Force Management Decision Process

Waldo D. Freeman
Joseph F. Adams
About This Publication
This work was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring organization.

For More Information
Mr. Joseph F. Adams, Project Leader, SFRD
jadams@ida.org, 703-845-2148
Mr. Michael L. Dominguez, Director, SFRD
mdominguez@ida.org, 703-845-2527

Copyright Notice
© 2017 Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [June 2013].
Force Management Decision Process

Waldo D. Freeman
Joseph F. Adams
This page is intentionally blank.
Executive Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) has adapted in important ways to the demands of the long, sustained counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. For example, one of the most useful classes of system—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—was fielded in new organizations and incorporated into doctrine. Also, several new types of units were devised and fielded to meet operational needs, and many existing units were modified and had their training tailored to meet mission requirements, including limited cultural, regional, and language skills. However, despite these important adaptations, DOD’s efforts fell short in many areas.

DOD continued to fight the war with the forces it had and not the ones for which the combatant commanders (CCDRs) might have wished. For instance, years into the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Secretary of Defense was supposed to have approved plans to rectify the capability shortfalls for the warfighting commands, yet the Secretary seemed unable to compel needed systematic change in force structure throughout the Department.

Indeed, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this inability to adapt sufficiently may have threatened or delayed mission success. Evidence suggests that adaptation has been painfully slow to other demands for capabilities less visible than the UAV but that arguably were and are even more crucial to mission accomplishment in Iraq and Afghanistan. These irregular warfare (IW)/COIN/stability operations capabilities either did not exist in the force structure or were present in inadequate numbers when the wars began. Were these demands given adequate attention or priority? Did structure, doctrine, training, and equipping change in response? How were these choices made and by whom and when?

Understanding how this critical management process performs is essential to DOD’s ability to respond effectively to the many uncertain and novel capability demands of contemporary conflicts, and this paper addresses that issue.
This page is intentionally blank.
Force Management Decision Process

Waldo Freeman and Joseph Adams

A. Introduction

In December 2004 in Kuwait, in response to a soldier’s question about lack of armor for wheeled vehicles, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld responded, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” This exchange occurred 20 months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq when the insurgency was raging and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the primary threat weapon. Although the Rumsfeld statement was true, the IED was an unanticipated demand on the battlefield and was visible and political since higher casualties affected support for the war. Immediately following this event, U.S. efforts to neutralize the IED, although already underway, were dramatically accelerated and resulted in expansion of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) manning, its establishment as a permanent organization in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and massive investment in counter-IED hardware, training and intelligence, and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). That effort at adaptation continues and has had major success in reducing casualties. However, is this example a major exception to the normal way of meeting operational requirements in the Department of Defense (DOD)?

DOD has adapted in other important ways to the demands of the long, sustained counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations. For example, in terms of technology, one of the most useful classes of system—unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—was fielded in new organizations and incorporated into doctrine. Several new types of units were devised and fielded to meet operational needs, and many existing units were modified and had their training tailored to meet mission requirements, including limited cultural, regional, and language skills. However, although there are examples of laudable efforts to adapt to the new operational environment, there also are many areas where DOD’s adaptations fell considerably short of what might have been achievable given the length of the conflicts.

In many respects, DOD continued to fight the war with the forces it had and not the ones for which the combatant commanders (CCDRs) might have wished if they had been able to make operational demands clearer and their importance to the effort more visible. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this inability to adapt sufficiently cost lives, threatened and delayed mission success, and imperiled the achievement of U.S. political objectives. Evidence suggests that adaptation has been painfully slow to other demands for
capabilities less visible than the IED or UAV but that arguably were and are even more crucial to mission accomplishment in Iraq and Afghanistan. These irregular warfare (IW)/COIN/stability operations capabilities either did not exist in the force structure or were present in inadequate numbers when the wars began. Were these demands given adequate attention or priority? Did structure, doctrine, training, and equipping change in response? How were these choices made and by whom and when? Understanding how this critical management process performs is essential to DOD’s ability to respond effectively to the many uncertain and novel capability demands of contemporary conflicts. Without this understanding, how will the “army you have” become “the army you wish to have”? This paper addresses that issue.

