/Pool Photo via AP)

Richard J. Pera is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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Background: Rising Insecurity Over the Past Year

An October 2016 attack on Nigerien security forces guarding a camp for Malian refugees [killed 22 soldiers](#) and prompted hundreds of refugees to [flee the border area](#) and relocate further north in the desert. On March 6, attacks killed [five gendarmes](#) in the Bankilare department near borders with Mali and Burkina Faso. On the same day, jihadists from Burkina Faso [attacked a Malian military post](#) in Boulkessi, killing at least a dozen Malian soldiers. In a village in northern Burkina Faso, jihadists, having warned weeks previously of attacks if schools taught anything other than the Quran, [killed two people](#), including a school official. Regrettably, these types of attacks have become common in the region over the last year, so much so that on March 4, 2017, the Government of Niger declared a [state of emergency](#) in the area near its border with Mali.

Three Sahelian terrorist groups – Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb – recently [announced](#) that they have merged under the name “Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen” (Support of Islam and Muslims) and pledged allegiance to al-Qaida. Looking ahead, this suggests that terrorist groups in the region will continue to pose a threat into the future.

A Military Mission for the Liptako-Gourma Authority

In response to this heightened insecurity, the governments of the three affected countries announced their intention to establish a joint task force under the purview of the Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (or Liptako-Gourma Authority). This organization was established in 1970 to promote development of mineral, energy, water, agricultural, grazing, and fishery resources within the Liptako-Gourma area (the contiguous areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger). Adding a military mission to this organization represents a new concept for countering growing violence in the neighborhood. According to Nigerien President Issoufou Mahamadou, the [idea](#) is to “pool resources and efforts and information in order to achieve tangible results in the fight against terrorism, gangsterism and cross-border crime that affect the countries permanently of the subregion and hamper their development efforts.”

Lessons from the MNJTF

The experience of the MNJTF, which is a regional force countering Boko Haram, offers potential lessons for the Liptako-Gourma Authority. Although MNJTF troops planned to conduct operations that required joint coordination and planning, the [consensus](#) has been that the fight has been characterized more as individual operations by contributing countries than

as a truly joint campaign. Chadian president Idriss Déby was [critical](#) of his Nigerian counterpart, citing a “definite deficit of coordination and lack of common action” when Nigerian troops failed to relieve Chadian soldiers after they liberated a Nigerian town that had been occupied by Boko Haram.

Command and control of the MNJTF also proved to be a contentious issue, with Nigeria [demanding](#) that it exert overall command of the joint force. Concerns over sovereignty also have the potential to affect operations and limit effectiveness. For example, Nigeria was initially reluctant to have foreign forces on its soil, which resulted in [lengthy deliberations](#) concerning the area of operations and whether neighboring countries would be permitted to conduct cross-border operations. These deliberations ultimately delayed the force’s deployment and [restricted](#) the ability of troops to pursue Boko Haram.

Conclusion

On the surface, the Liptako-Gourma Joint Task Force is a logical arrangement. First, it involves only those countries that are affected by the threat of terrorism in the region, thus promoting unity of effort and a common vision. Second, it recognizes the transnational nature of the threat and seeks to combat it with a concept that permits cross-border activities by the partners. Third, pooling resources to achieve a common goal is a sensible strategy for three countries with limited national resources. Last, such a force removes some of the bureaucracy and constraints associated with operations authorized by the UN or existing regional bodies. There are also, however, challenges that will affect the Task Force’s ability to conduct truly joint operations. Unless the governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have the means—in terms of resources and political commitment—to overcome potential issues related to sovereignty and command and control that the MNJTF faced, an alternative use of the Joint Task Force might be to provide a venue for the three countries to facilitate intelligence sharing, negotiate authorities to operate across each other’s borders, and coordinate the activities of existing forces on the ground.

