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Executive Summary

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) develops the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nations' defense institutions in support of United States defense strategy, enhances allied and partner capability and capacity to manage and sustain armed forces, and contributes to broader security-sector reform (SSR) initiatives.[1] The particular assistance provided to a nation's defense institutions is agreed to between the partner nation and the United States Government (USG) and is structured around episodic engagement between subject matter experts (SMEs) and partner-nation personnel. These engagements follow an assessment of the organizational weaknesses and an agreement on establishing a roadmap for addressing the shortfalls.[2]

In 2012, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for African Affairs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations[3] authorized a defense institution building (DIB) program effort for the Republic of Guinea. Within a broader effort focused on multiple objectives, a team of SMEs assisted the Guinean defense sector in applying the principles of Capability-Based Planning (CBP) to analyze and then improve its armed forces.

The DIB effort in Guinea posed a number of challenges, some of which may be unique to Guinea and others that may be applicable to other nations with lower-capacity defense institutions. These challenges included a lack of operational and leadership experience by senior armed forces leaders; a lack of knowledge on the role, function, and operation of a defense institution; limited data availability; limited analytic capacity; and little knowledge of the current force structure.

Given the challenges, the DIB team had to adapt its CBP methodology so that it was useable and useful in the Guinean context. Some of the revisions included the modified use of basic scenarios, skipping certain analytic steps, and focusing on identifying problems that could be solved through low-cost, implementable solutions.

It was demonstrated that it is possible to adapt the CBP process to make it suitable for lower-capacity defense institutions. Methodologies can be amended or abridged to make them work in places that do not have the same capacity as the United States. However, to be successful, this approach needs to be managed carefully, leveraging the available (yet limited) resources within the partner nation, and finding those areas which they can most readily understand.

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1 Department of Defense, *Defense Institution Building (DIB)*, DoD Directive 5205.82 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 27, 2016, including Change 1, May 4, 2017), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf.

2 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI)," accessed March 6, 2018, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative.

3 Now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation

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1. Introduction

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5205.82 states, "It is Department of Defense (DOD) policy to … develop the capabilities and capacity of allied and partner nations' defense institutions in support of [United States] defense strategy."[1] Pursuant to this policy, the directive also states, "DoD will conduct Defense Institution Building (DIB) activities [to] … enhance allied and partner capability and capacity to manage and sustain armed forces [and] … contribute to broader security-sector reform [SSR] initiatives, including in fragile, transitioning, or post-conflict venues."[2] DIB activities are funded through budgets allotted to multiple DOD programs managed by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).[3] Of these programs, the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI) program develops effective partner defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ national forces.

DSCA, through its management of the DIRI program, develops partner defense establishments by assembling DIB teams comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs). These SMEs tend to be multidisciplinary and work with partner nation personnel, through episodic engagement, to assess organizational weaknesses and establish a roadmap for addressing the shortfalls.[4] In 2012, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for African Affairs and the DASD for Partnership Strategies and Stability Operations (now the DASD for Security Cooperation), authorized a DIRI program effort[5] for the Republic of Guinea.

In January 2013, a DIB team went to Guinea to scope the assistance effort. The team concluded the most immediate needs that could be feasibly addressed would be to assist the Guinean Ministry of Defence (MoD) in developing a National Defense Strategy (NDS) and then to determine the mix of capabilities the force structure would require to implement

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1 Department of Defense, *Defense Institution Building (DIB)*, DoD Directive 5205.82 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 27, 2016, including Change 1, May 4, 2017), 3, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. 7. DODD 5205.82 delegates program management of DIB program to DSCA. DIB programs are listed at Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Defense Institution Building," accessed March 6, 2018, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/institutional-programs.

4 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (DIRI)," accessed March 6, 2018, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative.

5 Today, DSCA outsources management of many of the DIB programs it has responsibility for (including DIRI) to the Defense Governance and Management Team at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil Military Relations in Monterey, CA.

the strategy. To that end, the following primary and secondary objectives and their associated outputs were agreed between Guinea and the United States Government (USG) for the DIRI effort:

- Primary objectives
  - Increase the MoD's capability to develop its own national defense policy and strategy
  - Increase the MoD's ability to conduct its own force planning using a capability-based approach
  - Institutionalize enduring policy and strategy development and force planning processes within the MoD
- Secondary objectives
  - Develop the ability within the MoD to contribute meaningfully, in collaboration with other ministries and national leaders, to the development of a Guinean National Security Strategy (NSS)
  - Inculcate within the military a culture of reform and responsiveness to civilian control
- Outputs
  - Develop an NDS
  - Develop a capability-based force plan that guides the development of Guinean Armed Forces' capabilities necessary to implement the strategy
  - Increase the civilian executive's ability to govern the defense sector (i.e., increase civilian control of the military)
  - Develop and distribute the NSS

The primary focus of this paper is to describe the DIRI team's attempts to increase the MoD's ability to conduct its own force planning using a capability-based approach, the challenges encountered in doing so, and the methods adopted to overcome those challenges.

2. Background

Guinea is a poor nation in West Africa with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $500 United States Dollars (USD)[6] and a population of approximately 12.4 million. The country has abundant sources of potential wealth in mineral deposits; however, poor governance has plagued the nation since its independence from France in 1958, and its defense sector reflects that experience. From the Republic's founding until 2010, Guinea was ruled by a series of autocratic leaders.