B. Background

The issue raised here is not new. In 1972, Robert Kommer, the driving force behind creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam and its first director, published a RAND Paper. In this paper, he makes four points:

- Vietnam was an atypical situation that required innovation and adaptation, but institutional constraints worked against that.
- The DOD bureaucracy reflected a “business-as-usual” approach.
- Bureaucratic inertia inhibited the learning process because it preferred doing more of what it was already used to doing rather than changing patterns of organization or operation.
- All of the aforementioned contributed to the failure of the U.S. effort to generate an adequate response to the challenges that it faced.

DOD recently faced an atypical situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, unfortunately, some of the same institutional constraints that Kommer identified have been manifest despite the improvements of the Goldwater-Nichols (G-N) Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. G-N delineated and clarified the roles of the combatant commands (CCMDs) and the military departments. As part of this delineation, the military departments would be “force providers” to the CCMDs that would “employ forces” and capabilities in military operations. G-N separated the administrative chains of command from the operational

---


chains of command. This separation essentially enabled the force providers to interpret and determine the capability demand and then tune their forces to this demand. In cases where this approach was not practical, ad hoc force or “provisional” capability packages were stood up for temporary purposes. Our analyses and observations suggest these organizations lacked institutional ownership, well thought out and resourced training programs, and any semblance of continuity presumably because they were considered only temporary and, at the end of the term of force allocation, the capability was disbanded. The CCMDs could articulate specific capability demands, but they ultimately had to live with what the Services said that they were able to provide. While processes associated with this delineation have matured over time, the current decade of conflict and the extensive demands of COIN and stability operations have stressed the seams and have clearly exposed management and process gaps.

For example, CCMD “force employers” can and did “reallocate” forces from one Service into missions for which that Service had neither doctrine nor years of training and experience. These “in-lieu-of” assignments, primarily addressing Army shortfalls, continued for years, apparently indicating the system’s inability to recognize, accept, and adapt revised military Service “roles and missions” or, alternatively, the need for more of the types of units for which demand persistently exceeded supply. Even after a decade of conflict, many CCMD Requests for Forces (RFFs) were sourced (via the Joint Force sourcing process) with non-standard solutions rather than with forces that are well tailored to the need. Personnel to fill critical joint force headquarters in theater were filled by joint individual augmentees—an ad hoc and temporary sourcing solution—as contrasted with the way established overseas headquarters (United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Forces Korea (USFK), and so forth) are filled. Two of the most important mission-critical capabilities needed in Iraq and Afghanistan were advisor/trainer teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Both of these demands were met in various ways during the war but always with a non-standard, ad hoc solution on the margin of larger force deployments. These teams were not trained to the same standard as their counterparts primarily because they were packaged and resourced without full recognition of the capabilities required to be effective when deployed. See Appendix A for further elaboration on CCMD demand shortfalls and the potential for the same or similar issues recurring in the future.

In summary, while the G-N Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 shifts significant responsibilities to the CCDRs, the ability of the CCDRs to articulate specific

---

3 For example, see Waldo D. Freeman and Rachel D. Dubin, *Provincial Reconstruction Team Training and Lessons Learned from Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam*, IDA Paper P-4527 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, February 2010), FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
capability demands remains limited to what they can negotiate with the Services. This situation is due, in part, to the fact that OSD’s oversight apparatus remains focused on the military departments and agencies, leaving no ready and routine venue for the CCDR to articulate enduring organizational/human capital requirements.

C. The Problem

Since 2001, Secretaries of Defense have bemoaned a problem in the process of conducting operations within the DOD. Secretary Robert Gates, in his 2014 memoirs, recognized the problem when he stated “the Department of Defense is structured to plan and prepare for war, but not to fight one.”\(^4\) The Secretary’s observation, observations of other subject matter experts (SMEs), and the analyses at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) suggest the need for improvement of the management structure that formally links the processes of the administrative and operational chains of command with respect to operational needs and force provider response. Force management, when compared to the other major decision-making processes through which the Secretary directs the DOD (e.g., the program budget and the acquisition systems), may be the least documented, least governed and least integrated and have the least oversight. Consequentially, it is the poorest functioning but, arguably, the most important. Force management determines who goes to war, how the burden of deployment is distributed to the operational chain of commands (the CCMDs), and even how well prepared the organizations and their individuals are for the task they will have to accomplish.

