

## INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

# COVID-19 Lessons Learned for NATO Bio-responsiveness Capability

Presentation to the COVID-19 Lessons Learned Workshop Budapest, Hungary May 2023

> Julia Burr Lucas LaViolet Ashley Farris Catherine Scheible Ana Venegas

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### About this Publication

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### Motivation

The COVID-19 pandemic:

- · Highlighted innumerable challenges of controlling outbreaks of infectious disease
- · Provides an opportunity to prepare for the next outbreak

But NATO was already considering the challenges from biological outbreaks:

- ACT initiated the Smart Defence 1.1045 Project on Bio-responsiveness (SD 1.1045) in 2015 following Ebola outbreak in West Africa
- Purpose: "Enable NATO Commanders and medical staffs to generate an effective response to an outbreak of infectious disease of military significance in the Joint Operating Area, and by so doing, protect the health of the force and maintain or restore operational effectiveness"
- Bio-responsiveness Project concluded in the fall of 2019 with several deliverables:
  - Bio-responsiveness CONOPS identifying response phases, tasks, triggers, and checklists
  - New and enhanced NATO capability codes



### Overview

- Objective: Promote the development of a <u>collaborative</u>, <u>comprehensive</u> <u>program of work</u> to learn the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic for <u>NATO's</u> <u>bio-responsiveness capability</u>
- **Concept**: <u>Adopt/adapt the process</u> used in NATO for Medical Lessons Learned to assess COVID-19 pandemic response challenges and best practices <u>within the framework</u> of the NATO Smart Defence Bio-responsiveness Project (SD 1.1045)

### Project Organization:

- Initiated by the CBRN Medical Training Panel in 2021
- Intended to inform Program of Work for (at minimum)
  Biodefence Medical Panel













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Top 10 Tasks: Percent Tagged with Various Domains								
	Doctrine	Organization	Training	Materiel	Leadership	Personnel	Facilities	Interoper- ability
Med C4I & Decision Support	92%	20%	9%	20%	3%	7%	6%	23%
Non-pharmaceutical Interventions	90%	11%	15%	43%	3%	8%	16%	18%
Isolation, Quarantine, and ROM	94%	10%	9%	27%	2%	9%	21%	15%
Strategic Communications	93%	14%	8%	14%	2%	4%	6%	24%
Sustainment of Medical Support Operations	73%	24%	4%	73%	2%	8%	26%	34%
Patient Management	76%	37%	15%	35%	0%	20%	30%	17%
Medical Situational Awareness	94%	20%	3%	32%	1%	8%	7%	30%
CivMil Cooperation	73%	37%	12%	30%	2%	12%	21%	77%
Lab Assets	92%	16%	8%	82%	2%	7%	21%	14%
Continuity of Operations Planning	84%	27%	19%	41%	5%	17%	27%	24%
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	Doctrine Only	Organization	Training	Materiel	Leadership	Personnel	Facilities	Interoper- ability
Med C4I & Decision Support	42%	20%	9%	20%	3%	7%	6%	23%
Non-pharmaceutical Interventions	35%	11%	15%	43%	3%	8%	16%	18%
Isolation, Quarantine, and ROM	38%	10%	9%	27%	2%	9%	21%	15%
Strategic Communications	55%	14%	8%	14%	2%	4%	6%	24%
Sustainment of Medical Support Operations	5%	24%	4%	73%	2%	8%	26%	34%
Patient Management	16%	37%	15%	35%	0%	20%	30%	17%
Medical Situational Awareness	35%	20%	3%	32%	1%	8%	7%	30%
CivMil Cooperation	8%	37%	12%	30%	2%	12%	21%	77%
Lab Assets	5%	16%	8%	82%	2%	7%	21%	14%
Continuity of Operations Planning	16%	27%	19%	41%	5%	17%	27%	24%
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## Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions: Candidate Lesson Identified (1 of 14) Topics: Health Care Access, Risk Mitigation