Following a series of military coups and violent events in 2008 and 2009, including a military rampage that led to more than 150 fatalities,[7] the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) persuaded the Guinean leadership to embark on a process of reform. Among these reforms was the end of military control of the government—to be replaced by civilian, democratic control of the state, and an internationally sponsored SSR program. Mindful of the history of violence and authoritarian military rule, the USG agreed to participate in the SSR effort.

The USG provided $5.6 million in assistance to support SSR efforts and deliver direct assistance to reestablish Guinea's ability to participate in peacekeeping operations.[8] Furthermore, DIB efforts were authorized and tied to support for SSR and the sustainment of Guinean peacekeeping capabilities.

Given the two tasks of supporting SSR and sustaining peacekeeping capabilities, the development of a defense strategy was a logical starting point for the USG-sponsored DIB effort. With a new and evolving vision for the armed forces coming out of the SSR effort, Capability-Based Planning (CBP) seemed to be a logical approach to (1) translate the security and defense strategies into required capabilities, (2) prompt force and budget planning to build those capabilities, and (3) support USG and other international efforts to

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6 United Nations Development Programme, "Guinea," accessed December 22, 2017, http://www.microsofttranslator.com/bv.aspx?from=fr&to=en&a=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gn.undp.org%2Fcontent%2Fguinea%2Ffr%2Fhome%2Fcountryinfo.

7 Adam Nossiter, "Guinea's Capital Fades into a Ghost Town after Soldiers' Rampage," *New York Times*, September 29, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/africa/30guinea.html.

8 U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations With Guinea," accessed December 24, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2824.htm.

build peacekeeping capabilities under the assumption that the NSS and NDS would point to a need for peacekeeping.

The principal Guinean organization involved in these efforts was the MoD's Technical Committee for Security/Defense (Comité Technique Sectoriel/Défense (CTS/D)). The CTS/D is an organization of senior military members who have skills in strategy development. It was also the principal beneficiary of USG-sponsored DIB efforts.

The next three chapters will describe the standard CBP methodology to which the team referred when the work began, the challenges and opportunities that the DIB team experienced while working with its Guinean counterparts, and how CBP methodology changed in response to the Guinean context.

3. Standard CBP Methodology

A. Overview

A generally accepted notion is that democratic nations that employ armed forces must create and maintain armed forces that have the ability to achieve national policy objectives. Force planning is the process associated with creating and maintaining capable armed forces. CBP is a method of force planning that considers how to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.[9] More simply put, a capability-based force plan is an affordable plan to build a force structure suitable for multiple contingencies, not just a singularly distinctive threat. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) has built up a methodology its DIB teams use to explain and impart principles and concepts of CBP to foreign defense institutions that need to improve or create their own force planning capability.[10,11]

The purpose of force planning is to determine whether planned military capabilities (those in service now and those planned to be in service) are sufficient to meet national objectives. If these capabilities are not sufficient, force planners must identify the shortfalls, assess options for improvement, and propose solutions that will change the force structure from what it is to what the planning staff believes it needs to become. CBP relies upon prioritized policy guidance and applicable operational concepts and doctrine to assess the sufficiency and ability of the force structure to satisfy the defense policy objectives of the Defense Minister and other relevant national leaders. Military units are the building blocks of any armed forces' structure. Therefore, CBP assesses units' ability to achieve objectives. This assessment is individual (e.g., a single unit) and collective (e.g., a task force).

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[9] Paul K. Davis, *Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and Transformation*, MR-1513-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2002), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1513.pdf.

[10] For example; see Patrick A. Goodman, Martin Neill, Wade P. Hinke, and Kongdan Oh Hassig, *Observations on the Republic of Korea Force Requirements Verification System*, IDA Publication D-5044 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, October 2013), Chapter 2, Section E.

[11] See also, IDA Publications D-4021, *Defense Resource Management Studies: Introduction to Capability and Acquisition Planning Processes*; D-5729, *Defense Management Course, Office of Defense Cooperation, Jakarta, 9-20 November 2015*; and P-8405, *International Best Practice for Mission-Oriented Defense Resource Management*; (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses).

The purpose of this paper is not to provide a detailed description of international force planning practices or of IDA's CBP methodology. However, providing a succinct explanation of IDA methodology is necessary to be able to describe how and why our methodology changed while working in Guinea.

Before briefly describing CBP, we have to address inputs to CBP that are critical to its success. Three of these inputs are worth mentioning:

- **Scenarios.** The role of a scenario is to provide a common framework for analysis to support decision making that is consistent with current government policy. The connection to current policy is vital to ensure the scenario is relevant to the future challenges the current government wants the armed forces to be able to undertake. A scenario should represent the joint environment and should not advocate for a particular military service component, capability, or solution. It should provide the context to address levels of warfare—from the strategic through the operational down to the tactical[12].
- **Concepts.** A concept should describe how the armed forces may operate in response to the military challenges described by the scenario or scenarios being analyzed during a round of force planning. From a concept, the capabilities (or means to operate) should be derived. These capabilities are those that should be carried forward into force planning when the force structure is assessed for its ability to operate in accordance with the concept(s) being analyzed.
- **Capability taxonomy.** A capability taxonomy provides a common language for comparing individual military service contributions to joint warfighting and enterprise support. A taxonomy enables a discussion about capabilities across the defense enterprise.