Thus, it is clearly prudent that the Force Employment Decision Process structure be examined. It would include the process for the following:

- Hearing and understanding the capabilities needed by a CCDR in the field;
- Identifying the forces and systems available to meet that need and for constructing options for the Secretary of Defense, including the creation of new types of organizations and their training requirements;
- Selecting the information presented to the Secretary of Defense to support a deployment decision;
- Assessing the performance of employed forces, generating systematic feedback of those assessments to the force developers, and empowering an oversight mechanism to ensure that the institution was acting on that feedback.

Appendix A.
Force Employment Decision Process White Paper
Attachment: Examples of Operational Demand and Decision Process Shortfalls

Requests for Forces (RFFs)

After almost ten years into the contingency operations (Iraq and Afghanistan), there was still double digit, non-standard sourcing of RFFs (in lieu of joint sourced and ad hoc). At certain points, the percentage was higher than 20 percent. In a sense, such non-standard sourcing of RFFs from the Services (administrative chain of command and force providers) depicts the extent to which what the Services are providing in terms of capabilities simply does not match what the operational chain of command (through the combatant commands (CCMDs)) needs to accomplish operational missions. Why, after so many years, would this condition be acceptable within the Department of Defense (DOD)? What is the forcing function? This state of affairs also means that a significant portion of the individuals are being deployed into activities for which they are not doctrinally assigned or prepared through adequate additional training. One could argue that the extent to which these differences between inventory (supply) and demand exist is the extent to which the DOD and the nation are willing to assume additional operational risk. However, due to lack of visibility, this assumed risk is little known or understood.

Training for Non-Standard Organizations/Missions

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)/Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) study\(^1\) identified huge gaps in training for PRTs compared with the (better) training provided for CORDS personnel. These gaps in training were caused by a supply-side approach that failed to recognize the unique requirements for mission success. This approach, established in numerous well-intentioned policies, bounded the training in content and duration, which left little time to focus on what actually was needed to be effective. The IDA study concluded that the true training requirements were not understood and should have received a higher priority and

---

better resourcing and that the constraints should be eliminated. IDA’s first critical recommendation was near- and long-term follow-up actions, the most important of which was to develop a learning model for PRT and similar advisory positions based on Bloom’s taxonomy. These actions would provide a common understanding of the levels of learning required to achieve mastery of these skills. IDA’s second critical recommendation was to create a management structure to oversee the creation and retention of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) functions for irregular warfare (IW) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The recommendations also applied to training for the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), including ministerial advisors.

**McCrystal/Petraeus Counterinsurgency (COIN) Qualification Standards for Afghanistan**

In November 2009, General Stanley McCrystal promulgated a memorandum\(^2\) that outlined the essential training that every Service member should receive before deploying. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates followed up by endorsing the guidance in May 2010 and expanding it to support the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands (APH) program, CEW, and development of civilian institutions. He also tasked the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) to support International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) development of standards for the training. In August 2010, General David Petraeus, who had replaced McCrystal, forwarded the detailed qualification standards with metrics for individuals and units that had been developed by a team in Afghanistan supported by JCISFA. The standards were endorsed by Secretary Gates in November 2010, and implementation began in 2011. These standards became the catalyst for Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-002.\(^3\)

Since the United States had been in Afghanistan since 2001, a question arises: Why did it take a decade to figure out how to train properly for this mission? Clearly, the commanders in the field were not satisfied with the training, and it took a Secretary of Defense directive to begin to rectify the situation. Apparently, the Services either thought that they were providing adequate training or had been resisting requests to improve it.

---


Retaining Critical COIN-related Capabilities

The IDA study of requirements for counterinsurgency-related capabilities\(^4\) supported the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 11-002.\(^5\) The DTM presented for implementation throughout DOD components and organizations more than 70 responsibilities for COIN training and supporting systems to prepare U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. It established a temporary body for following up on the implementation. IDA’s supporting role was to identify those requirements that were enduring and should be preserved beyond the immediate needs of the Afghanistan war.