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Background: The UN and Mali

[UN efforts in Mali date back to 2012](#), following a rebellion in northern Mali, during which ethnic Tuaregs, supported by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other Islamist groups, declared independence and overran government positions. France intervened militarily, pushing rebels northward and stabilizing the government. A cease-fire and preliminary peace agreement were negotiated in April 2013, and [MINUSMA was established](#) to protect civilians and implement the agreement. The cease-fire broke down, and by the end of 2013 UN peacekeepers found themselves in the middle of an active insurgency. [Since 2013](#), 114 UN personnel have been killed—72 by what the UN calls “malicious acts” (e.g., improvised explosive devices (IEDs)). Fatalities in [2016](#) exceeded those of 2015. [The Washington Post](#) recently described MINUSMA as “the world’s most dangerous UN mission.”

In June 2016, the UN extended [MINUSMA’s mandate](#) through June 2017 and tasked peacekeepers to “support implementation of the political and institutional reforms . . . and to support the Government’s efforts for the effective restoration and extension of State authority and rule of law” In response to increasing terrorism, [MINUSMA was directed](#) “to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks.” This directive did not include a counterterrorism mission. The UN requested member states to provide intelligence capabilities, counter-IED training and equipment, and additional armored vehicles. It also authorized an increase in personnel by 20 percent to 15,209.

MINUSMA’s Current Capabilities

UN efforts so far in Mali in 2017 have had mixed results. [On the positive side](#), much of the force has received counter-IED training, and more armored vehicles have arrived. Also, [intelligence](#) is being integrated into operations, and surveillance capabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles, have been introduced. Nonetheless, member states have not fulfilled all UN requests for personnel and equipment. For example, current [MINUSMA manning](#) remains nearly 2,000 below the UN-authorized ceiling. The total number of armored vehicles is also well below the target level.

Western European contributions, while small in number, are critical because they include professional personnel and sophisticated equipment. The [Netherlands announced](#) late last year it would redeploy four AH-64/Apache attack and three CH-47/Chinook heavy-lift transport helicopters from Mali in 2017. Dutch troop strength would be reduced from 400 to 290, but the Netherlands would continue to man and lead MINUSMA’s intelligence cell. These redeployments would have left MINUSMA with only three Salvadoran attack and three Bangladeshi utility helicopters. Fortunately, [Germany later announced](#) it would contribute attack and transport helicopters as well as additional troops. [The Canadian government signaled](#) it may rejoin UN peacekeeping efforts by contributing up to 600 troops and equipment to the UN mission in Mali. The addition of Canadian forces would boost UN capabilities.



German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen, center spoke with German soldiers at Camp Castor near Gao, Mali Tuesday April 5, 2016. Von der Leyen stayed in Mali for a three-day visit and met soldiers of the German army stationed there as part of the Mission ASIFU-MINUSMA. (Source: Michael Kappeler/Pool Photo via AP)

Recent Attacks

So far in 2017, there has been only one UN fatality: on January 24, [a Chadian peacekeeper was killed](#) and two others were injured during a mortar attack on a UN base near Kidal. If the trend continues, MINUSMA fatalities in 2017 would represent a decrease of over 75 percent compared to [2016](#). The question remains whether improvements in UN military capabilities, processes, and training are starting to have an impact.

But attacks on Malian targets have proven more deadly. For example, on [January 18](#), an AQIM suicide bomber detonated an explosive-laden truck at the [Malian Army garrison in Gao](#), killing 76 and wounding over 100 Malian soldiers and former rebels who had joined the peace process. The garrison was [protected](#) by “a few Bangladeshi peacekeepers” who were outside a “flimsy metal gate.” Hervé Ladsous, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, [said](#) “. . . the suicide attack . . . was clearly aimed at derailing the peace process.”

On March 5, at least [12 Malian soldiers](#) were killed in an attack on an Army outpost near the Burkina Faso border. The jihadist group [Ansarul Islam](#) reportedly was responsible. Note that this same group claimed to have killed 12 Burkinabe soldiers in December 2016.

Key Developments

On March 2, three Islamist groups (AQIM, Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun), which previously attacked UN positions in Mali, announced that they had [merged into one organization](#) under the al-Qaida banner, with an apparent goal of enhancing their future ability to oppose UN efforts.

