Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation for Defense Institution Building Projects

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Executive Summary

In response to the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requirement that all significant security cooperation programs and activities contain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) IDA sponsored an internally funded survey of existing literature in this field and began preliminary work to develop an AM&E framework for Defense Institution Building (DIB) programs. This paper describes IDA’s recommended approach to AM&E for DIB programs, with specific emphasis on incorporating AM&E into the DIB work plan from the earliest stages of the program design process.

The preponderance of existing literature on AM&E focuses on traditional development projects, where measuring performance and effectiveness of programs is an established and common practice. The field of literature for AM&E of DIB activities is not as mature, and the practical application of an AM&E framework is rare. The unique and highly complex nature of change in defense institutions makes AM&E a potentially challenging—but not impossible—exercise. This paper describes how DIB practitioners may approach AM&E in their fields of work, emphasizing:

- A tailored AM&E framework that is derived from the United States Government (USG) and partner’s country-level objectives (the desired impact). A policy planning decision is required to endorse the practitioner’s theory of change connecting the DIB program’s outcomes to the desired impact.

- The continual analysis of institutional problems, development of solutions, and program evaluation in a joint manner with the partner, even when USG and partner objectives might diverge.

- The iterative nature of “baselining” to overcome the notion that early analysis of partner processes remains the basis for work through the life of the project. In reality, practitioners continually deepen their understanding of partner institutions and adjust the work plan accordingly.

- The role of non-DIB USG resources to achieve a desired impact, including other security cooperation tools, development assistance, diplomatic engagement, etc.

This paper supplements the academic record with a practical application of the principles outlined in FY17 NDAA and describes a method to incorporate AM&E into a DIB work plan in an observable manner.
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1. Introduction

A. Background

Subchapter VII, section 383 of the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) specifies, “The Secretary of Defense shall maintain a program of assessment, monitoring and evaluation in support of the security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense.” The intent of this requirement is articulated in the subsequent Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, which states, “DoD will maintain a robust program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation to provide policymakers, planners, program managers, and implementers the information necessary to evaluate outcomes, identify challenges, make appropriate corrections, and maximize effectiveness of future security cooperation activities.” Further guidance was issued through a new Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5132.14, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise,” requiring that all significant security cooperation initiatives administered by the DOD include an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) component.

Defense Institution Building (DIB) is one type of security cooperation that helps partner nations to implement institutional reforms and organizational changes that will lead to better and stronger management of their defense institutions. It focuses most attention on planning and management capacity (in the ministerial, Joint Staff, and Service

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1 FY17 National Defense Authorization Act. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt840/CRPT-114hrpt840.pdf. Security Cooperation is defined as All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.


3 DODI 5132.14, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise,” January 13, 2017. Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=798028. This document defines “significant security cooperation initiative” as The series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multi-year effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes. Such initiatives are generally planned by the geographic Combatant Commands and involve the application of multiple security cooperation tools over multiple years to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective as articulated in the country-specific security cooperation sections of a theater campaign plan.
headquarters levels), as opposed to traditional security cooperation programs that focus on tactical training and equipping to build operational capacity. DIB projects are just one type of security cooperation program and have several unique features that must be considered when developing an AM&E framework. This paper describes these unique features, explains why they pose a challenge for AM&E, and proposes a structured approach to incorporating AM&E into a DIB program design.

B. Challenges of Measuring Progress in DIB Activities

A significant field of research exists on AM&E in development programs. Considerably less analysis has been conducted for AM&E of DIB activities, though there are some commendable efforts. The challenges posed by measuring progress in DIB activities are multifold:

- Data may be difficult to access due to the sensitive nature of national defense activities and their implications for national security.
- Some stakeholders may be resistant to implementing certain reforms that may threaten their own equities by altering the balance of power.
- Implementing institutional changes is almost always a complicated process that is the result of many factors, not a single intervention. Thus, attributing a desired impact to a specific intervention is almost impossible, and measuring the extent to which a single intervention contributed to an institutional change is equally as difficult.
- Many desired impacts will take years to observe—well after the cessation of a specific DIB activity and the time frame for conducting AM&E.
- The USG’s and partner’s desired end state may differ slightly, posing a challenge for the practitioners and partners as they design the work plan and identify objectives.