IDA first concluded that existing issuances (directives), if they had been followed, would have made DTM 11-002 unnecessary. Existing guidance documents included strong support for retaining COIN-related capabilities. IDA’s second conclusion was that Vietnam lessons learned had been forgotten, which resulted in significant mistakes that could have been avoided. For example,

- Non-standard (ad hoc) units were heavily relied on but were never standardized or documented.
- Force generation capabilities were extensively modified but not institutionalized.
- Units were deployed to missions for which they had not been trained.
- Rigorous standards for training were not developed until late 2010.
- Language training was problematic.
- Theater commanders did not have adequate knowledge of the readiness of deploying or deployed units.
- No organization acted as proponent or center of expertise for COIN-related operations at the joint level, and Service organizations that do exist may be in jeopardy.

---


\(^5\) Department of Defense, “Counterinsurgency (COIN), Training and Reporting Guidance for Preparing U.S. Forces to Succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
Key IDA proposals for action were as follows:

- Update relevant issuances;
- Include COIN in the Secretary’s Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and planning scenarios;
- Document existing COIN-related structures—deployed and force generation;
- Study hard-to-recreate capabilities that should be retained;
- Plan for future linguist needs and enforce existing issuances on language;
- Include COIN in professional military education (PME)/training throughout DOD;
- Improve readiness visibility to theater commanders; and
- Create/maintain centers of COIN expertise.

**APH Program**

Prompted by General Stanley McCrystal, Admiral Michael Mullen established the APH program in August 2009. It was intended to “change the paradigm on how we manage our COIN forces” and “create greater continuity, focus, and persistent engagement across the battlefield.”⁶ Admiral Mullen stated, “I expect the Services to take comprehensive action to ensure AFPAK hands are not disadvantaged by volunteering or being selected to serve in this cutting edge initiative.”⁷ Apparently, this intent was less than fully supported by the Services because in December 2009, Adm. Mullen sent a memo to the Service Chiefs in which he expressed concern about the quality of personnel being put into the program. He said that “AFPAK hands is the military’s number one manpower priority and it requires your [Service Chiefs] continued attention.”⁸

Now more than five years later, as the United States transitions to a presence of under 10,000 in a support role with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) conducting virtually all combat operations, the need for the experience base that the AFPAK Hands provides is more critical. Smaller numbers magnify the importance of quality, situational

---


⁷ Ibid.

awareness, language, and Afghanistan-specific knowledge. Indeed, now is the time the investment in AFPAK Hands should be paying off.

Unfortunately, now is also the time that the Services are shedding the very personnel needed for the transition. According to a reliable source, “except for the Air Force, AFPAK Hands were crushed in selection boards and RIF [Reduction-In-Force] boards.” For example, the recent Army officer separation board for Majors selected AFPAK Hands at double the overall rate (12.4% vs. 6.5%). The Army FY 2014 LTC [Lieutenant Colonel] command selection picked Hands at a rate less than a quarter than that of the total population (6% vs. 27%), and the FY 2014 Colonel promotion board picked hands at the miniscule rate of 3% vs. 40% for the total number considered. A Navy source said that the Navy will no longer place strong performers into the program.

Apparently, the Services (except possibly the Air Force) are incapable of adjusting their personnel management approach to match the needs of the number one manpower priority. The industrial age bureaucracy grinds on, preferring and producing generalists, while the current need is for specialists who are critical to winning the war.

Ironically, while the AFPAK Hands program is under stress, General Martin Dempsey is attempting to start a similar program for the Asia-Pacific area. In this case, he wants the candidates to be individuals in the command track. It will be interesting to see how much traction this idea gets.

