


ECONOMIC CONCERNS THREATEN AFRICAN GROWTH NARRATIVE

By George F. Ward

On October 5, 2015, the World Bank, in its [periodic analysis](#) of African economic issues, estimated that economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa would fall from 4.6 percent in 2014 to 3.7 percent in 2015. This rate would be the lowest since during the world economic crisis in 2009. Moreover, the average annual growth rate after the economic crisis, 4.5 percent, remains significantly below the 6.5 percent registered in the 2003–2008 period. A sustained reduction in economic growth could have implications for the capacity of African governments to address urgent development issues. Given this possibility, it is important to look at the causes of the slowdown and consider whether the phenomenon is cyclical or more enduring. [more...](#)

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to decelerate in 2015 amid difficult global conditions and domestic challenges



Source: World Bank.

Projected GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Figure 1.3 in World Bank, *Africa's Pulse: An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa's Economic Future* 12 (October 2015), 6.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?

By Alexander Noyes

On September 28, 2015, President Barack Obama hosted a peacekeeping summit at the United Nations (UN), where some 50 countries [pledged](#) up to 40,000 new troops for UN peacekeeping operations. On the same day, the White House [released](#) a new presidential directive on peacekeeping, pledging to ramp up U.S. support for UN peacekeeping operations. At the summit, Obama [said](#) that peacekeeping operations “remain one of the world’s most important tools to address armed conflict.” This increased commitment to global peacekeeping prompts the question: does peacekeeping work? [more...](#)



In this Sept. 15, 2014, file photo, U.N. peacekeeping troops take part in a ceremony in the capital city of Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), to take over a regional African peacekeeping mission. (Source: AP Photo, File.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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
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Projected GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Figure 1.3 in World Bank, *Africa's Pulse: An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa's Economic Future* 12 (October 2015), 6.

Commodities, China, and Debt

Only [one year ago](#) the World Bank had projected an average growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa of 5.2 percent for 2015–2016. The decline in growth to the current estimate of 3.7 percent represents a fairly dramatic fall of more than 25 percent from the previous projection. In its [announcement](#) of the current estimate, the World Bank attributed the slowdown in growth to “the end of the commodity price super cycle—with a substantial drop in the price of oil, copper, and iron ore—a slowdown of the Chinese economy, and tightening global financial conditions.” As foreshadowed in the [March 20, 2015](#) issue of *Africa Watch*, the fall in the price of oil and other commodities is creating winners and losers on the continent. Producers of oil, minerals, and metals are experiencing economic setbacks. On the other hand, a number of countries, including Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Ivory Coast, are expected to buck the downtrend and to grow by 7 percent or more annually from 2015 to 2017. The World Bank [attributes](#) the level of growth in the second group of countries to investments in infrastructure and the resource sector and to consumer spending. Probably not coincidentally, none of the high-growth countries are currently significant producers of oil or gas.

The China Factor

Although the decline in demand from China is not the only cause of falling commodity prices, it is the largest single factor. Both the latest World Bank report and an [analysis](#) by Simon Freemantle, senior political economist at the Standard Bank, foresee continued downward pressure on commodity prices in the near term due to lower demand from China. At the same time, both also see significant longer term upsides for Africa as the nature of the Chinese economy changes. The World Bank cites a study that posits both a secular slowdown in the rate of economic growth in China, from around 7 percent annually now to 4.6 percent annually in 2030, and a rebalancing of the economy away from investment to household consumption. In the World Bank model, increased Chinese demand for consumption of imported products, chiefly agricultural ones, would outweigh the impact of lower commodity prices and produce a net advantage for sub-Saharan Africa over the longer term. Freemantle, focusing on Chinese investment patterns, comes to a similar conclusion and predicts increased Chinese investment in the agricultural sector in sub-Saharan Africa.

Challenges on the Way toward the Longer Term

Even assuming that the aforementioned analyses are correct for the longer term, sub-Saharan Africa will face significant challenges in getting through the near- and medium-term future. Perhaps the most significant current challenge is the combination of increased debt and falling currency values in key countries. An article in the [August 6, 2015](#) issue of Africa Watch pointed to the risks involved as African governments increasingly borrow on the international market. Since that time, the terms facing African governments have continued to deteriorate.

[Ghana](#), for example, was forced both to accept a higher interest rate and reduce the principal of its borrowing when it went to the Eurobond market in October 2015. In contrast to previous rates of 7.5 to 8 percent, Ghana will now pay 10.75 percent. Instead of borrowing \$1.5 billion, Ghana decided to request only \$1 billion. According to the Bank of Ghana, the country's total debt now amounts to 70.9 percent of GDP, and the [IMF predicts](#) that Ghana will end 2015 with a 75 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. Since the Ghanaian currency has [depreciated](#) over 25 percent in the past 15 months, the dollars needed to service the international portion of the country's debt have become dramatically more expensive. In most African countries, debt levels are rising, but are well below that seen in Ghana. For example, in [Zambia](#), which faces similar currency and debt pressures as Ghana, the ratio of government debt to GDP is still below 40 percent.

Stability at Risk?

Some believe that the decline in the rate of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is having a negative impact on standards of governance. The respected Ibrahim Index of African Governance reflected rapid progress between 2000 and 2008 in terms of safety and the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunities, and human development. The [most recent release](#) of the Index, on October 5, 2015, asserted that governance progress in Africa has stalled over the last four years. In that period, which is coincident with the onset of reduced economic growth, the African average overall governance score increased only slightly—by 0.2 points to 50.1 out of a possible 100.0. Tellingly, the sub-indices for sustainable economic opportunity and for safety and the rule of law actually declined.

Conclusion

In a continent burdened by the tremendous challenges of widespread extreme poverty and rapid population increases, vigorous economic growth is a necessity. If the analyses cited above are accurate, the needed level of economic growth is reachable in the long term, but perhaps only after a near-term period of relative stagnation. During this period, African governments will need to use their scarce financial resources wisely, investing in the infrastructure required to fuel future growth while not neglecting the basic human needs of their peoples. This is a test that would try the governments of even the most advanced economies. To pass it, African leaders will need wisdom and the support of their international partners.

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Peacekeeping in Africa

Africa has seen [50](#) peace operations since 2000, including UN and African Union (AU) missions ranging from Liberia to the Central African Republic (CAR) to Somalia. Approximately 80 percent of UN [peacekeepers](#) and nine out of 16 [current](#) UN peacekeeping missions are located in Africa. African actors and regional organizations, the AU in particular, are increasingly taking on responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. The United States, however, still provides crucial support for these peacekeeping efforts. Thus, as Africa remains “ground zero” for peacekeeping operations, this question is of great relevance to the continent.

As [highlighted](#) by political scientist Paul Williams in a recent Council on Foreign Relations report, “the United States is the single largest financial supporter of UN and African peace operations in Africa.” In 2013, the United States contributed \$1.7 billion to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa alone, and another \$770 million to support African-led peacekeeping efforts. The United States is also the largest financial supporter of UN peacekeeping beyond Africa, [accounting](#) for approximately 28 percent of the UN’s budget. Only 82 U.S. uniformed personnel, however, currently serve in UN peacekeeping missions. Last month, the White House [pledged](#) to double the number of military staff officers in UN missions and to ramp up technical, logistical, and training support.

On Balance, Peacekeeping Keeps the Peace

Peacekeeping operations in Africa and beyond face a number of [significant](#) financial and operational constraints. Despite high-profile failures in Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990s and [bad](#) press stemming from recent allegations of peacekeeper abuses, academic research suggests that overall, peacekeeping actually has quite a good record of preventing a return to war. The substantial, mostly statistical, academic literature on the effectiveness of peacekeeping is largely uniform on this point. As [argued](#) by political scientist Victoria Page Fortna, “the surprising thing about peacekeeping—the real story—is that, despite its many problems, it works.” Summarizing the recent research on the topic, Fortna [notes](#):

- the presence of peacekeepers significantly reduces the risk of renewed warfare. . . that is, peacekeeping makes peace more likely to last;
- the more peacekeeping troops, the fewer the battlefield deaths. . . that is, peacekeeping reduces the intensity of fighting; and
- the more peacekeeping troops and police deployed, the fewer the civilian deaths. . . that is, peacekeeping saves civilian lives.

These sentiments are echoed by a number of other scholars. For example, political scientist Anke Hoeffler recently [asserted](#), “there is considerable evidence that UNPKOs [UN peacekeeping operations] are effective in maintaining peace. . . the duration of peace is longer and wars are less likely to recur when peace-keepers are deployed.” Steven Pinker, a professor at Harvard University, also has [argued](#) that peacekeeping operations “work massively. A country is much less likely to fall back in civil war if they’ve got armed peacekeepers. And the better financed and armed the peacekeeping force, the more effective they are.” Specific examples of peacekeeping [success](#) in Africa include Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and [Liberia](#).



In this Sept. 15, 2014, file photo, U.N. peacekeeping troops take part in a ceremony in the capital city of Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR), to take over a regional African peacekeeping mission. (Source: AP Photo, File.)

Conclusion

Just because peacekeeping has worked in the past, does not, of course, mean it will continue to work in the future, especially if there is little peace for peacekeepers to keep. The mixed records of several recent UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, serve as reminders that peacekeeping is no panacea. As Paul Williams [notes](#):

Without a viable strategy, peacekeepers may stem some of the worst symptoms of a particular crisis, but they will not resolve the fundamental drivers of violence and instability. This has been a problem for many years in Darfur and the DRC, and more recently in South Sudan, Mali, and the CAR, where peacemakers have failed to resolve conflict and left peacekeepers to pick up the pieces.

This situation has prompted some scholars to [question](#) whether the previous findings on peacekeeping will hold in the future. Despite recent news [coverage](#) and a handful of well publicized failures, however, the overall research findings discussed above suggest that the enterprise of international peacekeeping, on balance, has a solid track record and that [more robust mandates](#) lead to bigger gains. Therefore, recent efforts to ramp up support for peacekeeping operations appear to be steps in the right direction and sound investments in global security.

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"GHANA IN THE EYES OF GOD"

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

In early October, the government of Ghana [suspended](#) seven High Court judges as part of an investigation into corruption in the judiciary, spurred to action by the release of an explosive new documentary, "Ghana in the Eyes of God." Filmed by renowned investigative journalist [Anas Aremeyaw Anas](#), the documentary details how more than 180 persons affiliated with the judiciary accepted bribes in exchange for more favorable sentences. [more...](#)



The Ghana national flag, center, flies in front of the Supreme Court building in the city of Accra, Ghana, Tuesday, Oct. 6, 2015. Ghana's judicial service says seven high court judges have been suspended following corruption allegations by a journalist. In a statement, the Judicial Council said the decision was made following the judges' "stated misbehavior." (Source: AP Photo/Christian Thompson.)

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RISE IN GOVERNMENTAL USE OF SPYWARE IN AFRICA

By Elisabeth Ferland

On October 15, 2015, Citizens Lab, a program based at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, released a [report](#) identifying 32 countries where at least one government entity was using FinFisher spyware, which is software used to covertly access electronic information.¹ In Africa, those countries were Angola, Gabon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. On the same day as the release of the Citizens Lab report, Privacy International also published a [report](#), *For God and My President: Surveillance in Uganda*, which outlined the Ugandan government's use of FinFisher. Sourced from leaked government documents, the report describes Uganda's use of software to [monitor](#) key opposition leaders, activists, elected officials, intelligence insiders, and members of the media. A [breach](#) of FinFisher security in 2014 revealed information regarding the largely secretive company, including its client list and the [price](#) of its services, which can run upward of \$3 million for a complete suite of products and services. Despite the expense, African governments appear to be willing to invest in this technology to gain information on opposition elements and dissidents. [more...](#)



Pro-democracy activists, from left, Moosa Abd-Ali Ali, Saeed Al-Shehabi, and Jaafar Al Hasabi, listen during a press conference in London, Monday, Oct. 13, 2014. The three pro-democracy activists say they have been hacked by Bahrain's government while living in Britain, one of a growing number of cases in which refugees say malicious software has been used to keep tabs on their activities abroad. Moosa Abd-Ali Ali, Jaafar Al Hasabi and Saeed Al-Shehabi are at the heart of a criminal complaint alleging that Bahrain's government infected their computers with FinFisher, a powerful piece of espionage software. (Source: AP Photo/Matt Dunham.)

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Scandal in the Judiciary

The release of "Ghana in the Eyes of God: Epic of Injustice" has caused a significant [uproar](#) in Ghana, a country typically lauded for its stability and democratic development. The scandal, believed to be [one of the worst](#) in Ghana's history, has some calling into question the quality of its political institutions and the depth of the country's democracy.

Even before the film's first showing on [September 22](#), there were indications that the impact of the film would be severe and far reaching. Twenty-two lower court justices were [suspended](#) on September 9, all of whom were reportedly identified in the film. A handful of justices opted to [resign from office](#) rather than face the scrutiny the film would bring to their careers. Some judges, however, scrambled to [prevent its release](#) by filing injunctions. Filmmaker Anas was reportedly under significant [pressure](#) from some powerful politicians to cancel the film's release. Television stations were [threatened](#) with lawsuits if they broadcast the film, leading Anas to offer free public screenings across the country instead.

No stranger to controversy, [Anas](#) is an enigmatic but towering figure in Ghana. No one knows exactly what he looks like. There are no clear pictures of his face; when he appears in public, Anas keeps his face covered. He has donned numerous [disguises](#) over the past 15 years in an effort to expose all manner of wrongdoing and corruption in his native Ghana. He has gone undercover in a mental institution to expose abuse; he took a job at a factory to film filthy working conditions; and he posed as an oil rig worker to catch sex traffickers. He even once concealed himself at a border post to observe smuggling across the Ghana–Côte d'Ivoire border. On an official visit to Ghana in 2008, President Barack Obama [commended](#) Anas's work, calling him a "courageous journalist. . . who risked his life to report the truth."

Epic of Injustice

Anas and his team, Tiger Eye Private Investigations, spent almost two years visiting all the country's regions in an attempt to document the depth and breadth of corruption within the judiciary. They collected over 500 hours of footage and captured [approximately 180 members of the judiciary](#), including clerks, registrars, and justices, accepting bribes. The Judicial Service came under particular fire as some of its staff were accused of doctoring case files and writing out their own judgments when justices proved incorruptible. Anas referred to the members of the Justice Service as a "[mafia](#)."

Just as troubling as the pervasiveness of corruption is the nature of the cases affected. Bribes were accepted in exchange for reduced sentences for serious crimes such as [kidnapping, rape, and murder](#). In one instance, a murderer was [freed](#) after a bribe of 3,700 cedis (approximately \$1,000) was paid and shared between a High Court justice and his clerk.

Conclusion

The film's debut was attended by [Attorney General](#) Marietta Brew Appiah-Opong, perhaps signaling how seriously the government is taking the film's allegations. The government moved quickly, both before and after the film's release, to



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investigate and suspend the accused. Anas has been granted [immunity](#) by the Attorney General so that he may continue participating in the investigation.

Although these moves are welcome, it is problematic that it took the efforts of a private citizen to get the government to act on accusations of judicial corruption. Since at least 2006, [when a local chapter of Transparency International](#) released a report alleging corruption in the judiciary, these issues have been known. There is currently no uniform system of case management, and the government does not collect or report statistics on case disposition, making it relatively easy for judges to pass sentences with little scrutiny.

It cannot be overstated how important trust in the judiciary is for democratic development. Beyond solidifying the supremacy of the rule of law, the judicial branch is often called upon to act as an impartial arbiter of matters of national importance, as seen in Ghana's recent electoral history. In 2012, the Ghanaian Supreme Court, after more than [nine months of televised deliberations](#), certified the outcome of a contentious presidential election. The opposition filed suit, claiming that electoral irregularities should invalidate incumbent president John Mahama's victory. Without public trust in the system, parties to disputes may not turn to the courts in the future, and the Court's decisions may be openly challenged. The success of the 2016 elections, which promise to be just as close and hard fought as those in 2012, will hinge upon strong and trusted institutions. The government should work quickly to restore the people's faith in the judiciary.

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What Is FinFisher?

FinFisher (also known as FinSpy) is sophisticated spyware written by Munich-based FinFisher GmbH and sold to governments only. The company's [website](#) states that the products can only be used to target individual users in contrast to mass interceptions. The suite of products is marketed as a tool for [covertly](#) accessing the computers of suspected criminals and terrorists. Once a computer is infected, FinFisher is undetectable by antivirus or antispyware software. Its capabilities include stealing passwords, allowing remote access to e-mail accounts, wiretapping Skype calls, and turning on the computer's camera and microphone. The [system](#) works by anonymizing the master server through proxy servers. The proxy servers then communicate with the infected computers, masking the location of the master command and control server.