Since 2014, about 3,000 French troops have been engaged in counterterrorism operations across the Sahel as part of [Operation BARKHANE](#). On February 6, the Sahel G5 group (Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania) [announced](#) that it would seek European funding to establish a [combined counterterrorism force](#). All five states currently contribute to MINUSMA, and it is not clear if any of the five would withdraw UN peacekeepers in order to support the new force.

The UN reached a milestone in late February 2017 when about 50 former Tuareg rebels donning distinctive turbans joined Malian soldiers to execute their first joint patrol in Gao, in northern Mali. These joint patrols, first proposed in 2015, began despite the AQIM attack in Gao noted above. [A UN spokesman said](#) the patrols were aimed at “building confidence and curtailing insecurity in northern Mali pending full restoration of state authority.”

Leadership Changes

On January 1, former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres replaced Ban Ki-Moon as Secretary General, a change that could affect the Mali mission. In his first report to the Security Council, [Guterres declared](#), “The peace process in Mali is at a critical juncture.” He added that renewed fighting was preventing implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, and he urged members to consider imposing sanctions on the obstructionists. However, sanctions are not a new idea, and it is not clear the Security Council will endorse them. Thus, the significance of the new Secretary-General’s interest in improving security in Mali remains to be seen.

On March 2, Secretary-General Guterres appointed a native French speaker, [Major General Jean-Paul Deconinck](#), Belgian Army, as MINUSMA Force Commander, replacing Danish Major General Michael Lollesgaard. In his final [interview](#), Lollesgaard was optimistic about MINUSMA’s long-term prospects, stating that MINUSMA would indeed be able to implement its mandate after it reached authorized troop strength. He concluded by saying that the most important thing MINUSMA brings to the people of Mali is hope.

Conclusion

The UN mission in Mali remains a significant challenge, but there has been improvement in some areas and promise in others. It remains to be seen if positive trends will continue during MINUSMA’s fifth year.

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BURUNDI: A DEEPENING POLITICAL IMPASSE

By George F. Ward

On February 23, 2017, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres submitted a [report](#) to the UN Security Council on the situation in the Central African state of Burundi as required by [Security Council Resolution 2303](#). The report described in convincing detail the progressive withdrawal by the government of Burundi from engagement with international efforts to help resolve the country's long-running political crisis. That crisis began with the decision by Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza to seek a third term in office in 2015. It is worth examining the course of recent developments in Burundi to better understand possible future directions. [more...](#)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



A protester holds up a poster as Burundi nationals from across the U.S. and Canada, along with supporters, demonstrate outside U.N. headquarters, calling for an end to political atrocities and human rights violations unfolding in Burundi under the government of President Pierre Nkurunziza, Tuesday April 26, 2016, in New York. (Source: AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews.)

IN SOUTH SUDAN A MAN-MADE CRISIS REPEATS ITSELF

By Sarah Graveline

On February 20, 2017, the UN announced that two counties in South Sudan were experiencing [famine](#). Over the next three months, 50 percent of the country's population is expected to be affected by emergency levels of [food insecurity](#). Although South Sudan's history of conflict-related hunger stretches back to the 1990s, the current famine highlights a worrisome new trend. While government and rebel forces have intermittently sought to control food aid for political ends, over the last three years soldiers have begun to target aid workers at unprecedented rates. Government obstruction is limiting the international community's response, thereby putting millions of South Sudanese at risk and sowing grievances that may fuel future conflict. [more...](#)



On March 6, 2017, South Sudanese women wait for food distribution by the World Food Programme in Leer County, Southern Leich State in South Sudan. (Source: AP Photo.)

Sarah Graveline is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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Background

Burundi has experienced periodic episodes of violence and instability since its post-colonial restoration of independence in 1962. As [Africa Watch](#) previously reported, the Arusha accords, agreed to in August 2000, effectively ended 12 years of civil strife between members of the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu ethnic groups. The accords established a framework for a post-civil-war government based on ethnic inclusion and power-sharing. The agreement specified that no ethnic group could comprise more than 50 percent of the Burundian armed forces. Before the accords, Tutsi had dominated the armed forces. Post-Arusha, a serious program of security sector reform built the Burundian military into an inclusive and professional organization that made major contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to pursue a third term shattered Burundi's 15 years of relative calm. Opposition to the decision broke out across ethnic lines, and the government responded with violent repression. The police and political party militias were the principal perpetrators, but an abortive coup led by a former army chief of staff increased the government's distrust of the armed forces.

