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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

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Army Active/Reserve Force Mixes**

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June 2014

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IDA | Agenda: Illustrative Analysis of Alternative Force Mixes at the Community Level

- Tasking
- Principal Objectives
- Analytic structure
 - Scope of analysis: what's in and what's out
 - Model inputs and outputs
 - Sources of data
- Examples for Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)
- Summary and Conclusions

- Develop an easy-to-use costing capability to evaluate Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) force mixes – a computer-based tool
- Wide range of warfighting communities, ultimately in all Services. Community = set of like units
- Capture alternative operational/rotational use policies
- Cost types: personnel, operating, procurement, infrastructure
- Emphasize Army first

- Provide overview of costs and benefits of alternative AC/RC mixes
- Work with Services and other organizations to develop agreed upon costing approach and cost factors

IDA | Prior Work Has Focused on Two Comparisons

- **Unit cost comparisons**
 - RC units cheaper because they cost so much less when they are not mobilized
- **Cost of deploying a single unit**
 - AC and RC costs much closer because it takes more RC units to generate a single deployed unit
- **Both points are correct, but**
 - The former ignores the reduced rotational capability of RC
 - The latter ignores the additional strategic depth provided by an RC capable of providing a given level of rotational potential
- **Analyses of force mix alternatives should capture rotational potential, strategic potential, and cost**

IDA | Scope of Analysis

■ Included

- Costs
 - Personnel
 - Operations
 - Procurement (optional)
 - Infrastructure
 - Deployment
- Characteristics of rotations
 - BOG:Dwell and MOB:Dwell constraints
 - Requirement to deploy
 - Deployment duration
 - Tempo during deployment
 - Amount of RC mobilization time not deployed
 - Overlap of deployments
- Dwell period resource levels
 - Reflects variations in readiness during Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle

■ Excluded

- Possible differences in unit effectiveness
- Transition costs
- Rate of force generation in surge
- Variation in infrastructure cost factors as a function of AC/RC mix
- Implications of exclusions
 - Results only a starting point for analysis of alternatives
 - Results likely less reliable for larger changes in AC/RC mix

IDA | Model Inputs and Outputs

- Inputs
 - Unit type – roughly 3000 covered at Standard Requirements Code (SRC) level
 - AC and RC force levels
 - Cost factors – from existing models
 - BOG:Dwell (AC) and MOB:Dwell (RC)
 - Choice of whether available units deploy
 - Deployment duration and level of activity
 - Transit time or overlap time
 - Pre-deployment training, post-deployment adjustment periods (RC)
 - Dwell-period resource levels (aim points) – and extra training days for RC
 - Equipment replacement, if desired
- Outputs: Community-level costs and capability
 - Strategic potential – total force level
 - Rotational (or operational) potential – number of deployable units
 - Average annual cost

IDA | Three Sources of Army Cost Factor Data

- **Force and Organizational Cost Estimating System (FORCES) Cost Model – force structure-related costs**
 - Non-deployed operating costs
 - Most personnel-related costs, including medical costs and retired pay accrual
 - Base operations and indirect support costs
 - Equipment costs
- **Army Military-Civilian Cost System (AMCOS) – additional personnel-related costs**
 - Annualized personnel accession costs
 - Annualized education and training costs
- **Army ConOps Costing Model – deployment-related costs**
 - Additional pay for RC personnel
 - Additional operating costs
 - Transportation costs

IDA | Inputs for Illustrative BCT Analysis

- AC and RC force levels for each kind of BCT
 - Infantry BCT (IBCT), Stryker BCT (SBCT), Armored BCT (ABCT)
- BOG:Dwell (AC) 1:2 and 1:3 and MOB:Dwell (RC) 1:4 and 1:5
- Forces deploy when available
- Deployment duration – 9 months for both AC and RC
- Transit time – one week each direction
- Pre-deployment training, post-deployment adjustment periods (RC): total of three months
- Default levels of dwell-period resources (aim points). Reflect policy regarding variation in readiness during phases of the ARFORGEN cycle
- Initially exclude equipment replacement costs, then include them