- **Observation**: Medical readiness declined during the pandemic as individuals were unable to make or keep in-person maintenance and preventive care appointments.
- Discussion: Measures to reduce risks in health care settings for both patients and medical personnel led to reductions in appointment availability. In addition, pandemic public health restrictions placed physical limits on attendance.
- Conclusion: The reduction in maintenance and preventive care appointments indicates a need to mitigate the risk of in-person attendance and/or to expand the capabilities of virtual care.
- Recommendation(s):
  - Implement and sustain practices that reduce risk to both patients and providers, such as minimizing the number of staff in contact with the patient and swabbing patients in a separate/easily cleanable area.
  - Increase telemedicine capability to minimize healthcare worker exposures, reduce the use of PPE, allow for continued care of non-urgent or uninfected patients, and conserve overall medical capability and capacity.
  - Address challenges that make it difficult to get in-person or virtual care in pandemic conditions, such as IT issues, digital health records that are easily shareable, ease of prescribing medication, and staffing.

Tier: Tactical

**Domains: Doctrine, Materiel, Facilities** 

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## Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions: Candidate Lesson Identified (2 of 14) Topics: Masking Strategy, Risk Mitigation

- **Observation**: Masking is a simple and effective public health measure, especially in conjunction with other measures and when implemented early, but was adopted inconsistently among populations during the pandemic.
- **Discussion**: During the pandemic, information on when masking should be adopted, who needs to wear them and when, how to wear them correctly, etc. was inconsistently provided to populations at risk.
- **Conclusion**: The benefits of masking were often compromised by delays in implementation and inconsistent guidance/communications.
- **Recommendation**: During outbreaks of contagious disease, establish and communicate clear and common/interoperable guidance on the use of masks, alone and in conjunction with other infection control measures. Such guidance should address the impact of masking on mission accomplishment and issues related to prioritization of masking among personnel.

Tier: Primarily Tactical, Operational/Strategic Aspects

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**Domains: Doctrine, Materiel** 

### **Remaining Steps**

- Prioritize outputs of "conventional content" analysis using a ranked choice voting method (*June 2023*)
- Finalize and distribute paper documenting analysis and findings (July 2023)
- Present final set of candidate Lessons Identified to Biodefence Medical Panel/CBRN Medical Training Panel (*Oct 2023*)

## **Questions?**

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# Backup

## "New" Bio-responsiveness Tasks

- Tasks that can be added to current bio-responsiveness tasks through expansion of existing definitions:
  - Civilian support to military  $\rightarrow$  CIV-MIL cooperation
  - Personal protective equipment  $\rightarrow$  Infection prevention and control
  - At-home testing  $\rightarrow$  Lab assets
  - Geo-spatial tracking  $\rightarrow$  Operational epidemiology
  - Non-pharmaceutical interventions → Infection prevention and control OR Isolation, quarantine, and ROM
  - Terminology → Strategic communications
- New stand-alone tasks
  - Continuity of operations
  - Public health measures
  - Research and development

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## Metadata Tag Definitions: SD 1.1045 Tasks (1)

Tag	Definition
Conduct infection prevention and control	Prevent loss or degradation of equipment and supplies from the effects of pathogens, including body fluids of infected casualties. Remove and neutralise infectious materials on equipment. Includes individual equipment, sensitive equipment, aircraft, watercraft, and facilities. Also includes the cleaning and sanitization of multi-use medical equipment. All decontamination operations must involve good personal protection practices (limited to equipment and sanitation).
Conduct isolation, quarantine, and restriction of movement	Establish isolation wards or separate MTFs for the care of contagious casualties. Quarantine suspected contacts/exposed personnel until they are determined to be free of infection. Consider implementing restriction of movement between exposed and unexposed personnel at either the unit or theatre level. Personnel interacting with isolated individuals must use good infection control and personal protection practices.
Conduct military and civilian cooperation	Liaise with NGOs, IOs, the host nation's medical system, other multinational medical forces, and NATO medical personnel.
Employ laboratory assets	Use one or more laboratories to support environmental hazard analysis, clinical diagnosis, medical treatment decisions, operational epidemiology, and forensics investigations. Disseminate laboratory results to appropriate medical and operational units.
Employ medical countermeasures	Use available pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis, and immediate and continuing therapy as part of the delivery of first aid, emergency medical care, and advanced medical care. Identify any particularly vulnerable subpopulations to be targeted for priority or exemption. Confirm that units follow standard procedures for recording the use of medical countermeasures (includes vaccine policy).
Manage contaminated clinical waste	Collect, safeguard, and safely dispose of potentially large volumes of waste contaminated with blood and other body fluids, cultures and stocks or infectious agents from laboratory work, or waste from contagious or potentially contagious patients. Use of disease-specific personal protective equipment and incinerators may be required.
Perform deployment health surveillance	Conduct continuous and systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health-related data with respect to deployed NATO forces. Rapidly detect public health incidents or outbreaks that could affect NATO operational capacities or objectives, and monitor the progression of those incidents or outbreaks over time.