International Conflict-Resolution Efforts Launched ...

Significant pre- and post-election violence in 2015 resulted in many deaths and sizable [refugee flows](#). Peace talks between the government and opposition, which were brokered by neighboring members of the East African Community, the African Union (AU), and the UN, began in the closing days of 2015. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni took on the role of mediator. Later, with Museveni focused on his own campaign for a fifth consecutive term, the [East Africa Community](#) named former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as an additional mediator, or "facilitator." Despite three meetings in the dialogue process chaired by Museveni and intensive consultations by Mkapa with the government and members of the political opposition, little or no progress has been achieved at the negotiating table.

The UN Security Council, which had periodically decried the violence in Burundi, adopted on July 29, 2016, a [resolution](#) that called for renewed efforts to resolve the conflict. The resolution noted that the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) had documented 348 extrajudicial executions and 651 cases of torture in Burundi between April 2015 and April 2016. Among other provisions, the resolution called on the government of Burundi to accept the deployment of 100 human rights observers and 100 military experts by the African Union. It requested the UN Secretary-General to establish a UN police component in Burundi to monitor the security situation and to support the OHCHR in monitoring human rights violations. The Secretary-General was asked to report every three months on the situation in Burundi.



A protester holds up a poster as Burundi nationals from across the U.S. and Canada, along with supporters, demonstrate outside U.N. headquarters unfolding in Burundi under the government of President Pierre Nkurunziza, Tuesday April 26, 2016, in New York. (Source: AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews.)

... But Have Proven Unsuccessful

None of the international efforts aimed at resolution of the conflict in Burundi have borne fruit. A January 2017 summary by [Human Rights Watch](#) chronicled the government's pattern of noncooperation. After the office of the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court opened a preliminary investigation on Burundi, the government on October 27, 2016, advised the UN Secretary-General of its decision to withdraw from the treaty that established the court. When UN human rights agencies moved to address the situation in Burundi, the government suspended all cooperation with those agencies. The Burundian government has also stonewalled on the AU's deployment of human rights and military observers to the extent that only a few have been deployed. The government rejected the deployment of a larger prevention and protection mission authorized by the AU, saying that the force would constitute an "invading and occupying force." Targeted sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union do not seem to have had a significant effect.

Current Situation

The [report](#) by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on February 23, 2017, painted a dramatic picture. In addition to chronicling the lack of progress in peace negotiations and on human rights issues, the report noted increased activity by the *Imbonerakure*, the ruling party's youth militia. The militia has been increasingly participating in joint operations with the police and intelligence services, and it has been implicated in numerous cases of arbitrary arrest, disappearance, sexual violence, and killings. In addition, the report noted that recently approved legislation on the armed forces could legalize the military use of the *Imbonerakure* and other ruling party militia elements. The effect of that could be to reduce the cohesion of the military, which until now has remained mostly neutral in the conflict.

The Secretary-General also pointed out that the political turmoil in Burundi has had a negative impact on the socioeconomic situation in the country. The key macroeconomic indicators are trending in negative directions—decreasing growth, falling investment, increasing public debt, and increasing unemployment, especially among youth. Most recently, Burundi's health minister declared a [malaria epidemic](#) after more than 9 million cases and 3,700 deaths were recorded since 2016.

Outlook

The current situation in Burundi is a starkly drawn example of the ability of a sovereign nation to successfully withstand international pressure and to reject international humanitarian and political efforts aimed at conflict resolution. In terms of international law, the UN Security Council has the power under Chapter VII of the [United Nations Charter](#) to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The UN has not exercised that authority with regard to Burundi and is unlikely to do so as long as the government of Burundi retains the support of Permanent Members of the Security Council, such as China, that have the power of veto. Beginning March 13, 2017, the Chinese foreign minister hosted his Burundian counterpart on an official visit to Beijing. Marking the occasion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry [noted](#) the ties between the two countries: "China and Burundi have been friendly with each other for a long time. In recent years, there has been a continual rise in the two countries' political mutual trust and the result of cooperation in infrastructure, medical care and public health, education, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and in other areas have been fruitful."

