



INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Defense Governance and Management**

**The Colombian Ministry of National  
Defense's "Transformation and Future  
Initiative"**

**Retrospective on a 9-Year Cooperative  
Effort Between the United States  
Department of Defense and the Colombian  
Ministry of National Defense**

Lina M. Gonzalez  
Aaron C. Taliaferro  
Wade P. Hinkle

October 2017

Approved for public release;  
distribution is unlimited.

IDA Paper NS P-8588

Log: H 17-000383



*The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation that operates three federally funded research and development centers to provide objective analyses of national security issues, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise, and conduct related research on other national challenges.*

#### About This Publication

This work was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under the Central Research Program (C6478). The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of the United States Government.

#### For More Information:

Mr. Aaron C. Taliaferro, RSM, SFRD

[ataliafe@ida.org](mailto:ataliafe@ida.org), 703-845-4381

ADM John C. Harvey, Jr. USN (ret), Director, SFRD

[jharvey@ida.org](mailto:jharvey@ida.org), 703-575-4530

#### Copyright Notice

© 2017 Institute for Defense Analyses

4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [June 2013].

# INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Paper NS P-8588

## **Defense Governance and Management**

### **The Colombian Ministry of National Defense's "Transformation and Future Initiative"**

### **Retrospective on a 9-Year Cooperative Effort Between the United States Department of Defense and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense**

Lina M. Gonzalez  
Aaron C. Taliaferro  
Wade P. Hinkle

This page is intentionally blank.

## Executive Summary

---

Dealing with internal armed conflict has been the primary focus of the Colombian Defense and Security sector for decades. However, as violence from internal armed conflict decreased due to the defeat of notorious criminal cartels and the defeat or pacification of political insurgent groups, new challenges from armed criminal organizations without political agendas arose. Additionally, new 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges in the maritime and cyber domains appeared, and political instability in the region presented potential, future threats to Colombia's security. For these reasons, the leadership of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) began the Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI). These leaders understood that the changing security environment and an end to internal conflict as the preeminent determinant of the force structure would require the Public Forces to restructure. The question to answer was, "Restructure to what?"

This paper's intent is to explain, from a Colombian perspective, why Colombian leadership initiated TFI and to provide a critique of the contributions of the U.S. Government to TFI. Particularly, the paper will address how and why senior leaders in the Colombian Defense and Security sector partnered with the United States and how U.S. support contributed to the MND's initiative. The paper also offers an assessment of the progress achieved and the opportunities and challenges still relevant to the MND's continued transformation. Appendix A includes a chronology of the transformation initiative, as well as the U.S. advisory effort. Appendix B includes the interviews, translated and transcribed into English from Spanish, which capture the perceptions of some of the Colombian actors that were or still are key to ongoing transformation efforts.

This page is intentionally blank.

# Contents

---

1.	Introduction .....	1
2.	Colombian Defense Sector Terminology and MND Organization .....	3
3.	Background on the Colombian Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI).....	7
4.	Key Factors in the Initiation of TFI.....	9
	A. A Changing Security Context.....	9
	B. Does Strategy Drive the Budget and Is It Affordable?.....	10
	C. More Effective Civilian Control of the Armed Forces .....	11
	D. Adoption of Standards and Best Practices.....	11
5.	Explanation of U.S. DOD Support to TFI.....	13
6.	What Allowed TFI to Have Success?.....	15
	A. Stable Civilian Leadership and Workforce .....	15
	B. Colombian Research.....	15
	C. Bi-lateral Cooperation between Colombia and the United States .....	16
7.	The Contributions and Outcomes of U.S. Support.....	17
	A. Successful U.S. Contributions within Lines of Effort 1–4.....	18
	1. Force Planning.....	18
	2. Tools and Analytic Capability for Life Cycle Cost Analyses .....	19
	3. Defense Policy Guidance to Institutionalize New Force Planning Techniques.....	20
	4. A More Robust Strategic Planning Capability within the MND.....	21
	B. Generating a Cultural Change.....	21
	C. Generating Staff Capability .....	22
	D. Validation and Legitimacy to the MND Transformation Process .....	23
8.	U.S. Support: Advisory Techniques and Practices that Worked.....	25
	A. Provide Subject Matter Expertise and Research & Analysis Capacity.....	25
	B. Persistence and Continuity among the Subject Matter Experts Traveling to Colombia .....	26
	C. Partnership with Deference.....	27
9.	U.S. Support: What Did Not Work or What Could Have Been More Effective?.....	29
	A. Wrong SMEs and Lack of Deference in Some Lines of Effort .....	29
	1. Human Capital.....	29
	2. Logistics .....	30
	B. A View of Institution Building That Was Too Narrow .....	31

C.	Introducing and Managing Change within the Defense Ministry and its Subordinate Organizations .....	33
10.	Moving Forward: Opportunities and Challenges .....	37
A.	Challenges.....	37
1.	The Inflexibility of Colombia’s Force Structure and its Budget Implications .....	37
2.	Lack of Ministerial Staff Capacity and Turnover among Senior Officers of the Public Forces.....	38
3.	Fiscal Uncertainty.....	39
B.	Opportunities.....	39
1.	Strategic Planning.....	39
2.	Analysis and Data Management.....	40
3.	Integrate the Science and Technology Directorate of the Vice Ministry of Business and Social Welfare (GSED) into Force Planning.....	40
4.	Education and Training .....	41
5.	Knowledge Management and Institutionalization.....	41

## Appendices

---

Appendix A.	Chronology of the MND Transformation Initiative .....	A-1
1.	2006 .....	A-1
a.	January–August (Civilian leadership team formed).....	A-1
b.	December (Colombian Congress approves extraordinary wealth tax for 2007–2010).....	A-2
2.	2007 .....	A-2
a.	August (Civilian leadership team grows).....	A-2
3.	2008 .....	A-2
a.	January (Director Giha implements budget planning reforms).....	A-2
b.	July (Director Quintero leads Colombian participation in strategic planning exercise with U.S. Southern Command).....	A-3
c.	October (Cost analyses methods used for the first time).....	A-3
4.	2009 .....	A-3
a.	January (The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) begins support to MND transformation).....	A-3
b.	March (Exploring force planning).....	A-4
c.	August (New leadership in the MND) .....	A-4
d.	October (Formal work plan between DRMS team and MND adopted).....	A-4



e.	December (Technical Collaboration Agreement signed).....	A-5
5.	2010.....	A-5
a.	January (based on the signed technical cooperation agreement, DRMS work in support of Colombian TFI begins in earnest .....	A-5
b.	January to June (Working towards a force planning methodology).....	A-5
c.	June (CBP Methods introduced to MND) .....	A-6
d.	August (Changes in leadership at the MND; defense and security policy unchanged).....	A-6
e.	October (Vice Minister Giha becomes senior sponsor for all DRMS support) .....	A-6
f.	December (Wealth Tax extended through 2014) .....	A-7
6.	2011.....	A-7
a.	January (MND investigates other national approaches to force planning).....	A-7
b.	March (Implementation of the first CBP exercises).....	A-7
c.	May (First seminar on linking policy objectives to budget planning).....	A-7
d.	June (Defense Strategic Planning Guidance for 2011–2014 released).....	A-8
e.	August and September (Life cycle cost analysis techniques develop).....	A-8
f.	September (Pinzon becomes Minister of Defense; more initiatives added to the Transformation Effort).....	A-8
g.	October (Diana Quintero becomes Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning).....	A-8
h.	November (Second restructuring of the Ministry of Defense).....	A-9
7.	2012.....	A-9
a.	January (Defining Mission Areas) .....	A-9
b.	February (Capability planning workshops with individual services begin).....	A-9
c.	March (DRMS program absorbed by DIRI) .....	A-9
d.	April (Identifying required capabilities).....	A-9
e.	May (Capability Planning Directorate institutionalized) .....	A-10
f.	September (Peace negotiations and capability planning).....	A-10
g.	November (Sharing the Colombian experience with Guatemala) .....	A-10
8.	2013.....	A-10
a.	January (Continued development of a CBP methodology).....	A-10
b.	March (Phase 2 of CBP Methodology: Capability Statements and Force Allocation).....	A-11
c.	May (Phase 3: Capability Gaps and Prioritization).....	A-11

d.	July (Gray areas, roles, and missions).....	A-11
e.	August (First International Forum: “Transformation and Future of the Public Force”).....	A-11
f.	October (Phase 4: Capability Proposals).....	A-11
9.	2014.....	A-12
a.	February (Capability Monitoring System) .....	A-12
b.	June (Analysis of Mission Area 8 (Management, Support, and Project Development) begins).....	A-12
c.	October (Vice Minister of Defense Quintero organizes her staff for a Mission Area 8 analysis).....	A-12
10.	2015.....	A-12
a.	January to June (Mission Area 8 framework and analysis completed).....	A-12
b.	June (New Minister of Defense) .....	A-12
c.	July (Joint concepts discussion) .....	A-13
d.	August (New Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning).....	A-13
e.	December (DIRI becomes DGMT).....	A-13
11.	2016.....	A-13
a.	January (Support to the 2018 budget planning process) .....	A-13
b.	May (Presentation of the Strategic Planning Guide 2016–2018).....	A-13
c.	May (DGMT presents at Colombian Commanders Conference) .....	A-13
d.	September (Linking the investment budget to capabilities).....	A-14
e.	October (Drafting a resolution).....	A-14
12.	2017.....	A-14
a.	March (Creating consensus and support for the resolution).....	A-14
b.	April to October (Work to Support the Resolution).....	A-14
c.	October (Program Budgeting Seminar).....	A-15
Appendix B. Interviews .....		B-1
1.	List of Those Interviewed.....	B-1
2.	Base Interview Questions.....	B-1
3.	Interview Transcriptions.....	B-2
a.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Paola Nieto.....	B-2
c.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Jorge Baquero.....	B-8
c.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Andres Salcedo....	B-17
d.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Francisco Moreno .....	B-21
e.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Diana Quintero ....	B-24
f.	Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Juliana Garcia .....	B-30

g. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Jaime Medina.....B-35  
h. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Cesar Restrepo.....B-41  
i. Written Response to Interview Questions from Dora Laverde .....B-50  
j. Written Response to Interview Questions from Carolina  
Matamoros.....B-53  
Appendix C. Acronyms .....C-1

This page is intentionally blank.

# 1. Introduction

---

Dealing with internal armed conflict has been the primary focus of the Colombian Defense and Security sector for decades. However, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as violence from internal armed conflict decreased due to the defeat of notorious criminal cartels and the defeat or pacification of political insurgent groups, new challenges from armed criminal organizations without political agendas arose. Additionally, new 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges in the maritime and cyber domains appeared, and political instability in the region presented potential future threats to Colombian security. As early as 2008, the leadership of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) began to think about how to transform the Public Forces of Colombia so they were postured for a post-internal conflict security environment.

Under the leadership of then-Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos and Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning Juan Carlos Pinzon, the MND began two important initiatives. One was led by the director of Sectoral Studies, Diana Quintero, and the other was led by the director of Programming and Budgeting, Yaneth Giha.

Director Quintero's Sectoral Studies Directorate was created to provide the defense minister with a prospective analysis of the future security environment, as well as options for the sustainable development of the Colombian Defense and Security sector over a long-term planning horizon. To do this, Director Quintero completed several planning exercises to evaluate the long-term effectiveness and affordability of force structure alternatives against a range of future scenarios. These exercises were the first ministerial attempts to apply a cost-constrained and future-looking methodological approach to force planning.

In her directorate, Director Giha initiated reforms with the overarching goals of budget efficiency and sustainability. Her focus was the design and implementation of methodologies to improve budget planning and execution. To create a sustainable defense and security sector, Director Giha understood that the Ministry of National Defense and its public forces needed to do more than plan an annual budget; it needed a multi-annual budget planning process that also tied planned spending to policy objectives. Furthermore, she understood that the MND needed to develop its technical skills and have access to and control of data – especially unit resource and cost data relative to the units and organizations of the individual Public Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police).

In 2009, to assist the Colombians in their defense transformation efforts, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD

CAPE) offered assistance to the MND through the Defense Resource Management Studies Program (DRMS). The offer was accepted and a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) was sent by the DRMS program manager to assist Director Giha and the Programming and Budget Directorate. This began a continuous effort, still ongoing, to assist the Colombian Ministry of National Defense with institutionalizing changes in multiple defense management practices.

During the same year, Director Quintero was investigating force-planning methodologies that could be used by the Public Forces for future force planning. In parallel, the directorate completed an exercise to analyze Colombia's future security context and propose operating concepts needed for the future. The initiative was called *The Public Forces and Future Challenges*. The result of the initiative was a published document, the *Prospectiva*, which provided much of the strategic thinking and guidance that would shape future force-planning efforts.

From late 2009 to late 2011, despite significant turnover among the Minister, Vice Minister, and key directors, these initiatives continued and eventually consolidated under President Santos and Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzon's Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI).<sup>1</sup> TFI was meant to transform the force structure and the institutions and processes of the defense and security sector so its leaders were able to make data-driven decisions about the future of the force structure. The leaders of the sector understood that an end to internal conflict as the preeminent determinant of the force structure would require the public forces to restructure. The questions to answer were, "Restructure to what?" and, "At what cost?"

This paper's intent is to explain, from a Colombian perspective, why Colombian leadership began a reform process and to provide a critique of the contributions of the U.S. government to those reform efforts. Particularly, the paper will address how and why senior leaders in the Colombian defense ministry partnered with the United States and how U.S. support contributed to the MND's initiatives. The paper will also offer an assessment of the progress achieved and the opportunities and challenges still relevant to the MND's continued transformation. The appendices include a chronology of the reform effort, as well the interviews, translated and transcribed into English from Spanish, which capture the perceptions of some of the Colombian actors that were or still are key contributors to the transformation of Colombian defense management practices.

---

<sup>1</sup> Yaneth Giha became Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning in August 2010 and continued Pinzon's reforms. In September 2011, Juan Carlos Pinzon returned to the MND as Minister of Defense. Later that same year, Vice Minister Giha moved to a different vice ministry within MND and Diana Quintero became the Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning

## 2. Colombian Defense Sector Terminology and MND Organization

---

To help the reader understand some of the unique characteristics and features of the Colombian Defense and Security sector, this section defines some key terms and provides a visual of the MND's organizational structure.

**The Colombian Defense and Security Sector:** In Colombia, neither the office of the President nor the Minister of Defense issues separate policy guidance or strategy for defense and security. These terms are not differentiated in budget or financial guidance, either. The public financial management agencies, which are the Ministry of Finance and the National Department of Planning, issue budgetary guidance to the Defense and Security Sector. The terms always appear together. This is because the Ministry of National Defense is responsible for both internal security and territorial defense, and it has ultimate responsibility for both the military services and the Colombian National Police. Throughout this paper, the term "Defense Sector" may be used for brevity, but it should always be understood to encompass both defense (military services) and security (police).

**The Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND):** The MND has responsibility for all the Public Forces of Colombia. Unlike the United States, the Colombian Defense Ministry includes the National Police, the Coast Guard, and a Maritime Directorate. As such, internal security and law enforcement in both ground and maritime domains are also areas of responsibility under the MND.

**The Public Forces of Colombia:** The Public Forces of Colombia, which fall under the MND, include the General Command of the Armed Forces; the Army; the Air Force; the National Police; and the Naval, Coast Guard, and Marine Infantry components of the Colombian Navy.

**The Commanders of the Public Forces:** Each uniformed public force in Colombia is commanded by a four-star officer who has responsibility to organize, train, equip, and sustain (OTE&S) the forces under his command, and exercise operational control over his forces. Each commander is assisted by a second in command (2IC). The 2IC usually presides over the OTE&S processes while the commander's focus is on operational planning and command and interfacing with the government on matters pertaining to his particular service.

**The General Command of the Armed Forces:** The General Command of the Armed Forces is a four-star military command with operational control over specified joint units and operations. It does not function like—nor does it have the responsibilities of—the United States Joint Staff. Further, the commander of the General Command does not have the responsibilities or authority of a Chief of Defense (CHOD) like the Chief of the Defense Staff in the United Kingdom’s structure. For example, the commander of the General Command has no authority over the National Police of Colombia and he is not in a position to guide, review, or approve the budget plans of the Colombian military services. The General Command does have its own budget for its staff operations and to maintain specified joint units; therefore, it is a separate military service, even though its members are composed of the three existing Colombian military services.

**The Colombian Navy:** The Colombian Navy has four components—the Navy, the Marine Infantry, the Coast Guard, and the National Maritime Directorate. Of these four components, the Navy, Marine Infantry, and Coast Guard are considered uniformed Public Forces of the defense sector. The National Maritime Directorate is an agency composed of civilians and naval officers with responsibility for oceanography, scientific research, maritime technology development, and maritime traffic control.

**Joint:** In the Colombian defense sector, the term *joint* refers only to the Army, Air Force, and uniformed Public Forces of the Navy. The National Police are not included in joint operations, joint doctrine, joint planning, etc.

**Joint and Coordinated:** Joint and coordinated operations, doctrine, planning, etc., include the National Police.

**Sustainability:** Many of the Colombians interviewed refer to *sustainability* and the term appears throughout the paper. For this paper, sustainability refers to the ability of the Colombian defense sector to sustain its rate of spending in the future. Many of the ministry’s senior leaders were or are concerned that the rate of spending that the defense sector has historically enjoyed is not sustainable going forward. A synonym for sustainable, in Colombian defense sector jargon, is affordable.

**Sectoral Studies:** Within Colombia, one will not find a national security white paper or a stand-alone document titled, the “Defense Strategy of Colombia.” Rather, within six months of the beginning of a new presidential term, the administration is constitutionally required to issue a Colombian National Development Plan. The plan lays out the government’s key policies and includes specific objectives by government sector. Within Colombia, the MND is responsible for achieving the objectives given to the Defense and Security Sector. The Public Forces of Colombia are the implementing agencies of the MND. In response to the National Development Plan, the MND issues its defense and security policy. The defense and security policy is informed by analysis and



research conducted by the Directorate of Sectoral Studies under the Vice Minister of Defense for Policy and International Affairs.

**MND Organizational Chart:** To help the reader place the offices referred to throughout this paper in their organizational context, an organizational chart is provided in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Organizational Chart

This page is intentionally blank.

### **3. Background on the Colombian Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI)**

---

The Colombian MND formally kicked off the TFI in 2010. The ultimate objectives were to define the country's future security environment and then transform the public force structure to one capable of addressing the identified and prioritized national security challenges of the future security environment. Though Colombia's leaders were uncertain when peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC), Colombia's most notorious political insurgent group, would be achieved and could not predict what effects peace would have on the defense sector's budget, they were confident that peace would be achieved and the sector would need to be able to adapt as a result. With that in mind, the Minister of Defense set several sub-objectives related to the sector's management practices as part of TFI. These were:

1. Institutionalize ministerial and public force planning processes that are repeatable, able to adapt to changing circumstances, and conducted in a joint and coordinated manner;
2. Improve the ability of the MND to estimate the current and future costs of force structure decisions; and
3. Develop an affordable, sustainable force structure based on national fiscal guidance and the Ministry's own internal budget forecasts.

With respect to the first sub-objective, the MND began its own analysis of the security threats and challenges it expected the nation to face in a future security environment. The period under analysis extended out to 2030. To institutionalize a joint and coordinated force planning methodology, the MND required the participation of each of the Public Forces' Commanders, Seconds in Command (2ICs), and the forces' chiefs of operations, planning, and intelligence to participate in TFI working groups convened by MND staff. From the beginning of the initiative to the present, products generated by the working groups were submitted to a strategic committee composed of the Vice Ministers, Public Force Commanders, and 2ICs for approval.

Though far into the future, the period under analysis was extended to 2030 because ministry officials did not want to incorrectly forecast a near-term peace with the FARC. They also knew that once a decision to transform was made, it would take significant time to align financial resources to prioritized defense sector capabilities. Furthermore, if the level of internal armed conflict continued to drop and peace with the FARC was achieved,

there was an expectation that the privileged budget position the defense sector had historically enjoyed relative to other public sectors would end. Therefore, aligned with sub-objectives 1, 2, and 3 above, the MND also focused on how to improve its ability to manage defense resources.

With these objectives in mind, the MND issued policy guidance in 2011 that directed the sector to design and implement new defense management practices, tools, and procedures. The changes in management practices were seen by MND leadership as a precondition for the transformation of the force structure. The policy stated that the development of systematic medium- and long-term planning practices was necessary to ensure an effective response to the nation's present and future threats, through the development of an affordable force structure. Furthermore, the policy directed a joint and coordinated analysis of the force structure's capability to respond to current and expected security challenges. The assessment of capability was to be the driving influence of future budget allocation decisions. To implement this policy, the ministry kicked off two initiatives. These were the spending sustainability initiative<sup>2</sup> and the capability-based planning initiative.

Joint and coordinated long-term planning with capability as a main factor in budget decisions were new ideas. Historically, the defense sector's planning horizon had never extended beyond the term of the current presidential administration, and what planning did occur was conducted by each public force individually. Budget decisions were primarily based on activities driven by a given budget account, not on how spending affected the capability of the Public Forces and their contribution toward achieving national security objectives.

With the main objectives of TFI in mind, the next section describes some of the key factors that motivated the initiative.

---

<sup>2</sup> The focus of the spending sustainability initiative was to create and utilize cost analysis and budget planning methods and tools. The MND intended to use the new methods and tools to forecast the future cost of the existing force structure plus any changes proposed during capability planning. With the costs known, the ministry could assess whether the defense sector would have enough budget to sustain a spending rate able to keep the force structure at an effective level of capability.

## **4. Key Factors in the Initiation of TFI**

---

### **A. A Changing Security Context**

For more than five decades, Colombia's security context was predominantly characterized by a four-sided internal war between leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, transnational organized criminal cartels, and the Public Forces of Colombia. For just as long, the MND and its forces have focused on internal conflict. As a result, planning horizons were focused on current operations, budget decisions were based on expedient need, and the defense sector enjoyed extraordinary national resources and generous assistance from international partners.

The expectation that internal armed conflict might no longer be the preeminent Colombian security threat created a great opportunity for the MND to redesign and develop the Public Forces' structure so those forces were capable of protecting the nation's security in a more diverse security environment. However, this required strategic analysis and long-term planning, skills the defense sector had not needed during the decades of internal conflict.

Furthermore, the anticipation of a shift in Colombia's security context generated important discussions about the future roles and missions of the Military Forces and the National Police. These discussions were not without controversy, as the discussants knew that decisions about roles and missions could be tied to decisions about individual service capabilities and budgets. Additionally, important policy matters were highlighted by the discussions, such as the conceptual differences between security and defense, the employment of military forces in Colombia for internal security if there were no armed political insurgents, the military capabilities of the National Police, and the need to have all Public Forces under the Defense Ministry.

Paola Nieto, a former director of the Ministry's Programming and Budget Directorate (DPP), speaking about the most relevant factors behind TFI, said, "We knew that there could be changes in the conflict [in the future] and to this end the subject of how to deal with the police and military services in an appropriate manner" was a question. Nieto, continuing her comments, said it was necessary to differentiate between concepts of security and defense, which did not exist at the time.<sup>3</sup> Jorge Baquero, who was in the

---

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix B(3)(a).

MND's Directorate of Sectorial Studies at the time, remembers that the effort to bring the FARC to the negotiating table [and thus end the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian government] was a main driver behind TFI.<sup>4</sup> If the conflict with the FARC ended, what would be the priority security challenge(s) of the future?

## **B. Does Strategy Drive the Budget and Is It Affordable?**

As a means to achieve his primary objective of ending Colombia's internal conflicts, President Uribe obtained both popular and congressional support for an extraordinary wealth tax on the nation's citizens whose net worth was greater than 50 percent of the national average. This tax was partially earmarked for the Public Forces of Colombia and enabled a significant buildup in the strength and capability of the forces. The MND received the benefit of these extraordinary resources over three different periods: 2003–2006, 2007–2010, and 2011–2014.<sup>5</sup>

These resources were used mostly to pay for an increase in military and police personnel, as well as materiel and equipment for the new personnel. However, the decision to increase the size of the force was made without consideration of the future cost of the decisions. Furthermore, the MND had no means to measure or assess the impact of the investments on the forces' capability. The personnel and equipment inventory of the Public Forces of Colombia were increasing, but the Ministry lacked the means to determine how these increases were affecting the forces' ability to achieve the President's policy objectives.

Additionally, the MND had no tools to analyze or forecast the medium- or long-term budget requirements of the increases. Assuming that extraordinary resources would not be available forever, the implication was that the MND was accruing a structural deficit. Without the institutional capacity and analytic tools in place to manage the inevitable drawdown required by a smaller future budget, there was a risk that the force would be hollowed out once peace was achieved.

Some senior officials in the MND, notably Juan Carlos Pinzon and Yaneth Giha, recognized these institutional capability gaps and future risks before TFI formally kicked-off, but at the time the nation and its Public Force Commanders were focused on internal conflict. There was no planning for a future that did not include earmarked extraordinary resources for the defense sector, and no tools existed to analyze whether defense expenditures supported defense and security sector objectives. However, the Minister of Defense and his Vice Ministers knew the fiscal situation would be less predictable once

---

<sup>4</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).

<sup>5</sup> According to numbers provided by DPP, the MND received approximately 2.72 billion Colombian Pesos (COP) in 2003–2006, 7.54 billion COP in 2007–2010, and 7.2 billion COP in 2011–2014. The last extension of the tax occurred during the term of President Santos.

the internal conflict subsided and understood that a more deliberate and future-oriented approach to force planning and budgeting needed to be developed.