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4 For more information on USAID’s efforts in this area, see https://www.usaid.gov/evaluation; http://usaidprojectstarter.org/content/project-mel-plan; https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/me_platform_report_final_public_version.pdf; http://static1.1.sqspscdn.com/static/f/752898/9984730/1296501650077/MEmodule_planning.pdf?token=01A4DOjPgComw8xWd4sYnmss9YQ%3D.

These challenges characterize most defense enterprises, which may be considered complex systems of systems in which the analysis of specific problems and development of proposed solutions is an iterative process.

C. Why Measure Progress in DIB Programs?

Aside from promoting accountability and facilitating the responsible, integrated use of USG and DOD resources in an era of fiscal restraint, there are compelling reasons to monitor progress from the practitioner’s and partner’s perspective. IDA’s experience in DIB activities has demonstrated that developing project goals and identifying milestones jointly with a partner is a critical part of a successful program. A joint analysis of the performance of a defense institution is imperative to accurately diagnosing the problem. Only a partner understands the dynamics and nuances associated with its defense structure, organization, and processes, while U.S. experts can identify potential solutions that may be tailored to a specific environment or situation. Establishing objectives and monitoring progress jointly is a key part of a successful DIB project because it ensures opportunities to make adjustments to the work plan as a matter of practice.
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2. AM&E Taxonomy: Levels of Measurement

There are various ways to measure progress of a given project. Likewise, terminology varies among organization and analyst. A common approach to measuring progress of a project is embodied in DoD’s Joint Pub 5.0, which describes “Measures of Performance” (MOPs) and “Measures of Effectiveness” (MOEs), where “a MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment” and “a MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, an objective, or the creation of an effect.” Joint Pub 3.0 elaborates further, stating that MOEs help answer the question, “Are we creating the effect(s) or conditions in the operating environment that we desire?” while MOPs help answer the question, “Are we accomplishing tasks to standard?”

Although this is a useful construct that differentiates between specific interventions and broad impact, IDA endorses the more nuanced taxonomy originally described by the World Bank in its Performance Monitoring Indicators Handbook from 1996. It recommends using indicators that are predicated on a framework that specifies four levels of objectives: Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, and Impact (Figure 1).
IDA has determined that this taxonomy, which was initially designed to facilitate assessment of development projects, is also appropriate for the assessment of DIB activities. These four levels of assessment, along with indicators, can be applied with due consideration given to the unique aspects of a DIB program:

- **Inputs**—Inputs include any resources provided in support of the activity, such as expertise, technical advice, financing, and political commitment. In the DIB context, inputs provided by a donor include frequent visits by subject-matter experts in the areas of resource management, strategic and capability planning, human resource management, logistics management, etc. Inputs provided by the recipient include staffs’ time, facilities, access to key government officials, and political commitment of senior leadership. Together, these inputs create an opportunity for partners to engage for the purpose of joint analysis of institutional challenges. Inputs are generally easily observable and quantifiable.

- **Outputs**—Outputs are the immediate product of an activity, such as the publication of a new government policy, the creation of a new organizational structure, or the reorganization of an existing structure. These outputs, however, say very little about the substantive effect of the initial intervention. In the DIB context, an example of an output might be the creation of a new Ministry of Defense (MOD) instruction to guide the defense planning process. While this output may be necessary to the desired change, it mostly likely is not sufficient to achieve it. Outputs are generally easily observable and quantifiable, but they should not be cited to claim institutional change (an outcome or impact).
• **Outcomes**—Outcomes are the intermediate effect of an output on the people or institution the activity sought to target, such as the adoption of a new government policy or procedure that fundamentally changes the behavior of an institution. In other words, an outcome is a change that occurred as a direct result of a specific activity. It is observable, although it may take time to determine its full impact. In the DIB context, an example of an outcome might be the implementation of planning guidance, resulting in a cost-constrained capability plan that integrates investment and operations and maintenance costs.

• **Impacts**—Impacts are the long term change that occurs as a result of a program, (what we hope our efforts will accomplish.) Impacts are very broad and therefore difficult to attribute directly to a given input, output, or outcome. In the DIB context, an example of an impact might be a country’s ability to execute more effective counterterrorism (CT) operations (which might be attributable to improved operational readiness (OR) rates resulting from improved budgeting for operations and maintenance.) Impacts are hard to measure, however, since they may take years to observe and often depend on the successful application of multiple resources/programs at various levels of the defense institution.