National Intelligence Service in Kenya

Citizens Lab was able to identify by name those using FinFisher in 10 countries. In Kenya, one of the servers was registered to a [user](#) identified as "National Security Intelligence." The National Intelligence Service (NIS) in Kenya, established by an Act of Parliament in 1998, was [formerly](#) known as the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). In 2014, in the wake of the Westgate Mall terrorist attack, the Kenyan Government rushed to pass the [Security](#) Law (Amendment) Bill. The [Bill](#) expands the authority of the Director General of the NIS to monitor communications or obtain information to protect national security, without court oversight. Human Rights Watch, in its 2015 [report](#) on Kenya, implicated members of the NIS in human rights abuses, including disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Kenya has yet to publicly comment on its use of FinFisher spyware.

Operation Fungua Macho in Uganda

Operation Fungua Macho, [meaning](#) "open your eyes" in Swahili, was launched by President Yoweri Museveni in January 2012 and run by the Chieftancy of Military Intelligence (CMI). According to a media report, the Director of Technical Intelligence (DTI), in a January 2012 memo to the CMI titled "Progress Reports on Operation Fungua Macho," outlined the use [FinFisher](#) against opponents of President Museveni during protests against the government. The [purpose](#) of surveillance was to



Pro-democracy activists, from left, Moosa Abd-Ali Ali, Saeed Al-Shehabi, and Jaafar Al Hasabi, listen during a press conference in London, Monday, Oct. 13, 2014. The three pro-democracy activists say they have been hacked by Bahrain's government while living in Britain, one of a growing number of cases in which refugees say malicious software has been used to keep tabs on their activities abroad. Moosa Abd-Ali Ali, Jaafar Al Hasabi and Saeed Al-Shehabi are at the heart of a criminal complaint alleging that Bahrain's government infected their computers with FinFisher, a powerful piece of espionage software. (Source: AP Photo/Matt Dunham.)

¹ At the time of this writing, all links in this article were functional. We note that readers may encounter difficulty in opening some of the links due to circumstances beyond the Africa Watch team's control.

“crackdown on government officials and personnel who leak information to the opposition, and covertly collect information and data from the leading opposition entities so as to be a step ahead of them.”

According to a media report, [four](#) CMI officers took part in a one-month training course in Germany, bringing knowledge back to the 73 recruited operatives who manned the intrusion programs. Along with targeting the protest movement, the [operation](#) also aimed at spying on the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) opposition leaders, parliamentarians, members of the media, as well as criminals. This was achieved by inserting FinFisher “access points” in Parliament and key government institutions; hotels; and suspects’ homes, vehicles, and electronic devices. According to the memo, the information gathered was potentially to be used as [blackmail](#) to contain political opponents and control the media.

The Ugandan government has denied the existence of this electronic surveillance program. Controversy over the allegations comes at a time when, with elections due in 2016, political tensions are already running high, largely because of continuing suppression of the political opposition by the Museveni government.

Conclusion

The FinFisher enterprise has attracted criticism not only from watchdog organizations, but also from governments. In December 2014, Gamma International, the parent company of FinFisher GmbH, was criticized in a ruling by UK National Contact Point, an agency of the British government, as having a selling approach “not consistent with the general obligations to respect human rights.” Despite the attention and criticism, Citizens Lab has found that there are [more](#) FinFisher servers in more countries globally now than ever before. Proponents of free political expression and human rights have reason to be concerned.

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

TANZANIA VOTES: ELECTIONS ANNULLED IN ZANZIBAR

By Alexander Noyes

On October 25, 2015, Tanzanians went to the polls. Although it was the country's most competitive election to date, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party was able to hold onto power with their presidential candidate, John Magufuli, [receiving](#) 58 percent of the vote. An opposition coalition candidate, Edward Lowassa, garnered 40 percent. While the elections were generally [deemed](#) free and fair by international observers, things quickly took a turn for the worse in the semi-autonomous island region of Zanzibar, which also held elections. Alleging irregularities, Zanzibar's electoral commission annulled the region's elections after the opposition candidate declared victory, precipitating an electoral crisis. [more...](#)



In this photo taken Monday, Oct. 26, 2015, police special forces ride in the back of a vehicle with unidentified men they had arrested, in the Darajani area of Stone Town, Zanzibar. Zanzibar's election commission chief announced that the results of the island archipelago's presidential election have been nullified because of alleged irregularities, saying that the decision was taken because of several issues with the voting process. (Source: AP Photo.)

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AFRICA AND INDIA—RELATIONS IN A NEW PHASE

By George F. Ward

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put on quite a party in New Delhi recently, and representatives of 54 sub-Saharan African countries showed up. Over 40 African heads of state or government attended the Third India-Africa Forum Summit from October 26 to 29, 2015. China, obviously not present at the summit, was nevertheless [on the minds of observers](#). They wondered whether, with China's Africa engagement seemingly on pause (see the [October 22, 2015](#) issue of *Africa Watch*), India may be in a position to take up the slack. [more...](#)



Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari, center, attends the India Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi, India, Thursday, Oct. 29, 2015. Indian Prime Minister Modi described India and Africa as bright spots of hope and economic opportunity and offered technology and credit in an effort to match rival China's influence over the continent at a summit with more than 40 African leaders Thursday. (Source: AP Photo/Saurabh Das.)

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Zanzibar's Troubled Election History

Zanzibar is a semiautonomous island region located off the northeast of mainland Tanzania. It consists primarily of the islands of Unguja and Pemba. While mainland Tanzania is known for its record of peace and stability in a volatile neighborhood, Zanzibar has an extended history of election-related violence. Allegations of fraud and violent flare-ups between the CCM party and the Civic United Front (CUF)—the main opposition party—surrounded the 1995, 2000, and 2005 elections.

Before the 2010 elections, some headway was made on political [reconciliation](#), as a government of national unity (GNU) ensured both parties would have a stake in governance, no matter the outcome of elections. After a peaceful but tightly contested vote in 2010, a GNU was formed between CCM and CUF. Ali Mohamed Shein of CCM narrowly won the presidency, while Seif Shariff Hamad of CUF, as the second-place finisher, assumed the position of first vice president. As highlighted in the September 3, 2015 [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, despite some progress under the GNU, political tensions reemerged ahead of the October 25 vote.

2015 Polls Annulled

The October 25 election was largely [peaceful](#) and orderly in Zanzibar. A day after the polls closed, CUF's candidate, Hamad, [declared](#) that he had won, based on his party's vote tabulations, a claim that was refuted and called illegal by CCM. Hamad's declaration led to CUF supporters celebrating in the streets, where they were met with tear gas from the police. On October 27, the army surrounded the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) building as votes were still being counted. Sensing something was afoot, Hamad [asserted](#) that he would "not concede defeat if robbed of my victory." On October 28, the ZEC [annulled](#) the election results, citing gross irregularities, especially on the island of Pemba, a CUF stronghold. The ZEC chairman, Jecha Salim Jecha, [announced](#): "The process was not fair and had breaches of the law . . . I declare all the results to be null and void." Fresh elections are planned in 90 days.

Domestic and International Fallout

After the annulment, fears of violence escalated as police found several homemade [explosive](#) devices, and a number of homes were burned. CUF [alleged](#) that 16 people had been injured in clashes. Following the ZEC's annulment, Hamad [said](#), "We are telling CCM that we know what you are up to and we are not going to accept it . . . the people of Zanzibar have had enough of this entire situation and are losing their patience." International election [observers](#) also criticized the annulment and urged Tanzania to resolve the crisis quickly. The U.S. embassy in Tanzania expressed grave concern and [requested](#) that the annulment decision be reversed: "We call for this announcement to be recalled, and urge all parties to maintain a commitment to a transparent and peaceful democratic process."



In this photo taken Monday, Oct. 26, 2015, police special forces ride in the back of a vehicle with unidentified men they had arrested, in the Darajani area of Stone Town, Zanzibar. Zanzibar's election commission chief announced that the results of the island archipelago's presidential election have been nullified because of alleged irregularities, saying that the decision was taken because of several issues with the voting process. (Source: AP Photo.)

A multilateral negotiation process is now under way to resolve the political crisis, with assistance from the United Nations and a [group](#) of countries referred to as “Friends of Tanzania.” While initially promising protests if his alleged victory was not recognized, Hamad on November 2 urged his supporters to remain calm and voiced confidence in a negotiated resolution. “I ask CUF fans and Zanzibaris to remain calm and observe peace—diplomatic efforts have been going on well ... Let us be patient, as the international community is also helping to have Zanzibar’s political crisis resolved.” Tanzania’s outgoing president, Jakaya Kikwete, is also reportedly involved. He released a statement on November 1 [saying](#) he is “working tirelessly and consulting widely over the last few days to find an amicable and peaceful resolution to the situation in Zanzibar.”

Conclusion: Another GNU?

An independent [assessment](#) by political scientist Keith Weghorst compared CUF’s unofficial vote tabulation with the partial official results released by the ZEC, concluding that CUF’s numbers were more or less accurate. Weghorst finds that, if anything, Hamad actually underestimated his support. It appears that Hamad has the numbers on his side. This suggests that the ZEC’s fraud claims and annulment may have been a power grab by CCM, aimed at preventing a CUF win on the islands. While CCM may at some point attempt to paint the ZEC actions as rogue, CCM has openly [supported](#) the annulment. The GNU provision in Zanzibar’s constitution would provide CCM with a stake in the next government, even if it lost. So why does CCM care so much about remaining in power in tiny Zanzibar? One major reason is that bitter disagreements between the parties over a delayed [constitutional reform](#) process added greater stakes to this election, as a CUF victory could well lead to more constitutional autonomy for Zanzibar (which is favored by most Zanzibaris).

Given Hamad’s seemingly genuine victory, uniform condemnation by the international community, and the real threat of protests and potential widespread violence, it appears that CCM overstepped in Zanzibar and is now searching for a way out that allows the party to save face. While the situation remains fluid, a possible outcome of negotiations is another GNU, with CCM as a junior partner. Even if a settlement is successfully negotiated, the flawed election process raises several red flags for electoral management in Tanzania. Such flags include premature declarations of victory by opposition candidates in both the mainland and Zanzibar and CCM’s willingness to resort to extra-constitutional measures to remain in power. A number of electoral reforms might be considered, including a revamped and independent ZEC.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

AFRICA AND INDIA—RELATIONS IN A NEW PHASE

By George F. Ward

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put on quite a party in New Delhi recently, and representatives of 54 sub-Saharan African countries showed up. Over 40 African heads of state or government attended the Third India-Africa Forum Summit from October 26 to 29, 2015. China, obviously not present at the summit, was nevertheless [on the minds of observers](#). They wondered whether, with China's Africa engagement seemingly on pause (see the [October 22, 2015](#) issue of *Africa Watch*), India may be in a position to take up the slack.

An Ambitious Summit for a Growing Relationship

The first two India-Africa summit meetings—New Delhi in 2008 and Addis Ababa in 2011—were fairly modest affairs attended by a relatively small number of African governments. This year's edition was anything but modest. Over 2,000 African delegates attended and participated in separate meetings for senior officials, foreign ministers, and heads of state and government. In between, there were social events and cultural performances. At the meeting, Prime Minister Modi [stressed](#) the importance India's relationship with Africa: "The relations between India and the countries of Africa, these relations and these bonds that we have, are not just political and economic but we also have a very rich cultural tradition." In public, Modi did his best to play down comparisons with China, [saying](#), "Our relationship with Africa is unique and does not need any point of reference."

Prime Minister Modi was wise to stress the cultural aspects of the Indian relationship with Africa, if only because economic relations, although expanding, are still much less extensive than those of China. India is Africa's [fourth-largest trading partner](#), after China, the European Union, and the United States. China's lead is commanding, with its two-way trade with Africa reaching almost [\\$222 billion in 2014](#). The comparable number for India was [\\$71 billion](#), an increase from [\\$25 billion in 2006](#). Like China, India imports a great deal of crude petroleum from Africa. Angola is China's preferred partner in the oil trade, while Nigeria plays that role for India. Also like China, [India exports](#) manufactured goods for both the industrial and consumer markets to Africa. In the high-tech area, China is dominant in electronic goods, while India has developed a significant African market for its pharmaceuticals.

What Happened at the Summit?

The summit was about more than cultural performances and speeches. The Indian government made pledges of significant economic assistance to Africa. Two summit documents included support for some of India's key international diplomatic and political objectives. The documents also outlined an extensive program of cooperation in a variety of fields, including agriculture, the environment, education, and health.

In concrete terms, India [pledged](#) to provide African countries with \$10 billion in concessional loans over the next five years. In addition, India will provide \$600 million in grant aid and 50,000 scholarships for study in India over the same period. Although these amounts are relatively modest in absolute terms, they are evidence of India's willingness to make new commitments to Africa at a time when other partners are retrenching. The [India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation](#), one of the two principal summit documents, includes detail on specific cooperative endeavors in a number of fields planned for the next five years.

The [Delhi Declaration 2015](#), the second document agreed to at the meeting, addresses a variety of themes, but focuses mainly on the political, including some of particular importance for India. The Declaration takes off from the statement, "Indians



Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari, center, attends the India Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi, India, Thursday, Oct. 29, 2015. Indian Prime Minister Modi described India and Africa as bright spots of hope and economic opportunity and offered technology and credit in an effort to match rival China's influence over the continent at a summit with more than 40 African leaders Thursday. (Source: AP Photo/Saurabh Das.)

and Africans together comprise nearly one-third of humanity today,” and goes on to demand international action to achieve more democratic global governance. In another expression of developing-country solidarity, the summit participants called upon the developed nations to provide the financial resources and technology needed by developing countries to cope with the impacts of climate change. The document commits summit participants to support the reform and enlargement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Interestingly, however, India did not receive African support for permanent membership on the UNSC, which is a major Indian foreign policy goal. The Declaration states only that participants “noted” each other’s positions on UNSC reform.

Did the Summit Matter?

As the summit was convening in New Delhi, Sanusha Naidu, a researcher at a South African think tank, noted the [lack of attention](#) to the event in African media and among commentators. Naidu opined that it was impossible to discern what African leaders expected from the summit or to make out any strategic plan on the African side. A scan of media coverage before, during, and after the summit confirms Naidu’s point. The Indian press and electronic media covered the summit heavily, posting many articles on various aspects of the event. Attention was also paid to the summit in international media, garnering both financial and general interest. In contrast, little notice was given to the summit by African sources of news and comment. Before the summit, South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS) posted a [commentary](#). Coverage in Africa of the summit itself was sparse, with as much attention given to the [stumble](#) by Zimbabwe’s nonagenarian President Robert Mugabe on his way to the speaker’s podium as to most other aspects of the event.

One can only speculate about the reasons for the lack of attention by Africans to a significant milestone in a partnership that is of growing importance. One factor may be that Africans and African governments are becoming jaded by summits. In the relatively recent past, the American, Chinese, and Japanese governments have hosted African leaders for summit meetings. Another [China-Africa summit](#) is scheduled for South Africa in December 2015. A second factor may be that the Indian presence in Africa is simply less visible on a day-to-day basis than that of the Chinese. Over a million Chinese currently live on the continent, and they are present in virtually every country. In contrast, Indians and Africans of Indian descent, although numerous, are concentrated in only a few African countries, such as Mauritius, Kenya, and South Africa. Finally, there is a difference in [economic scale](#). China is the world’s second-largest economy, while India is in tenth place. China’s trade with Africa is three times that of India. In the end, China plays a role in the daily lives of Africans, while India does not. In sum, the Third India-Africa Forum Summit was a landmark in a relationship that still has plenty of room to grow.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

TIMING IS EVERYTHING: ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN CAR

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

The Central African Republic—a country without an elected government since former president François Bozizé was deposed in March 2013—is scheduled to hold a series of elections in late December 2015 to restore multiparty democracy. Some are concerned, however, that the country is not currently prepared to hold elections given the ongoing levels of [intercommunal violence](#). What are the dangers associated with holding elections prematurely? [more...](#)



French peacekeeping soldiers patrol the city of Bangui, Central African Republic, Wednesday, September 30, 2015. (Source: AP Photo.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

“CORRUPTION IS UNDERMINING KENYA’S FUTURE”

By George F. Ward

That is what the Ambassador of the United States to Kenya said on November 12, 2015, in a [joint statement](#) with representatives of 10 other diplomatic missions in Nairobi. The diplomats might have added that Kenyan corruption is negatively affecting not only that country’s future, but also regional efforts to defeat al-Shabaab terrorism. [more...](#)



A Kenyan soldier stands among piles of locally produced charcoal in the seaside town of Bur Garbo, Somalia. (Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.)