Speaking about these issues, Andres Salcedo, former coordinator in DPP, said:

I believe that one of the most important aspects related to the harmonization of the strategy with the budget. Before [TFI] started, there [was] a mismatch between the two. It was not easy to [trace] between strategy and budget.<sup>6</sup>

Salcedo also referred to financial sustainability as both an initiative within and a reason for TFI. “Is our force structure sustainable?” This was a Colombian way of asking themselves whether they could afford their force structure, given the forecast fiscal environment. Francisco Moreno, another former coordinator in DPP, remembers the MND needed to be able to “cost” the services’ force structure and have clearer criteria for budget allocation and spending decisions.<sup>7</sup>

### **C. More Effective Civilian Control of the Armed Forces**

Former Vice Minister Diana Quintero remembers the desire among her Colombian defense peers, Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon and Vice Minister Yaneth Giha, to increase the Ministry’s effective control of the Public Forces by increasing the effectiveness of the Ministry’s decision-making processes.<sup>8</sup> In a similar vein, Juliana Garcia remembers that both Giha and Pinzon were motivated to plan and allocate the defense sector’s budget in a way that allowed them to respect the needs of all of the four Public Forces, but also demand results based on the budgets allocated to each individual service.<sup>9</sup>

### **D. Adoption of Standards and Best Practices**

In addition to greater civilian control over planning and budget decisions of the Public Forces, Diana Quintero recalled that modernization of the Public Forces based on best international practices of defense management was another reason for TFI.<sup>10</sup>

Future-oriented force and budget planning were features the Defense Ministry knew it had to adopt as a standard management practice. Extraordinary national resources combined with generous international security assistance had allowed the defense sector to build and modernize its Public Forces without need for analyzing the future impact or necessity of present decisions. Essentially, the robust defense sector budget was covering

---

<sup>6</sup> Appendix B(3)(c).

<sup>7</sup> Appendix B(3)(d).

<sup>8</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>9</sup> Appendix B(3)(f).

<sup>10</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

a multitude of deficiencies in the sector's planning practices. Though present operations were successful, they were being built on a foundation not designed to last.

The adoption and implementation of medium- and long-term defense sector planning and budgeting methodologies, therefore, were the first foci of TFI. This was complementary to the desire to increase the Ministry's influence and control over defense sector budget decisions. Both the Minister of Defense and his Vice Ministers knew that reducing the individual services' control over these matters required a standard set of planning tools and processes that had to be used transparently and informed by joint and coordinated data collection and evaluation. To make their argument, the MND focused on convincing senior uniformed leaders that it was important to understand the link between resource allocation and spending (the inputs) and the capability of the armed forces (the outputs). Furthermore, it was important to understand not only how effective the forces were, but how efficiently the resources enabled force effectiveness.

Jorge Baquero, the first Civilian Coordinator in the MND's Capabilities Planning Directorate, stated that by the end of 2010 the Ministry had made it clear to the Commanders and senior officers of the Public Forces that the Ministry expected them to maintain operational effectiveness with the resources allocated to them and to be efficient in their use of resources.<sup>11</sup> To make their case to the Public Force Commanders, the MND used information provided by U.S. advisors and from documents and individuals from the United Kingdom and Australia, among others. However, the U.S. advice, provided by the Department of the Defense (DOD), was the most influential and robust. The next section explains why and how the U.S. supported TFI.

---

<sup>11</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).



## **5. Explanation of U.S. DOD Support to TFI**

---

U.S. support of Colombian defense transformation began in 2009 through the DOD's DRMS program. DRMS was sponsored by both OSD Policy and OSD CAPE. The initial focus of the support was life cycle cost analysis and force modeling. All of the advisors and SMEs provided by the DRMS program came from IDA. Shortly after DRMS support through IDA began, the initial effort expanded to force planning. These efforts also were sourced by DOD through IDA. Furthermore, IDA personnel managed the day-to-day efforts of the DRMS program in Colombia on behalf of DOD.<sup>12</sup>

In 2012, DOD consolidated DRMS under the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program. DIRI was sponsored and funded by OSD Policy; however, management of the program was delegated to the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR). Support efforts begun by DRMS and executed by IDA continued under DIRI. However, under DIRI sponsorship, support to TFI expanded to other aspects of defense management. These included logistics, human resources, and eventually joint concept development.

To staff these efforts, CCMR continued to use IDA in support of the Programming and Budgeting Directorate and the Directorate for Capability Planning. Initially, a team of for-profit contractors were sourced by CCMR to support the Human Capital Development Directorate; however, they were eventually replaced by RAND, which like IDA, is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center. DIRI support to the Directorate of Logistics was sourced to a for-profit contractor. The result is that by 2014, there were three separate U.S. advisory teams in Colombia supporting TFI under DIRI sponsorship: a team of private contractors supporting the Directorate of Logistics; the original IDA team still in support of force planning, cost, and budget reforms; and a RAND team supporting human resource management (HRM) reform. Each team had its own lead and reported to CCMR personnel who managed the DIRI program.

At the end of 2015, at the request of the Colombian Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning (VMOD S&P), CCMR consolidated the support effort in Colombia under the IDA team lead. RAND was still the lead for HRM, but reported through the IDA

---

<sup>12</sup> Salvador Raza, PhD., did travel to Colombia from the U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University around this same time. He presented ideas on force planning to the Directorate of Sectorial Studies; however, Dr. Raza did not make a repeat visit in support of TFI.

team lead, who reported to the DIRI program manager. The logistics effort was given to IDA to source, along with a new effort focused on joint concept development. As of the date of this publication, the organization and scope of the effort is the same as it was at the end of 2015.

In 2016, DOD once again consolidated some of its defense institution building programs. The sponsor remained OSD Policy; however, the program is no longer called DIRI—it is now known as the Defense Governance and Management Team (DGMT). Program management of DGMT is still delegated to CCMR at this time.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> Language in the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act implies that program management may shift to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. However, this has not occurred as of the date of this publication.

## **6. What Allowed TFI to Have Success?**

---

### **A. Stable Civilian Leadership and Workforce**

A determining factor in TFI success is relatively stable and consistent MND leadership. Though the initiative formally began in 2010, its seeds and vision were planted in 2006 by then Vice Minister Pinzon and Minister Santos. Furthermore, while Pinzon was Vice Minister, he hired two civilian directors, Yaneth Giha and Diana Quintero, who would later become Vice Ministers and who were key figures in the MND's transformation efforts.

In addition to the leaders, a cadre of young, capable civilians were hired in 2013 to implement the initiative. Since 2013, the MND has enjoyed low turnover among the ranks of civilians hired into key transformation positions. Many of these civilian hires became coordinators or even directors in their respective directorates, and in turn have hired and trained civil servants to continue to build the capability and capacity of the MND to govern and manage the defense sector's financial, personnel, and logistics resources.

Former Vice Minister Diana Quintero described the stability of leadership and its Defense Ministry staff as a feature that allowed for stable senior-level ownership of the transformation process.<sup>14</sup> Due to this, the initiative has had the time, people, and resources required to transform the Ministry effectively.

### **B. Colombian Research**

Given the objective of developing management practices based on international standards, the MND sought advice and information from foreign defense ministries and individual defense experts. The United States, England, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and Chile served as conceptual references for the MND and, in some cases, provided direct assistance. This assistance came in the form of advice and information to Colombian defense leadership and validation of different methodologies as the Colombians created and begin to implement them. In the case of the United States, England, and South Korea, visits to their respective ministries of defense were arranged so a Colombian delegation could obtain information firsthand. Additionally, representatives from some of the other countries mentioned came to Colombia, along with acclaimed defense strategists and planners, to attend or facilitate a seminar where they were asked to share their own

---

<sup>14</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

perspectives and comment on the Colombian initiatives. These seminars enriched the intellectual space needed for reforms, while also validating initiatives underway.

### **C. Bi-lateral Cooperation between Colombia and the United States**

The Colombian objective to transform its force structure from one focused on internal conflict to one able to meet Colombia's future security challenges is shared by the United States because it is a matter of national security for both countries, given the security threats in the region.

Though the TFI began in 2010, significant and active U.S. government (USG) assistance to the Colombian defense sector began in 1999 under Plan Colombia. U.S. assistance to strengthen and modernize the Colombian Public Forces' strategic planning capabilities also began before 2010. The introduction of a joint and coordinated logistics data system ("*SILOG*") in 2007 is the first USG-COL effort directly linked to the objectives of TFI.

*SILOG*, a software system designed to track parts based on contract line item numbers, was supported by USG security assistance. It improved the accountability of the contracting system and allowed for more knowledge of where and when parts were arriving into the defense logistics system.

Additionally, strategic exercises, such as Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), were instrumental in enabling the defense sector to define a future Colombian security environment. The JIPOE exercise was run by military and police personnel from the Public Forces and civilians from MND with support from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Though JIPOE was an operational planning exercise (thus, not future-oriented), it was the first time that personnel from the defense sector participated in a planning exercise that required an assessment of military capabilities to respond to the exercises' scenarios.

Finally, the U.S. Military Group, DOD's representatives in the U.S. embassy in Bogota, established a permanent office within the ministry. This conspicuous U.S. presence in the Defense Ministry lends visible credibility to U.S. support of TFI. In turn, U.S. support is important to senior civilian leadership, who point to that support as an indicator of TFI's importance. Furthermore, a standing office in the Ministry makes it easy for the Ministry to route inquiries and requests to USG officials. Likewise, the USG can easily contact the Ministry through its office.

## **7. The Contributions and Outcomes of U.S. Support**

---

With sponsorship and funding from DOD, appointed advisory teams have focused on helping the Colombian MND and its Public Forces in the following lines of effort.

1. Produce and implement methodologies, tools, and processes for medium- and long-term force planning and development. In particular, support MND in the design and implementation of a capability-based planning (CBP) methodology to identify, prioritize, and improve the capabilities of the Colombian Public Forces in accordance with Colombian defense policy.
2. Introduce and implement tools and techniques required for life cycle cost analyses so current and future capabilities are more likely to be developed and sustained within the fiscal limitations of the defense sector.
3. Produce resolutions, guidance, and instructions that clarify and institutionalize management and process changes as a result of TFI.
4. Develop a more robust strategic planning capability within the MND and establish a framework for analyzing the roles and responsibilities of the defense sector.

These first four initiatives have been the focus of U.S. support since 2010. They are also the areas that the interviewees for this project are most familiar with or that have shown some tangible success. The entire U.S. support effort also includes lines of effort 5-8; however, these are newer initiatives, begun in 2015 or later, or they have not achieved notable success so far. Therefore, they are not discussed in this chapter.

Even now, the most significant objectives of TFI are not yet achieved. Therefore, this chapter will describe the contributions that have led TFI to where it stands today. Chapter 8 will describe where U.S. support might have had more of an impact and chapter 9 will discuss opportunities and challenges that are still ahead.

5. Support the Ministry's Directorate of Logistics (DILOG) in the development of strategic logistics plans and policies to guide the development of the defense sector's logistics enterprise.
6. Support the Ministry's Human Capital Development Directorate (DDCH) and the Public Forces in the development of tables of organization and equipment (TOEs).

7. Support DDCH in the design and development of career plans by occupational specialties and research and explain force-shaping tools to adjust the personnel structure of the Public Forces.
8. Support the General Command of the Military Forces (CGFM) to design and employ a methodology to produce joint concepts and joint doctrine.

The rest of this chapter will describe the U.S. advisory effort in terms of its contribution to TFI and any outcomes related to those contributions.

## **A. Successful U.S. Contributions within Lines of Effort 1–4**

### **1. Force Planning**

Begun in 2010, designing and implementing a force planning methodology based on capabilities is one of the two longest-running U.S. support efforts. The focus has been to develop a force-planning methodology using CBP and to implement the methodology in a joint and coordinated manner throughout the defense and security sector. The work has led to significant conceptual and practical changes.

First, the Ministry and all the Public forces re-organized themselves. DPC was a new directorate created under the VMOD S&P, while Sectoral Studies was refocused and moved under the Vice Minister of International Affairs and Policy. Sectoral Studies now focuses on analyzing the future security environment and proposing planning scenarios to guide analysis during force planning. Each of the four Public Forces has a force planning office now, with a two-star general in the lead. This shows at least a recognition by the Ministry and the Public Forces that some priority must be given to planning for a future force versus planning to deploy and operate the current force.

Second, the institutionalization of future-oriented and capability-based force planning is considered a significant cultural change within the MND and throughout the pPublic Forces. In further support of this change, Jaime Medina points to all current defense policy and strategic planning documents that relate the defense sector's objectives to the capabilities required to achieve them.<sup>15</sup> Former Director of Sectoral Studies, Cesar Restrepo, points to the language the individual Public Forces use to communicate within their organizations and to senior leaders in other organizations when referring to their own forces' objectives, requirements, etc. All of them now refer to the major objectives of the defense and security sector and the capabilities they believe their individual service requires to achieve their assigned objectives.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

<sup>16</sup> Appendix B(3)(h).

Last, former Vice Minister Quintero highlighted how the introduction and eventual implementation of CBP through the MND enabled the MND to lead force-planning discussions with the Public Forces. For Vice Minister Quintero, this is a definitive success in terms of civil military relations and civilian control of the uniformed services by the MND because it connects MND policy guidance to the defense sector's force planning and resource allocation decisions.<sup>17</sup>

## **2. Tools and Analytic Capability for Life Cycle Cost Analyses**

The introduction and implementation of life cycle cost analyses tools and methodologies within the auspices of the Spending Sustainability Initiative is a U.S. contribution that played a direct role in creating Colombian institutional capability that did not previously exist. Today, the Colombian defense sector has established cost factors that are reviewed annually and applicable to all Public Forces. Furthermore, all Public Forces in the Colombian defense sector must include a life cycle cost analysis when submitting requests for investment budget.<sup>18</sup>

The U.S. contribution to this achievement was a two-part effort. First, select staff within DPP were trained and educated on life cycle cost concepts and practices. Second, a life cycle cost analysis software model was installed and MND and Public Forces' staffs were trained on how to use it. From these two efforts, DPP has been able to lead the Public Forces into greater implementation of the concepts and the tool, establishing defense sector cost factors, validating historical costs and updating cost factors, and performing independent life cycle cost analyses of Public Force initiatives.

The cost analysis tool, the Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS), enables the MND and each Public Force to estimate the force structure's cost at a unit level. Furthermore, it is based on cost factors that can be updated and validated based on actual costs. This information system is the tangible link to how resources are being used to build capable units because it models the relationships between cost, budget, and capabilities and how programmed capabilities relate to defense policy objectives and priorities.

According to Paola Nieto,<sup>19</sup> the former director of DPP, the improvements provided by U.S. support enabled her directorate to know the size of the force and its cost relative to size for the first time. Further, the establishment of a standard methodology for all Public Forces to estimate the life cycle cost of the equipment and infrastructure being planned for provided her office with the ability to show senior leaders how investment affects future

---

<sup>17</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>18</sup> In Colombia, the Investment Budget is typically used for capital expenditures, such as infrastructure or major equipment items.

<sup>19</sup> Appendix B(3)(a).

operating costs and thus the sustainability of the force structure. Andres Salcedo,<sup>20</sup> a DPP coordinator who worked for both Paola Nieto and Juliana Garcia, described the adoption of FOCIS as very important because it enables DPP analysts to quickly and confidently cost proposals to close capability gaps within the force structure, to identify trade-offs (to pay for an approved solution) or to propose alternate solutions that fit under a fiscal limit.

### **3. Defense Policy Guidance to Institutionalize New Force Planning Techniques**

Specific to the VMOD S&P, U.S. support has aided the Vice Minister's coordination of this intra- and inter-institutional effort.

Within the MND, formulating policy guidance must be a coordinated effort between vice ministries and among the directorates of those vice ministries. Further, given the unique nature of the Public Forces' components, the guidance must also be coordinated among the services to ensure it has applicability and enforceability among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police. For this reason, the U.S. support teams often perform as a coordinator for the Vice Minister to consolidate feedback from various defense and security sector actors to bring stakeholders together when contentious issues arise.

Policies that affect how MND prepares and justifies its budget requests must also be coordinated with the Department of National Planning (DNP)<sup>21</sup> and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Capability is now the basis for force planning and for investment budget requests. The training and preparation of personnel, within VMOD S&P and the Vice Ministry of Policy and International Affairs, to explain how capability planning relates to national objectives has been instrumental in preparing those civilian officials for socializing new MND planning and budgeting practices with DNP and the MOF.

Speaking about the results of TFI and the impact of U.S. support, former Vice Minister Quintero said,

We have a before and an after in our dialogue with the services; our internal dialogues, and our dialogue with other [government agencies], like the Ministry of Finance...and that was a resounding success to such an extent that today it is being shared with other countries.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Appendix B(3)(c).

<sup>21</sup> DNP is an administrative department of the executive branch of government. The head of DNP reports directly to the President. DNP assists the President by preparing his strategic vision for the nation and then evaluating how Colombian line ministries are implementing that vision through their own investment plans and projects. The vision is published in the National Development Plan. The plan is produced, by law, after each presidential election.

<sup>22</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).



#### **4. A More Robust Strategic Planning Capability within the MND**

A Ministry-led joint and coordinated process to define the mission areas<sup>23</sup> of the defense sector is an area where U.S. support proved effective. Jorge Baquero remarked that<sup>24</sup> the institutionalization of a mission area framework was the first joint and coordinated strategic planning effort the defense sector had completed. Once the Mission Areas were established, the process provided a framework for the MND to set priorities, and evaluate and assign roles and missions of the individual Public Forces. It also allowed for joint and coordinated determination of required capabilities and their associated resources.

As an example of its usefulness, the mission area framework is the basis for how the MND issued its latest policy guidance. The Colombian defense sector's 2016–2018 Strategic Planning Guide was organized by mission area. This document laid out the Defense Minister's policy in terms of the capabilities required to achieve objectives in each Mission Area.

#### **B. Generating a Cultural Change**

A notable success of the U.S. effort has been to help catalyze a cultural change within the Ministry. First, with respect to civil-military relations, the initiative has given the Ministry of Defense a more prominent and authoritative role in force planning and budgeting vis-à-vis the uniformed services. Second, the planning culture moved from short-term considerations only to one that also considers medium- and long-term planning priorities. Third, there is an acknowledgement that the sector has to use a joint and coordinated framework for force planning and resource allocation.

Given the myriad security challenges the Colombian defense sector expects to confront and the constrained resources to address these challenges, the MND embraces joint and coordinated planning as the way for the sector to fulfill national objectives. The common capability planning framework for all Public Forces is a significant change from the previous parochial, force-planning processes. Furthermore, it is now commonly accepted that to be effective, the services must be sustainable, and to be sustainable, the services need to provide joint and coordinated solutions that are affordable given existing fiscal guidance.

---

<sup>23</sup> A mission area is not a mission. Rather, a mission area is a grouping of interrelated activities that must be performed effectively to accomplish national level objectives. As such, mission areas are a way to organize and categorize the capabilities of the armed forces and then analyze them for relevance to national and/or defense policy objectives. A mission area is akin to a Joint Capability Area (JCA) in the U.S. Joint Force lexicon.

<sup>24</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).

Last is the recognition that MND requires its own capability to assess service compliance with policy guidance and approved force-planning decisions. These assessments need to be measurable and provide traceability and transparency, both internally and externally to defense sector stakeholders. Prior to TFI, the MND did not think of its responsibilities in these terms.

### **C. Generating Staff Capability**

Another important contribution from the U.S. has been the preparation and education of analysts on the MND staff. This has generated staff capacity and capability. In Colombia's experience, some standard international practices cannot be applied to the Colombian defense sector based on their existing laws or other distinctive features. As the civilian end strength and capability of the Ministry's civilian personnel has increased, these people have to determine which practices are suitable to the Colombian case and which are not. When standard practice does not work, the Colombians use advice from the U.S. team and then adjust so that it is tailored to their needs. A number of the Colombians interviewed commented on how the U.S. contribution has generated staff capability to assess standard practice and adapt it to Colombian context.

Vice Minister Quintero stressed how important it has been for the Colombian team to develop its own capabilities for the changes to be sustainable in the long term. She attributes the successes in the implementation of the initiative to both teams, the U.S. and Colombian; they have been able to determine together the best approaches to solving the Ministry's challenges.<sup>25</sup>

The former Director of Sectorial Studies, Cesar Restrepo, thought the main contribution of U.S. participation in TFI has been as a trusted counterpart that communicates with Colombian officials and works toward applicable solutions to meet mutual objectives.<sup>26</sup>

Francisco Moreno, the main point of contact in DPP when the U.S. advisory teams first arrived, remembers that the U.S. advisors provided the cost analyses and budget planning software that enabled the MND to relate units to their total life cycle cost, and the teams showed the MND staff how to gather, process, and analyze the data using the software.<sup>27</sup>

There are three primary ways U.S. support teams have worked to generate staff capability: first, the use of seminars and conferences to train and educate hundreds of Colombian personnel within the MND and the Public Forces; second, through hundreds of

---

<sup>25</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>26</sup> Appendix B(3)(h).

<sup>27</sup> Appendix B(3)(d).

hours of one-on-one or small group consultative conversations with personnel throughout the Colombian defense sector; and third, the provision of specific analytic tools designed to assist MND and Public Force personnel in implementing new methodologies designed through MND-led transformation efforts. Not only has this generated capability within the institutional staff, it has also provided a pipeline of younger officials prepared to take over for more senior officials as promotion and rotation patterns occur.

#### **D. Validation and Legitimacy to the MND Transformation Process**

Finally, because the United States is a common benchmark for topics related to defense and security, another important contribution of the U.S. team has been as a validator of MND-led management and process changes. This validation has been important to all levels of the Ministry, including the Vice Ministers, and it supports the Vice Ministers' credibility and reputation among the senior leadership of the Military Services and the National Police. Moreover, the role as validator has also been important when presenting specific planning or budgeting initiatives to other institutions of Colombia's government that are important to the defense sector's planning and management processes. Finally, the Colombians regard U.S. support as an implicit guarantee that the processes, tools, and methodologies developed as part of TFI were developed in accordance with standard, credible, international practices.

Juliana Garcia, the former Director of DPP, during her interview remarked,

the [Colombian] defense sector is not easy. The services are not easy [to work with] and having them believe you is not easy either. But when they see the same people [from the United States] participating in the effort for so many years, people start believing.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Appendix B(3)(f).

This page is intentionally blank.

## **8. U.S. Support: Advisory Techniques and Practices that Worked**

---

For eight years, Colombian defense officials have been able to rely on U.S. advisory teams capable of researching and suggesting alternative management practices and assessment methods contextualized to Colombia for the problems Colombian defense leaders confront. This has saved the Colombians a significant amount of resources in terms of labor hours and money that otherwise must be dedicated to any change management initiative. With that in mind, this chapter provides a Colombian perspective on which techniques of U.S. support were effective. The next chapter provides a criticism of U.S. support. It is relevant to clarify that the impact of U.S. support, whether for better or worse, will not be fully known until several years after the initiative is complete. Therefore, praise or criticism of techniques will continue to develop in the coming years.

As mentioned previously, the main objective of TFI is to transform the force structure of the Colombian Public Forces so the nation is prepared to meet the challenges of a security environment not dominated by internal armed conflict. A key sub-objective is to develop the institutional management capability to plan and budget for future force development, such that the capability of the force is linked to national defense policy and fiscal guidance. The contribution of the U.S. team to this goal, achieved through multiple lines of effort (numbers 1 through 4 in the preceding chapter), has enabled some success. The authors and the people interviewed credit the following techniques.

### **A. Provide Subject Matter Expertise and Research & Analysis Capacity**

One of the most important contributions of the USG to TFI has been its role as a consistent provider of SMEs who have the right skills and a persistent but not permanent presence. This has strengthened the Ministry's ability to design Colombian-specific defense management practices. It also enhances the credibility of the MND vis-à-vis the Public Forces, which generally perceive the United States as a credible reference in terms of best practice. However, because the support is persistent but not permanently on site it has avoided two errors made by numerous historical attempts at providing technical assistance.

First, the U.S. advisors in Colombia have not been doing the work for the MND staff. U.S. advisors have not written Colombian policy guidance or instructions. They have not designed Colombian processes and turned implementation over to unknowledgeable staff.

Rather, the U.S. advisors use multiple, short visits and pair with local MND staff who learn the skills and implement their own initiatives within the Colombian defense and security sector. Second, because the role of U.S. assistance has been to advise and not to do, the project leadership, whether at IDA, RAND, or from the USG, has focused its personnel on transferring skills to Colombian officials, rather than trying to solve Colombian problems.<sup>29</sup>

The U.S. team has been able to present or provide reference materials, examples, case studies, and potential solutions pertinent to the management challenges of the Colombian MND. Given the limited size and capacity of the Ministry's staff, this has been a force multiplier for the MND. Furthermore, with the objectives of TFI in mind, the U.S. team takes the role of independent analysts diagnosing challenges and providing informed alternatives to management problems they identify. In this role, the teams anticipate and advise regarding new challenges or problems that arise from the implementation of a new Colombian practice.

Finally, the Vice Minister and her directors rely on the team to help them prioritize their work efforts. This has been important input, given the low number of personnel in the Ministry and Public Forces in institutional staff positions to complete the different initiatives.

Jaime Medina describes the U.S. contribution in this way:

They helped us save time because they guided us towards the relevant content of the different [defense management] areas because they know where the knowledge lies or they have conveyed the concepts to us or they have provided the bibliography or they have put us in contact with the experts.<sup>30</sup>

## **B. Persistence and Continuity among the Subject Matter Experts Traveling to Colombia**

Two aspects factor into the effectiveness of U.S. support. First, there is sensitivity within the MND and the forces to any perception that the United States is trying to impose its approach inside of Colombia. Second, the U.S. team has been entrusted with Colombian force structure, posture, capability, and budgetary data. With this information, U.S. advice has been tailored to the Colombian context. However, this is sensitive data. If the U.S. team did not have low turnover among its experts, it is not likely that they would have earned the trust required to have access to such sensitive information.