Given that more robust action by the United Nations on Burundi seems unlikely, the responsibility to act may fall on the AU and the East African Community. The crisis has driven 391,700 Burundians into [exile](#) since April 2015, and 27,000 have left since January 2017. The burden on neighboring countries of these refugees, along with the occasional violence related to spillover of the conflict in Burundi, may eventually prompt more forceful intervention. If African regional or subregional organizations take that course, they will deserve the support of friends in the developed world.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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On March 6, 2017, South Sudanese women wait for food distribution by the World Food Programme in Leer County, Southern Leich State in South Sudan. (Source: AP Photo.)

Understanding the Roots of the Famine

The UN's [announcement](#) of famine clearly stated that the crisis was man-made, a result of instability that has spread across the country as conflict between government forces and rebel militias devolved into widespread violence. As [Africa Watch](#) has reported, the current crisis was sparked in July 2016 when fighting between forces loyal to South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and the opposition leader Riek Machar caused Machar to flee the country and destabilized the already faltering peace process.

In a [report](#) released on March 6, 2017, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found that between July 2016 and March 2017, fighting between the government's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and opposition forces SPLA-IO (In-Opposition) spread to three regions across the country, leading 700,000 people to flee South Sudan and displacing 2 million inside the country.

This massive displacement created widespread food insecurity because civilians in states like [Central Equatoria](#), which typically produces much of South Sudan's food, were forced to abandon their farms. Conflict has made travel risky, which has reduced exports from neighboring countries that might otherwise have filled the gap in domestic production. The lack of food supply and the concurrent financial crisis have caused [food prices](#) to soar, making provisions out of reach to many even in areas where food is available.

Hunger as a Political Tool in South Sudan

South Sudan's leaders have a long history of using hunger for political and financial gain. In the 1990s, when the SPLA was a rebel group fighting for South Sudanese independence from Sudan, [SPLA leadership](#) arranged "hunger camps" by gathering displaced civilians to solicit international relief. Once the aid was delivered, the SPLA would loot the food for its own troops, leaving the civilians to suffer. Similarly, during this same period, Riek Machar (who in [1991](#) left the SPLA to form his own militia before rejoining in 2002) [was accused](#) of keeping child soldiers in camps and stealing the aid that was delivered for the boys.

These tactics continued after South Sudan gained independence in 2011. After conflict broke out in 2013, the government attempted to tax the [World Food Program](#) when it tried to deliver aid, and soldiers regularly looted food supplies intended for civilians. More perniciously, [human rights groups](#) accused soldiers on both sides of the conflict of purposefully destroying civilians' food supplies as a coercive measure.

This pattern has repeated itself in 2016 and 2017. Multiple [reports have](#) indicated that the SPLA, SPLA-IO, and a proliferating number of militias are directly targeting civilians along ethnic lines. Abuses include physical and sexual violence as well as cattle theft and the looting of food supplies.

This intentional targeting of civilian populations has put the international community in a difficult position in South Sudan. Providing food to starving civilians is a clear humanitarian imperative, yet the need to deliver aid makes humanitarian missions vulnerable to political interference. As recounted above, South Sudanese elites have regularly sought to control the provision of food aid to align with specific political or tactical goals. This has forced humanitarian missions into compromising situations and also put aid workers at risk.

Current Aid Obstruction Reaches Dangerous New Levels

Such risks have been a factor previously in South Sudan. In the 1990s and early 2000s, aid workers were killed and missions were pressed to pay bribes to deliver aid. Over the past four years, however, the South Sudanese government has shown an increasing willingness to target international missions through bureaucratic interference and a tacit endorsement of violence against humanitarian workers.