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UGANDA SETS ELECTION DATES AMID INCREASING OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT MUSEVENI

By Elisabeth Ferland

On November 4, 2015, Uganda’s Electoral Commission (EC) set February 18, 2016, as the date for next year’s presidential and parliamentary [elections](#). The same day, the EC cleared seven candidates to challenge incumbent President Yoweri Museveni in 2016. Despite the number of challengers, it is likely Museveni will remain in power, and some call into question how open and free the election will actually be. [more...](#)



In this photo taken Friday, September 11, 2015, former Prime Minister, Amama Mbabazi, left, chats with Forum for Democratic Change, Kizza Besigye, in Naguru, Uganda. (Source: AP Photo.)

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA’s three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA’s Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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French peacekeeping soldiers patrol the city of Bangui, Central African Republic, Wednesday, September 30, 2015. (Source: AP Photo.)

Transitioning to Elections

CAR has been in crisis since a March 2013 coup installed former rebel leader [Michel Djotodia](#) as president. In January of 2014, in the midst of an increase in violence across the country, Djotodia was forced by regional leaders to resign, marking the beginning of the transition back to democratic rule. Catherine Samba-Panza, previously appointed mayor of the capital city, Bangui, was appointed interim president

Since 2013, Djotodia's initial backers, the Séléka, have been engaged in a low-intensity conflict with militia groups known as anti-balaka. While there is a religious component to the schism, with Séléka being mostly Muslim and anti-balaka groups being mostly Christian, the country has [no history of religious conflict](#). CAR does, however, have a long history of coups, dictators, and instability.

Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for December 27, 2015. A referendum on changes to the current constitution is scheduled for two weeks earlier on December 13. These voting opportunities have already been [postponed](#) several times over the past year due to fears that insecurity and violence would accompany the vote.

Danger of Early Elections

The [international community](#) has strongly encouraged CAR to hold elections as soon as possible. [France](#) in particular has been vocal in encouraging elections in 2015 and expressing its desire to [withdraw](#) its troops from CAR. Many [analysts](#) and [nongovernmental organizations](#), on the other hand, have called for elections to be postponed yet again.

The [problems](#) associated with hastily arranged elections are legion, but the largest issue casting a shadow over CAR is the possibility of continuing or even increased conflict after an election. Research by [Brancati and Snyder](#) suggests that elections held too early—before demobilizing and building trusted institutions necessary to administer an election—generally lead to a re-ignition of conflict.

Despite a peace agreement signed in August 2015, the conflict in CAR has not been resolved and the violence has not receded. An international [peacekeeping force](#) of 10,000 troops, as well as French-led mission [Operation Sangaris](#), is currently deployed in CAR. Even more troubling, the [disarmament](#) process is proceeding at a slower-than-expected pace, meaning that rebel groups still have easy access to weaponry.

From an organizational standpoint, several logistical hurdles need to be addressed in post-conflict CAR to ensure that the election is free and fair. A representative voter registration process is absolutely necessary, and the government claims it has conducted one. But with nearly 1 million displaced persons, the majority of whom researchers believe to be [Muslim](#), it is unclear how representative the voter registration exercise could possibly be. It is also not clear that the country has the manpower needed to administer the electoral process. The president of the electoral commission [resigned](#) in early October, expressing doubt that an election could be successfully held in such an abbreviated timeframe.

Conclusion

On October 31, Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, appointed to office in January 2014, [assured](#) voters and the international community that elections would be held before the close of 2015. According to her, “There is no alternative for us because we cannot stay indefinitely in a transitional process.” There is truth to this concern. Without an internationally recognized government, CAR struggles to manage its foreign development assistance, and many businesses and governments are wary of doing business under such circumstances. The country also desperately needs solid leadership to unify the country and guide it out of this conflict.

But it is not clear that the country is ready or able to hold elections at this juncture. Rather than fast-tracking elections, or forcing the country to adhere to a strict, time-bound transition process, the international community might instead set specific benchmarks (disarmament, a representative voter registry, enhance electoral commission capacity, etc.) and help the interim government of CAR achieve certain milestones before proceeding with elections.

Elections do not resolve conflict; in fact, by their very nature, elections create competition and often foster political conflict. Political institutions—an electoral commission and the judiciary in particular—will be called upon to ensure that all participants accept the outcome of elections. Elections held without proper safeguards to protect the integrity of the result and without assurances of fair and trusted processes can do more harm than good. As things stand, it does not appear that the voter registration process has accurately captured the entire population. Elections held under such circumstances can cause displaced populations to feel marginalized, creating or reinforcing existing grievances and fueling further conflict. Elections held in an environment with readily available weapons and easily mobilized rebel groups, as is currently the case in CAR, may be a recipe for disaster.

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Observers Say Corruption Is Out of Control

On June 29, 2015, Kenya's Auditor General released a report on the financial statements of the Kenyan government for the 2013–2014 fiscal year. According to the [report](#), only 3.8 percent of government revenue had been fairly recorded. Of the 101 financial statements available to the Auditor General, only 26 percent received unqualified opinions. Coming just a day following [President Obama's speech](#) in Addis Ababa, in which he challenged African leaders with the statement: "Nothing will unlock Africa's economic potential more than ending the cancer of corruption," the audit report was widely discussed in Kenya.

Since the release of the Auditor General's report, corruption has remained a major focus of political debate in Kenya. In early August, John Githongo, an internationally respected whistleblower and activist, warned that corruption was sliding out of control. Githongo [called](#) the government led by President Uruhu Kenyatta "the most rapacious administration that we have ever had." In early November, yet another corruption scandal rocked the country when it was revealed that the [Ministry of Devolution and Planning](#) had been grossly overspending and mismanaging government funds. For example, pens normally priced at 10 cents were being purchased for as much as \$85 each.

After Denial, the Government Responds

The initial government response to the Auditor General's report was to shrug it off. Finance Minister Henry Rotich was [reported](#) as saying that his ministry "has since established that there were no resources lost." Only on November 13, a day following the release of the diplomatic statement noted above, did President Kenyatta take action. After a meeting with business executives, Kenyatta [stated](#), "We agreed we are going to work and come up with a framework of dealing with real corruption as well as perceived corruption." He promised that a group composed of government and private sector representatives would present a report within a week on dealing with corruption. In a [statement](#) announcing this move, Kenyatta's press spokesman lauded the roles of Kenya's "vibrant democracy" and "free press" in bringing allegations of corruption to light. He also called upon Kenya's international partners, including the United States and the European Union, to work harder to ensure that the proceeds of corruption used to buy property abroad are returned to Kenya.

Meanwhile, Somalia-Based Smuggling Continues

An article in the [July 10, 2014](#) edition of *Africa Watch* reported on the extensive documentation provided by a United Nations Security Council monitoring group on the involvement of the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) in violations of the ban on trafficking in charcoal produced in Somalia. In effect, the KDF was a participant in a trading network that provided the terrorist group al-Shabaab with its largest source of income.

The [most recent report](#) of the same UN group, released on October 9, provided an update on that situation. The report indicated that although the illegal trade in charcoal continues, al-Shabaab's share of the income has diminished. This is apparently largely because al-Shabaab no longer controls any major ports used for exporting. In response, the terrorist group



A Kenyan soldier stands among piles of locally produced charcoal in the seaside town of Bur Garbo, Somalia. (Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, File.)

has sought to obstruct the trade and thereby deny profits to its opponents, which include the KDF and the Ras Kamboni militia. The cumulative effect, according to the monitoring group, has been a reduction in the charcoal trade and a fall in revenues.

Just as the export trade in smuggled charcoal has diminished, illicit trade in sugar from Somalia to Kenya is thriving. The UN monitoring group reported that sugar is imported to Somalia through the port of Kismayo, which is controlled by the KDF, and transported by truck across several border points. Al-Shabaab is reported to levy a toll of around \$1,000 on each truckload. This revenue is a major source of income for the terrorist group.

The UN monitoring group provided few details on the sugar smuggling network and avoided directly identifying the KDF or Kenyan government officials as part of the network. Those connections are, however, made in detail in “Black and White: Kenya’s Criminal Racket in Somalia,” a [report](#) released on November 11 by Journalists for Justice. The title refers to the complementary trades in charcoal, exported from Somalia, and sugar, which is imported. The same vessels may carry both cargos. According to the report, the KDF, al-Shabaab, and the Ras Kamboni militia are all heavily involved in the sugar trade. The report estimates that 150,000 tons of illicit sugar enter Kenya via the Somali port of Kismayo each year. This trade amounts to about 230 trucks with 14 tons leaving Kismayo for Kenya each week. Based on these estimates, the sugar trade may yield an income of \$12.2 million annually to al-Shabaab and a similar amount to members of the KDF and its Somali allies. Meanwhile, according to Journalists for Justice, the illegal charcoal trade continues to flourish.

Kenyan Government Rejects Accusations, but Somali Parliament Wants Kenyans Out

The Kenyan government was quick to denounce the report of Journalists for Justice. A [government spokesman](#) called the report “absolute garbage” and “intellectual dishonesty masquerading as research” that undermine Kenya’s effort to stabilize Somalia. A [KDF spokesman](#) also rejected the report, saying, “It is not correct and it is not factual.”

Whatever the accuracy of the report, it has put further strain on the relationship between Somalia and Kenya. That relationship has been under stress since the start of Kenya’s incursion into Somalia in October 2011, when Kenya supported the effort of the Ras Kamboni militia to establish itself as the de facto government in Jubaland, the portion of Somalia bordering Kenya. More recently, Kenyan plans to put in place a series of barriers and fences along the border with Somalia have strained ties. On November 14, the Somali parliament, reacting to the report by Journalists for Justice, reportedly [voted](#) overwhelmingly to demand that Kenya withdraw its forces from Somalia. This resolution is likely to have only symbolic effect since the KDF is present in the country as part of an African Union force that is authorized by the UN Security Council, but it is indicative of the poor state of relations.

Conclusion

The move by President Kenyatta to establish a committee to recommend courses of action to curb corruption may be a step in the right direction, but it is only a small one. With multiple, credible allegations of misconduct on the part of Kenyan officials and military personnel on the public record, it would seem important for the Kenyan government either to convincingly refute the charges or to take steps to ensure that misconduct ceases and that the guilty are called to justice. Absent such action, the confidence of the Kenyan public in their government, which has been a key partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism, seems likely to continue to decline.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses

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On November 4, 2015, Uganda's Electoral Commission (EC) set February 18, 2016, as the date for next year's presidential and parliamentary [elections](#). The same day, the EC cleared seven candidates to challenge incumbent President Yoweri Museveni in 2016. Despite the number of challengers, it is likely Museveni will remain in power, and some call into question how open and free the election will actually be.

Campaign Season Begins Amid Police Suppression

Campaign season officially started in November, and Human Rights Watch has called on the Ugandan authorities to stop obstructing peaceful gatherings of candidates running against the sitting [president](#). Among the seven challengers officially nominated on November 4 are Dr. Kizza [Besigye](#), the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) nominee, and Faith Maureen Kyalya [Walube](#), the only female in the race and the former presidential advisor on poverty alleviation. Besigye has already lost three contested elections to Museveni. Amama [Mbabazi](#), a former prime minister and longtime ally of Museveni, is on the ballot as an independent candidate. Mbabazi was fired from his position within Museveni's government in 2014 for fear of his increased influence among members of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), particularly [younger](#) members, who feel Museveni has been in power for too long. Museveni came to power in a coup in [1986](#) and has won several contentious elections over his nearly three decades in office.



In this photo taken Friday, September 11, 2015, former Prime Minister, Amama Mbabazi, left, chats with Forum for Democratic Change, Kizza Besigye, in Naguru, Uganda. (Source: AP Photo.)

Rigged Elections and the Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy (CCEDU)

The [prevailing](#) sentiment in the country is that there is little chance of a power change. In a [poll](#) conducted by Research World International, 61 percent of voters do not believe Museveni would peacefully hand over power if he is defeated in the election (19 percent think he can peacefully hand over power, 14 percent do not know, 6 percent are undecided, and 1 percent had no comment), and 32 percent do not believe elections will be free and fair. In the same poll, 94 percent of those questioned said they intend to vote. According to some analysts, however, [turnout](#) is expected to be even lower than it was in 2011, given the sense of inevitability that Museveni will win.

Museveni is using the levers of power available to him to ensure his reelection. In September, police in the towns of Soroti and Jinja used [teargas](#) to disperse a peaceful gathering of Mbabazi supporters. [Human Rights Watch](#) has called for this practice to be stopped, saying that people should be allowed to gather and hear information about each of the candidates. According to the police, large rallies were [illegal](#) at the time because the EC had not formally nominated Mbabazi. As recently as October, Besigye was placed under house arrest to prevent him from [leading](#) planned rallies. Police [brutality](#) may further undermine the election process through intimidation and fear. Finally, vote buying and bribery remain tactics actively used by candidates in Ugandan elections. The result could be elections that are neither free nor fair, with low levels of voter turnout.

At least one organization is taking steps to encourage higher voter turnout. Created in 2009, the [CCEDU](#) is a coalition of over 600 NGOs and 8,000 individuals working toward electoral democracy in Uganda. The CCEDU works to increase voter turnout and promote citizen participation in the electoral process, and it [encourages](#) citizens to demand free and fair elections from the government. It fights against apathy among citizens who believe their vote will not matter in the ultimate outcome. Like other grassroots campaigns, [CCEDU](#) urges voters not to succumb to bribery and to instead choose the elected officials they feel would best represent their country. CCEDU has been very active in the run-up to the 2016 elections.

Conclusion

Under Uganda's first-past-the-post system of elections, it is likely Museveni will succeed at winning another term in February. The presence of two strong opposition candidates could work in Museveni's favor by splitting the vote. This, coupled with reported bribery and strong-arm tactics of the police, suggest that Museveni will emerge as the victor once again. But the electoral climate could look very different in Uganda in 2021, whether or not Museveni is again a candidate. Some see the [departure](#) of Mbabazi and his supporters from the NRM as a culture shift and a harbinger of further change. The key question may be whether the opposition in 2021 will be able to unite around a single, strong candidate. Success in that regard could make for a more competitive election.

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ZIMBABWE: WILL GRACE MUGABE TAKE OVER FROM HER HUSBAND?

By Alexander Noyes

On December 7, 2015, President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) annual congress is set to [begin](#). The congress launches amid [speculation](#) that Grace Mugabe, President Mugabe's wife, is gunning to eventually succeed her husband, who has been in power in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Last year, the congress was full of political fireworks that led to the expulsion of former vice president and liberation war veteran Joice Mujuru. Her sacking was followed by a series of purges that saw [hundreds](#) of former ZANU-PF stalwarts expelled from the party. Will this year's congress bring more surprises? [more...](#)



Zimbabwe's First Lady Grace Mugabe dances at a rally in Harare, Thursday, November 19, 2015. At the rally, held in a poor neighborhood in the capital, she told supporters she was skipping some of her meals to empathize with Zimbabweans who could only afford to have one meal a day. The first lady also dismissed claims that she plans to succeed her husband when his term ends in 2018. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

STUDENT ACTIVISM AND THE COST OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

In mid-October, student protests broke out on several university campuses across South Africa over an anticipated tuition hike. The protests, with a few [exceptions](#) largely peaceful, ultimately resulted in acquiescence by the government and a promise by President Jacob Zuma that there would be [no tuition increase in 2016](#). Why were the protesters successful and how responsive is the government to its youngest voters? [more...](#)



Photo by the author taken in December 2015 of the base of the former monument to Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town that was removed from campus in April 2015.

Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is available now.

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On December 7, 2015, President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) annual congress is set to [begin](#). The congress launches amid [speculation](#) that Grace Mugabe, President Mugabe's wife, is gunning to eventually succeed her husband, who has been in power in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Last year, the congress was full of political fireworks that led to the expulsion of former vice president and liberation war veteran Joice Mujuru. Her sacking was followed by a series of purges that saw [hundreds](#) of former ZANU-PF stalwarts expelled from the party. Will this year's congress bring more surprises?

ZANU-PF's Succession Saga

As highlighted in [previous editions](#) of *Africa Watch*, a fierce succession struggle within ZANU-PF has been playing out over the past several years in Zimbabwe. Before the 2014 party congress, the main protagonists of the battle were Mujuru and current Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, a longtime party loyalist who has held a number of positions, including justice and defense minister. Grace, a political novice until last year, when she became secretary of the ZANU-PF women's league, played a major role in bringing down Mujuru by sharply [attacking](#) her at rallies around the country for [allegedly](#) attempting to overthrow President Mugabe. Since Mujuru's expulsion, Mnangagwa has been seen as the leader of the pack in the contest to replace Mugabe. But the position of frontrunner to take over from Mugabe is a precarious one to hold in Zimbabwe, as the 91-year-old has a long history of keeping both his allies and opponents guessing over who will eventually succeed him.