---

<sup>29</sup> For a more extensive treatment on typical mistakes made by foreign technical advisors, see IDA Non-Standard Document D-5102, *Foreign Culture and its Effect on U.S. DOD Efforts to Build Capacity of Foreign Defense Institutions*, Wade Hinkle, Alex Gallo, and Aaron Taliaferro, October 2013.

<sup>30</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

In fact, the U.S. team has experienced an even lower turnover rate than key Colombian positions in the MND. The same faces providing consistent contact with each visit to Colombia demonstrated U.S. commitment to the Colombian cause. As a result, the U.S. team is considered to be direct consultants to the Ministry and its Public Forces. Though this is truer in certain lines of effort than in others, the U.S. team is generally considered a trusted partner in the implementation of TFI.

Recalling the statements attributed to Juliana Garcia in the previous chapter, she said that “people do not believe in short term efforts and they [will] put up barriers to prevent their success. However, this continuous long-term [U.S. advisory] effort has been part [a reason for] of DIRI’s success.”<sup>31</sup> Said even more succinctly, Francisco Moreno attributed the success of the U.S. advisory efforts to a single word—“trust”—which he referred to as the most important aspect of U.S. and Colombian actions with respect to implementation of TFI.<sup>32</sup>

### **C. Partnership with Deference**

Along with persistence and continuity, deference has also been key to gaining the trust of the Vice Ministers, Directors, and staff members in the Colombian MND. Colombian leadership has been clear, the Ministry must decide what works and what does not work for the Colombian defense sector. While the Vice Minister and her directors consider the U.S. team’s proposals, perceptions, considerations, etc., the Ministry has always had the last word on which and how different lines of effort are developed in Colombia. When these efforts were successful, the U.S. team has not tried to claim credit for the ideas they proposed that the Ministry accepted.

Former Vice Minister Quintero credits this deferential approach to the effectiveness of the U.S. team in building the capability and capacity of her staff. The exchange of ideas, rather than the imposition of ideas, allowed critical thinking skills to develop within the Colombian staff.<sup>33</sup> Jaime Medina, Director of Capability Planning, described the U.S. approach as one of conceptual flexibility.<sup>34</sup> This flexibility has been the key element allowing both teams to be able to work together to determine the best way to improve the Ministry’s capability.

---

<sup>31</sup> Appendix B(3)(f).

<sup>32</sup> Appendix B(3)(d).

<sup>33</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>34</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

Andres Salcedo put it this way:

They [the U.S. advisors] have never done the work on our behalf. What they've done is provide us the tools and we have adapted that to Colombian reality which is, in my view, the proper way to do things.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Appendix B(3)(c).



## **9. U.S. Support: What Did Not Work or What Could Have Been More Effective?**

---

### **A. Wrong SMEs and Lack of Deference in Some Lines of Effort**

#### **1. Human Capital**

As mentioned previously, the U.S. role within the Human Capital line of effort has two main objectives. First, support the Human Capital Development Directorate (HCDD) and the Public Forces in the development of the TOEs. Second, support HCDD in the design and development of career plans by occupational specialty and research, and consider force-shaping tools to adjust the personnel structure of the Public Forces. These are the current objectives of the effort. However, the objectives have evolved to this point. Early on in the effort, the objective was different and the Colombian sponsors were critical of U.S. support.

HCDD is a relatively new organization within the MND, created in 2011. HCDD's first director, Dora Laverde, said an initial objective of HCDD was to identify the human capital requirements of the individual services and incorporate those into TFI.<sup>36</sup> In support of this objective, a U.S. team of for-profit contractors (paid for and provided by the DIRI program) was to guide a needs analysis exercise with the Public Forces and then work with HCDD personnel to diagnose requirements and propose a work plan focused on human capital transformation. According to Director Laverde, the work done by the team of U.S. experts in this specific process was not well received because the team took too much credit for the outputs of the effort. This damaged the credibility of the results and created friction and a lack of trust between the U.S. team members and the members of HCDD and other Colombian colleagues focused on human capital transformation.

After the initial formation of HCDD, former Vice Minister Quintero also described U.S. support to human capital transformation as ineffective. Quintero felt that the U.S. SMEs assigned to support HCDD thought they could implement their views without incorporating the Colombian perception. She also argued that the particular team of U.S. experts assigned was not successful in transmitting their knowledge and ideas to the

---

<sup>36</sup> Appendix B(3)(i).

Colombian team. As a result, after two years, Quintero asked the United States for a different team of experts.<sup>37</sup>

The new team's focus<sup>38</sup> was to support HCDD by contributing research and experience based on international practices. With this information, HCDD was expected to lead the human capital transformation effort. Both Director Laverde and Vice Minister Quintero felt that U.S. support started making positive contributions at this point, but reiterated that the initial U.S. team's approach was a factor in hindering the work of human capital transformation within the context of TFI.

## **2. Logistics**

It is the perception of different actors<sup>39</sup> within the logistics initiative on the Colombian side that this line of effort has not always had team members with appropriate technical or advisory skills. Like HCDD, the Directorate of Logistics (DILOG) was created in 2011 under the VMOD S&P. An initial effort by DILOG was to create a Master Logistics Plan (MLP) to guide the defense sector's logistics enterprise

The personnel assigned to DILOG upon the organization's founding were not a deep team of specialized logisticians. This is not surprising; in general, the Colombian defense sector suffers from a lack of skilled and experienced logisticians. DILOG is not an exception. An MLP was completed, but it was not met with acceptance across the Colombian defense sector. As a result, in late 2015, DILOG was directed to try again. Regardless of whether it was a lack of knowledge by the U.S. experts assigned to support DILOG, or a failure to provide timely and expert advice, the perception was that the U.S. team did not provide effective support. In 2015, as with the team assigned to support HCDD, VMOD S&P requested that U.S. support to the logistics line of effort be restructured.

Finally, the efforts of the U.S. support teams in DILOG did not tie into the efforts of support teams in DPC, DPP, or HCDD. For this reason, it is the perception that opportunities for staff development and increased staff capacity were lost. Also, the MLP was further weakened because it was developed without knowledge of the force planning, budgeting, and human capital changes planned or underway.

---

<sup>37</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>38</sup> At the DIRI program's request, RAND filled this requirement. RAND personnel replaced the for-profit contractor team.

<sup>39</sup> The people who provided the authors with this information did not wish to be attributed. Therefore, there is not an interview in the appendix to cite.

## **B. A View of Institution Building That Was Too Narrow**

Despite the accomplishments in capability planning, the DPC Director, Jaime Medina, opined that lack of involvement by the individual services at the beginning of the project may have been a misstep in the implementation of the U.S. support effort. Medina remembers<sup>40</sup> that U.S. support started with initiatives to improve cost analysis and budget planning with a focus on linking resources to objectives, and the support was limited to the MND. At the time, this was not a significant problem, as the topics were almost exclusively ministerial. However, the CBP methodology started to take shape because of the work on cost and budgeting without service involvement. According to Director Medina, his office found itself designing new methodologies for force planning without knowledge of the existing practices and doctrine of the individual services.

It is Director Medina's understanding that the U.S. support effort was limited (by the USG) to the ministry;<sup>41</sup> therefore, while this was not necessarily a decision of the U.S. experts on the ground, the failure to consider the institutional practices of each of the military services at the beginning led to delays in implementing planned changes later on. In his own words, he states, "the thing is, one cannot create a process inside the Ministry of Defense without interacting with the General Command [of the Armed Forces] and the services."<sup>42</sup> Both Director Medina and Vice Minister Quintero recalled that the design of the planning methodology had significantly advanced before the services were included in the design process.<sup>43</sup>

Medina<sup>44</sup> felt that his team did not have the experience to manage the individual services and the perspectives of their stakeholders through the design and implementation of a capability based planning (CBP) methodology. In his own words, his team had a "head-on collision" with the services once the services were brought into the design process. Ultimately, in Medina's own words, the problems were fixed through joint and coordinated working groups convened by the Ministry and composed of individuals who were willing to think and act flexibly. However, he thought the initial U.S. approach to its consultancy with the Colombian defense sector was not the right approach for such a significant change effort. Medina felt that if DOD leadership had allowed time to properly diagnose the scope

---

<sup>40</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

<sup>41</sup> There are some conflicting accounts. IDA team members on the ground at the time recall that the Colombian officials within the MND were not ready to include the individual military services in the design of the CBP process. Some Colombian officials felt that the USG had restricted U.S. SME support to the Ministry of National Defense.

<sup>42</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

<sup>43</sup> Medina at Appendix B(3)(g) and Quintero at Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>44</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

of the effort and the far-reaching effects of its intervention, it would have assigned more people to work on a broader scope across the Public Forces and the MND on a more aggressive schedule. To summarize, he felt that the U.S. should have known to solicit Public Force participation more aggressively in the processes at project initiation.

In spite of his criticism, he does admit that a positive outcome occurred and he attributes it to the U.S. approach. In Medina's words, the CBP methodology in place today is completely Colombian, as it was the result of learning by doing, even though there are still aspects of the methodology that are lacking<sup>45</sup> and which might have been addressed earlier if the Services were brought into the design process at the beginning.

As a counterpoint, the view of the IDA advisors on the ground at the initiation of the capability-based planning project was that the MND needed to demonstrate the value added to the capability based approach before the individual uniformed services were going to participate. When DPC was stood up, it was a new, unproven organization comprised of a young, yet capable civilian cadre. At that time, the services were nearly sovereign over force planning decisions and processes, and had most of the relevant information. Joint and coordinated force planning did not occur. At the onset, on anything other than a superficial level, it was not practicable to involve the individual services in the creation of a methodology aimed at instilling joint and coordinated force planning within the defense sector. The services would not have yielded to MND processes or decisions. Thus, the approach that the IDA team took was to establish and demonstrate a credible capacity to think through joint and coordinated force structure challenges to a degree that the services would be compelled to participate in a friendly, non-confrontation way because they recognized that it would be in their interest to be part of the process.

Similar to the criticism of Director Medina, Andres Salcedo thought U.S. support might have been more effective if it took a more systematic view of the whole defense management system at the beginning of their effort. For example, he stated that personnel costs are the bulk of the Colombian defense budget and that personnel management issues at the service level probably deserved more priority at the beginning.<sup>46</sup>

By their own admission, the Colombians interviewed noted that there is a habitual lack of coordination among the Vice Ministries and their respective directorates. As a

---

<sup>45</sup> One example of a deficiency in the Colombian CBP process is that it depends upon Joint and Coordinated (J&C) Operating Concepts or Doctrine. However, there are neither J&C concepts nor doctrine in use in Colombia today. As a result, the MND staff had to create new J&C concepts through J&C working tables convened to consider a set of scenarios under analysis. While this has allowed the planning process to proceed, some of the results of the process have been met with skepticism or a refusal to accept by the uniformed leaders of the National Police, Military Services, or General Command. The current line of effort focused on concepts and doctrine is in place to address this gap.

<sup>46</sup> Appendix B(3)(c).

result, tasks are performed inefficiently and do not consistently respond to prioritized goals. These cultural norms of behavior remain a hindrance to TFI. However, Jorge Baquero stressed<sup>47</sup> that if the U.S. support effort took a more comprehensive view of the MND, its various offices, and their interaction with the services at the start of the work, it might have changed the order of U.S. efforts and the way to structure U.S. team interactions with the Colombian officials they were trying to support.

Former Vice Minister Quintero stated that U.S. support should be grounded on an initial assessment of the client's necessities, followed by constant tuning of its efforts to the client's priorities, timing, resources, etc. The client was not the MND specifically, but rather the entire Defense and Security Sector that the MND is working to transform. Further, this requires constant monitoring and evaluation of the support being provided so that they are less likely to lose the connection with the client's conditions, requirements, and priorities.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, on this general topic of being too narrow in approach, former DPP Director Paola Nieto<sup>49</sup> considers that, just as Colombia assesses the U.S. team's contribution to accomplish Ministry's objectives, the U.S. should evaluate the Colombian team's effectiveness in using U.S. support. In her own words, there should be "greater mutual demands" focused on the ability to progress.

### **C. Introducing and Managing Change within the Defense Ministry and its Subordinate Organizations**

A perception of several of the interviewees is that the U.S. DOD lacked a structured methodology when advising to implement change. The U.S. was clear that it was willing to support the Colombian Ministry of Defense, but there was a lack of clear guidance in terms of how much latitude with which the U.S. support team could operate. For example, was U.S. support limited to the MND or was it focused on institutional transformation across the institutions of the defense sector? Also, did the effort have boundaries or limits in terms of time and funding? If there were limits, they were not clear to the Colombians.

These issues were particularly relevant during the beginning of the U.S. support to the MND. The senior leadership of the MND had a clear purpose, to transform its Public Forces to respond to future scenarios. MND leadership knew it would need to restructure its planning processes to do so. Though the Ministry was clear on its intent, and the U.S. was willing to support this process, a methodological framework to begin restructuring the system as a whole was not well defined and the limits and scope of U.S. support were not

---

<sup>47</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).

<sup>48</sup> Appendix B(3)(e).

<sup>49</sup> Appendix B(3)(a).

clear. As a result, opportunities were missed and the transformation process may be taking longer than it should.

Specifically, both Jaime Medina and Diana Quintero thought U.S. support was initially restricted to the MND. They felt this limitation prohibited an assessment of the MND's and Public Forces' roles within the entire Defense and Security Sector and then designing a work program tailored to the Colombian context. Also, it was (in their perception) difficult to get DIRI support for work in other Vice Ministries, even though the work would have been complementary to ongoing efforts sponsored by the VMOD S&P.

Cesar Restrepo<sup>50</sup> refers to a decision to avoid direct support of Colombian efforts to develop their own strategic planning processes—such as planning scenarios and the development of the operational context—as missed opportunities. Not only would this have provided more integrated support to the already-existing lines of effort in DPP and DPC, it would have allowed the U.S. advisors to obtain a greater sense of the entire defense management system in Colombia, and thus be better able to understand and provide advice on the implication of the changes taking place.<sup>51</sup>

On the topic of change management, Jorge Baquero provides a statement of need:

I don't know whether I would say [that this topic was] not explored with DIRI, but I have mentioned the importance of change management. Because these transformation topics [require a] change, we have to change the processes, we have to change what we were doing. We had the process, but that must go hand in hand with an adaptive process. I mean, how people will deal with change as an organization? What do we need to do, what are the losses, how are we going to deal with all those changes? And the important thing was [in] support of the process to prevent one directorate from not responding or someone not being aligned with it or maybe a service not liking it. That can be foreseen and you can work on that with people, and I don't know whether that's necessarily DIRI, but, obviously, this kind of process needs that. How do I manage change and how do I support the organization for it to understand how its DNA is changing. [How will] this changed DNA affect the organization, and how do I mitigate people resisting change. I think that's key. I don't know whether DIRI has

---

<sup>50</sup> His comments on this matter do not appear in the appendix. He made this statement directly to the lead author.

<sup>51</sup> Originally, Cesar Restrepo and Jorge Baquero were in the Sectoral Studies Directorate under the Vice Minister of Strategy and Planning. However, this directorate was moved under the Vice Minister of International Affairs and Policy. It is not clear to the authors whether the decision not to support the development of the strategic planning processes to which Mr. Restrepo refers was a USG decision driven by a desire to limit the scope of the project at that time, a Colombian decision to limit the project to support the Vice Minister of Strategy and Planning or both.

to develop a special line [of effort] in that regard, but it would be very useful. I personally believe it is required in a transformation process.<sup>52</sup>

Jaime Medina,<sup>53</sup> argues that when the transformation process began in Colombia, the U.S. effort lacked the willingness to intervene within and across the Colombian Defense sector. This includes not just the Ministry, but also the General Command and the individual Public Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police). He claims that just as important as the conceptual frameworks provided for the individual lines of effort, a transformation process like the one being completed in Colombia required a conceptual approach to transforming the management system, not only to incorporate change but also to manage the changes taking place. He felt that if the USG understood this, it would not have restricted its support to the MND.

In hindsight, the IDA team acknowledges that the team should have mapped out the decision processes in use in the MND upon project initiation and assessed what IDA proposed as activities against those existing processes. From that point, the team may have had a better understanding of the extent of change being introduced and had a better idea of how to explain and sequence changes that might have been foreknown. It is not clear to the authors whether USG sponsors would have allowed time and money for such an upfront assessment.

---

<sup>52</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).

<sup>53</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

This page is intentionally blank.



## 10. Moving Forward: Opportunities and Challenges

---

The retrospective study concludes with a brief description of the challenges relevant to the continuation of the cooperative effort between the United States and the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the opportunities for continued or enhanced institution-building support.

### A. Challenges

#### 1. The Inflexibility of Colombia's Force Structure and its Budget Implications<sup>54</sup>

There are clear opportunities to improve the capability of the defense sector, and some of these have already been analyzed and proposed at some point over the past eight years. However, Colombian national peculiarities impose considerable inflexibility in budget planning and allocation, which make it difficult to take advantage of the opportunities. For example, historical decisions to increase the number of personnel in the Public Forces has created a situation in which the defense sector is running a future structural deficit that will only get bigger over time unless some legal or policy changes are made.

As of 2016, 45 percent of the defense sector's budget was tied to salaries. In addition to salary, there is also the increase in what Colombian law calls "transference costs." Transference costs are all other economic benefits stipulated in law for military and police personnel. These include pensions, as well as other retirement benefits and legal support for current and former members of the Public Forces. Transference costs made up approximately 27 percent of the total defense budget in 2016. Together, salary and transference costs are consuming 72 percent of the total budget, leaving only 28 percent for operations and investment.

The transference costs are growing at an increasing rate every year. This is due to legal guarantees provided to citizens who volunteer to serve in the Public Forces. An individual who volunteers, rather than being conscripted, is guaranteed post-retirement compensation and benefits after 20 years of service. Further, the pension compensation is paid to the service member's surviving family members if he or she dies. Finally, a volunteer is legally guaranteed the right to 20 years of service, notwithstanding criminal

---

<sup>54</sup> All percentages and figures presented in this section are based on data provided by DPP.

activity. There is no provision for separation due to lack of performance and there are few incentives offered to entice people to leave service prior to 20 years.

To reduce the growing structural deficit, a legal option for the defense sector would be to rely less on volunteers and more on conscripts, who have no guaranteed pension benefits. However, the leadership in the defense sector has learned over the past 20 years that conscripts come at the cost of operational effectiveness. Therefore, the current defense sector dilemma is a choice between an affordable force structure and an effective force structure. It can be argued that this constitutes the most relevant challenge to the transformation of the defense sector. A way out of this dilemma is to change the law and allow more incentives for early retirement and to allow for merit-based promotions and separation short of retirement. However, these are not force-shaping tools that the MND can use legally at this point.

## **2. Lack of Ministerial Staff Capacity and Turnover among Senior Officers of the Public Forces**

TFI is grounded on the conceptualization and institutionalization of new management processes largely initiated and carried out by employees filling civil service positions that already existed before the initiative started. This means that many people assigned to the initiative are not exclusively dedicated to the work that has resulted from the management changes. With some exceptions,<sup>55</sup> existing responsibilities remain, along with the new analytic and data management requirements created by the new processes. While the ministry has created some new civil service positions to handle the workload, more are needed. Andres Salcedo addressed this directly in his interview. “I am convinced that this [TFI] will eventually need more people. If that doesn’t happen, it’s going to be very difficult to carry this through.”<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, Salcedo suggests that the U.S. team should also advocate for more staff capacity within the Ministry.

While the Ministry has capacity limitations within its staff, the problem in the military services and the police is turnover. Senior officers rarely spend more than 18 months in any position. With each of the four Public Forces being a major stakeholder in TFI, the consistent and rapid turnover of senior leaders puts even more pressure on the limited staff capacity of the Ministry. Its members must spend much of their time educating and re-educating flag officers on the effort, and this slows progress, frustrates results, and makes it difficult to keep people focused on the objectives and reasons for the effort.

---

<sup>55</sup> There have been some new civilian positions and offices created in the MND, but for the most part, new work has been added to existing positions without an analysis of workload.

<sup>56</sup> Appendix B(3)(c).

Reflecting on what the Ministry can do to overcome some of the staff limitations, Jaime Medina suggested<sup>57</sup> the implementation of different processes be more concentrated in time. For example, when the U.S. support team begins a particular intervention, it should have the exclusive dedication of the Colombian personnel who focus on the processes under analysis or undergoing change. This way, change may occur more quickly and be less susceptible to personnel rotation and staff limitations.

### **3. Fiscal Uncertainty**

The defense sector's budget dropped in 2016 due to decreases in foreign assistance and in tax revenues previously allocated to defense. At the start of 2017, the government announced that the defense sector would have to absorb both a 40 percent reduction in appropriations for its investment accounts and, for the first time in many years, a real (after-inflation) reduction in the operating budget. While some of the cuts have been restored due to an increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the downward pressure on the defense sector's budget remains. Further, Colombian law<sup>58</sup> dictates that national debt cannot exceed a specific percentage of GDP. So, even though government priorities in a given year may justify deficit spending, the law will allow it only to a certain point, and this creates uncertainty and volatility in medium and long-term planning.

## **B. Opportunities**

### **1. Strategic Planning**

TFI is founded on a new way of planning that enables the sector to link defense policy to resources. This new way of planning is explained in a ministerial resolution that describes it as a planning model for the defense sector. The first phase of the new planning model concentrates on formulating the set of strategic documents necessary to determine sector priorities.

Based on these priorities, the Ministry then determines the objectives to be met within each priority and identifies the associated work plans to accomplish them, along with their required resources. To determine priorities and objectives, the Ministry conducts a series of exercises to characterize the security context and its associated risk to national security and to the MND's policy objectives.

Before TFI, there was no institutionalized strategic planning process in the Ministry. The Ministry and the services completed their strategic planning processes independently. The systematization of an institutional strategic planning process is just being implemented

---

<sup>57</sup> Appendix B(3)(g).

<sup>58</sup> The law is the Fiscal Responsibility Law.

in Colombia, and for this reason, the U.S. experience and support could facilitate and enhance the effective establishment of the Ministry's strategic planning.

Cesar Restrepo argues<sup>59</sup> that even though an important component of strategic planning consists of exercises based on the service's intelligence information and analyses, the Ministry should provide future planning scenarios and tools to prioritize risk within the security context. These are topics he believes could benefit from U.S. support.

## **2. Analysis and Data Management**

The Ministry wants to know whether resources are being employed effectively and efficiently to accomplish objectives established by defense policy and planning. To do this, MND desires a system to evaluate if resources are being employed to strengthen or develop prioritized capabilities. In other words, does the budget ultimately reflect defense policy and planning? If the budget is structured according to policy and planning priorities, the Ministry also wants to know if the spending has the desired effect (whether capability improves). The defense sector has limited available data for such analysis, though it is unclear if the data is limited because it exists in multiple, disparate data systems that are hard to mine, collate, and analyze, or if the data simply do not exist. Second, as already mentioned, there is limited staff capacity to determine the whereabouts and quality of existing data.

Additionally, there is not a readiness and reporting system or standards of readiness that apply across the defense sector. Since there are no approved readiness indicators (and limited or invalid data) and no formal reporting, there is little visibility into readiness accounts, such as training, maintenance, spare parts, fuel, etc. Thus, the ability to conduct trade-off analysis during capability, program, or budget planning is inhibited.

The opportunity for U.S. support is to help develop and institutionalize sound data management and analysis practices, as well as readiness standards and reporting with an ultimate objective of helping the MND monitor whether its resources are being used effectively and efficiently.

## **3. Integrate the Science and Technology Directorate of the Vice Ministry of Business and Social Welfare (GSED) into Force Planning**

A future line of effort that could benefit from U.S. support consists of the necessary integration of the different initiatives being completed in the Science and Technology Directorate. The personnel within this office have expertise not only in terms of the current technologies of the Public Forces, but also in terms of future technologies that the forces may be able to develop. It is important to highlight that this directorate was once part of

---

<sup>59</sup> Appendix B(3)(h).

the Vice Ministry of Strategy and Planning but was assigned to GSED in 2011 when the Ministry was restructured. The objective was to strengthen Colombian Military industries. However, the Science and Technology Directorate continues to have important inputs for strategic planning and CBP processes.

#### **4. Education and Training**

As mentioned previously, one of the most important U.S. contributions has been its role as a capability generator. To sustain these capabilities, Cesar Restrepo and Jorge Baquero stress the importance of U.S. support in education and training of personnel across the defense sector responsible for the new planning processes created by TFI. Restrepo argues<sup>60</sup> that the key to sustaining gains made by TFI will be institutionalization of a civil and military technocracy that can continue to improve the already established accomplishments. Related to another opportunity, Restrepo believes U.S. support of education and training in quantitative monitoring and assessment techniques would be a valuable contribution. Baquero correspondingly argues<sup>61</sup> that education in defense management should be incorporated into the programs of the military and police academies so that all personnel have access to this knowledge from the beginning of their careers. To conclude, Juliana Garcia considers that the strengthening the Public Forces' internal resource management practices (consistent with the practice and guidance of the MND) would help sustain the transformation initiative in the long term, as it makes it less dependent on the political administration in charge at a given time.

#### **5. Knowledge Management and Institutionalization**

The U.S. team's conceptual diagramming and methodological support has been critical to the ministry's ability to produce directives to guide the future implementation of processes developed as part of TFI. Nonetheless, continued support is needed. Some of the documents that still need to be produced are:

- a) Instructions for producing Defense and Security Policy – institutionalizing some of the strategic planning processes (scenario development and risk analysis),
- b) Methodology and guidelines for producing an analysis of the strategic context,
- c) An MND directive for capability planning,
- d) Defense programming guidelines and guidance,
- e) Guidelines for submitting investment budget proposals and managing investment projects,

---

<sup>60</sup> Appendix B(3)(h).

<sup>61</sup> Appendix B(3)(b).