	1:2 AC / 1:4 RC				1:3 AC / 1:5 RC			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BCT Quantity (AC/RC)	73 (45/28)	65 (37/28)	60 (30/30)	60 (24/36)	73 (45/28)	65 (37/28)	60 (30/30)	60 (24/36)
Infantry BCT	40 (21/19)	35 (16/19)	32 (13/19)	32 (11/21)	40 (21/19)	35 (16/19)	32 (13/19)	32 (11/21)
Stryker BCT	9 (8/1)	9 (7/2)	9 (6/3)	9 (4/5)	9 (8/1)	9 (7/2)	9 (6/3)	9 (4/5)
Armored BCT	24 (16/8)	21 (14/7)	19 (11/8)	19 (9/10)	24 (16/8)	21 (14/7)	19 (11/8)	19 (9/10)


IDA | Analysis of Alternative BCT Force Structures

Model provides community-level information on strategic potential, operational potential, and annual cost

	1:2 AC / 1:4 RC				1:3 AC / 1:5 RC			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
BCT Quantity (AC/RC): Strategic Potential	73 (45/28)	65 (37/28)	60 (30/30)	60 (24/36)	73 (45/28)	65 (37/28)	60 (30/30)	60 (24/36)
IBCT	40 (21/19)	35 (16/19)	32 (13/19)	32 (11/21)	40 (21/19)	35 (16/19)	32 (13/19)	32 (11/21)
SBCT	9 (8/1)	9 (7/2)	9 (6/3)	9 (4/5)	9 (8/1)	9 (7/2)	9 (6/3)	9 (4/5)
ABCT	24 (16/8)	21 (14/7)	19 (11/8)	19 (9/10)	24 (16/8)	21 (14/7)	19 (11/8)	19 (9/10)
Rotational Deployability: Operational Potential	18.1	15.6	13.7	12.7	13.9	12.0	10.6	9.9
Annual BCT Community Cost	\$36.4B	\$31.4B	\$27.4B	\$25.0B	\$33.0B	\$28.5B	\$24.9B	\$22.7B


Cost and Capability of Alternative AC/RC Mixes: ABCT Community at 1:3/1:5

- For the ABCT community, blue lines trade cost against the number of deployable units, which rises with the percent AC
- Moving along a community-size line from right to left shows how cost and deployable potential change as RC is substituted for AC
- Shows cost of meeting both strategic requirements (community size) and operational requirements (number of deployable units)
- For ABCTs, you can meet deployment requirements, increase force structure, and save money with a relatively Reserve-intensive force



IDA | Effect of Adding Equipment Replacement Costs

- Equipment life specified in terms of years of use (30 years in this case)
- Use is assumed only when present in units – a function of aim points
- Lines move closer together, but it still is cheaper to generate a given number of deployable units from RC – this is generally not the case for aviation units



IDA | Summary and Conclusions

- **Modeling Effort**
 - We can use Army models and cost factors to quickly estimate the cost and capabilities associated with alternative AC/RC mixes of BCTs
 - We developed a new way to look at the cost and capability of entire communities, which may help compare a wide range of alternatives
- **Analytical Results**
 - In many cases, as long as you can meet operational requirements, the more you rely on the RC, the more force structure you can afford
- **Caveats**
 - Readiness is not currently addressed
 - Some aspects of costs are not considered (transition costs, possible variability of infrastructure cost factors)
- Model provides a better starting point for analysis of AC/RC force mix alternatives, not conclusions

- Develop initial capability for Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy
- Allow users to vary some infrastructure assumptions
- Incorporate into model balancing demand for forces and supply of forces
 - Explicitly incorporate speed of surge response
 - Stochastically generate 20 years of demand for forces
 - Observe deployment shortfalls
 - Evaluate many alternative force structures
 - Derive efficient frontier

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