Mnangagwa vs. Grace?

Reports [allege](#) that a faction within ZANU-PF aligned with Grace is plotting to have her replace Mnangagwa as party vice president at the upcoming congress. President Mugabe is allegedly on board with the proposal. According to *Africa Confidential*, the alleged [plan](#) is for Grace's allies to call for the restoration of a women's quota at the highest ranks of the party and then propose Grace as the natural candidate to fill the shoes of Mnangagwa who would be ordered to step down into a less prominent party position. The thinking goes that Grace would then be in a prime position to take over from her husband. Grace has publicly hinted about bad blood with the Mnangagwa camp, [saying](#) in August of this year, "We know they have been mobilizing since 2013 claiming they want to take over from President Mugabe. But let me warn you. When you are asked to act it does not mean you have been anointed heir apparent. Be patient."

Grace has made contradictory statements about her own political ambitions. Last year, she left the door open to running for [president](#): "Some say I want to be president. Why not? Am I not Zimbabwean, too?" But last month she suggested that she has [no aspirations to rule](#): "I am standing here as the wife of our President and as someone whom you chose to lead the women. I am ending here and I don't need another position." Despite her public statement, Grace's recent high-profile rallies around the country have convinced Zimbabwean analysts that she is readying a run at higher political office. Dewa Mavhinga of Human Rights Watch [argues](#), "Whoever says there is no bigger plan behind Grace's whirlwind campaigns across the country is lying with a straight face. This could very well be the establishment of a Mugabe dynasty, if the people of Zimbabwe allow it." Some opposition members are convinced that Grace is already calling the shots behind the scenes



Zimbabwe's First Lady Grace Mugabe dances at a rally in Harare, Thursday, November 19, 2015. At the rally, held in a poor neighborhood in the capital, she told supporters she was skipping some of her meals to empathize with Zimbabweans who could only afford to have one meal a day. The first lady also dismissed claims that she plans to succeed her husband when his term ends in 2018. (Source: AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi.)

for the elderly Mugabe. Former finance minister Tendai Biti [says](#) that Grace “is the de facto leader of government. . . Now she is looking for de jure power and Mugabe has no power to stop her.”

Conclusion

While Grace’s recent political maneuverings suggest that she is looking to move up in the ranks of ZANU-PF, her chances of taking over for Mugabe after he departs the political scene seem modest. This is due to three main factors. First, it is unlikely Mnangagwa would go down without a fight, and he has strong [backing](#) from Zimbabwe’s influential military chiefs. Second, Grace has no real political or governing experience and no liberation war credentials to help her build a popular support base. Her critics [call](#) her “Gucci Grace” because of her penchant for lavish shopping trips abroad. A ZANU-PF insider recently [commented](#) that she is “clueless in terms of statecraft.” Grace would have a hard time commanding grassroots or elite-level support independently of her husband.

Finally, and perhaps most important, her ascendancy within ZANU-PF of late is entirely dependent on Mugabe’s largesse and still firm grip on the party. As [noted](#) by political commentator Alex Magaisa, Grace “is not an emerging center of power, since her power derives from and is inextricably tied to her husband’s.” If Mugabe dies in office, Grace’s political ambitions would be all but buried along with him. Grace’s only real shot at becoming ZANU-PF’s candidate in the country’s 2018 elections would be if President Mugabe were to formally step down and hand the reins to her, while remaining in total control behind the scenes. She could then run as a proxy candidate for Mugabe. This scenario is unlikely given Mugabe’s advanced age and decades-long refusal to voluntarily give up power, but it remains a possibility.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

STUDENT ACTIVISM AND THE COST OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

In mid-October, student protests broke out on several university campuses across South Africa over an anticipated tuition hike. The protests, with a few [exceptions](#) largely peaceful, ultimately resulted in acquiescence by the government and a promise by President Jacob Zuma that there would be [no tuition increase in 2016](#). Why were the protesters successful and how responsive is the government to its youngest voters?

The Strength of Student Activists in South Africa

Student activism has a long and storied history in South Africa. From the [Soweto Uprising](#) over education inequality in the 1970s and the activism of Steve Biko, to the anti-apartheid protests of the [1980s](#) and more recently the [Rhodes Must Fall](#) movement earlier in 2015, students in South Africa have frequently taken to the streets to force their government to listen to them. Their concerns often revolve around issues of social and economic equality and justice. Additional issues include [underpaid support staff](#) and the [decolonization of education](#) in South Africa.

Fees Must Fall

Student protests began on October 14 at [Witwatersrand University](#) (Wits) in Johannesburg over a proposed [10.5 percent fee increase](#) for the 2016 school year, and they quickly spread to other universities. Using the hash tag #FeesMustFall, students from around the country, inspired by events at Wits, organized protests on their own campuses. Within a week of the initial protests, several schools, including the University of Johannesburg, University of Pretoria, Stellenbosch University, Rhodes University, and the University of Cape Town, were shut down by student protesters.

On October 23, more than 10,000 students marched to the parliament in Cape Town to force the government to listen to their demands. The government's response to the protests, although [initially muted](#), turned defensive as the police were called out in riot gear to repel the protesters, and then grew swiftly as the movement appeared to gain traction. Ultimately, President Jacob Zuma and administrators from several universities met with the students and agreed to not raise fees in 2016. Although some celebrated this concession as a victory, others believed that the government's decision [did not go far enough](#). The protests mostly ceased, and students returned to campuses to resume taking finals and preparing for the end of the semester.

The government's quick capitulation perhaps reflected its own ineffectiveness in addressing social and economic problems. Economic inequality has remained a persistent and troubling trend in South Africa. It is estimated that in terms of [access to education](#) and economic opportunities, post-apartheid South Africa is [performing worse](#) in many ways than the previous regime. Despite comprising less than 10 percent of the total population, whites in South Africa [overwhelmingly](#) make up the professorial pool at the university level. In addition, although their enrollment levels are up, black and colored students are [significantly less likely](#) than their white counterparts to graduate from universities.

The government may also be trying to appear responsive to the needs of the next generation of voters as a way to bring them into the party. There was much initial enthusiasm for the 2014 elections, as they represented the first chance the "born frees"—those born after the end of apartheid in South Africa—could cast their ballots. Both [registration](#) and [turnout](#) for the 18 to 24 age group were lower than expected, however. Perhaps to improve its relationship with this cohort, the ANC has



Photo by the author taken in December 2015 of the base of the former monument to Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town that was removed from campus in April 2015.

seemingly offered Wits Student Representative Council president [Nompendulo Mkatshwa](#) a research position within the party, but the offer has led many to criticize her and her role in the movement.

Conclusion

The lack of inclusivity of higher education and the cost of higher education, already [out of reach](#) for the majority of South Africans, still loom large in South Africa. In early December, new pro-student graffiti appeared on the University of Cape Town campus, suggesting that the demands of the students have not yet been completely addressed. The proposed fee hikes have only been postponed. It is possible protests will resume next year in light of the government's inability to reconcile its post-apartheid promise with current levels of educational inequality.

Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is available now.

A DEADLY “REBELLION WITHOUT A CAUSE” IN THE DRC

By George F. Ward

The insurgency conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been described as a “[rebellion without a cause](#).” Since its first attacks in Uganda in 1996, the ADF has moved in and out of public attention. Most recently, the ADF was again in the news when on November 30, 2015, its forces attacked the town of Eringeti in the eastern DRC near the border with Uganda. According to [Reuters](#), at least 30 people died in the fighting, including seven civilians who were killed in a hospital. A look at the ADF reveals not so much a rebellion without a cause as one that is based on several causes and interests. Taken together, these intertwined factors have provided the ADF with a remarkable degree of resilience. [more...](#)



In this Friday, May 22, 2015 file photo, rebel leader of the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces, Jamil Mukulu, center, is escorted by prison wardens as he appears at a magistrates court to challenge extradition proceedings against him, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The head of Interpol in Uganda said Friday, July 10, 2015, that Mukulu, a most-wanted Ugandan extremist who is accused of committing atrocities in Uganda and Congo, has been extradited to Uganda. (Source: AP Photo/Khalif Said, File.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

A TURNING POINT FOR BURKINA FASO?

By Elisabeth Ferland

The first elections in Burkina Faso since demonstrators ended the 27-year rule of President Blaise Compaoré in October 2014 took place on November 29, 2015. [Fourteen](#) candidates vied to become the first freely elected leader in decades. The White House released a [statement](#) of support for the new President-elect Roch Mark Christian Kabore: “The United States congratulates the people of Burkina Faso for participating in peaceful and orderly elections on November 29, marking a major milestone in the country’s democratic progress.” The election is a first, but welcome, step in a country attempting to overcome many economic and social problems. [more...](#)



People toss pamphlets with the face of Burkina Faso presidential candidate Roch Mark Christian Kabore at a rally in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Friday, Nov. 27, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Theo Renaut.)

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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The ADF—A Persistent Threat

[MONUSCO](#), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC, has the unenviable mission of protecting civilians and supporting peace efforts in the troubled eastern portion of the country, which is home to several insurgent groups. The UN force has long struggled to accomplish its mission, hampered by, among other things, the difficulties of operating effectively in a vast territory, troubled relations with the DRC government, and lack of resources. In March 2013, the UN Security Council sought to bolster MONUSCO by adding a 3,000-strong “[Force Intervention Brigade](#)” with an explicitly offensive mandate targeted on the insurgent groups. In fairly short order, that brigade dealt successfully with the M23 rebel group. The expectation at the time was that the brigade would next turn its attention to other significant insurgent groups, including the ADF.

Yet more than two years later, the ADF continues to terrorize civilians in its area of operations. In the year from October 2014 to September 2015, [450 civilian deaths](#) were attributed to the ADF. In part, the lack of success against the ADF was due to the [suspension of collaboration](#) between MONUSCO and the armed forces of the DRC in February 2015. More recently, some degree of cooperation between the Congolese army and MONUSCO was re-established in the wake of increased ADF raids on villages in the second half of 2015, and a joint operation was launched. In commenting on the difficulty of dealing with the ADF, UN sources noted that both some local Congolese authorities and criminal elements were involved with or complicit in ADF operations.

The ADF’s Deep Roots

In fact, the ADF cannot be understood without tracing the history of its involvement with local and national governments, criminal elements, commercial interests, religion, and ethnicity. Two excellent works on the background of the ADF are a 2012 [study](#) by Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot, “Rebels without Borders in the Rwenzori Borderland? A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces,” and Lindsay Scorgie-Porter’s 2015 [article](#), “Economic Survival and Borderland Rebellion: The Case of the Allied Democratic Forces on the Uganda-Congo Border.” The discussion that follows is based chiefly on these two sources.

The ADF was originally a Ugandan movement that drew its support mainly from Uganda’s Muslim community. Many of its original adherents were former supporters of the notorious Ugandan President Idi Amin and members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). Both the ADF and NALU established themselves in the Rwenzori borderland between the eastern DRC and western Uganda. Over time, the ADF deepened its ties with the people in the borderland through marriage, agriculture, and trade.



In this Friday, May 22, 2015 file photo, rebel leader of the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces, Jamil Mukulu, center, is escorted by prison wardens as he appears at a magistrates court to challenge extradition proceedings against him, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The head of Interpol in Uganda said Friday, July 10, 2015, that Mukulu, a most-wanted Ugandan extremist who is accused of committing atrocities in Uganda and Congo, has been extradited to Uganda. (Source: AP Photo/Khalfan Said, File.)

The ADF's initial military focus was on the Ugandan government, which was led then as now by President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement. Beginning in 1996 the ADF, operating with NALU, targeted Ugandan villages, police posts, army installations, and government facilities with cross-border raids and, in the capital of Kampala, terrorist bomb blasts. ADF/NALU forces received substantial support from the regime in Sudan, which also sought to destabilize Museveni's government. Sudan supplied military assistance by air, helping to fuel military operations that killed more than 1,000 people and displaced 150,000 in the 1996–2001 period.

In 1999, the Uganda army launched its "Operation Mountain Sweep" against the ADF in the DRC. Between 1,500 and 2,000 ADF rebels were killed, and senior leaders were captured. The Ugandan army operations succeeded in reducing the ADF to a few hundred militants and eliminated the rebel threat to Uganda itself.

The ADF's reaction was to embed itself in DRC society. Its combatants became "naturalized" into the predominantly Muslim local communities. Low-level ADF fighters supported themselves through agriculture, while ADF leaders developed other lines of business, including illegal harvesting of timber; coffee cultivation; growing a local brand of marijuana; and trafficking in retail goods, foodstuffs, motorcycles, and pharmaceuticals. The ADF even levied taxes on the chain saws used in illegal timber operations.

Through these economic activities, the ADF forged deep ties with business interests in the DRC and neighboring countries. Acting opportunistically, it found common cause at various times with other rebel groups, such as the Mayi-Mayi, and with Congolese army forces, which themselves were often involved in illicit trading activities. All the while, it maintained connections with its Muslim roots. According to a Ugandan army officer who spoke to Lindsay Scorgie-Porter, assistance to the ADF came from as far afield as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

The Outlook for the ADF

Given its multiple sources of support, the survival of the ADF at least at a minimal level of activity seems likely. Even if MONUSCO and the DRC armed forces were to join in a concerted anti-ADF campaign, the insurgents could fall back on their sanctuaries in the Rwenzori mountains. And in reality, close collaboration between MONUSCO and the DRC army is unlikely to endure long enough to suppress the ADF. In early December, MONUSCO's force intervention brigade, including South African attack helicopters, launched multiple attacks against the ADF. According to a [media report](#), these attacks were carried out despite an attempt by the DRC government to forbid them. The DRC government's stance was reportedly motivated by its desire, based on differences over the mission of the UN force, to reduce the strength of MONUSCO from its current level of over [22,000 uniformed personnel](#) to only 7,000. Given the extent of the threat to vulnerable civilian populations in the eastern DRC, the UN is unlikely to budge on the size of its force. At the same time, the government of the DRC is likely to persist in its periodic efforts to obstruct operations. The ADF may well prove to be the net beneficiary.

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People toss pamphlets with the face of Burkina Faso presidential candidate Roch Mark Christian Kabore at a rally in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Friday, Nov. 27, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Theo Renault.)

Attempted Coup Pushes Back Election

The election was originally scheduled for October 11, but an attempted coup d'état by the military on September 16 forced postponement. Under coup leader General Gilbert Diendere, the military took temporary [control](#) after guards seized the interim president, Michel Kafando, the prime minister, Isaac Zida, and two cabinet members. Due to domestic protests, whose suppression resulted in 14 [deaths](#) according to Amnesty International, and international opposition to the coup, interim President Kafando took back control seven days later. General Diendere was [charged](#) in October with crimes against humanity, attacking national security, and murder. (While being held for those charges, General Diendere was also charged on December 7 with complicity in the 1987 murder of former President Thomas Sankara, which led to the rise of Blaise Compaoré.) Elections were pushed back to November to allow the protests to dissipate and tensions following the coup attempt to die down.

First Election since October 2014 Uprising

Less than three months after the failed coup attempt, the Burkinabe went to the polls in an historic election. It was the first time in 27 years (and the last four elections) that Compaoré was not on the ballot. Over 70 percent of the [population](#) is under 30 years old, making this the first election for the majority of the country without an incumbent on the ballot. It also marked the end of the transition period that began in October 2014 with the uprising that followed Compaoré's attempt to amend the constitution to extend his term.

The elections took place in the midst of relative calm, under international, regional, and local observation. All told, [more](#) than 17,000 official election observers were at nearly 18,000 polling stations. Barthelme Kere, [president](#) of the electoral commission, noted the success of the provisions: "this election went off in calm and serenity, which shows the maturity of the people of Burkina Faso." Despite the calm, [security](#) was paramount, with increased police presence on the streets. Between November 27 and December 1, Burkina Faso's land borders were also closed as a precaution.

In an effort to be open and transparent, election-monitoring application software that could be accessed using mobile devices published results within hours of the polls closing. The Burkina Open Data Initiative (BODI), responsible for promoting information and computer technology, ran the app in [partnership](#) with the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The [website](#), which is still active, has all the election results posted for each race. President-elect Kabore won with 53.49 percent of the vote, avoiding the need for a run-off. Of the 5,517,015 people eligible to vote, 3,309,988 people actually voted, placing turnout at 60 percent. These efforts at transparency were positive, especially on a continent where delayed election results often result in suspicion and protests.