- f) Defense policy on requirements for TOEs,
- g) A definitive capability taxonomy (like the U.S. Joint Capability Area Taxonomy),  
and
- h) Ministerial guidance or directive for readiness standards and reporting and the  
evaluation of capabilities.

## Appendix A.

# Chronology of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) Transformation Initiative

---

This section provides a chronology of important events that led to the MND's transformation initiative, as well as the evolution of the initiative from its inception to the present as of May 2017.

### 1. 2006

#### a. January–August (Civilian leadership team formed)

President Alvaro Uribe's primary policy focus during his presidency was on strengthening internal security through the consolidation of territorial control as a requirement for economic development. Confronting and defeating Colombia's main guerrilla movement, the FARC, was a key to Uribe's platform. The MND and its Public Forces (Army, Navy and Marine Infantry, Air Force, and National Police) were the organizations responsible for confronting and defeating the FARC.

Within the Ministry, President Uribe appointed the following leadership team and charged them with implementing his policy.

**Juan Manuel Santos, Minister of Defense:** He served as Minister until May 2009 when he resigned in order to start his presidential campaign for the 2010–2014 presidential term.

**Juan Carlos Pinzon, Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning.** As Vice Minister, Pinzon led the design and implementation of the President's security policy. Additionally, Pinzon was responsible for the modernization of the Colombian Armed Forces' capabilities required to defeat the FARC. Using extraordinary tax revenues granted to the defense sector by special taxes, he focused primarily on strengthening special operations and intelligence capabilities. In a parallel effort, he also directed resources toward the Public Forces' education systems and welfare programs in order to improve conditions for all personnel and their families and boost recruiting efforts. Finally, to sustain these initiatives, Pinzon carried out a structural reform of the MND itself. His purpose was to adjust the organization's structure to the objectives and challenges imposed on the Public Forces by the President's policy.

**Yaneth Giha, Director, Ministry of National Defense Office of Programming and Budgeting (DPP):** Giha's term as Director, DPP, coincided with both Santos' and Pinzon's terms as Minister and Vice Minister. She reported to Vice Minister Pinzon, who charged her to develop the staff capacity and tools necessary to improve the Ministry's ability to allocate its budget among the Public Forces under the MND. Another of Giha's assigned objectives was to develop a method of planning for the Ministry and the Public Forces that allocated budgetary resources based on requirements to fulfill strategic objectives over a multi-year period.

All three of these people would ascend to the position of their immediate superior during the next presidential administration.

**b. December (Colombian Congress approves extraordinary wealth tax for 2007–2010)**

An October 2006 car bomb attack against a military university in Bogota galvanized popular support for Uribe's policy. A result was congressional approval of another extraordinary tax that provided more than 7.5 billion Colombian Pesos for the strengthening of the Public Forces capabilities<sup>62</sup> between the years 2007 and 2010.

**2. 2007**

**a. August (Civilian leadership team grows)**

Diana Quintero, an economist, was appointed the first Director of the Sectorial Studies Directorate. The Directorate was created because of Pinzon's structural reform of the Ministry. The purpose of the Directorate was to provide the Defense Minister with strategic analysis and to focus on providing options to the Minister for the sustainable development of the Colombian defense sector over a long-term time planning horizon. During her time as Director, Quintero completed several planning exercises to evaluate the long-term impact of different defense expenditure scenarios. These exercises were the first ministerial attempts to apply a cost-constrained and future-looking methodological approach in order to plan the development of the Public Force's structure.

**3. 2008**

**a. January (Director Giha implements budget planning reforms)**

With the overarching goals of budget efficiency and sustainability, Director Giha began effort to design and implement different methodologies to improve budget planning

---

<sup>62</sup> Source is the Planning and Budget Directorate, MND.



and execution. Referred to as the budget improvement initiative, DPP began a process to develop two skills within the Ministry's planning and budget directorate. These were results-based budgeting and capability planning.

**b. July (Director Quintero leads Colombian participation in strategic planning exercise with U.S. Southern Command)**

At Minister Santos' direction and request, a combined strategic planning exercise was completed by appointed military and police personnel of the Public Forces with the support and guidance of personnel from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The exercise had three objectives: complete a joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), determine a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the continuation of operations in support of the President's policy, and determine necessary capabilities to implement the CONOPS. Director Quintero led the Colombian exercise. Notably, the first two objectives of the exercise were completed, but the third was not.

**c. October (Cost analyses methods used for the first time)**

The Ministry was required to explain for both government and public consumption how extraordinary tax resources were going to be used. In partial fulfillment of this requirement, the Sectorial Studies Directorate published a document presenting a standard cost methodology for calculating sector expenditures. Using the methodology, the document explained defense expenditures covering the period 1998–2011. It was an unclassified historical and forwarding-looking analysis of defense sector expenditures.

Notably, even though the planning and budget directorate may have been more suited to provide these analyses, the Sectorial Studies Directorate took on the task because it had the capacity to do so. Not long after, DPP did assume responsibility for defense sector cost analyses.

**4. 2009**

**a. January (The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) begins support to MND transformation)**

In the context of the budget improvement initiative led by DPP, a small team within DPP's budget monitoring group started working with a team of U.S. experts from IDA, who were provided through OSD's Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS) program. Initial DRMS support focused on the possibility of implementing a cost analysis model that would enable the Ministry to understand the relationship between defense forces and costs at the armed forces unit level. The goal was to associate defense sector expenditures with the individual force elements of each of the four Public Forces.

Eventually, IDA's Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS)<sup>63</sup> model was adopted by the MND for this purpose. FOCIS enabled analysts within DPP to calculate how defense resources were being used relative to the strategic objectives and priorities of the President's policy. It could also be used to relate the total cost of alternative capability options to implement CONOPS. Since then, FOCIS constitutes the primary cost and program budget database to inform defense decision makers on the cost and impact of force planning decisions.

**b. March (Exploring force planning)**

Unable to determine the capabilities required to implement the CONOPS developed during the July 2008 exercise with SOUTHCOM, a main task of the Sectorial Studies Directorate became the determination of a force planning methodology.

In parallel to investigating force planning methodologies, the Directorate also initiated an exercise to analyze Colombia's future security context and propose operating concepts needed for the envisioned future. The initiative was referred to as *The Public Forces and Future Challenges*. The published document, referred to as the *Prospectiva*, provided much of the strategic thinking and guidance that would shape future force planning efforts.

**c. August (New leadership in the MND)**

Gabriel Silva was appointed Minister of Defense after Minister Santos' resignation to start his presidential campaign. Alejandro Arbelaez was appointed by Minister Silva to be the new Vice Minister for strategy and planning. Arbelaez appointed Mauricio Vargas to be the Planning and Budget Director.

**d. October (Formal work plan between DRMS team and MND adopted)**

Despite the change in leadership, the Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) continued without any changes to its primary goals. Based on exploratory analysis begun earlier in the year, the DRMS team and the MND agreed upon a coordinated work plan to install FOCIS and implement life cycle cost analysis methodologies within the defense sector. The work plan included training for the personnel required to complete the task and the data collection and processing requirements for both the Colombian defense sector and the DRMS team.

---

<sup>63</sup> More information on FOCIS is available through IDA Publications. 1. Force Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS) User's Manual, January 2013, IDA Document D-4318 and; 2. Using a Relational Database (FOCIS) to Improve Defense Force Planning and Budgeting; March 2017, IDA Paper NS P-5361.

**e. December (Technical Collaboration Agreement signed)**

A technical collaboration agreement between the U.S. military group in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota and the MND was signed to formalize the support efforts underway between DOD and the MND to improve defense resource management practices.

**5. 2010**

**a. January (based on the signed technical cooperation agreement, DRMS work in support of Colombian TFI begins in earnest)**

**b. January to June (Working towards a force planning methodology)**

Both DPP and the Sectorial Studies Directorate were exploring force-planning methodologies.

Sectorial Studies held a Force Structure Design workshop with the support of the U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (a.k.a., The Perry Center). The purpose was to advance and consolidate a methodology for the Public Forces and the Ministry to agree upon an integrated force design capable of meeting the future defense and national security requirements of the nation. Though the event contributed to the Ministry's conceptual understanding, the Sectorial Studies Directorate required further support to translate theoretical planning approaches into an actual planning exercise.

At the same time, DPP held a different workshop under the auspices of the budget improvement initiative. The purpose of this workshop was to investigate an approach to connect force planning to budget planning. During the workshop, the DRMS team presented a four-stage model of defense force and resource planning: (i) strategic planning, (ii) capability planning, (iii) resource (or budgetary) planning, and (iv) acquisition planning. About 60 personnel attended the seminar, including military, police, and Ministry personnel. At the end of this workshop, Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning Alejandro Arbelaez directed his staff to develop a Colombian approach to implement the model presented by the DRMS team. At this time, the Colombian interest was limited to implementing the model. No other interested was expressed or welcomed.

Eventual outcomes from this workshop were the MND's Spending Sustainability Program and the Capability-Based Strategic Planning Model. These were institutionalized in the Ministry's Strategic Planning Guide 2011–2014, published in early 2011.

An immediate outcome was the consolidation of DPP and Sectorial Studies efforts. Going forward, Sectorial Studies was given responsibility to implement the Vice Minister's guidance, which included the implementation of a capability planning methodology. However, all future efforts were to be in coordination with DPP and with the support of the DRMS team.

**c. June (Capability Based Planning (CBP) Methods introduced to MND)**

By this time, the model being introduced by the DRMS team opened up a dialogue to achieve what was previously not thought practicable—linking policy to resources in a way that can be logically explained within a proposed budget. To respond to this expressed curiosity, the DRMS team facilitated a three day introduction to CBP seminar. It was attended by 70 people from across the MND, services, and the Government of Colombia (including the office of the President). MND interest to expand the DRMS project into CBP is piqued and activities are introduced to begin doing so.

**d. August (Changes in leadership at the MND; defense and security policy unchanged)**

- i. Juan Manuel Santos was elected President.
- ii. Juan Carlos Pinzon was appointed Presidential Chief of Staff.
- iii. Rodrigo Rivera was appointed Minister of Defense.
- iv. Yaneth Giha became the Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning.
- v. Cesar Restrepo became Director of Sectoral Studies.

President Santos' priority was to sustain the military effort until the FARC agreed to peace negotiations. In partial payment for that effort, Vice Minister Giha is held responsible for the execution of extraordinary resources derived from the continuation of the wealth tax. As a way of directing where to spend extraordinary resources, the Vice Minister demanded that the capability planning line of effort become first priority and requested an immediate work plan, updated, to design and implement a capability planning methodology in the Ministry of Defense.

**e. October (Vice Minister Giha becomes senior sponsor for all DRMS support)**

At a conference in Bogota, DRMS team presents its work plan and methodology to an audience of representatives from the Office of President, the Ministry of Defense, The Directorate of National Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Public Forces, and the U.S. Military Group.

During the conference, Vice Minister Giha presented her strategy for reform in the defense sector, and committed to implementing a capabilities based multi-year programmatic approach to defense resource management over the next four years with DRMS support.

DRMS support focused on DPP and the Sectorial Studies Directorate. The initiative in DPP was to install FOCIS and institute life cycle cost analysis in all future investments. In Sectorial Studies, the DRMS team helped the Directorate develop a Colombian capability planning methodology.

**f. December (Wealth Tax extended through 2014)**

The defense sector received another 7.2 billion Colombian pesos for strengthening armed forces capabilities.<sup>64</sup>

**6. 2011**

**a. January (MND investigates other national approaches to force planning)**

During the first quarter of 2011, the Sectorial Studies Directorate focused on consolidating and refining a CBP methodology for the Ministry of Defense. With the support of DRMS, and based on a bibliography from different countries (the United States, UK, Australia, and Spain, among others), Sectorial Studies established the first draft of a CBP methodology for the Colombian Military Forces and National Police. To augment DRMS support and increase their own understanding, Vice Minister Giha and Caesar Restrepo traveled to the UK in January for consultations with the UK Ministry of Defence.

**b. March (Implementation of the first CBP exercises)**

Having concluded the first version of a CBP methodology, the Sectorial Studies Directorate, with the support of DRMS, ran the first set of capability planning exercises. Among the exercises completed were the determination of capabilities for the protection of critical oil and gas infrastructure and the Marine Infantry's capabilities within the National Navy. Through the development of these exercises, the Sectorial Studies Directorate completed several key documents: specifically, a master task list, a set of future planning scenarios, and a defense and security white paper.

**c. May (First seminar on linking policy objectives to budget planning)**

Based on progress in the Sectorial Studies Directorate and DPP to develop a CBP methodology and to advance the budget improvement initiative, the two directorates led an effort to develop an integrated workshop on how to link policy to budget. Personnel from all services and Vice Ministries attended the workshop.

---

<sup>64</sup> Source: Planning and Budget Directorate, MND.

**d. June (Defense Strategic Planning Guidance for 2011–2014 released)**

The Strategic Planning Guide is the institutional document that records the work plan to implement and monitor the defense and security policy of a given administration. In the case of the Strategic Planning Guide for 2011–2014, the document was the result of a coordinated exercise between the Ministry of Defense, the Military Forces, and the National Police.

The Strategic Planning Guide directed institutionalization of long-term planning as a prerequisite for the sustainable modernization of the defense sector. Two initiatives were specifically called out in the planning guidance: Spending Sustainability and Capability-Based Planning.

**e. August and September (Life cycle cost analysis techniques develop)**

In support of the two initiatives presented in the Strategic Planning Guide, DRMS continued supporting the development of tools for medium- and long-term planning.

A workshop led by DPP with DRMS support presented standardized life cycle cost estimation methodologies as a key tool to support medium- and long-term planning.

Furthermore, due to the relevance of logistics to both initiatives, Vice Minister Giha ordered a characterization of the logistics system of the Public Forces, identifying functions, tasks, responsible actors, etc. This effort constituted the initial step to start integrating a logistics line of effort within TFI. The Sectorial Studies Directorate was held responsible for this new task.

**f. September (Pinzon becomes Minister of Defense; more initiatives added to the Transformation Effort)**

Pinzon moved from the President’s office to the Minister’s chair. As Minister, Pinzon continued the efforts he began during his term as Vice Minister, which Vice Minister Giha had continued to pursue during Pinzon’s time away from the ministry.

In addition to initiatives already underway, Pinzon added two other goals to the MND’s transformation initiative: to improve the services’ internal education systems, and to improve the Public Forces’ welfare programs. Finally, Pinzon kicked off a second reorganization of the MND staff in light of his new initiatives and in light of what DPP and Sectorial Studies had already accomplished.

**g. October (Diana Quintero becomes Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning (VMOD S&P))**

Vice Minister Yaneth Giha changed positions and was appointed the Vice Minister for the MND’s Business and Social Welfare Group (GSED). Vice Minister Quintero sustained the priority of the lines of effort established in the Strategic Planning Guide.

**h. November (Second restructuring of the Ministry of Defense)**

The Defense Ministry was changed again in order to increase its ability to carry out the goals of Pinzon's TFI. The organizational analysis was led by the Sectorial Studies Directorate with DIRI support. Three new directorates were created under the VMOD S&P as a result: the Capabilities Planning Directorate, the Human Capital Directorate, and the Logistics Directorate. The Sectorial Studies Directorate became the Strategic Studies Directorate and was moved under the Vice Minister for Policy and International Affairs.

**7. 2012**

**a. January (Defining Mission Areas)**

With DRMS support, the Capability Planning Directorate led a defense sector-wide process to define the mission areas of the sector. By March, a first version was ready for review by the senior leadership of the MND.

**b. February (Capability planning workshops with individual services begin)**

DRMS team members and DPC conducted a workshop with the participation of the planning chiefs of the military services and the National Police. The objective of the workshop was for each service to present its individual force planning models and compare them to the defense management system described in the Ministry's Strategic Planning Guide. The objective was not to reform the services' existing planning models; rather, it was to identify existing common ground between the service planning and the Ministry's new approach to force planning and to demonstrate to the services the benefits of CBP.

An ultimate goal of the series of workshops that began in early 2012 was to arrive at one consolidated, joint, and coordinated force-planning methodology that used the same terms. Both the VMOD S&P and Policy and International Affairs participated in these workshops at this time.

**c. March (DRMS program absorbed by DIRI)**

For its own bureaucratic reasons, the DOD moved funding for the DRMS effort out of the DRMS program and over to the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program. From the Colombian perspective, the transfer of DRMS to DIRI was invisible. The team members in support of DPC and DPP efforts did not change.

**d. April (Identifying required capabilities)**

Using capability planning methods, a joint and coordinated working group organized by DPC analyzed the ability of the current force to protect Colombia's critical infrastructure. The result was a set of specific recommendations to increase the capability

of the Marine Infantry to fulfill such tasks. This piloted analysis provided important credibility to the newly created directorate.

**e. May (Capability Planning Directorate institutionalized)**

Vice Minister Quintero appointed retired Air Force Colonel Jaime Medina to be the first Director of DPC. The directorate was provided with its own office spaces and independent staff within the Ministry of Defense.

**f. September (Peace negotiations and capability planning)**

Formal peace negotiations with the FARC began.

At a high-level meeting between the senior leadership of the Ministry and the Public Forces, it was decided to expand the scope of the capability planning process to the entire defense sector.

**g. November (Sharing the Colombian experience with Guatemala)**

The Capability Planning Directorate was invited by the Guatemalan Armed Forces to share the Colombian experience in CBP. This was an important event because it was the first time the MND shared its progress, in an international setting, in the implementation of the new planning methodology.

**8. 2013**

**a. January (Continued development of a CBP methodology)**

Phase 1 of methodology development began in March 2012 with the validation of the mission areas defined earlier in the same year. Exercises followed to define scenarios for each mission area that allowed the defense sector to identify and prioritize threats and challenges in each mission area.

Following these exercises, working groups, with the participation of each service, developed a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the highest priority threats and challenges.

As 2013 began, the scenarios, prioritized threats and challenges, and CONOPS had been validated by the senior leaders of the defense sectors. These senior leaders included the Minister and his Vice Ministers, as well as the Commanders and Deputy Commanders of each of the four Public Forces.



**b. March (Phase 2 of CBP Methodology: Capability Statements and Force Allocation)**

Using the validated CONOPS as a reference, the CBP working groups were tasked to define the capabilities required to implement the CONOPS and to quantify the amount of capability required. The amount was referred to as a capability statement—the capability required to implement a CONOPS under analysis.

Secondarily, the existing units of the Public Forces were mapped to the identified capabilities.

**c. May (Phase 3: Capability Gaps and Prioritization)**

During Phase 3, the capability statements were compared to the existing capability of the Public Force units mapped to each CONOPS. Capability gaps were identified and each service was tasked to propose solutions to close the gaps identified within their respective units. In parallel, the working groups prioritized the identified gaps.

**d. July (Gray areas, roles, and missions)**

For many capabilities, it was not difficult to identify the service and the associated units primarily responsible to provide them. However, there were some capabilities that multiple services would claim as their primary role and mission to provide. When these overlaps occurred, they were referred to as a gray area. The gray areas were identified and listed by the working groups.

**e. August (First International Forum: “Transformation and Future of the Public Force”)**

The Ministry of Defense organized a two-day seminar to discuss its force modernization initiatives with internationally renowned experts. The event was designed to generate discussion, exchange ideas, and validate Colombian force planning efforts with both national and international experts. The objective was to build consensus in support of the Minister’s TFI within the entirety of the defense sector. Four hundred uniformed and civilian personnel from the defense sector participated in the event in addition to the invited guests. President Santos attend the event to signal his support for TFI and Minister Pinzon used it as a public validation of his efforts. In addition, the MND hosts the Chilean Sub-Secretariat of the Armed Forces and other Chilean Ministry of Defense officials to share their methodology with the Chilean delegation.

**f. October (Phase 4: Capability Proposals)**

In the final phase (Phase 4), the services presented their proposals to close identified gaps and then had the senior leadership validate the proposals. This work was completed before the end of 2013. However, the validated proposals were not prioritized according to

the prioritization of the gaps. This flaw in the process would create an inability to link any one proposal to the budget process during the following year because the DPP did not have a good analytic basis for approving the allocation of budgetary resources toward any of the proposals. Each service prioritized its own proposals, but there was no joint and coordinated defense sector prioritization of validated proposals.

## **9. 2014**

### **a. February (Capability Monitoring System)**

Vice Minister Quintero directed the Capabilities Planning Directorate to come up with a means to measure the how capabilities might increase or decrease as a result of the implementation of proposals approved during the capability planning process. This effort came to be called the Capability Monitoring System initiative.

### **b. June (Analysis of Mission Area 8 (Management, Support, and Project Development) begins)**

DIRI presented several seminars on the link between the operational capabilities analyzed by the defense sector working groups in 2013 and supporting capabilities necessary to create and sustain operational capabilities.

### **c. October (Vice Minister of Defense Quintero organizes her staff for a Mission Area 8 analysis)**

Vice Minister of Defense Quintero directed that an assessment of mission area 8 be completed during 2015. Unlike the operational capabilities, which were analyzed in working groups led by the services and facilitated DPC, she wanted mission area 8 analysis to be led by the civilian directors of the MND with DPC playing the role of facilitator.

## **10. 2015**

### **a. January to June (Mission Area 8 framework and analysis completed)**

In the first half of 2015, the capabilities of mission area 8 were defined, a full capability taxonomy of the mission area was completed, and the units and organizations of the Public Force structure and Defense Ministry, which provide those capabilities, were mapped to the taxonomy.

### **b. June (New Minister of Defense)**

President Juan Manuel Santos appointed Luis Carlos Villegas to be Minister of Defense. Former Minister Pinzon was appointed Ambassador of Colombia to the United States.

**c. July (Joint concepts discussion)**

Due to the difficulties in concept formulation during the first implementation of the capability methodology, DPC agreed that DIRI should open a line of effort, working the CGFM and devoted to joint concept development.

**d. August (New Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning)**

Mariana Martinez was appointed Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning.

**e. December (DIRI becomes DGMT)**

For administrative reasons within DOD, the name of the initiative of the expert team supporting the Colombian modernization process changed from DIRI to the Defense Governance and Management Team (DGMT).

**11. 2016**

**a. January (Support to the 2018 budget planning process)**

At the beginning of 2016, Vice Minister Martinez required the input of the CBP methodology to effectively plan and allocate the resources associated with the 2018 budget. For this reason, and having in mind the political priorities given by President Santos, it was established that the second cycle of the implementation of the CBP methodology would be applied to assess humanitarian demining and illegal mining capabilities.

**b. May (Presentation of the Strategic Planning Guide 2016–2018)**

As with the Strategic Planning Guide 2011–2014, the Strategic Planning Guide 2016–2018 presented the CBP methodology as the requirement to link policy to budget. Furthermore, it was the first institutional document to present the objectives and strategies of the defense sector in terms of the mission areas established through the implementation of the first cycle of the capability methodology.

**c. May (DGMT presents at Colombian Commanders Conference)**

At Minister Villegas' invitation and with support from the U.S. Military Group and the DGMT program, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) gave a presentation to the assembled Commanders and senior leaders of the Public Forces. The focus was on how other nations transformed their force structures, the impetus for change in each of the nations presented, the process of change, and the results of each process. This was a way for the Minister and Vice Minister to signal to the Public Forces that work begun under Minister Pinzon's TFI would continue.

**d. September (Linking the investment budget to capabilities)**

With the objective of issuing a guide for how to propose investment projects, DPP, with IDA support, produced a document describing how to describe capabilities in terms that comply with Colombian legal requirements and DNP regulations when requesting funds from the investment budget. The guide was developed over many months and with the input of DNP, the agency in Colombia responsible for approving investment projects and monitoring their implementation.

**e. October (Drafting a resolution)**

Based on all the MND learned from the beginning of the process to transform its management of the Public Forces, Vice Minister Martinez directed her staff to write a resolution that formally codifies and directs the Public Forces to utilize the new planning and analysis tools and methodologies. The resolution was referred to as “The Model for the Planning and Development of the Capabilities of the Public Forces.”

With DGMT support, drafting began in late 2016 and was completed in May 2017. The draft (as of the publication date of this document) is with the Vice Minister and awaiting signature or further review.

**12. 2017**

**a. March (Creating consensus and support for the resolution)**

Prior to signing the resolution, the Vice Minister requested that DGMT, in coordination with her directors, familiarize key personnel from the Ministry, General Command, and Public Forces with the main concepts and ideas in the resolution. A two-day seminar fulfilled this purpose. The seminar also signaled the implementation work ahead for the attendees. Highlighting the importance the Colombian leadership placed on the resolution, almost the entire staff of the VMOD S&P participated in the two-day event.

**b. April to October (Work to Support the Resolution)**

The first ever draft of a Joint Colombian National Defense concept was completed. DIRI funded teams from IDA facilitated several workshops and exercises that led participants from the military services through the concept development process. Also, for the first time, the General Command of the Armed Forces, and not the MND, was the lead Colombian beneficiary of the U.S. advisor effort.

In support of HCDD and the objective to create Ministerial policy guidance on how the uniformed services should develop and document their tables of organization and equipment (TOEs), RAND and IDA advisors held a series of meetings during this period

to assist the HCDD director in getting a draft of the TOE policy to the desk of the VMOD S&P.

Finally, to prepare the MND and specifically DPP to lead the defense and security sector through the adoption of program budgeting techniques, the IDA team has worked side by side with DPP staff responsible for the Colombian FOCIS database. The objective has been to increase the functionality of the data base so it can be used for multi-year budgeting and not just annual budgeting and life cycle cost analysis.

**c. October (Program Budgeting Seminar)**

DPP, with IDA support, hosted a comprehensive seminar on program budgeting in order to educate VMOD S&P staff on programming and planning techniques. The seminar's intent was to educate and familiarize MND staff in order to begin preparing those same staff members to educate and familiarize the staff members of the Public Forces in the following year.

This page is intentionally blank.