B. CBP

In its simplest form, IDA describes CBP in six steps[13]:

1. Conduct mission area analysis,
2. Apportion military units to accomplish those missions,
3. Assess the readiness of the units to provide the capability,

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[12] For more on construction and use of planning scenarios, see IDA Publications D-5665, *Scenarios – International Best Practice: An Analysis of Their Use by the United States, United Kingdom, and Republic of Korea*; D-5434, *Defense Planning Scenarios: Best Practice and International Comparison*; and NS-P-5350, *Defense Governance and Management: Improving the Defense Management Capabilities of Foreign Defense Institutions, Defense Policy and Strategy Development for Foreign Defense Institutions;* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses).

[13] See D-4021 supra. and D-5729, supra.

4. Identify meaningful gaps,
5. Prioritize gaps, and
6. Develop capability proposals.

1. Construct Mission Area Framework

Based on input from defense policy makers, national defense or military strategy, and other national level defense or security guidance, mission area analysis defines in operational terms what the armed forces are expected to do for the nation. Each area of expectation is referred to as a mission area. For example, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) may be an armed forces mission area because it is expected that the armed forces will be called upon to provide relief in extremis to the civilian population when that population faces privation from catastrophic events.

Once defined, each mission area needs to be decomposed into capability areas and capability subareas. The output of mission area analysis is a mission area assessment framework for each mission area, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Mission Area Assessment Framework

Mission Area	Capability Areas[14]	Capability Subareas[15]
HADR	Austere Airfield Opening	Aerial Port
		Engineer Construction
		Tactical Airlift
		Airfield Operations
	Humanitarian Operations	Bulk Water Supply
		Field Kitchen
		Engineer Construction
	Medical Operations	Field Medical Support
		Tactical Airlift

2. Apportion Military Units to Accomplish Those Missions

Using the current or planned force structure, the next step is to allocate applicable military units (i.e., those units that possess the capability) to each capability subarea in the mission area assessment framework. Normally, an individual military unit is not mapped to more than one capability subarea unless planners know the unit can be disaggregated or

[14] Analogous to the U.S. concept of Joint Capability Areas. See Joint Publication-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, Incorporating Change 1, 12 July 2017, Chapter II(2)(a)

[15] Can also be thought of as functional capabilities; see D-4021, supra, pages 2-6 to 2-13

unless the planners either know or assume certain capabilities are not used simultaneously. Units should be apportioned by unit name. If none of the units in the force structure are able to provide a capability listed in the mission area assessment framework, the field should be left blank. Table 2 provides an illustrative example of step 2.

Table 2. Apportioned Units by Unit Name

Mission Area	Capability Areas	Capability Subareas	Apportioned Unit Name
HADR	Airfield Opening	Aerial Port Operations	1st Aerial Port Squadron
		Engineer Construction	1st Horizontal Construction Flt
		Tactical Airlift	128th Tactical Airlift Sq
		Airfield Operations	1st Operations Support Flt
	Humanitarian Relief Operations	Bulk Water Supply	1st Water Production Flt
		Field Kitchen	3rd Mission Support Flt
		Engineer Construction	1st Vertical Construction Flt
	Field Medical Operations	Field Medical Unit	3rd Field Hospital
		Tactical Airlift	129th Tactical Airlift Sq

3. Assess the Readiness of the Units to Provide the Capability

The capacity of each unit to provide the capability to which it is mapped in the mission area framework must be assessed. A proxy measure for capacity is readiness. In this case, the question is, how ready is the unit to provide the capability against which it is mapped within the specific mission area scenario and the concept of operations used by force planners to conduct their analyses? The readiness rating of the unit is added to the framework (see Table 3).

Table 3. Complete Mission Area Assessment Framework

Mission Area	Capability Areas	Capability Subareas	Apportioned Unit Name	Readiness Rate (%)
HADR	Airfield Opening	Aerial Port Operations	1st Aerial Port Squadron	90
		Engineer Construction	1st Horizontal Construction Flt	90
		Tactical Airlift	128th Tactical Airlift Sq	50
		Airfield Operations	1st Operations Support Flt	65
	Humanitarian Relief Operations	Bulk Water Supply	1st Water Production Flt	25
		Field Kitchen	3rd Mission Support Flt	25
		Engineer Construction	1st Vertical Construction Flt	90
	Field Medical Operations	Field Medical Unit	3rd Field Hospital	60
		Tactical Airlift	129th Tactical Airlift Sq	85

4. Identify Meaningful Gaps

Capability gaps come in three types:

- **Type 1.** No units of the type needed are available (relevance gap).
- **Type 2.** Not enough units of the type needed are available (sufficiency gap).
- **Type 3.** Inadequate readiness of the units that are available (readiness of sustainability gap).

Generally, all type 1 and type 2 capability gaps are meaningful because they represent limited or no capacity to provide the capability in the mission area being analyzed.