Conclusion

Kabore [broke](#) from Compaoré's party in January 2014 after the introduction of the proposed amendment to the constitution that would have allowed Compaoré to run again. In the previous government, Kabore had been prime minister and speaker of parliament. Kabore and 75 [members](#) of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) joined together to form the now victorious People's Movement for Progress (MPP). In less than two years, Burkina Faso has taken great strides toward becoming a more democratic country. But Kabore will have to work hard to prove that his presidency will really be different from the one that preceded him, given his background as a leading figure in Compaoré's government.

The election is only the first step in a long process for a country that ranks among the 20 [poorest](#) in the world. President-elect Kabore ran on a [platform](#) to build a "new Burkina Faso" that targeted the youth, women, and the elderly. He wants to fight youth unemployment, modernize the health-care system and improve access to education. After 27 years under the [same](#) leadership, the electorate is going to expect change, including reforms to the justice system and efforts to end corruption. Kabore will still face some political opposition. Although members of Compaoré's CDP were not [allowed](#) to run for president, they were not banned from running for Parliament and won 18 [places](#) in the 127-seat body.

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

PEACE AT A PRICE: NIGERIA'S PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PLAN

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

From 2006 to 2009, militants in the Niger Delta, Nigeria's major oil-producing region, were engaged in a low-intensity conflict with the government over the distribution of oil revenue. In July 2009, former president Umaru Yar'Adua unveiled an innovative plan meant to stop the hostilities by providing economic alternatives to militancy. Upon taking office, President Muhammadu Buhari promised in June that he would [allow the program to expire](#) at the end of 2015. How likely is this to occur and, if it does, what impact could this have on stability in the South? [more...](#)



This photo from March 26, 2015, shows Goodluck Jonathan, left, and opposition candidate Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, right, before the last presidential elections. (Source: AP Photo/Ben Curtis, file.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

MILITARY INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

By Alexander Noyes

The difficult task of integrating former rebel and government forces into a single military command after civil war is a regular component of international peace building worldwide. Indeed, since the 1990s, military integration programs have increasingly been included in negotiated settlements to civil wars. Over [50 percent](#) of civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements in the 2000 to 2006 period formally included such initiatives. What is the track record of military integration programs in Africa's post-civil war states? And what conditions contribute to success or failure? [more...](#)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Country	Duration	Estimated Combatants	Number Demobilized	Number Reintegrated	Budget (millions of US\$)
Namibia	1989-1999	Unavailable	57,000	11,950	Unavailable
Mozambique	1992-1994	100,000	92,000	Unavailable	Unavailable
Chad	1992-1996 (Phase I) 1996-1997 (Phase II) 1999 Reintegration (Post program)	27,179	27,179	Discontinued	12
South Africa	2005-2010	9,000	Never implemented	Never implemented	10
Rwanda	1999-2001 (Phase I) 2001-2008 (Phase II)	22,000	7,881	4,758	50
Sierra Leone	1998 (Phase I) 1999-2000 (Phase II) 2002-2004 (Phase III)	84,200	71,043	54,000	68
Ethiopia	2000-2003	148,000	148,000	148,000	174
Uganda	2000-	50,000	26,288	5,395	8
Guinea-Bissau	2001-2006	12,595	12,129	4,261	13
Angola	2002	3,120	Delayed	Delayed	Unavailable
Angola	2002-2008	165,000	92,390	92,297	246
Somalia	2003-2007	53,000	1,500	505	3
Liberia	2003-2008	103,079	101,495	58,831	110
Côte d'Ivoire	2003-2007 (Phase I) 2007-2010 (Phase II)	40,000	17,001	0	40
Central African Rep.	2011-	100,000	Yet to commence	Yet to commence	Unavailable
Burundi	2004-2007	7,565	2,556	2,556	13
Burundi	2009-	19,100	6,431	Yet to commence	Unavailable
DRC	2004-2010	75,000	26,283	21,012	84
Rep. of Congo	2004-2010	240,000	159,419	72,238	275
Niger	2005-2008	30,000	Unavailable	15,179	25
Sudan (Darfur)	2006-2007	3,160	3,160	3,160	2
South Sudan	2009-	4,700	5,363	303	Unavailable
Nigeria	2009-2011 (Phase I) 2012-2017 (Phase II)	150,000	12,523	8,307	165
Uganda	2009-2014	30,000	26,358	6,549	63
Uganda	2015-	150,000	Yet to commence	Yet to commence	Unavailable

Sources: These figures are based on various estimates from multiple United Nations and World Bank documents, commissioned studies, and news reports. Some residual DDR activities continue in countries where past programs have formally ended. Civilian disarmament campaigns in Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and elsewhere were omitted because they contain no demobilization or reintegration components.

Source: Table taken from Prosper Nzekani Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa," *Africa Security Brief* 24 (January 2013), 4, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/AfricaBriefFinal_24.pdf.

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Conflict in the Niger Delta

The distribution of Nigeria's oil wealth, concentrated in several southern states collectively referred to as the Niger Delta, has long caused the country problems. Specifically, there has been tension between the region's belief that it should be the primary beneficiary of revenue from its oil reserves and the federal government's centralized management and redistribution of oil revenue across all the country's states.

In the 1990s and 2000s, groups in the Niger Delta sporadically protested the government's handling of its oil resources. For example, the [Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People \(MOSOP\)](#), the Ijaw Youth Council, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the [Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta \(MEND\)](#), and the Egbesu Boys all claimed that despite the region's oil wealth and its contribution to the central government's coffers, the region remained underdeveloped, enjoyed too little of the revenue from oil sales, and experienced significant environmental hardships associated with oil production because oil spills were frequently occurring. These groups demanded either more autonomy or a greater share of oil revenue.

Beginning in 2006, militant groups engaged in a series of escalating attacks against oil installations in the region, many of which were owned by multinational corporations. These attacks took the form of kidnappings and ransoming of oil workers and theft ("bunkering") of oil. From 2006 to 2009, attacks increased, intensifying to the point that oil production in the country dropped to an all-time low. It was estimated at the height of the attacks that the government was losing more than [100,000 barrels of oil per day](#) and spending [approximately \\$19 million](#) per day on counterinsurgency operations.

Yar'Adua's Presidential Amnesty Plan

President Yar'Adua's approach to the crisis in the Niger Delta was [two-pronged](#): a military offensive that began in May 2009 and a disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) amnesty program. The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) is a voluntary program in which militants, during an initial 60-day amnesty period in late 2009, traded in weapons for educational and/or vocational training and a monthly stipend. PAP was envisioned as a five-year program to run from 2010 through 2015, although there was an assumption that it was likely to be [renewed](#) at least once. Since 2010, the program has provided scholarships, vocational training, and skills-acquisition programs, as well as a monthly stipend (approximately \$300 to \$400) to [30,000 participants](#). At the time of the program's unveiling, however, [some were concerned](#) that the program was a temporary measure that did not address the underlying drivers of underdevelopment and conflict in the region. Some called it merely a scheme for "[buying relative peace](#)" in exchange for access to oil. In addition to the formal amnesty program, [some ex-leaders](#) of rebel movements received lucrative contracts to provide pipeline security and larger-than-average stipends.

PAP and Buhari

The PAP was one of many campaign issues in the 2015 presidential election. Former rebel groups from the Niger Delta were split in their support for the presidential candidates in the 2015 election, but [many supported incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan](#). For example, the NDPVF threw its support [behind Jonathan](#), a southerner from Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, based on the belief that he would protect the region and potentially the program. On the other hand, MEND, the largest militant group active during the mid-2000s conflict, [supported Buhari](#). The group's leadership alleged that corruption under the Jonathan regime had cost the country – and the Niger Delta in particular – far too much and that Buhari was better suited to lead the country.

The responses to Buhari's April victory were, predictably, split. MEND leadership expressed its hearty [congratulations](#), but ex-militant Mujahid Asari Dokubu, leader of the NDPVF, [threatened a resumption of conflict](#). Other groups have issued [similar warnings](#) of violence in the event the government does not adequately address the needs of the Niger Delta.

Several ex-militants staged a protest on December 14 in response to the government's proposed 2016 budget. They claim that the amount allocated for the amnesty program amounts to a [significant reduction](#) and will not support the program through 2016. Protesters claim that if the amnesty program ends in 2015, they will go to war. The government has been sending [mixed messages](#) regarding the status of the program, suggesting that it has not yet decided how to proceed. Several state governments [recently reported lapses in payments](#), but the federal government has said that this was an [oversight](#) and not the beginning of the end of the program.

Conclusion

While it is encouraging that MEND has distanced itself from other ex-rebel groups and remains in support of the Buhari government, the threat of a resumption of violence in the Niger Delta remains very real. The Presidential Amnesty Program, while expensive, has not yet produced the kind of results needed to engender meaningful development in the Niger Delta. [Only 151](#) of the program's 15,451 graduates have thus far found permanent employment. Part of the problem may be related to the misuse of program funds. The program's former head, Kingsley Kuku, and eight other contractors and consultants [have been arrested](#) and charged with misappropriating funds.

Regardless of the source of the program's lack of sustainable progress, the government will soon be forced to decide how it will deal with the situation in the Niger Delta. It cannot afford another conflict, but it may also not be able to afford continued peace. Whatever measures are taken next should emphasize long-term, inclusive development.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

MILITARY INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

By Alexander Noyes

The difficult task of integrating former rebel and government forces into a single military command after civil war is a regular component of international peace building worldwide. Indeed, since the 1990s, military integration programs have increasingly been included in negotiated settlements to civil wars. Over [50 percent](#) of civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements in the 2000 to 2006 period formally included such initiatives. What is the track record of military integration programs in Africa's post-civil war states? And what conditions contribute to success or failure?

Military Integration in Africa

Military integration efforts after civil wars have been widespread in Africa, often as part of security sector reform or disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. By one count, [22 African countries](#) (see chart) have embarked on DDR programs since 1990. Military integration programs have been initiated in countries ranging from Sierra Leone and Liberia in West Africa to Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Central and East Africa to Mozambique and South Africa in Southern Africa. Such programs have featured varying degrees of international involvement, although international actors, principally the United Nations, have provided some level of support in most cases.

Surprising Success?

Two recent academic studies on the topic of military integration help shed light on the dynamics and outcomes of military integration processes in Africa. In a 2014 [volume](#) that he edited, political scientist Roy Licklider argued that despite some notable failures, the track record of post-civil-war military integration programs in Africa is surprisingly good. Eight of the 11 case studies in the volume are located on the continent (Sudan, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, South Africa, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, DRC, and Burundi). Of these, only the DRC stands out as a total failure. As Licklider optimistically argues, "perhaps the most counterintuitive conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that it is in fact possible under a variety of circumstances to integrate personnel from competing military groups after civil wars ... the overall record is quite positive."

Interestingly, the Licklider volume finds that traditional military capabilities and effectiveness have little impact on whether militaries were able to [successfully integrate](#): "the military capabilities of the new forces were often irrelevant to their successes." On the capability of military integration to prevent renewed conflict, Licklider strikes a more modest tone,

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Country	Duration	Estimated Combatants	Number Demobilized	Number Reintegrated	Budget (millions of US\$)
Namibia	1989-1999	Unavailable	57,000	11,950	Unavailable
Mozambique	1992-1994	100,000	92,000	Unavailable	Unavailable
Chad	1992-1996 (Phase I)	27,179	27,179	Discontinued	12
	1996-1997 (Phase II)				
	1999 (Reintegration pilot program)				
South Africa	2005-2010	9,000	Never implemented	Never implemented	10
	1995-2001	22,000	7,081	4,758	50
Rwanda	1997-2001 (Phase I)	57,000	29,794	43,891	68
	2001-2008 (Phase II)				
Sierra Leone	1998 (Phase I)	84,200	71,043	54,000	45
	1999-2000 (Phase II)				
	2002-2004 (Phase III)				
Ethiopia	2000-2003	148,000	148,000	148,000	174
Uganda	2000-	50,000	26,288	5,335	8
Guinea-Bissau	2001-2006	12,595	12,129	4,261	13
	2008-	3,120	Delayed	Delayed	Unavailable
Angola	2002-2008	105,000	97,390	92,297	246
Somalia	2003-2007	53,000	1,500	505	3
Liberia	2003-2008	103,019	101,495	59,831	110
Côte d'Ivoire	2003-2007 (Phase I)	48,000	17,601	0	40
	2007-2010 (Phase II)				
Central African Rep.	2011-	100,000	Yet to commence	Yet to commence	Unavailable
	2004-2007	7,565	7,556	7,556	13
	2009-	19,100	6,431	Yet to commence	Unavailable
Burundi	2004-2008	35,000	26,283	21,012	84
DRC	2004-2010	240,000	159,670	77,780	275
Rep. of Congo	2005-2008	30,000	Unavailable	15,179	25
Niger	2006-2007	3,160	3,160	3,160	2
Sudan (Darfur)	2008-	4,700	5,363	303	Unavailable
South Sudan	2009-2011 (Phase I)	150,000	12,523	8,307	165
	2012-2017 (Phase II)				
Nigeria	2009-2014	30,000	26,358	6,549	63
Libya	2011-	150,000	Yet to commence	Yet to commence	Unavailable

Sources: These figures are based on various estimates from multiple United Nations and World Bank documents, commissioned studies, and news reports. Some residual DDR activities continue in countries where past programs have formally ended. Civilian disarmament campaigns in Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and elsewhere were omitted because they contain no demobilization or reintegration components.

Source: Table taken from Prosper Nzekani Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa," *Africa Security Brief* 24 (January 2013), 4, http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/AfricaBriefFinal_24.pdf.

asserting that military integration alone is not a cure-all. He notes that “no contributor to this project believes that military integration by itself will make renewed civil war impossible.”

Conditions for Successful Integration

Other scholars echo this sentiment. Reflecting on her 2015 research on military integration in Africa, political scientist Nina Wilén [argues](#) it “is highly improbable that military integration alone can produce a stable peace.” Her 2015 [study](#), published in *International Peacekeeping*, analyzed the conditions that foster successful military integration in Africa, with a focus on Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda. She found that four factors shaped successful military integration outcomes: political education (aimed at forging a national identity), welfare provision (guaranteeing the basic needs of soldiers), socialization (often forged through intense training or deployments), and professionalization (military ethos). She also found that cohesive international and domestic support were important to success. Based on these considerations, Wilén deemed Rwanda and Burundi’s military integration programs as relative successes but, in agreement with the Licklider volume, viewed the DRC’s experience as a failure.

Wilén added two important caveats to her findings on Burundi and Rwanda. On Burundi, she noted that current tensions within the security forces stemming from President Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial election to a [third](#) term in July 2015 threaten to reverse progress on military integration. Recent troubling events in Burundi, including [growing](#) tensions in the army, underscore this point and demonstrate that military integration is no panacea. On Rwanda, Wilén [noted](#) that a strong, integrated military does not mean that a country’s security forces will be used in accordance with democratic practices: “In terms of effects on the peacebuilding process, military integration may have a positive and stabilizing effect on a post-war society if the government adopts a democratic relationship to the army.” If, however, an authoritarian government creates “a strong, integrated army that can be used as a tool against opponents, the result could be disastrous.” Licklider also makes a similar point regarding the case of Zimbabwe in the 1980s.

Conclusion

Although the above research suggests that military integration programs are unlikely to single-handedly prevent renewed conflict, both studies suggest that such efforts can help countries emerging from civil conflict on a number of fronts that contribute to post-war stability. Given current conflict trends, the international community will continue to play a crucial role in military integration programs in Africa. International actors would therefore be wise to heed the lessons from Rwanda and Zimbabwe and strive to promote democratic civil-military relations as a key component of military integration programs.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

PROSPECTS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN THE DRC IN 2016

By Elisabeth Ferland

Starting in October 2015 and continuing for 13 months, the people of the DRC were scheduled to go to the polls in a series of local, provincial, and national [elections](#). In November 2016, a new national parliament and president are to be elected. Under the current [constitutional](#) two-term limit, President Kabila is barred from running for re-election. But the government, citing [violent](#) protests in January 2015 over proposed revision of the electoral code, the establishment of 11 new provinces, and a court-ordered evaluation of the election timeline, appears to be angling to delay the elections scheduled for November to allow Kabila to hold onto power. [more...](#)



DRC President Joseph Kabila. (Source: Theophile Costeur, "DRC: Kabila Eyes Lifetime Presidency and Must Be Given a Way Out," African Arguments, August 27, 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/08/27/drc-kabila-eyes-lifetime-presidency-and-must-be-given-a-way-out-by-theophile-costeur/>)

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ZANZIBAR ELECTION CRISIS CONTINUES

By Alexander Noyes

After more than three months of a political crisis stemming from an [annulled](#) presidential election in October 2015, Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous island region of Tanzania, is scheduled to hold a rerun of the presidential election on March 20, 2016. The announcement of a rerun, made by the chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), abruptly put an end to a series of negotiations between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, headed by Ali Mohamed Shein, and the main opposition party in Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF), led by Seif Sharif Hamad. The CUF, which claims to have won the 2015 elections, has threatened to [boycott](#) the new vote, raising tensions and [fears](#) of renewed election-related violence. [more...](#)



ZEC Chairman Jecha Salim Jecha (left) announcing the annulment of election results. (Source: David Brewin, "Zanzibar – Votes Annulled," Tanzanian Affairs 113, January 1, 2016, <http://www.tzaffairs.org/2016/01/zanzibar-votes-annulled/a-way-out-by-theophile-costeur/>)

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IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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Joseph Kabila and His Delaying Tactics

Joseph Kabila [assumed](#) the presidency after his father, Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in 2001. Since then, Kabila has gone on to win contested re-elections in 2006 and 2011. In 2011, [controversy](#) surrounded the elections, with the Carter Center saying that “serious irregularities” and “mismanagement” made it impossible to verify the election results. Despite the concerns of the international community, the results were [upheld](#) by the Supreme Court, and Kabila was inaugurated to his second elected term in December 2011.