## Appendix B. Interviews

---

### 1. List of Those Interviewed

- a) Paola Nieto: former Director, Programming and Budgeting (DPP) under the VMOD S&P
- b) Jorge Baquero: former staff member, Directorate of Sectoral Studies and Director, Capability Planning Directorate (DPC) under the VMOD S&P
- c) Andres Salcedo: former Coordinator; DPP
- d) Francisco Moreno: former Coordinator, DPP
- e) Diana Quintero: former Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning (VMOD S&P)
- f) Juliana Garcia: former Director, DPP
- g) Jaime Medina: Director, DPC
- h) Cesar Restrepo, former Director, Sectoral Studies<sup>65</sup>
- i) Dora Laverde: former Director, Human Capital Development (HCDD) under the VMOD S&P (Ms. Laverde responded in writing)
- j) Carolina Matamoros: former staff member, DPC (Ms. Matamoros responded in writing)

### 2. Base Interview Questions<sup>66</sup>

- 1. What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior-level decision-makers in initiating a change in the Colombian defense sector's way of planning its future force structure?
- 2. Did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process? Which countries were relevant and how did they influence the decision?

---

<sup>65</sup> At first, he was under VMOD S&P. But later, the MND reorganized and Sectoral Studies was moved under the VMOD for International Affairs and Policy

<sup>66</sup> There were some variations in the questions asked of each person interviewed. The variations are captured in the transcripts included in this appendix.

3. Why was it decided to incorporate USG assistance through the Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS, later the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI)) program in this transformation process? How was the process started, and what was the planned role of the USG-provided advisors?
4. In your opinion, what have been/were the contributions of the USG team in this process?
5. In your opinion, what have been/were other lines of support not explored with USG assistance through DRMS or DIRI?
6. Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were/are effective in the development of the transformation initiative?
7. Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were not/are not effective in the development of the transformation initiative?
8. In your opinion, was/is DMRS/DIRI support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?
9. In terms of the accomplishment of sectorial objectives, what is the contribution/impact of DRMS/DIRI support?
10. How could DRMS/DIRI improve its effectiveness/contribution in the successful development of the transformation initiative?

### **3. Interview Transcriptions**

#### **a. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Paola Nieto**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you want me to go over all the questions or shall we just go one-by-one? Let's do them one-by-one.

So the idea is to identify the key elements that gave life to the work between the Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense and, on the other hand, I'd like you to address both the good things as well as the not so good things. So let's start with the first question.

What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers in initiating a change in the Columbian defense sector's way of planning its future force structure?

PAOLA NIETO: There were several. First, there was a problem in respective roles and functions that we needed to look into because maybe the services were not working as they should. There were certain opposed opinions and on the short term we knew that there could be changes in the conflict, for example, in the medium term, and to this end the



subject of how to deal with the police and military services in an appropriate manner because evidently they had -- it was necessary to have a differentiation which did not exist at the time and we had to differentiate the concept of security and defense. And even though it's closely tied to roles, this is something that could be looked at separately.

And there was a third important element which is the un-sustainability of military spending and the way it was managed. Hence, the need to identify what was happening, how much was being spent, how much was being properly allocated and how much was not being spent or being allocated or spent in things that were not very impactful because spending was increasing at an unsustainable rate. I would say those are the key reasons that led us to want to work with them.

LINA GONZALEZ: Second question. After identifying the relevant factors, do you think that other countries played a role in the decision to initiate this process? In such case, what countries were relevant and how did they influence the decision?

PAOLA NIETO: I don't think so. It's likely that if there was a country it was the U.S. The U.S. because of its experience, support and Plan Columbia, but besides the United States, I cannot think of another country that exerted a significant influence. There were other countries that we looked at as a model that we tried to analyze but they were more like triggers.

LINA GONZALEZ: Once we initiated the transformation initiative, what reasons led to incorporate U.S. Government assistance through DIRI and how did the process start? What was the planned role of U.S. support in the beginning?

PAOLA NIETO: First, we had the American team, the fact that we had them -- we had the American group inside the Ministry was very important. Second, because they had always been our allies in many discussions because even though there are other countries with whom we had discussions, the American team was the one that was there. It was inside the Ministry. Plan Columbia was working. We were looking at many strategic topics with the Americans. So I think that's a very important function and I think it's one of the strategic issues because as far as plan structure which was the DPP point, the U.S. managed everything. I would say that in capabilities there were other countries that you could look at, but we had already started the capability process with DPP.

It was the fact that they were inside the Ministry, we already had contacts, progress had been made with them. [People from CHDS<sup>67</sup> also arrived and started asking a series of questions but it was obvious that we had to [move ahead] with the same teams with whom we had started discussing these topics and I'm talking mainly about capabilities. You know, maybe you think capabilities and think of Great Britain but, no, the U.S. was the country

---

<sup>67</sup> CHDS – The Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

with whom we had already been working for quite some time, with whom we had established bonds of trust.

LINA GONZALEZ: Fourth question. In your opinion, Paola, what have been or were the contributions of the U.S. support team to the process?

PAOLA NIETO: I would say that first the [FOCIS] model. The fact that we had a model was very important because we didn't have the experience or knowledge to build the model ourselves and it presented us with something that we were able to adjust and improve. That was the most important contribution. The other contribution was the training provided to many groups because, you know, we had a permanent team two weeks a month at the Ministry that were there to train, to re-train and to support all the construction processes and that's very important as was the experience of the U.S. team members, their knowledge and their willingness.

We would write them and we always got an answer from them. The fact that they were there with us was very important. What did they give us, the model, how to do it, the analysis, the programming, how to integrate things. Right now, I don't know what became of the model and what it's like today, but up until I was there, it modeled very well. It worked very well.

Sometimes we weren't very happy. We got into a lot of trouble. But it allowed us to identify what we wanted as well as the different scenarios that we could devise and we drew on that. All the tools for long-term planning were either given us to by or provided by the [U.S. support] program.

LINA GONZALEZ: Looking at things from a different perspective, in your opinion, Paola, what were or have been other lines of support not explored that should have been?

PAOLA NIETO: From the DPP perspective, I believe that there was a topic that would have been interesting to look at and we didn't, not because did not want to, because was the possibility of exchanging Colombian experience with the rest of the world. Having someone like Andreas and Guillermo<sup>68</sup> going out and seeing how a decision is made. Well, no, no, they were not the decision makers but rather how the model was used or what are the scenarios are most likely and what other additional uses. That would have been very important. The topic of going out there and experiencing, that was something that was important and should have been done.

Another thing we missed, not because of DIRI, but more so because of our own Columbian government structure and service structure is separating defense from security. It gives rise to the need to look at roles but then you start thinking of what should be the ideal size, discussions that did not fully profit from [what IDA] had to contribute. So from

---

<sup>68</sup> Guillermo refers to a civilian coordinator inside of DPP who worked for Ms. Nieto.

the security perspective, how do you deal with certain things? The police special forces should do what and what not. How to maintain those Special Forces? I mean, those are very complicated topics that have to do with Columbian sovereignty.

There is no discussion there but many of these things could have been discussed with them with no problem. At least that's what I think.

And there's another topic that has to do with Columbian military forces made up by men and women having roles and specificities, but there were certain topics that were not clearly discussed. I believe that there could be others but those are the ones that come to my mind. We never mentioned the police. Yes, we included them in the numbers but we never truly mentioned them, maybe because it was Defense and not Homeland. I understand the expectations [of the U.S. government] but for the work we were doing, we needed it.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question six. Of the lines of work developed with [IDA], which do you consider were or are effective?

PAOLA NIETO: I don't know how to answer because I don't recall all the lines of work. All I can tell you is that the ones we worked on through DPP were very effective. All of them were very effective, the planning, the size of the force. One, for example, knowing the reality of the services, we had -- remember the zero base cost system that allowed us to project and understand things. That work was very effective because there we were able to determine lots of things.

Some people said, you know, we're missing this, we're missing that, what are processes going to be like in the future? That was definitive. The [FOCIS] model as such was very effective because it allowed us to determine what would happen if this or that happened, if there was a post-conflict or not or if growth was going to be [sustainable]. It allowed us to identify realities and truths we all knew, which was that the resources we had available were [not] sufficient or the problem was with the allocation of those resources.

However, I believe that everything that was proposed by DPP proved very efficient. I'm sure you'll recall I was there when a special group was established, you know, with a very high profile. We had dedicated people working on different areas of the restructuring and that allowed us to make a lot of progress. And afterwards you came in. You know, the capabilities group.

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you think -- if this applies or not, but do you think that there is or was a line of work that was not effective?

PAOLA NIETO: As far as I know, no.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question 8. In your opinion, was/is U.S. support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?

PAOLA NIETO: From the perspective of finances and budget planning, yes, because transformation was so big, so large that I am not in a position to tell you whether capabilities, you know, worked out. I don't know. What I do know is that from the perspective of DPP which was to build a force structure and have a model was very important but even more important was that we had U.S. support to reach out to the services because you would go to the services and you'd say, General, sir, we are working with the American [advisory] group and we have high level consultants coming over two weeks a month and you can profit from that. And everybody did profit.

If we hadn't had IDA, it would have been very difficult to get to where we got, first, because of their knowledge, experience and everything else and, you know, everything this implied. And another was the support, name and creditability in the eyes of the service and, to be honest, the fact that they participated here would give services the peace of mind that on the other side they had the American group and that the Americans would support them.

LINA GONZALEZ: Perfect. Question 9. In terms of the accomplishment of sectorial objectives, what is the contribution or impact of U.S. support?

PAOLA NIETO: Now [we] had cleaner numbers on the size of the force, the growth of the force, future policy. Because at the time, IDA supported us in presenting different options for policy, decisions and, you know, major policy decisions, distribution of the extraordinary resource, for example, comes to my mind. And the decisions were not made -- I mean, this was a necessary input. I imagine that the force size in the post-conflict will be defined with the help of the model if it still exists and I hope it does and that they're still using it.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question 10, last question. This is somewhat forward looking. How could the U.S. improve its effectiveness and contribution?

PAOLA NIETO: What I'm about to say may go against everything I've said because I believe that in the compliance of policy we could be a bit more demanding in terms of results because what I was able to identify up until I was there -- remember, I left -- is that if the director was committed then the progress was monumental. I broke my arm and they continued to progress and continued progressing and advancing. We need something that allows us to measure the commitment that could allow you to determine, indicate or -- that go beyond the person so you wouldn't need to depend on the person but rather the institution. Because our counterparts are charming them and how can you ever say no to them? And, you know, they were all very friendly and we became friends and the work was really cool. So, yes, I believe that there should be greater mutual demands. You know, you give me but I don't progress and should not leave the fate of the work in the hands of personal friendship.

LINA GONZALEZ: Would you like to add anything that we haven't discussed that you feel is relevant or important to add?

PAOLA NIETO: Yes, I would say that it's important to mention that we always had the best people -- at least while I was there, the people coming to Columbia were just very professional, you know, and very rigorous and robust technically speaking in their knowledge but they were also good human beings. They were, you know, valuable people, comprehensive people and that's very important for the project. That's one of the things I would like to underline, the quality of the people [supporting DPP].

Another thing I think is very important is that during my time as director -- this may be funny -- I always felt very supported by IDA, not just in terms of the support but if I had a question, for example, I always had someone to ask. You know, send an email, say I have this on my mind, what do you think, what is the U.S. experience? And that feeling of support is very, very important because I always got an answer to my questions.

There's something else. There's only one that is not positive is the, you know, funding anxiety because you have the support and the support is there but, you know, it's planning three years out and sometimes that doesn't let you go beyond that planning horizon. And in planning we had -- we were always under this anxiety of should we continue, should we not, who goes, should you go, and that, you know, gave a certain degree of uncertainty to the project. And, yes, it made it interesting but at the time of planning and projecting, it gave us peace of mind to know we had the support.

INTERPRETER: This is the end of the interview.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

**b. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Jorge Baquero**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: The purpose of this interview is to identify three key aspects: one, how did the process start, what were the reasons or relevant factors to start this initiative, and, two and three are closely interrelated, and we would like to hear in your opinion what lines of effort were effective and which were not all that effective. So address success factors, as well as opportunities for improvement, and we would appreciate you explaining how the process started. The ten questions that I will now read to you are:

First. What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers to initiate the transformation process? So relevant factors to start the initiative.

Second. Did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process? What countries were relevant, and how did they influence the decision?

Third. Why was it decided to incorporate U.S. assistance in this transformation process, and how did the process start, and what was the planned role for U.S. advisors?

Fourth. In your opinion, what have been or were the contributions of the U.S. team to this process? These are contributions.

Fifth question. In your opinion, what have been or were other lines of support not explored with U.S. support, which did not happen?

Sixth question. What lines of work with the U.S. do you consider were or are effective in the transformation initiative?

So the previous questions are identification. Question six is more evaluation.

Seven. What lines of work do you think were not all that effective?

Eight. In your opinion, was/is U.S. support decisive in the transformation initiative?

Nine. In terms of achieving sectoral objectives, what is the contribution or impact of U.S. support?

Question ten. How could the U.S. improve its effectiveness or contribution to the successful development of the transformation initiative?

So let's start. Do you want me to repeat the question?

JORGE BAQUERO: Yes. Relevant factors?

LINA GONZALEZ: What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers to initiate the transformation process?

JORGE BAQUERO: I would say this dates back to Minister Santos, with Vice Minister Pinzón. When I joined the newly established directorate of sectoral studies, there were two main concerns that later on proved decisive for this work. The first was the

internal conflict in Colombia and what was happening at the time with the FARC and everything related to the need to intensify operational efforts to bring FARC to the negotiation table. So there was a major operational challenge. And the other was the long-term sustainability challenge that was only just beginning. And the directorate of sectoral studies set as an objective the need to it look at long-term sustainability, and also to look at fiscal matters as well as the numbers, and no one was being forward-looking at the time. And a series of studies were conducted. We also conducted research. And a very important aspect was a workshop seminar organized 2010.

Possibly before 2010, that, you know, before I joined the Ministry in 2009, I -- they worked with the JIPOE, the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, which is purely operational, but later on is closely tied to this subject. So this was one of the background things that led us to organize a seminar with Salvador Raza,<sup>69</sup> in an effort to see how all this was linked because, obviously, force structure was linked as sustainability, and when we started doing projection exercises with the data, we developed an Excel-based forecasting tool to see what today has strengthened this unit costing tool, which in the beginning was Excel-based. And we said, if we maintain everything constant and we increase the number of soldiers or reduce the number of soldiers, or if we change the GDP increases or decreases, how would this look like in 2030? So we tried to look at things from a budget perspective, from an investment perspective, and to try to determine trends in what we realized at the time was that it was unsustainable because we did not have the resources. And there's a specific juncture because during those years, we had the wealth tax in effect, which is very important, because part of the effort throughout these exercises was to justify, and you can actually take a look at the prospective series number 1, which looks at spending projections, and why we felt it was unsustainable, and why we needed additional funds in order to operate. And this first effort revolved around that justification, structuring that justification. So we started looking at the force structure, and that's when we invited IDA for the first time. I don't know what the relationship was like because this came over from the planning directorate, not our directorate, and it was looked at as a purely expense issue and -- not looking at the timeline right now. Let me take a look at a document where I have some notes that will refresh my memory.

Yes. This happened in 2010. That's when we organized the force structure seminar. And then IDA comes in, I don't know exactly when. Here, the DPP also organized spending, sustainability, workshops, and since the topic was spending sustainability, that's when IDA starts looking at things and realizes that the unit cost tool [FOCIS] is very good to do what we are doing today, and that we did in a very rudimentary manner in the beginning with this Excel-based tool developed by us. So we started working on force

---

<sup>69</sup> Refers Salvador Raza, PhD. At the time, he was on faculty at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University in Washington DC.

structure. We did not yet talk about capabilities. But we did realize that there was a trend emerging from initial exercise. And Vice Minister Giha and Cesar traveled to the UK at the time. And during that trip to the United Kingdom, they brought back a lot of information on capabilities, this was very relevant information, and that helped strengthen the conceptual framework that we developed. And these were simply a series of ideas of what does a force structure mean, and since this is a process, and to impact spending, we had to go back several steps to look at the force structure, and that was tied completely to sustainability.

My notes tell me that by 2011, we already had an idea of the modernization program, with a time horizon of 2025. During the first half of 2011, we worked on improving the methodology, and every month we would present new conceptual methodologies, and this was done by reading different doctrine documents of our public services, doctrine documents of countries like Australia, the UK, the U.S.. There are RAND research documents. And one of the cornerstones of all this -- yes, Australia, UK, Spain, as well, and RAND. And when I say Spain, UK, Australia, I am talking military forces. When I say RAND, that's more like research centers. And for the first time, we included capability planning in the 2011, 2014 planning guide. This happened in 2011, I don't know how things transitioned exactly, but when we realized that this was linked, was when we looked at the UK information and realized that there was closely tied to resources and that's when we approached planning department, and they told us what they were doing with IDA. We spoke to Hal, and he said, you know, on our next trip we can include capabilities, to discuss this with you and Mark Tillman<sup>70</sup> came on the next trip. And every since Mark started coming to Colombia, we started to discuss this topic, and we started to improve all the conceptual frameworks with him. Whenever we discussed an idea, he would say, "Okay, I think that the operational concept is very important," or -- and that helped us structure the entire process. So looking at all these things with Mark and with IDA's feedback, we were able to improve significantly our methodological frameworks.

When the Ministry of Defense restructuring process starts around about this time, lead by the sectoral study directorate, with the IDA support as well. During that exercise, we looked at Ministry processes and the work done to date with the capability-based planning. Methodology was key for process redesign. And they supported the structuring -- I've already said that. In September 2011, we had a change of minister. Now we have Minister Pinzón, and Vice Minister Quintero, former director of sectoral studies, comes back to the Ministry. So we continued with the same line. And this is a very important component, and that is that there was continuity because during the -- we've been having -- following the same line during the last twelve years, and that was the priority in our minds, and the overall

---

<sup>70</sup> Hal and Mark Tillman refer to Hal Laughlin and Mark Tillman. Both, as of publication date, are still professional research staff members at IDA.



plan is to strengthen ourselves operationally and be far more efficient to get to what we're seeing today with FARC, but we also had to think about the sustainability of this sector in a more rigorous and more studious manner that was always what the President and Minister had in mind. And in spite of all the changes, this line has been maintained, as well as its importance, and that has been very important for the success of this entire process.

LINA GONZALEZ: You mentioned in passing certain aspects of question number two, but in order to be a bit more explicit, did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process, what countries, and how did they influence?

JORGE BAQUERO: In my opinion, and I first -- my first contact with the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, which is a document that looks at not just the long-term, because this is not a planning force, but it is operational planning, and how we had -- or, rather, how to deal with the threats in two of the mission areas, which are mission area of national defense and the mission area on public security.

And that was -- I recall that that exercise was done with the U.S. southern command, and why did we have contact with them if we were the numbers department, because that was the way to calculate the gap in our ability to deal with the threats. So the first exercise is what do we have today, and what are we -- what do we need. We were not talking about capabilities at the time. That comes later. But this is how it starts. Later on in time, as I said, the UK trip, the trip to the UK was very enlightening in terms of our ability to better understand how this links to programming. When I say "programs," I mean programming. How we can link this and bring it down to things that have their lifecycle and thinking about, you know, a multi-year project, and thinking about sustainment. Then in capability terms, we did read documents from Australia. We got documents from the Australian Ministry of Defense, as well as Spain, that also made a capability decision, so we looked at those documents as well. And the U.S., but with the RAND and IDA conceptual documents.

LINA GONZALEZ: Third question. Why was it decided to incorporate U.S. assistance in this transformation process? How was the process started, and what was the initial or planned role of the advisors?

JORGE BAQUERO: It all started with the expenditures sustainability project [Spending Sustainability Initiative], how to improve, you know, budget and budgeting, and better understand how we were spending money. That is what we did with [IDA] at the time. We at sectoral studies were already considering capabilities. And when we went to talk to DPP, they had already advanced in spending, and that's when it clicked and linked and IDA said, yes, this is interconnected, it is linked, and that's when we started working closer together, and that's something that happened in the year -- in the year 2010, 2011.

LINA GONZALEZ: So this is how the process started, right? And through the spending sustainability initiative, through the planning and budget department, but what were, in your opinion, the relevant reasons why we resorted to the U.S.?

JORGE BAQUERO: Ah. Yes. The reasons. The truth, the ones offering us aid in and help and support in capacity building was IDA and CHDS, and they [CHDS] -- during the seminar I spoke about, they presented us with a methodology that was too theoretical and we didn't know how to apply it. I am going back to the how, but, no. What we had was a need that we were identifying gradually that had different facets, and when we shared this with them they'd say, "Yes, you were missing this, you are missing that." And so together we built this theoretical framework.

LINA GONZALEZ: This question has several related questions. In your opinion, what was the initial or plan role of the IDA advisors?

JORGE BAQUERO: As I said, the plan role -- I mean, initially, in the very beginning in the expenditures sustainability model, we had the unit cost model. I wasn't in planning, but that's what I came across when I started working with the models. That was the role, to support the expenditures sustainability effort being implemented by the [DPP] through the use of the focus tool.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question four. In your opinion, what have been or were the contributions of the U.S. team to the transformation to the Ministry of Defense?

JORGE BAQUERO: I would say that it was -- it had many sides. First, we have the capability planning to -- we also had improving strategic planning. So when working in spending sustainability, we realized we had to go back because there were flaws in the way in which we were doing strategic planning, and there was a lot of disconnect. And we also had difficulties with long-term force planning, we were also reacting, reacting, as a result of the inertia of what was going on at the time. And the effort to improve capabilities and to -- obviously, with the end goal of improving the sectors expenditures sustainability, and that does to improve organizational architecture because the way we were organized, it was impossible for us to think this way, that entailed the institutional transformation, and they supported us. So these were different moments in time with different team members, but they helped us ever since we had identified the problem, which was the sustainability of our military spending, and together we put together all the pieces, and they supported us in every step of the process: in strategic planning, capability planning, and in planning [our] budgeting and spending, and the organizational architecture required for this. And, certainly, at the end, the -- obviously, capability planning implies human talent management and logistics management, which were the last things that we identified as requiring strengthening.

We set up offices in 2011, but the role [of these new human capital and logistics offices] wasn't all that clear in the beginning. It wasn't clear in terms of the strategic

planning exercise, and that's when we set a series of tasks and realized that this was good for some things, but not necessarily for the strategic process.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question number 5. In your opinion, what have been or were the other lines of support not explored with IDA?

JORGE BAQUERO: I don't know whether I'd say not explored with IDA, but you have mentioned repeatedly the importance of change management. Because these transformation topics, when they have a technical component, because here we have to change the structure, we have to change the processes, we have to change what we did, and we had clearly identified what we wanted to do. We had the process, but that must go hand in hand with an adaptive process. I mean, how people will deal with change as an organization, what we need to do, what are the losses, how are we going to deal with all those losses. And the important thing was to support the process to prevent one directorate from not responding or someone not being aligned with this or maybe a service not liking it. That can be foreseen and you can work on that with people, and I don't know whether that's necessarily [part of what the U.S. will provide], but, obviously, this kind of process needs that. How do I manage change and how do I support the organization, and for it to understand how its DNA is changing in this changed DNA will affect the organization, and how do I mitigate people resisting change. I think that's key.

I personally believe that that is required in a transformation process, so. I think this is already being done, and when one looks at the merger of capabilities, we see the topic of the doctrine, we also see the importance of human resources, personnel, as well as equipment, and that entails logistics, how can I enhance and improve human resources. We focused a lot not just on material solutions, but non-material. We offer solutions as well as other aspects of managing that planned force that, you know, all these things I understand are being done today, or at least they have been clearly identified by the logistics and human talent directorates.

But I think this is lacking something else, which is education. We should be putting this in the future officer -- of the DNA of future officers, the future force commanders. So we should have like a special course, not on operational planning, but help them understand what the force planning process is, and for them to understand how this works, and for them to be taught this while in school. So we need a special academic program to help others understand that change management is difficult, and if we have a planning officer who already understands the methodology, you know, hopefully won't be changed by another person or replaced by another person, who is not knowledgeable in human talent education is very important, and it is also important to generate doctrine. All this, all these things that are happening at a Ministry level, should translate into processes and also to provide doctrine to the services, you know. This is -- to produce manuals that state what has to be done.

So it is more like looking at the fusion because I am talking about the lines of action that were not looked at back then, they are being looked at today. We have to look at the capability equation and see where we need more support, simply because we haven't looked very clearly at what those lines really mean, and what is entailed or what that factor entails in the planning process.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question six. What lines of work do you consider were or are effective in the transformation initiative?

JORGE BAQUERO: Sustainability was super, super effective. I understand that today we have a very important volume of information on capabilities. We organized an exercise, and to make sure that, you know, this becomes part of their DNA instead of having to force this on anyone.

LINA GONZALEZ: And what lines of work have not been very effective in the transformation initiative?

JORGE BAQUERO: I understand that when the offices were established, and I'm talking about the logistics directorate and the human talent directorate, I don't know whether this was not part of the emphasis, we had identified -- maybe this is clearer to the Vice Minister today, but in my view, we have not yet taken on the leadership required or - - yes, or, rather, to understand who you are in the system, and that you are part of a process, and that we have a role to play, and I don't know whether we did not request U.S. support in this specific area, in the beginning, or whether the effort was -- did not suffice. I don't know. That's not clear to me. I really don't know.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question 8. In your opinion, was/is IDA support decisive in the transformation initiative?

JORGE BAQUERO: Yes, of course.

LINA GONZALEZ: Why?