A readiness gap (type 3) may or may not be meaningful. For example, planners may determine that a unit assessed at 70 percent readiness will be capable of performing well enough to accomplish the overall mission objective in the scenario and concept under analyses. Therefore, it is not a meaningful gap. However, a unit at 60 percent readiness may be assessed as not being able to perform well enough. Therefore, it is a meaningful gap. All meaningful gaps are carried forward to the next step in CBP.

5. Prioritize Gaps

Once all of the meaningful gaps have been identified, the force planners need to produce a prioritized list of those gaps. The prioritization should be based on two considerations: first, the risk that the gap poses to the mission area being analyzed; second, the relative importance of the mission area as articulated by national strategy or defense policy guidance. This prioritized gap list should be approved by a senior defense official, such as the Chief of Defense (CHOD) or the Minister of Defense. Once approved, the prioritized list is a key input for developing proposals to close the gaps.

6. Develop Capability Proposals

Capability proposals are options to close prioritized gaps. These proposals can be a combination of material (i.e., capital equipment and infrastructure) and non-material (i.e., more resources for supplies, maintenance, and training) solutions. For each gap, a generally accepted practice is that three proposals should be developed and that at least one proposal should rely only on non-material solutions. The point of a proposal is not necessarily to close 100 percent of the gap identified. Rather, it is to propose a solution that improves the capability of the force structure and provides decisions makers tradeoffs between cost and capability.

For this reason, cost analysis is an essential capability inside the CBP process because the cost analysts are the ones who produce cost estimates of capability proposals. While budget-level detail is not required during CBP, the proposals offered must be affordable,

or they cannot be implemented. Once the capability planning proposals have been completed, they should be provided to senior leaders for approval of preferred options.

The next chapter will describe the challenges confronted by the DIB team when it tried to explain and impart CBP methodology to the Guinean Defense Sector.

4. Challenges and Opportunities

As mentioned earlier, DIB teams assess organizational weaknesses and then work with partner nations to establish a roadmap to address the shortfalls. Guinea's structural weaknesses presented challenges to the implementation of their roadmap). Among these challenges were the following:

- **Lack of operational and leadership experience.** The armed forces of Guinea were severely restricted following the violent events of 2009. Furthermore, even though Guinea had once sent peacekeeping troops to the Belgian Congo crisis in the early 1960s and later to Sierra Leone, Benin, and Liberia,[16] few active members had any experience in Peacekeeping Operations, which was envisioned by the security and defense strategies as a key mission area of the armed forces.

- **Lack of knowledge on the role, function, and operation of a defense institution.** The military leadership had considerable exposure to the military concepts of its historic donor nations (China, France, United States, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)). However, most experienced Guinean officers were called up to perform non-military functions—in essence, to run the country. For example, one CTS/D member had once served as the Minister of Agriculture.

- **The military lacked the analytical tools and the data to perform the type of analysis required by CBP.** Creating a force structure that can achieve policy objectives requires an understanding of the capability each unit (battalion, company, and so forth) brings to operations. However, since the armed forces did not know what capabilities existed within its force structure, neither the Guineans nor the DIB team had the ability to develop a baseline force assessment. This posed an analytical challenge: how to develop an analytical framework for a defense institution that cannot assess its baseline force.

- **Data were either not available or difficult to access.** Unit performance evaluations did not exist. Budgetary data or data on equipment status or maintenance

[16] International Crisis Group, *Guinea: Reforming the Army*, Africa Report N° 164 (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 23 September 2010, 3, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/164-guinea-reforming-the-army.pdf.

rates either did not exist or were collected by one individual, inconsistently maintained, and often not available electronically. While the SSR process worked on overarching issues, such as transparency and rule of law, it did not develop much in a practical way to connect the NSS and NDS to concrete actions that would enable the armed forces to achieve the objectives of these national policy documents. For that reason, requests such as maintenance and training rates came first from the DIB team and often had to be created or exploited for analyses by DIB SMEs.

- **Limited evaluation of what the current force structure was or what it was capable of doing.** A positive result of the SSR process included moving many troops out of the capital and placing them in a better location to carry out their tasks and to reduce the potential for violent or unproductive interactions with the civilian population. For example, Army units were supposed to move and posture themselves to defend the borders. However, whether they did move to the border or could actually defend the border was unknown. It was known that the military performed administrative functions, but its defense and/or security abilities were not understood.
- **The Guinean team did little work between visits of DIB team.** The CTS/D was the DIB team's primary point of contact, but its roles and functions were greater than supporting specific defense reforms carried out under the DIB effort. The staff members of the CTS/D were the primary defense sector contributors to the SSR process. They were responsible for drafting the defense strategy but also had other work as assigned. Hence, the CTS/D did not do much of the work requested by the DIB team between visits. The natural consequence was that work on defense reform was slow.
- **Project timeline uncertainty.** The USG's support for the project, in terms of length, was unclear. The working understanding was that at two years the project would be considered for renewal, but the terms and conditions of that renewal were unclear.

Several opportunities were available to support and enhance the DIB work:

- **Following the SSR effort and the general upbeat political theme.** The DIB team was fortunate to follow the SSR effort since this effort introduced some of the concepts developed further in CBP. In general, the political situation was positive, and many international partners were encouraging the government of Guinea to continue with its reform efforts.
- **Good sponsor.** The principal sponsor was General Aboubacar Sidiki Camara, the senior military leader in Guinea, or CHOD. He understood what the DIB team was proposing, the need to engage with the United States, and the power of

moving reform forward. Most importantly, he was responsible for personnel changes within the armed forces that benefited the work. He ensured continuity of personnel throughout the project and enabled the DIB team members to meet with specific members from various defense offices.