• **Indicators**—Indicators are data points that measure or describe (quantitatively or qualitatively) an activity’s impacts, outcomes, outputs, and inputs. These are monitored throughout the execution of a program to assess progress toward the program’s objectives. Indicators organize information in a way that clarifies the relationships between a project’s impacts, outcomes, outputs, and inputs and helps to identify problems along the way that can impede the achievement of project objectives.9

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3. Incorporating AM&E into the DIB Program Design Process

A. Developing the Work Plan

The AM&E taxonomy described earlier is a useful framework to apply to a DIB program. It is a sequential process wherein inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts can be observed in that order. This is typically true of most projects, DIB-related or otherwise, and therefore requires a project leader in conjunction with the foreign partners (collectively a Joint DIB Team, or JDT) to begin with the end in mind when designing a DIB program. That is, the program design starts with an articulation of the desired impact to identify what outcomes, outputs, and ultimately inputs are required to achieve that impact. This approach effectively builds an AM&E framework into the DIB program design that is highly tailored (and therefore has the greatest impact) for that partner and supports USG goals and objectives in a given country. This chapter describes how this AM&E taxonomy can be practically applied per the logic summarized in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. IDA's Recommended DIB Program Design Flow](image)

1. Impact (Country-level Objectives)
   - What is the desired impact the USG and Partner Nation are seeking to achieve?

2. Outcomes (DIB Desired Outcomes)
   - What new planning & management processes must be implemented to achieve desired impact?

3. Outputs (DIB Products)
   - What new planning & management processes must be created to achieve desired outcome?

4. Inputs
   - DIB Work Plan: What DOD and Partner expertise, personnel, time and commitment are required to achieve the desired impact?
   - Other USG Resources: What additional resources are required to achieve the desired impact? (development assistance, diplomatic engagement, etc.)

1. Impact

The desired impact of a program should support the USG’s country-level objectives and the partner’s vision for their security or defense sector. From the USG’s perspective,
these are the highest level security- or defense-related objectives that it is seeking to achieve in a partner nation. These objectives are typically articulated in an Integrated Country Strategy, which is a “single, multi-year, overarching strategy that encapsulates USG policy priorities, and objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them.”\textsuperscript{10} It reflects input from a wide array of USG departments and agencies, and its creation is led by the Department of State, specifically the Chief of Mission (COM) in a given partner nation. Ensuring the work plan seeks to achieve both USG and partner nation’s goals is an art, but one essential to maximize the chance of success.

When designing an AM&E framework for a DIB program, the JDT must first study these country-level objectives to consider how a DIB activity can support the COM’s vision, the country objectives articulated by the Combatant Commander, and the partner’s goals for its security or defense institution. It is important to posit the expected contribution of a DIB program to achieve the desired end state and recognize that other Title 10 activities, diplomatic engagement, development assistance, or other USG resources may be necessary to help achieve it.

\textit{Important Practical Tip:} In practice, the JDT cannot be held responsible for achieving a desired impact. The desired impact describes the quality of independent decision-making by the partner and is therefore the result of changes in the partner’s actions and behaviors. JDTs posit that the outcomes of their activities will contribute to these changes—an assumption that must be endorsed by USG and partner policy planners for work to proceed.

\textit{Example:} The MOD in Country X programs and executes a budget that contains the appropriate capabilities to implement the President’s national security priorities.

2. Outcomes

Identifying the desired outcomes of a DIB activity requires a definition of the problem. That is, why doesn’t the desired end state exist today? This becomes the problem statement. JDTs can then conduct a rigorous root-cause analysis of the problem statement and propose the planning or management processes relevant to it. It is important to observe and describe the current state of these processes to understand the relevant gaps and feasible improvements. Because some gaps may not be relevant to the desired outcome, discerning between those that are relevant and those that are not is an important analytic step. As explained above, it requires making an assumption regarding the relationship between the proposed Outcome and desired Impact. It is imperative that this assumption be validated by senior leadership from the USG and partner nation.