JORGE BAQUERO: Because I am convinced that this is a process that you cannot look at once. It is not easy to size at a single point in time, and with IDA we were able to work at our own pace and discover things. And, yes, we had an emphasis in sustainability, let's look at that. And maybe we saw a gap that forced us to look at something else. But we were, you know, cognizant this was the result of self-reflection, and this permeated the organization and IDA supported us constantly during this discovery process. And whenever we had a question on that, there was always an answer. They were not giving us the answer, they were saying, "Listen. You have to do all these things." And whenever we said we felt we had a problem in what we were doing, because for some reason the information wasn't flowing properly, what do you think could happen, what can we do, and that they would guide us and help us discover new things, and they always had an answer to our question, obviously, from their perspective, or they would give us the view

from the perspective of doctrine, or how the U.S. defense sector does it, or how the services do it in the U.S., and/or they would give us research documents to read. So they supported us throughout this discovery process.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question 9. In terms of achieving sectoral objectives, and, you know, security and defense objectives, what is the contribution or impact of IDA support?

JORGE BAQUERO: It is very important, first, because they helped us define the objectives of the defense sector that were not all that clear to us, so in that regard, they helped us to clearly and better understand what we wanted to do, and it is not that we did not know what we wanted to do, the thing is, we -- it wasn't -- we did not all have a collective understanding, but thanks to the mission area and strategic planning efforts, we were able to differentiate the objectives we wanted to achieve [in each of our] mission areas. And, second, how we could better measure both in terms of what resources are we allocating to these areas as well as what results do we want. And that conceptual framework helped us further clarify what we wanted to measure -- obviously, what we wanted to do and how to measure it. And if today you look at the four-year strategic sectoral plan, it's organized by mission areas with its objectives and indicators for these objectives or metrics. When we conducted a study on how things were organized before, how the sectoral strategic plans organized before, that required interpreting or construing what we were going to measure because it wasn't all that clear. So we had to interpret things, and today it is much, much of clearer and IDA [support] was key.

LINA GONZALEZ: Tenth and last question. How could IDA improve its effectiveness and contribution to the successful development of the transformation initiative?

JORGE BAQUERO: It's difficult because we have to move at the pace of what the country wants to do. And to try to plan how to improve is quite complex. I think it is a matter of being ready and prepared and have a well-packaged and clarity around the different processes and subprocess of this overall transformation process, because if that is properly managed, is properly packaged, then the pace will be set by the country. And the country will say, "Now I want to know a bit more about this," and IDA has to be ready with a structured response with tools that can help answer those questions.

And what I said earlier, two more things, I mean, how to provide training and education, because this is something that comes from the bottom up as well, because you can aim for both things and, also, how to provide change management, which is very important support.

LINA GONZALEZ: Jorge, is there something that we have not discussed and you would like to mention, or you'd like to underline?

JORGE BAQUERO: No. I think it's been very clear. Let me think a minute. Or maybe to underline what I said earlier, which is the biggest challenge, which is our -- the need for us to resolve two problems; one, the operational problem, and the other is the long-term sustainability, and what is the force structure we want in the future, and, also, answer the question, what do we want in 30 years, plus knowing we want to be stronger operationally today. And that was a very difficult question that was answered separately at one point, and we later were able to bring together the answer about the today and how to project that today in the long-term because I am convinced that -- I mean, some countries don't have or maybe that's what led us to restructure, because if a country doesn't have, does not have the desire to respond to today or have something short-term, it would be very difficult for it to engage in a transformation process such as this, for one. And that's seen in other countries, that -- it is not until they have the urgency, the urge to want to do this. They don't do it.

LINA GONZALEZ: Thank you very much.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

**c. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Andres Salcedo**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: Question #1, what do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers in initiating a change in the Colombian defense sectors way of planning its future force structure?

ANDRES SALCEDO: In my view, I believe that one of the most important aspects related to the harmonization of the strategy with the budget. Before this effort started, there existed a mismatch between the two. It was not easy to [trace] between strategy and budget. We could identify strategies that were not [in the] or [budget] not necessarily tied to a strategy and this was the most relevant effort to commence the transformation process. And there are other important things like spending sustainability but that is implicitly tied to the link between the strategy and the budget.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question two, did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate the transformation process? Which countries were relevant and how did they influence the decision?

ANDRES SALCEDO: I don't have much knowledge to answer the question. When I arrived, the process had already started. However, I believe that the country that played the most important role in this was the U.S., but I'm not sure because I was not present at the time.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question three, why was it decided to incorporate U.S. assistance in this transformation process and how was the process started and what was the planned role for U.S. advisors?

ANDRES SALCEDO: Lina, like I said, this process had already started so I don't have an answer to this question.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question four, in your opinion, what would have been/were the contributions of the U.S. team to the process?

ANDRES SALCEDO: I believe that support took place in several areas, not just planning, and I'm going to mention a bit of what I know. As for planning, which is what affected me directly, obviously contributions have been tied to the implementation of the capability-based planning methodology and in these areas we can identify different aspects such as the capability-based planning model that was adapted later on to suit Colombian reality as well as mission areas and operational concepts. I would say that the support was methodological because we in Columbia were the ones who applied [the methodology] to our reality.

Regarding spending sustainability, I would say that the biggest support has been the modeling – the budgetary modeling and in this regard I can say that [FOCIS] modeling has been very important in our work because it is the tool that allows you to develop solutions,

material and non-material solutions, through the planning process of the transformation. There are other aspects like lifecycle [cost analyses] that was something that was introduced conceptually.

I would say programming has been a very important aspect, as well. In this process, obviously we identify the programming methodology currently under implementation which is the way in which you can create programs that help you support or align and link the policy and budget. I would say that this is in very general terms because there are very specific matters that are very -- where the specific advice has been very important and it is not necessarily a very robust line of work but did help the DPP office do a lot of planning work. There were other matters like personnel where they were very supportive but was not part of their core.

As regards logistics, human capital, the work underway in human capital and obviously the work done in respective training and developing an appropriate personnel model is very appropriate but I am not the ideal person to make specific comments on this. And before I left, there were other matters but I repeat, you would have to address that or talk about that with people who were directly involved in that work. And to summarize, I would say that contributions have always been the result of this methodological support. They have never done the work on our behalf. What they've done is provide us the tools and we have adapted that to Columbian reality which is, in my view, the proper way to do things.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question five, in your opinion, what have been or were other lines of support not explored with the U.S.?

ANDRES SALCEDO: I do not have any comments to make on this regard. I think that this question should be asked at a much higher level than my own.

LINA GONZALEZ: In question six, which lines of work with the U.S. do you consider were/are effective in the development of the transformation initiative?

ANDRES SALCEDO: As I said earlier, I would say that resource management is what has proven most effective in the transformation initiative. Implementation, in my perspective, of human capital is not very solid. I don't know. I think that human capital has not made much headway. Logistics was beginning before I left, but still I don't know. I think that while I was there, particularly when I was working with another team, they were not IDA, I don't think it was very effective. That's my personal perception.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question eight, in your opinion, was/is IDA's support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?

ANDRES SALCEDO: Completely. Yes, I am convinced that had we not had that support it would have been very difficult, very complicated, if not impossible to do all this. In part, I'd say that working with -- had we not worked with professionals it would have



been very difficult to bring on board all the services to participate in these change initiatives and we, as civilians, would have had a very difficult time trying to develop this on our own. And thanks to them, their support, their profile, they can provide us a lot more support because of their experience than if we were to attempt to reinvent the wheel.

Regarding the accomplishment of sectorial objectives and what is the contribution impact of [the Department of Defense's] support, I would say that their support is not direct. Direct support is done through our services and national police. But obviously we can say that as far as the methodology is concerned and the way in which one structures the strategy and how you link that to the strategy, I would say that you can see an indirect impact naturally through the work we do. And when I say "we", I'm talking about the Ministry of Defense using IDA methodologies and what you seek at the end of the day is to harmonize better policies that are tailored to the country's needs but also respond to our budget reality. So in that regard, I would say that the contribution will take place. I'm not sure it has happened yet because there is yet a lot to be done before we can complete the transformation. But I would say that the entire model as it is conceived is based on their support.

How could IDA or DOD improve its effectiveness of its contribution in the successful development of the transformation initiative? I would say that from a planning perspective the work is very good. It's been very good. My interaction with the entire team was very consistent and we've had great communication and I do see a little disconnect in communication that remain unresolved and those unresolved issues affect the initiative. How could we improve this? I would say that through better coordination with senior management be it through periodic meetings. I don't know to what extent. I can mention the case of what is currently happening in capabilities and operational readiness versus plan readiness. This is a [topic] that still remains unresolved. Even before I left it was still unresolved.

So I would say that affected effectiveness and it's evident that they have an opinion that I share and it is that it has not yet permeated the directorate. Up until I left we continued working on that and part of what should happen is that, yes, there is room for improvement there and human capital and logistics are also a part of this. And when I left, and after improving interaction with them, I think that all this has to do with a systemic view. It isn't just a planning issue. Human capital is the bulk of our budget and I would say that human talent issues inside the services deserves a lot more priority. And, I don't know, I think that we have yet to look at the different results per field or per area. That is what comes to my mind. And something else that is related to the allocation of [human resources to the] Ministry. I'm talking about mainly people resources, I had to work with my bare hands and fingernails last year. I was two people down. And I would say that we are lagging behind in our work. Given all the work projected, it should be strengthened. And even though that is not a DOD or IDA issue, I think that they too should start advocating in favor of this.

I told this several times to the vice-minister. I explained the problem. And I also understand the bureaucratic restrictions and constraints affecting the Ministry, but this is a topic of great priority and I am convinced that if there is the will, we will find the way. I am convinced that [the Ministry] will need more people. If that doesn't happen, it's going to be very difficult to carry this through.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

**d. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Francisco Moreno**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: As I was telling you, we started off by trying to identify all of those relevant factors that led senior level decision makers to start the transformation process. In your view, Francisco, what were the most relevant factors?

FRANCISCO MORENO: The project started off by offering something that the sector lacked and something that is lacking in the Columbian Government sector and I think that this is true for all the countries of the region and that is they lack a tool to cost what the services have to offer. In this case it's the services. I would say that was the decisive factor.

LINA GONZALEZ: Perfect. Do you recall – and I'm asking you because I knew you used to work at DPP at the time, do you recall the fiscal situation back then? Was it the result of cost reduction or was it more a matter of transparency?

FRANCISCO MORENO: There were limited resources at the time but there was something else which was having clear criteria to make a better use of resources. It wasn't so much a matter of monetary constraints [at the time] but more so to use money more efficiently.

LINA GONZALEZ: Second question, do you believe that other countries played a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process?

FRANCISCO MORENO: No.

LINA GONZALEZ: In your opinion, what were the reasons that led to decide working with the U.S.?

FRANCISCO MORENO: The answer would be the same answer to the first question. They came here to offer something we needed and what they had to offer was a very practical tool for obtaining information and that's why it was decided to work on this effort.

LINA GONZALEZ: The other part of the question is how does the process start and what was the planned role of the U.S. advisors.

FRANCISCO MORENO: Yes. The purpose was to develop a system that would allow the armed services to better [estimate] costs. That was its aim.

LINA GONZALEZ: What was the contribution they were to provide?

FRANCISCO MORENO: They provided the software to do all this and they also supplied technical assistance for data gathering to gather and process the information. They also provided training and they were working on providing training, gathering and processing data.

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you recall when this all started?

FRANCISCO MORENO: 2010.

LINA GONZALEZ: Just before you left?

FRANCISCO MORENO: I would have to double check. Let me check my emails a minute and I can answer that question. 2009. Yes, 2009. Contact was established in 2009 and it all started in 2010.

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you believe that there were other lines of support that were not considered and you could have [worked on] but it didn't happen for some reason?

FRANCISCO MORENO: The truth is I was there at the very onset of the process so I couldn't answer that question very well.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question six, as far as you can recall, what did you find effective in your work with IDA?

FRANCISCO MORENO: We did some initial costing exercises that I think were very useful and we simply installed the tool and that allowed us to cover new actions by the services. A lot of training was provided so that Ministry officials could use the tool.

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you think any of things we've been talking about was not effective?

FRANCISCO MORENO: No. Everything was effective.

LINA GONZALEZ: Was IDA support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?

FRANCISCO MORENO: Yes, of course.

LINA GONZALEZ: Focusing on what we've been talking about in terms of achieving sectorial goals, at the time did you see any connection with the sector objectives? I mean, were there any contributions to the accomplishment of sector objectives?

FRANCISCO MORENO: When you say sector objectives –

LINA GONZALEZ: In terms of the defense and security sector.

FRANCISCO MORENO: Yes, of course. This contributed information on the cost of [sector] policies on how costs could be affected, for example, by policy changes.

LINA GONZALEZ: Last question. I don't know whether this last question applies but, you know, thinking about the beginning, how could IDA or the DOD improve its contribution? Do you think that -- I mean, could you -- do you recall any recommendations you would have made back then?

FRANCISCO MORENO: You mean an effort to help build trust? It wasn't easy to get any information from the services and I think that was due mainly to lack of trust on the part of the services.

LINA GONZALEZ: Anything else you'd like to add?

FRANCISCO MORENO: Yes, I would say that trust, trust was the most important aspect.

LINA GONZALEZ: I know that, you know, with you this interview is going to be short and concrete, but I'd still like to ask you if there is anything you would like to mention and that I failed to ask you, you know, within the framework of the work I described to you that I'm doing.

FRANCISCO MORENO: No, I think it's an effort that should be preserved. We should maintain the effort. I don't know how far they ever got, but it should be something that covers the service actions that are most important in resource terms. That would be very valuable to have that information.

LINA GONZALEZ: Okay, Francisco. That's it. Thank you very much.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

**e. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Diana Quintero**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: As I was mentioning earlier, Diana, the idea is to discuss the factors that proved critical in the onset of this project. So the question is, what do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers to initiate a transformation process in Colombia's future force structure?

DIANA QUINTERO: First, the need for modernization, the political will of the ministry, the political will of the president and minister, and the importance of doing so, as well as the continuation of a process. This is something that had started around 2007, even though I arrived in 2011. Vice Minister Pinzón started the transformation process. He started by establishing vice ministers. This was the continuation of his effort, and the new offices were set up like the sectoral study office. This was a directorate established in 2008. I was its first director, and in 2011, it was reformed. So it is the continuation of a process of a strategic thinking of the Minister himself, who started this while he was Vice Minister. Part of his team while he was Vice Minister was the same team he had when he was Minister. So I see it as the continuation of an effort, it's not our coming in and deciding to issue a new decree. This was the result of analyzing what had been done, what worked, what didn't, and we also profited very much. I personally did.

IDA had already done some prior work, work that Yaneth [VM Giha] had initiated while she was Vice Minister, and that helped us round out the [work program] that actually changed the institution, but always with two principles, these being modernization according to international standards and a more effective civilian control of the military apparatus. I would say these are the two guiding principles. I mean, they weren't exactly principles, it was not based on a cost reduction principle, nor that kind of principle, but it was a principle of efficacy more than efficiency.

LINA GONZALEZ: Second question. Did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process? In such case, what countries do you think were relevant and what was their inference?

DIANA QUINTERO: You mean other countries besides the U.S., or just the U.S.? I would say that the U.S. was key, and, second, England, the UK. I am convinced that the United States, UK, and NATO, in general. A lot of emphasis was attached to issues like transparency as well as the analysis, and, obviously, the NATO model was very important to us. That's how I would summarize, but I would say that the U.S. played a very important role.

LINA GONZALEZ: What was [the USG] influence in the startup or the onset of this process?

DIANA QUINTERO: The U.S. was very much interested in these changes being implemented. We had been discussing this since 2007 with the U.S. military group. I personally recall a visit to the logistics agency, the [Defense Logistics Agency] because that's when we started to think about having a logistics directorate and having joint logistics processes for the services. And I'd say this started even earlier with Plan Colombia, that helped create SILOG.<sup>71</sup> This started with Plan Colombia, and that seed was planted by the U.S., and this helped us ask ourselves many questions regarding logistic affairs.

We become stronger by creating more directorates, a more hierarchal structure, not very flat. We start asking questions in areas different from logistics, but if we're thinking about the true genesis, everything starts with Plan Colombia and SILOG, that modernizes the day-to-day work of the services and their relationship with the ministries. So Plan Colombia played a very important role, as did the military group's presence, as well as the exchange of information between Colombia and the United States. Obviously, knowledge and resources, plus, we also worked with the UK. England is more silent in its cooperation with Colombia, but there's a lot of cooperation with the UK in strategic areas. And we had also been discussing best practices, and Colombians desire to have best practices lead us to look at NATO, the U.S., and even Korea. South Korea also participated because we did have some conversations on good practices with South Korea. We did not have direct cooperation.

LINA GONZALEZ: Third question. What are the reasons that led to initiating the process with the U.S. government? How did the process start, and what was the role planned initially for U.S. support for the IDA advisors?

DIANA QUINTERO: I think that this started with the modernization linked to Plan Colombia, which is something that happened before IDA starts. It [started] with SILOG at a ministry level, you know, with the school, the helicopters, and many of the things done with the U.S. military group. So the modernization starts with SILOG. And why did we opt -- why did we decide to work with the U.S.? Their expertise, first, and, second, because the United States has a military group in our Ministry of Defense at Colombia. And, third, because the United States was interested in improving Colombia's capabilities. And, fourth, personally, during my time as director and Vice Minister, I viewed the IDA team as an advisory team, as an expert group. We always wanted a team that would help us build the capabilities instead of, you know, doing their work and leaving or leaving us manuals behind.

---

<sup>71</sup> SILOG is an SAP software system. It is managed by the Ministry of National Defense. Its original purpose was to track parts coming into the defense sector and associate them with their contract line item numbers. In this way, SILOG verified when parts were ordered and delivered by a vendor.

So the way I viewed the DIRI team from the very beginning, for good or for bad, was knowing that we needed people who wanted to be our partners, who wanted to coach us, support us, help us improve our capabilities without imposing anything. And that created a lot of tension at some points; at other points, not very strong tensions, but there was always a bit of tension, because the tendency is to impose, and I would say that the challenge was that nothing be imposed, but, rather, we build capabilities together. And that was achieved in the end, I think, that we did build some very important capabilities in Colombia, not that DIRI advisors imposed their views on us.

LINA GONZALEZ: In your opinion, and based on what we've just discussed as well as the planned role for the DOD advisors in the beginning, which were or have been the DOD team's contributions to the process?

DIANA QUINTERO: Monumental. The first, its role as capability builder, I would say that they fully understood Colombia's needs, and then what was a bit difficult was, you know, the pace at which we work in Colombia and the way we work in Colombia, to put it kindly. When they tried to impose a vision and this happened and logistics and human capital, at least that's how I see it, I stopped them.

Our teams never allowed having a vision imposed on them. On the contrary, we built the vision together. Regarding human capital, for example, and I will, you know, tell you the story here and now, is that some very important characters, very knowledgeable, went to work with human talent division, but didn't have much knowledge or information about Colombia. They were unable to understand us and simply wanted to impose their will, and that was their attitude. No one paid attention to them, to such an extent that I had to go to Jeannie<sup>72</sup> and tell them, "This team doesn't work. If this is the kind of people you are going to send me, don't send me anyone, because I don't want my people or yours to waste their time." And that created a problems in DIRI, that's the feeling I have, but in the end, they sent a team that was an improvement. But human talent took a bit longer to start, precisely because of that, because for a very long time, they sent the wrong people. There was a small group of people who believed that since they had done it before, they wanted to do it again the same way, and it didn't work, and that fortunately, improved. In logistics we went through different stages, and we also identified clear roles, and those roles came to an end, so we had to move on to the subsequent stage, which was to improve the logistics agency<sup>73</sup> under General Perez, and I don't think DIRI liked that very much at the time.

---

<sup>72</sup> The Vice Minister is referring to Jeanne Giraldo. Ms. Giraldo, at that time, was the Program Manager for the Defense Institution Reform Initiative. Ms. Giraldo is an employee at the Naval Post-Graduate School's Center for Civil Military Relations.

<sup>73</sup> The logistics agency she is referring to is GSED. It is the Vice Ministry for Defense Business and Well Being. General Perez (retired) was the Vice Minister of GSED.



So, yes, we did have a constant dialogue. We built the capabilities, we exchanged best practices, and those are the most important contributions, I'd say, because they send people who do have practical experience, and that was very helpful. They helped us a lot.

LINA GONZALEZ: Very well. Question 5. In your opinion, what have been, or were, other lines of support not explored with DIRI, that we failed to explore with DIRI?

DIANA QUINTERO: Many. I would say that in respect of policy, we could have done a bit more. I'm not sure that this was just a DIRI issue. I believe that in respect of statistics, we could have done a lot more, I believe that in the area of the white papers, like the steering documents, we could have done a lot more. We started to do, I don't know whether that continued, we continued working with the different ministry agencies, and we started working with the general command, and that was very important. I hope it continued because I would say that the bulk of what we did at the ministry, we were not able to reflect this appropriately at the general command. But in the end of my tenure, [the IDA team under DIRI sponsorship] started working with the general command. I don't know whether that prospered or not, but when we asked DIRI to work with general command, they became a bit scared, they didn't have the resources, the funds. But the idea was that the mirror between the ministry and the general command did not exist. I hope it's been built. In my days, the ministry was more advanced in respect of best practices and standards [than the] general command. And that created tension and prevented the transformation from being easier. Yes, in the areas of the general command, statistics, and policy.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question six. Of the lines of work carried out with DIRI, which do you consider were or are effective in the transformation initiative of the ministry?

DIANA QUINTERO: In my opinion, I would say that the most effective one was the capability work, capability projections, and all the cost analyses work we did. I believe that included, and I don't know how things are being done today, but having brought FOCIS to Colombia in general and to the Ministry of Defense, in particular, it breaks the story in two. We have a before and an after in our dialogue with the services. Our internal dialogues or dialogue with other sectors, like the Ministry of Finance, and the creation and of DPC, the capability planning directorate, and I understand that today, DPC has managed to do a lot of capability work that has been taken out of the services, and I would say that that was a resounding success that worked to such an extent that today it is being shared with other countries. And I believe that's something that's very important. I would say those are the two most important. I believe that the force structure, the force planning, and all the budgeting work are key and will continue to be very important.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question seven. I think you've answered this, but could you elaborate on the lines of work that you felt were not very effective in the work with DIRI?

DIANA QUINTERO: Human capital, in the beginning, today, I don't know. I don't know how -- what it is like today. I was there -- I was four years in the ministry, and maybe

it started being effective, I'd say, in the last 18 to 24 months. I cannot say it was effective before that. And I don't know how things are today.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question eight. In your opinion, was DIRI support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?

DIANA QUINTERO: Yes. In Colombia it was. I don't know if this is true in other countries, but in Colombia, for example, when a foreigner gives us advice, it is -- it is viewed as good, and it is very important to have people who can validate the process, and besides being our consultants, provide us with methodologies. They helped us validate our efforts, and they also helped us validate our work in the eyes of the services. So it wasn't something that the Minister of Defense or the Vice Minister or the director were inventing, but this is something that was brought over from the U.S. and that was very important for our work, having the U.S. seal on our work.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question 9. In terms of accomplishing sectoral objectives, what is the contribution or impact of DIRI support?

DIANA QUINTERO: I cannot say that nothing would have been done if DIRI hadn't been there, but they acted as a catalyst, as a validator. At some point we got together and decided that this, at such a slow pace, wouldn't work, that if we were going to play the slow game, we were not interested. But when we took the reins of this topic and things started to step up, well, DIRI adapted, and that was very important. And the Ministry's transformation in terms of its new capabilities, plus all the plans developed by the different directorates to look at the transformation plans of the Ministry and services, it is there. It exists, there are books, there are manuals, and that was very important, even more important than budgetary aspects.

LINA GONZALEZ: Last question. How could DIRI improve its effectiveness or contribution to the successful -- to the success of the transformation initiative?

DIANA QUINTERO: You've only been asking about DIRI. I think that more so than DIRI itself, I would say, that working with the authorities at the right level, if it's the Vice Minister, for the Vice Minister to be well informed, and I feel that IDA and DIRI would have to answer that. I think that IDA was able to set up a team or found a team that was very demanding on DIRI, and they paid attention. Maybe in other countries, DIRI is there, but their counterparts don't necessarily pressure them. And in our case, it was the two of us [IDA and the MND] working in the same direction. So if DIRI loses its connection with its customers or clients concerns, well, DIRI would be lost. And they can have all the money in the world, and that doesn't really matter. I don't think that this is a matter of money or time, it is a matter of truly understanding the problem, and, also, be able to meet the client's needs. I remember that when I was there, everything was like for two years

time. And I never forget the meeting with Hal [Laughlin]<sup>74</sup> when he said, "No, we either have it ready in six months or this won't do." And he almost died, but it worked. And this helped to pressure everyone then, you, us, that sense of urgency that one has in the Ministry is something that DIRI does not have.

So if you are to ask me what would I change in DIRI, it is not DIRI dependent, but, rather, depends on the authority with whom they are working, is that sense of urgency, that they are in office and not in academia. It's always easier to be the academic that can take three years to write the paper than to be the practitioner. So I know that this is not just DIRI dependent, it depends a lot on the quality of the authority in the country they are working in and also the quality of the people that makeup the DIRI team on the ground. Because there's a bit of everything.

LINA GONZALEZ: Are there things that we haven't mentioned and you'd like to mention?

DIANA QUINTERO: Like I told you earlier, what we call the ownership, that the government of Colombia and the Ministry of Defense or the Vice Ministry decided that this is -- this was something that had to be done, and we assigned and allocated the resources, we devoted the time, the people, the working hours, the presence, at DIRI -- people felt that the Vice Minister didn't have to be pressuring all the time, but Yaneth and I, as heads, decided to pressure DIRI. Without that kind of pressure from the vice ministers, DIRI would not have been successful without that pressure. I would say that the good and the bad isn't just DIRI because you have good and bad on both sides. But the idea is to have this high level pressure on your advisors and your team to deliver.