Since 2013, the government has regularly [threatened](#) to expel foreign workers and occasionally followed through on this threat. In [June 2015](#), South Sudan expelled Toby Lanzer, the deputy head and humanitarian coordinator of the UN Mission in South Sudan. In [December 2016](#), two officials from the Norwegian Refugee Council were deported. Following the declaration of famine, South Sudan raised the international [visa fee](#) from \$100 to \$10,000, in a move nongovernmental organizations claim was designed to limit the presence of humanitarian workers in the country.

The South Sudanese government has also overseen an uptick in violence against foreign workers. In July 2016, [presidential guard soldiers](#) fired at a U.S. Embassy vehicle carrying the Deputy Chief of Mission. In the same month, [SPLA soldiers](#) killed a journalist and raped Western aid workers at the Terrain Hotel in Juba. In total, since December 2013, [67 aid workers](#) have reportedly been killed in South Sudan, making the country one of the most dangerous for humanitarian workers.

Conclusion

South Sudan's famine has not come as a surprise to the international community. South Sudanese leaders in both the government and opposition have a long history of using hunger for political ends. Under these conditions, the humanitarian response is challenging and, as some have [argued](#), potentially counterproductive.

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MUJURU OPPOSITION PARTY SPLITS IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

On March 3, 2017, [one](#) year after the official launch of the Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) party, former vice president of Zimbabwe Joice Mujuru “rebranded” her fledgling opposition party, [changing](#) its name to the National People’s Party (NPP). Mujuru’s rebranding followed a public falling out last month with her erstwhile allies and ZPF co-founders, Didymas Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo. On February 8, Mujuru publicly [announced](#) the expulsion of Mutasa and Gumbo, as well as five other party officials, alleging that they were agents of President Robert Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party who were bent on unseating her as party leader. This most recent episode of fractionalization within Zimbabwe’s opposition has implications for the upcoming 2018 elections. [more...](#)

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
Source: Joice Mujuru. (Source: Photo adapted from “National People’s Party (NPP) Name Change Statement,” Press Release, 4 March 2017, <http://thezimbabwe.com/press-release-37016-national-peoples-party-npp-name-change-statement.html>.)

GHANA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR: EXPECTATIONS UNMET

By Dr. Ashley N. Bybee

Just five years ago, the discovery of oil in Ghana generated [excitement](#) throughout the country. In the impoverished Western region, local residents eagerly awaited thousands of anticipated new petroleum sector jobs, while in Accra the 2012 national elections focused heavily on the future of Ghana’s oil economy. Since major production began in 2012, however, the benefits Ghanaians expected to accrue from the new oil discovery have failed to materialize at the level initially anticipated. In fact, Ghana’s “good news story” has been taken over by a number of economic problems in recent years. [more...](#)

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TEN oil field development and production areas. (Source: Tullow Oil, “TEN Project: First Oil 2016,” <http://www.tulloil.com/Media/docs/default-source/operations/ten-project-brochure-july-2016-web-spreads.pdf?sfvrsn=4>.)

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Background: Mujuru Joins the Opposition

Zimbabwe, a landlocked country in southern Africa with a population of 14 million, has faced a long struggle over who will eventually succeed Mugabe, in power since 1980. As [highlighted](#) in previous editions of *Africa Watch*, the ZANU-PF succession battle spilled over in 2014 when Mugabe sacked Mujuru, who had been his vice president since 2004. Mugabe accused Mujuru of plotting a coup to topple him and purged [hundreds](#) of ZANU-PF party officials whom he viewed as Mujuru allies. In March 2016, following months of rumors over if and when she would rejoin politics, Mujuru officially [launched](#) ZPF on a platform of democratic reform and renewal. Her platform took Mugabe and ZANU-PF head on, calling for a number of wide-ranging reforms, including reengagement with Western countries and a reversal of the country’s contentious indigenization laws and land-reform policies.