- **Partner office.** The CTS/D was an existing organization headed by a Brigadier General. It was created to support the SSR process but also served as a credible and appropriate DIB sponsor during our visits. In some countries that have been or are the recipient of USG-sponsored DIB assistance, working groups or principal offices (rather than a reform office) do work in the interim between visits.
- **Embassy support.** The U.S. Ambassador was interested in the workings of the DIB team and was updated regularly. In addition, the USG hired a contractor to advise Guinea on SSR matters, and she was vital in connecting the DIB team to some major players in the capital.

Finally, there were several efforts to use these opportunities and to mitigate challenges:

- **DIB outreach.** To overcome the lack of operational experience, the DIB team had visitors discuss their understanding of operational concepts and invited guest speakers, such as the ECOWAS Special Envoy to Guinea, a Senegalese strategy expert, and the UN Representative for SSR, who had operational experience. The Guinean military had a few useful experts, including the former commander of peacekeeping battalion in Mali and members of the engineering battalion, and these people were also invited to share their insights with the CTS/D.
- **Disease outbreak.** The Ebola outbreak of 2014 served to increase the credibility of the DIB team because it continued the work despite the conditions. The DIB team also had an opportunity during the outbreak to provide a demonstration of an Incident Command System (ICS), a simple UN-approved tool for coordinating interagency command and control (C2) during emergency responses.
- **Senior leadership involvement.** The senior leadership became invested in the process. Many mid-grade officers also flowed through the CTS/D and were exposed to DIB ideas. Due to the constant officer corps turnover, the SMEs constantly and consistently had to explain what had been done, what was going to be done, and what the end goals were. While frustrating, the repetition provided opportunity to educate many members of the officer corps.

Given these challenges, the DIB team revised its CBP methodology and created a process suitable for lower capacity countries.

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5. Revised CBP for Guinea

As applied in Guinea, IDA's CBP methodology required adjustment to account for the context. Specifically,

- The DIB team refocused the framework of analysis away from a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the baseline force.
- Analysis was delinked from force readiness and the ability of specific units to provide capability.
- The analysis focused on filling crosscutting gaps in total force capability.

These adjustments were made in four ways: changes to CBP methodology, simplified use of scenarios, overcoming lack of reliable data, and finding cross-cutting, affordable and implementable solutions.

- **Changes to CBP methodology.** Assessing the six steps referred to in Chapter 3, DIB SMEs adjusted these steps according to the context, ultimately creating a new approach for teaching CBP to a lower capacity armed force. In the discussion that follows, each step is addressed, beginning with a statement of whether it was undertaken in Guinea (i.e., "Yes," "No," or "Limited").
  - Construct mission area framework
    - Yes. The DIB team constructed a mission area framework with its principal partner, the CTS/D. Constructing the framework was a useful way of reminding the CTS/D of the military's core roles and functions. Despite the prior SSR work, which had covered some of these concepts, the integrity of the analysis became suspect as the team moved to capability subareas. The subareas were logical, but they were still notional to a military that did not conduct complex missions. This notional perception was an early indicator that the military was simply not accustomed to conducting operations.
  - Apportion military units
    - No. As noted, the force structure was mostly administrative, with a rough accounting of manpower that could only infer unit capability. Rather than attempting to apportion existing units to the mission area framework, the DIB team worked with CTS/D to create a template to

typify those units that might do the tasks implied by the sub- capability areas in the mission area framework.

- Assess the readiness of the units to provide capability
  - Limited. Since Guinea does not employ unit readiness reporting, the DIB team used other means to determine a level of readiness. The team first discerned potential unit capability from a snapshot of personnel and key equipment (aircraft, boats, vehicles, radios, and weapons) assigned to units. To discern unit readiness, the team conducted interviews with key staff officers, logisticians, and commanders. These interviews, along with the data on unit resources, gave the team insight into the capability of maneuver units concerning their ability to shoot, move, and communicate; the capability of combat support units to perform functions such as C2; and the capability of combat service support units to provide logistics functions. The team also used recent budgetary and expenditure data to gain insights into equipment readiness. For example, annual fuel allocations provided an understanding of how vehicles, aircraft and boats were used.
- Identify meaningful gaps
  - Yes. However, gap analysis was conducted at the military service level rather than at a joint level of warfare because it was not possible.
- Prioritize gaps
  - Yes but…prioritized gaps were not tied to specific units but to unit types (e.g., infantry battalions). Excess force structure, such as a preponderance of aging, largely useless Soviet equipment, was also identified, but how to deal with excess capacity was not addressed during the DIB project. In another round of work, dealing with excess capacity would have been a good place to suggest tradeoffs that would help to close identified gaps.
- Develop capability proposals
  - Yes. The CTS/D focused on basic skills rather than strategic tradeoffs for the military and identified three functional areas (logistics, training, and command, control, and communication (C3)) that could be improved. The proposed solutions were cost informed by examining the rough-order cost of solutions as a percentage of annual operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures.