\footnotesize
JDTs can then further refine the root-cause analysis to define what new planning and management processes or changes to those processes the partner is willing and able to make to achieve the desired impact. Successfully implementing these planning or management changes becomes the DIB program’s desired outcomes.

Important Practical Tip: The COM, in collaboration with USG and partner policy planners, is best positioned to judge whether the proposed outcomes will have the desired impact on a partner’s security or defense institution. They must make this judgment as a policy planning decision and the basis for the DIB work plan.

Example: The USG hopes that Country X will improve its maritime surveillance capabilities. (That is the hoped-for “Impact.”) Country X says it “agrees in principle.” USG security cooperation policy planners suggest instantiation of capabilities-based planning and multiyear programming in Country X as the best way of planning affordable capability improvements and sustaining them. (That is the hoped for “Outcome.”) A JDT in fact succeeds over several years in fully implementing capability-based planning and multiyear programming in Country X, and the US portion of the JDT departs. (So the Outcome was fully successful.) Over the next several capability planning cycles, however, Country X identifies important shortfalls in internal security capabilities. In Country X, internal security has the highest mission priority; maritime surveillance is third. Accordingly, the limited funds Country X has available for capability increases are programmed for internal security. Maritime surveillance capability does not increase. So the Impact is different than hoped for, even though Country X used its new capability planning abilities perfectly.

In this case, evaluation of the JDT’s work would say the team was fully successful in achieving the desired Outcome. But, a few years later, an evaluation of the DIB policy planning function would say that the desired Impact was not achieved. Why? Because the cause and effect relationship between Outcome and desired Impact that the policy planners assumed did not exist. In this case, the disconnect was the USG’s failure to recognize that maritime surveillance was a relatively low priority for Country X.

3. Outputs

Once the DIB program’s desired outcomes are defined, the JDTs can identify the logical, sequential intermediate steps that are expected to result in the desired outcomes. These may be the creation of new planning or management processes, tools, structures, or concepts. This stage may require certain assumptions to be made regarding the links between subsequent steps; these assumptions can be systematically tested during project implementation. This is commonly referred to as the “theory of change,” which is a statement of expectations regarding the process by which planned activities will lead to stated objectives. It articulates assumptions and plans about how and why a set of activities and actions are expected to evolve in the future,
including causal linkages through which early and intermediate outcomes will lead to long-term results.\textsuperscript{11}

Successfully creating these planning or management processes become the DIB products.

Important Practical Tip: Experienced DIB practitioners are best positioned to verify whether proposed DIB products are suitable and appropriate to achieve the desired outcomes.

Example: The MOD in Country X develops a cost-estimation tool that is populated with accurate data.

4. Inputs

Once the DIB products are defined, the JDT can create a DIB work plan. The work plan will describe what DOD and partner expertise, personnel, time, and commitment are required to create the products identified as outputs, implement them to achieve the desired outcomes, and ultimately contribute to the desired impact. Note that the absorptive capacity of the partner nation and other factors that may inform the frequency and duration of in-country engagements should be considered when developing the work plan.

This step in the DIB design process requires active involvement from senior USG personnel that oversee implementation of the program. These individuals have the authority to commit resources and the ability to coordinate with other USG representatives to identify what additional resources (time and money) are required to achieve the desired impact, such as development assistance, diplomatic engagement, other security cooperation activity, etc. It is also important at this stage for practitioners and policymakers to evaluate whether the resources likely to be available for a specific DIB project (from both the USG and partner) will be sufficient to achieve the desired outcomes.

Important Practical Tip: DIB subject-matter experts are the most easily observable inputs to a DIB program.

Example: USG budget experts engage counterparts in a partner’s MOD for 2 weeks, six times per year, holding technical workshops in the partner’s facilities.

5. AM&E Framework

To facilitate the process of incorporating AM&E into the DIB work plan, the following framework provides a template that JDTs might adapt to their project.