No Mechanism to Force Service Force Structure Change

In recent dialogue, former senior officials in the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8) emphasized that no mechanism is in place to compel a force structure/doctrine/PME change by the Services. Years into the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Secretary of Defense was supposed to have approved plans to rectify the still considerable capability shortfalls for the warfighting commands, yet DOD did not have a mechanism to compel needed systematic change in force structure throughout the Department. The J8 created the Persistent Shortfalls process, which would bring to light sourcing shortfalls over RFF periods (what became Force Sufficiency Analysis), yet this process only looked at limited and not holistic requirements across the Department. This process commenced within the Force Management and subsequent Force Support Functional Capabilities Board (FCB). As the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) “Beyond Goldwater Nichols” series highlighted, demands can come into the Department from multiple channels, including those from commanders in the operational theaters, yet the Services decide which capability demands will be accepted or “approved” by the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC). The CCMDs of the operational chain of command are not voting members of the JROC; hence, for example, PRTs are not “on the books” and are cobbled together purely in an ad hoc fashion year after year. This situation means that at the end of any tour as a member of a PRT, the
individuals are disbanded/disbursed throughout the DOD as with any provisional or ad-hoc-type organization.

**Impermanence of Institutional Adaptations**

The Services are cutting organizations and personnel with IW/COIN capabilities significantly, yet national strategy states a need for these capabilities (and frequency of deployment underscores the continued demand for them) as a primary mission. Capabilities that are supposed to leverage relationships and language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) take time to develop and evolve, yet areas such as LREC are exactly where Services are willing to make cuts and take risks, with little or no OSD oversight. Recent Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Civil Affairs promotion/retention results indicate that service in important joint billets when promotions are Service business is problematic for the individuals concerned. Reductions in COIN and IW capabilities in General Purpose Forces (GPF) also are a major consideration for Special Operations Command (SOCOM) since Special Operations Forces (SOF) depend on them for support in many ways. Capabilities currently planned to be eliminated or reduced include the following:

- **Army.** 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, 162nd Advisor Training Brigade, 189th/4th Cavalry PRT Training Brigades, 09L Translator Interpreter Company, National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) program.
- **Navy.** Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCASTCOM), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) mobile and support units, Riverine Squadrons, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadrons (MSRONs), Expeditionary Training Groups (ETGs).
- **Air Force.** Air Advisor Academy.
- **Marine Corps.** Advisor Training Group, Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG), Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), Mojave Viper.

**Related IDA Study Tasks**

- AE-6-6366, Creating Foundational Foreign Language, Regional, and Cultural Proficiency in General Purpose Forces;
- BE-55-3770, The Feasibility of Requiring and Resourcing Language Education for Uniformed Personnel;
- AE-55-5527, Cross Cultural Competence as a Critical Enabler for Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense Missions;
- BA-6-2844, Managing Within Constraints;
• BA-6-2844A3, Self-Selection as a Tool For Managing Individuals’ Deployment Demands;
• BE-6-3074, Provincial Reconstruction Team Training and Lessons Learned from Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam;
• BA-6-3183, Support to the Quadrennial Report for Military Compensation;
• BA-6-3227, Assessments Supporting Versatile and Adaptive Land Forces;
• BE-6-3241/A1, Tracking and Analysis of Request for Forces Trends;
• BA-6-3328, Support for Front End Assessments and Cross-Cutting Studies; and
• BE-6-3338, Enduring Requirements for Counterinsurgency-Related Capabilities.
This page is intentionally blank.
Appendix B.
References


# Appendix C. Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFPAK</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APH</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOCL</td>
<td>Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEW</td>
<td>Civilian Expeditionary Workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic &amp; International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Directive-Type Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETG</td>
<td>Expeditionary Training Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCB</td>
<td>Functional Capabilities Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-N</td>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCISFA</td>
<td>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIEDDO</td>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirement Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LREC</td>
<td>language, regional expertise, and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAVNI</td>
<td>Military Accessions Vital to National Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCASTCOM</td>
<td>Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSCG</td>
<td>Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSRON</td>
<td>Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>professional military education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Requests for Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>State Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P&amp;R)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Force management decision process:

When compared to the other major decision making processes through which the Secretary directs the DOD, such as the program budget and the acquisition systems, force management may be the least documented, least governed, least integrated, and have the least oversight. Consequently, it is the poorest functioning, while at the same time being arguably, the most important. Force management determines who goes to war, how the burden of deployment is distributed to the operational chain of commands (the combatant commands) and even how well prepared organizations and its individuals are for the task they will have to accomplish.

Subject terms:

Force management, force employment, force provider, requests for forces, non-standard missions, in lieu of, ad hoc, AFPAK Hands, institutional adaptations, force structure, counterinsurgency (COIN)
This page is intentionally blank.