Party Rebrand

After less than a year in existence, however, ZPF fell victim to infighting, following a well-worn path in Zimbabwe’s [opposition](#) politics. In February, Mujuru fell out with her party co-founders, Mutasa and Gumbo, who were also both former high-ranking ZANU-PF officials. Announcing their expulsion, Mujuru [explained](#): “we have decided to eject some of the colleagues and comrades we thought would stand with the people’s cause but have chosen to be agents of the [ZANU-PF] regime.” On her choice to rebrand her party, Mujuru [maintained](#), “We realised that there were limitations that the name . . . had in reflecting and selling the national democratic ideology and core values we espouse as a party.” On the launch of NPP, Mujuru [continued](#) to tout the major tenets of her previous political platform: “As national democrats, we are guided by our main core values of constitutionalism, inclusivity, devolution of power and equity.”

Questions of Complicity

Questions remain about whether Mujuru will be able to successfully distance herself from her long political past within the ruling party. (She was a ZANU-PF official for 34 years.) When recently questioned about her complicity in ZANU-PF’s violent and authoritarian politics, Mujuru [argued](#) that she was an “individual” who did indeed question some of the party’s violent strategies from within when she was in power, but ultimately she could not stop executive orders from Mugabe. When pressed on this question by the interviewer, Mujuru [said](#): “Do we want to live in the past? Or should we now start to look forward?” In fact, Mujuru is pivoting to her platform and the 2018 [elections](#): “it’s now my time, it’s now my



Source: Joice Mujuru. (Source: Photo adapted from “National People’s Party (NPP) Name Change Statement,” Press Release, 4 March 2017, <http://thezimbabweemail.com/press-release-37016-national-peoples-party-npp-name-change-statement.html>.)

chance. Because before, I've been subservient to lots of leaderships [sic]. But now that I will be the leader in my own right, surely . . . they [the people] think something better will come out of it."

Grand Coalition to Challenge ZANU-PF in 2018?

Yet Mujuru is unlikely to be able to threaten Mugabe and ZANU-PF's grip on power without the help of other opposition parties. Despite an extended history of fissures within Zimbabwe's opposition, of late there have been [indications](#) that a grand opposition coalition may be formed to take on Mugabe and ZANU-PF in elections scheduled for 2018. Indeed, the National Electoral Reform Agenda (NERA), consisting of over a dozen opposition parties—including former opposition prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) and Mujuru's party—has staged a series of [rallies](#) calling for electoral reform before the 2018 elections. Earlier this month, Mujuru indicated that her party rebrand would not affect her decision to join a potential coalition and confirmed that a formal alliance between her and Tsvangirai was in the [works](#): "We have a memorandum of understanding roadmap that we are planning to sign very soon."

Conclusion

Previously, the most serious challenge to the forging of a Tsvangirai-Mujuru coalition was the question of leadership, as both party presidents firmly [believed](#) that they were best placed to lead. The recent infighting within Mujuru's fledgling party may have helped settle this question against her—the party turmoil is likely to hurt Mujuru's bargaining position in ongoing coalition talks. As [noted](#) by Zimbabwean political analyst McDonald Lewanika, "The split of the nascent political project further weakens it [Mujuru's party] and its stature, and resultantly, its bargaining power with other opposition forces." Under these circumstances, Mujuru may be forced to concede that Tsvangirai is currently better positioned to lead the fledgling alliance, despite recent [concerns](#) about his health. Mutasa, Mujuru's former ZPF ally, recently openly praised Tsvangirai and [called](#) him the "natural leader" of a potential opposition alliance, maintaining that the "the rest of us are latecomers in this game."

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Ghana's Economic Crisis

Ghana's economic crisis was the result of a number of factors. First, a new [wage policy](#) in 2014 required the government to increase its [spending](#) on civil servants' salaries, which was paid for by borrowing against anticipated future oil and gas revenues. When a [glut](#) in the global oil supply caused oil prices to decline steeply, Ghana found itself in a major [debt crisis](#). Similarly, oversupply in the gold and cocoa markets caused government revenues to decrease further. Combined, these factors contributed to high [inflation](#) and made maintaining a stable exchange rate difficult. The debt crisis that ultimately ensued was exacerbated by the poor performance of the local economy due to widespread and prolonged power outages following damages to the West Africa Gas Pipeline. Ghana's economic crisis ultimately required a [\\$1 billion bailout](#) from the International Monetary Fund in 2015.