\textsuperscript{11} DODI 5132.14, “Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Police for the Security Cooperation Enterprise.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY-LEVEL OBJECTIVES:</th>
<th>What is the desired impact the USG and Partner Nation are seeking to achieve?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIB DESIRED OUTCOMES:</td>
<td>What new planning &amp; management products or processes must be implemented to country-level objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY OF CHANGE:</td>
<td>How are these new planning and management products or processes expected to contribute to the country-level objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATORS:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB PRODUCTS:</td>
<td>What new planning &amp; management products or processes must be created to achieve DIB desired outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY OF CHANGE:</td>
<td>How will these new planning and management products or processes result in the DIB desired outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATORS:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIB INPUTS:</td>
<td>What DOD and Partner expertise, personnel, time and commitment are required to produce and implement the DIB products?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATORS:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER USG INPUTS:</td>
<td>What additional resources are required to achieve the desired impact? (Development assistance, diplomatic engagement, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICATORS:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **The Importance of Flexibility**

Impact, outcomes, outputs, and inputs are each captured in a project work plan that also contains the AM&E framework. This work plan and AM&E framework are developed jointly with the partner at the outset of a DIB program. It is rare, however, that the initial
work plan and related AM&E framework are accurate and appropriate for the duration of a DIB program. It is highly likely that these guiding documents will need to be adjusted on a regular basis as experts and practitioners learn more about existing processes, opportunities, and barriers to change. Adjusting the work plan should be considered a positive sign that those involved in the process recognize what is effective and what is not, and adapt the plan accordingly. Moreover, the process by which work plans are constantly monitored and assessed also supports the development of partner analytical capacity, enabling partner institutions to independently evaluate and adjust future programs.

B. Observing Change

1. Documenting Existing Practices

An essential step in any AM&E exercise is to conduct an initial assessment that documents and describes current processes. This is often referred to as “baselining,” although this term may be misleading in the context of DIB because it implies that an early analysis of partner processes remains the basis for work through the life of the project. In reality, teams continually deepen their understanding of partner institutions and periodically adjust the work plan as needed. At the same time, teams are careful to avoid creating the perception that the project remains in an assessment phase. Skill building and introduction of new concepts begin early and develop a better understanding of specific challenges and opportunities for change.

In the context of DIB, an initial assessment of the partner’s management capacities within its defense institution is typically accomplished through a “scoping” phase that examines current practices, structures, tools, and relevant processes. These are documented and analyzed as part of the process to design the work plan, offering insights that may help to identify what outcomes, outputs, and ultimately inputs are required to achieve the desired impact.

2. Indicators

Designing a DIB work plan as described above effectively builds an AM&E framework into the DIB program design that is highly tailored for a specific partner. Extracting the specific inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impacts therefore produces a list of objectives or milestones that may be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. Change can be observed through indicators, which measure changes in the system that can be attributed to a given activity. Indicators are monitored throughout the lifetime of a project to assess progress toward achieving its goals.12 Due to the unique nature and complexity

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of each DIB project, a tailored AM&E framework based on the project’s objectives and baseline is of greater value than one that relies on general or universal indicators.

Indicators may be qualitative or quantitative, because both are valid ways to measure progress (see Figure 3). Using multiple indicators to demonstrate progress toward achieving a given output, outcome, or impact strengthens the case that progress is being made and reduces the chance that project implementation will be skewed by an over-reliance on individual metrics that may not fully capture the nature of the change that is desired. Partners play a key role in developing indicators, measuring progress, and defining success, as they have first-hand experience with the processes, tools, structures, or concepts in question. Partners are also the experts within their nation and are therefore essential in helping to identify constitutional, legal, or other authority constraints on actions, as well or other factors that may affect the project, such as national elections. Collecting data associated with indicators may be a time-consuming process requiring additional resources or may be cost prohibitive. JDTs must make this determination and plan accordingly in the DIB program design and work plan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Assessment</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Improved border surveillance capability.</td>
<td>• Readiness of relevant units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased contributions to regional peacekeeping operations.</td>
<td>• Number of personnel/units deployed on PKO missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Development of a strategy-driven, multi-year defense planning process.</td>
<td>• Clear statements of policy and priority to guide resource planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Budget proposals expressed in terms of capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of cost-constrained capability plan.</td>
<td>• Cost of capability plan relative to budget limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved ability to execute annual defense budget</td>
<td>• Percent of Armed Forces budget executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Budget execution as compared to spend plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved balance between investment and O&amp;M in defense budget.</td>
<td>• O&amp;M budget as percentage of defense budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Development of cost estimation tool.</td>
<td>• Database populated with data from services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Database operators identified and trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of new directive to integrate MOD and Armed Forces planning processes.</td>
<td>• Formal inclusion of joint civilian/military reviews in planning cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Approval and publication of directive</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Example Indicators