- **Simplified use of scenarios.** Scenarios and operating concepts create a common framework for analysis, support decision making, and provide context for

capability assessment. However, in Guinea, the armed forces did not have any scenarios or operating concepts. The intent was to use the six mission areas agreed to by the CTS/D and analyze each with its own scenario. However, the Guineans assigned to the working groups lacked the operational experience needed to develop their own scenarios or operating concepts. To compensate, the DIB team helped the CTS/D and other members of the Guinean defense sector analyze an improvised scenario and operating concept focused on territorial defense. Then, the subsequent analysis was limited to the armed forces' ability to shoot, move, and communicate.

- **Overcoming lack of reliable data.** Although some solid data collection habits were in place, Guinea did not have the tools to analyze data and use these data to conduct planning. Serious data collection began half way through the two year project, with the addition of a resource management expert to the DIB team. This SME conducted a yearlong data collection effort that looked at inventory related to shoot-move-communicate and the limited to non-existent readiness data. These data were then used to help develop rough-order, costed capability solutions. The late addition of the data effort worked well since the construction of the analytical framework took some time. While data were insufficient to attempt detailed force structure analysis or to inform strategic level decision making, these data were adequate for analyzing deficiencies in the key areas identified by CTS/D (logistics, training, and C3). Rough-order costs of capability solutions were fairly easy to produce since the fixes were fundamental and required few inputs.

  Another way the lack of reliable data was overcome was to go outside the CTS/D and the immediate CBP working groups CTS/D had put together. On request, an auxiliary group of officers from active work centers was formed. The information from this group of officers allowed the DIB team to get needed data and some additional operational perspective from sources that, while not formal, were still valuable given the context.

- **Finding cross-cutting, affordable, and implementable solutions.** After gaps related to the basic infantry task of shoot-move-communicate were identified and status of operations and maintenance was created, the CTS/D moved to solutions. Proposals to close gaps were developed using feasibility criteria and an assessment of whether these gaps closed some or the entire gap and included a narrative of pros and cons. From these proposals, the team developed cost estimates for each proposal, using its own data, SME analysis, and international standards. CTS/D divided itself into three working groups, matching the three functional areas (logistics, training, and C3). Most of the solutions were cross-cutting (imparting improvement to several mission areas) and were cost

informed by examining the rough-order cost of a particular solution as a percentage of its O&M expenditures. The estimated recurring cost of all draft solutions was under 1.5 percent of O&M expenditures. The solutions included implementing plans that assigned tasks to be executed over a defined time frame, with metrics and addressed the basics of who, what, where, when and how.

A more robust round of CBP might have been useful in Guinea because the military needed to be recapitalized, professionalized, and restructured. However, applying the existing CBP methodology to the Guinean military would have been a long project and, without prospects of funding, probably futile. By adjusting the methodology and overall goals, the DIB team was able to effect some positive change consistent with the overall objectives of the project.

6. Outcomes

A number of outcomes resulted from the work in Guinea. Some of these outcomes may be specific to Guinea, and some will transfer to other lower capacity nations.

CBP is scalable for use in lower capability defense institutions. This work has demonstrated that CBP methodology can be adapted for use where the capability within an MoD is limited and where the amount of available data is limited. To make changes to the methodology, understanding the knowledge and experience of the individuals assigned to work CBP was important. This enables the DIB team to identify those CBP steps that were going to be the most useful and those likely to be the most challenging.

A **revised CBP process** was developed. This new process was taken from the existing methodology. It relied on less data, allowed for more assumptions when conducting certain steps, and skipped certain steps. As stated previously, the identification of which steps to undertake or to skip was based on the DIB team's understanding of the participant's knowledge and experience. The model used in Guinea could possibly be used in other countries that have similar issues, but the key lesson is that CBP can successfully be applied to meet particular requirements.

A **cadre of personnel** who understand the revised CBP process and would be able to repeat, revise, and enhance the process in the future is needed. Within Guinea, it was the CTS/D cadre who had previously been assembled and tasked with tackling a number of defense issues, such as drafting an NDS. Upon completion of the DIB work, the expectation was that CTS/D would continue to oversee implementation of the capability solutions.

The Delegate Defense Minister credited the work of the CTS/D in bringing critical assessment and strategy development skills to the MoD. For that reason, he designated the CTS/D, which was supposed to disband in 2017 when the SSR process culminated, as a permanent body. Using the skills and tools developed with the support of the DIB team, the permanent CTS/D can serve as a center of excellence within the MoD.

Despite the limited access to data, a concerted effort by the U.S. SME, in partnership with some Guinean officers, led to a robust and useable data set in key areas. These new data helped to correctly identify the causes of the issues (e.g., a lack of radios was actually a lack of proper maintenance of the radios and their batteries).

The project resulted in a set of cross-cutting and implementable options, which, if pursued, should improve the quality of the Guinean Armed Forces. Identifying options that

had the greatest effect or relevance across multiple mission areas helped to ensure that the limited budget was focused on the right areas. By getting the Guinean working groups to examine the applicability of each solution to the other mission areas (even without detailed analysis), it was possible to identify cross-cutting solutions.