Ineffective Management of Ghana's Oil Sector

Ghana's Petroleum Revenue Management Act establishes at the Bank of Ghana a Petroleum Holding Fund that is divided into three sub-funds: the Heritage Fund, which is reserved for future generations; the Stabilization Fund, which cushions public expenditure in the event of unpredicted shortfalls; and the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), which is for annual support of the national budget. Funds from the ABFA have been used to advance four priority areas for the Ghanaian government: loan servicing, road construction, agricultural modernization, and capacity building.

Despite the fund's investments in Ghana's national development, [critics](#) maintain that many of the expenditures have been undermined by government malfeasance. For example, significant resources have been spent on administrative departments, like the Office of the President, while key infrastructure projects have been neglected because the state failed to fully fund them. Other [observers](#) have noted the lack of transparency in the process for companies to be granted exploration licenses by the government of Ghana, suggesting that personal connections and opportunities for personal enrichment might be influencing those decisions.

Insufficient Local Content

Ghana passed its [Local Content and Local Participation Regulation](#) in 2013 with the main objective to give Ghanaians opportunities to participate in the petroleum industry and develop local capacity to support it. While Tullow and other international partners involved in oil exploration in Ghana have professed support for the principle of local content, local [experts](#) complain that international oil companies prefer to work with global contractors with whom they have longstanding relationships rather than with local companies with unproven track records and often limited expertise or capacity.



TEN oil field development and production areas. (Source: Tullow Oil. "TEN Project: First Oil 2016." <http://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/default-source/operations/ten-project-brochure-july-2016-web-spreads.pdf?sfvrsn=4>.)

Operational Challenges

Oil production in Ghana's Jubilee oil field began in late 2010, with the first export of crude occurring in January 2011. For several years, this field [produced](#) between 110,000 and 115,000 barrels per day (BPD), which was 5,000 barrels less than expected due to underperformance at the wells. In March 2016, major technical problems beset production from the Jubilee oil field, and Tullow [halted](#) its operations when a fault in a bearing on a turret required a lengthy and complex repair. By [May 2016](#), Tullow had recommenced drilling but struggled to produce 30,000 BPD, well under the anticipated 120,000 BPD. Production was also limited by the requirement to reduce the amount of [excess gas](#) released into the environment. As a result, gas from the Jubilee field is being [reinjected](#) into the undersea reservoir until a pipeline is constructed to transport the gas ashore.

Looking Ahead

The Jubilee oil field, a valuable asset to the government of Ghana with reserves estimates of up to 1 billion barrels, will not produce indefinitely. It is expected to reduce output in [2024](#). In preparation for this eventuality, the government of Ghana is also exploiting the Jubilee field for its natural gas and has encouraged continued exploration of offshore oil fields in its territory. A second field, TEN—comprising the Tweneboa, Enyenra, and Ntomme deepwater fields near Jubilee—is [estimated](#) to have reserves of between 300 million and 500 million barrels. In [May 2013](#), the Plan of Development for TEN was approved by the government of Ghana, and Tullow commenced its second major deepwater development.

The TEN oil field, which started [production](#) in 2016 at 23,000 BPD, is [expected](#) to peak at 80,000 BPD. Although a maritime border dispute with Côte d'Ivoire has the potential to affect operations, the [outlook](#) is positive for 2017, with oil production in Ghana expected to increase to between 180,000 and 200,000 BPD due in large part to additional production from the TEN field. [Reports](#) that Ghana will construct a second oil refinery with double the capacity of its current refinery may also improve its economic outlook by enhancing its ability to service neighboring countries.

The Economist Intelligence Unit [predicts](#) a partial recovery in global oil prices in 2017, which will be welcome news to Ghana as it emerges from its current economic predicament. To deliver the wealth, development, and economic opportunities that its citizens have been waiting for, however, Ghana should consider improving its management of the oil sector, developing its gas sector, and imposing stricter requirements for local content.

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