3. Observing Partner Commitment

A separate but related issue is that concerning commitment by the partner. The level of a partner’s commitment is not necessarily an indicator of program success nor does it
always equate to progress, but it is an important component for any successful DIB program. To that end, partner commitment can be considered to be necessary but not sufficient for a successful DIB program. Here are some possible indications that a partner is genuinely committed to a DIB program:

- The relevant parts of the organization in question are represented.
- Information sharing is occurring among the appropriate individuals and offices within the partner’s government.
- Participants are willing to discuss hard questions and share information needed to analyze and improve current processes.
- Participants make a reasonable effort to complete tasks between visits and overcome obstacles to change.
- Partners are applying new skills and processes.
- Senior leaders are actively providing oversight and guidance.
- Senior leaders provide the financial and human resources required to achieve the stated objectives and desired impact.
- Partners are making different choices than they were before the start of the program.
4. Conclusion

An AM&E framework must begin with a thoughtful DIB work plan that is driven by the USG’s and partner’s desired impact to the defense institution and a rigorous joint analysis of how to achieve that impact. This approach not only is a practical application of the principles outlined in FY17 NDAA but also emphasizes the role of non-DIB USG resources, including other security cooperation tools, development assistance, diplomatic engagement, etc. Most important, it emphasizes incorporating AM&E in the earliest stages of project design to ensure project objectives and the resulting AM&E framework are relevant and targeted to the partner’s context.
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This field of research employs a specific lexicon of terms to describe the various components of AM&E. Following are common terms in the AM&E lexicon:

- **Assessment**: An assessment is the initial analysis or baseline that informs project objectives and design.

- **Monitoring**: Monitoring is the practice of checking progress against agreed-upon milestones. It is performed throughout a project and facilitates continual learning and adaptation.

- **Evaluation**: Evaluation is generally conducted following the completion of a project, although evaluations may also occur at a defined mid-point. Evaluations are commonly performed by an independent/external team.

DOD has recently adopted the mnemonic acronym “SMART” to describe the attributes that security cooperation objectives should have.\(^{13}\) In the context of DIB, SMART objectives exhibit the following characteristics:

- **Specific**: Target a specific defense sector process, organization, or management domain for improvement.

- **Measurable**: Define what progress and success will look like through the use of clear objectives and indicators (qualitative and/or quantitative).

- **Achievable**: State what results can realistically be achieved, given available resources and a partner’s existing capacity.

- **Relevant**: Support USG and partner nation priorities.

- **Time Bound**: Specify when the results can be achieved. Timelines may be calendar driven (e.g., depend on the MOD’s budgeting cycle, political elections, or the start of a new administration) or may be driven by other products (e.g., development of a new strategy or concept.)

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\(^{13}\) SMART objectives were originally conceptualized by Peter Drucker in his 1954 book, *The Practice of Management* (New York, Harper and Row).
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AM&amp;E</td>
<td>Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defense Institution Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute for Defense Analyses</td>
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<td>JDT</td>
<td>Joint DIB Team</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>MOP</td>
<td>Measure of Performance</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Operational Readiness</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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References


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In response to the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requirement that all significant security cooperation programs and activities contain a program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) IDA sponsored an internally funded survey of existing literature in this field and initiated preliminary work to develop an AM&E framework for Defense Institution Building (DIB) programs. This paper describes IDA’s recommended approach to AM&E for DIB programs with emphasis on incorporating AM&E into the DIB work plan from the earliest stages of the program design process. The preponderance of existing literature on AM&E focuses on traditional development projects where measuring performance and effectiveness of programs is an established and common practice. The field of literature for AM&E of DIB activities is not as mature and the practical application of an AM&E framework is rare. The unique and highly complex nature of change in defense institutions makes AM&E a potentially challenging – but not impossible – exercise. This paper describes how DIB practitioners may approach AM&E in their fields of work. This paper supplements the academic record with a practical application of the principles outlined in FY17 NDAA and describes a method to incorporate AM&E into a DIB work plan in an observable manner.
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