The approved capability solutions were low cost. Guinea's budget does not provide adequate funds to improve its armed forces, so it was important to identify solutions that were low cost. As a result, the DIB team and the working groups focused on changes in doctrine and training. We also expect this approach will make the implementation of the solutions more likely. For example, to address a lack of C2, the recommended solution was to conduct regular command post exercises for the most likely missions that the Guinean Armed Forces would undertake. Further, spending more money on training their mechanics would be a less costly alternative than purchasing more spare parts to keep their vehicles in working condition.

7. Lessons Identified

A number of lessons were identified that will either apply to future efforts at capacity building in lower capability defense institutions or to other DIB efforts.

- **Use all the available resources, especially knowledge from elsewhere within the armed forces.** In Guinea's case, the lack of operational experience meant drawing upon a wider circle of individuals than those assigned to work with the DIB team. Those individuals who had most recently participated in regional peacekeeping as part of an international mission were invited to discuss their experiences and their understanding of operational concepts. These discussions brought essential operational experience and perspectives to the challenges facing Guinea's armed forces.
- **Use methodology as a reference not a map.** The DIB team identified that little would be gained from spending long periods working through different scenarios and attempting to apportion units to missions and tasks in accordance with standard CBP methodology. Instead, a simple but credible scenario (see Appendix A) was developed, which enabled Guinea to focus on the following:
  - How would it learn of a territorial breach?
  - Who would it deploy to respond?
  - How will it deploy?
  - What will it do when potential combatants arrive?
  - How will the troops be sustained during the period?

  The answers to these questions do not require detailed operational experience. They only require a limited understanding of how the armed forces are constructed and how their broad capabilities can be employed. Initially, a large list of shortcomings will be generated; however, by focusing on effect and likelihood, these shortcomings can be trimmed quickly. In Guinea's case, this small set of questions enabled the team to understand quickly that communication (radios and processes), lethality (marksmanship), and logistics were its primary gaps.
- **Working with limited data can still lead to successful outcomes.** Access to data is a problem in many nations. In Guinea's case, the available data were not

centrally located or managed. Rather, these data were dispersed throughout numerous offices, each of which managed information for very specific purposes. To address data management, an auxiliary working group was created and given the responsibility of getting the necessary information from wherever it was located within the armed forces. To accomplish this information-gathering task, the auxiliary group visited various offices and individuals in the pursuit of data. In this endeavor, we found that assembling information from disparate sources (logistics, personnel, and budget) resulted in unit insights that were previously unknown. This group was largely comprised of junior officers (below the rank of Major). Identifying the lack of access to data earlier in the project would have been helpful and has resulted in a recommendation that future teams address this lack of data access early in their project.

- **DIB teams need sufficient time to assess the context and environment in which work is to be performed before diving into specific reform efforts.** The DIB team in Guinea did not know the background, experience, or capability of the individuals assigned before specific DIB project work began. It was clear that the majority of the attendees had international training (France, China, Russia, and the United States). However, we did not know beforehand that virtually none of these individuals had any operational or command experience. Identifying this lack of operational or command experience before project work began would have prompted the team to modify the CBP methodology earlier rather than discovering these truths through the analysis and development of scenarios and operational concepts. If no time or insufficient time is provided for assessment, the DIB team should not to commit to any specific work plan until the background and experience of its partner nation counterparts is understood.
- **Learn about other major initiatives underway in the defense sector and look for synergies with the DIB project.** The UN SSR process was underway in Guinea when the DIB team arrived. During the DIB work, some complementary aspects of the SSR process and the DIB work were discovered. For example, the SSR process identified the need to move large numbers of soldiers out of the capital city for security reasons. CBP identified that no suitable training areas were available for basic marksmanship. Identifying such synergies and then packaging them together could have led to more effective and efficient decision making. However, this is only possible if the DIB team is given access to personnel in the defense sector who are not specifically identified as being part of the DIB effort and if the DIB team is given the time to assess or investigate whether and how complementary efforts could be developed as part of a DIB project plan.

- **Augment established DIB teams with SMEs for specific and limited purposes as the need arises.** The DIB team in Guinea had the trust of the CTS/D and the other members of the working groups with whom it interacted. The DIB team definitely benefited by the addition of a third SME, who was focused on obtaining data to support the analysis. This DIB team member joined about halfway through the project and only as it became clear that a lack of reliable data was going to be an issue. This focused augmentation of the DIB team was highly effective.

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8. Conclusion

The conclusion of this work should be viewed through two lenses: the first on how it affected Guinea and the second on the wider effect of working with lower capacity defense institutions.

As stated previously, Guinea and the USG had agreed on primary and secondary objectives and projected outputs:

- Primary objectives
  - Increase the MoD's capability to develop its own national defense policy and strategy
  - Increase the MoD's ability to conduct its own force planning using a capability-based approach
  - Institutionalize enduring policy and strategy development and force planning processes within the MoD
- Secondary objectives
  - Develop the ability within the MoD to contribute meaningfully, in collaboration with other ministries and national leaders, to the development of a Guinean National Security Strategy (NSS)
  - Inculcate within the military a culture of reform and responsiveness to civilian control
- Outputs
  - Develop an NDS
  - Develop a capability-based force plan that guides the development of Guinean Armed Forces' capabilities necessary to implement the strategy
  - Increase the civilian executive's ability to govern the defense sector (i.e., increase civilian control of the military)
  - Develop and distribute the NSS

Through the focus on CBP, the rise in capability of the CTS/D as a result of this work and its change of status to a standing body, we can conclude that some institutionalization of the CBP process took place. Lastly, the approach of CTS/D and the Guinean Armed

Forces to this work clearly demonstrated their willingness to reform under civilian leadership.