In January 2015, Kabila lost an [attempt](#) to amend the constitution to include a census before the 2016 elections. The proposed constitutional amendment was seen by opposition parties as a way to delay the election. Since then, Kabila and his supporters have said he will [uphold](#) the constitution without explicitly saying he would not run, leading some to fear he will use delaying tactics until he can legitimize his mandate to stay in power. Only [months](#) after the violent protests in January 2015, the government, citing the country’s lack of preparation for the elections, suggested presidential elections should be delayed for up to four years.

The 2006 constitution [mandated](#) division of the existing 11 provinces into 26 by 2010. Kabila’s March 2015 plan to achieve the division by the summer of 2015 was seen as his latest attempt to hold onto power because the constitutional court had [ordered](#) that governors for the 21 new provinces be elected before the scheduled round of elections for provincial deputies and local counselors. As a consequence, the provincial and local [elections](#) did not take place in October 2015, and at the end of that month, Kabila appointed special commissioners to provisionally govern the new provinces. Opponents saw this move as a way for Kabila to install loyalists into these positions and control revenue flows and security in the new provinces. But rather than waiting for elections, the constitutional court [legitimized](#) these appointments because of the state of “political anarchy” in the new provinces.

By not holding the elections scheduled for October 2015, the government created uncertainty for the rest of the DRC’s election timeline. Under the constitution, local and provincial [elections](#) must take place before national elections. The longer these are postponed, the more likely it becomes that the November 2016 parliamentary and presidential elections will not take place as scheduled.

Opposition Calling for 2016 Elections

In November 2015, Kabila called for a [national](#) political dialogue to discuss election issues, such as funding of the voting and the calendar that must be amended following delays. Kabila has not specified when these [discussions](#) will start.



DRC President Joseph Kabila. (Source: Theophile Costeur, “DRC: Kabila Eyes Lifetime Presidency and Must Be Given a Way Out,” African Arguments, August 27, 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/08/27/drc-kabila-eyes-lifetime-presidency-and-must-be-given-a-way-out-by-theophile-costeur/>)

He has agreed to international mediation, which was a demand from the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), the DRC's largest opposition party. The UDPS is the only opposition party that has not said it will [boycott](#) these discussions.

Citizen Front 2016, a [coalition](#) of opposition political parties and civil society organizations formed in December 2015, promised to hold opposition gatherings and protests commemorating the January 2015 victims of violence and to pressure Kabila to stick to the November 2016 elections. They have also refused to take part in the national dialogue proposed by Kabila. Citizen Front 2016 gained a [victory](#) when Moise Katumbi, a former Kabila ally, joined the opposition coalition. This could signal a shift in momentum away from Kabila and a solidification of the opposition threat. Katumbi, the [former](#) governor of Katanga province, Kabila's home province, is a politician with significant popular support. He was formerly a member of the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) and an ally of President Kabila. His break with Kabila in September 2015 was over the issue of Kabila's perceived attempts to hold onto power post-2016.

Conclusion

Before voting can happen, both the government and opposition agree that voter rolls must be updated. But there is disagreement over the timeline for these updates. According to a [chart](#) prepared by the country's electoral commission (CENI) on January 10, 2016, and posted by the president of the UK-based Association for Development and Democracy in Congo, this process would lead to a delay of at least 13 months. On the other hand, [according](#) to the UK's Special Envoy to Africa's Great Lakes Region, it would be technically possible to hold the elections in November 2016, even with an update of the voter rolls. Opposition leader Katumbi agrees with the UK assessment and thinks that with [help](#) from the UN this process should take a maximum of six months. Pressure is growing on Kabila not to postpone elections and to allow the first democratic transition of power in the country since independence. If the last few months of delaying tactics are any indication, however, even if Kabila decides not to run, elections are unlikely to take place on time in November 2016.

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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After more than three months of a political crisis stemming from an [annulled](#) presidential election in October 2015, Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous island region of Tanzania, is scheduled to hold a rerun of the presidential election on March 20, 2016. The announcement of a rerun, made by the chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), abruptly put an end to a series of negotiations between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, headed by Ali Mohamed Shein, and the main opposition party in Zanzibar, the Civic United Front (CUF), led by Seif Sharif Hamad. The CUF, which claims to have won the 2015 elections, has threatened to [boycott](#) the new vote, raising tensions and [fears](#) of renewed election-related violence.



ZEC Chairman Jecha Salim Jecha (left) announcing the annulment of election results. (Source: David Brewin, "Zanzibar – Votes Annulled," *Tanzanian Affairs* 113, January 1, 2016, <http://www.tzaffairs.org/2016/01/zanzibar-votes-annulled/>.) a-way-out-by-theophile-costeur/)

Background and 2015 Elections

Zanzibar is made up of the islands of Unguja and Pemba. It has a long history of disputed elections, with fraud and violence marring the 1995, 2000, and 2005 polls. Before the 2010 polls, Zanzibar sought to end this cycle of electoral violence by forming a government of national unity (GNU) between the first- and second-place finishers. As noted in the August 7, 2014, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, this led to a peaceful 2010 election and some surprising progress on political reconciliation under the GNU, which remained in office until the 2015 elections.

The October 25, 2015, poll was initially hailed as [peaceful](#) and orderly, and an independent vote [tabulation](#) confirmed CUF's claims that it had won. But the unilateral [annulment](#) of the election on October 28 by the ZEC on the grounds of alleged irregularities in CUF strongholds pushed Zanzibar into an extended electoral crisis. International actors decried the annulment, with the United States [suspending](#) a \$472 million Millennium Challenge Corporation grant to Tanzania. Despite reports of clashes and police intimidation (CUF [alleged](#) that over a dozen of its supporters were injured), the islands remained mostly peaceful in the interregnum. In the midst of a [series](#) of domestic and international mediation attempts to come up with a viable negotiated settlement, the ZEC unilaterally announced the March 20 rerun.

Rerun Boycott and Reaction

CUF quickly said it would [boycott the election rerun](#): "We are not going to take part in the elections ... and we kindly ask other Zanzibaris, particularly those who respect rule of law and democracy, also to boycott the fresh elections." The CUF party maintained that it had won the first round of elections, [arguing](#), "Elections are over, held in 2015, we want our victory back." The CCM party has disregarded CUF's boycott threat, with Zanzibar's minister for elections and internal affairs, Mohamed Aboud Mohamed, [saying](#) that "the planned fresh polls will be held with or without opposition."

International actors have again voiced coordinated concern over the rerun. Fifteen Western diplomats released a [statement](#) on January 29 condemning the rerun and calling for a negotiated settlement: "We regret that an election rerun was announced, while a dialogue between parties was still ongoing. ... For the benefit of all Tanzanians, we reaffirm our belief that the current political impasse in Zanzibar would be best addressed through a mutually acceptable and negotiated solution."

Tanzanian civil society has also questioned the legality of the rerun. Imelda Urio, the acting head of the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), [argued](#) that the ZEC "does not have the mandate to rerun the election."

Conclusion: Prospects for Renewed Violence?

In its press release, the group of 15 Western diplomats [raised fears about looming violence in Zanzibar](#): "We are deeply concerned that the unilateral declaration of a rerun may lead to an escalation of intimidation and tensions." Hamad himself

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[warned](#) about a return to election-related violence in Zanzibar if the rerun goes ahead: “Any decision to hold fresh elections would lead to violence. . . . A re-run of the election is a desperate attempt by the ruling party to gain political legitimacy after losing the election.” This could be read as a threat by CUF. The concern that a rerun could act a flashpoint is valid, but concerted international pressure could help thwart a return to Zanzibar’s dark days of electoral violence.

As argued in the November 5, 2015, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, the GNU provision in Zanzibar’s constitution still stands, providing the CCM party with a significant role in the next government, regardless of which party won the 2015 elections. Given CUF’s ostensibly genuine election win and Hamad’s openness to continue with the GNU model, the international push for a negotiated settlement, with CCM as a junior partner, seems appropriate. Longer term electoral reforms might also be part of an agreement, including a truly independent ZEC.


Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ELECTIONS IN UGANDA: THE SUPPORT MAY BE REAL, BUT THE PROCESS IS FLAWED

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On February 20, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni extended his 30-year rule for at least another five-year term. The elections were marred by [sporadic violence](#), a [heavy police presence](#), and repeated [harassment of the opposition](#). Since coming to power in 1986, Museveni has enjoyed significant popularity. For at least the past 15 years, his approval ratings have not dipped much below 60 percent. How can Museveni's consistent popularity be reconciled with his party's willingness to resort to electoral manipulation to secure the vote? [more...](#)

Museveni Presidential Approval,
2000 to 2015



Data taken from [Afrobarometer](#) surveys.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

NIGERIA'S PRESIDENT BUHARI—DEALING WITH TOUGH CHALLENGES

By George F. Ward

Elected in March 2015 as an opposition candidate amid popular demand for change, Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari faces a difficult task. During the campaign, he promised that if elected he would defeat Boko Haram while simultaneously attacking the endemic corruption that hobbles Nigeria's government and society. Because of the downturn in oil prices, however, the financial means at his disposal are substantially reduced. He also faces significant international pressure to deal with well-documented abuses of human rights by Nigeria's security forces. These challenges would test the abilities of any leader. As the anniversary of the 2015 election approaches, it is worth taking stock of how President Buhari is doing. [more...](#)



Nigerian former Gen. Muhammadu Buhari speaking to journalists in Abuja, Nigeria, Wednesday, April 1, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

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
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The Conduct of the 2016 Elections

Two days after the polls closed, and amid [allegations of fraud](#), the Electoral Commission swiftly and officially declared National Resistance Movement (NRM) candidate Museveni [the victor](#) in the country's February 18 presidential poll. Museveni allegedly garnered 60 percent of the vote to first runner-up Kizza Besigye's 35 percent. Besigye's party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), has rejected the results and vowed to challenge them in court. Besigye has called for his supporters to protest the election results. Amama Mbabazi, a former ruling party stalwart who split with Museveni in 2015 and announced an independent candidacy, received only 1.6 percent of the vote. Mbabazi also claims that the election results are [fraudulent](#).

During the lead-up to the elections, the opposition was repeatedly harassed by government forces and many were concerned that the [elections would not be free or fair](#). Besigye was arrested four times in eight days. He has been [accused](#) of planning to incite violence. One protester [died](#) as a result of fighting between opposition supporters and the police. Citing [security concerns](#), the government shut down social media sites, including Facebook and Twitter, on the day of the election.

The [United States](#) and the European Union (EU) have been highly critical of the elections. In particular, the EU [criticized](#) the Electoral Commission for its lack of independence and transparency. The Commonwealth's observation mission, led by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, [had similar concerns](#).

Previous Elections

The 2016 elections bear more than a passing resemblance to the 2011 polls. In that election, Museveni defeated Besigye 68 percent to 26 percent. [Accusations](#) of fraud, intimidation, vote buying, and harassment were numerous. Besigye led weeks of opposition [protests](#) in the capital Kampala, but they amounted to little in the end. Museveni also won the 2006 election, the country's first multiparty election held in decades, 59 percent to Besigye's 38 percent. Besigye was arrested multiple times before that election on various charges, including treason and rape. The opposition claimed the elections were characterized by fraud and intimidation.

A [detailed analysis](#) of several public opinion polls conducted before the 2011 election suggest that Museveni's electoral support was, to a large extent, genuine. He enjoyed high approval ratings and was trusted by the majority of the population. Vote buying was a factor (estimates of 15 percent of those surveyed were offered money to vote for the ruling party), but most who reported accepting bribes said they voted how they wanted to anyway.

Museveni's Popularity Explained

The past 15 years of Afrobarometer surveys demonstrate a persistent trend of high public support for Museveni (see figure at top of article). In the most recent edition of the survey, conducted in 2015, more than 80 percent of respondents either approved or “strongly approved” of Museveni’s presidency. Almost 60 percent of Ugandans trust President Museveni “a lot.” Urban and younger voters are less approving and supportive of Museveni, but the numbers are still in the 70-percent range. Approval ratings are significantly lower if a respondent assessed the previous election as being fraudulent, but 50 percent of those asked said that the 2011 election was completely free and fair.

Given the conduct of elections in Uganda, with intimidation, fear, and harassment being par for the course, it may seem surprising that Museveni enjoys such a wide base of support. Several factors figure in Museveni’s popularity. First, his rule, although authoritarian in nature, has brought stability and relative peace to the country, which had experienced several coups before 1986. Some Ugandans may value stability over freedom and democracy.

Another interpretation, however, is that Museveni uses intimidation to his advantage to convince the population that there is no real alternative to his rule. According to an [August 2015 poll](#), 61 percent of Ugandans don’t think that Museveni would accept an electoral defeat. Although the Afrobarometer survey is conducted across the continent by a nongovernmental, nonpartisan organization, in the 2015 Afrobarometer survey, 40 percent of respondents thought that the government sent the team to conduct the survey. Nearly 32 percent of those surveyed said they feared becoming a victim of political violence “a lot,” 13 percent “somewhat,” and 18 percent “a little bit.” Fifty-seven percent responded that you “always” or “often” need to be careful about what you say about politics.

In sum, Museveni may have significant voter support, but his regime has gone to extreme lengths, using undemocratic means to secure it. The processes that have produced his electoral victories have been flawed and coercive. It is difficult to say if truly democratic processes would produce the same result, but under his leadership, we are unlikely to find out.

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

NIGERIA'S PRESIDENT BUHARI—DEALING WITH TOUGH CHALLENGES

By George F. Ward

Elected in March 2015 as an opposition candidate amid popular demand for change, Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari faces a difficult task. During the campaign, he promised that if elected he would defeat Boko Haram while simultaneously attacking the endemic corruption that hobbles Nigeria's government and society. Because of the downturn in oil prices, however, the financial means at his disposal are substantially reduced. He also faces significant international pressure to deal with well-documented abuses of human rights by Nigeria's security forces. These challenges would test the abilities of any leader. As the anniversary of the 2015 election approaches, it is worth taking stock of how President Buhari is doing.



Nigerian former Gen. Muhammadu Buhari speaking to journalists in Abuja, Nigeria, Wednesday, April 1, 2015. (Source: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba.)

Starting in Measured Fashion

President Buhari was elected at the end of March 2015 and assumed office two months later. He organized his administration at a deliberate pace, waiting to [announce](#) his choices as cabinet ministers until November 11, 2015. He then reduced the number of cabinet departments to from 28 to 24. He named himself Minister of Petroleum Resources. In between his inauguration and the formation of his government, the ascetic Buhari set the tone for his tenure by vowing to fight [corruption](#) and to [defeat Boko Haram](#) before the end of 2015.

Rumors of Boko Haram's Death Were Premature

Nigeria's army has recently had significant successes in operations against Boko Haram, but the movement has not been defeated. The extent of territory in Nigeria's northeast controlled by the insurgent movement has been sharply reduced, and civilian deaths have declined. According to the [Nigeria Security Tracker](#), the mean monthly number of deaths due to violence motivated by political, economic, and social grievances in Nigeria declined from 1,657 in the first six months of 2015 to 790 in the second half of the year. Tragedies on the scale of Boko Haram's massacre of an estimated 2,000 people in the city of [Baga](#) in January 2015 have not been repeated. The decline in violence and reduction of territory occupied by Boko Haram were motivations for Buhari's statement in late December 2015 that the Islamist movement had been ["technically" defeated](#). Only days later, however, Boko Haram launched an attack with rocket-propelled grenades and suicide bombers in the major northeast city of [Maiduguri](#) in which at least 50 people were killed. Since then, Boko Haram has continued to launch hit-and-run attacks against population centers, often using suicide bombers. These attacks, coupled with the fact that civilian administration has not been re-established in most towns and villages in the northeast, have deterred most of the [over 2 million displaced persons](#) in the northeast from returning to their homes.