LINA GONZALEZ: Anything else? No? That's it? Thank you very much.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

---

<sup>74</sup> Hal Laughlin was and still is the team lead for the IDA team working in Colombia. In 2015, he became the overall lead for the entire DIRI (now DGMT) effort in Colombia.

**f. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Juliana Garcia**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers in initiating a change in initiating a transformation process inside the Ministry?

JULIANA GARCIA: I would say it was continuing the line of thought on the part of senior leadership because when we started this the [DPP] director was Yaneth Giha and the vice minister for [strategy and] planning was Juan Carlos Pinzon. Ever since they came into the Ministry of Defense, they had this obsession of organizing the budget in such a way that the discussions with the services would be the result of an analysis and in response to needs instead of the historic inertia of budgets.

I think it's very important to underline that this made things easier and it has to do with the nature of the Ministry of Defense and what it does is to bring together four different budgets. So that was a discussion that had to take place with other institutions and agencies [within the Defense and Security Sector] that are practically independent from the Ministry of Defense. So we started by thinking about what would be the best way to not just allocate the budget, respecting the needs of each service, but to also have a way -- a means of demanding results based on the budgets allocated to each service.

We started working as a small team inside the planning directorate. But a point came when it was evident that we had to take a step towards this becoming something institutional, not just pure research, but an institutional issue. And I would say that the DRMS - later DIRI - proposal came at the right time plus it was wonderful for an independent, objective institute like IDA would come and help us in the process because that helps validate the process with the services as well.

This is something we started doing in 2009, if I'm not mistaken. So we started working with IDA and we started working on small things. We started with a series of pilots that focused on budgeting and planning and I think that it is equally important the way IDA works because it's been eight years that IDA has been coming constantly every month and what that means is that all those of us at the Ministry had a very agitated day-to-day but there were certain days a month that you had to devote to this topic and this helped create discipline in the people looking into budget issues and affairs. You know, continuity in the line of thought in the MOD senior leadership was very important.

LINA GONZALEZ: Do you believe that other countries played a role in the decision to initiate the transformation process? If yes, what countries and how did they influence the decision?

JULIANA GARCIA: When we were starting all this, I remember that there were successful experiences and I personally knew of two, these being first the U.S., naturally, and second, Chile. We went to Chile to look at their result-based budgeting system.

Many other things have been said on paper. They say Australia and that there are other experiences, but the ones I had the chance to get to know in-depth were those two, the U.S. and Chile.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question three. What were the reasons why we decided to work with U.S. assistance and how did the process start?

JULIANA GARCIA: The first reason is the close relationship between the two governments. This happens within the framework of the bilateral meetings of the two governments. And as I said earlier, it came at the right time when we were considering taking that step of starting to qualify the budget.

Second, which I also mentioned, has to do with IDA's experience in defense. And third, wanting to institutionalize the process because [people leave]; Yaneth left, the Vice Minister [Quintero] left, I eventually left. When it started, I was the coordinator for budget follow up and follow through and this started as an attachment to my coordination. On the one hand we had IDA [led by] Hal. You know, back in my day only IDA would come to Columbia and we also hired two consultants here locally in Columbia, Francisco Moreno and Filipe – I forget his last name.

In any event, the two were very knowledgeable in budgets. Francisco knew a lot about investments because he had come over from Finance. And IDA would come every so often back then. We would get together, develop work plans and Francisco and Filipe would just think about that. Francisco and Filipe came in before IDA. But like I said, you know, we all left and in spite of our all leaving, this was something that had already become institutional because IDA continued to come because we knew Francisco was also going to leave. And that's how it all started and it started only in budget issues. This was inside DPP and in the beginning it was attached to the budget follow-through group, which was my group, I was the coordinator.

LINA GONZALEZ: In your opinion, what have been or were the contributions of the DIRI team to the process?

JULIANA GARCIA: I believe that the objectiveness. There were things that maybe we were already predisposed and thought that what we were thinking about doing was the way to do it. However, they gave us options and helped us to approach this topic differently. They helped us think different. With the passing of time what I've seen is that there's the advantage that they have strengthened their relationship with the services and that has also been very good and I also believe, again, that, you know, the sustained effort. The defense sector is not easy. The services are not easy and having them believe you is not easy either.

But when they see the same people participating in the effort for so many years, people start believing.

In Defense people are non-believers. They do not believe in sharp changes. They think that this is a project that someone thought of, they will try implementing it and will fail. People do not believe in short term efforts and they put up barriers to prevent their success. However, this continuous long-term effort has been part of our success.

LINA GONZALEZ: In your opinion, Juliana, what have been or were other lines of support not explored with DIRI in your time?

JULIANA GARCIA: I don't know. It may be other countries, but I think that we did an assessment and we knew no other country would help us in such a permanent, constant manner. It may have been, you know, the national budget authorities. I'm talking about DNP<sup>75</sup> and the Ministry of Finance. However, you know, looking at things after the facts, they never had nor will they ever have time to do those processes and they too were skeptical in the beginning of our ability to do it. And maybe experiences we never explored were local experiences, never. That's something we never, ever did and I had come from the territorial office of DNP and I know that there are many territorial authorities that have also undergone their own transformations. We never looked into those possibilities. We never looked into those.<sup>76</sup>

LINA GONZALEZ: Question six. Which lines of work with DIRI do you consider were/are effective in the development of the transformation initiative?

JULIANA GARCIA: I would say budget planning. I, to a certain extent, would add capabilities. The thing is the true changes were seen in the budget. In capabilities a lot of head way was made, but in respect of the budget, things have changed and the things we did have proven very useful for several years now. I am very skeptical in respect of human talent. I believe that, you know, maybe I don't know that very well. However, I never saw the movement we saw in our budget directorate. I did not see the same thing in the other directorates. And maybe because they started later so they too had their own learning curve and maybe later on they will show good results. But, you know, what I saw during that last year of my tenure at the Ministry, I would say that the biggest results were in budget in very concrete areas, very useful as well as in respect of capabilities.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question seven explicitly asks what lines of work were not very effective. You've already mentioned them. Would you like to add anything else?

---

<sup>75</sup> DNP: The Department of National Planning in Colombia

<sup>76</sup> Author's note: DRMS, DIRI, DGMT were all programs offered by the U.S. Department of Defense. With some exceptions that do not cover the DRMS, DIRI, or DGMT programs, the Department of Defense is not legally authorized to use its program resources to work directly ministries other than the Defense Ministry.

JULIANA GARCIA: No. No, I'd say that human capital and logistics.

LINA GONZALEZ: Question eight. In your opinion, was/is the U.S. support decisive in the development of the transformation initiative?

JULIANA GARCIA: Yes. I believe that the overarching concept was naturally the result of a lot of people thinking about this and having, you know, the Ministry senior leadership on board. I believe that the U.S. contributed concrete tools that have helped the transformation effort occur.

LINA GONZALEZ: Nine. In terms of the accomplishment of sectorial objectives, what is the contribution of U.S. support and did it have any impact?

JULIANA GARCIA: Of course, to the extent that the budget is linked to achieving sectorial objectives, the impact is monumental. It's everything. And in specific things like the [analysis of the] wealth tax, execution [of the wealth tax], et cetera, which were very important sectorial objectives at the time, had a very important impact.

LINA GONZALEZ: Last question. How could DIRI improve its effectiveness?

JULIANA GARCIA: I think that in respect of human talent and logistics, I don't know whether it's a matter of, you know, personal relationships or -- because the thing is we [in DPP] have been -- we've had the same people coming for many years and now we have a relationship of friendship. Everything flows much better today and I don't know whether it's that but my recommendation would be a sustained continuous effort in those areas. Budget and capabilities are now moving on their own in that direction but I would put a bigger effort into human capital and logistics.

What else can I say? I think that they've taken a very important step while I was there and I'm talking about the link with the general command. I think that was missing and it's very, very important. You know how the services are. Everybody rotates, people come and go, and I think that was missing [initially] in the [transformation] strategy which was to institutionalize this in the services. If there comes a time when there's an administration that doesn't like the program, it's good to have this institutionalized in the military services. What we were unable to do, and I don't know whether we should recommend it, is the [national] police. I don't know if you'll be able to achieve that because it would be very, very, very important to have the police on board, participating. But this is something that has been reflected in the fact that we've never been able to have, you know, a sincere budget relationship with the police. That's why I would recommend making the effort of bringing the police on board, but I don't know if that's going to be possible or achievable.

LINA GONZALEZ: Is there anything that I have not asked you and that you think is important to mention, whatever that is? Would you like to add anything else?

JULIANA GARCIA: I think that the Columbian case is a role model. I think that very few countries of the world have a success story to tell in the defense sector. That could

very well be true in other government sectors or in other sectors of the economy, but I would say that there are very, very few countries that actually have done this in the defense sector as we have done and [DIRI] should exploit that more. I don't know whether [DIRI] has brought this model to other countries and is showing it, I don't know that, but I do believe that they should make room and not just decision makers, but the people who have lived the process at the very base. I'm talking about the services. I mean the people who actually work on the budget. It would be wonderful for them to know about the Colombian experience. It could prove very beneficial to others.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)



**g. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Jaime Medina**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

LINA GONZALEZ: My first question is what do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior level decision makers in initiating a transformation in the way in which the Ministry of Defense plans its future force structure?

That's the question. Nonetheless, I do want to underline that is something I've done in previous interviews, as well. Others have made me realize that these weren't just factors by Columbian senior level decision makers but at a high level, the U.S., as well. But my question is, what are the relevant factors that gave life to the transformation initiative?

JAIME MEDINA: I would say that the process does not start as a transformation process. It started as an initiative and, from a budget perspective, to be able to link the defense policy to the budget without necessarily thinking that we were going to change the organization. That was not the initial idea. I would say that halfway into the process or three years into the process when Minister Pinzon wanted to sell the initiative as something we were doing because of the times we were living and he started calling it transformation. We were the first to be surprised because in our mission as provided in the decree that gives life to us which was to implement the capability-based planning methodology. First it was a tool then it became a political initiative and finally it became the pillar for the modernization of the sector though it did not start like that. It was more a need to sell the defense sector as a sector that was always at the forefront and ready to stand up to any challenge in uncertain environments.

LINA GONZALEZ: My second question, other countries played a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process. In such case, what countries were relevant and how did they contribute?

JAIME MEDINA: I don't know firsthand whether there was any pressure by other countries for us to change but at least we were interested in showing our allies that our defense system was ready or was always ready thanks to this permanent process of change. And we also wanted to show the U.S., our traditional ally, that we were undergoing changes. The ability to sell ourselves as a defense sector coming out of an irregular conflict and is changing in preparation for a new scenario opened doors to continue receiving support.

LINA GONZALEZ: In your opinion, Jaime, what were the reasons that led to incorporate U.S. Government assistance through IDA in this transformation process? How did the process start? And in the beginning, when you started, what was the planned role for the U.S.-provided advisors?

JAIME MEDINA: I think this process starts not so much as a specific request by the U.S., but as far as I know and have heard, this was an initiative of the then Vice Minister

of Defense, Yaneth Giha, who has always studied and researched defense. She, as director of the budget, had the chance to travel to England and to Kings College and she realized that there were other ways of looking at the defense economy. And the first idea came after looking at the British system. That makes her understand at least from a budget perspective, not necessarily thinking about the services transformation, she did realize the importance of implementing a new methodology and that is the seed for all the changes we have seen.

This seed is well received by Juan Carlos Pinzon who has a monumental network and many friends in the U.S. He finds a way to make this real, to materialize it, and he starts with the strategic planning guide then he receives support in terms of, you know, the expert help we needed. And thanks to Minister Pinzon's contacts, we get [initially to DRMS] and IDA. But I would say that the initial idea was Yaneth Giha's idea and she was looking more at the Brits than the Americans.

LINA GONZALEZ: In that regard, what was the planned role for U.S. advisors?

JAIME MEDINA: It started small and it turned into something into very big, very beautiful and for that very same reason at this point in the process, I would say some five years later, we have had to restate and deepen certain areas that were not clearly identified in the beginning. In the beginning the perspective was more of a budget perspective and greater emphasis was given to aligning the defense budget. The initial vision was more budgetary. It was smaller in scope. The idea was, you know, to ensure the traceability of the money.

At the time we did not give much emphasis to how to connect to the services, how to take into account military doctrine, how to see what we had and did not have in respect of doctrine. And in the first part of the work, we first had like a head-on collision with the services and that was fixed through hard work and working groups who were willing to be flexible and work with the services because the methodology of how to interact with the services, how to bear in mind their doctrine, that is something that we made up along the way but that created very big conceptual badges and today that we're formalizing the process we are better understanding this. So the scope was not the original scope nor was the consultancy process then per say the right one for what we are doing today. And that has two consequences, a positive one and a negative one. The positive consequence is that it has allowed us to learn and develop our own process that today is not the Paul Davis or DIRI or Chilean or Spanish model. It's our own.

And it's very peculiar because it includes the national police and we were able to observe the police thanks to the fact that we did not have a rigid format. But the negative consequence and here I must underline the stubbornness of the services. In leaving aside military doctrine, we have changed the original conception of how to deal with military services and today we have to work on that. That is what we have to do now. It's not that

we've wasted time or maybe we did lose a bit of time and creditability because we didn't know where we were heading in the beginning. I think that's what happened.

LINA GONZALEZ: Now that you've mentioned this -- now that you've mentioned these topics about the things that were done right and the things that you were able to do differently, let's start with in your opinion what are the contributions of the DIRI team to this process? What have been or were the contributions of the DIRI to the process?

JAIME MEDINA: There's an important thing I'd like to say and it is that the DIRI team -- the IDA team -- has helped us save time because they have guided us towards the relevant contents of the different areas because they do know where the knowledge lies and they've conveyed the concepts to us or they've given us the bibliography or they've put us in contact with experts. So that is undeniable and that has saved us a lot of time in terms of the research we would have been forced to do and they have focused us with their advice and whenever we've had any doubts as to how to continue the process, we've always received their timely advice. Second, they've been very flexible in the implementation of the concept and that has also allowed us to change the methodology according to our needs. That's been very positive. Third, normally we have had people who are open-minded with a broad vision of the different topics, always making reference to best practices and that, in my view, has created a very good working environment with the team. I mean, this creating a good environment in the team is no minor issue and the fact that it's a very close team is very important because this allows the group to deal with situations that are not defined in a manual. So that's one of the positive aspects that I see in our work.

LINA GONZALEZ: You've mentioned this in passing but I want you to be a bit more explicit and to elaborate a bit more on this. In your opinion, what have been or were lines of support not explored that could have given a lot of value to the process?

JAIME MEDINA: I understand that DIRI came to support the Ministry of Defense and not the general command and services. I understand that was the initial intent. The thing is one cannot create a process inside the Ministry of Defense without interacting with the general command and the services and in that regard, yes, we did take too long in interacting with the services and that -- and, you know, in the beginning DIRI and IDA was not to blame for that. And that's why topics that are key today in order to continue this process like operational concepts, like truly understanding what we have written in doctrine creates an additional difficulty to the process and we'll deal with it. But since the initial approach was the Ministry, the [uniformed] services were disregarded.

And the other thing I think is very important to mention is that the initiative was sold as something small or not very transcendental and in the beginning we did not have the decided support of senior management. The ability to present the transformation issues to the Commander's agreement has been very difficult for my office. It's been viewed almost as a favor. At that level it hasn't been registered or recorded as something formal and it's

only until now, thanks to the directive we're working on, has the process received the backing, the force and guidance of the Ministry. So I think that the process wasn't properly sold. Evidence thereof is that the participation in the process has depended more on the people that make up the directorate than the effort of everyone here at this directorate more so than an initiative that has the force and support of the Minister.

The process has helped us sell to politicians that we're doing something but internally it did not have the force that the vice minister wants to give it. It was not sold well, started with little support, and that's why it's been so difficult to get to where we've gotten. I remember clearly what General Javier Pettis said when he was the [General Command's] chief of staff. He said, "Don't worry. This is just a change of format." And that's very revealing of how the process started.

LINA GONZALEZ: Looking at the lines of work done with DIRI, in your opinion, what has proven effective?

JAIME MEDINA: I would say that the knowledge base and all the advice we've received has been very effective. That's why we are where we're at and that has allowed us to do other things, as well. What could have been more effective?

LINA GONZALEZ: That's my next question.

JAIME MEDINA: There are two things when you are in a process such as this. One is knowing the technical content which is something I think DIRI does very well. They have the experts, they have the access to the information, that's one thing. But there's another topic and I'm talking about the management of the process itself and having a consultancy methodology that they lack. I think that DIRI lacks sitting down to structure [to assess] a process starting with a diagnosis to know what is the institution that it's going to intervene within, what to attach priority, strength to and ensure things are done in a timely manner. I think that we started with a very important topic without having the people and services ready...work such as phase one, get to know this. That does not exist.

You know, given the fantastic technical knowledge, they need people who know how to implement organization change and how to manage those processes. Any DIRI intervention is for change. You don't want to intervene to continue the same. You intervene to change.

LINA GONZALEZ: Are there any other initiatives that you feel require improvement?

JAIME MEDINA: Yes, I think that the model is -- extends too long in time and there's a lot of rotation in the people participating in the exercise. I think that this exercise should be having people taking two, three or six months devoted to this intervention and to work full time on that because coming a week or once a month or once every month-and-a-half allows extending the process too much in time and when processes that require so many

people, it makes -- it's very difficult because there's a lot of rotation. You have to bring people up to speed and you overload the office and that is what has happened all this time. And another very important aspect is the timing of the process. That should also be taken into account.

LINA GONZALEZ: Having identified the lines of work, the effective efforts and the not so effective efforts, those that could be improved, do you think that U.S. assistance has been decisive for the successful development of the initiative?

JAIME MEDINA: Yes. Without them, this would have been impossible. There was room for improvement and obviously there is a 90/10 relationship, 90 positive, ten to be improved. And I complain about that ten percent but we now have a capability-based planning structure. People understand that they are accountable for the proper use of the resource to have tools to ensure follow up and follow through to do that effectively and efficiently.

That has -- you know, that's priceless today in any meeting for acquiring something through any source of funds has to include the capability that will be effected by the project. It must also relate to existing inventory and as part of an existing capability. I mean, that's a gain and there's no going back. And I think that that's the most important aspect besides all the conceptual tools and formats that can be improved.

LINA GONZALEZ: This next question is general but in terms of accomplishment of sectorial objectives in security and defense, do you think that DIRI's efforts have translated into a contribution or impact?

JAIME MEDINA: Yes, of course. The example that reveals all the impact of our work is if you read the most recent strategic plan, it is the fruit of all the work done by this [DPC] office. So what I'm saying is that if we can all currently influence the most important documents of the sector to develop a strategic plan based on capabilities with mission areas talking about capabilities and closing gaps, the impact is -- it's monumental. It's complete. There's no doubt whatsoever there. And that maybe it's a cultural issue that they don't understand or don't share and think that the process could be better and have better definitions or capabilities but people are no longer thinking about, you know, planning based on shopping list but now everyone is doing capability planning and thinking in terms of capability planning.

LINA GONZALEZ: Last question, Jaime. How could DIRI improve its effectiveness? How could we improve DIRI initiatives to impact more sectorial objectives?

JAIME MEDINA: I think that DIRI's task -- and DIRI should view its task not as the implementation of tools but rather intervening [in] a system. They lack that. To have a systematic vision, to clearly understand the methodology of how to implement the intervention more so than the technical content which is excellent and I think that to avoid

extending this a lot of time, a couple of years is a good time and therefore I suggest working intensively with them in the development of concept because they understand the system and there are certain pre-designed activities as well as timelines where we can work.

So I would say two months of intense work followed by four months of work, that would be very, very good while, you know, in the meantime they come down and help us as they have been helping us. Because when things take too long there's a lot of personal rotation. You lose efforts. You lose sight of what you're doing.

LINA GONZALEZ: Thank you very much, Jaime. Do you have anything you'd like to add? Something I failed to ask?

JAIME MEDINA: No.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

#### **h. Audio Transcription of Recorded Interview of Cesar Restrepo**

(WHEREUPON, the following was transcribed from an audio recording, to wit:)

CESAR RESTREPO: Finding peers was very complicated. The language used was very complicated, the objectives. So we were advised initially by MPRI. And MPRI in 1999 comes to help build the institutional framework because the Ministry of Defense was purely military. Civilians were coming in. We needed well educated military. So we should start looking at things since MPRI and see how it has evolved since. The Department of Defense and their power groups manage resources through cooperation. I mean, you don't need to be very romantic to know that.

Nonetheless, what they've done is to achieve the objective...to bring about an institutional structure with which they could communicate. And that's the key of everything and the importance of all their efforts. It is not that the U.S. realized it worked or didn't work. What it realized was the need to establish channels of communication, of understanding, of having partners who would report the information they needed so that they could in turn justify their fund-raising back home as well as their [own] interests. Because there is no free lunch, as we all know. Now, what was successful in Colombia is thanks to our civilian technocracy, very high level civilian technocracy, those who had been ministers and vice ministers since 1999 have been people who were prepared to dialogue, to engage in conversation with them, and they acted as a bridge between a completely informal structure and a structure that was highly formalized, and they transformed it into concrete results.

When I speak of Plan Colombia, I always say that the main result of Plan Colombia was not reducing acreage [of coca planting], but rather generating an institutional framework of security and defense that was very robust professional and technical, and, on top, has irrigated and permeated other state agencies because Plan Colombia and technical cooperation ended up representing "X" effort of institutional capacity building and also building state legitimacy, which is one of the most important aspects of their work. It is so important that the Americans realize that it was very useful and, therefore, would never stop and should never stop, because at the end of the day, they, too, have learned things along the way. There's a movie called War Dogs. Have you seen it?

LINA GONZALEZ: Yes.

CESAR RESTREPO: War Dogs shows [a different way to] manage -- like in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the thing is that if there are no institutions [to] communicate with, then all the medium and low level administrators coming from the U.S. cannot set objectives. So we were able to overcome that.

And to the extent that [institutionalization] progressed, other things happened, and the country through the technocrats and strengthening their civilian base and increasing their knowledge sought to go beyond a relationship of cooperation, and that's why the Minister

includes in his discourse this issue that we are no longer the recipients of your cooperation, we are your partners. So we're talking about -- we're talking differently now. You haven't come here to teach me to do things. I have my stuff, my way of doing things, and let's look at them. But what they [the U.S. Department of Defense] were good for was to co-generate the mirror structure with which they could engage in a dialogue and they could ensure effective communication and coordination.

LINA GONZALEZ: Relating this to the first question, what we're trying to do with these questions is identify the decisive factors, the relevant factors that gave life to this initiative and how they were formulated at the time. So this was -- you have identified things on the U.S. side that was also a motivator of things.

CESAR RESTREPO: Senior leadership in Colombia had the following reflection at the time. They said, it is not that I need this or that, what it does is an analysis of what is being required from me. And that's why we created the human rights directorate, which did not exist, but the waivers and all that, the human rights [pressures] that were so powerful led leadership to say, "How am I going to do this?" So they realized they had to do [something]. Every six months, the State Department would publish a human rights report, and the Human Rights Watch would publish its report once a year. And this, you know, was very complicated. And what did the Minister think at the time? That they were at the mercy of these [reporting organizations], so we are going to produce our yearly human rights report by the Ministry of Defense. Based on how they -- how the counterparts were presenting the [information], we were thinking about our own solutions and requiring, and that's when MPRI arrives. And when it arrives, senior leadership knew that they were not prepared to [utilize] what they were bringing in knowledge terms, and that had to be developed.

And that's why the Ministry of Defense structure has changed some four times since 1999. About four times, and those structural changes have not been capricious changes, they've been evolutionary because each time has required adjusting the structure to respond to the internal [political pressure] and also for our own defense. If the world follows the pathway of capabilities that did not exist 16 years ago, not as clearly as it exists today, when we started the conversation, we realized we had to speak the same language, otherwise we could not communicate. And the biggest problem with cooperation programs in Central America today is that the U.S. is doing things in a War Dog style, give, give, give, give, and there are some people over there, we're sending in all that [explicative] and that's it. But what -- or, rather, the success in Colombia is determined not by giving, but by generating capabilities.

When I was responsible for this, I used to tell them at the embassy that they were squandering their money because in our country, no one is taking ownership of what they're doing. We need teams that help integrate and construct things because they have the key idea.



LINA GONZALEZ: Yes. Okay. My next question, the purpose of my next question is to discuss the importance, the role of the advisors, not just U.S. advisors, but advisors from other countries.

CESAR RESTREPO: There's a key difference. The U.S. was the only one who came down here and stepped into our offices, and they read, even if they did misread -- because on many occasions they misread the information -- even if they did misread, they did come to read the context and establish personal relationships with leaders, with senior management and the troops, and that allowed them to share a lot more knowledge than [just] the knowledge of the programs they represented.

When I went to England with [Vice Minister] Yaneth Giha, one would sit down, you'd hear a lecture, and that was it. That was, you know, just transfer of knowledge, and we would do a lot of networking, and we would write and, you know, that was the culture. If, for example, the [U.S. wishes to study] how to develop the Colombian experience in other countries, what we need to say is that it cannot be done by remote control, that you have to deploy, you have to go in, get in without meddling with the, you know, stupid imperialist rationale, that we're going down there to manage things. No, no, no. The idea is to get into the system, see how it works, and see through what doors or windows they could get into the system, and see what other things have to be done that are not necessarily related to the [specific] cooperation program [any one team represents], like bilingualism, or another example, mathematics, another example, information systems.