In the spectrum of lower capacity defense institutions in the world, Guinea is likely to be among the lowest. Therefore, a reasonable assertion is that what worked in Guinea is likely to work in other lower capacity defense institutions, albeit with some modifications for each specific nation. This work also demonstrated that it is possible to modify the CBP process to make it suitable for low-capacity defense institutions. This needs to be done carefully, leveraging the available (yet limited) resources within the partner nation and finding those areas that they can most readily understand. The focus should remain on identifying a process that is suitable and that does not rigidly follow standard methodology. The materials and issues discussed in this paper, coupled with the slides in Appendix A, should provide other DIB teams a good reference for any future work with a low-capacity defense institution.

Appendix A.
Scenario and Operating Concept

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Guinean Scenario: Territorial Integrity

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Introduction

- What are scenarios?
  - Scenarios are narratives of future environments and how these events might unfold and require a defense or security sector response
- What are mission areas?
  - Mission areas are the highest order grouping of the activities charged to the defense and security sector
  - Mission areas are necessary in the formulation of resource management process assessments
  - Mission areas are evaluated against each of the scenarios, although not all mission areas apply to all scenarios
  - Shortcomings in mission areas in the context of the scenarios become the basis for operational challenges

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Operational Challenges

- What is an operational challenge?
  - An operational challenge exists when a scenario stresses the available or planned force structure to an unacceptable level of concern in one or more mission areas
  - The challenge may exist for the entire force or only a portion of the force
  - The challenge may not be a problem for all scenarios or all mission areas being evaluated
  - Some suggested potential challenges are included at the end of the presentation

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Territorial Integrity: Context

- Tensions have been increasing between Guinea and neighboring Country A
- Country A has been conducting military exercises at its border with Guinea
- An army company from Country A crosses the border and advances several kilometers into Guinea
- Country A claims that the company was in pursuit of insurgents
- Shots are fired in the area and result in civilian casualties

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Territorial Integrity: Strategic and Military Goals

- Strategic goals
  - Restore territorial integrity
  - Protect civilian populations
- Military goals
  - Halt the advance of the army company from Country A
  - Find, disarm, and confine any insurgents
  - Control and secure the border
  - Protect and bring aid to the civilian population

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Territorial Integrity: Assumptions

- Border violation was intentional
- Insurgents are not hostile to Guinea
- The invading army company from Country A intends to pursue the insurgents and conduct acts of sabotage against Guinea
- Response will be purely Guinean
- Country A does not have international support
- The theater of operations is limited to the national territory
- Operation is limited to 30 days

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Territorial Integrity: Situational Awareness

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Territorial Integrity: Concept

- Mission
  - The Guinean Army will deploy forces to halt and repel the attackers, protect the population, and restore territorial integrity. Guinean Air and Naval forces will support the Army as necessary
- Concept of operations
  - Operating in a joint framework and under the command of a commander of operations, the Guinean Armed Forces will carry out a mission to restore territorial integrity on the southwest border of the country for a period of 30 days
  - Mission objectives include halting and repelling attackers, securing and controlling the border, and protecting the affected population
  - Tasks include organizing patrols, protecting infrastructure, setting up checkpoints and support points, and conducting offensive operations
  - The Navy and the Air Force will operate in support of the Army as required, but there are no direct air or maritime threats

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Simple Sketch of Operational Concept



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Potential Challenges

- Logistics
  - Ability to sustain forces at distance (water, food, fuel, ammunition, and so forth)
  - Stockpiles, vehicles, infrastructure, and so forth
- Command, control, and communications (C3)
  - Ability to communicate between entities
  - Clarity of command chain from the highest to the lowest levels
  - Leadership in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks
- Training
  - Frequency and duration of training
  - Individual and collective training
  - Conduct live firing

Appendix B.
Illustrations

Tables

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Appendix C.
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Appendix D.
Abbreviations

AU	African Union
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communication
CBP	Capability-Based Planning
CHOD	Chief of Defense
CTS/D	Comité Technique Sectoriel/Défense (Technical Committee for Security/Defense)
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DIB	Defense Institution Building
DIRI	Defense Institutional Reform Initiative
DOD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
Flt	Fleet
GDP	gross domestic product
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
ICS	Incident Command System
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
O&M	operations and maintenance
SME	subject matter expert
Sq	Squadron
SSR	security-sector reform
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
USD	United States Dollars
USG	United States Government
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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14. ABSTRACT

Not every nation's defense institutions have the capacity, need, or desire to undertake capability-based planning according to the best practices of the United States or other advanced militaries. This paper summarizes the efforts, challenges, opportunities, and outcomes of applying a revised capability-based planning methodology in the Republic of Guinea. It defines a revised capability-based planning process, which not only worked in Guinea, but may be transferable to other lower-capacity defense institutions.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Capability based planning, lower capacity defense institutions, Guinea, Defense Institution Building, Africa, Security Sector Reform

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