Moves against Corruption

Like Boko Haram, corruption in Nigeria has not been defeated, but as in the fight against the Islamists, there has been progress. President Buhari has supported the efforts of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which has undertaken several investigations into instances of diversion of government revenues. These investigations have resulted in high-profile interrogations and arrests. Most notably, [Sambo Dasuki](#), the national security advisor of former President Goodluck Jonathan, has been arrested for stealing over \$2 billion through awards of phantom contracts to buy military aircraft and ammunition. Another investigation is targeting the former Chief of Defense Staff [Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh](#), who is alleged to have illicitly diverted around \$22 million in government funds. In addition to these investigations of

corruption in the military sector, the EFCC has taken action against senior figures involved in Nigeria's oil industry, including the arrest of a [former minister of petroleum resources](#). While none of these actions have yet resulted in convictions, Buhari's government has made a promising start.

Human Rights Concerns Remain

One area in which President Buhari and his government have made less visible progress is in dealing with allegations of human rights violations by Nigerian security forces. In two recent instances, the government could be faulted for a lack of transparency. The first involved the [violent clash](#) between the Nigerian army and members of a Shiite Muslim sect in the city of Zaria in December 2015, in which hundreds of civilians appear to have been killed. The army's account is that members of the sect blocked a convoy carrying the chief of staff of the army and attacked soldiers. Leaders of the Shiite group allege on the contrary that soldiers overreacted to a peaceful demonstration, engaging in widespread extrajudicial killing and torture. The circumstances surrounding the violence in Zaria remain murky and promise to remain so in part because the Buhari government has not moved with any degree of dispatch to make the facts public.

In another move that has prompted international concern, in February 2016 the leadership of the armed forces reinstated to active duty Major General Ahmadu Mohammed. The general had been retired in 2014. In a June 2015 report, Amnesty International claimed that 1,200 people had been arbitrarily executed by Nigerian military forces and 7,000 had died in military detention. The report recommended that nine Nigerian military officers be investigated for war crimes, including Major General Mohammed. At the time of the report, [President Buhari stated](#), "this administration will leave no stone unturned to promote rule of law and deal with all cases of human rights abuses." The reinstatement of Major General Mohammed casts doubt on that pledge.

The Economy—Buhari's Achilles Heel?

There is no doubt that President Buhari was dealt a bad hand in the economic sphere. Nigeria depends on oil revenue to fund around 75 percent of the government budget. In response to the decline in the price of oil, at a [12-year low](#) in late January, Buhari has promised to reduce the cost of government administration and to increase the efficiency of tax collection. He has also, however, included \$2.5 billion in [cash transfers to the poor](#) in his budget. Although the needs of the poor and growing unemployment certainly demand attention, Buhari's budget has contributed to rising inflation and pressure on Nigeria's currency. Buhari has stoutly resisted calls to [devalue the naira](#), even though its value on the open market has declined to half the official rate. With little promise of near-term relief through increased tax collections or the return of illicitly diverted revenues, the likelihood is that Nigeria's financial situation will continue to worsen. At some point, recourse to international financial institutions may become inevitable.

Conclusion

President Buhari has made a brave start against the twin challenges of Boko Haram and corruption. The bulk of the challenge of restoring security in the northeast and rebuilding government integrity nevertheless remains. Unless President Buhari moves decisively to put the government's financial house in order, his freedom of action to make progress on security and governance issues may be restricted.

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

HOW WILL THE UNITED STATES RESPOND TO THE ISLAMIC STATE IN LIBYA?

By Richard J. Pera

The United States conducted airstrikes against the Islamic State (IS) outside Syria and Iraq for the first time in November 2015. The attack—in eastern Libya—was followed by a second attack—in western Libya—in February 2016. Both attacks reflected the consequences of Libya's so-called [second civil war](#), which began in 2014. In the absence of a unified central government, IS has continued to grow in numbers and territory, threatening not only Libya's future, but neighboring countries and Western nations as well. How will the U.S. respond to Libya's political situation and IS's expansion? [more...](#)

Richard J. Pera, a former naval officer, is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.



Libya and Surrounding Countries. (Source: CIA, "Libya," The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>)

FORMER VP MUJURU LAUNCHES CHALLENGE TO MUGABE IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

On March 1, 2016, Joice Mujuru, vice president of Zimbabwe from 2004 to 2014, officially [launched](#) her new opposition party, Zimbabwe People First (ZPF). Mujuru and ZPF will challenge her erstwhile allies, President Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, at the polls in 2018. Mugabe [sacked](#) Mujuru from her vice president position in December 2014, alleging that she sought to overthrow him. The reemergence of Mujuru on the political scene could pose a threat to Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who have been in power for 36 years. ZANU-PF appears weak as it struggles with an economic downturn and the question of who will succeed Mugabe. [more...](#)



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President Joice Mujuru talks to the Associated Press during an interview at her house in Harare, Wednesday, March 2, 2016. Mujuru announced plans Tuesday to run in elections scheduled for 2018 against President Robert Mugabe. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

FORMER TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MKAPA NAMED NEW MEDIATOR IN BURUNDI PEACE TALKS

By Elisabeth Ferland

On [March 2](#), 2016, the East African Community (EAC) named former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as a new mediator in the Burundi peace talks. Burundi has been dealing with spreading violence in the wake of the July 2015 elections in which President Pierre Nkurunziza was re-elected to what many perceived as an [unconstitutional](#) third term. [more...](#)



U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, right, and Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza shake hands during a joint press conference in Bujumbura, Burundi, Tuesday, Feb. 23, 2016. Ban was in Burundi to encourage dialogue between the government and its opponents amid violent unrest. (Source: AP Photo.)

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

About IDA

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation operating in the public interest.

IDA's three federally-funded research and development centers provide objective analyses of national security issues and related national challenges, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise.

IDA's Africa team focuses on issues related to political, economic, and social stability and security on the continent.

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Libya's Second Civil War: No Central Authority...Yet

Libya's first civil war ended on October 20, 2011, when Libyan leader Muammar al Qaddafi was killed. The nation's first democratic elections were held in July 2012, and the future looked bright. Nevertheless, today, oil-rich [Libya is in shambles](#). Since the summer of 2014, fighting and political maneuvering—Libya's second civil war—have resulted in a country divided between opposing governments and armies. The government in Tripoli (western Libya) is the General National Congress (GNC), which is backed by armed groups known as Libya Dawn. This group is "Islamist-leaning," includes the Muslim Brotherhood, but rejects jihadist groups like IS and al Qaida-linked Ansar al Sharia. The government in Tobruq (eastern Libya) is the House of Representatives (HOR); it is backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and other militias. This group is fiercely anti-Islamist. To make matters worse, the situation has become a [proxy war](#); Turkey and Qatar support Libya Dawn, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia support the LNA. The United Nations (UN)-brokered "[Libyan Political Agreement \(LPA\)](#)," which created a "Government of National Accord (GNA)," was signed in Morocco in December 2015 and endorsed by the [UN Security Council](#) and Western nations. The appointed Prime Minister, Fayaz al Sarraj, is in the process of filling cabinet positions. Progress on launching the GNA is [slow](#), and success is not certain.

The Islamic State in Libya

As a result of this situation, large portions of Libyan territory have not been governed by a central authority since 2014. As in Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia, terrorist groups have tried to fill the void. Most alarming is the [growth of IS](#), which now possesses a 150-mile swath of territory east and west of Sirt on the Gulf of Sidra (shown as Surt on the map). During the past year, IS has had an operational presence in both eastern Libya (Darna, Benghazi, and Adjabiya) and western Libya (Misrata, Tripoli, and Sabratha). In addition to recruiting Libyans, IS has attracted foreign fighters to Libya, especially from Iraq and Syria. In January 2016, IS attacked oil facilities at Sidra and Ras Lanuf, suggesting that control of Libya's oil economy is a key objective. An [internal IS document](#) revealed the group is seeking to recruit engineers, explosives experts, oil and gas workers, and physicists. There may be as many as [6,500 IS fighters in Libya](#) today.

The Islamic State in Libya Threatens Its Neighbors

IS's behavior and rhetoric suggest it is also focused externally. In February 2015, [IS in Libya beheaded 21 Egyptian Christians](#) near Sirt. In response, Egypt and Libya (LNA) conducted combined airstrikes on IS targets in Darna and Sirt. In March 2015, IS in Libya struck inside Tunisia, killing 21 mostly foreign tourists at a [museum in Tunis](#). In June 2015, IS in Libya also struck a seaside [resort in Sousse](#), Tunisia, killing 38 mostly European vacationers. IS appears to view Tunisia as a



Libya and Surrounding Countries. (Source: CIA, "Libya," *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>.)

particularly attractive target. The birthplace of the Arab spring, Tunisia is a fragile democracy with maturing institutions and modest security forces. Tunisia's 285-mile border with Libya is porous, although the U.S. and European Union are working diligently with Tunisia to reinforce border security. Targets like the ones described above permit IS to strike Tunisia and Europe simultaneously. Such attacks, which may well continue, undermine Tunisia's all-important tourist economy. Most of those killed were European—[described by IS](#) as “subjects that make up the crusader alliance fighting the state of the caliphate.”

IS could also use Libya as a launching pad for attacks in Europe. This could be done by dispatching suicide bombers in one of hundreds of migrant-laden boats headed for Italy.

In addition, as IS oil revenues in Iraq and Syria wane because of coalition attacks, the group might intensify efforts to control oil facilities in Libya.

Scorecard: U.S. vs. Islamic State in Libya—So Far

In the past year, the U.S. has become increasingly concerned about the unchecked build-up of IS in Libya. Joint Chiefs Chairman [GEN Joseph Dunford, USMC, commented](#) that IS could use Libya as a platform for other activity in Africa: “we’re looking forward to take decisive military action against ISIL [in Libya] in conjunction with a legitimate political process.” [John Brennan, CIA Director](#), warned, “You cannot put off counterterror operations as this long process of government building takes place.” Regarding a potential IS arc from the Gulf of Guinea to the Mediterranean, [BG Donald Bolduc, Commander of Special Operations Command Africa, noted a link to Libya](#), “in the Lake Chad area. . . [IS affiliate] Boko Haram is growing more dangerous thanks to its connections in Libya.”

In February 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry ruled out U.S. military intervention against IS in the near term, saying that a national unity government would stop the expansion of IS. Exceptions to this policy have included two F-15E strikes on IS leadership. In November 2015, [U.S. struck Darna](#) in eastern Libya, killing the “Jihadi John of Libya”—a man known by the nom de guerre, “Abu Nabil.” In February 2016, the [U.S. struck Sabratha](#) in western Libya, killing, among others, a man known as “Sabir,” a Tunisian national and senior IS facilitator linked to IS attacks in Tunisia. President Obama also reportedly approved [deployment of U.S. special operations forces \(SOF\) to Libya](#). [British](#) and [French](#) counterparts are already in country.

How Will the U.S. Counter the Islamic State in Libya Going Forward?

Pending establishment of a unified government, the U.S. likely will continue its intelligence and military focus on IS in Libya. This may include unmanned surveillance missions flown from Sicily, which [Italy approved](#) recently. [Additional airstrikes](#) with precision-guided munitions on high-value leadership targets, including in urban areas, are also possible. If IS continues to expand unchecked by local forces, the U.S. may consider expanding military operations, a scenario we have seen play out in Iraq and Syria.

Richard J. Pera, a former naval officer, is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

FORMER VP MUJURU LAUNCHES CHALLENGE TO MUGABE IN ZIMBABWE

By Alexander Noyes

On March 1, 2016, Joice Mujuru, vice president of Zimbabwe from 2004 to 2014, officially [launched](#) her new opposition party, Zimbabwe People First (ZPF). Mujuru and ZPF will challenge her erstwhile allies, President Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, at the polls in 2018. Mugabe [sacked](#) Mujuru from her vice president position in December 2014, alleging that she sought to overthrow him. The reemergence of Mujuru on the political scene could pose a threat to Mugabe and ZANU-PF, who have been in power for 36 years. ZANU-PF appears weak as it struggles with an economic downturn and the question of who will succeed Mugabe.

Background: ZANU-PF's Succession Struggle

Mugabe's party has faced a long-running battle over who will replace Mugabe after he departs the political arena, as [highlighted](#) in previous editions of Africa Watch. For years, the struggle was between current Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and Mujuru, both longtime ZANU-PF stalwarts with liberation war credentials. After Mugabe sacked Mujuru and purged [hundreds](#) of her allies from ZANU-PF, Mnangagwa appeared to have the upper hand. But recently, Mugabe's wife, Grace, has led attacks on Mnangagwa and his faction, known as "Team Lacoste." Grace is believed to have her own political ambitions. She is [aligned](#) with a different faction, known as G40. Political [purges](#) continue at the highest levels within the party. Mugabe has continued to [deny](#) that he needs a successor, despite celebrating his 92nd birthday last month: "Why successor? I am still there. Why do you want a successor? I did not say I was a candidate [in 2018] to retire." He also [denied](#) rumors that he would leave the political throne to his wife: "Others say the president wants to leave the throne for his wife. Where have you ever seen that, even in our own culture, where a wife inherits from her husband?"

ZPF Party Launch and Response

Even as Mugabe keeps his party guessing on the succession issue, his decision to expel Mujuru may soon come back to bite him. At her party's launch, Mujuru, aged 60, outlined a political agenda that contrasts sharply with ZANU-PF's, calling for wide-ranging reforms. She [declared](#): "Today we confirm the existence of a viable, home grown, inclusive political party. Zimbabwe People First is here." She went [on](#): "The time we are living in calls for truth to correct our wrong past. Change for good, unity and determination to build a new Zimbabwe in peace. Zimbabwe faces an urgent need for political, economic and social reform." In September 2015, Mujuru released a policy [document](#), "Blueprint to Unlock Investment and Leverage for Development" (BUILD), which further outlined her political platform. In addition to the above reforms, BUILD called for reengagement with Western countries and a reversal on Zimbabwe's contentious land reform program. Two other former high-ranking ZANU-PF officials, Didymus Mutasa (former state security minister) and Rugare Gumbo (former minister and ZANU-PF spokesperson), also [hold](#) leadership positions in the young ZPF party.

ZANU-PF responded swiftly to the ZPF launch. Last week, Mugabe downplayed the impact of the new party, [declaring](#): "They will live in the wilderness, where little ants and other biting insects are destined to live Some think we are afraid of them. We are not." Savior Kasukuwere, minister of local government and member of ZANU-PF's highest body, the politburo, [echoed Mugabe](#): "We will defeat them anytime. We are ready for them. What is it that they want to tell us that they couldn't do for 34 years when they were with us in the party?" ZPF's Gumbo [hit back](#): "We are aware of the divide and



Former Zimbabwean Deputy President Joice Mujuru talks to the Associated Press during an interview at her house in Harare, Wednesday, March 2, 2016. Mujuru announced plans Tuesday to run in elections scheduled for 2018 against President Robert Mugabe. (AP Photo/Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi)

rule tactics that they [ZANU-PF] want to employ but we are united. They have come up with several strategies to try and destroy our party, and they are welcome because we know them and we are ready to deal with them.”

Potential Opposition Alliance

At the ZPF launch, Mujuru reiterated her past [statements](#) about welcoming potential alliances with Zimbabwe's other fractured opposition parties. Opposition groups, including the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), headed by former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, applauded the launch of ZPF. Obert Gutu, MDC-T spokesperson, [said](#): “We are willing and able to work and collaborate with any opposition political party that shares the same vision, values and ethos with us. . . . In this respect, therefore, we don't perceive Joice Mujuru and her new political party as our political adversary.” Welshman Ncube, the leader of another MDC faction (MDC-N), [called](#) for an alliance and a “Table of Patriots.” Former Finance Minister, Tendai Biti, who is now head of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), also welcomed Mujuru and ZPF. Gordon Moyo, the secretary general of PDP, [said](#): “We view ZPF as a critical actor in the opposition political society.” Moyo [pointed out](#) that ZPF's previous experience in the state machinery could be an asset for the opposition moving forward: “The majority of them were part of the coercive ZANU-PF system. They know how filthy the system is, they know all the four corners of Mugabe's ZANU-PF, they know the mechanism of electoral corruption.”