Тад	Definition
Perform forensic functions	If attribution is desired, use specialist sample collection units and appropriate reach-back laboratories to apply chain-of-custody procedures in the collection, handling, transport, and analysis of samples. Reach-back and forensics efforts must adhere to differing national and cultural standards for the collection, management, and use of medical information and clinical samples.
Perform medical C4I and decision support	Provide medical advice to the Joint Force Commander and direct medical units in the performance of bio-response tasks. Provide medical staff and MEDAD with the tools and information needed to understand the causation, nature, and progression of disease outbreaks and the potential impact of control measures. Support development of bio-response courses of action, to include assessment of operational risk (includes modelino).
Perform medical evacuation	Provide medically supervised enroute care from point of presentation to a medical facility during tactical and strategic medical evacuation utilising appropriate infection control practices. May include movement by ground, intra-theatre air (fixed-wing or rotary), and strategic air assets. Evacuation assets will require patient isolation capability and/or enhanced personal protection equipment for crew, management of clinical waste, and decontamination after use.
Perform national outreach, reach-back, and fusion	Request support from designated reach-back experts, teams, laboratories (including NATO, partner, and host nation assets), or other facilities as needed to augment in-theatre capabilities or knowledge. Establish any necessary support agreements to enable reach-back. Disseminate reach- back analysis results to appropriate medical units and theatre organisations (includes SME POC phone book; standup reachback capability).
Perform operational epidemiology	Investigate disease outbreaks to determine their source, nature, and magnitude. The information provided can be used to improve medical treatment for existing cases and to support the implementation of public health and physical control measures to prevent additional cases. Operational epidemiology may also be an important component of forensic investigation of a biological incident known or suspected of being deliberately caused (includes contact tracing)
Perform patient management	Assess, triage, and treat infectious or contagious patients across all levels of care through acute and convalescent phases of illness. All interactions with infectious or contagious patients will require good infection control practices.
Perform sample management	Collect, anonymise (as necessary), transport, track, store, and dispense clinical and environmental samples using chain of custody as necessary. Consider the following sample types: body fluids, tissue samples, powders, and other environmental samples (food, vectors, water, soil, etc.). This would include veterinary and vector sampling. God infection control practices and use of personal protection will be required.
Perform strategic communications	Coordinate and use NATO communications activities and capabilities, including public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations as appropriate, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide NATO forces, host nation civilians, international and non-governmental organisations, and national governments and populations with the information needed to support bio- response objectives and operations (includes anti-IO).
Prepare medical risk	Systematically identify, locate, assess, and document occupational and environmental infectious disease hazards to both military and civilian populations, and communicate the health threats and potential operational impact posed by those bazards to the commander