There are many skills to be developed. Human capital development is very important because in most countries, which was not the case in Colombia, human capital is not developed by the nation. And I am talking about, you know, Central America, the Caribbean, they don't have their own human capital development dynamics, which was not the case here. Here, the technocracy had studied in U.S. and UK universities, and they had the ability to dialogue

Before IDA, there was Dyncorp that used to [do mobile] training - mobile IMET<sup>77</sup> teams. These were one- or two-week programs. [The courses were in] operations, operations concepts, defense economy. Two-week courses that helped establish a common terminology. It also allowed for a lot of networking, and also the construction of an efficient security and defense communication requires interacting with a sector that is not broken down into little pieces and parts. And all that means that a young Colombian will be recognized and acknowledged by others.

---

<sup>77</sup> International Military Education and Training

LINA GONZALEZ: Let's elaborate on what you've just said. One of the most important added value of interviewing you is to try to rescue that historical memory. I mean, how did the process with IDA start? How did this initiative start?

CESAR RESTREPO: I said the initiative does not start with IDA, as I told you earlier. This was an evolution. When IDA arrived, it arrived at a special juncture. When Yaneth comes to the vice ministry, when the government, the new government is sworn into office [under President Santos], and Pinzón starts saying that the dynamics of the confrontation is catching up on us. We had achieved many things and we were starting to lose ground, and it was necessary for us to shift, to change in respect of capabilities. So senior leadership, we were very fortunate in the Colombia-U.S. dialogue, everyone, some more than others, ended up sending a message saying, "We are going to take the step and we are going to follow this path, and you can accompany us or not." And, obviously, the Americans said, "Okay, yes, let's go for it."

If you recall, for two years we worked with three words: sustainability, flexibility, and adaptability. And all three words, in my view, unleashed something I call economy. Being efficient in our spending, and being effective in the achievement of our missions. In the new phase of our cooperation plan, [it] required spending money to continue with our institutional capacity building and not the giving away stupid gifts.

CESAR RESTREPO: No. My masters in defense management, during the last seven years of my [employment], I in my discourse, when I left the office I said, listen. During the last seven years I've been going to class every day. No one is going to give me a certificate, a diploma for this, but I studied a lot, I learned, I understand, I, you know, explained, apply, correct, assess, what have you. And one of my conclusions is that defense management is where there is room for another country to intervene. The space for defense management are building a strategic vision on security and defense, that's a very broad field, to manage resources, understood as the planning, budgeting, and execution, the logistics process, and one which cuts across them all, called monitoring, follow-up and evaluation. And those are the spaces.

If those five things were re-enforced, what do you accomplish? That each peso, and here I see this in a very businesslike perspective. Every peso I invest in that business will represent profit, but if I don't strengthen these five things, each peso I invest in that company, I am going to lose ten pesos. It is a matter of efficiency. So if I think I wanted to be efficient, what do I want to be efficient [at]? I want my investment to be efficient, and that means I want my interest to be achieved, and it is in those specific fields.

And you have to be very careful. Of course, an American, has [his or her] own approach, and [he or she] has to be very careful in working in favor of your neighbor's interest, not your own, because this is like the person who sells bread when kids are coming

out of school. They want to addict them. If you don't approach them properly, you will never make it.

LINA GONZALEZ: I think we've addressed this in virtual terms, but I want you to be a bit more explicit. In your opinion, of all the lines of work we've discussed, which were effective and which were not?

CESAR RESTREPO: The transformation processes inside these institutions can take anywhere between 15 to 20 years. I [have] lived it. Therefore, knowing what yielded results and what did not is something that cannot be done. Not yet. I can do evaluations, yes. However, capability-based planning, we pulled it through, it became common language, it became common jargon. It starts being part of our norms and standard, parts of our general imagination. Yes. Is this here? Yes. That we don't have results in that line of work, or maybe because the institutional culture is so hard to change that that would only happen later on in time.

[Another] example is human rights. I've always criticized human rights because we develop human rights based on a defensive attitude to avoid being messed with. And I used to think that was wrong, and I still think that vision is wrong because it is a vision that conveys a message. If you're not caught, then you will fall quiet. You will stay silent because our system is to defend ourselves, and that's, you know, the origin of the false positives. The thing is, we needed a culture of internalization, which did not exist.

And the same thing can happen with anything, [for example] what would happen with coordinated joint and interagency. Every presentation by [the National Police] starts with those three words and ends with those three words, and most of them don't even have a clue as to what it means.

And that's the truth. Because incentives are wrongly set up. So to try to analyze that in parts can be mistake. If I understand it as a whole, and on top of that I can assess it not against the process in itself but rather against the results in terms of strategic objectives, then I will know how much progress I've made. I made this progress regarding these results, and the end of the process or the end evaluation of the process can take 20 years.

So I can tell you that in seven years, I've created four generations of technocrats who have left, but not because I fired them, but because they went off to study, other opportunities presented themselves, but they were all trained to come back to generate new views. And we've been very fortunate that the person in the head has understood that if this is politicized that's wrong. And this is true in the military forces, there are certain positions where they themselves, when they sent someone to that position, they say, "Oh, no. They are sending that person because they know in advance he's going to screw up." And that's why I think that [General] Mejia became the commander and officer of the army, because he is a military technocrat.

LINA GONZALEZ: Yes, completely. How relevant has been [DOD's or IDA's] role as creator or rather participant in this transformation process? Do you think they were decisive?

CESAR RESTREPO: If DOD is to be evaluated to be -- for being decisive or not, that's a mistake. That is not the proper evaluation approach, in my view. Nor can it be considered as such in a country having such a strong institutional framework. And there I use myself as an example with a director that had a very tiring way of doing things, and in my country, we have to do what my boss says and not what DOD says, and I think we were all alike with very few exceptions, if any.

Being decisive, what does that mean? I would say that DOD, MPRI and IDA, and all of them have like the Monterrey Post Graduate Center, all those institutions that have cooperated with us have provided us with sufficient tools for processes to have been successful. But [they are not] decisive, because behind the word "decisive" there is a thread I'm going to pull. And it could be -- this is how I interpret it. Has [DOD assistance] been responsible for how things have changed? No. In Colombia? No. At least not in Colombia. There may be in other countries that can happen much easier. And I think that is a lesson learned in their country approach.

For me, in Central America, the key aspect of this is that everybody thinks about that indicator, that these people have come here to be decisive. It is not that they are decisive. Their support is a great accomplishment in itself for the Americans because they are collecting information firsthand. So the word "decisive." It's the wrong word.

You can evaluate whether it was decisive in accordance with the U.S. strategic interest. [Perhaps] it's been decisive, at least for the U.S., but not necessarily for the recipient country. And any cooperation program outside of the U.S. that does not receive the support of the line of cooperation [serve the interest of both nations] is a mistake.

LINA GONZALEZ: This next question is closely tied to what you've just said and other things you've said, and it has to do with the accomplishment of sectoral objectives. Have they been accomplished? Does there exist an impact?

CESAR RESTREPO: The most important, in the year 2011, we set the goal that by 2018 FARC would no longer exist. The easy or the hard way? One year before that, FARC no longer exists. For a war machine to work, all processes must work. If the process does not work, the machine won't move. If the machine does not move, the enemy will win. And that is the main factor for success. DOD was a part of the process [their support].

However, in the sectoral strategy, there are many success indicators. The first is the language. In a very short period of time, what we did was never been done before. When I am at home having a beer with myself, I say, "God, we're good. That team in our office is worth three times its weight in gold because they did in five years something that could

take 15 to 20, and did so painlessly." The language changes in manuals and methods, the generation of the needs -- generate the need for new doctrine. That is not spontaneous, to such an extent that it's been 40 years since we last revised our doctrine. So the process in itself and where DOD has contributed things has given way to the logistic [SILOG] system. And in seven years we're now talking about cataloging, based on the NATO catalog system, and that in itself is a success. And who's been there all along? DOD.

We've taken some very big leaps that the capability planning process was led by civilians, not by military. And that we also brought in policemen when this is typically a defense thing, a defense process. And I would say that the success is such that we are at a time where if our team from seven years ago were asked to develop the methodology in other government sectors, we could do it. After seven years of doing this, for me, our capability development became a structural tool, and we're ready.

LINA GONZALEZ: I agree. Yes. My last question, Cesar. How could U.S. support, talking specifically about DIRI, how could it improve its effectiveness? What else would you ask from DIRI?

CESAR RESTREPO: I repeat: In my opinion, the effect of the support in itself is successful. Asking for more things. That is like opening up the Pandora box. There are lines where I think we have to work on strength.

LINA GONZALEZ: Strengthen?

CESAR RESTREPO: I don't know if that should be done through consultants, for example. Quantitative methods, for example, are very important because our societies, our culture in Latin America, talking about the southern command and its field of action, which is the Caribbean and Central America, does not have that culture and if we are to talk about adaptability, flexibility, and sustainability, we are to talk about monitoring, follow up and evaluation, if we are going to talk about good governance, you know, we can put in positive language everything we want to do, and we see that this is a key tool. It is a fundamental tool, so much so that if you were to isolate yourself from civilian political operators, if I were to be -- if I were put in a room with the commander of the south command and his staff, I would say, "General, sir, generate the line of cooperation to train military in these specific fields. The weakness of military forces in Central and South America and the Caribbean is the result of these military forces' inability to establish a dialogue with their political counterparts. And this is a way of moving away from that lousy discourse of Latin American countries to say that the military are a danger because tomorrow they will wage a coup d'état. That's highly anachronistic, but still very current.

And that's because there is a clear vision that it is through the use of force and not the use of discussion, which is not doing politics. These are two radically different things. That would reverse the weakening of the military services throughout the region. And, obviously, we have to prepare them to be able to receive DIRI [like assistance].

When is DIRI insufficient? When I send guys who speak English to talk to people who speak Quechua. It's not going to work. They won't be able to speak. And I think that we can actually coin the term military technocracy. We are in times of peace. Let's use these people to do technical military things. They don't have to be inside the Ministry of Defense. They can work with the services themselves, have their interlocutors inside each service, and I'd say that is the way to change things.

And I repeat: all these MPRI and DIRIs and IDAs, and all that, obviously, has to look at capability planning and look at doctrine and organization. That is the way to change things. And I repeat: all these MPRI, DIRI, IDA, they have to look at the capabilities equation and simply limit themselves to that. Doctrine and organization. The equation is one thing and the process is another, for these people to develop capabilities. And, obviously, a capability must aim at sustainability because it's very unpopular today to spend in military sectors when the world is on the verge of madness.

How are you going to convince society that you need [more money for the military]. And people say, no, that -- you know, [defense spending] will be taking homes away from people, they won't be building homes. And that's not the case. We have to increase military spending, and that makes a difference. Who is prepared and who is not prepared will make all the difference if all hell is going to break loose. I would talk about efficiencies and common interests. Long haul, obviously, both Americans, as well as Colombians, have to spend money. Every year we reduce it in Colombia. For example, I used to tell the INL people, let's assess how many of the people we've trained are doing what we trained them to do. "Ah, no. [and INL official] said, no, that evaluation wouldn't be good for anything, wouldn't be worth anything."

And in things where we should work very hard on is in needs assessment. Doing needs assessment. In Central America [the USG is] sending this in cooperation and [it is] throwing the money down the toilet. What [USG assistance programs] need is a system for human resource management. To have [their own] doctrine, develop [their own] capabilities, inventories, end user assessment, and [then] teach those people how to do it.

LINA GONZALEZ: What about Follow-up evaluation of work that has been done?

CESAR RESTREPO: If [the USG] wants to get inside, they have to make [the nation they assisted] see the need of them being there. [The USG] spends [so many millions] in this or that cooperation program. What's the impact? [I say] look at the capabilities from the perspective of the administration, the people that's been trained.

Three questions: How long -- I mean, how long did [the people trained] stay in office after they're training, and of that time in tenure [how much time] was dedicated to what I trained them to do, and how many of those people influenced the doctrine, the organization, et cetera, et cetera, and did they make decisions thereon.

LINA GONZALEZ: Thank you very much, Cesar. I think we've covered all the questions. Would you like to emphasize anything else?

CESAR RESTREPO: No. Thank you.

(WHEREUPON, audio recording ends.)

**i. Written Response to Interview Questions from Dora Laverde**

1. *What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior-level decision-makers in initiating a change in the Colombian Defense Sector's way of planning its future force structure?*

The Public Forces' constant struggle to adapt and respond to new defense and security challenges was the main motivator.

Likewise, the need to make the best of scarce resources to provide the Public Forces with new technology led [the sector] to analyze how to improve planning processes and make them more efficient. Decisions should strive to benefit joint work instead of the specific needs of the individual Services.

2. *Did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process? Which countries were relevant and how did they influence the decision?*

As far as I can remember, we analyzed the work done by Israel and the United States. Colombia has always viewed the United States as a standard in areas like doctrine, technology, and others

3. *Why was it decided to incorporate USG assistance through the Defense Resource Management Systems (later DIRI) program in this transformation process? How was the process started and what was the planned role of the USG provided advisors?*

When I arrived at the MOD, the process with DIRI had already started. Two processes were implemented In Human Capital, which is where I worked.

The first was a needs analysis with the Services. One of the DIRI consultants' missions was to guide the exercise and conduct a diagnosis of potential lines of action.

Regretfully this exercise failed to meet the Services' expectations. What was said at the time is that the DIRI advisor took all the credit for a task that was done jointly, thus [the Colombian side lost] confidence in the results.

The second process required specialized advise from DIRI, who brought experienced professionals in different areas of Human Talent in the defense sector. DIRI contacted the Rand Corporation [to provide this support].

The Services' Human Talent and Education Directors agreed the main topics to be tackled and DIRI advisors enriched the discussions with lessons learned and the latest breakthroughs in each topic.



4. *In your opinion, what have been/were the contributions of the USG team in this process?*

One of the most important contributions made by the DIRI team is its experience. In Human Capital we had professionals who had worked in personnel reassignment, determination of profiles, and other personnel development activities. The Services' working groups profited from their knowledge and lessons learned.

5. *In your opinion, what have been/were other lines of support not explored with USG assistance through DRMS or DIRI?*

I don't know how much progress was made in respect of the work agenda we defined with DIRI, but I think that having defined Human Capital management processes that are quick, strict in terms of the conditions, time, and transparency is a big contribution to personnel development.

As well as aligning such processes to capability planning.

6. *Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were/are effective in the development of the transformation initiative?*

I think a lot of headway was made in the Logistics exercise in favor of joint work. It helped identify opportunities for significant savings.

Likewise, the Sector is working on achieving capability-based [planning and program] budgeting, which is a gigantic step towards a more efficient use of resources.

7. *Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were not /are not effective in the development of the transformation initiative?*

I think all lines of work had good results. Nonetheless, I believe the agenda on Human Capital issues still needs a lot of support.

8. *In your opinion, was/is DRMS/DIRI support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?*

Yes, absolutely. Every transformation process needs benchmarks and I am convinced that DIRI support greatly facilitated the evolution of the different lines of work.

9. *In terms of the accomplishment of sectorial objectives, what is the contribution/impact of DRMS/DIRI's support?*

Every transformation process aims at improving the quality and relevance of the work done by the Public Forces in the fulfillment of their mission. In this regard, DIRI's contribution has greatly impacted the way things are done. It created efficiencies and opened options allowing the Services to guide their work in response to new challenges.

*10. How could DRMS/DIRI improve its effectiveness/contribution in the successful development of the transformation initiative?*

I think it is important to provide the Services with practical solutions. On some occasion exercises can be too theoretical and it is important that the time and dedication of each Service to the transformation process translates into punctual changes that bring about benefits.

## **j. Written Response to Interview Questions from Carolina Matamoros**

1. *What do you consider to be the most relevant factors for senior-level decision-makers in initiating a change in the Colombian Defense Sector's way of planning its future force structure?*

a. Budget unsustainability in the medium and long terms. Budget forecasts made it apparent that the way the sector was being planned and managed was not sustainable [over] time, and so it became indispensable to establish a new way of planning that could come up with a way to allocate the resources depending on the various environments that the sector has to face.

b. Planning by the Ministry and the Forces is fragmented and independent, [even though] all agencies [have to draw from] the same budget even [as] they each plan independently. This is the reason why the Budget is normally allocated based more on the forms used and the urgency with which the Budget requests are filed, than based on needs that could be grouped under the sector as a whole.

c. Lack of Long-Term Planning. Since the status of the conflict did not vary, it stopped being indispensable to plan with long-term horizons and this eventually led all the Services and the Ministry to fail to have somebody in charge of long-term planning.

d. The conflict prevailed, in spite of the democratic security policy. That, and the emergence of criminal armed groups and other forms of threat made it look like it was going to be necessary to modify the Sector's response.

2. *Did other countries play a role in the decision to initiate this transformation process? Which countries were relevant and how did they influence the decision?*

The decision to begin the transformation process was greatly influenced by the UK and the USA. They both brought their own experiences and showed them as examples of cases where changes in the sector had been successful. Once the process began, we consulted other countries which turned out to be equally relevant, like Canada, Spain, Argentina and Chile. They all participated in Transformation meetings aimed at positioning the Colombian transformation process within international standards. In fact, in time, the Colombian experience had become relevant to the other countries, during both the initial and implementation phases.

The USA was particularly relevant for our transformation process, due to the support we have received from the DIRI / IDA team. Even before we made the decision, thanks to their help we managed to detect the sustainability problem and the lack of long-term planning. Also, they have advised the Services on other occasions. Also, because they have always worked very closely with Top Management, that has facilitated the development and implementation of the various initiatives.

3. *Why was it decided to incorporate USG assistance through the Defense Resource Management Systems (later DIRI) program in this transformation process? How was the process started and what was the planned role of the USG provided advisors?*

This group had provided strategic advice to various Ministry offices that at least had the overall vision of the sector. It was like the current Strategic Studies Directorate. From there, they began to help our officials detect the various problems and to launch the project. Back then, key actors in the process, like Vice-Minister Pinzón and Vice-Ministers Giha and Quintero held other positions within the same chain of command and when they got promoted, they continued promoting these initiatives with the help of the same group of international advisors.

DIRI's role back then was much more closely linked to education; they sought to train officials in Capability-Based Planning or Budget Sustainability so that they could handle those functions inside the Ministry. They also acted as validators, verifying whether in fact, the MDN's proposals were consistent with the concepts they were introducing.

4. *In your opinion, what have been/were the contributions of the USG team in this process?*
- a. Detecting issues and identifying critical problems of the sector. This includes Capability-Based Planning, Budget Sustainability and the Logistics Master Plan, which are all crucial for the performance of the Vice Minister of Strategy and Planning.
  - b. Providing advice regarding the structural change of the Ministry during the creation of the Capabilities Directorate (DPC) and the Human Capital Development Directorate (DDCH).
  - c. Providing on-going support during the development of the process, where they cooperated by verifying possible hurdles throughout the process and the way to involve both Top Management and the Top Ranks of the Armed Forces.
  - d. Provided consulting for the Forces in their capacity as international agents, when it was necessary to give more credibility to the concepts arising from the transformation process.
  - e. By using their external vision of the process, they identified the coordination issues existing among the various MDN divisions.
  - f. They presented cases similar to the Colombian case, so that we could use the lessons learned in other countries.

5. *In your opinion, what have been/were other lines of support not explored with USG assistance through DRMS or DIRI?*
- a. Joint implementation of the process; I think we need to have a team aligned with the same advice message both in the Ministry, in each Force, and in the corresponding Planning Offices [of the Public Forces] (and the Transformation Office, in the Army). For example, all such offices should also have access to and training in FOCIS.

b. We should count on their advice to estimate and report capabilities inside the Forces. The ideal would be to have a FOCIS module that would allow us to enter information on capabilities the same way we enter information on Personnel, Materials & Equipment, and Infrastructure.

c. It's still necessary to define the way to derive the various career paths from the required capabilities. So far we've been able to work with the sustainability group to derive the implications of materials, equipment and infrastructure. Nevertheless, the implications for the other components, especially Personnel, are still very isolated.

d. The process has to be institutionalized, whether through a rule, a directive, a policy, a commanders' agreement, an experts' team, etc. We have unsuccessfully explored that possibility several times, and the sector needs it. There should be established cycles and responsibilities. This is a pending issue that is imperative because once the personnel renewal cycle is over, we run the risk of losing all the work we've done so far.

6. *Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were/are effective in the development of the transformation initiative?*

- a. Budget Planning – Life Cycle and Sustainability
- b. Capability-Based Planning in order to identify the Sector's capabilities (First Cycle)
- c. Standardization of materials and equipment

7. *Which lines of work with DRMS/DIRI do you consider were not /are not effective in the development of the transformation initiative?*

- a. Career path (or personnel) planning
- b. Logistics Master Plan
- c. Support Capabilities
- d. Follow-up on capabilities (How to follow up on the development of the capabilities as a consequence of developing a Budget proposal).
- e. Second capability cycle as a pilot of two specific problems.
- f. Advice for the Armed Forces, particularly the CGFM

8. *In your opinion, was/is DMRS/DIRI support decisive in the successful development of the transformation initiative?*

Their support was/has been instrumental. Their contribution is indispensable, especially in terms of anticipating possible problems that may arise at the time of implementing a given process.

Their contribution is also key at the time of prioritizing the projects to be developed when considering personnel constraints at the MDN and among the Forces for the various initiatives.

9. *In terms of the accomplishment of sectorial objectives, what is the contribution/impact of DRMS/DIRI's support?*

Their contribution/impact has been VERY HIGH in terms of the Sector's objective to "Continuously transform and modernize the Defense Sector, as well as to improve

education, wellbeing, moral and legal security, and the Financial, Budget and contractual management of the Public Force” (Objective 6 of the Security and Defense Policy).

10. *How could DRMS/DIRI improve its effectiveness/contribution in the successful development of the transformation initiative?*

a. Providing advice for the implementation of the process and not only for its planning. For that, I suggest creating “Task Forces” in each Force (each one with DIRI consultants reporting to one single head) for the implementation of the transformation process. This will ensure that Human Capital, Logistics, Capabilities and Budget all benefit jointly from the results.

b. Aligning the message. Example: The original proposal was for the capability components to be DOMPI (See 2011 - 2014 Strategic Planning Guideline); but when the Army began talking about DOTMLPF (including other components such as leadership and training) they should have not changed the message.

c. Analyzing problems in depth and not just issuing recommendations to Top Management; it is also necessary to identify the actions to be undertaken inside the Forces and the Ministry. Otherwise, we will be repeating statements that are already known to all. For example: It’s not enough to say that we lack doctrine or organization, or that it is necessary to do joint and coordinated planning, or that we need the best possible human capital. Those are all things the sector knows. What we need is to get advice regarding the actions required to solve the issues.

d. In order to avoid conflicts between the different Ministry Offices and the Forces, they must always work as colleagues. Last year we tried to implement the advice from the top down, beginning with the Vice-Minister, but that generated friction among the various actors. Please try to avoid defining the action plan of the various Ministry Divisions. Instead, you might think about having a given specialized advisor for each directorate.

## **Appendix C. Acronyms**

---

2IC	Second in Charge
CAPE	Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
CBP	Capability-Based Planning
CCMR	Center for Civil-Military Relations
CGFM	General Command of the Military Forces
CHDS	U.S. Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
CHOD	Chief of Defense
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DDCH	Human Capital Development Directorate
DGMT	Defense Governance and Management Team
DILOG	Directorate of Logistics
DIRI	Defense Institution Reform Initiative
DNP	National Department of Planning
DOD	Department of Defense
DPC	Capability Planning Directorate
DPP	Directorate of Programming and Budgeting
DRMS	Defense Resource Management Studies
FARC	The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
FOCIS	Force Oriented Cost Information System
GSED	Vice Ministry of Business and Social Welfare
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
MLP	Master Logistics Plan
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MoF	Ministry of Finance
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTE&S	Organize, Train, Equip, and Sustain
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command

TFI	Transformation and Future Initiative
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
USG	United States Government
VMOD	Vice Minister of Defense
VMOD S&P	Vice Minister of Defense for Strategy and Planning



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) XX-10-2017	2. REPORT TYPE Final	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>Defense Governance and Management The Colombian Ministry of National Defense's "Transformation and Future Initiative" Retrospective on a 9-Year Cooperative Effort Between the United States Department of Defense and the Colombian Ministry of National Defense</i>		5a. CONTRACT NO.			
		5b. GRANT NO.			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO(S).			
6. AUTHOR(S) Lina M. Gonzalez Aaron C. Taliaferro Wade P. Hinkle		5d. PROJECT NO. C6478			
		5e. TASK NO.			
		5f. WORK UNIT NO.			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses Strategy, Forces and Resources Division 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311-1882		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO. IDA Paper NS P-8588 Log: H 17-000383			
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses Strategy, Forces and Resources Division 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311-1882		10. SPONSOR'S / MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) IDA			
		11. SPONSOR'S / MONITOR'S REPORT NO(S).			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT  The Transformation and Future Initiative (TFI) of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) was a pre-emptive action to prepare the Colombian Defense and Security sector for a security environment not predominantly characterized by internal conflict. Buoyed by consistent national policy and relatively stable senior civilian leadership in the sector over four consecutive presidential terms (from 2002 to the present), the Colombian TFI provides a model of change management in the public sector. Throughout the past two decades and from the beginning of TFI, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has supported the Colombian Defense and Security sector's efforts. Specific to TFI, DOD has provided through direct advisory assistance. This paper explains MND efforts to transform the management practices of the Defense and Security sector as the security situation in Colombia changed and to provide a retrospective commentary on the U.S. advisors' assistance. The paper's source material is drawn from a series of interviews (transcripts included in appendix B) with current and former MND officials, as well as the first-hand experience of the authors (one a former employee of the Colombian MND and the other an advisor tasked by DOD to assist the Colombian MND with TFI).					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Defense institutions; Defense management; Defense governance; Capability planning; Security cooperation; Colombia Advisors; Program Budgeting Life Cycle Cost Analysis					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NO. OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	U	130	ADM John C. Harvey, Jr. USN (Ret)
U	U	U			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 703-575-4530

This page is intentionally blank.