Conclusion

Several signs indicate that Mugabe and his party may be politically weak in the run-up to 2018 elections. These indications include Zimbabwe's current [economic](#) struggles, Mugabe's old age, ZANU-PF's ongoing purges, reports of coming high-level [defections](#), and ostensible splits in the security sector. The addition of Mujuru (and ZPF) to the political arena, with her strong liberation credentials and ostensible grassroots support (in 2014 Mujuru won nine out of 10 provinces in party elections before her expulsion), may be enough to tip the balance and finally remove ZANU-PF from office, especially if she is able to put together an opposition alliance. As argued in the September 17, 2015, [edition](#) of *Africa Watch*, a broad opposition coalition with Mujuru at the helm could substantially increase the chances of a changing of the guard in Zimbabwe. The traditional opposition's positive response to the launch of ZPF suggests that a coalition is a genuine possibility.

Mujuru's ostensible support from some within Zimbabwe's powerful security apparatus could help make this moment unique, because the security sector has remained firmly in support of Mugabe in previous election cycles. Last week, ZPF's Mutasa [spoke](#) on this issue: “I know people in the defense forces, people in the police, people in the Central Intelligence Office who will be very willing to see her [Mujuru] leading Zimbabwe.” Mugabe and ZANU-PF are sure to put up a fight, but stopping Mujuru may prove difficult without the full support of the country's security apparatus.

Alexander Noyes is an Adjunct Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

FORMER TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MKAPA NAMED NEW MEDIATOR IN BURUNDI PEACE TALKS

By Elisabeth Ferland

On [March 2](#), 2016, the East African Community (EAC) named former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as a new mediator in the Burundi peace talks. Burundi has been dealing with spreading violence in the wake of the July 2015 elections in which President Pierre Nkurunziza was re-elected to what many perceived as an [unconstitutional](#) third term.

Controversial Elections Lead to Violence

When the Arusha Agreement was signed in 2005, ending Burundi's Civil War, it [designated](#) a two-term limit for the country's highest office. President Nkurunziza justified a third term because he was originally elected by "indirect suffrage" by the National Assembly and Senate, not by popular vote. Opposition groups boycotted the 2015 elections, citing them as [rigged](#), unfair, and illegal, even though the nation's [Constitutional](#) Court upheld Nkurunziza's position.

Between April 2015, when Nkurunziza announced his desire to run for a third term, and the elections in July, at least 70 people were killed, including [opposition](#) leader Zedi Feruzi. Médecins Sans Frontières [estimated](#) that around 1000 people were fleeing into Tanzania each day in fear of violence against opposition supporters. Nkurunziza won the [election](#) with about 69 percent of the vote, although turnout was lower than expected, and extremely low in the capital, Bujumbura (about 30 percent of eligible voters).

Nkurunziza Does Not Return to Talks in January 2016

On December 28, 2015, peace talks between Burundi's government and opposition began in [Uganda](#), under the mediation of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni. Representatives of the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), and Western nations also attended. The talks are aimed at reaching a political solution to end the violence in Burundi.

The peace talks have bogged down over questions of timing and participation. The dialogue was supposed to begin again on January 6, 2016; however, President Nkurunziza [rejected](#) that date, giving no indication of when he would be willing to resume negotiations. He also rejected amnesty for members of the National Council for the Restoration of Arusha Agreement and Rule of Law (CNARED). Last, [Nkurunziza](#) asserted he would not negotiate with opposition leaders whom he suspected of plotting a coup to prevent his bid for a third term.

Opposition Parties are Hopeful of Renewed Energy

Since the talks stalled in January 2016, the AU has [pledged](#) to send 200 military advisers and human rights observers to Burundi in an attempt to stem the violence. This pledge comes in the wake of high-level UN and AU visits to Burundi in [late](#) January 2016. At the same time, Human Rights Watch issued a [release](#) documenting the increasingly sinister nature of violence against real or perceived opponents of President Nkurunziza: "The Burundian police, military, intelligence services, and members of the ruling party's youth league are using increasingly brutal methods to punish and terrorize perceived opponents." Stalled discussions are only allowing the violence to continue unchecked.

There is [renewed](#) hope for the peace talks because of the appointment of former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as a new mediator. Although Ugandan President Museveni is recognized as the principal mediator, Mkapa will



U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, right, and Burundi's President Pierre Nkurunziza shake hands during a joint press conference in Bujumbura, Burundi. Tuesday, Feb. 23, 2016. Ban was in Burundi to encourage dialogue between the government and its opponents amid violent unrest. (Source: AP Photo.)

be co-mediator during new rounds of dialogue. The opposition was especially [encouraged](#) by Mkapa's appointment, as Museveni has been more focused on Uganda's February 2016 presidential elections (and winning a fifth consecutive term) than on peace talks in Burundi. Museveni's domestic distractions, which presumably have lessened following his recent re-election, had been blamed for the slow pace of the talks.

At their summit meeting, the EAC heads of state [unanimously](#) agreed to appoint Mkapa as a new mediator. Mkapa is [respected](#) by many as a new kind of African leader: he is seen as one who did not tolerate corruption during his tenure as Tanzania's president. His reputation adds credibility to the peace process. Nkurunziza was the only leader who did not appear at the summit.

Conclusion

Since the April 2015 violence [started](#), the UN estimates that around 400 people have been killed and more than 220,000 have fled Burundi. The turmoil in the country shows no signs of stopping, and a diplomatic solution to the problem is more urgent than ever. During a press conference with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, President Nkurunziza [promised](#) to restart the dialogue but did not give a time frame. He did, however, unequivocally reiterate that some members of the opposition would not be included in future talks. Although Mkapa's appointment is a positive step, it remains to be seen if he can be successful in jump-starting negotiations and overseeing a process that all parties perceive as fair.

Elisabeth Ferland is a Research Associate in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

ETHIOPIA MOVES FORWARD ON HYDROPOWER DAMS

By George F. Ward, Jr.

On March 10, 2016, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn [announced](#) that his government would soon launch a new hydropower project, building a 2,000 megawatt dam in an undisclosed location. The new dam would be part of the 2015–2020 development plan, under which Ethiopian electric generation capacity would rise from the current capacity of just over 2,200 megawatts to over 17,000. This announcement comes as two other large hydropower projects are moving into their final stages, despite concerns voiced by environmentalists and the government of Egypt. [more...](#)



Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn speaks to The Associated Press at his office in the capital Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Thursday, March 17, 2016. (Source: AP Photo/Michael Tewelde.)

Ambassador (ret.) George F. Ward is editor of Africa Watch and a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

LEAVING NOTHING TO CHANCE: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE 2016 REPUBLIC OF CONGO ELECTIONS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On the day before the Republic of Congo's March 20, 2016, presidential election, the Ministry of Interior ordered a temporary shutdown of telephone and Internet communications for "[reasons of security and national safety](#)." The government was allegedly concerned about the premature publication of results. What prompted the government's decision and what was it really meant to accomplish? [more...](#)



In this photo taken on Sunday, March 20, 2016, Congo incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso casts his ballot at a polling station in Brazzaville, Congo. (Source: AP Photo/John Bompengo.)

Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard is a Research Staff Member in the Africa Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her new book, [Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Consequences](#), is out now.

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ETHIOPIA MOVES FORWARD ON HYDROPOWER DAMS

By George F. Ward, Jr.

On March 10, 2016, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn [announced](#) that his government would soon launch a new hydropower project, building a 2,000 megawatt dam in an undisclosed location. The new dam would be part of the 2015–2020 development plan, under which Ethiopian electric generation capacity would rise from the current capacity of just over 2,200 megawatts to over 17,000. This announcement comes as two other large hydropower projects are moving into their final stages, despite concerns voiced by environmentalists and the government of Egypt.



Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn speaks to The Associated Press at his office in the capital Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Thursday, March 17, 2016. (Source: AP Photo/Michael Tewelde.)

Gilgel Gibe III Dam Threatens Lake Turkana

As reported in the [January 26, 2015, issue](#) of *Africa Watch*, the government of Ethiopia has forged ahead with construction of the Gilgel Gibe III hydropower project in the face of environmental concerns. Gibe III is designed to generate 1,870 megawatts of electric power. According to a [hydropower trade publication](#), in October 2015 the Gibe III dam began generating electricity at a reduced level. The project is not yet complete, however, as the reservoir behind the dam will take years to fill, and construction of electric transmission lines for export of the power to Kenya, Sudan, and Djibouti will extend to at least 2018.

Environmental activists have [campaigned](#) against Gibe III for years. They claim that the flow of the Omo River into Lake Turkana on the Kenya-Ethiopia border will be reduced by about two-thirds for three years, threatening the livelihoods of up to 300,000 people in Kenya. Lake Turkana, which has already been shrinking for some time because of drought and other factors, receives 90 percent of its water from the Omo River. The government of Kenya has largely been silent on these concerns, perhaps because of its desire to secure the 500 megawatts of power that it expects to receive from the dam.

For its part, the Ethiopian government has bluntly turned aside objections to Gibe III. In an [interview](#) published on November 17, 2015, Motuma Mekasa, Ethiopia's minister of water, irrigation, and energy, was quoted as flatly saying, "The Gilgel Gibe III Dam has no environmental or social repercussions on the local Kenyan population." This statement, which conflicts with the claims of environmentalists, is emblematic of the approach of the Ethiopian government to its program of hydropower development. While listening to objections and talking with affected governments, Ethiopia has denied the existence of problems and has never deviated from its construction plans.

Egyptian Options Narrow as Nile Dam Nears Operational Capacity

The [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam](#) (GERD) is the largest hydropower project in Africa. When complete, the GERD will generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity. The GERD's reservoir will be large enough to hold more than the volume of the entire Blue Nile, on which it is located. Egypt, which claims rights to most of the waters of the Nile under a colonial-era treaty, has voiced objections to the GERD since construction began in 2011. Egyptian leaders even considered [military action](#) as recently as 2013, but that alternative seems highly unlikely now.

In May 2013, an [international panel of experts](#) released a report that cited the lack of attention by the Ethiopian government to assessment of the potential effect of the GERD on Egypt's and Sudan's water security. Trilateral discussions on the dam's impact began in August 2014. In early 2015, agreement in principle was reached to commission studies by international consulting firms, one on the socioeconomic impact of the dam and another on the hydraulic impacts on the Nile River Basin. Subsequently, however, technical experts from the three countries failed to reach an agreement on the choice of consulting firms, and the studies have never been carried out.

In the meantime, the government of Ethiopia has remained on course with its construction plans. Reports on the state of progress differ, but journalists and experts seem to agree that although the dam has reached only around half its intended 145-meter height, it will be able to begin [generating electricity](#) as early as June 2016. Initial electricity production, which would come from only two of the planned 16 turbines, would generate only a bit more than 10 percent of the GERD's planned capacity.

Ethiopia's "Three No's" Narrow Egyptian Options

According to one report, Ethiopia has raised "[three no's](#)" in its negotiations with Egypt and Sudan over the GERD: no to talks about stopping the work on the dam; no to negotiations about dam specifications, height, and storage capacity; and no to talks about dividing water quotas with Egypt and Sudan. Given these positions, Egypt's negotiators have been left to concentrate on salvaging what they can from a project that is fast becoming a fait accompli. So far, Ethiopia is reported to have [refused](#) Egypt's requests to extend the period of filling the dam's reservoir to 11 years (from 3 to 5 years) and to reduce the storage capacity of the dam.

While continuing to seek Ethiopian concessions at the negotiating table, the government of Egypt also seems to be seeking to manage the Nile waters issue domestically. The government's moves in this area have caused it some embarrassment. In January 2016, the Egyptian minister of water resources and irrigation announced the [discovery](#) of a large underground water basin that he said covers 85 percent of Egypt's area. After reports emerged that the ministry was merely recycling reports of an already known aquifer that is largely non-renewable, the ministry was obliged to issue a clarification. In another move, Egypt's National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences announced on March 16 that a new satellite would be used to [monitor](#) progress on the GERD. The satellite measurement, Egyptian officials said, would bolster that country's case should it become necessary to bring the issue of the GERD to international arbitration.

Conclusion

Given Ethiopia's unwillingness to make concessions to Egypt at the bargaining table, steps by Egypt such as introducing satellite monitoring seem almost akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. It is possible that problems in construction of the remaining portion of the GERD or its associated "saddle dams" could still significantly delay completion of the project. That would provide Egypt with more time to bargain and perhaps additional evidence that aspects of the dam's design should be re-examined and revised. Absent developments of this sort, the GERD project is likely to be completed on Ethiopia's terms, and it will be up to that country to manage the fill rate of the reservoir and the flow of the Blue Nile River in a fashion that respects Egypt's existential dependence on those waters.

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LEAVING NOTHING TO CHANCE: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE 2016 REPUBLIC OF CONGO ELECTIONS

By Dr. Stephanie M. Burchard

On the day before the Republic of Congo's March 20, 2016, presidential election, the Ministry of Interior ordered a temporary shutdown of telephone and Internet communications for "[reasons of security and national safety](#)." The government was allegedly concerned about the premature publication of results. What prompted the government's decision and what was it really meant to accomplish?



In this photo taken on Sunday, March 20, 2016, Congo incumbent President Denis Sassou Nguesso casts his ballot at a polling station in Brazzaville, Congo. (Source: AP Photo/John Bompengo.)

Elections in the Republic of Congo

President Denis Sassou Nguesso has been in power for approximately 32 nonconsecutive years. A former army general and minister of defense, Nguesso first came to power in a coup in 1979. He ruled the Republic of Congo until 1991 when, under international pressure, he allowed the introduction of multiparty elections. Nguesso came in third in the 1992 elections, losing out to Pascal Lissouba. Before the country's next scheduled elections in 1997, forces loyal to Nguesso clashed with government forces. A brief civil war broke out, and Nguesso's troops won. He was promptly installed as president. Having subsequently won multiparty elections in 2002 and 2009, both of which were [problematic](#) and marred by harassment, intimidation, and opposition boycotts, Nguesso ran for a third elected term in office.

Term Limits Need Not Apply

A new constitution in 2002 introduced executive term limits (two) and an age restriction for presidential candidates (younger than 70). After years of speculation, President Nguesso announced on September 22, 2015, that a constitutional referendum was to be held that October to decide if term limits were still appropriate for the country. Five weeks later, Congolese voters passed a new constitution eliminating term limits—92 percent voted in favor—allowing Nguesso to run in 2016. The new constitution also grants lifetime immunity to former presidents. Some have termed Nguesso's maneuvers to consolidate power a "[constitutional coup](#)."

The elections were originally scheduled for July 2016, but on December 30, 2015, the government announced that elections would be held in March 2016 on an abbreviated electoral schedule to [accelerate](#) "Congo's march on the path of its development." International actors, including the European Union, refused to send [electoral observers](#) because of concerns that the process would be less than democratic. The government also banned the [use of motor vehicles](#) on Election Day nationwide, with [police checkpoints](#) erected to enforce it.

President Nguesso faced eight opposition candidates in the election, the strongest being retired General Jean-Marie Mokoko, a former ally. The government repeatedly brought [Mokoko](#) in for questioning in February and March, alleging that he was conspiring with military supporters to overthrow the government. The day before the elections, the Interior Minister ordered all telephone communications shut down, including text messaging and Internet traffic. The government spokesman, Thierry Mounkala, [said](#) the ban was "necessary to block people from manipulating public and international opinion on the good nature of the election." But blocking social media in particular has a secondary purpose: it prevents monitoring election fraud and mobilizing protesters.

[Preliminary](#) results indicated that Nguesso would be re-elected, most likely in the first round. On March 24, the Interior Ministry [announced on national television](#) that Nguesso had won 60 percent of the vote. The opposition had already indicated they would not accept the results but, due to the continuing communications blackout, was not immediately

available for comment. Security is reportedly very heavy in major urban areas and opposition strongholds, with reports that riot police and the military have both been deployed.

Elections and Social Media

Technological innovations over the past few years have given social media a [prominent role](#) in helping civil society and opposition supporters reduce fraud and prevent election-related violence in elections around the world. In Africa specifically, crowd-sourced websites such as [Ushahidi](#) allow individuals to anonymously report electoral infractions. Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp have been used to share sensitive electoral information and to organize protests. During the weeks before the October constitutional referendum, Twitter was one of the [premier sources](#) for news on the protests and demonstrations surrounding the referendum. Unfortunately, like other forms of communication, these outlets have also been used to promote [hate speech](#) and [foment violence](#), giving repressive governments a ready excuse to shut down social media in the name of national security.

Conclusion

Congo-Brazzaville is not the only country to take such preventive measures. Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Niger, and Democratic Republic of Congo have all imposed social media blackouts [during recent past elections](#). Furthermore, news and communications blackouts are not necessarily a new phenomenon in African elections. For example, during the 2007/2008 election crisis in Kenya, the government imposed a [ban on live broadcasts](#). Communication blackouts such as these allow the government to control the flow of information and decide what messages should be shared with domestic audiences. As social media continue to increase in prominence and usage in Africa, expect social media bans to increase as well.

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