## Metadata Tag Definitions: SD 1.1045 Tasks (3)

Тад	Definition
Provide fatality management	Safely perform initial processing and storage, post mortem radiographic or invasive examination, decontamination, and dignified disposal of potentially contagious human remains in accordance with national regulations and practice. Use of disease-specific personal protective equipment and fatality protective equipment may be required.
Provide medical situational awareness	Generate an overall picture of the health of the force by informing medical staff of relevant results from clinical diagnoses, clinical sampling, laboratory diagnoses, environmental analysis results, and operational epidemiology. This includes contextual information necessary to interpret the results and their potential impact on operations, such as background disease rates; characteristics of the disease and its causative agent; military and civilian vulnerability to infection; current and planned force dispositions and locations; and capabilities for medical diagnosis, force and civilian health surveillance; and medical countermeasures (includes internal info sharing short of strategic comms, reporting practices; findings from vaccine trials).
Provide psychosocial support	Foster resilience and prevent pathological sequelae in the medical team and patients by helping them and their families to cope with the stress of the illness and resume their normal lives. Use an integrated approach to encourage community acceptance and reintegration of survivors an medical personnel.
Support clinical diagnosis	Assess disease in military personnel and eligible civilians to support medical decisions. Establish presumptive or use existing case definitions. Includes identifying causative agents.
Sustain medical support operations	Sustain operation of medical treatment facilities providing isolation and quarantine. Provide security and sustainment for those facilities, and for personnel held therein. Manage the stockpiling, distribution, and resupply of medical countermeasures and other medical and non-medical materiel and consumables required by medical units for treating infectious or contagious patients, with particular focus on low-density, high- demand medical equipment (e.g., ventilators) and non-medical items that will be required in increased amounts (e.g., water) (includes log/planning).
Other	Continuity of operations planning (BCP) Civilian support (civ support) Common lexicon (lexicon) Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) (e.g., border restrictions, hand sanitizer, handwashing, limiting public/private activities, masking, registration, remote work, screeping, social distancing)
	Personal protective equipment (PPE) Public health measures (e.g., food safety) (PHM) Research and development (R&D) At-home testing (testing) Tracking via mobile device or video surveillance (tracking)
	Unspecified bublic salety measures tunspecified measures

Tag	Definition
Doctrine / Policy	Doctrine: fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Policy: any DoD, interagency or international policy issues that may impact effective implementation of changes in the other DOTMLPF-I considerations (includes mandating a plan, authorities).
Organization	(i.e., capacity) A joint unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support joint warfighting capabilities.
Training	Training (including mission rehearsals) of individuals, units, and staffs using joint doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces or joint staffs to respond to strategic, operational, or tactical requirements considered necessary by the CCMDs to execute their assigned or anticipated missions.
Materiel	Everything necessary to equip DoD forces to operate effectively. Materiel includes ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excludes real property, installations, and utilities.
Leadership	Professional development of joint leaders that is the product of a learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-improvement.
Personnel	(i.e., capability) Ensuring that qualified personnel exist to support joint capability requirements. The number or quantity of personnel is a function of organization, while the quality, type, or skills of personnel is considered in the personnel function.
Facilities	Real property consisting of one or more of the following: buildings, structures, ranges, utility systems, associated roads and other pavements, and underlying land. Key facilities are defined as command installations and industrial facilities of primary importance to the support of military operations or military production programs.
Interoperability	The ability to be interoperable with forces throughout the NATO alliance.
Other	Other domains including logistics



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14	ABSTRACT							
T pr fr co br uu P	he work described in this Institute for Defense andemic response challenges and best practices from official NATO lessons learned repositories ombination of directed and conventional conten- io-responsiveness concepts and capabilities, im- sed to generate a road map to improve N ersonnel, Facilities, and Interoperability domain	Analyses presentation adapts within the framework of the N and documented COVID resp t analysis. The outputs of the proving interoperability, and ATO bio-responsiveness ca ns at the tactical, operational,	the process used in NA NATO Smart Defence I ponse collaboration tele analysis were collated i I identifying areas for apabilities in the Do and strategic levels.	TO for Medical Lessons Learned to assess COVID-19 Bio-responsiveness Project. Observations were collected conferences, and assessed using metadata tagging and a nto a prioritized set of Lessons Identified for enhancing standardization. The results of this initiative can be etrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,				
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